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**The Claim-making of the Islamist Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the
Radical Right-wing party NPD in the Federal Republic of
Germany**

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Publications

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Abstract

The events of September 11th 2001 increased the attention of Western public towards religious activism in Germany. In fact, this country had become a shelter for radicalized Islamic activists involved in the terrorist attacks. At the same time, the growing domestic violence performed by organized right-wing activists urged the German state to increase pressure on the German right-wing movement. In part, these attacks were related to a terrorist cell called National Socialist Underground (NSU). This cell is said to be closely related to the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, hereinafter NPD).

Since then, the public debate about migration, Islam and the German society has undergone significant changes while the government of the Federal Republic has become interested in controlling and labeling each protest movement, whichever their affiliation may be, left, right or religious. In the case of the Islamist movement Hizb-ut-tahrir (Party of Liberation), this resulted in the banning of its activities from the country. The NPD, although still legal, barely survived an authority ban attempt in 2003.

The dissertation's main research question is *how repression by the state affects the Protest mobilization, in particular public communication, of the Right-wing and the Islamist movements*. More specifically, the goal is to see how these movements mobilize within changing conditions of the political environment, namely in the presence, or absence, of a more or less serious possibility of legal banning, which obviously would exert a significant deal of pressure on the movement.

The claim-making that the Islamist and radical right-wing movement address to the public and their adherents constitutes the unit of analysis of this thesis. In order to define these claims, it is necessary to document protest claims and actions within the selected time frame, which covers the period between 2000 and 2011. The data set is mainly consisting of publications, articles and documents released by both movements.

Chapter 1.

Introduction

The events of September 11th 2001 increased the attention of western public towards Islamist activism. In fact, Germany had been a shelter for radicalized Islamic activists who were involved in the terrorist plot of 2001. Having politicized Islam through their rhetoric, Islamist activists participate in violent conflicts in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, for example.

These conflicts have been imported by migrants from the regions of origin into the countries of immigration. At the same time, the growing domestic violence, performed by organized right-wing activists, urged the German state to increase pressure on the German right-wing movement¹. After the reunification, Germany faced a severe phase of radical right-wing violence against immigrants and asylum seekers. This violence reached its deadly peak at the beginning of the 1990s, when Turkish immigrants became victims of arson attacks in the cities of Moelln and Solingen (Koopmans et. al. 2005: 3).

Within ten years after the Islamist terrorist attacks of September 11th, Germany discovers that a wave of Right-wing terrorist turns against its own citizens. A terrorist cell called National Socialist Underground (NSU) - being responsible for the murder of a significant number of immigrants - is seemingly closely related to the (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) NPD. This is particularly noteworthy for the NPD, which barely survived a legal ban attempt in 2003 due to formal legal mistakes. Since then, public debate has changed about

¹ <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/aug2000/nazi-a11.shtml> (10.03.2011)

migration, Islam and the German society. While the government of the Federal Republic is highly interested in controlling and labeling each protest movement, be it from the left, right or the Islamist scope, each movement adapts to the given institutional and discursive opportunities.

In particular, the radical right-wing and the Islamist party are paradoxically related to each other. Although the right-wing and the Islamist movement antagonize each other, they share common denominators favoring disintegration as well as racially or culturally homogenous communities.

The selection of two marginalized groups, which at the edge of public and society, claim for societal change, confronts research with limited information and thin access to movement and state actors. This dissertation aims to answer how two radical movements react toward state pressure, changing their communication and protest tactics.

Political studies focused on rational and institutional approaches looking at movements from a macro perspective, aggregating data on state policies to describe the relationship between state and movement. While Political Science examines institutional measurements such as legal instruments (court decisions and police action) applied by the State, they mainly focus on political parties. Social movement studies rather extend the field of investigation including parties and social groups that belong to a broader movement (Minkenberg 2003: 32).

The dissertation fits in the literature of social movement studies and their theoretic sub-strand on repression and mobilization. Furthermore, it will consider elements of the theoretical

framework of discursive opportunity structures, which affect the claim-making of social movements.

While there is a rich social movement literature on student, peace, ecological, gender and human rights movements (Rucht 2001; Della Porta 1995) depicting in detail their extraordinary protest in local and global perspectives, right-wing and religious² movements have barely been studied in this discipline. The dissertation focuses in particular on the German National Democratic Party, the right-wing party NPD (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) and the movement party Hizb-ut-tahrir (Party of Liberation) that was banned by the Minister for Interior in 2003.

The claim-making of the Islamist movement party Hizb-ut-tahrir and radical right-wing party NPD to the public, and their adherents, through communication messages, constitutes the unit of analysis in this dissertation. Studies deriving from social movement literature have up until nowadays separately paid attention to the Islamist movement party Hizb-ut-tahrir, for example, and their claim-making after the Danish Muhammad cartoon, (Lindekilde 2008). Also, the right-wing movement conducted studies separately, when Giugni et.al list discursive

² American scholars have deeply investigated the emergence of Christian religious movements and their impact on United States politics. European scholars investigated the impact of the Catholic Church during the cold war era and its role during the Polish and East German unrest against the socialist bloc (Kniss/Burns 2004: 702f.). With religious movements, I only refer to Islamic activism that shares a few common aspects with contemporary social movements (e.g. Wiktorowicz 2004). Thereby, my dissertation focuses only on Islamist activists within the Islamist movement. Henceforth, the selected case will be presented as part of the Islamist movement.

opportunities that affect right-wing claim-making and lead to diverse mobilization options in Germany and four European countries (Giugni et.al 1999). Claim-analysis comprises the discursive elements in public including speeches, articles and documents published by the movements (Koopmans et.al. 2005: 23). The theoretical framework of discursive opportunity analyses the movements affected by specific opportunity structures, national context and political space when mobilizing protest.

The complex process of protest includes the examination of State, media and counter groups; and the merging of movement leaders, who interact with adherents and the public to persuade and influence them in favor of acceptance and support for the mobilization of their movement. Protest communication through the claim-making of the Islamist and the radical right-wing movement should distinguish between interaction processes and interpretation schemata in periods of existential pressure by the State.

The intensive study of claim-making improved the understanding of the claim-making of the radical right-wing (Koopmans et.al. 2005: 188). Radicalization and/or moderation of rhetoric is the results of calculated rational decisions or pure survival strategies of protest movements. Trough the media, both protest movements were addressees of legislation and visible to the public. They also received democratic rights such as freedom of assembly and access to media. Their framing strategies and protest mobilization depend on discursive opportunity structures. The consequences of their protest communication reveal how marginalized protest movements apply communication tactics and develop long-term protest

strategies in democracies. In other words, how does state repression in a democratic society such as Germany affect two radical protest movements?

Thus, the outgoing research deals with the question as to how repression by the state affects the Protest mobilization of the Right-wing and the Islamist movement, in particular the public communication. The thesis analyses whether these movements become moderate or radicalize their communication. Both of the indicated movements are confronted with constant pressure and the threat of legal sanctions.

The initial thought behind this thesis was to explain the reaction of movements that are marginalized and enjoy low societal acceptance. From a normative point of view, the initial interest began to shake the interaction between the democratic State and its challengers beyond the common friend and foe analyses. There is no doubt about the necessity for a democracy to defend its pluralistic order against groups, which are seeking to implement an illiberal State and societal order. At the same time, groups with different social and political ideas have to be tolerated and, as a consequence, they need to be granted freedom (Klump 2004: 339).

When comparing the right-wing movement with the Islamists movement, the question why they should have anything in common and, thus, be compared immediately comes up. At the first glance, both movements have little in common. Different ideologies and differing socio-cultural backgrounds seem to collide with the concept of a direct comparison (Dantschke 2009). On closer examination, right-wing and Islamists share coincident

meetings and cooperation back in the 1920s (Kuentzel 2007³ ; Whine 2006). Since the 1990s, Hizb-ut-tahrir has begun its activities in Germany. Its communication activities and claim-making regarding several social, cultural and political issues are similar to those of the right-wing NPD. This is why, at the end of 2002, Hizb-ut-tahrir Germany and its leading member Shaker Assam, organized a congress meeting at the technical University of Berlin with the title: Iraq – a new war and its consequences⁴. Young Muslims, including students and well educated sympathizers welcomed this event. The invitation of two leading NPD members, Horst Mahler and Udo Voigt was highly controversial amongst Hizb-ut-tahrir members (Dantschke 2009: 441). Many feared that the party would lose intellectual and/or religious supporters. Supporters, in their opinion, would feel insulted by the attempt to cooperate with a German racist and extremist party, which had nothing but one goal in mind: to deport and exclude all Muslim immigrants from Germany. Also, the German state might find an incentive to increase pressure on Hizb-ut-tahrir, once it forms extremist allies.

The self-perception of the members of the right-wing and the Islamist movement as deprived socioeconomic losers is a common denominator. This self-image is the result of their conviction of being persecuted by law in a globalized and dominated order. For the Hizb-ut-tahrir, religion and the final goal to restore the caliphate become the main unifying drive, which is de-territorial and free from boundaries of any kind. The right-wing movement relies highly on the “nation” as a concept and depends, therefore, on the territory. In particular, Hizb-ut-

³<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/080ruyhg.as> (21.04.2011)

⁴ Der Spiegel 47/2002.

tahrir and NPD include social and cultural issues to attract the attention of wider groups of the population. The right-wing party NPD and the Islamist party organization Hizb-ut-tahrir position themselves within a broader movement to adapt better ad hoc changes, being less bound to party objectives such as conventional political parties.

Specific about Germany, whose political and institutional characteristics provide a unique setting to examine the impact of state policies on social movements, is the limited political opportunity structure for movements once facing the opposition of societal treaties and its institutions. State repression in Germany does not depend on party preferences like in Italy's progressive 1960's (Della Porta 1995). Also, it does not adapt UK open dialogue policies that have been set as an option for the government to deal with radical right or Islamist movements. Also, it cannot be compared with tolerant secular policies like in Denmark (Valentine 2010; Caver/Ege 2004). The German state uses its institutional strength through the Federal Ministry of Interior increasing pressure and eventually banning those groups and/or movements that are perceived as a threat to the "Free democratic basic order".

German interior policy can be described as rather exclusive with tendencies to polarize conflicts with challenging groups (Kriesi et al. 1995). Both, the involvement of NATO forces in Afghanistan and the marginalization of Muslims through strict anti-terrorist security policies of the German state are two main protest issues for Hizb-ut-tahrir. The German right-wing party NPD expresses its dissonance against the military intervention in Afghanistan as well as against the repression policies of the state against the right-wing after a number of severe right-wing

violence. Despite the fact of NPD being an institutional actor and legitimate parliamentary party, the party is mostly confronted with a closed institutional setting, seldom passing 5% thresholds to access local parliaments and excluded from main discussions in the mass media. Its weak position in the political and institutional sphere explains its permanent protest activities outside of the institutional arena, where any topic - be it international, and domestic - is brought up to attract public attention.

Compared to other European countries, Germany has a high presence in the field of policies related to migration. The radical right-wing movement of Germany has proportionally raised a higher rate of unspecific xenophobic claims against migrants in the public sphere, outside of the institutional arenas by extra-parliamentarian associations and organizations (Koopmans et.al. 2005: 199). Two protest arenas which both belong to the public are instrumentalized for that purpose. The first arena is the street where adherents can be mobilized in advance. Hizb-ut-tahrir and NPD are tightly organized and highly top-down movements, as opposed to bottom up grassroots movements (Heinrich 2008; Hamid 2007: 147). Events such as street demonstrations have been crucial for Hizb-ut-tahrir and NPD. These events demonstrate to their supporters and opponents that the movements have the capability to lead an entire movement and to get an overview of the people joining them and attending their events. The second arena is the media sphere shifting a major part of their claim-making to the internet (Kleinschmidt 2009: 374f). The same factor applies to Hizb-ut-tahrir, which refuses to participate to public life as a parliamentary party, representing Muslim immigrants at the institutional level. Instead, it follows a disintegrative approach in favor of

exclusion. It operates with injustice frames such as cultural oppression of Muslims by the west in order to undermine Muslim organizations and detach immigrants from their local communities. Hizb-ut-tahrir and NPD's have one central claim in common: that is protest for exclusion. The Islamist movement advertizes for a catch-all solution: the re-establishment of the caliphate in the Middle East and North African region that will unite all Muslim against "western injustice and exploitation" and the right-wing movement is more than pleased to help all Muslims to return to their "homeland".

Thus, I regard Hizb-ut-tahrir and NPD as protest movement actors throwing their claims into the public. I will use the protest definition of Rucht et al. (Rucht et al. 1998:9). They define protest as following: "collective protest can be understood as a public expression of dissent or critique that is often combined with making claims which, if realized, would affect the interests of particular groups in society". As Rucht generalizes, those who protest are against a situation and in favor of an attitude. Protest would involve interaction including activists, observers, passive participants and police and counter protests.

Chapter 3.

Islamism as a Social Movement

3.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with Islamism and its narrative and interpretative contexts. They are particularly relevant for the understanding of Islamism as a social movement. For scholars working on social movements, the description of language, terms and definitions are shaped by and bound to historical and social contexts, mainly of the western society (Bayat 2005: 892). Most strands of the Islamist movement reject any adaptation to western terms and ideas like protest, globalization and modernity⁷. Thus, when borrowing terms such as anti-capitalism, globalization or equality and applying them to the narrative of Islamist movement, one has to be very careful and adopt a critical approach. When fundamentalist clerics denounced Israel and the United States as exploiters of Muslim culture and soil, their messages were received and interpreted in various ways by Muslim addressees as opposed to a western audience. When religious preachers call for “cleansing infidels out to purify the holy country”, one might interpret it as an act of national, transnational or religious liberation (Thomas 2005: 90).

It might be an act to establish, protect or expand a pan-Islamic state *Caliphate*, hence, the focus on the narrative and interpretative context. For instance, modern Salafists address young Muslims to protest against the *establishment* denying young Muslims access to full social and cultural equality and

⁷ Interview with Hizb-ut-tahrir press representative (2010)

they encourage them these Muslims to reject their identity. Islam becomes the interpreted source of self-determination. The Salafist adherents identify themselves through common dresses and symbols such as the *niqab* and *burka* for women or the long beard and calve covering *thaub* for men (Hemmingsen 2011: 1212). Also, individuals may share common cultural values, independent of race, ethnicity or the social class. Islam becomes the common denominator. Also, perceived opportunities are crucial to explain how movement members and adherents perceive their action, be it violent or non-violent.

3.2 The emergence of Islamism

As a consequence of the migration waves of the 1970s and 1980s, religious movements were experiencing a resurgence of mobilization in response to globalization processes. Salafism encouraged Muslim immigrants to follow the pure Islam based on the era of its prophet Muhammad. In the emerging phases of the 1970s and 1980s, religious movements were expanding their ideologies as a kind of *Weltanschauung*. The most important ideologues were Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahab (1703-1792), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949) and Sayid Qutb (Abbas/Siddique 2012: 124). These ideologues succeeded in connecting theory with practice, inspiring political activists to follow their ideologies and to politicize Islam in the Middle East and North African regions.

For instance, fundamentalism as a political activism does contest some aspects of modernity and western culture. In an emerging global order, Islamic fundamentalism competes with the western models of secularism, nationalism and liberal democracy. Some

fundamentalist ideologies, like the Islamist movement of Ayatollah Khomeini, combined nationalist aspirations with a religious agenda.

Also, Islamists organize protest involving new issues such as gender, sexuality and identity, which are important to the young Muslims generation in Western Europe (Husain 2007: 67). The Islamist movements tend to interpret Islam in favor of their organizations. The on-going social and cultural exclusion of young Muslim immigrants in western societies provides a unique opportunity to the Islamist movement to promote Islam as the only solution for young Muslims.

Islamists motivate young Muslims to raise their opposition against their parents, detach them from nationalist sentiments towards their countries of origin and offer them the “chance” to be part of a bigger, more powerful global community. This way, young Muslims would overcome exclusion and isolation. Enabling Muslims to belong to a community, whose solidarity goes beyond every ethnic and national boundaries, Islam and its religious form of expression turn into a visible form of protest against racism and anti-Islamic rhetorics (Abbas/Siddique 2012: 126). Simultaneously, religion becomes a tool for mobilization, which represents cultural identities and promotes religion as a marker of social control (Schmidt 2011: 1227).

The emergence of the Islamist movement, by including cultural and religious issues, adds a new dimension that goes beyond the regular left-right scope of social movements. Its orientation towards the inclusion of Islamic culture and the religion of Islam as its central values underlines the relevance of Islamist movements for the literature of political sciences and sociology,

in particular social movements (Wiktorowicz 2004; Reetz 2004: 67). The commonalities that enable the Islamist movement to unify and mobilize protest action share general belief, language and symbolic codes as well as the advocacy of Islam as part of the Muslim public life, and, also, the expression of religious and political change in society (Bayat 2005: 900).

Often, the scholarship tends to portray Islamism either as an anti-modernist and reactionary movement, whose goal is to oppose modernization and religious pluralism, or as a reaction to postmodernism, representing cultural autonomy and alternative identity (Bayat 2005: 894; Reetz 2004: 62).

In particular, Islamism was explained as an anti-capitalist and anti-liberalist movement, which would mobilize “tribal resistance for identity and community” against “neoliberal globalism” and a universalistic secular order (Lindholm/Zuquete 2010: 8). As Bayat summarizes when mapping religious movement across scholarly literature, “these movements are said to be anti-democratic and regressive by character. On the right, the ‘clash of civilization’, proposed by Bernard Lewis and popularized by Samuel Huntington, manifests the framework within which the ‘anti-modern’ character of such movements in their encounter with Western modernity is assessed. On the left, one can point Alberto Melucci and Alain Touraine, among others, who express concern about religious revivalism. ‘Regressive utopianism’ and ‘anti-movement’ are the ways they refer to religious including the Islamic, movements.” (Bayat 2005: 894). Melucci’s reference to religious movements, which defines identity in drawing a historical path to an idealized past, including an Utopianism as the upcoming project, come closest to the description of the Islamist movement.

Islamism, instead, is not a homogenous monolith in static form but a heterogeneous social movement in constant shift, whose fundamentals are founded and embedded in the Islamic society. Moreover, the Islamist movement is not only mobilizing support for its claims in politically closed Muslim societies. Being cross-boundary, transnational Islamist movement organizations operate in European societies with advanced technical media tools, addressing people on the basis of a common identity and “generalized belief” and “shared values” (Bayat 2005: 892). Structuralist approaches of the social movement literature such as the resource mobilization theory by Mc Carthy and Zald (1977) mainly focused on American and European social movements, emphasizing the relevance of rationalist models as partial motives for action. Bayat criticizes the overstretched focus of structuralist approaches written by Tarrow on movement outcome and its dependence on political opportunity structures (Bayat 2005: 898). According to Tarrow, social movement outcomes mainly depend on the changing structures of political opportunities that enable them to fail or to raise and challenge state authorities for social and political change (Tarrow 1994: 86). However, the demand for structural change is integrated within the ideological body of some Islamists such as Hizb-ut-tahrir when communicating their political agenda to the public.

While on the one hand, rationalist models were used to explain Islamist emergences throughout Muslim-majority countries in the 1970s and 1980s, social theorists on the other hand, borrowed concepts such as the Weberian charismatic leadership to rationalize revolutionary movements such the Iranian revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. Islamism has been described as a partial derivation of Marxism, emerging out of the material necessity for societal change (Bayat 2005: 896). Weberian

scholars, instead, grouped religious adherents as one cluster whose driving motor would be a belief system dependent on symbols and ideas. Hence, the leader would use its charisma to unify and mobilize the movement (e.g. Bayat 2005: 896). Like Tarrow's opportunity structures approach, Weberian scholars rarely tend to look at the impact societal and state conditions have on the dynamic and, hence, argumentative rhetoric of movements. Instead, contemporary social movement theorists have been concerned with the role of social movement actors as challengers of the polity struggling for power (Tarrow 1994; Bayat 2005). It is thus legitimate to ask whether movement action has changed social discourse and opportunities of the movement itself.

Islamists seek for recognition among the Muslims community, aiming to demonstrate their religious and political knowledge in order to increase their legitimacy. Islamists are eager to dominate discourses on religious freedom, no matter whether they are led by religious Muslims, moderate Muslim organizations or by other Islamist organizations. The former are perceived and discredited as westernized Muslims who cooperate with the "*Kafir*", unbelievers who are represented by western States and suppress the Muslims community "*umma*" (Metzger 2002: 10). The latter are perceived as competitors and discredited as Islamists who either follow the wrong path, or work for illegitimate Arab regimes, which in turn are functioning as western puppets. Islamist groups aim to dominate the discourse within the Muslim community, binding religious, social and political issues to the local or national context. Hence, the strategic goal of the Islamist movement is to legitimize its presence with the claim to represent a fictive Muslim monolith against an oppressing west.

3.3 The four strands of Islamism and the Caliphate

This section will introduce the concepts for *Caliphate* and *Jihad* for the purpose of clarification. Especially after September 11th, most media and political representatives began to relate political and social actions by Muslims to Islamism.

Islamism functions as the general term for every Muslim group, independent of whether it attaches itself to the *Salafi* and *Wahabi* or to a different strand. The term Islamism characterizes all Muslim strands, which combine every element of Islam with societal and the political matters and claim Islam to be the solution for each problem (El Difraoui 2012: 7).

Islamism contains different strands, with similarities and differences. *Islamic fundamentalism*, *Salafism*, *Wahabism* and *Jihadism* constitute the four main strands of Islamism. Before Islamism dominated the discourse in public and media, *Islamic fundamentalism* became publicly and scholarly visible to the world as an outcome of the Iranian social movement in 1979 (Denoeux 2002: 61). Its call for restoring the original purity and literal reading of the Quran and its rejection of a concrete political project is one of the main characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism.

Despite its theological claim for quietism (Buchta 2004), Shiite Islamic fundamentalism showed its political and militant components, when clerics entered politics after the victory of the Iranian revolution. In order to export the “Islamic revolution”, the clergy legitimated militant actions inside and outside of Iran, declaring a Fatwa, a religious judgment authorized by a highly qualified clergyman against all infidels and enemies of Islam

(Mozaffari 1998: 86ff.). The consequence was the foundation of “Hizbollah” (Party of God) and its engagement in south Lebanon as an opposing force against the State of Israel as well as against Christian militias in the Lebanon civil war (Walt 1996: 246). *Salafism* is one strand of Islamism, which theologically is close to *Wahabism*. *Al Salafiyya* or *ahl al Salaf* can be translated as followers of the pure tradition of the prophet Muhammad (Abou-Taam 2012a). Salafist preachers have become popular among young Muslims in Germany and other western countries as they combine youth rhetoric and pop culture with Islamic dogma (Dantschke 2007: 3). They teach a pure practice of Islam that returns to the life of the life of Muhammad and his companions. Salafism can be regarded as a protest strand of Islam against modernity. Also, it rejects the narrative forms of Islam *hadith* that begun to depict Islam in the 7th century A.D. Consequently, it rejects Sufi cults and the cult of saints as one can find in Shiite Islam (Denoeux 2002: 58), for example. Warning Muslims not to follow blindly textual interpretations of Islam, Salafist thinkers call every Muslim to interpret and reason their words and actions individually (Reetz 2004: 64). Similarly to Hizb-ut tahrir, the Salafists proclaim a caliphate and strongly reject any form of nationalism and citizenship based on territory and ethnicity and language. The global Muslim community *umma* is politicized as the pool for economic, social and cultural resistance against western systems and constitutes the midpoint of the Salafist movement (Abou-Taam 2012a).

It was the Arab preacher Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahab in the Arabian Peninsula, to establish *Wahabism* in the 18th century (Antes 1997: 55). Similarly to Salafism, Wahabism is strict in condemning decadence and moral corruption in society. The state of ignorance *Jahiliyya* and the rejection of God are

considered to be the greatest heresies. Wahabism is characterized by its strict interpretation of the Sunna and Quran as well as by the intolerance towards any deviant form of interpretation (Metzger 2002: 25). From the theological point of view, Wahabism is an ultra-orthodox and isolated strand of Islam; however, it has become powerful and political when allying with the house of Saud in 1745 (Denoeux 2002: 59). Thanks to its alliance with the Saudi family who had unified all Arab tribes under their control, Wahabism became a state controlled ideology and the main strand of Islam in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as well as its State doctrine. Thanks to oil supplies of Saudi Arabia and its ambition to engage overseas from Bosnia to the Malaysia, Wahabism spread over a large territory and became a transnational ideology. Materially and logistically supported by the Saudi State, mosques, Islamic centers, religious schools *Madrasas* and Universities were built in Europe, Africa and Asia (Metzger 2002: 28). In 1979, Sunni Wahabism did not only become a major ideology spreading in revolutionary Iran with an expanding Shiite Islamism. At the same time, it served as a source of mobilization for Afghan, Pakistani and Arab Mujhaheddin fighters against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.

Jihadism is derivated from *Jihad*, which literally means “effort”. In the era of the prophet Muhammad, it was understood as the “holy fight for the will of God” and, thus, Jihad was given a military interpretation (Antes 1997: 39). Besides its military interpretation, Jihad has a religious and civilian meaning. It is interpreted as an invitation *dawa* to Islam (Reissner 2007: 26). Also, it calls Muslims to express solidarity to the poor, an effort to reduce famine and an effort to build shelter for the weak and homeless in the Muslim community.

The Islamic law Sharia legitimizes Jihad in case of Muslims living in the State of war “*dar al harb*”, forcing them to defend their State of Peace “*dar al Islam*” against decadence “*taqut*” and the State of ignorance “*jahiliya*”. These aspects legitimate justifications to struggle for the Islamic State (Khosrokhavar 2011: 19). Adherents of the Jihadi strand of Islamism perceive themselves as the defenders and executors of Jihad, defending the Islamic community *umma* and the Islamic State, the Caliphate or *khilafah*. Islamist ideologues such as Nabhani - founder of Hizb-ut tahrir or the England based Umar Bakri - introduced *the method of khilafah*. It subordinates Islamic activism under one final goal, which indicates the establishment of the Islamic State *khilafah*. The establishment of the *Caliphate* or *khilafah* is divided in three main phases. First, Muslims are urged to Islamize the society and convince the faithless and infidels *kuffar* to convert to Islam. Second, having established the Islamic State, Muslims are not entitled to wage war against other Muslims or the *kuffar*. They do need the authorization of the Caliph to engage in an armed struggle. Jihad can only be legitimated by the Caliph of the Caliphate, whose legitimacy, based on the rule of god and religious wisdom, entitles him to call Muslims for Jihad. Hence, the Caliphate guarantees stability and political order for Muslim and non-Muslims. The political implications of Jihad were formulated by Islamist thinkers in the middle of 20th century. Ideologues such as Mawdudi⁸, Al- Banna or Sayyid Qutb⁹, not

⁸ Mawdudi found the organization Jamaat Islami (Islamic society) on the Indian subcontinent. His idea of a Muslim community was tailored to the Indian context and became the driving force of Islamic identity in Pakistan in 1941 (Khosrokhavar 2011: 20). According to Mawdudi, a slow Islamization would be necessary even by the use of force (Husain 2007: 50).

⁹ Qutb who began his career as a secular Egyptian state employee, slowly radicalized after he visited the United States and perceived their decadence as

only called every Muslim to regard Jihad as his/her hitherto duty but demanded his/her participation in Jihad (Khosrokhavar 2009: 42). The establishment of the caliphate is achieved through a chain of phases, which would implement a chronological order. These would be the spread of ideas, the use of intellect, the share of thoughts, the challenge for Muslims and the Western allies, the conceptualization of systems, the development of concepts, the destruction of the western puppet regimes and the construction of the caliphate (Husain 2007: 50).

The Islamic State would be ruled by wise and well guided *Caliph* or *hakim*, which would be free of moral and material defect of the West (Khosrokhavar 2012: 20). The Islamic State, caliphate or khilafah, was a political project that was supposed to include regulatory elements for government through a religious council, *Shura*. In the era of the 7th century A.D. and after the death of the prophet Muhammad, the pretense to extend the territorial borders of the caliphate were limitless. A transnational caliphate was impossible to be governed as different rivals violently contested for the succession Muhammad (Antes 1997: 51). This led to the schism between the Sunni and Shiia strand of Islam. During the era of Muhammad, the caliphate remained bound to territorial borders. Today, the caliphate remains a political utopia but exists as a real political agenda for the Islamist movement, in particular Hizb-ut tahrir (Reissner 2007: 23).

the main cause for societal decline. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood and participated in protests against the Egyptian government. His ideas radicalized during his stay in prison. Qutb's thoughts drew a society, which would be divided between good and evil with the necessity to implement the Islamic Sharia law and be at war *Jihad* with all those who would oppose the Islamic State and society (Metzger 2002: 30).

With regard to the caliphate, which for instance functions as the main political project of the Islamist Hizb-ut tahrir, it is necessary distinguish between the Sunni caliphate and the Shiia "*Velayat e faqih*". In 1979, radical Shiite clerics followed Ayatollah Khomeini who established the Islamic government based on the concept "government of the jurist" *Velayat e faqih*. This concept was written and theorized by Ayatollah Khomeini and tailor-made to the leader of the Islamic revolution himself (Khomeini 1981). Khomeini's Islamic government left no space for the concept of the caliph and criticized its imprecise and loose utopian configuration (Buchta 2004: 83).

Indeed, the caliphate is not designed for a single country, but aims for the unification of the entire Muslim world to one society under one Islamic state. The caliphate turned out to be a utopian project for the Sunni Salafi and Jihadi Islamists, as no Sunni country has adopted this concept (Khosrokhavar 2012: 83), yet. No Arab country has voluntarily allowed to universalize its material goods or allowed foreign groups to influence its policies. Considering what said before, the Jihadi mission to restore or construct the caliphate becomes endless. In contrast to Islamic fundamentalists, who regard the caliphate as a political system that should be attained through a calm societal transition in an indefinite future, the very existence of Jihadi Islamists depends on endless violent confrontation with the Jahiliya (Khosrokhavar 2012: 84).

Despite of their differences, all strands of Islamism share an idealized narrative about the historical beginning of Islam, the prophet and the construction of the first caliphate.

- All of them represent Islam as the only social and political solution.
- Wahabi, Salafi, Jihadists and Fundamentalists believe in the restoration of the caliphate as the ultimate goal, inscribed by the *umma*, the community of believers.
- All Islamist strands use a religious language combined with practical examples familiar to every Muslim.

Also, there are the following differences:

- Salafi, Jihadists and fundamentalists claim to establish a *khilafah*, an Islamic government without national territorial boundaries. The Wahabi Islamists, who are loyal to the Saudi Arabian kingdom, do not accept such a khilafah.
- Fundamentalists are concerned about arbitrary changes within the theoretical discourse and interpretation of religious terms. They call for a slow transformation of state and society by peaceful means. But the younger Islamists such as the Jihadi, Salafists and some Wahabi call for action to change state and society with peaceful and when necessary violent means.
- Jihadists and Salafists are dependent on an endless Jihad to establish the caliphate in a global umma. In contrast, Islamic fundamentalists aim at Islamizing state and society. The Islamic government is a political project.
- Women are totally neglected and denied a public role by the Wahabi Islamists. In contrast, Salafists and Jihadists support the education of woman, believing that proper

education and even active participation of women in the public sphere would serve Jihad and be a relevant constituent of the Islamic society as long as the family is protected and genders segregated.

With respect to the heterogeneity of the Islamist social movement, one has to distinguish between “modern” young Islamists, who were born and raised in the western context, and “anti-modern” clerical fundamentalists. Denoeux (2002) writes about the ambiguity of the relation between modern Islamists and fundamentalists; because of young Islamist’s little knowledge about religious jurisprudence and their pragmatic approach towards modern technical tools, they do not tend to follow orthodox clerics or even become one. On the contrary, they challenge the established positions of fundamentalist clerics who are traditionally highly educated and experienced clerics (Denoeux 2002: 63).

In some cases, they compete for power and resources accusing each other to be infidels and puppets of the Un-Islamic *kafr* government. Again, while there should be no doubt about fundamentalists’ intentions to seize power, one should emphasize their first concern meaning to Islamize society and to purify its moral and value order. They do seek for political power but are more concerned with the influences of western culture in Islamic societies. Like the fundamentalist cleric Ayatollah Khomeini once said, revolution does not end with the downfall of the prior un-Islamic regime but with the cleansing of “west-toxification” (Khomeini 1981). Fundamentalists regard the establishment of a truly Islamic society as a fair long-term perspective (Denoeux 2002: 64). On the other hand, Islamists

see the necessity of revolution in toppling the infidel regimes, which cooperate against the will and needs of the Umma.

3.4 Hizb-ut-tahrir within Islamism

In 1953, Hizb-ut tahrir (Party of Liberation) was founded by Taqiuddin an-Nabahani¹⁰. Born in Palestine, he was a Sheikh from a noble Arab family who was close to the Ottoman Empire. Unlike Mawdudi and Qutb, Nabhani studied Islamic Studies at the prestigious Al-Azhar University of Cairo (Husain 2007: 84). Nabhani's experiences during the era of colonialism, 1928-1948, have had a great influence in shaping his ideas and views about Islam, Arabs and their relation to the world.

The British mandate over Palestine was interpreted by many Arabs as occupation. From the Islamists point of view, a western power attempted to influence Muslim culture and to introduce its legal and social system by coercion. Having successfully sensed the national, religious and socio-cultural grievances of Arabs, Nabhani proceeded to adapt ideas, previously formulated by Islamists like Mawdudi about the Islamic State, adapting them to the political reality of the 1950's (An-Nabhani 2002: 61). According to Nabhani, the return of the Jews and the foundation of the State of Israel only continues the occupation after the upheavals of World War II and ensure the occupation of Muslim land through a "Zionist movement" (Valentine 2010: 412).

¹⁰ <http://hizb-america.org/about-us/prominent-members/170-sheikh-muhammad-taqiuddin-al-nabhani> (22.4.2012)

Hizb-ut-tahrir embodies the political party with Islamism at its core (Husain 2007: 84). Every Muslim has to be convinced of the *wajib* necessity to implement the Islamic State khilafah¹¹. Only if Muslims realize the value and importance of the khilafah for the Muslim community and Islam, only then, the Islamic State will be constructed. The historical contextualization is relatively important to understand Hizb-ut-tahrir's political agenda today. Since Hizb-ut-tahrir was banned in most Arab countries across the Middle East and many of its activists jailed, Hizb-ut-tahrir members began to request for political asylum in the United Kingdom or other West European countries (Valentine 2010: 413).

The Islamic State only serves as a utopia or long-term political project. Hizb-ut-tahrir introduces the khilafah as an intellectual and political anti-concept to western democracy. It regards democracy as a blasphemous Greek concept, rooted in *demos* and *kratos* – government by the people (Husain 2007: 78). Arab governments would have lost any legitimacy in the 1960s and 1970s, as they followed the International system and refused to hear the call of Muslims to establish the only legitimate form of government, the Islamic State. Once the khilafah is established and wealth distributed, there would be no famine and poverty among Muslims. Then, Hizb-ut-tahrir would redistribute the wealth of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, sharing their oil among one Muslim nation ruled by one caliph¹².

Albeit Hizb-ut-tahrir does not call for violence in western States, it possesses a militant strand calling Muslims around the world

¹¹ Statement of Hizb-ut-tahrir representative in Germany, Shaker Assem. (2009)

¹² <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/DE/def> (22.4.2012)

to unite to one army, under one caliphate in order to defend Muslims against the disbelievers (Husain 2007: 81). In recent years, Islamist activities have increasingly focused on fragile countries, which are categorized as the so called failing states including Pakistan, Sudan, Ex-Yugoslavia and Uzbekistan¹³.

When mapping Hizb-ut-tahrir within the Islamist movement, one should highlight how Hizb-ut tahrir distinguishes itself from traditional orthodox fundamentalism. There are three reasons, which explain why Hizb-ut-tahrir rather follows a self-interpreted politicized approach similar to the Salafist strand but avoid close coalitions with Salafists¹⁴ or other Islamist groups. First, they interpret the narratives of Sunna and Quran independent from established Islamic schools and traditions. Hizb-ut tahrir perceives its religious and political agenda as the only path to lead the Muslims. Hizb-ut tahrir intentionally applies its own intellectual approaches with the “logic of argumentation” and “methodology”. It aims to distinguish itself from Islamist groups. Each public meeting, with or without media presence¹⁵, is used as a public platform for Hizb-ut tahrir. It emphasizes its unique path and argues about ethical issues relating Hizb-ut tahrir’s political agenda of khilafah to current issues such as Muslim identity, social exclusion and migration. Second, they keep their political project, the *khilafah*, alive. Also, the idea of the Muslim community *umma* serves as a mobilizing tool for action to designate Hizb-ut-tahrir as part of a broader Muslim movement (Husain 2007: 76). Third, Hizb-ut-tahrir

¹³ Expert Interview, Claudia Dantschke (2011)

¹⁴ The Salafist movement in Germany has become a protest movement that recruits young Muslims within the “Diaspora-Community” (Abou-Taam 2012b)

¹⁵ (Hizb-ut tahrir press conferences in Copenhagen 2010-2011)

discusses modern concepts such as liberal democracy and capitalism and combines them with its Islamist interpretation.

Thus, Hizb-ut tahrir perceives itself as a political party standing within the Islamic community to establish an Islamic State: "Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam. Its objective is to resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic State that executes the systems of Islam and carries its call to the world. Hizb-ut-Tahrir has prepared a party culture, which includes a host of Islamic rules about life's matters. The party calls for Islam in its quality of intellectual leadership, from which the systems dealing with universal problems emanate: these include political, economic, cultural and social systems. Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a political party, which admits to its membership men and women, and calls all people to Islam and to adopt its concepts and systems. It views people according to the viewpoint of Islam, no matter how diverse their nationalities and their schools of thought are. Hizb-ut-Tahrir adopts the interaction with the Ummah in order to reach its objective and it struggles against colonialism in all its forms and attributes in order to liberate the Ummah from its intellectual leadership and to deracinate its cultural, political, military and economic roots from the soil of the Islamic lands. Hizb-ut-Tahrir endeavors to change the erroneous thoughts which colonialism has propagated, such as confining Islam to rituals and morals."¹⁶

In contrast to other Islamist strands, Hizb-ut-tahrir includes women as an important part of society and refuses to ban them from public life, as long as both sexes live in society ruled by

¹⁶ <http://english.hizbuttahrir.org/index.php/about-us> (1.3.2012)

Islamic laws¹⁷. Corresponding with its competitive economic agenda, participation of women is welcomed as long as their responsibilities towards the “preservation of harmony in the family” will not be threatened. Hizb-ut tahrir attracts young Muslims who struggle to cope with adaption in western societies. It provides cultural and religious shelter for young Muslims¹⁸.

In sum, two major differences distinguish Hizb-ut tahrir from other Islamist groups. First, Hizb-ut tahrir emphasizes the necessity of ideas, systems and concepts and second, the relevance of a methodology to establish its final goal. Yet, to establish the Islamic state, one needs to understand its political, social and cultural system. Political organization is a *wajib*, a necessity, to dominate Muslim discourse and gain political ascendancy (An-Nabhani, a). Hizb-ut tahrir is close to the position of other Islamist ideologues, when demanding the necessity for a radical political change as Qutb does in his epic Islamist book “Milestones”. In the past, Arab nationalism and Marxism have shown that radical political change could be achieved, if a revolutionary movement would fully politicize and convince people of one idea for change. The Muslim is supposed to know his religious duties including prayer and fasting. Hizb-ut tahrir expects its members to go further and to confront themselves with the ideas and concepts, which would suit the political empowerment of the party (Husain 2007: 92). The method of argument is placed in the first secret stage. Through talk and dialogue, Muslims need to convince each other of the

¹⁷ <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/DE/def> Hizb-ut tahrir constitution (21.6.2011)

¹⁸ <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/jugendkultur-islam-und-demokratie/65147/demokratie-ist-eine-falsche-religion> (12.2.2012)

existential necessity of the khilafah. They do need to organize themselves in groups and increase their *political awareness* and *consciousness*. Without determination for the Islamic State, no Muslim would live in a society of peace and shelter (An-Nabhani 1998). Convincing Muslims and arousing their political awareness can only be accomplished through talk and dialogue as opposed to force. Hizb-ut tahrir introduces a three-state strategy to its members, explaining how to take over power:

1. Secret Stage
2. Open Stage
3. *Nusrah* Stage (Assistance from powerful sources to take power)

In the secret stage, activists organize study groups and a core to build up a political party. In the open stage, Muslim activists challenge the dominant political and social establishment, attempting to destroy and replace it with a new political and social form. A military coup or revolution would be the necessary completing assistance at the *Nusrah* stage (Husain 2007: 93).

3.5 The Islamist Hizb-ut-tahrir

While studies on Islamism concentrate on Salafist Jihadist and orthodox Wahabist, labeling them as unified sections of Islamism¹⁹, a closer differentiated view is advisable, as current Hizb-ut-tahrir is not a party but an organization that acts globally and widely. Like the nationalist right-wing party NPD, Hizb-ut-tahrir is one actor within a broad movement. Although, the movement party Hizb-ut-tahrir has no nationalist agenda, it is not to be defined as a pure fundamentalist or Salafist religious movement. It defines itself as a political idea that is able to unify Muslims under the banner of Islam without dependence on western values and a western oriented global order.

2 <http://islamonline.com/> In 1928, Hassan Al Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Islamist Yusuf al-Qaradawi inspired and influenced Banna. Qaradawi advocates a democratic participation of Islamists is best known for the doctrine of wasatiyya (centrism), which lies between secularism and fundamentalism. He rejects the violent extremism of Al Qaeda and extremist doctrines of the Salafists. At the same time, he shares a common hostile stand towards the USA and Israel. In contrast to the Salafists, Tariq Ramadan does not favor hudud (penalties) which include stoning of adulterers. Due to the failure of Muslim Brotherhood's model of political participation, Salafists are gaining power and influence among Muslims in the Middle East. The flow of oil money including institutions and individuals has improved their position. The purity of Salafism offers simple answers to the questions and needs of Muslims in Europe who partly feel disintegrated and suffer a crisis of identity in the highly individualized western societies. For some scholars, the difference between violent and non-violent Islamism does not mean to underestimate. Whereas violent Islamism would use violence to achieve its goals and seize state power, non-violent Islamism would undermine the culture of liberal democracy, exercising soft power to transform public culture across the Middle East and the west afterwards.

Hence, Hizb-ut-tahrir can be defined as a transnational Islamist movement organization belonging to what scholars define as a “broader social movement that aims at the establishment and consolidation of a global community of Muslim believers in a politically and sociologically virulent sense. This includes non-violent elements of transnational political Islam such as the various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as regional entrepreneurs spreading the vision of the global *umma* through the mass media.” (Friedrichs 2011:2).

The main target groups, which have been addressed by the Islamist movement, belong to underprivileged classes. In most cases, the target group is young Muslim immigrants who live in Europe in the second or third generation (Brettfeld/Wetzels 2003: 311). They come from less educated backgrounds and are less likely to benefit from the globalizing market economy, which appeals to include well-educated individuals²⁰. Therefore, the protective, unifying and social message of religion is more likely to reach these groups. Competing in a market of ideas with other Islamist movement organizations such as Al-Muhajiroun, Hizb-ut-tahrir aims to appeal to addressees, which are well educated and well integrated, too (Abbas/Siddique: 2012: 124). Conducted interviews with students and academics showed that this group of adherents does not necessarily suffer socio-economic deprivation. They protest against a dominant western order that

²⁰ Brettfeld, Katrin/ Wetzels, Peter (2003) Junge Muslime in Deutschland: Eine kriminologische Analyse zur Alltagsrelevanz von Religion und Zusammenhängen von individueller Religiosität mit Gewalterfahrungen, -einstellungen- und handeln. In: Islamismus, Texte zur inneren Sicherheit, Bundesministerium des Inneren

seems to rule Muslims trying to oppress and ultimately abolish Muslim culture with its norms and rules. Hizb-ut-tahrir's rhetoric is to some extent attractive to young Muslims, as it offers an alternative to traditional orthodox organizations that have failed to address the needs and feelings of young Muslim immigrants (Abbas/Siddique 2012: 125). Since 2000, immigrants with a Muslim background have faced a peculiar alienating climate through Islamophobia, racism, the negative impact of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Gaza conflict and cultural and socioeconomic exclusion.

Thus, Hizb-ut-tahrir's claim-making based on these issues found partial support among a small group of Arab and Turkish immigrants in Germany, although this did not lead to radicalization and an outbreak of violence. It is *wajib* (necessary) for every Muslim to self-interpret and reason the logic of argumentation of Hizb-ut tahrir. This is one of the *vasiliya* (key means) of Hizb-ut-tahrir to address young Muslims.

Besides its constant proposal to introduce the Sharia law in Muslim and a non-Muslim country, Hizb-ut-tahrir seeks for allies and a public audience to establish an Islamic state *caliphate*. Generally, its members avoid clear statements on contentious issues such as the place of non-Muslims in the Islamic state, the toleration of secular Muslims, or where the authority to interpret Islamic law should reside. Some might consider them as democrats but their positions are certainly not liberal. True believers and, thus, full members of the *caliphate* are those Muslims who are no heretics and consider Islamic norms, values and rules with respect to the Islamic Sharia law. Hizb-ut-tahrir understands secularism as a social and political attitude that cannot be accepted or tolerated among Muslims by any means.

In the contrary, Hizb-ut-tahrir considers its ideology confirmed, when referring to western public opinion surveys, which estimate a vast majority of Muslims in Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan and Nigeria to support death penalty as punishment for crimes such as “apostasy” (PEW 2010: 14)²¹. Its revolutionary rhetoric for an uprising of Muslims may differ from other “established” Islamist actors within the movement, but its views on framing the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the Islamic community prove similarities. Separation between in-group and out-group and discriminating patterns of religious minorities can be found across Salafists, Wahabi and Shiia Islamists (e.g. Denoeux 2002: 58). Despite a wide range of terms for infidels, Islamists address a number of subcategories that have been created to discriminate not only against Muslims and non-Muslims. They include *kafir*, *harbi* and *mushrik*, who are described as idolaters (Friedrichs 2011: 14). One exception upgrading the status of non-Muslim religious minorities is the “people of the book” that eventually acknowledges Christians and Jews from other infidels.

²¹ Egypt:84%; Jordan:86%; Pakistan:76%; Nigeria:51%.

Chapter 4

The radical Right-wing movement

The German right-wing movement has experienced a structural and paradigmatic change. Initially, it has been strongly hierarchical and revisionist – claiming to review the national-socialist past in 1950s. Parties pursuing to be represented in the parliament, like the NPD, became more pragmatic in the 1980s (Art 2011: 204-205). The radical right-wing movement, in particular the NPD, maintains nationalism at the top of its agenda but has begun to de-ideologize, shifting towards new topics such as immigration, social and economic policies (Koopmans 2001: 108).

Within the last five decades the right-wing movement has faced a change regarding the issues, adherents and organizational structures. The claim-making of the radical right-wing movement was about revision and pro National Socialism in the 1950's and 1960's. Immigration and ethnic issues have become a significant dominating protest issue since the unification of Germany (Koopmans 2001: 110f.). While, protests actions were structured and organized by parties and organizations in the 1950's and 1960's, they became diffuse and less organized after the fall of the Berlin wall.

Table 1 Old and New NPD. Sources: Koopmans 2001; Art 2011: 204

<i>Old Right-wing NPD</i>	<i>New Right-wing NPD</i>
Claims in 1950s and 1960s:	Claims since 1990s:
Ideology: Revisionist and pro NS regime	No Immigration, pro welfare, family and child-care
Old disappointed members of NS	Young members
Structure: Hierarchical, highly organized	Structure: Less organized
Party influence: Strong	Party influence: Decentralized, loose connection
Party presence: Only West Germany	Party influence: Partly in West-mainly East Germany

Their addressees are the less educated and/or unemployed people mainly coming from underprivileged classes (Stöss 2005: 94)²². In its relatively young and peculiar history, the Federal Republic of Germany had to deal with several right wing and right extremist parties after the Second World War, including the German Nationalist Party NPD and the Republican Party. Despite organizational constraints, disastrous campaign affairs and political scandals, a few right-wing parties achieved to maintain within the political system. Their goals are to protest against the established party system and capitalistic policies that collaborate against the “German people”. Hence the right-wing movement was successful in attracting sympathizers which are

²² Stöss, R. (2005) Rechtsextremismus in Wandel. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

unsatisfied with their socioeconomic situation for they fear existential loss (Leggewie, 2003, p. 24).

The right-wing movement divided its resources distinguishing between “block recruitment” and “individual recruitment”. The NPD possesses the largest amount of organizational and financial resources seeking to organize the block recruitment that attempts to integrate large groups of the population within its movement. It tries to attract voters support with populist policy issues relating the agenda and the framing process of action to the cultural circumstances of the milieu of supporters. It articulates the elements of democratic discourse and causes people from different classes of society to come together in agreement on certain issues, for instance against higher taxes (Puhle, 2003, p. 17).

The number of supporters is on the rise, as it includes pure opportunist supporters, who sustain a single issue of the right-wing party or organization. Also, there are activists who have a strong belief system and share, above common ideas, the mind set of the right-wing group. They have been non-violent at the beginning, but got more motivated and become violent later. When the group is weak the right-wing movement applies individual recruitment through sub-groups such as the youth organization NA. In both recruitment processes, leaders are crucial for recruitment and organization. However, their resources are limited through restrictive mechanisms by state authorities, banning their web pages and controlling their social activities like concerts and marches. “Political entrepreneurs” lead and organize the mobilization of the activists (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008a, p. 6). One of the most influential entrepreneurs was Juergen Rieger. He supported the NPD with facilities and

huge amounts of financial aid²³. With his help, the NPD was able to support diverse right-wing movement actors in Germany. They were benefiting from his dense social networks across the Federal Republic.

4.1 Right-wing extremism as a social movement

The case study of the NPD provides an opportunity to overcome interdisciplinary boundaries of social movement research, party studies and populism are broken out. The concept of social movements does apply to the NPD, which acts within a heterogenic network of individuals, groups and associations in German society (Heinrich, 2008, p. 29). Although, not a classic protest party, the NPD tries to attract protest voters in the short-term, expanding its set of issues to attract more individuals (Pfahl-Traugher, 2003, p. 48). As a legally recognized party, the NPD possesses a certain degree of organized bureaucratic structure and is financed by the State. This enables the NPD to bind Neo-Nazi groups, providing organizational and material resources. The intention is to recruit adherents and bind them as members across the right-wing movement in the long-term (e.g. Heinrich, 2008, p. 30). Geographically underdeveloped areas in East Germany with high unemployment rates are targeted by the NPD. According to its own public statements, the party compensates those social and cultural gaps in which the State withdraws infrastructure and social services. As a consequence, the NPD offers social and cultural programs to young low-educated Germans in structurally underdeveloped areas (Roth, 2003, p. 24).

²³ <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/438/492792/text/> (10.01.2010)

“The NPD is part of the right-wing movement but it is not clear whether young right-wing activists are fully loyal to the NPD party. The party has to offer alternative opportunities for young sympathizers who look for “cool” music instead of polka and folk’s music with old men and beer bars.” (Expert Interview 2011 Jan Riebe)

In 1993, social sciences began with a new discussion regarding the radical right-wing not purely as extremist, but as a social movement (Pfahl-Traughber 2003: 44). It was understood as a reaction against the influx of migration and ethnic diversity as well as globalization. The “intellectual” ideologues of the right-wing adapted these issues formulating them to a new agenda. National-liberalism and the national conservatism belong to the theoretical key words of the right-wing movement. The Neo-Nazi and Skinhead scenes represent the ideas on the street fighting with violent means. Different political strands have weakened the radical right-wing movement through rivalry (Art 2011: 201; Uhrlau 1996: 12). The right-wing movement is heterogeneous, as different generations and ideological groups compete with each other. This led to discontinuous degrees of mobilization in East and West Germany.

The pursuit of social movements for societal change requires the willingness to face opponents such as State and counter movements. Ideology is a necessary characteristic for each social movement to unite and mobilize collective support. The right-wing movement contains these characteristics and uses them to mobilize collective protest. Ethno-centrism, anti-liberalism and anti-parliamentarian attitudes construct the opposite pole to the

democratic State and potential opponents from the political left (Rucht 2002: 78).

4.2 The NPD within the movement

The NPD was found in 1964 as the successor of a number of right-wing parties, which were either dissolved because of internal conflicts or banned by the State. As a pool of disappointed and grieved individuals, the NPD gathered right-wing conservatives, old Nazi members and adherents of a new Nazi Germany (Dornbusch, 2008, p.18f.). A political party is sensible as the visibility is stronger when influencing the public discourse (Koopmans/Muis, 2008, p. 7). Albeit, German media, academia and the State have been drawing an enormous amount of attention to the NPD, the party has never won a single parliamentary seat in the Bundestag since 1945 (Art, 2011, p. 191). Despite their constant failure as a parliamentary party, the NPD has managed to win seats and to enter local parliaments in some regions of East Germany. Since 1996, Udo Voigt became the head of NPD, the party shifted strategically towards the self-promotion of a social movement actor that would dedicate all its resources to the German people. At the same time, the NPD is an official parliamentary party, which competes for electoral seats in local parliaments. The NPD uses an aggressive rhetoric including biological racism. For obvious historical reasons, this is a strong legal justification for legal sanctions by the German State and judiciary. Racism and hate speeches contradict with the basic fundamentals of the free-democratic order of the German constitution. Due to the threat of legal banning by the State, the NPD started to embed its ideology-loaded issues in a strong social agenda. It improved its organizational structure and

developed strong links to violent skinhead groups and comradeships, which are usually not involved in the parliamentary political process (Spiegel, 2012, p. 34). They transmit their message through the media and manage to initiate campaigns, which are not limited to their own political or cultural milieus.

Ten years after the Islamist terrorist attacks of September 11th, Germany discovers that a wave of Right-wing terrorist hits against its citizens on its own soil. A terrorist cell called National Socialist Underground (NSU) has some personal ties closely related to the NPD. This is particularly peculiar for the NPD, which barely survived a legal ban attempt in 2003 due to formal legal mistakes. Its strategy towards a less extremist but more socially acceptable party aimed to decrease its negative appeal to the public and lower State sanctions.

At least four reasons can be named to explain why the NPD shifted its positioning. First, the NPD had to look for new voters who feel stigmatized and economically deprived after the reunification. Second, in order to look for new voters it had to promote an image of a conventional party. This leans towards extremism much less than expected. Its extremist image originates in its extremist positions and partly violent adherents. Third, this consequently leads to institutional repression through legal sanctions by the German state. As regard to the last point, the NPD had to compete with other right-wing parties such as the German Folks Union (DVU).