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States’ membership in energy Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs): trade, alliances and regulation

Lenzi, Veronica (2013) States’ membership in energy Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs): trade, alliances and regulation. Advisor: Andreatta, Prof. Filippo. pp. 213. [IMT PhD Thesis]

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Abstract

Chapter 1: Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) have emerged as prominent actors in the global marketplace since the median decades of the twentieth century. The unique role of energy in informing global trade flows, supply and demand, and overall wealth distribution renders IGOs interacting with the energy sector particularly critical to shaping the worldwide economic order; and yet, a quantitative system of classifying IGOs has yet to be articulated. Grounded in rational design and rational choice theory, this body of research selects a population of IGOs based on the following criteria: formal agreement between sovereign states, independent institutions or organizations dependent upon IGOs, energy-focused agenda, permanent bureaucratic system, and active-status. Given these criteria, a model is articulated for classifying IGOs interacting within the energy sector, with conclusions drawn regarding links between apparent, participatory variability of IGOs and environmental forces. Key conclusions include the increase in consumption-driven IGOs and decrease of production-driven IGOs which is indicative of the interconnectivity of market trends and the quantity and function of energy-focused IGO agendas. - Chapter 2: Why do states choose to join and form IGOs that regulate energy policy? In this paper we make three specific contributions to the literature on international cooperation and diffusion. First, we show that countries form and join energy IGOs in response to memberships previously gained by direct competitors among oil and gas producers and consumers. Moreover, we demonstrate that energy IGOs diffuse among countries that share oil and gas pipelines. Finally, we provide evidence that the institutional design of established energy IGOs impacts the development of their membership network. To test these hypotheses, we rely on original data on oil and gas pipelines and the design of energy IGOs as well as on a newly compiled dataset that includes 152 countries and covers 38 years (1970-2007). We employ both network analysis and spatial econometrics. - Chapter 3: The goal of this paper is to provide an explanation for the formation of energy intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) among energy consumer or consumer/producer countries, predicated on the need to make alliances for energy security. The paper uses a two-stage model to explain the formation of energy IGOs and following this formation, the actions of the state within the IGO. The first stage, called the bargaining stage, involves the negotiation process for formation of the energy IGO, which is based on existing alliances and shared energy concerns. The second stage, called the enforcement stage, involves the actions of the state within the IGO, including the formation of shared energy security frameworks and common policies, based on shared energy concerns and infrastructure development needs. Two qualitative analytical case studies, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), are used to demonstrate the use of this model and provide support for the hypotheses. - Chapter 4: This research addresses the national-level effects on energy competition that occur when a National Regulatory Authority (NRA) enters a European Network of Energy Regulators (ENER) competition in the electricity and gas sectors. The approach chosen uses a policy making model with four actors (NRA, Industry, Government, and European Commission) and one instrument (ENER), based on the previous work of Putnam (1988). This policy model is demonstrated qualitatively using selected case studies of this situation, including the Czech Republic‘s adaptation to CEER standards and Spain and the creation of ACER. For both case studies, changes in conditions of competition, accountability, independence, and transparency are assessed. These results show that the policy model as constructed does provide explanatory value for an increase in competition in the energy sectors of member states of ENER through the mechanisms of increasing accountability, transparency, and independence of policy decision-making.

Item Type: IMT PhD Thesis
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
PhD Course: Political Science and Institutional Change
Identification Number: 10.6092/imtlucca/e-theses/100
Date Deposited: 17 Apr 2013 09:54
URI: http://e-theses.imtlucca.it/id/eprint/100

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