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Transformations of Political Culture in Post-Totalitarian Societies. Post-World War II West Germany and Post-Soviet Russia in Comparative Perspective

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To my family

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Abstract

This dissertation is a comparative historical analysis of institutional and cultural transformations in post-totalitarian societies of post-World War II West Germany and post-Soviet Russia. It addresses democratization efforts in the two countries trying to discover and understand determinants of political culture transformations as well as the factors affecting democratic consolidation in them.

Given the complexity of post-totalitarian contexts, the interplay between different levels of post-totalitarian transformations – political, economic, social, and cultural – is researched. More specifically, this study investigates how institutional transformations in post-totalitarian societies affect political culture.

The dissertation is based on critical evaluation and synthesis of the following theoretical fields: democratic transition, political culture, collective memory and national identity. It employs and develops a view of political culture as a system of symbols and meanings that determines both the collective identification and the citizens' attitudes and orientations towards the political system. This understanding of political culture has defined a twofold analysis of political culture transformations in West Germany and Russia from both attitudinal and symbolic perspectives. The analysis combines, thus, the focus on political attitudes and orientations of citizens with the focus on the history-related symbolic structures in public opinion.

The variables under consideration in the comparative study of West German and Russian societies on the individual level are interest in politics, the feeling of political efficacy, political participation, social trust, and support for democratic values. The study investigates how attitudes toward self (civic attitudes, and primarily, the feeling of political efficacy) and toward others in politics (trust, cooperative competence) as well as toward the political system changed in the cause of post-totalitarian transformations in the two analyzed cases.

Given the central place of memory in the constitution of identity the development of collective memory discourses of the two totalitarian pasts is also analyzed in detail. More specifically, the dissertation explores the ways in which West Germany and Russia confronted their totalitarian legacies and how they remembered their respective totalitarian regimes - the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. The questions addressed in this regard are: How collective memory discourses influenced the national identity and political processes in postwar West Germany and post-Soviet Russia? And more generally: How the shift in the official memory narratives from a nation-centered positive memory towards a more complex and more critical memory framework may affect democracy and national political development?

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Understanding Democratization in West Germany and Russia: the Basis for Historical Comparison

This study is a comparative historical analysis of institutional and cultural transformations in post-totalitarian societies. Initially my intention was to improve understanding of political and cultural transformations in post-Soviet Russia. In fact, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the new independent Russian state has formally taken a path of democratization. The Constitution adopted in 1993 proclaimed the Russian Federation a "democratic federative constitutional state with republican form of government."[1] Since then, in the language of legal terms as well as in the public rhetoric of Russian officials, the democratic character of the new Russian state has been seldom put under question. In his 2004 Federal Assembly address, then-President Vladimir Putin emphasized "considerable success" which had been achieved by the "young Russian democracy" and reproached those who "persistently ignored these achievements."[2] However, with each passing year since the beginning of the political reforms in post-Soviet Russia it has been getting more and more obvious that the emerging system is anything but classically democratic.

Since the mid-1990s there have been many attempts to classify the Russian political regime as either a 'hybrid regime,' combining the traits of democracy and dictatorship (Schmitter and Karl 1994); or as a 'demokratura' - the term used to describe an authoritarian regime which strongly limits political participation but is dressed up in the garb of democracy. Guillermo O'Donnell, in turn, defined it as 'delegative democracy' (O'Donnell 1994). Other classifications also

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[1] The Constitution of the Russian Federation. Moscow: Prospect, 2003.
[2] Transcript of the Federal Assembly Annual Address by President Vladimir Putin, Moscow. 26 May, 2004.

existed, such as 'authoritarian democracy and regime system' (Sakwa 1997), 'illiberal democracy' (Zakaria 1997), 'electoral democracy' (McFaul 1999), 'democratic dictatorship' (Daniels 2000), 'managed pluralism' (Balzer 2003) and even 'market Bolshevism' (Reddaway and Glinski 2001), etc.

As the authoritarian tendencies in Russian politics intensified, especially with President Putin's rise to power in 2000, the political regime in Russia was more often described as 'competitive authoritarian' (Levitsky and Way 2002), 'electoral autocracy' (Shevtsova 2004), and simply 'authoritarian' (Shlapentokh 2007; McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008; Vorozheikina 2009).

As the Russian political scientist Lilia Shevtsova put it in her article *How Russia Hasn't Coped with Democracy: The Logics of Political Sliding Backward* (2004), the Russian reality reveals that after years of attempted reforms it is "sliding backward to the state it painfully tried to overcome in the 1990s."[3]

The attempts to investigate the reasons for such a retreat required turning to other national experiences to study the problem of post-totalitarian democratization in a comparative perspective. Among other countries that had faced the challenges similar to the challenges faced by Russia in the 20th century the experience of the post-World War II Federal Republic of Germany appeared one of the most viable.

It is viable and relevant, above all, due to the fact that Germany and Russia are united in many similar aspects of their respective histories, and consequently, similar cultural heritage. The imperial German past and state-centered mode of development profoundly impacted both the German state institutions and the political culture of the German society. For example, mythology of the "unique path" and a "strong hand" mentality were inherent in the German and Russian cultures. Besides, in Germany and Russia, the countries of secondary modernization and medium levels of development, bureaucratic authoritarian methods of management used to dominate and the state used to play a significant role in national integration.

Furthermore, the idea of empire used to be of paramount importance in the histories of both states as each of them harbored the expansionist, hegemonic ambitions. Both The German Empire (*Deutsches Reich*, or *Kaiserreich*, 1871-1918) and the Russian Empire (*Rossijskaja Imperija*, 1721-1917) aspired from the 19th century to become 'modernized' countries, seen above all in terms of rapidly

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[3] *Shevtsova, Lilia.* How Russia Hasn't Coped with Democracy: The Logics of Political Sliding Backward // Pro et Contra, Vol. 8, № 3, 2004. p. 36.

advanced industrial development. This was regarded as the only way to expansionism and the attainment of great-power status.[4]

At the same time, democratic traditions in both cultures were historically rather weak. The German political culture, according to some experts' evaluations, used to display such traits as passive participation, rely on administrative rather than political procedures, and the lack in a very general sense of tolerance to "the other" manifested primarily in strong anti-Semitism. These cultural characteristics appear to be very similar to the Russian counterpart.

Furthermore, in the 20th century both Germany and Russia became the sites of ignition for the greatest century's catastrophe embodied in a "total" (or totalitarian) state becoming the scenes of most inhuman cruelty. Within the limits of these two countries, totalitarian regimes regarded subsequently as "classic" cases found soil for their realization.

Despite essential differences in the two totalitarian dictatorships of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union (expressed primarily in different ideologies as well as different durations of existence and scenarios of collapse), it is important to note the evident similarities in their political toolkits and methods of goal achievement, as well as in the destinies of the countries afflicted by them. As the authors of the volume *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison* conceptualized, "the unprecedented inroads into all mobilization and new levels and types of repression and terror are crucial features that bracket these regimes together and distinguish them from other modern dictatorships."[5]

The similar destinies of Russia and Germany lie also in the fact that although with almost semicentenial rupture (Germany in 1945, Russia in 1991), both countries in the long run had to take the path of large scale socio-political transformation caused by the collapse of their respective totalitarian regimes.

The likeness of political, economic and social context in postwar Germany and post-Soviet Russia can also be easily hallmarked. The consequences of defeat in World War II for Germany were economic collapse, breakdown of the political system, liquidation of state independence, and an identity crisis due to a prevailing complex of national defeat. In Russia the consequences of 'losing' in the Cold War which resulted in the country's disintegration were also hard to cope with. The problems of severe economic crisis, narrowed national borders, destroyed Soviet institutions which lost both functionality and legitimacy,

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[4] See *Kershaw, Ian; Lewin, Moshe* (eds.) Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p. 345.
[5] Ibid. p. 344.

demanded the same immediate solution as half a century before in postwar Germany.

The collapse of totalitarian regimes in both countries required not simply reforming, but in many respects, creating political, economic, and social spheres anew. Both post-WWII Germany and post-Soviet Russia not only had to carry out political democratization, but also were compelled to introduce a liberal market system, launch prices liberalization, remove numerous regulations and controls, and establish federative relations among the countries' regions. The exit from totalitarian rule in both countries took place in a situation of severe economic recession.

The legacies of Germany's and Russia's turbulent histories, however, have often raised serious questions about the possibility and viability of the democratic system in these countries.

It is important also to point out that the political cultures of postwar Germany and post-Soviet Russia were very much alike. The observers from The Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) in the American zone of occupation as well as such researchers as Friedrich von Hayek (1944), Karl Jaspers (1945, 1966), Theodor Adorno (1950, 1959), Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963), Ralf Dahrendorf (1965), Steven Warnecke (1970), Kurt Sontheimer (1973), to name just a few, underscored the lack of democratic traits in Germans and pointed to such characteristics of the German political culture as "pragmatic," "detached," "almost cynical," and "passive." Observers of the Russian political culture, most notably Stephen White (1984, 2000, 2004), Yuri Levada (1993, 1995, 2000), Jeffrey W. Hahn (1991, 1993, 2001, 2005), similarly underscored cultural continuities with the inheritance of the Soviet regime in post-Soviet Russia. To illustrate, Yuri Levada and his colleagues pointed to the persistence of such features of 'Soviet Man' as self-isolation, state paternalism, cynicism and slyness, etc. The totalitarian regimes in Germany and Russia, thus, left very similar traces in the culture and social relations of the two societies.

Review of specific political and economic differences of the two cases provides valuable insight. These differences ultimately defined the specifics of the respective post-totalitarian regimes. For instance, the fact that private property was not prohibited under Hitler explains why privatization reform in postwar Germany was not required. Another significant difference refers the levels of civil society development. In fact, political parties, trade unions, businesses, local grassroots associations, and churches of various denominations were all part of German civil society since the second half of the 19th century. Since the Nazi rule lasted much less than the Soviet, the elite counter movement formed during the Weimar period, despite rather severe repressions, largely survived the Third Reich (either in inner emigration or abroad) becoming a basic

driving force of postwar democratization. In Russia the civil society which had started developing in the short inter-revolutionary period between 1905 and 1917 certainly could not survive the Stalin's reign of terror.[6] But even after the dictator's death in 1953 and the Khrushev's de-Stalinization campaign the secret police penetration of society and the deterrent effect of that penetration remained too high for civil society to be able to develop. The *dissidents* that started appearing in the Soviet Union during that period lived in an atmosphere of fear and in constant expectation of arrest. Nevertheless, namely these groups of underground activists were later in the forefront of post-Soviet democratization processes on the civil society level.

The main difference of the two situations was, however, Germany's postwar occupation. The political institutions of postwar Germany were created under the direct impact and supervision of the Western Allies, who controlled the initial stages of the postwar transformation. By contrast, Russian reforms had to be launched and implemented without any outward strict supervision and support. Most important is that the denazification program carried out by the Allied occupation forces in Germany resulted in liquidation of the Nazi party, any affiliated organizations and repressive institutions such as the Elite Guard (SS), the Security Agency (SD) of the SS, the Secret State Police (*Gestapo*). In Russia where no similar program took place, the Soviet secret police Committee for State Security (KGB) and other law enforcement agencies survived the collapse of the USSR. Though formally KGB was dismantled and ceased to exist in 1991, its successor from late 1991 – the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) – preserved many of the former KGB functions and much of its structure.[7] In 1995, the FSK was reorganized into the Federal Security Service (FSB) which soon reemerged into one of the most powerful political forces in Russia.

Nevertheless, as a closer look at the German postwar situation makes it clear, the impact of the occupation and denazification program as its part was albeit highly important but limited. In the first instance, it was due to the fact that the occupation period appeared limited in terms of time lasting incomparably less than the subsequent independent West German state.

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[6] On development of civil society in pre-revolutionary Russia see, for example, *Wartenweiler, David.* Civil Society and Academic Debate in Russia 1905-1914. (Oxford Historical Monographs). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. *Conroy, Mary Schaeffer.* Civil Society in Late Imperial Russia. In: *Evans, Alfred B. Jr.; Henry, Laura A.; Sundstrom, Lisa McIntosh* (eds.) Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment. New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2005.

[7] *Gevorkian, Natalia.* The KGB: "They Still Need Us" // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1993. pp. 36–39. <http://books.google.com/books?id=aQsAAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA36>; *Albats, Yevgenia.* The State within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia—Past, Present, and Future. Trans. by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994.

Secondly, the occupation authorities' policies were more aimed at helping Germans to get over their problems themselves rather than solving the problems for them. There is much evidence that the Allied authorities in the western parts of postwar Germany were primarily concerned with ensuring that Germany overcame its economic and social difficulties, thereby getting well gradually and independently.[8]

In his September 1946 speech *Restatement of Policy on Germany* (also known as *The Speech of Hope*), James Francis Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, expressed the intention of the American people to "return the government of Germany to the German people."[9]

Thus the Allies' active support and involvement took place only during the initial stages of the new state. Subsequently Germans, just like Russians, had to build up their political system independently.

Furthermore, the occupation authorities were unable to provide all the necessary personnel for deciding everyday issues in such a complex and densely populated country as Germany. This encouraged the delegation of local responsibilities back to the German authorities as quickly as possible.

A vivid indicator of the "national" factor relevance in the course of German reforms was the fact that the Economic Council responsible for adoption and realization of the Allies' basic decisions was headed by a German citizen who acted with a rather high degree of independence.

While France and Great Britain nationalized most of their economies and introduced central planning, Ludwig Erhard, elected in 1948 by the Bizonial Economic Council to the office of Director of Economics, launched currency reform and abolished the price fixing and production controls that had been enacted by the prior military administration. His actions definitely exceeded the authority of his office.[10]

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[8] See *Drabkin, Jakov* et al. (eds.) Totalitarizm v Evrope 20 veka: Iz istorii ideologij, dvizhenij, rezhimov i ih preodolenija. Moscow: Pamjatniki istoricheskoj mysli, 1996. p. 376.

[9] *Byrnes, James Francis.* Restatement of Policy on Germany. Speech held in Stuttgart on 6 September, 1946. <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga4-460906.htm>

[10] One day General Lucius Clay, commander of American forces in Germany, called Erhard into his office and said, "Herr Erhard, my advisers tell me you're making a terrible mistake." Erhard replied, "Don't listen to them, General. My advisers tell me the same thing." Journalist Edwin Hartrich also described Erhard's confrontation with a U.S. Army colonel who asked him the same week: "How dare you relax our rationing system, when there is a widespread food shortage?" Erhard's reply this time was: "But, Herr Oberst. I have not relaxed rationing; I have abolished it! Henceforth, the only rationing ticket the people will need will be the deutschemark. And they will work hard to get these deutschemarks, just wait and see." In: *Hartrich, Edwin.* The Fourth and Richest Reich. New York: Macmillan, 1980. pp. 4, 13.

The difference between the initial plans of the Western Allies and the actual outcome of the reforms also provides evidence that the German leaders acted quite independently and that decisions made by the national political elites were determinant of the country's postwar development. In fact, according to the Potsdam Conference agreements Germany was compelled "to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she had caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility."[11] This meant payment of essential reparations to the Allied countries. Within the country the Allies intended "to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services […] essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries."[12]

Adopted by the Allied Control Council in March 1946 the Industry Plan for Germany introduced even more rigid requirements than had been fixed in the Potsdam Declaration. In essence, this plan intended to lower and control German industrial potential after World War II so that it would not represent a military threat in the future. However, the plan was also likely to prevent Germany from competing seriously in the world markets over a long term perspective. According to historian Boris Zaritsky, the idea of the Potsdam agreements and the Industry Plan was to convert postwar Germany into an agricultural and light industry economy where reduced industry would function mainly to supply reparations and the minimum needs of the German population.[13]

In light of the Allies' goals, how can the high growth rates of the late 1950s be explained? The economic growth as well as other achievements of the West German postwar state provide evidence that German leaders were capable of leading the nation out of the systemic crisis and managed to assert the German peoples' right to independence.

The occupation of the western parts of postwar Germany by the Allied powers appears thus an important, but not a decisive factor in German transformations. Active intervention of the occupation authorities took place only at the initial stage of transformations, in the formative first years of the Federal Republic. After that Germans also had to build and further sustain their political system on their own.

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[11] The Potsdam Declaration. Tripartite Agreement by the United States, the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia concerning Conquered Countries, 2 August, 1945.
<http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450802a.html>
[12] Ibid.
[13] *Zaritskij, Boris.* Ludwig Erhard: sekrety "ekonomicheskogo chuda". Moscow: BEK, 1997. pp. 44-45.

As known, Germany achieved considerable success this way, having restored its legitimate place in Europe after a long isolation by creating a stable political system of representative democracy. By the 1960s it became the homeland of the Economic Miracle, having reached a high level of economic growth and people's welfare. As for post-Soviet Russia, its path of transformation appeared much more problematic.

The comparative analysis of the two cases could be helpful thus in discerning the "weak points" of the failed Russian transition and so contribute to an understanding of the conditions necessary for a successful exit from totalitarian rule, which Russia may yet achieve.

It is noteworthy that despite explicit similarities of the two countries that have not only endured totalitarian rule but were burdened by highly repressive, criminal national pasts, there have been virtually no studies comparing postwar Germany and post-Soviet Russia. This is why I chose to investigate post-totalitarian transformations in these two cases through their historical comparison. By this work I not only intend to fill in the gap in the literature, but to refine a more general understanding of post-totalitarian democratization.

The main research question addressed in this dissertation is: What were determinants of political culture transformations and the factors affecting democratic consolidation in the post-World War II Federal Republic of Germany and the post-Soviet Russian Federation?

While comparative research of transformations in the two cases might primarily interest those concerned about German and Russian politics and culture, this analysis has certainly broader implications, and thus is closely linked to a set of more general questions that are relevant for a broader audience: What is the correlation between institutional change, transformations of political culture and national identity? Under what circumstances citizens are more likely to acquire democratic attitudes and skills? Which are the effects of the institutional transformations over the individual attitudes of citizens towards themselves and others in politics? What factors contribute to attainment of congruence between political culture and structure? What role collective memory of the traumatic past plays in shaping the national identity and fostering democratic consolidation? What are the sources of change and the mechanisms through which change occurs?

In the following section of this introductory chapter I will develop the theoretical foundations of my general argument that lies at the crossroads between the democratization, political culture and collective memory theories. Addressing the main theoretical issues will allow me to discuss the rationale behind the selected strategy of comparative analysis. In the following section I

will also discuss how I have designed the research to address and compare political culture transformations in the two analyzed cases.

1.2 Theoretical Framework and the Thesis Structure

As I have stated above, this dissertation represents a comparative study of post-totalitarian transformations of post-WW II West Germany and post-Soviet Russia.

The dissertation has three different, albeit highly interdependent parts: in the first one (**Chapter 2**), I present an overview of political context of transformations and trace the impact of economic reforms on democratic consolidation in the two cases. In the next **Chapter 3** I move to the individual-level analysis of political culture. The rationale behind that chapter is to offer an overview of the political culture developments from the perspective of citizens' orientations towards political system and their participation in it. **Chapter 4**, in turn, moves into the explanatory analysis of the symbolic dimension of political culture which primarily affects the legitimation of polities and the formation of national identity. More specifically this part of the dissertation explores the determinants of German and Russian collective memory narratives of their respective totalitarian pasts and investigates how they have evolved in the course of the exit from totalitarian rule.

To begin addressing the theoretical foundations of the research, it is important to point out that since the 1970s problems of democratic transitions have been extensively developed in the so-called 'transitology' literature primarily based on the studies of transitions from authoritarian rule in the countries of Southern Europe and Latin America. The discussions about regime change in that region of the world were launched by Dankwart Rustow's 1970 pioneering article and the tenets of a lengthy debate on democratic transitions were largely summarized in the influential 4-volume edition by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (1986).

With the end of the Cold war, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, researchers' attention was increasingly drawn to the transformations of the former communist Eastern European states. At the initial stage some scholars of comparative politics were eager to present post-communist regime change as a process analogous to the democratization that had been previously taking place in other parts of the world. At the beginning of the 1990s such authors as Samuel Huntington (1991), Adam Przeworski (1991), and Giuseppe di Palma (1990) published books that treated

the Eastern European transformations of 1989 as part of a global tendency toward democratization. However, other prominent thinkers with expertise in the post-communist region questioned this approach pointing to the peculiarities of the communist regimes and underscoring the inadequacy of applying the entire transitological framework to post-communist analysis (most notably, Bunce 1995, 1998, 2000, 2003; O'Donnell 1996; Jowitt 1996, 1998). The transition paradigm was also criticized for its alleged teleological assumption of linear historical progress leading toward a single and pre-determined endpoint—liberal democracy (Carothers 2002; Cohen 2000; Gel'man 1999; Pickel 2002; Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Stark 1992; Verdery 1996; Stark and Bruszt 1998).[14]

Since the beginning of the 1990s, scholars have more often pointed to the more dramatic character of transformations in post-communist Eastern Europe (whereat entire economies were to be restructured, national consciousnesses and, in some cases, national boundaries were to be reshaped) in comparison with the former authoritarian transitions. Valerie Bunce (1995) was among the first to point to the difference between the nature of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America and the totalitarian states of the Eastern Bloc. In their comparative research *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (1996) Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan also drew attention to some unique traits of post-communist regimes such as the legacies of totalitarianism in their case studies of Eastern Europe.

Though I do consider a transition framework a useful analytical construct, in this work I will operate mostly with a less teleological and more open-ended concept of "transformation."[15] My focus will be primarily on the developments in the two analyzed cases and on evaluation of empirical evidence in relation to them.

The study of post-totalitarian transformations could not, certainly, get along without reference to the literature on totalitarian rule developed primarily in the works *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (1956) by Carl J. Friedrich and Zbignew K. Brzezinski, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1958) by Hanna Arendt and *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (1975) by Juan J. Linz.

In this thesis I adopt the definition of a totalitarian system introduced by Lev Gudkov (2001) who defined it as "the structure of institutions of repressive and isolated societies, the functioning of which is provided by the definite

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[14] See *Gans-Morse, Jordan.* Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm // Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 20, № 4, 2004. pp. 320–349.

[15] According to a dictionary definition, a transformation connotes a "marked change, as in appearance or character, usually for the better." See the *American Heritage Dictionary* at <http://dictionary.reference.com/> Quoted in *Gans-Morse, Jordan.* Op. cit.

technology of power."[16] Based on this definition it is possible to conceptualize that the extrication from totalitarian rule is to be manifested in the transformation of both the specific structures of totalitarian rule and the societies which sustain them.

In this study I will be focusing primarily on cultural aspects of post-totalitarian transformations. However, I do realize that the complexity of post-totalitarian contexts cannot be understood without attention to different, albeit interrelated, spheres in which the transformations occur – political, economic, social and cultural. More specifically, such factors as domestic politics, economic well-being, social attitudes and behavior, historical legacies as well as external factors should be considered in order to grasp the complexity of post-totalitarian societies.

Similarly, though representatives of different schools of thought tend to stress the importance of either cultural (*culturalists*) or institutional (*institutionalists*) factors in the cause of social transformations, both factors, as it appears, are equally relevant as they mutually affect each other. Both theses that "the behavior of peoples is determined by their respective cultural traditions," and that "political engineering" is determinant in terms of transformations' success appear credible and worthy of analysis.[17]

Therefore in this research I would like to investigate how the institutional changes in the course of exit from totalitarian rule affected political cultures of the analyzed societies. It will be also interesting to see how cultural changes affected political system of each country.

In the following sections of this introductory chapter I will address theoretical issues of political and cultural change and introduce the main concepts that will be used in this work. The overview of the main theoretical discourses will help me in defining key variables of the further comparative analysis.

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[16] *Gudkov, Lev.* "Totalitarinism" kak teoreticheskaya ramka ("Totalitarism" as a Theoretical Framework) In: *Gudkov, Lev.* Negativnaja identichnost'. Stat'i 1997-2002 godov. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, VCIOM-A, 2004. p. 419.

[17] On controversy between culturalists and institutionalists see: *Werlin, Herbert H.; Eckstein, Harry.* Political Culture and Political Change // The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, №. 1, March 1990. pp. 249-259. *White, Leslie A.* Science and Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization. New York: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 1969. p. xxiv.

1.2.1 Analyzing Political Context of Transformations (Institutional Dimension of Democratic Consolidation)

Transition from authoritarian and, particularly, totalitarian regimes is a highly complicated and ambiguous process. During these periods, society experiences a loss of the former stability and an uncertainty of the future. Also, there is an institutional vacuum characterized by the absence of well-defined 'rules of the game' and ambiguity surrounding the mechanisms of conflict resolution. Not surprisingly then, many transformation periods do not end with the triumph of democracy, but often with chaos and anarchy, leading to new dictatorships.

According to the Argentine sociologist Guillermo O'Donnell, "The crucial element in determining the outcome of the transition to democracy is success or failure in the building of a set of institutions which become important decisional points in the flow of political power. Such an outcome is contingent upon governmental policies and political strategies of various agents which embody the recognition of a paramount shared interest in the task of democratic institution building. Successful contemporary cases have exhibited great care, by a winning coalition of political leaders, in advancing toward the creation and strengthening of democratic political institutions and, to a lesser extent, of interest representation. In turn, these achievements have facilitated reasonable success in dealing with the social and economic problems inherited from the authoritarian predecessors."[18]

According to modern political science, democratic transition is generally regarded as a cycle beginning with the collapse of the previous regime and concluding with the initiation of democratic consolidation. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, having united various approaches to the concept of democratic consolidation, concluded that "a democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure.*"[19]

These two political dimensions, which Linz and Stepan name as a necessary condition of a democratic regime consolidation, correspond directly with the two dimensions of the power accountability described by O'Donnell.

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[18] *O'Donnell, Guillermo.* Delegative Democracy // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, № 1, January 1994.
[19] *Linz, Juan, Stepan, Alfred.* Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. p. 3.

Prevalence of formal institutions, according to the scholar, creates conditions for "horizontal" accountability of power, which supplements the mechanism of "vertical" accountability realized by means of electoral competition. Horizontal accountability is carried out in "a network of relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other institutions) that have the capacity of calling into question and eventually punishing "improper" ways of discharging the responsibilities of the given officer."[20] Accountability in institutionalized representative democracy is realized both vertically and horizontally.

Democracy, in other words, presupposes the presence of institutions (or sets of standard norms and rules of political activity) in the framework of which the state-power appears accountable to citizens for its decisions and actions. These institutions also carry out representation and consequently accountability of power holders, providing thus a republican dimension of democracy.[21] Among these democratic institutions the institution of elections or the electoral competition in modern democratic societies certainly reigns supreme. A regular change of government in the course of general free and fair competitive elections is a key criterion which differentiates democratic and non-democratic regimes.

However, democracy should not be reduced to a "procedural minimum," to a pure institutional process of implementing elections or other practices. Empirical analysis reveals many examples of political systems in which the presence of elections does not guarantee elimination of authoritarian rule which continues to exist covered up by a democratic façade. Thus, despite the significance of vertical accountability of power for establishment and consolidation of a democratic regime, the process of transition from a command-administrative, totalitarian system to a system of liberal democracy should be also marked by addressing the problem of horizontal accountability, i.e. the formation of formal, public, independent institutions.

It is horizontal accountability that actually creates *a political space* in any state system. Despite O'Donnell's pointing to existence of vertical accountability alongside the right to form parties and influence the public opinion in the so-called "delegative" democracies (which upon closer examination resemble much more authoritarian than democratic regimes), a regime might be seriously questioned when the mechanisms of horizontal accountability are lacking. It is obvious that the absence of horizontal accountability of the executive by the

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[20] See. *O'Donnell, Guillermo.* Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, № 3, 1998. pp. 112-26; Delegative Democracy // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, № 1, January 1994. pp. 55-69.

[21] According to O'Donnell (1994), "Representation entails the idea of accountability: somehow the representative is held responsible for the ways in which he acts in the name of those for whom he claims to be entitled to speak."

legislature and the judiciary will either considerably reduce the efficiency of vertical accountability in a form of electoral competition, or completely eliminate it in case of a likely absorption of political space by the executive. Anyhow, it is possible to speak about the dilution of vertical accountability in case of its horizontal counterpart absence. Moreover, it can become a serious obstacle to formation of a democratic law-based state observing the citizens' rights and freedoms and governed by the rule of law.

As already Charles Montesquieu conceptualized in *The Spirit of Laws*, "when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest *the same* monarch or senate should *enact* tyrannical laws to *execute* them in a tyrannical manner. Again: Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for *the judge* would then be *the legislator*. Were it joined to the executive power, *the judge* might behave with all the violence of *an oppressor.*"[22] Similarly, according to the pluralistic concept of "polyarchy" introduced by Robert Dahl, observance of the basic civil and political rights serves as the main indicator of the democratic character of society.[23]

The creation of formal, depersonalized political institutions ensuring governmental accountability may be also viewed as an expression of sociopolitical modernization characterized by continuous structural differentiation in the major institutional spheres of the society as well as the continual weakening of ascriptive and direct allocation and regulation, and the development of various mechanisms of nonascriptive allocation.[24]

The understanding of importance of the system's institutional dimension should prevent the extremely broad use of the term "democracy" generally employed in the recent years. This tendency, that evidently started with the world-wide euphoria about the alleged "end of history" and inevitable democratization of the failed authoritarian regimes in the late 1980s, has led to naming the states, having endured the collapse of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes and trying to get out of their ruins, new "democracies" without much differentiation. However defining the countries which lack the necessary content or the institutional framework as democracies seems inappropriate. One can speak about the completed democratic consolidation no sooner than the democratic institutions, manifested in an effective system of "checks and

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[22] *Montesquieu, Charles.* The Spirit of Laws. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002. p. 151.

[23] *Dahl, Robert.* Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven / London, 1989.

[24] *Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah.* Modernization: Protest and Change. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966. pp. 9, 11.

balances," a strong parliament, an independent judicial system, government by the rule of law, etc. have been formed and established.

From this perspective in **Chapter 2** of this research I will address the political context of post-totalitarian transformations in post-WWII West Germany and post-Soviet Russia. I will investigate how political institutions, primarily the national executives and legislatures, in the two countries were changed and compare these changes.[26] In the same chapter I will also explore how the economic reforms affected the institutional building processes in both countries, acknowledging the utmost importance of economic transformations for societies who have to reform their political and economic systems simultaneously. I believe that the general understanding of the institutional context of transformations in the analyzed cases can provide an important basis for further analysis of cultural transformations in post-totalitarian West Germany and Russia.

As it appears, the research and analysis of political transformations of post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian societies should be focused, primarily, not on the declarative statements of its leaders and not only on the constitutional provisions, but on the institutional characteristics of the emerging political systems. As O'Donnell justly observed, "formal rules about how political [and administrative] institutions are supposed to work are often poor guides to what actually happens."[25]

In the following subsections of this introductory chapter I will dwell on the political culture discourse development and present the relevant thesis chapters afterwards.

1.2.2 Analyzing Political Culture: Focusing on Political Attitudes, Orientations and Behavior

Interest in cultural aspects of politics, emphasis on the importance of the cultural factors, as well as awareness that culture in general and values in particular play an important part in human life are not new phenomena. As one of the founding fathers of the political culture theory Gabriel Almond observed, "Something like a notion of political culture has been around as long as men have spoken and written about politics."[27] The development of the political culture concept,

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[25] *O'Donnell, Guillermo.* 1994. Op. cit. p. 40.

[26] NB: Due to space limitations I will not be able to discuss the transformations of the German and Russian judiciaries in this thesis. Besisdes, for the same reasons I will not focus on the cadre rotation system in postwar West Germany and post-Soviet Russia.

[27] In: *Almond, Gabriel; Verba, Sidney* (eds.) The Civic Culture Revisited. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989. p. 1.

however, dates back to the late 1950s - 1960s when relevant research in political science was stimulated by several sociopolitical factors. At that point of time the collapse of representative governments in interwar Italy and Germany as well as the failures of democratic transitions in some non-Western countries, trying to copy Western political models, required explanation and the political system of democracy in the Western context needed finding new ways of stabilization. Additionally, the necessity to "democratize" former dictatorships faced by political and cultural elites in the post-World War II period asked for renewal of existing theories.

Although interest in political culture faded in the 1970s and 1980s, the debate has been revitalized since the 1990s as a result of efforts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics to construct democracy out of the ashes of communism, as well as growing concern in "old" democracies about the apparent decline of social engagement, electoral turnout and about other signs of public weariness and skepticism.

In the 20th century the political culture concept was introduced by the American social scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in their seminal 1963 study *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, where it was argued that in addition to the institutional and constitutional features of political systems, the political orientations of the individuals who constitute them are also relevant.[28] Almond and Verba's work thus redirected empirical enquiry from an inclusive preoccupation "with the structure and function of political systems, institutions, and agencies, and their effects on public policy" and their concept of political culture bridged the gap between macro-level politics and micro-politics.[29] As the scholars suggested, "The relationship between attitudes and motivations of the discrete individuals who make up the political systems and the character and performance of political systems may be discovered systematically through concepts of political culture."[30]

The major point of Almond and Verba's comparative study was thus addressing the role of subjective values and attitudes of national populations in the stability of democratic regimes. They defined "political culture" as the

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[28] Barnard (1969) pointed out that the term 'political culture' was used as early as the 18th century by Johann Gottfried von Herder, student of Immanuel Kant, a dialogue partner of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, and a mentor and friend of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe // See Johann Gottfried Herder on Social and Political Culture. Edited and translated by F. M. Barnard, 1969.

[29] *Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney.* The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. p. 31.

[30] Ibid. p. 32.

aggregate pattern of individual subjective attitudes and political dispositions in the populace to political institutions and outcomes.[31]

In a newer formulation Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell (1980) elaborated the concept of political culture in three directions: (1) substantive content; (2) varieties of orientation; and (3) the systemic relations among these components, and argued that analysis of a nation's political culture would have to concern itself with all three. From the point of view of *substantive content* one may speak of *system culture*, *process culture*, and *policy culture*. *The system culture* of a nation consisted of the distribution of the attitudes toward the national community and its authorities, including the sense of national identity, attitudes toward the legitimacy and effectiveness of the incumbents of the various political roles. *The process culture* included attitudes toward the self in politics (e.g. parochial – subject – participant) and attitudes toward other political actors (e.g. trust, cooperative competence, hostility). *The policy culture* consisted of the distribution of preferences regarding the outputs and outcomes of politics, the ordering among different social groupings of such political values as welfare, security and liberty.[32]

Orientations toward the system, process and policy objects may, in turn, be *cognitive*, consisting of beliefs, information, and analysis; *affective*, consisting of feelings of attachment, aversion, or indifference; or *evaluative*, consisting of moral judgments of one kind or another (what they think of how things are).

A third aspect of a political culture would be the relatedness or systemic character of its components. Based on Philip Converse's concept of "constraint" characterizing situations in which attitudes toward political institutions and policies go together, the researchers argued that the political cultures of nations and groups may be distinguished and compared according to their internal constraint or consistency: "Thus, in a given population, attitudes toward foreign policy, domestic economic policy, and racial segregation may be parts of a consistent ideology; for most individuals in this group, if one knew how they stood on foreign policy one could predict their views on taxation, on busing, and the like. In other groups these attitudes might be independent. Similarly, information, beliefs, feelings, and moral judgments are interrelated."[33]

On the basis of extensive cross-national survey research in five nations – the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy and Mexico, - *The Civic Culture* theorized three basic orientations toward political institutions and

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[31] Ibid. p. 12.

[32] *Almond, Gabriel A.; Powell, Bingham Jr.* (eds.) Comparative Politics Today: A World View. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1980.

[33] *Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney.* 1989. Op. cit. pp. 27-28.

outcomes: *parochial*, where politics is not differentiated as a distinct sphere of life and is of relatively little interest; *subject*, in which individuals are aware of the political system and its outcomes but are relatively passive; and *participant*, where citizens have a strong sense of their role in politics and responsibility for it. In their comparative research Almond and Verba paid attention to the citizens' orientations toward political institutions and outcomes, and rated five countries on these qualities, finding the United States and the United Kingdom to be participant political cultures, Germany to be subject, Italy and Mexico to be relatively parochial.

Subsequent work in this tradition developed Almond and Verba's original argument regarding the link between citizens' attitudes and orientations and the stability of political system of democracy. Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues' broad-ranging cross-national study of democracy and citizen attitudes *The World Value Survey* confirmed that both the inauguration and stability of democracy is promoted by certain traits of political culture among the citizenry. The researchers discovered the link between democracy, economic affluence, basic satisfaction with political life and high levels of interpersonal trust thus arguing that democracy depends on cultural as well as economic factors. Inglehart and his coauthors particularly emphasized the importance of "secular-rational" and "self-expression" values over "traditional" and "survival" values in the attainment of democracy.[34] Seymour Martin Lipset (1959, 1994) also devoted much attention to the causal links between levels of social development, culture and democracy.

Other scholars in this tradition – James S. Coleman (1988), Robert Putman (1993, 2000), Francis Fukuyama (1995) et al. – further developed the political culture theory by introducing a concept of "social capital" defined by Putnam in the early 1990s as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions."[35]

In 2000, an important collection of essays *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, drawn from a symposium sponsored by the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies and edited by Lawrence E. Harrison

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[34] *Inglehart, Ronald.* The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Postindustrial Societies // American Political Science Review, 65, 1971. pp. 991–1017.

[35] *Putnam, Robert.* Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. p. 167. Later Putnam also referred to "connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them." See *Putnam, Robert D.* Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. p. 19.

and Samuel P. Huntington, addressed worldwide effects of culture on liberalization, prosperity, and justice in different national contexts.[36]

It is noteworthy that one of the major debates around the political culture concept occurred in relation to the role of citizens' participation and behavior. In fact, Almond conceptualized that the civic culture concept is largely based on "the 'rationality-activist model' of democratic citizenship, the model of a successful democracy that required that all citizens be involved and active in politics and their participation be informed, analytical and rational."[37] He added, however, that this model is considered to be only one component of the civic culture and that "only when combined in some sense with its opposites of passivity, trust and deference to authority and competence […] is a viable and stable democracy possible."[38] The theoretical framework of the five-nation study put thus major emphasis on the "mixed" character of the "civic culture," which combined "some measure of competence, involvement, and activity with passivity and non-involvement."[39]

Although this emphasis on passivity was criticized by those who argued that political participation was the very stuff of democratic government, Almond and Verba underscored the correlation between strong democracy and rational involvement and participation of citizens. They argued that civic culture is, in the first place, an allegiant participant political culture in which the political culture and political structure are congruent. According to the scholars, "the democratic citizen is expected to be active in politics and to be involved in it. He is also supposed to be rational in his approach to politics, guided by reason, not by emotion and he is supposed to be well-informed and a decision is made on the basis of careful calculation as to the interests and the principles he would like to see furthered."[40]

Furthermore, Almond and Verba stressed the importance of participation and engagement even in non-political organizations and associations for democratic development and democratic political culture, arguing that "membership in some associations, even if the individual does not consider the membership politically relevant and even if it does not involve his active participation, does lead to a more competent citizenry."[41] More recently, Robert Putnam confirmed that non-political organizations in civil society are vital for

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[36] *Harrison, Lawrence E.; Huntington, Samuel P.* Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books, 2000.

[37] *Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney.* 1963. Op. cit. p. 16.

[38] Ibid.

[39] *Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney.* 1989. Op. cit. p. 221.

[40] *Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney.* 1963. Op. cit. pp. 29-30.

[41] Ibid. p. 322, see also *Verba et al.* 1978, 1995; *Parry et al.* 1992.

democracy as they build social capital, trust and shared values, which are transferred into the political sphere and help to hold society together, facilitating an understanding of the interconnectedness of society and interests within it.[42]

Over time the allegation that civic engagement and democracy are inseparable has become widely acknowledged. As Jan van Deth has recently observed, "Democracy is not worth its name, if it does not refer to government by the people; hence democracy cannot function without some minimum level of political involvement. A lack of political involvement is considered destructive for democracy and debates are focused on the degree of involvement – not on the necessity of participation."[43]

Although students of political culture were not particularly united over inclusion of political behavior in the definition of political culture, even those followers of the subjectivist approach who like Archie Brown and Jack Gray (1977), as well as Jeffrey W. Hahn (1991, 1993, 2001, 2005) excluded political behavior from the definition, they did not completely disregard it. As Brown noted, "To define political culture in such a way as to exclude behavior in no way implies a lack of interest in behavior."[44] According to this view, however, the significance of political culture is independent of its ability to explain political behavior, although the two may be related.

Other researchers, however, moved beyond the attitudinal dimension to include political behavior and political participation in the definition of political culture. The representatives of another, more "interpretivist" approach to political culture, became associated with the anthropological methods used by the followers of Clifford Geertz and Max Weber argued for inclusion of behavior and participation in the definition.[45]

Following this tradition, in this work I include the participatory aspect in the analysis of political culture developments in Germany in Russia. By *political participation* I understand citizens' activities aimed at influencing political decisions. Jan van Deth observed that though various definitions of political participation (for e.g. by Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba and Nie 1972; Kaase and Marsh 1979; Parry et al. 1992; Verba et al. 1995; Norris 2001) emphasize distinct

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[42] *Putnam, Robert D.; Leonardi, Robert; Nanetti, Raffaella Y*. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

[43] *van Deth, Jan W.* Studying Political Participation: Towards a Theory of Everything? Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, Grenoble, 6–11 April 2001. pp. 4-5.

[44] *Brown, Archie.* Political Culture and Communist Studies. London: Macmillan, 1984. p. 150.

[45] See more on this discussion in *Hahn, Jeffrey W.* 'Yaroslavl' Revisited: Assessing Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture Since 1990. In: *Whitefield, Stephen* (ed.), Political Culture and Post-Communism, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2005.

aspects differently they share the common understanding of this phenomenon. Political participation refers to people in their role as *citizens* and is understood as an *activity*, i.e. presupposes some action. To add to this, the activities of citizens defined as political participation should be *voluntary* and not ordered by the ruling class or obliged under some law or rule. Finally, political participation concerns *government and politics* in a broad sense of these words ('political system') and is neither restricted to specific phases (such as parliamentary decision making, or the 'input' side of the political system), nor to specific levels or areas (such as national elections or contacts with officials).[46]

It is noteworthy that the study of political participation since the mid-20th century has been developing in direction of constant expansion reflecting the social changes in modern societies. The research in this field has dealt with numerous forms of political participation such as casting a vote in elections and campaigning by politicians and parties (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Berelson 1952); participation in community groups and direct contacts between citizens, public officials, and politicians (Verba and Nie 1972); participation in social movements and public protests (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979); civil activities as volunteering and social engagement (Putnam 2000; Norris 2001; Thränhardt and Hunger 2000). Whether citizens take part in public life through direct forms of political participation, such as voting, party work, organizing for a cause, demonstrating, lobbying, or in more indirect forms, such as membership in civic groups and voluntary associations, both kinds of participation, it is argued, influence the quality of government.[47]

If the correlation between political democratization and citizens' involvement in political affairs has been widely acknowledged, there was a considerable debate regarding the causation of this correlation.

In his famous critique of *The Civic Culture* study, Brian Barry (1978) pointed out that political culture should be viewed as the effect and not as the cause of political processes. He believed that correlation between civic culture attitudes and democracy does not say anything about causal chain. The presumption that a civic culture is conducive to democracy can also be interpreted the other way round, but such a conclusion would be less exiting, namely that "'democracy' produces 'civic culture'."[48] In a similar vein, Dankwart Rustow (1970) argued that "democracy makes democrats" rather than vice versa.

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[46] *van Deth, Jan W.* Studying Political Participation: Towards a Theory of Everything? Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, Grenoble, 6–11 April 2001. pp. 4-5.

[47] Ibid. See also *Remington, Thomas F*. Politics in Russia. London: Longman, 2006. p. 385.

[48] *Barry, Brian.* Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. pp. 51-52.

Carol Pateman (1980) criticized the assumed relationship between people's orientations and political outcomes, arguing that it remained unclear how the values of people should affect the political system.[49] The direction of causality imputed between democracy and political culture has also been subject to some empirical scrutiny by Richard Rose et al. (1998), Edward N. Muller and Mitchel Seligson (1994), and John Sides (1999).

Developing this line of argumentation Jeffrey Hahn (2005) underscored that it is wrong to assume that political outcomes are directly linked to, or explained by, political culture. Hahn shared the view that institutional outcomes and political culture are mutually dependent and that the causal arrow can go either way. While political culture may condition political outcomes and institutions, it is equally clear that political institutions can and do shape political cultures.[50]

In his answer to this critique Almond underscored that he and his coauthor regarded culture and political structure as interconnected, mutually dependent and dynamically interacting: "Political culture is treated as both an independent and a dependent variable, as causing structure and as being caused by it."[51] Beliefs, feelings, and values are the product as well as the cause of the political system.

To conclude this brief overview of the development of political culture theory, it is important, as it appears, to add one consideration. Whenever one conceptualizes democratic political culture and considers political participation as well as membership in various associations and organizations as a key factor in the development of a competent citizenry, it is important to bear in mind an institutional and, more precisely, a political regime factor.

It is reasonable to suggest that the emergence of associational life requires a definite type of institutional structure and can develop more or less freely only in a definite institutional framework. A prerequisite of such a differentiation is at least a minimum realization of the principle of pluralism and competition, as well as a certain degree of freedom in the political sphere. "Democracy, - states Neera Chandhoke, - requires as a precondition a space where various groups can express their ideas about how society and politics should be organized, where they can articulate both the content as well as the boundaries of what is desirable in a good society. Correspondingly, individuals and groups should possess the

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[49] *Halman, Loek.* Political Values. In: *Dalton, Russell J.; Klingemann, Hans-Dieter* (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior. Oxford University Press, 2007. p. 305.

[50] *Hahn, Jeffrey W.* 'Yaroslavl' Revisited: Assessing Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture Since 1990. In: *Whitefield, Stephen* (ed.), Political Culture and Post-Communism, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2005.

[51] *Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney.* 1989. Op. cit. p. 29.

right to conceptualize in conditions of relative freedom their notions of the desired and the good society."[52]

The observance of the above mentioned freedoms and rights serves as a foundation for the emergence and development of *the public sphere* as "a realm of social life where citizens can confer in an unrestricted fashion about matters of general interest and through that discussion exert influence on political life."[53]

The concept of the public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*), first introduced by Jürgen Habemas in his seminal work *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere – An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (1962), appears, in my view, one of the central concepts in political culture research.[54]

Oscar Negt and Alexander Kluge (1993) pointed out that the term *Öffentlichkeit* encompasses a variety of meanings implying "a spatial concept, the social sites or arenas where meanings are articulated, distributed, and negotiated, as well as the collective body constituted by, and in this process, "the public."[55] The public sphere represents, thus, an arena on which interests and concerns of different actors can be articulated, presented, debated, negotiated and distributed.

Representing "a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment," the well-functioning public sphere serves as a chief indicator of a participant political culture characterized by the polity members' acceptance of their responsibilities of citizenship, their active involvement, civic competence and the sense of efficacy.[56] It is possible, thus, to hypothyze that the

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[52] *Chandhoke, Neera.* The 'Civil' and the 'Political' in Civil Society // Democratization, Vol. 8, № 2, Summer 2001. p. 20.

[53] *Habermas, Jürgen.* Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1962. [English translation: Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989.]

[54] Habermas argued that "the bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's public use of their reason (*öffentliches Räsonnement*)." *Habermas, Jürgen.* 1989. Op. cit. p. 27.

[55] *Negt, Oscar; Kluge, Alexander.* Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.

[56] *Hauser, Gerard.* Vernacular Dialogue and the Rhetoricality of Public Opinion // Communication Monographs, Vol. 65, № 2, June 1998, p. 86. See also: *Goodnight, Thomas G.* The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument // Journal of the American Forensics Association, 18, 1982. pp. 214-27.

advent of participatory political culture is to be manifested in expansion of the public sphere as citizens will be taking a more active role in public affairs.

In this sense the public sphere as the realm of associational life of civil society is distinct from the private sphere of family and close friends.[57] This distinction refers to the difference between social activities that are within close and trusted circles and those that go beyond them to involve interaction with other forms of organization in the society at large. In other words, there is a qualitative difference between a gathering with a circle of family and friends – whether small or large, occasional or regular – and activities that involve an established group, where different kinds of people come together based on a common ideas, interests, talents, or causes.[58]

The distinction between the private and the public sphere is best expressed in the civil society concept which refers an array of groups, associations, and organizations that transcend family relations, are independent of the state and actually serve as a mediator between the individual and the state.[59] It is argued that civil society organizations and civic groups may contribute to democratic stability in two ways: internally they may inspire habits of cooperation, solidarity, public-spiritedness, and trust; whereas externally, these networks aggregate interests and articulate demands to ensure the government's accountability to its citizens. It is this dense infrastructure of groups, experts argue, that is the key to making democracy work.[60]

1.2.3 Analyzing Political Culture: Focusing on Symbolic Structures of Collective Identity and Collective Memory

As noted previously, since its introduction in the late 1950s the political culture concept has engendered a lot of controversy and criticism. Most trenchant, however, were charges that Almond and Verba focused excessively on the psychological aspects of the problem and defined political culture in terms of

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[57] *Habermas, Jürgen.* Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989.

[58] *Howard, Marc Morjé.* The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. p. 34.

[59] Howard enumerates the civil society organizations that may include community and local organizations; human rights, peace, and environmental groups; educational and cultural activities; churches or religious organizations; sports or recreational clubs; and women's, veterans', youth, elderly, disabled, animal rights, health, and self-help groups. *Howard, Marc Morjé.* Op. cit. p. 35.

[60] *Bae, Junghan.* Underdeveloped Civil Society in Russia: Origin, Development and Differentiation of Independent Social Organizations in the Transforming Russia // Slavic Research Center News, № 13 (9). 16 May, 2005. p. 1.

subjectivity thus eviscerating the importance of culture as symbols and meanings. "What 'theory' may be found in anyone's head is not," one set of critics charged, "culture. Culture is interpersonal, covering a range of such theory. [...] Political culture is the property of a collectivity."[61] Without a richer understanding of symbols, meanings, rituals, and the like, critics charged, political culture could not be distinguished conceptually from political psychology.

Lowell Dittmer (1977), among others, argued for understanding political culture in relation to political symbolism as an independent dimension of political life, remarking that political culture cannot otherwise be distinguished conceptually from political psychology, on the one hand, or from political structure, on the other: "If political culture can be reduced to the distribution of attitudes among a given population, wherein lies the need for a distinct conceptual framework and line of inquiry?... If reduction of ideology to social structure was possible, we would have no need for a concept of culture or a category of meaning. A sociology of knowledge would suffice... To the extent that political culture contains elements of political psychology or political structure in its definition, its use to explain change in either of these variables is of course tautological."[62] Dittmer believed that "political culture should be conceptualized as an emergent variable, one whose properties transcend the sum of its members' belief and value systems."[63]

Subsequently the concept of political culture was reinvented by interpretive social scientists such as Charles Taylor (1971), Clifford Geertz (1973), Ronald Rogowski (1975), Lowell Dittmer (1977), Brian Barry (1978), Lynn Hunt (1984), Keith Baker (1990), Mabel Berezin (1994), Steven Brint (1994), Margaret Somers (1995), Marc Howard Ross (1997), and other scholars.

One of the authors of the new political culture theory Jeffrey Olick (1997) wrote that "in contrast to older reductionisms (to both the subjectivism of earlier political culture theory and those who answered it by de-emphasizing culture, viewing attitudes were seen as epiphenomenal, as mere expressions of (or at the very least tools for) the more real – that is, objective social structure), new political culture analysis defines culture neither narrowly as subjective ideas, values, or attitudes, nor disdainfully as epiphenomenal, but broadly as the symbolic aspect of all social situations. Culture is regarded as intersubjective and as embodied in symbolism and patterns of meaning (Alexander 1990); it is

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[61] *Elkins, David J.; Simeon, Richard E. B.* A Cause in Search of its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain? // *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 11, № 2, 1979. pp. 128–129.

[62] *Dittmer, Lowell.* Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis // World Politics, Vol. 29, № 4, 1977. p. 555.

[63] Ibid.

pervasive."[64] Olick conceptualized that political culture "is not something which can be measured by traditional opinion surveys, but is something which needs to be excavated, observed, and interpreted as a system in terms of its own constitutive features."[65]

Sociologist Yuri Levada who focused on the research of symbolic structures in public opinion drew attention to the coexistence of the two systems or levels of action, one of which, "the program of experience," sets, controls and optimizes some goal-oriented sequences of actions, while the second, "the program of culture," places those present actions in a more general context.

According to Levada, "the program of culture" reveals the degree of importance and relevance of the goal itself and thus confirms the sense and the direction of one's movement towards it. The program of culture appears thus superior to the actual actions and behavior of social actors setting their meaning and direction. Differently, at the level of culture selection, sanctioning, authorization, and generally setting (explicit or implicit) of the framework for behavior and actions of individual actors takes place. This behavior, in turn, becomes an indicator of the social identification of individuals with a suggested or mutually elaborated cultural program. Levada noted that linking these two dimensions or levels of meaning becomes possible only through some, primarily symbolic, mediating mechanisms or structures.[66]

The importance of symbolic structures in the processes of collective identification and the necessity to study them has become widely recognized in social research. As Levada observed, "Appeal to symbolic structures simplifies a person's relation to social reality, relieves him from autonomous efforts of understanding, evaluation, etc. It is used as a proof of loyalty to a tradition, ideology, social group or institution."[67]

The problem of identification with political system retains, however, particular significance in societies coping with the former regime's collapse and facing thus the necessity to search for and select new symbols of identifications. Similar societies are particularly in need of symbolic structures that would contribute to legitimation of the new regime's political institutions and processes,

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[64] *Olick, Jeffrey K.* Collective Memory and Cultural Constraint: Holocaust Myth and Rationality in German Politics // American Sociological Review, Vol. 62, № 6, December 1997. p. 922.

[65] *Olick, Jeffrey K.* Political Culture. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 2nd edition, Macmillan Reference, New York, 2007. pp. 300-302. *Olick, Jeffrey K.* The Sins of the Fathers: The Third Reich and West German Legitimation, 1949-1989. Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1993. p. 48.

[66] *Levada, Yuri.* The Lectures on Sociology. Moscow, 1993. pp. 51–53.

[67] *Levada, Yuri.* Ljudi i simvoly. Simvolicheskie struktury v obshestvennom mnenii. Zametki dlja razmyshlenija // Monitoring obshestvennogo mnenija: ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny, № 6 (56), 2001. p. 11.

on the one hand, and that would secure the identification of citizens with them, on the other.

Importantly, collective identity that may be broadly defined as the feeling of belonging to a certain group or groups, the sense of collective "we-ness," rests on an awareness of continuity through time."[68] A sense of continuity binding a community together can be regarded, thus, as both the basis and sign of personal or collective identity.

This explains the sustained interest in the problems of temporality and temporal coordination of polities in the 20th century social sciences. As early as 1905 the French sociologist Henri Hubert defined time as a symbolic structure representing the organization of society through its temporal rhythms.[69] The thesis about the use of time for control, regulation and synchronization of social life was discussed in the writings of Wilbert Moore (1963) and Pitirim Sorokin (1964). The issues of using time in advancement of power interests were developed in the works by Michele Foucault (1977), and subsequently in Western sociology. Max Weber (1978), for instance, showed that control over information, including information about the past, can become an instrument of power and control.

Getting back to the problem of identity, it should be pointed out that temporality here is expressed primarily through the concept of memory. Awareness of continuity over time necessary for sustaining a collective identification depends largely on the commonality of memory of past events. In this sense collective identity formation is intimately linked with collective memory and the latter can be viewed as "a signifying practice and as a cornerstone of group identity."[70]

In 1925 the student of Émile Durkheim French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs in his landmark study *The Social Frameworks of Memory* described memory as a social phenomenon, arguing that "it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories."[71] Halbwachs was the first to introduce the concept of collective memory which he defined as a shared account of the past by a group

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[68] *Maier, Charles S*. The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988. p. 149.

[69] *Hubert, Henri*. Etude sommaire de la representation du temps dans la religion et la magie // Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes studies. 1905. pp. l-39; *Hubert, Henri; Mauss, Michel*. Melanges d'histoire des religions. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1909.

[70] *Eyerman, Ron*. The Past in the Present: Culture and the Transmission of Memory // Acta Sociologica, Vol. 47, № 2, June, 2004. p. 166.

[71] *Halbwachs, Maurice*. On Collective Memory. Trans. and ed. by Lewis A. Coser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. p. 38.

of people. However, for Halbwachs, the collective memory of a certain group was bound in space and time. Decades later the French historian Pierre Nora enhanced the theory of memory by breaking through time and space limitations with the help of symbols and cultural codes.[72] Nora introduced the notion of "the sites of memory" (*lieu de mémoire)* by which he understood "any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community."[73] In other words, the sites of memory, according to Nora, are the realms "where [cultural] memory crystallizes and secretes itself."[74] These may include: places such as archives, museums, cathedrals, palaces, cemeteries, and memorials; concepts and practices such as commemorations, mottos, and rituals; objects such as inherited property, commemorative monuments, manuals, emblems, basic texts, and symbols.[75]

German Egyptologist Jan Assmann specified the idea of memory conceptualizing two different types of memory within a community – "communicative" and "cultural memory." While "communicative memory" is fairly unorganized, unstructured and formed by communication of every day life situations, cultural memory stands for the "outer dimension of human memory."[76] It is constituted by cultural molding – such as texts, rites, or memorials, as well as institutionalized communication such as recitation, solemnization, or contemplation. It is from the content of its cultural memory, according to Assmann, that the self-perception of a nation derives.[77]

Since policies are largely legitimated through appeals to the past events, collective memory can be viewed as one of the main factors in the national identity and political culture formation.[78] The correlation between collective

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[72] *Nora, Pierre.* Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire. Representations № 26, Special Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory, Spring 1989.

[73] *Nora, Pierre.* From Les Lieux de Mémoire to Realms of Memory. In: *Nora, Pierre; Kritzman, Lawrence D.* (eds.) Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. Vol. 1: Conflicts and Divisions. New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1996. p. xvii.

[74] *Nora, Pierre.* 1989. Op. cit. p. 7.

[75] Ibid.

[76] *Assmann, Jan.* Das Kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und Politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen. Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992. p. 19.

[77] *Assmann, Jan*. Kollektives Gedächtnis und kulturelle Identität. In: *Assmann, Jan*; Hölscher, Toni (eds.) Kultur und Gedächtnis. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988. *Assmann, Jan*. Erinnern, um dazuzugehören. Kulturelles Gedächtnis, Zugehörigkeitsstruktur und normative Vergangenheit. In: *Platt, Kerstin; Dabag, Mihran* (eds.): Generation und Gedächtnis. Erinnerung und kollektive Identität. Wiesbaden: Opladen Verlag, 1995.

[78] Notably, this understanding let some researchers even argue that "memory to some extent is political culture." See, for e.g., *Müller, Jan-Werner* (ed.) Memory and Power in Postwar Europe. Studies in the Presence of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 26.

memory, national identity, and political culture was noted in the works of Charles Maier (1988), Jeffrey Olick (1993, 2005), Jeffrey Olick and Daniel Levy (1997), Takashi Yoshida (2006), James W. Booth (1999, 2007), Richard Ned Lebow (2006), and other researchers.

According to Jeffrey Olick and Daniel Levy, "Political cultures operate as historical systems of meaning – that is, as ordered but changing systems of claim-making – in which collective memory obliges the present (as prescription) and restricts it (as proscription) both mythically and rationally."[79]

In the recent study on collective memory *Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice of Memory* (2007) a social philosopher James Booth analyzed the central place of memory in the constitution of identity, introducing the concept of "memory-identity." Drawing observation from Aristotle's *Politics*, Booth conceptualized that, in the first instance, "the issue of identity explicitly involves a temporal dimension: the question of the sameness of a person / community that undergoes change over time."[80] He also argued that sameness through time is at its core normative in character. According to Booth, since "communities exist in time and are responsible in time," "political identity is not just a temporal proposition but a moral-temporal one: Continuous selves are the foundation of holding individuals and political communities to account for their past; and they also lay out a claim of duty toward the future continuation of this same self."[81] While "our" membership in communities is largely unchosen, choice appears only in how "we" understand and rework such inherited attachments, and in how "we" understand their history and do justice to it. Thus, Booth concluded that "democracies old and new have a choice with respect to how to assume responsibility for their past" and that people's freedom rests in "whether and how we bear witness to the past which is ours."[82]

This raises the issue of responsibility for coming to terms with national pasts as an important part of collective identity formation in post-totalitarian societies. Helmut Dubiel, among others, has pointed to a new "culture of legitimation" that has emerged throughout the world and that is defined by "the abandonment of the traditional 'positive' form of political legitimation" — typically marked by "triumphalistic assertions of national history"—in favor of

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[79] *Olick, Jeffrey K.; Levy, Daniel.* Collective Memory and Cultural Constraint: Holocaust Myth and Rationality in German Politics // American Sociological Review, Vol. 62, № 6, December, 1997. p. 922.

[80] *Booth, James W.* Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice of Memory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

[81] *Booth, James W.* Communities of Memory. On Identity, Memory, and Debt // The American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, № 2, June 1999. p. 252.

[82] *Booth, James W.* 2007. Op. cit. pp. 181-82.

one that "incorporates the remorseful commemoration of collective injustice" perpetrated by nations at some point in their past.[83]

At the same time Dubiel posited that when the memory of national trauma such as genocide is silenced or repressed, the strength of the democracy in terms of a democratic political culture is weakened. According to the author, "Post-totalitarian societies that deny, repress, or narrowly define pasts that include state-organized terrorism would continue to bear signs of the regimes from which they emerge. Democratic polities, in contrast, are those in which the past, however painful, becomes a living part of the present."[84]

Other observers have also underscored that the way the country deals with its history has a major effect on national identity and the democratization efforts of a nation after tyranny and dictatorship and that the political use of history in form of politics of memory has a significant effect on the success and failure of democracy.[85]

Thus, besides important goals of forming democratic political culture and civil society destroyed or seriously weakened by the dictatorial regime, former totalitarian and authoritarian societies face the necessity of confronting their repressive pasts.[86] Or, differently, the processes of democratization in similar contexts are to be supplemented with the societies' active attempts to deal with their past legacies and 'work through' their repressive pasts in the public sphere.

In the **Chapters 3 and 4** of this thesis I will focus on the transformations of political cultures in the postwar Federal Republic of Germany and the post-Soviet Russian Federation. Given the importance of the two observed dimensions of political culture – individual-level or subjective, on the one hand, and symbolic, on the other – I will analyze both these levels in their interaction, mutual impact on each other and on the formation of political culture in analyzed societies.

In **Chapter 3** I will at first determine the variables that will be analyzed in a comparative study of the two individual political cultures. The chapter will

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[83] *Dubiel, Helmut.* Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte: Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in den Debatten des Deutschen Bundestages. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1999. pp. 200-201. Quoted in *Moeller, Robert G.* What Has "Coming to Terms with the Past" Meant in Post-World War II Germany? From History to Memory to the "History of Memory" // Central European History, Vol. 35, № 2, 2002. pp. 223-56.

[84] Ibid.

[85] See, for instance, *Groppo, Bruno.* Dealing with a "Dark" Historical Past (Kak byt' s "temnym" istoricheskim proshlym?) // The Public Lecture, Moscow, 25 February 2005.

[86] See *Averintsev, Sergei.* Overcoming Totalitarian Past // Religion in Eastern Europe XXIV, 3 June, 2004. p. 29.

focus then on attitudes and participatory orientations of citizens towards political system in West Germany and Russia.

Chapter 4, in turn, will explore the ways in which West Germany and Russia confronted their totalitarian legacies and how they remembered their respective totalitarian regimes - the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. The developments of collective memory discourses of the respective national totalitarian pasts will be analyzed and compared in that chapter. On presenting the collective memory developments in both cases, I will turn to an analysis of the sources of change (and continuity) in official narratives of traumatic historical events.

In the concluding Chapter 5 I will face the task of untangling how these multiple transitions in political and cultural spheres affected each other and overall social development in the two cases. On the one hand, I will try to understand how political change and institutional transformations in post-totalitarian societies have affected political cultures. At the same time, I will try to see how collective memory discourses influenced the national identity and political processes in post-WWII West Germany and post-Soviet Russia.

1.3 The Case-Studies' Literature Overview and Remarks on Methodology

It is important to point out that the area of West German studies in general is highly developed. Various aspects of democratic transition in the postwar War II Federal Republic were analyzed in detail by both German and foreign researchers. Most important contributions to the analysis of political changes were made in the works by Kurt Sontheimer (1971), Klaus von Beyme (1971, 1990, 1999, 2004), David P. Conradt (1972, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008), Kurt Sontheimer and Wilhelm Bleek (1984), Peter Katzenstein (1987), Russell J. Dalton (1993), Timothy Garton Ash (1993), Gordon Smith et al. (1996, 2004), Max Kaase and Günter Schmid (1999), Ludger Helms (2000), Manfred Schmidt (2003), to name just a few.

Descriptions of political culture transformations can be found in the writings by Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, Theodor Adorno, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963, 1980), Sidney Verba (1965), Ralf Dahrendorf (1965), Karl Jaspers (1966), Steven Warnecke (1970), Max Kaase (1971), Kurt Sontheimer (1971, 1973, 1990), Bradley Richardson (1973), R. Boynton and Gerhard Lowenberg (1973, 1974), Kendell Baker (1973, 1978), William Chandler (1974), David Conradt (1974, 1980, 1981), M. Kent Jennings (1976), Walter Jaide (1976), Klaus Allerbeck (1976, 1977), Samuel Barnes and Max

Kaase, et al. (1979), Martin Greiffenhagen and Sylvia Greiffenhagen (1979), Kendall Baker, Russel Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt (1981), Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Edgar Piel (1983), Martin Greiffenhagen (1984), and other scholars.

Perhaps the most elaborated research field in German studies is the studies of collective memory and cultural representations of the Holocaust. The politics of memory, the problems of dealing with Nazi legacies, the German national identity and the related debates have attracted much scholarly attention from diverse fields such as history and intellectual history (for example, Charles Maier 1988; Saul Friedländer 1992; Jeffrey Herf 1997; Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich 1997; Mary Fulbrook 1999; Dan Diner 2000; Rudy Koshar 2000; Siobhan Kattago 2001; Omer Bartov 2003; Wulf Kansteiner 2006; Dirk Moses 2007), cultural and literary theory (for example, Aleida Assmann and Ute Frevert 1999; Sebald 1999; Stuart Taberner and Frank Finlay 2002; Caroline Pearce 2008), psychoanalysis (for example, Alexander Mitscherlich and Margarete Mitscherlich 1975; Domenick LaCapra 1998; Eva Hoffman 2004), sociology (for example, Helmut Dubiel 1999; Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider 2001), German studies (Caroline Wiedmer 1999; William Niven 2002; Jan-Werner Müller 2000; Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer 2003), political science (Peter Reichel 1995, 2001; Gesine Schwan 2001), Judaic studies (James Young 1993, 1995, 2000), and journalism (Jane Kramer 1996; Judith Miller 1990).

Political transformations in post-Soviet Russia were also rather thoroughly discussed, primarily, in the works of such scholars as Michael McFaul (1993, 1995, 1999), Tatiana Vorozheikina (1994, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009), Leon Aron (1995), Steven Solnick (1998, 1999), Archie Brown (1999), Dmitry Furman (1999, 2010), Alfred Stepan (2000), David Laitin (2000), Mikhail Afanasiev (2000), Vladimir Gel'man (1999, 2000, 2002, 2003), Lilia Shevtsova (1999, 2001, 2004), Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski (2001), Andrei Melville (1999), Timothy J. Colton (2000), Valerie Sperling (2000), James Hughes (2000), Steven Fish (2000), Michael Burawoy (2001), Paul Kubicek (2002), Lev Gudkov (2004, 2007), Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa (2005), Thomas Remington (2006), Stephen White, Richard Sakwa, and Henry E. Hale (2009).

Most notable publications on the Russian political culture include works by Jeffrey W. Hahn (1991, 1993, 2001, 2005), Yuri Levada (1993, 1995, 2001, 2005), James L. Gibson (1996, 1998, 2001), Timothy J. Colton (2000), Stephen White (2000), Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul (2002), Jan Teorell (2002), Stephen White and Ian McAllister (2004), Richard Rose (1998, 2000), Stephen Whitefield (2005), Lev Gudkov (2002, 2004, 2007), Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin (2007, 2008).

The field of memory studies in the Russia case is, however, much less developed. As Alexander Etkind asserted, "The scholarship on the Russian

memory of Soviet terror is negligible."[87] Still there were several important contributions to this topic as well. Such authors as Nancy Adler (2001), Boris Dubin (2003, 2004, 2005, 2008), Alexander Boroznyak (2004), Lev Gudkov (2005), Leon Aron (2008), Alexander Etkind (2009), Maria Ferretti (2003, 2007), Dina Khapaeva (2007, 2009), Christian Folk (2009), Arseny Roginsky (2008), Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber (2005, 2006, 2008) have written on the issues of national memory of the Soviet past.

As noted previously, given the fact the comparisons of the post-totalitarian transformations of West Germany and Russia are virtually nonexistent, this research work represents an attempt to fill in this gap. The analysis presented in this dissertation is largely based on the existing sociological data and secondary literature. For analytical and illustrative purposes I also use some primary sources documents such as official addresses of leaders, public speeches, transcripts of relevant meeting and conferences, relevant press news and newspaper articles, etc.

In terms of timing I will refer to postwar, i.e. the post-1945, period of the West German history. Since the West German state ceased to exist with the unification of the two parts of Germany in 1989, I will try to limit my analysis by that point. However, as some of the processes that occurred beyond that time-point appear to be a direct continuation of some discourses that had developed and the decisions that had been made before, in some cases, when it is required by the logics of narration and objectives of the research, this time-limit will inevitably be crossed.

Similar remark can be made in relation to the Russian case. Since *de jure* the post-Soviet period starts with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, I will regard it as a general starting point. However, it should be remembered that an important point of departure in terms of socio-cultural and political transformations was the *perestroika* period of the second half of the 1980s. Therefore in my analysis I will definitely refer to the mentioned period as well.

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[87] *Etkind, Alexander.* Post-Soviet Hauntology: Cultural Memory of Soviet Terror // Constellations, Vol. 16, № 1, May 2009. p. 185.

Chapter 2

Political Context of Transformations in post-WWII West Germany and post-Soviet Russia

As discussed in the Introduction, democratic system is expressed not in the constitutional texts only but primarily in the well-realized principles proclaimed in them or, more specifically, in the existence of mechanisms of power accountability. In their work *Formal and Informal Institutions in Defective Democracies* Wolfgang Merkel and Aurel Croissant argued that constitutional self-restraint of democracy has to provide necessary mechanisms of protection from the menace of self-destruction by the tyranny of the majority and from despotic rule of democratically legitimized power bearer.[88] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, in turn, asserted that a rule of law embodied in a spirit of constitutionalism entails a relatively strong consensus over the constitution and especially commitment to "self-binding" procedures of governance that require exceptional majorities to change. It also requires a clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a strong legal culture in civil society.[89] The indispensable democratic principle of *the rule of law* can be realized only within a framework of institutions. The proclaimed constitutional principles and values do not possess much worth unless there is an institution serving as their guardian.[90]

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[88] *Merkel, Wolfgang, Croissant, Aurel.* Formale Institutionen und informale Regeln in defecten Demokratien // Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Bd. 41, № 1, 2000. pp. 3-30.

[89] *Linz, Juan; Stepan, Alfred.* Op. cit. p. 10.

[90] *Seyfarth, Georg.* Constitutional Control of the Federal and Regional Levels: the Experience of Germany. Report at the Seminar on Constitutional Control in Federal and Unitary States, Strasbourg, 21 June 1999.

In 1999 the Russian political scientist Igor Klyamkin pointed to the traditional absence of political system in the Russian state which used to possess only a political subject represented by one ruler (an autocrat or a Secretary General of the party at office) who incorporated in himself all power functions.[91] In this sense the transformations launched in the second half of the 1980s during the so-called *perestroika* period and followed by the collapse of the communist regime, provided Russia with a chance for changing such an obviously unproductive (from the viewpoint of state development) *status quo*. Nevertheless, it is evident that the only way of genuine state reforming was in creating and establishing public political institutions and introducing modern mechanisms of government.

This chapter will address the political context of post-totalitarian transformations in postwar West Germany and post-Soviet Russia. As noted in the introduction, the post-totalitarian democratic transformation presupposes change of the structure of a state-party monolith into a new formation, a totally different political system. The term "political system" implies, in turn, the aggregate of autonomous power institutions responsible for performing certain functions in society and the accountability mechanism for this performance to citizens. According to the founders of the structural-functional approach to political science, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., political systems consist of several types of structures: political parties, interest groups, legislatures, executives, bureaucracies, and courts. The authors claim these structures exist in any modern political system. These structures are not universally evident, however, and when present they do not always function as independent, autonomous institutions. In addition, only the existing "set of institutions and agencies concerned with formulating and implementing the collective goals of society or groups within it" can testify, as it seems, to the fact of that political system's real presence in a country.[92]

Political systems consisting of all abovementioned types of structures are realized in full, as it appears, only in modern systems of representative democracy, defined as "a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives."[93] In

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[91] *Klyamkin, Igor.* Rossijskaja vlast' na rubezhe tysjacheletij // Pro et Contra, Vol. 4, № 2, Spring 1999. p. 63.

[92] *Almond, Gabriel A.* et al. (eds.) Comparative Politics Today. A World View, 8th edition. Pearson. Longman, 2006. p. 36.

[93] *Karl, Terry Lynn. Schmitter, Phillippe.* What Democracy Is… and Is Not // Journal of Democracy.б Vol. 2, № 3, Summer 1991. p. 76; *O'Donnell, Guillermo.* Delegative Democracy // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, № 1, January1994. pp. 55-69.

other words, a distinctive feature of modern democracy is the presence of independent autonomous institutions in the framework of which the authorities appear accountable for their decisions and actions by other institutions and citizens. Although not all transition periods end up with the formation of this system, the extrication from totalitarian rule cannot be regarded as complete unless such a system emerges.

The set of questions that I am going to address in analyzing the political transformations in the two cases are thus as follows: Has a political system in each case been formed and has it replaced the command-administrative systems in the analyzed countries? Have there been created mechanisms of horizontal accountability in the form of effective system of "checks and balances", where each branch of power can veto the decisions of the others in critical circumstances, but where, at the same time, exists the possibility to negotiate, make coalitions, search for compromises? Have the lessons of the past regarding the collapse of the former totalitarian systems been taken into account in both analyzed contexts?

Additionally this chapter will address the impact of economic reforms on political transformations. As the West German and Russian opinion polls data reveal, in a situation of severe economic crisis the population regard economic stability as the most important goal. The poll carried out by the Levada Analytical Centre (former VCIOM) in 1989 showed that economic prosperity was viewed as the main end by the majority of citizens of the Soviet Union (57 percent). Only small percentage of the respondents (11 percent) acknowledged the lack of political rights and freedoms as a necessity and a problem.

Similarly, in the April, 1946 poll held in the American occupation zone of the postwar Germany 75 percent of the respondents expressed opinion that the state should mainly provide essential material needs, and only 25 percent mentioned the importance of individual and political rights observance.[94] In May 1947 another poll was conducted by the American sociologists and this time 62 percent of the respondents favored the political system guaranteeing economic stability and full employment while 26 percent chose rather the one guaranteeing primarily political rights and freedoms (12 percent of respondents refrained from making any assessments).[95]

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[94] Special Political Survey, Winter 1946. In: *Merritt, Anna J.; Merritt, Richard L.* (eds.) Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: the OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949. Urbana*:* University of Illinois Press, 1970. p. 76.

[95] *Schwarz, Hans-Peter.* Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik. Deutschland im Widerstreit der aussenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 1945 - 1949 (2nd ed.), Stuttgart 1980. p. 689.

In the cause of exit from dictatorship the efficiency of economic transformations (as the appropriate answer by the authorities to the powerful social demand) can become a major prerequisite for successful consolidation of a new political regime. Differently, legitimation of a newly established democratic system and success of its consolidation largely depends on success of economic reforms carried out in the course of transformations. Since democratic societies cannot survive for a long time unless their people believe democracy a legitimate form of government, one of the key reformers' concerns while carrying out economic reforms should be creation and further preservation of democratic values in society.[96] Effective economic reforms alongside with establishment of functional and effective political systems are certainly the most important factors in values legitimition.

Thus, economic transformations in the analyzed contexts will interest us, first of all, from the specified perspective, - as an essential condition of political system consolidation during the exit from totalitarian rule. Taking into account the priority of institutional building (as according to O'Donnell (1994), institutions, above all, facilitate "success in dealing with the social and economic problems inherited from the authoritarian predecessors"), it would be interesting to analyze the efficiency of institutional changes in the post-Nazi Germany and post-Soviet Russia in terms of achievement of democratic consolidation through implementing the mechanisms of governmental accountability, on the one hand, and the economic prosperity as and increase of the population well-being, on the other.

2.1 Comparative Analysis of Political Transformations post-WWII West Germany and post-Soviet Russia

West Germany

As it was already mentioned, after the end of the Second World War Germany mostly lay in ruins. The industrial production had fallen to one-third of its prewar level (since 1936 the steel production decreased almost 7 times, while the production of coal suffered 2.2 times decrease). Since the available housing stock had been largely destroyed during the war whereas more than 9 million Germans had been sent back to Germany from East Prussia, Poland and Czechoslovakia there was the acutest housing problem. The level of living had dropped by one third. The money had lost its value; barter trade and black-

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[96] See. *Fukuyama, Francis.* The Primacy of Culture // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, № 1, 1995. pp. 7-14.

marketing flourished. The industrial equipment started to be removed from Germany by the Allies following the policy of reparations and industrial disarmament. Worn out real capital, destroyed infrastructure, undermined financial system complicated socio-economic situation even more.[97]

To add to this Germany ceased to exist as an independent state: having lost one forth of its prewar territories, it was occupied. Following the agreements reached by the four Allied powers in the Yalta Conference and in the Potsdam Conference of 1945, Germany was divided into four occupation zones with the United States, the Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union each occupying one zone. The Allies decided that they would pursue a policy based the principles known as the four "Ds": demilitarization, decentralization, democratization and denazification. In the Potsdam Declaration signed in August 1945, it was written: "It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis."[98]

Realization of decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences on denazification of Germany was launched simultaneously in all zones of occupation alongside with the final preparations for the launching of the Nuremberg Trials. The denazification program was intended to accomplish several socio-political steps (carried out in a legal way) called to prevent any reproduction of the former socio-cultural and socio-political relations.

It included, first of all, the practice of condemnation and criminal prosecution of the Nazi criminals (primarily, ideologists of Nazism and functionaries of the higher and middle ranks); a chain of international, and later - German tribunals and trials of different levels. Besides, the denazification program was called to achieve the removal of the Nazis from the governmental bodies and from the other positions of influence (from the legislative and judicial structures, and to a lesser extent – from the army and the police), as well as the exclusion of those involved with the Nazi regime from the reproductive systems of society – their non-admission to teaching positions at universities and high schools, to mass media, restriction of their influence on culture, art, literature, etc. (e.g. a temporary ban on publications).[99]

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[97] *Hughes, Stuart H.* Contemporary Europe: A History. 5th ed. Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966. pp. 411-12.

[98] The Potsdam Declaration. Tripartite Agreement by the United States, the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia concerning Conquered Countries, 2 August, 1945.
<http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450802a.html>

[99] *Gudkov, Lev.* "Totalitarizm" kak teoreticheskaja ramka // Negativnaja identichnost'. Statji 1997-2002. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, «VCIOM-A», 2004. p. 432. On the denazification program also see, *Arenhövel, Mark.* Demokratie und Erinnerung: der Blick zurück auf Diktatur

Denazification became an important benchmark in the struggle between those who "tried to collect on the Reich's ruins everything that would be possible to use once again" and those who strived for a total elimination of the National Socialism from the country's public life.[100] According to the Potsdam conference decisions the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) with all its affiliated and supervised organizations was banned; all Nazi institutions were dissolved; all Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion were abolished. The Nuremberg process and the court proceedings which followed it were intended not only to punish the Nazi criminals, but also to facilitate the cleanup of the German political life and overall democratization of the German people.

After the unification of the American and British occupation zones in the Bizone (or Bizonia) in December, 1946 the United States got a decisive influence on the economic organization and the legislation in the area.[101] The administrative activity in Bizonia was coordinated by *the Executive Council* which consisted of the Federal States' (*Länder*) representatives appointed by the corresponding Federal States' governments *(Landtags)*. The Executive Council activity was supervised by *the Economic Council* formed from 52 members, nominated by the *Landtags*. Political parties were presented in these assemblies proportionally to the level of their political popularity. In the beginning of 1948 the Economic Council increased twice in number reaching thus 104 members and becoming a sort of quasi-parliament.

In addition to the Executive and Economic Councils in the western parts of the country there was created *the Administrative Council* or *Direktorium* (a prototype of the future Federal government), authorized to manage the current

und Menschenrechtsverbrechen. Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 2000; *Dudek, Peter.* Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Zur Problematik eines umstrittenen Begriffs // Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Vol. 1-2, 1992. p. 44 ff; *Fischer, Torben; Lorenz, Matthias N.* (Hg.). Lexikon der "Vergangenheitsbewältigung" in Deutschland: Debatten- und Diskursgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus nach 1945. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009; *König, Helmut.* Von der Diktatur zu Demokratie oder Was ist Vergangenheitsbewältigung. In: *König*, *Helmut*; *Kohlstruck, Michael; Wöll, Andreas* (Hg.). Vergangenheitsbewältigung am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998. pp. 371-92; *Reichel, Peter.* Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland. Die Auseinanderstzungen mit der NS-Diktatur in Politik und Justiz. München: Beck, 2001.

[100] *Niethammer*, *Lutz; Borsdorf*, *Ulrich*; *Brandt*, *Peter* (eds.) Arbeiterinitiative 1945: Antifaschist Ausschusse und Reorganisation der Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland. Hammer, 1976. pp. 702-703.

[101] With the addition of the French occupation zone in April 1949, the entity became the Trizone or Trizonia.

economic activity in the area. Another administrative organ that appeared simultaneously - *the Federal States' Council* - was called to empower regional administrations with the right to vote for the new economic legislation.

Thus, in Bizonia was established a proto-government, institutional structure of which provided the model for the future national government established later with some minor modifications in the Federal Republic of Germany.[102]

As for the formation of the new constitutional order, a special body – *the Parliamentary Council* – was formed to work out and adopt the Basic Law for West Germany. After completing its work, the Parliamentary Council, consisting of 65 delegates from the respective 11 Federal states' parliaments and chaired by the leading CDU politician Konrad Adenauer, met in Bonn in the fall of 1948 to work out the final details of the document.[103] After months of debate, a final text of the Basic Law was approved by a vote of 53 to 12 on 8 May, 1949. The new law was ratified by all *Landtags*, with the exception of the Bavarian parliament, which objected to the emphasis on a strong central authority for the new state. After approval by the Western military governors, the Basic Law was promulgated on 23 May, 1949. Thus a new state, the Federal Republic of Germany came into existence.

The historian Henry Turner (1992) later remarked that although many of the Council members had actively participated in the political life of Germany during the Weimar times, their present actions testified that they had learnt the lessons from the collapse of the former political system. While the Weimar parliament had been notorious for its uncompromising attitudes and adherence to hard line, the Parliamentary Council revealed its inclination to a sober practicality and aspiration to making compromises.[104]

Upon the whole, overcoming institutional deficiencies that had brought down the Weimar Republic became the main objective of the Parliamentary Council in fashioning the articles of the Basic Law. They sought, therefore, to approve a law that would make it impossible to circumvent democratic procedures, as had happened in the past. In meeting this end they tried to establish more accurate frameworks of political power and its responsibilities and to guarantee a strong system of "checks and balances", capable of preventing power usurpation similar to that in the Third Reich.

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[102] See *Turner, Henry Ashby.* Germany from Partition to Reunification. Yale University Press. New Haven and London, 1992. pp. 20-21.

[103] 27 members of the Parliamentary council belonged to the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), 27 – to the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), 5 – to the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the others – to smaller parties, including two communists.

[104] *Turner, Henry Ashby.* Op. cit. pp. 35-36.

Though initially the Basic Law was supposed to create a temporary political system to serve the Federal Republic until the reunion of West and East Germanys, it, nevertheless, has passed a serious test by time. Adopted in May 1949 the Basic Law endured the long expected unification of the two German states in October 1990, revealing an exclusive example of political engineering. It formed the system of the parliamentary democracy, capable of involving wide social groups, of encouraging political responsibility of the elite, of dispersing political power and limiting the influence of extremist groupings.[105]

According to many Weimar Constitution analysts one of the reasons for the Weimar Republic's decline was the existence of a super-powerful head of the state. Therefore in the new Basic Law the powers of the lower house, the Bundestag, and the Federal Chancellor (*Bundeskanzler*) were enhanced considerably at the expense of the Federal President (*Bundespräsident*), who was reduced to a figurehead and whose office was transformed into a mostly ceremonial post.

In the first instance, this was achieved by changing the way of electing the Federal President. Unlike the Weimar Republic, the President in the Federal Republic of Germany is not elected directly, but by the Federal Convention (*Bundesversammlung*) consisting of the members of the Bundestag and an equal number of representatives delegated from the state legislatures. The term of the President's office was reduced to five years, and the possibility of his re-election was limited to only one time.

Second, the President's power was significantly reduced assuming a relatively weak role. He is no longer the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, nor does he play any significant role in foreign policy. In contrast to the Weimar Republic, the Federal President in post-1949 Germany does not have the right to govern by emergency decree. Even more important is the fact that the President lost the possibility to influence the Cabinet, which is now formed by the Parliament and accountable primarily to it. Thus, in contrast to the Weimar Republic, the founding fathers of the Federal Republic of Germany prevented a newly institutionalized conflict between the head of the state and the federal government by a wide variety of constitutional arrangements, including a mainly representative and ceremonial role for the President.[106]

The intention to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of any single actor or institution was manifested in the relationship established between the legislative and executive branches. For instance, the Chancellor lacks the

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[105] Ibid.

[106] *Schmidt, Manfred G.* Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oxford University Press, 2003. pp. 36-37.

discretionary authority to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections, something that is normally found in parliamentary systems. The Bundestag and the Bundesrat have the right to criticize the actions of the Cabinet and revise its legal initiatives.

On the other hand, the Basic Law limits the legislature's control over the Chancellor. In a parliamentary system the legislature normally has the authority to remove a chief executive from office by a simply majority vote. During the Weimar Republic, however, extremist parties used this device to destabilize the democratic system by opposing incumbent chancellors. The Basic Law modified this procedure and created a constructive non-confidence vote. According to the Article 67.1 of the Basic Law, "The Bundestag may express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor by the vote of a majority of its Members and requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply with the request and appoint the person elected". This ensures continuity in government and an initial majority in support of a new chancellor. It also makes removing the incumbent more difficult; opponents cannot simply disagree with the government – a majority must agree on an alternative.[107]

As Russell Dalton explains, the functioning of the federal government follows three principles laid out in the Basic Law. First, *the chancellor principle* says that the chancellor defines government policy (Article 65.1) which means that the formal policy guidelines issued by the chancellor are legally binding directives on the Cabinet and the ministries. Thus, in contrast to the British system of shared Cabinet responsibility, the German Cabinet is formally subordinate to the chancellor in policymaking. The second principle of *ministerial autonomy* gives each minister the authority to direct the ministry's internal workings without Cabinet's intervention as long as the policies conform to the government's guidelines. Ministers are responsible for supervising the activities of their departments, guiding their policy planning, and overseeing the administration of policy within their jurisdiction. *The cabinet principle* is the third organizational guideline. When conflicts arise between departments over jurisdictional or budgetary matters, the Basic Law calls for them to be resolved in the Cabinet.[108]

The founding fathers of the West German constitution while defining a role and a due place of parties in political system also took into account the

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[107] *Dalton, Russell J.* Politics in Germany. In: *Almond, Gabriel A.; Dalton, Russell J.; Powell, Bingham Jr.; Strom, Kaare* (eds.) Comparative Politics Today: A World View, 8th edition. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006. pp. 276-77.

[108] Ibid. pp. 274-75.

Weimar tragic experience and tried to create effective legal obstacles to establishment of a dictatorial regime. Consequently for the first time in the German history the role of political parties was so highly appreciated and in detail described in the Basic Law. The constitution specifies a number of basic requirements to political parties which are intended to "participate in the formation of the political will of the people." According the Article 21 of the Basic Law political parties (1) may be freely established; (2) their internal organization must conform to democratic principles; (3) they must publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds; (4) parties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality.[109]

Among the reasons of the Weimar Republic's collapse analysts also named *a proportional representation (PR) electoral system* (a system that allocates legislative seats based on a party's percentage of the popular vote) fixed in the Weimar Constitution. Such an electoral system usually fits a small and well organized party system. The Weimar Republic however had a considerable quantity of parties - 43 parties participated in the parliamentary elections in May 1928 and more than 60 in summer of 1932. Their political 'immaturity', inability to make compromises led to the exclusion of parliament from a constitutional-legal mechanism. Besides, the fundamental rights and the role of parties in the country's political life were not well-defined and fixed. Consequently, a steady and well-functioning party system was not established.

Proportional representation system, in turn, led, according to some experts, to depersonalizing of the parliamentary representation and conduced to a fast spread and budding off of small parties. This brought about the state of things well-described by Hanna Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and other publications. Institutions in democratically ruled countries were not able to promote popular participation in politics as they actually excluded the vast majorities from participation in the management of public affairs. This led to appearance of the politically neutral and indifferent – "slumbering" – masses, which later became organized on the basis of totalitarian movements. The success of the latter, according to Arendt, meant the end of illusions that "the people in its majority had taken an active part in government and that each individual was in sympathy with one's own or somebody else's party."[110]

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[109] Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) for the Federal Republic of Germany. <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm>

[110] *Arendt, Hanna.* The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harvest Books, 1973. p. 312.

Political parties with their programs reminding of "'ready-made formulas' which demanded not action but execution" were turned into "very efficient instruments through which the power of the people is curtailed and controlled."[111] It is evident, however, that the blame was not only with parties but with the limitations of a proportional representation system itself where parties running the show led to depersonalization of politics and the general loss of interest in public matters.

To avoid the fragmentation of the Weimar party system and ensure some accountability between electoral districts and their representatives, the architects of the postwar Federal Republic of Germany changed the national electoral system from proportional representation (PR) to mixed member proportional (MMP) system. While one half of the Bundestag members is elected by proportional representation, the other half is directly elected from single-seat constituencies, voters casting their votes for a candidate running to represent a particular district.

In conclusion, it is worth mentioning that 'learning from catastrophes' in the history of the country became the major feature of political transformations in postwar Federal Republic of Germany. Its constitutional structures were attributable to learning from the institutional pathology of the Weimar Republic.[112] Especially important here is the fact that West German political elites managed not only to comprehend and evaluate the negative experience of the Weimar Republic period, which had led to the Third Reich, but also to find institutional mechanisms of overcoming the Nazi legacy.

The major achievement of the West German political elite, as it appears, was their ability to come to the consent on the basic issues of the new state project with the new "rules of the game". The Basic Law of 1949 was adopted as a result of the coordination of interests of the postwar major political forces with an overall orientation at the pluralistic system of democracy. The reached consent on the key parameters of the newly created political system testified to the fact that culture of confrontation and irreconcilability habitual for the Weimar Republic was changing into the culture of compromise.

Second, learning from the lessons of the past was revealed in the overcoming of the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the Federal President, as well as in the clearly defined limits of powers within the executive branch in general.

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[111] *Arendt, Hanna.* On Revolution. Penguin Classics, 1991. pp. 264, 269.

[112] *Schmidt, Manfred G.* Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oxford University Press, 2003. p. 17. *Fromme, Friedrich K.* Von der Weimarer Verfassung zum Bonner Grundgesetz, Die verfassungspolitischen Folgerungen des Parlamentarischen Rates aus Weimarer Republik und nationalsozialistischer Diktatur. Tübingen: Mohr, 1962

Third, the proportional electoral system which had led to depersonalizing of politics in the past was changed in the Federal Republic of Germany into a mixed member proportional system. Partial single-mandate representation of deputies in Parliament opened, as it appears, wider perspectives for the future system's legitimation. Knowing one's own representative in an electoral district and the possibility to call this very person (and not some abstract power institutions) to account served, undoubtedly, as an important stabilizing factor, conducing to the greater level of the citizens' trust in the system.

On adoption of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949, the first parliamentary elections took place in August and the parliamentary chambers – the *Bundestag* and the *Bundesrat* - were constituted. It is important to point out that carrying out general elections in postwar Germany became an important result of the consensus achieved by different groups of the political elite in their negotiations on the country's Basic Law. In the Policy statement delivered in the Bundestag on 20 September, 1949 the first Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer underscored that his "election to the Federal Chancellorship and the formation of the Government are a logical consequences of the political conditions which had arisen in the Bizonial area."[113]

Russia

If in case of Germany the collapse of the Nazi regime was caused by the military defeat in World War II, the Soviet system in the conditions of a closed society and a constant confrontation with the West was gradually falling into decay on its own. According to Jakov Drabkin, it was the comprehension of the inevitable system deadlock (and not any other external or internal threat to the Soviet regime) that made General Secretary Gorbachev "turn on the tap" and launch the reforms. Despite indisputable courage of the *perestroika's* initiators, it is obvious, however, that they could not foresee the radical demolition of all economic and political Soviet structures and "even in a bad dream they could not imagine the collapse of the CPSU and disintegration of the Soviet Union."[114] Consequently all changes in the organization of power taking place during the *perestroika* period (intended as a liberalization of the communist regime) followed by the Soviet system liquidation were not the results of some strategic plan realization, but of the ad hoc solutions made mostly out of economic and political expediency.

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[113] *Adenauer, Konrad.* Reden 1917-1967. Eine Auswahl. Stuttgart, 1975. pp. 153-54.

[114] *Drabkin, Jakov* et al. (ed.) Totalitarizm v Evrope XX veka: Iz istorii ideologij, dvizhenij, rezhimov i ih preodolenija. Moscow: Pamjatniki istoricheskoj mysli, 1996. pp. 525-27.

If in postwar West Germany the initial control of the occupation authorities and the obvious democratic orientation of the leading political forces became a reference point for carrying out democratic transformations, in post-Soviet Russia no such transformation goals were set. The transformations in Russia went spontaneously which meant they could have ended with any imaginable outcome, including the Soviet system restoration. Moreover, in the Russian context the likeliness that the traditional power logics of 'a single power' would after all prevail was particularly high.

Nevertheless, the disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of the Russian Federation as an independent state required an adoption of a new constitutional order. In 1990 the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin (in office 1991-1999) set up a parliamentary Constitutional Commission. The Commission formally chaired by the President co-operated with highly skilled experts while creating a first Constitution draft.[115] According to Lilia Shevtsova, in that context the possibility to develop several variants of a new power design was rather high. High was also a chance to facilitate an extensive public discussion of the contours of the future political system, thus getting a society accustomed to political responsibility.[116] However, as Shevtsova underscored, Yeltsin's actions evidenced that a political reform, creation of new institutions and their legitimization in the new elections were not among his priorities: "Having created the Constitutional Commission, Yeltsin practically forgot about its existence. Even after the August coup he was not interested in formation of new institutions though, apparently, this was what actually had to be done."[117]

It is obvious that this unwillingness to solve essential problems of political system restructuring cost the country a lot. Unlike Germany where the power during the postwar period was concentrated in the representative bodies - initially in the Economic and the Administrative councils, and later in the Parliament and the Cabinet formed by a parliamentary majority, - the post-Soviet Russia from the beginning of its existence faced a situation of the "dual power," i.e. a paralyzing standoff between the executive and legislative branches. It manifested in an acute political crisis, continuous two-years-long antagonism of the President and the Congress of People's Deputies in which each of these institutions struggled for absolute power monopoly.

By the end of 1992 the conflict between the President and the Parliament aggravated so that the mutual distrust between the two institutions excluded

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[115] See also *Sheinis, Victor.* Sostjazanie proektov (k istorii sozdanija rossijskoj Konstitutsii) // Obshestvennye nauki i sovremennost', № 6, 2003.; *Afanas'ev, Mikhail.* Klientelizm i rossijskaja gosudarstvennost'. Moscow, 1997.

[116] *Shevtsova, Lilia.* Regim Borisa Yeltsina. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999. p. 43.

[117] Ibid.

their further coexistence. The ambiguity of functions and the both parties claim for monopoly, their unwillingness to make compromises and concessions created a situation of political deadlock.

The "dual power" crisis of 1992 - 1993, however, is often linked to the fact that, after the August 1991 coup, neither general elections were held, nor a new Constitution was adopted. According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, if the new parliamentary and presidential elections had been called in the fall of 1991, the democratic forces, united largely within Democratic Russia coalition, might have done well most likely winning the majority within the Congress of People's Deputies. "A newly legitimized, independence-era Russian parliament could have voted support for the economic plan […] and could have provided the government with a constitutional foundation for political, economic, and social reform," – the scholars concluded.[118]

The Russian political scientist and one of the authors of the 1993 Constitution Victor Sheinis agreed that democratic Constitution could have been adopted in the immediate aftermath of the coup defeat at the forefront of the democratic wave of August 1991, but the favorable moment was missed.[119]

It is also noteworthy that Adam Przeworski in his seminal study of democratic transitions insisted that the institutional framework is better to be adopted in the moment following the collapse of the dictatorial regime when the relation of forces is unknown ex ante. In this case, Przeworski argued, the institutions will comprise extensive checks and balances and will last in the face of a variety of conditions. He wrote that if different political actors "know little about their political strength under the eventual democratic institutions, all opt for a maximin solution: institutions that introduce checks and balances and maximize the political influence of minorities, or, equivalently, make policy highly insensitive to fluctuations in public opinion. Each of the conflicting political forces will seek institutions that provide guarantees against temporary political adversity, against unfavorable tides of opinion, against contrary shifts of alliances. […] Hence, constitutions that are written when the relation of forces are still unclear are likely to counteract increasing returns to power, provide insurance to the eventual losers, and reduce the stakes of competition. They are more likely to induce the losers to comply with the outcomes and more likely to induce them to participate. They are more likely, therefore, to be stable across a wide range of historical conditions. […] Institutions adopted when the relation of

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[118] *Linz, Juan. Stepan, Alfred.* Op.cit. pp. 393-94.

[119] *Sheinis, Victor.* Sostjazanie proektov (k istorii sozdanija rossijskoj Konstitutsii) // Obshestvennye nauki i sovremennost'. № 6, 2003. p. 7.

forces is unknown or unclear are most likely to last across a variety of conditions."[120]

If the democratic institutions were established in 1991, there was a real chance for creating an effective system of democracy (the "parliamentary project" of the Constitution the authors of which supported the idea of parliamentary-presidential republic provided such a possibility).[121] However, this favorable chance of fulfilling a timely political transition through consensus or compromise agreements was lost and the political crisis was finally resolved by force. The Congress of People's Deputies was dissolved by presidential decree on 21 September, 1993 and on 4 October the White House was shelled by the army tanks and seized by the military following the parliamentary supporters barricading themselves inside the building.

Yeltsin's order to open fire on the obstinate Parliament showed that in Russian politics, despite a declarative adherence to democratic values, the traditional Russian rule of force again prevailed over the rule of law. The further violations of democratic standards and principles by the Russian political elite reconfirmed that establishment of democracy as an effective system of "checks and balances," conducing to realization of the public control over the power institutions, was highly unlikely in Russia.

After the events of October 1993, as Michael Brie explained, President Yeltsin remained the unique legal factor of power and after the dissolution of parliament he could operate "in an environment free from institutions", no longer restricted by any obligations (including obligations towards his political supporters).[122] Thus already on 15 October, 1993 together with parliamentary elections there was simultaneously proclaimed a referendum on a new Constitution the text of which had been hasty drafted by Yeltsin without any consultations with other political forces. The project published on 10 November just a month before the referendum was known only to a handful of experts and could not be publicly discussed.[123]

Unlike postwar Germany which managed to overcome confrontational tendencies peculiar to the Weimar Republic period, post-Soviet Russian

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[120] *Przeworski, Adam.* Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. pp. 82, 87-88.

[121] Such form of government promotes the representative principle on which republican dimension of democracy is based.

[122] *Brie, Michael.* Russland: Das Entstehen einer "delegierten Demokratie". In: *Merkel, Wolfgang; Sandschneider, Eberhard; Segert, Dieter* (Hrsg.) Systemwechsel 2. Die Institutionalisierung der Demokratie, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1996. pp. 305-06.

[123] *Slater, Wendy.* Russia's Plebiscite on a New Constitution // RFL/RL Research Report, Vol.3, № 3, 21 January, 1994. pp. 1-7.

transformation represented a mere *imposition from above*.[124] The tragic events of the fall 1993 revealed the unwillingness of the leading Russian social and political forces to fulfill socio-political restructuring based on democratic procedures and principles. Instead the rule of force prevailed over the political conflicts resolution. The project of the new Constitution drafted by the Kremlin and approved in the December referendum became actually "the constitution of the winner," and was neither a reflection of, nor a basis for a political consensus, - something that the Constitution of a country is intended to be - "not the act of its Government, but of the people constituting a Government."[125]

Inability to learn historical lessons from the country's past, and also unwillingness to take advantage of the other countries' political experiences entailed another basic error also successfully overcome in postwar Germany: the *concentration of power in the hands of one political actor*.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted by the national referendum on 12 December, 1993 established a presidential regime which provided the President with such powers that it let experts speak about the "super-presidential republic."[126] Though the separation of powers was formally provided in the 1993 Constitution text, the powers of the President as the head of the state either incorporated some major functions of the other branches of power, or allowed to limit their independence at any point.

The legislature in the Constitution thus assumed a secondary role compared to the executive which, in turn, appeared completely controlled by the President. As Vladimir Ryzhkov explained in his book *The Fourth Republic*, all the articles safeguarding accountability of the government and the executive before the State Duma were excluded from the Constitution. First, the parliament was completely deprived of such a traditional right as the parliamentary control over government. Besides, it was deprived of the possibility to participate *de jure* in government's formation. According to Article 111.4 in case the State Duma rejects three times the candidates for the post of the prime-minister suggested by the President, the latter can still appoint the desired person dissolving the Duma and calling new elections. The Constitution thus actually provides the President with an exclusive right to appoint the prime-minister (although with necessity of the political consent of the State Duma). Besides, Yeltsin assigned himself the right to dissolve the parliament also in case the prime-minister raises before the State Duma the issue of no-confidence to the government and if the Duma votes

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[124] See *Karl, Terry Lynn and Schmitter, Phillippe.* Models of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe // International Social Science Journal, № 128, 1991. pp. 269-84.

[125] Common Sense, the Rights of Man and Other Essential Writings of Thomas Paine. Signet Classics, 2003. p. 173.

[126] Izvestia, 12 October, 1994, p. 4, and 19 March, 1998, p. 2. See also *Fish, Stephen* (2000).

no-confidence twice in a three-months period, the President may adopt a decision on the resignation of the government or dissolve the State Duma and announce new elections (Article 117.4). Thus, the President secured himself not only by maximum dilution of the Parliament's role, but also by creating a constant threat of its dissolution which could be realized in the course of political crisis.[127]

As for the "checks and balances" of the presidential power, though formally the President may be impeached (Article 93) in reality the Constitution architects made everything to transform this procedure into something, in Ryzhkov's formulation, "absolutely impossible." The Duma has, first of all, to vote in favor of proceedings by a two-thirds majority on the initiative of at least a third of the deputies after a special commission of deputies had decided he had been guilty of treason or a crime of similar gravity; the Supreme Court had to rule that there were grounds for such an accusation, and the Constitutional Court had to confirm that the proper procedures had been followed. The Federation Council had then to vote in favor by a two-thirds majority, not later than three months after the original charges had been presented.[128] According to Stephen White (who actually defined Russian presidency as "formidable") it was unlikely, given this elaborate procedure, that Yeltsin or any future president would be forced out of office on this basis, although the Duma might sometimes find a sufficiently large majority to initiate these proceedings.[129]

At the same time no real responsibility of the President for non-observance of the Constitution was specified. The possibility of his impeachment "on the basis of the charges of high treason or another grave crime" (Article 93.1) has no relation to the Constitutional law and consequently cannot guarantee responsibility of the head of state in any way as the Constitution guarantor. Thus, the Russian political system was deprived of the major channels of horizontal accountability.

The legalized concentration of powers in a single personified institution, quite corresponding to the Russian political tradition of full possession of power, was legitimized however in a new way – through national elections of the head of the state. Nevertheless, many experts agreed that these elections did not initially correspond to the democratic standards – they were neither completely free nor fair, nor did they possess an important characteristic of unpredictability of result. Neither during presidential elections of 1996, nor during the elections

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[127] *Ryzhkov, Vladimir.* Chetvertaja respublika. Ocherk politicheskoj istorii sovremennoj Rossii. Moscow: Ad Marginem, 2000. pp. 32-43.

[128] Ibid.

[129] *White, Stephen.* Russia's New Politics: the Management of a Postcommunist Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp. 82-83.

following them the ruling elite was changed. That testifies to the fact that the institution of elections in Russia did not become a basic element of vertical accountability of power.[130]

The establishment of a super-presidential system in post-Soviet Russia became a serious obstacle on the way of democratic consolidation as well as further democratic development. As Steven Fish observed, the growth of unaccountability and irresponsibility of the executive power resulted in the most terrible errors made by the Russian government. One of the greatest among those catastrophic failures was the Chechen war launched personally by Yeltsin and a group of *siloviki*, without any consultations with the Parliament and with the public.[131] From the very beginning this war was extremely unpopular among the population and many of the politicians. In 1994-95 60 percent of Russians believed that troops should be withdrawn from Chechnya and a peaceful solution should be found.[132] Obviously this and many other grave mistakes would not have taken place, be the legislative and judicial branches given more control over the executive.

One of the most evident signs of the governmental unaccountability in Russia became an enormous scope of the state corruption. In the annual Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index where Russia was included for the first time in 1996 it ranked 47 out of 54 countries surveyed.[133]

The link between corruption and super-presidentialism is found in the executive's control over public expenditure and the weakness of checks on executive-branch officials. Thus, corruption in the sprawling executive-branch bureaucracy rages unchecked by legislative or judicial oversight. Those who control the state's resources at the national level are accountable only to the President.[134] Furthermore, the corruption in Russia is similarly rampant at all levels of the state bureaucracy including the legislature and the judiciary.

As for the third issue, namely, the electoral system choice, the problem here was that though initially Russia, just like postwar Germany, adopted a mixed member proportional system, this choice appeared significantly devalued

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[130] See. *Gel'man, Vladimir. Elezarov, Vitaly.* «Uchreditel'nye vybory» v kontekste rossijskoj transformatsii. In: *Gel'man, Vladimir; Golosov, Grigorij* (eds.) Pervyj elektoral'nyj tsikl v Rossii (1993-1996), Moscow, 2000.

[131] *Fish, Steven M.* Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2005. pp. 242-243.

[132] See VCIOM and FOM opinion polls data held in December 1994 – January 1995. For instance, the all-Russia poll of city and rural population by the Public Opinion Fund (FOM), January, 1995. <http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/Chechnya/truck_war>

[133] The Transparency International 1996 Corruption Perception Index.
 < http://www.transparency.org/content/download/2914/18028/file/cpi1996.pdf>

[134] *Fish, Steven M.* 2005. Op. cit. pp. 242-43.

by the secondary, minor role of the legislature in a political system. Although the exclusion of the Russian parliament from government formation contradicted the Russian Election Law (according to which half of the State Duma was elected under proportional representation from party lists), the tendency to eliminate representation prevailed so that in 2005 the mixed member proportional system was replaced with proportional representation system. Furthermore, the electoral threshold was increased from 5 to 7 percent. The government formation again remained unaffected by the party composition of the parliament.

Though in general the system of the Soviet institutions during the post-*perestroika* period was largely destroyed, many of its elements and different kinds of links penetrating its structures remained intact.[135] Additionally, the structure of the Russian elite was largely conserved as the former Soviet nomenclature occupied the majority of leading positions in politics and business.[136] This bureaucracy has gradually restored its domination in the spheres of influence previously lost. At the same time the separation of powers – both vertical and horizontal - outlined in the early 1990s has been almost completely eliminated and the basic rights and freedoms of individuals (primarily, the freedoms of expression, conscience, assembly, etc.) have been increasingly limited. As some formal and informal rules subordinated the property rights to the control of bureaucracy, market and private property in Russia have also been strongly restricted. [137]

2.2 Characteristics of West German and Russian Economic Reforms

As mentioned in the introduction, the extrication from totalitarian rule cannot be imagined without transformation of the central planning system into a free market economy characterized by decentralized decision making and market principles of interaction (the so-called "invisible hand"). Overcoming the inefficiency of coordination and management of central planning economy gets greater importance as it affects the consolidation of a new democratic regime. In this section of the chapter I will address the impact of economic reforms in West Germany and Russia on their sociopolitical transformations.

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[135] See *Gudkov, Lev*. «Totalitarizm» kak teoreticheskaja ramka. In: *Gudkov, Lev*. Negativnaja identichnost'. Statji 1997-2002 godov. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, «VCIOM-A», 2004. pp. 439-42.

[136] *Kryshtanovskaya, Olga*; *White, Stephen*. From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite // Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, № 5, July 1996. pp. 711-33.

[137] See for e.g. *Vorozhejkina, Tatiana.* Gljadja nazad: vozmozhnye al'ternativy v razvitii perestrojki. In: *Vorozhejkina, Tatiana* (ed.) Puti Rossii: 20 let peremen, Moscow: Moskovskaja vysshaja shkola sotsial'nyh i ekonomicheskikh nauk, 2005. p. 28.

West Germany

It is remarkable that when people speak about the West German "miracle" they mean the Economic Miracle *(Wirtschaftswunder)* in the first instance. However it is necessary to remember that economic reforms were launched in the western parts of Germany within the limits of a coalition proto-government of Bizonia, formed already in December 1946. It means that economic reforms were implemented on the base of though not yet legally fixed, but de facto established institutions which formed an institutional basis for the Federal Republic's political system.

The German currency reform launched in June 1948 was intended to restore monetary stability and to end the inflationary after-effects from the Nazi period. Not only was a new currency put in place, but it was done through a process of reducing the money supply. Shortly after that, Ludwig Erhard, Director of Economics of the Bizonial Economic Council, introduced another element of the reform: abolition of the price and production controls. On Sunday, June 20, 1948, when Allied officials were resting, Erhard announced an end to exchange controls as well as to price controls, rationing regulations, central planning practices, and trade restrictions.[138]

The strategic line of Erhard's radical reorganization of economic mechanisms consisted in using stabilizing effect of rigid currency reform with simultaneous launching of prices' liberalization, removing numerous regulations and controls holding down the initiative of economic agents, and creating the conditions for competition by adopting antitrust laws that would prevent monopoly. Additionally, the reform consisted in reorienting investment streams into the production of consumer goods and housing construction fields as well as in implementing social shock-absorbers for protection of the weakest and the unprotected.[139]

Creation of effective and strong economy competitive in the world markets and favoring well-being of the German citizens became the main leitmotif of the reforms. Erhard, who formulated his ultimate goal as "prosperity for all" (*Wohlstand für alle*), saw a way of achieving this aim in formation of socially focused market economy based on free competition and mutual responsibility of the citizens and the state.[140]

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[138] *Erhard, Ludwig.* Prosperity through Competition. London: Thames and Hudson, 1958. pp. 10-36.

[139] *Zaritskij, Boris.* Ludwig Erhard: sekrety «ekonomicheskogo chuda». Moscow: BEK, 1997. p. 74.

[140] *Erhard, Ludwig.* Wohlstand für alle. Econ; Auflage: Neuausg. 1997.

An important component of the German economic reform was providing workers' with co-determination rights – the rights to participate in decision making in their enterprises and in shaping of their working environment. Workers' participation was introduced in the Federal Republic in 1951 in coal, iron and steel industries' enterprises with more than 1,000 employees. In all other major German enterprises workers' participation was introduced by the 1976 Co-determination Act which stipulated that employees and shareholders should be equally represented on the companies' supervisory boards. The act applied to private and public limited companies (*Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung* and *Aktiengesellschaften*, respectively) with more than 2,000 employees.[141] The activity of work councils provided a workers' participation activity in smaller companies (with more than five employees).

The postwar economic reforms resulted in a remarkable growth of national economy. The growth rate of industrial production was 25.0 percent in 1950 and 18.1 percent in 1951. Growth continued at a high rate for most of the 1950s, despite occasional slowdowns. By 1960 industrial production had risen to two-and-one-half times the level of 1950 and far beyond any that the Nazis had reached during the 1930s in all of Germany. GDP rose by two-thirds during the same decade. Although wage demands and pay increases had been modest at first, wages and salaries rose over 80 percent between 1949 and 1955, catching up with growth.[142] After an initial spike in prices when the controls were abolished, by the end of 1950 the greater industrial and agricultural output that was offered on a more open market significantly reduced the cost of living. Germany's economic-recovery path assured that well into the 1960s its rate of growth in output and productivity would place it far ahead of virtually all the other countries of western Europe, including the victors in the war.[143]

The highest growth rates took place in metallurgy, mechanical engineering, electric power and chemical industries. Deep qualitative changes in economy occurred under the influence of the scientific-technical revolution. Successful economic development also allowed to rapidly increase the export capital. Since 1951 Germany had started its export performance which by 1953

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[141] Before the act came into effect in 1976, codetermination in these enterprises had been less extensive. According to the former Works Constitution Act of 1952 (the current *Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz*), employees only had the right to one third of the seats on the supervisory board.

[142] The Economic Miracle of Germany at <http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/facts/bl_economic_miracle.htm>

[143] *Ebeling, Richard M.* The German Economic Miracle and the "Social Market Economy." There is No Third Option between Government Control and Free Markets // The Freeman, Vol. 58, № 3, April 2008.

ranked third in the world following that of the United States and Great Britain. About half of all German products were exported to the European and world markets. Germany paid off the national debts, created considerable gold and exchange currency reserves, the West German deutschmark becoming one of the most reliable world currencies.

Significant role in restoration and development of economy was played by financial and credit regulation. In the first postwar years the government assisted in restoring large monopolies and providing large corporations with labor force. This, in turn, caused expansion of housing construction, the fast growth of direct state capital investments in restoration of housing destroyed by war. From the beginning of the 1950s the share of indirect state investments has been increasing in the structure of capital investments. The focus was made on supporting key economic branches of industry through state credits and grants. In the 1960s the state capital investments in the form of direct investments in science and education also increased. Considerable investments in infrastructure promoted acceleration of economic growth rates, qualitative development of the social sphere, and overall growth of the standard of living of the population.

Kendall Baker and his colleagues asserted that the dramatic economic improvement made since World War II was undoubtedly one of the factors contributing to the Federal Republic's accelerated political development. By 1950 industrial production had exceeded its 1936 value, and by 1961 it had increased by an additional 162 percent. At the beginning of the 1980s, Germany's industrial production far exceeded that any of its European neighbors, placing the German economy in the forefront of advanced industrialism.[144]

Russia

Just like postwar Germany shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russia initiated transition from state-controlled economy central planning to a market-oriented economy. The chosen conversion policy included the sudden release of price and currency controls, withdrawal of state subsidies, and immediate trade liberalization within a country – the so-called "shock therapy." The privatization of the previously state-owned assets also followed in the early 1990s.

The chosen timing however outlined a major difference of the Russian reforms from those in West Germany and later – in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. The matter is that economic reforms in Russia were launched

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[144] *Baker, Kendall L; Dalton, Russell J.; Hildebrandt, Kai.* Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. p. 10.

before the adoption of a new constitutional order. As discussed earlier in this chapter, instead of creating the institutional base for the future reforms President Yeltsin chose to carry out an economic reform with retaining the inherited Soviet institutions (and with intention to gradually substitute them with the new ones). This choice defined in many respects the country's future development. In Lilia Shevtsova's view, "Yeltsin's decision to embark on economic reforms while refusing to introduce independent institutions inevitably reduced reform to a mechanism for delivering privatized state property into the hands of the "old new" ruling class."[145]

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, who believed timing to be "crucial in all politics, but especially in democratization processes," also concluded that the Russian political class selected the worst possible sequence of reformatory steps. In their judgment, "Yeltsin's decision to privilege economic restructuring over democratic state restructuring weakened the state, weakened democracy and weakened the economy."[146] The researchers asserted that, "Yeltsin's choice in the fall of 1991 to privilege economic restructuring and completely to neglect democratic restructuring of the parliament, the constitution, and the state further weakened an already weak state, deprived the proposed economic reform program of the minimal degree of political and state coherence necessary for its successful implementation, and contributed to the mutual deligitimization of the three democratic branches of the government."[147]

Officially President Yeltsin declared drastic economic reforms at the 5th Congress of People's Deputies in late October 1991. He promised then that difficulties and deprivations would last no longer than six - eight months and that already the following fall, in 1992, the country would encounter real changes: economic stabilization and gradual improvement of the standards of living. On 2 January, 1992 Yeltsin declared the liberalization of foreign trade, prices, and currency. The program of liberalization and stabilization, which had been designed and further carried out by Yeltsin's deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, entailed removing Soviet-era price and currency controls, legal barriers to private trade and manufacture, and cutting subsidies to state farms and industries while allowing foreign imports into the Russian market in order to break the power of state-owned local monopolies.

The deregulation of most of the prices in January 1992 resulted in unprecedented prices increase which reached 245 percent in that month alone. In

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[145] *Shevtsova, Lilia.* Russia - Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies. Arch Tait. 2007. p. 14. *Shevtsova, Lilia.* Regim Borisa Yeltsina. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999. p. 53.

[146] *Linz, Juan; Stepan, Alfred.* Op.cit. p. 392.

[147] Ibid. p. 397.

1992, the first year of economic reform, retail prices in Russia increased by 2,520 percent.[148] Shock therapy had wiped out the savings of most Russians: the savings of the people in state-owned *Sberbank* were frozen and subsequently destroyed by hyperinflation.

Though the consumer market was filled with goods due to the combination of prices increase and opening of the borders for imports, low competitiveness of domestic products, however, became one of the main reasons for decrease in sales and production in the Russian enterprises. In 1992 industrial production was reduced by 18 percent, and by 1994 (comparing with 1991) – by 52.9 percent; gross national product decreased by 35.6 percent, capital investments – by 76 percent. The country had not known economic decline of similar scope since the Second World War.

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Despite the outward similarity of the economic policies initiated in the course of reforms in Russia and West Germany, review of specific differences of the reforms' outcomes in both countries provides valuable insight. In this respect it is worth singling out several characteristics of West German economic reforms conducive to the Economic Miracle.

First of all, trying to understand the reasons for success of the West German economic transformation, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact of preliminary preparation to the reforms within the country. Walter Eucken, a founder of the Freiburg School and an intellectual architect of West Germany's postwar economic miracle, started to develop his transition program from the centrally administered Nazi economy to a free state and market economy already in the late 1930s. Following the National Socialists' seizure of power in 1933, Eucken maintained contact with other anti-Nazi Germans who understood the need to think about how to transition a post-Nazi Germany towards a society marked by ordered liberty rather than socialism or communism. In 1940 his well-known research entitled *Basis of National Economy* (*Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie*, 1939) was published. While West Germany's 1948 currency reform and abolition of price-controls was engineered later on by Ludwig Erhard, the latter himself called Eucken an intellectual godfather of the changes that took West Germany "from rubble to riches" in less than ten years.

Starting from 1942 Ludwig Erhard, supported by the Reich Group for Industry (*Reichsgruppe Industrie)*, also worked on concepts for postwar reforms. He did so both privately as well as in the newly founded Institute for Industrial

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[148] Ekonomika i zhizn,' № 4, 1992; Izvestija, 19 March, 1992.

Research (*Institut für Industrieforschung*). In 1944 Erhard completed his *War Finances and Debt Consolidation* Memorandum (*Kriegsfinanzierung und Schuldenkonsolidierung*), which later served as a theoretical basis of the 1948 economic reform.[149]

Unlike architects of reforms in postwar Germany, Russian liberals had no well-defined program of social and economic transformations, and the economic reforms were launched by Yeltsin and Gaidar without any particularly well-developed program.[150] Though some Russian economists also developed economic programs during the *perestroika* (e.g. Grigory Yavlinsky's *500 Days*), no one presented a really worked out strategy similar to Erhard's almost 300-pages Memorandum. Taken largely by surprise, the political elite of post-*perestroika* Russia did not possess any prepared plans of action, whether be conversion of the centrally planned system into the market economy, transformation of the communist system, or introduction of parliamentarism.

At the same time the ability of some representatives of the German elite to correctly forecast and prepare alternative economic programs became, as it seems, one of the most significant factors for success in the West German reform process. A crucial role in the economic transformations was played, certainly, by Ludwig Erhard who, combining qualities of a scholar, an expert and a politician, was able to eventually achieve the realization of his elaborated program. Through sharp criticism both from the Allied authorities and his own compatriots he managed to successfully implement his ideas and groundwork. Russia, in turn, certainly lacked people with Erhard's leadership qualities such as determination, combined, importantly, with the readiness to make compromises, renouncing at times personal ambitions for the sake of the general welfare.

The factor of qualitative preparation for reforms in Germany is intrinsically linked with another important factor, - the way in which the reforms where carried out. Interestingly, Erhard started outlining his economic transition program not with defining concrete financial and economic recipes, but with human psychology. According to Boris Zaritsky, a narrow technocratic approach to economic problems was alien to the Economic Minister. Any potentially successful economic policy, according to him, should have begun with gaining popular trust and support for reforms, for a man with his psychology, hopes, plans, with delusions was a centre of economic life. Realizing that without this trust even the most reasonable policies might be frozen, Erhard formulated the basic requirements to the effective policy during transition. In the first instance,

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[149] *Erhard, Ludwig.* Kriegsfinanzierung und Schuldenkonsolidierung. Faksimiledruck der Denkschrift von 1943/44. Frankfurt a.M./Berlin/Wien, 1977.

[150] Evropa i Rossija: opyt ekonomicheskih preobrazovanij. Moscow: Nauka, 1996. p. 289.

this policy should be clear to citizens, consistent, open and fair and politicians should convince people of its rightness. Besides, the policy should be correctly designed tactically, i.e. reformers should make provision not only for long-term intended outcomes, but also try to meet people's expectations within a reasonable time, convincing through some vivid demonstrative effects and results. Among the first anti-crisis measures Erhard chose deregulation of economy, liberalization of prices and restoration of viable currency with the help of which, according to him, it was possible to fill the market and provide valid working stimulus in a short period of time.[151]

In his manifesto *Prosperity for All (Wohlstand für alle)* Erhard wrote: "Modern psychology demands precisely that the national economic process be not merely considered in the technical sense. It is equally important that the human beings who animate this machinery be included in national economic calculations. How we ourselves act is of decisive importance for the trend of the economy."[152] It is evident that for Erhard-economist the market was not an end in itself, but only means for achieving a socially-oriented economy. He was aiming at overcoming a strong stratification of society and the maximum development of a creative power of the country. The desire to provide a minimum "exclusion" of the needy resulted in implementation in the postwar Federal Republic of a large-scale welfare system supporting the old, the sick and the unemployed.[153]

In Russia, by contrast, no one seemed to care about these groups of the population. Liberals-technocrats started reforms hypothesizing that market relations would improve economy at once, that market economy was universal and favorable for all. There dominated an illusion that the market grace would be poured out immediately, without deterioration of living standards of the majority of the population and that a new "middle class" would ostensibly emerge in the long run. At the same time reformers did not trouble themselves to inform the population of their decisions, to convince people with the help of decent arguments and explanations. For some paradoxical reason, called "democrats," the new Russian leaders were not eager to ensure an open and transparent policy-making. The American journalist Paul Khlebnikov, for instance, expressed sincere perplexity on how little reformers seemed to care about the Russian people, how "many members of the Yeltsin government often spoke about their country with such icy detachment that you thought they were

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[151] *Zaritskij, Boris.* Op. cit. p. 32.

[152] *Erhard, Ludwig.* Prosperity Through Competition. London: Thames and Hudson, 1958. p. 179.

[153] "Die wirschaftlichen Grundlagen der sozialen Sicherung in Deutschland", IN Sozial-Report 1, 1993.

describing a foreign land."[154] In confirmation of his impressions the author quoted the words of the opposition leader Grigory Yavlinsky describing the approach and views of the reformers of those years: "Gaidar and his colleagues believed that Russia was populated by *sovki* (rotten Soviets), that everything that exists in Russia should be wiped out and that only then can you build something new. Any methods or means are all right. […] That's the way Gaidar spoke – 'The scientific establishment can wait! The northern regions are unnecessary for us! The older generation is guilty...' The paradox of those years is that they were building capitalism using purely Bolshevik methods. A Bolshevik is a man for whom the aim is important but the means are not."[155] This purely technocratic approach of the Russian reformers sharply contrasted with the much more human-centered one of the West German leaders.

Another feature of the West German economic transformations, in my view, consists in the fact that German reformers perceived economic liberalization not as an ultimate goal, but primarily as means of democratization. The formation of political system of democracy was, seemingly, their priority, and consequently, everything including economic reforms should have promoted meeting this end. The West German political elite seem to have fully realized the role which economic transformations are able to play in building and consolidating a democratic state.

To illustrate, Ludwig Erhard wrote: "Through the increase in general prosperity economic policy contributes to the democratization of West Germany. The thread, then, is a desire, after years of effort, for increased general prosperity, and, if the only possible path leading to this goal is through increased economic competition, then economic policy is bound at the same time to strengthen the many traditional basic human freedoms."[156] And also: "If the future of our young democratic country is to be assured, it is high time it returned to the path of virtue. In this economic and social policy join forces. In the middle of the 20th century a prosperous economy is closely linked with the fate of a country, as, conversely, every government or country is immediately affected by the failure of its economic policy. This interdependence of politics and economics forbids all narrow thinking. *In the same way as the economist must feel a duty towards the democratic state, so must every politician recognize the outstanding importance of the economic well-being of the people and act accordingly.*"[157]

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[154] *Khlebnikov, Paul.* Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism. New York: Harcourt, Inc, 2000. p. 103.

[155] Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky, 1998. In: *Khlebnikov, Paul.* Op. cit. pp. 102-3.

[156] *Erhard, Ludwig.* Op. cit. p. 6.

[157] Ibid. p. 8. (Italics added)

Unlike Ludwig Erhard and other West German political leaders, Russian liberal-reformers believed that "only free market and private property had an inherent worth, not democracy."[158] Such an approach was approved by a necessity of solving modernization problems. The latter, in turn, according to many ideologists of transformations, could be solved exclusively in an authoritarian way. Thus the authors of modernization program for Russia, which was developed in the Russian Independent Institute of Social and Nationalities Problems (RIISNP) with the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Researches in 1992-1993, stated that "in Russia in the foreseeable future there would be no such a question: democracy or authoritarianism? The question should be put in a different way: what type of authoritarianism will be established in Russia?"[159]

According to the program developers, among whom were Victor Krasil'shikov from RIISNP, Vladimir Gutnik and Victor Kuznetsov from the Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAN), as well as some other experts, the modernization necessity in post-Soviet Russia required "the establishment of an authoritarian regime, liberal-technocratic and patriotic in essence, which would assume responsibility as a political and legal guarantor of the genuine renewal of Russia. Without a strong, even rigid power, it will not be possible just by economic means to restrain mafia clans, to put an end to the continuous saturnalia of corruption and to call lumpen proletariat to order. Such "enlightened" authoritarianism, protecting conditions for the civil society development, open for innovations and gradual democratization, can become an effective alternative to the country's present backwardness and chaos. […] To be successful modernization authoritarianism should create and form an ideological and political consensus in the society."[160]

Another illustration of the similar approach is the analytical note of the Leningrad Association of Social and Economic Sciences headed then by a famous liberal technocrat and one of the Yeltsin's reforms architect Anatoly Chubais. The note written in March 1990 presented authoritarian methods and instruments to be utilized while carrying out economic reforms. Among the mentioned measures were "a dissolution of trade unions in case of their opposing government policies," "emergency antistrike legislation," "control over mass

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[158] *Gel'man, Vladimir.* "Transition" po-russki: konceptsii perehodnogo perioda i politicheskaja transformatsija v Rossii (1989-1996) // Obshestvennye nauki i sovremennost'. № 5, 1997. pp. 66-67.

[159] *Krasil'shikov, Victor; Gutnik, Vladimir; Kuznetsov, Victor* (eds.) Modernizatsija: zarubezhnyj opyt i Rossija, Moscow: Agentstvo Infomart, 1994. pp. 104 -05.

[160] Ibid.

media," "measures of direct suppression of the body of active party functionaries," which however should be combined with such "softening" measures as "pluralism and publicity in all the aspects which are not related to the economic reform." As for the measures promoting fragmentation of social links and weakening of resistance to reforms, it was offered "to close one mine out of three, keeping the normal wages in the two remaining mines" or "to partially reduce the labor force in several enterprises."[161]

Similar viewpoint was shared by many intellectuals while Yegor Gaidar's government was in power. As Boris L'vin remarked in a 1990 publication, for the sake of the whole society while carrying out reforms the government should ignore all private and group interests as well as the institutions expressing them, including parliament (what actually Gaidar's government tried to do in the first months of 1992).[162]

The Russian reforms' ideologists and apologists of authoritarianism as a necessary condition of post-totalitarian transition seem to have turned a blind eye to the experience of postwar West Germany (as well as to democratic transitions in some countries of Southern Europe and Latin America) which had accomplished democratization and market liberalization without any intermediate deliberately authoritarian stages.

Certainly the tactical choices made by the West German and Russian elites in the course of transformations had long-term and far-reaching consequences. Although in both countries decontrol of prices was an important element of the economic reform, the Federal Republic chose to pursue a social market economy with a strong social welfare component and a system of codetermination, which gave workers some say about their management. The establishment of a generous system of social services that included statutory health, unemployment, and pension insurance programs, provided a long-term protection and security for the Federal Republic's citizens. In Russia no such protective measures were undertaken and the 1992 hyperinflation immediately resulted in a sharp decline of the level and quality of life of the Russian population.

Another difference in approaches was manifested in the restraint of liberalization of the external economic relations in postwar Germany. In fact, up to the convertibility of the deutschmark in the early 1950s the state preserved monopoly in foreign trade. The restraint of liberalization in foreign trade helped

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[161] Zhestkim kursom… Analiticheskaja zapiska Leningradskoj assotsiatsii sotsial'no-ekonomicheskih nauk // Vek XX i mir, № 6, 1990. pp. 15-19.

[162] See *L'vin, Boris.* Svoboda ruk // Vek XX i mir, № 2, 1990. *Gel'man, Vladimir.* "Transition" po-russki: konceptsii perehodnogo perioda i politicheskaja transformatsija v Rossii (1989-1996) // Obshestvennye nauki i sovremennost', № 5, 1997.

to prevent the capital flight from the country and to attract the capital from the outside.[163]

The Russian leaders, in turn, acted the other way round. Paul Khlebnikov underscored that, the state's withdrawing from the export-import business and abolishing customs duties became disastrous for Russia in 1991-1992. As the journalist explained, "The country functioned on a double price system with respect to its key export commodities – one price on the world markets and another price (much lower) on the domestic market. This was a license for private traders to make enormous profits. The new foreign trade companies tended to hide most of their profits abroad. Capital flight from Russia during these years was estimated at $ 15 billion to $ 20 billion a year as crime bosses, corrupt officials and factory directors set up bank accounts in Switzerland, Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, England, Israel, the United States and the Caribbean islands."[164]

By 1994 the majority of Russia's foreign trade was being handled by private trading companies. The country's official exports dropped by 40 percent in two years; the government suffered an even sharper drop in revenue it traditionally received from export and import tariffs. By 1996, the total amount of Russia's flight capital reached an estimated $ 150 billion.[165]

2.3 Conclusions

1. The retrospective analysis political transformations allows to conclude that a political system (as a system of independent institutions) was not created in post-Soviet Russia. As a result of adoption of the 1993 Constitution, which became "the constitution of the winner" and established a super-presidential regime, Russia obtained a system lacking accountability of the government to the legislature. This absence of horizontal accountability, in turn, reduced efficiency of vertical accountability in the form of electoral competition. As a result the real centers of power in the country were concentrated not within the formal representative institutions, but in nontransparent structures of the Presidential Administration and Federal Security Service (FSB).

In the Federal Republic of Germany, in turn, the 1949 Basic Law established a parliamentary system where the federal government actually

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[163] Evropa i Rossija: opyt ekonomicheskih preobrazovanij. Moscow: Nauka, 1996. p. 264.

[164] *Khlebnikov, Paul.* Op. cit. pp. 96,99.

[165] Ibid. See also "The Threat for Russian Organized Crime: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 2nd Session: 30 April, 1996". US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1996. p. 34.

represented the parliamentary majority and the Chancellor elected by the Bundestag was responsible to it for the government's actions. The representative institutions of the parliamentary republic became the main centers of decision-making in the country. The economic reforms, for instance, were carried out in the frameworks of proto-government of Bizonia formed on the basis of coalition of the CDU/CSU and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Later the government of the constitutionally established Federal Republic formed in the publicly elected Bundestag appointed the figure of Ludwig Erhard as the Minister of Economics, thereby sharing with ex-head of the Economic Council the responsibility for the painful market reforms.

In Russia, by contrast, the two branches of power were not able to reach a consensus on the key issues of the country's development and on economic reforms in the first instance. It testified to the fact that the Russian leaders could not, unlike their German colleagues, draw lessons from the country's history and rise above narrow corporate ambitions. As Virginie Coulloudon observed, "At the core of the reality is the Russian elites' continued lack of respect for, or even understanding of, the notion of the public good. Soviet ideology offered its own concept of the public good. But when that ideology was totally discredited, nothing emerged to take its place. If things had gone differently, the Soviet state could have given way to the rule of law. Instead, Russian elites have reproduced the old pattern without the constraints of Soviet ideology. As a result, many individuals and the government itself operate in an ethical and moral vacuum. The new system has drifted into political arbitrariness and generalized criminality. Russian public officials have gradually forged a new political system where the notions of the rule of law and the public good are secondary to the necessity of keeping power and managing the state's wealth. They have adorned this system with democratic trappings, including a constitutional court, a democratically elected parliament, and a free press. But they reject the idea of a real alternation of power in the Kremlin."[166]

2. As the analysis of the postwar Federal Republic development reveals, the Economic Miracle accelerated consolidation of the new German state. While the Weimar Republic – as the first German experience with democracy – perpetually struggled against economic difficulties, democracy became associated largely with never-ending hardships and anxieties and the democratic Weimer state was blamed for the failure to solve economic problems. In the Federal Republic, by contrast, Germans became for the first time convinced that democracy is compatible with economic growth. While during the Weimar

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[166] *Coulloudon, Virginie.* Crime and Corruption after Communism. The Criminalization of Russia's Political Elite // East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 6, № 4, 1997.

period many tended to look back at the authoritarian but more economically successful German Empire as the Golden Age of the German state, the Third Reich which had initially restored the standards of living, but had precipitated the country into a destructive war and economic catastrophe, aroused nostalgia only in the first postwar years. For the majority of the Economic Miracle contemporaries, as Henry Ashby Turner summarized, the financially safe, democratic present seemed the best of all periods.[167]

In Russia, on the contrary, unprecedented economic recession took place in the era of post-Soviet "democratization." It is not surprising therefore that democracy, associated with the chaos of the 1990s, became linked in the public opinion with poverty and humiliation. Already in 1995 half of the Russian countrymen and a quarter of the town dwellers believed that democracy had brought Russia and its citizens only harm.[168] 72 percent of the respondents of the 1998 poll approved of the pre-Gorbachev situtation and only 35 percent positively estimated the existing regime.[169]

The experiences of West Germany and Russia, thus, confirmed that through raising of living standards economic development provides a political regime with necessary legitimacy and long-term sustainability. Legitimacy, being an important condition of any regime's existence, gets its prime value in democratic states.

Besides, economic development positively affects cultural changes which, in turn, facilitate democracy stabilization. In the following chapter I will turn to analysis of the cultural transformation in West Germany and Russia.

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[167] *Turner, Henry Ashby.* Op. cit. pp. 116-17.

[168] The All-Russia poll of city and rural population ordered by the German WDR TV Channel. December 1995. <http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/of19960303>

[169] *Rose, Richard; Shin, Doh Chull.* Qualities of Incomplete Democracies: Russia, the Czech Republic and Korea // Compared Studies in Public Policy. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, № 302, 1998. p. 21.

Chapter 3

Transformations of Political Culture in post-WWII West Germany and Post-Soviet Russia: Attitudinal and Participatory Dimension

3.1 Theoretical Framework

The importance of studying cultural aspects of post-totalitarian democratization is largely determined by the fact that democratic institutions, as Francis Fukuyama argued, rest on civil society which, in turn, has the predecessors and prerequisites on the cultural level.[170] As voluntarily associations constituting civil society are formed and sustained by individuals, individual attitudes and orientations towards self and others in politics and towards political system constitute an important part of cultural analysis. As Marc Morjé Howard put it, "Only by considering the motivations of individuals will we be able to understand and explain their behavior. And only by considering individual behavior will we be able to make sense of collective patterns within and across societies."[171] Although Howard acknowledged the importance of such country-level variables as the economy and the roles of the state and political institutions, a focus on individual-level factors, in his view, could provide the most direct link to understanding and explaining political participation in a comparative perspective.[172]

As previously noted, the nature of causation between the political culture of citizens and the quality of democracy has evoked considerable controversy

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[170] *Fukuyama, Francis.* The Primacy of Culture // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, № 1, 1995. pp. 7-14.
[171] *Howard, Marc Morjé.* Op. cit. pp. 18-20.
[172] Ibid.

over time. Nevertheless, the link between these two phenomena has become widely recognized and the congruence between culture and structure has been seen as an important prerequisite of a successful democratization. As Jürgen Habermas observed, "A republic can ultimately be stable only insofar as the principles of its constitution take root in the convictions and practices of its citizens. Such a mentality can be formed only within the context of a free and combative political culture; it emerges through criticism and confrontations in the arena of a public sphere that has not lost heart, is still accessible to arguments, and has not been ruined by commercial television. Such a network of motives and opinions cannot be created with administrative means, and it constitutes the yardstick for measuring the political civilization of a community."[173]

Evidently achieving such a "civilization" in the countries that have gone through highly repressive totalitarian regimes is more complex than in other social contexts. The very nature of totalitarian rule presupposes resort to violence and terror at least to some extent and to some groups of the population. This violence is directed first of all against certain groups of citizens who are regarded by the regime as enemies and who become thus its main victims. Violence and terror, however, inevitably affect society as a whole, destroying social links, making an individual withdraw into himself, leaving fear and distrust behind themselves.[174]

The students of the legacies of totalitarianism Donna Bahry and Brian Silver argued that such regimes "atomize society so that people become isolated and mistrustful of one another and hence unable to concert their efforts in organized political activity."[175] Under a system of totalitarian atomization, "Society itself thereby becomes an instrument of coercion: the memory of mass terror, the elimination of autonomous intermediary groups between state and individual, and the continued reliance on informers breed an atmosphere of social intimidation that undermines any collective activity not officially sanctioned by the state."[176]

Barrington Moore, writing before the end of Stalinism, asserted: "The regime deliberately seeks to sow suspicion among the population, which to a marked extent results in the breakup of friendship groupings, in the work

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[173] *Habermas, Jürgen.* A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany. Polity Press, 1998. pp. 162-64.

[174] See *Groppo, Bruno.* Dealing with a "Dark" Historical Past (Kak byt' s "temnym" istoricheskim proshlym?) // The Public Lecture, Moscow, 25 February, 2005.
<http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2005/02/25/groppo.html>.

[175] *Bahry, Donna; Silver, Brian D.* Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR // American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, 1987. p. 1065.

[176] Ibid. p. 1069.

situation and elsewhere, and the isolation of the individual… Terror ultimately destroys the network of stable expectations concerning what other people will do that lie at the core of any set of organized human relationships."[177] James Gibson agreed that totalitarianism undermines civil society through the atomization of individual citizens.[178]

The repressive character of totalitarianism *eliminates the public sphere* as an area of social life where people can get together and freely discuss and identify societal problems and, consequently, makes any voluntary organized, institutionalized forms of public participation, activity and solidarity impossible.

In their study of totalitarian regimes Carl Friedrich and Zbignew Brzezinski described the state of things under totalitarian rule as follows: "No organizations are allowed unless they bear the stamp of official approval and are effectively coordinated with the ruling party. Nor do the means exist by which an enterprising person might gather others for effective cooperation. The regime's total control of all the means of mass communication, as well as post, telephone, and telegraph; its complete monopoly of all weapons; finally, its all-engulfing secret-police surveillance, which utilizes every available contraption of modern technology, such as hidden recording devices, as well as the older methods of agents-provocateurs and the like – these and related features of totalitarianism make any attempt to organize large numbers of people for effective opposition well-nigh hopeless."[179] Thus in a totalitarian society, "opposition is prevented from developing by the organization of total terror, which eventually engulfs everyone."[180]

Writing about the countries whose citizens have been subject to generalized or centralized violence, the authors of the volume *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America* Juan Corradi, Patricia Weiss Gagen and Manuel Antonio Garréton pointed to the fact that the populations of such countries "have experienced the erosion of public values, of legal and even primary social bonds. Uncertainty, self-doubt, insecurity have been the staples of public life. In such contexts, fear is a paramount feature in social action: it is

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[177] *Moore, Barrington, Jr.* Terror and Progress USSR: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. pp. 158, 176.

[178] *Gibson, James L.* Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democracy // American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, № 1, January 2001. pp. 53-55.

[179] *Friedrich, Carl J., Brzezinski, Zbignew K.* Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965. p. 287.

[180] Ibid. p. 162.

characterized by the inability of social actors to predict the consequences of their behavior because public authority is arbitrarily and brutally exercised."[181]

Thus totalitarian reign of terror undermines the ground on which participation normally grows – the citizens' assurance that their actions can be influential and effective, i.e. *the feeling of efficacy*. In a situation where "total fear reigns" and terror "embraces the entire society, searching everywhere for actual or potential deviants from the totalitarian unity," where "the repressive measures of a regime aim first at eliminating their open enemies and are gradually extended to other sections of society" one cannot be under an illusion that he or she can exercise any political influence.[182] Moreover, the thought control under the totalitarian rule "dehumanizes the subject of the regime by depriving them of a chance for independent thought and judgment."[183]

Political efficacy taps an individual's belief that ordinary people have some influence and control over what the government does. To many commentators, this feeling that one can have some impact on government is extremely important in a democracy even though it won't lead to any actual attempts at exercising any influence.[184] As Almond and Verba pointed out, the democratic citizen "is not the active citizen; he is the potentially active citizen," i.e. he is the one who believes he can exercise influence if necessary.[185]

The feeling of political efficacy as well as a sense of civic competence, or the citizens' belief they can influence the course of governmental decisions, have been generally regarded as the key elements of the civic culture model and democratic participation, as they are found to lead to higher levels of political involvement. Giuseppe di Palma, for example, noted that "political efficacy is the orientation most strongly correlated with participation."[186]

Furthermore, Kendall Baker and his colleagues asserted that "strong feelings of political efficacy indicate more than mere support for a political system; they also suggest that the norms and behaviors expected of a citizen in a democracy have been learned and internalized."[187] George Balch, in turn, pointed to the fact that political efficacy is a part of a larger cluster of civic attitudes: "The

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[181] *Corradi, Juan; Gagen, Patricia Weiss; Garretón, Manuel Antonio* (eds.) Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992. p. 2.

[182] *Friedrich, Carl J., Brzezinski, Zbigniew K.* Op. cit. pp. 162-163, 186.

[183] Ibid. p. 147.

[184] See *Baker, Kendall L. Dalton, Russell J, and Hildebrandt, Kai.* Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. p. 27.

[185] *Almond, Gabriel* A., and *Sidney Verba.* 1963. Op. cit. p. 481.

[186] Quoted in: *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 51.

[187] Ibid. p. 28.

citizen who has a high sense of political efficacy is [...] politically active, supportive, informed, interested, loyal, satisfied and public regarding."[188]

The sense of efficacy and readiness to participate is linked with another basic orientation representing the most general level of politicization, namely *interest in politics*. Any participation presupposes interest and in the past comparative research interest in politics has been shown to be positively related to political participation and to constitute a foundation on which other political attitudes such as political efficacy and political trust are built (Bratton 1999; Duch 1993; Mishler and Rose 1995).

Political interest (as tapped by the simple question "Generally speaking, are you interested in politics?") represents alongside with the feeling of efficacy a measure of one of the attitudinal antecedents to political participation, which can also serve as a general measure of politicization.[189] As a rule, such general interest is manifested in following the news and discussing political issues with friends, acquaintances and relatives.

Students of comparative communism have described the cultural legacy of communist regimes as a widespread habit among the population of dichotomizing society into two spheres: the private sphere of relationships with family members and close friends, where people can be trusted and they genuinely try to help each other, and the public sphere, where mistrust prevails, as each can expect the conduct of others to be motivated by narrow self-interest and statements of ideological or ethical principle to be essentially hypocritical.[190]

Indeed, because of the fear of repressions discussing politics under a totalitarian rule becomes possible only within close circles of trusted friends and family (e.g., the so-called "kitchen-talk" in the USSR). It means that the totalitarian reign of terror not only eliminates the public sphere and undermines civil society, it also inevitably leads to the loss of general trust, on the one hand, and to strengthening of private relationships with a close circle of relatives and friends or, differently, to the strengthening of "strong ties," on the other.[191]

In his research of post-communist societies Marc Morjé Howard observed that during the Soviet times the relations in the private sphere "were extremely

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[188] *Balch, George.* Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: The Concept 'Sense of Political Efficacy'// Political Methodology, № 1, Spring 1974. p. 4.

[189] See .: *Conradt, David.* Changing German Political Culture. In: *Almond, Gabriel; Verba, Sidney* (eds.) The Civic Culture Revisited. 2nd ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989. p. 238.

[190] See *Evans, Alfred B. Jr.* A Russian Civil Society? In: *Evans, Alfred B. Jr.; Henry, Laura A.; Sundstrom, Lisa McIntosh* (eds.) Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment. New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2005. p. 102.

[191] *Granovetter, Mark.* The Strength of Weak Ties // American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 78, № 6, May, 1973. pp. 1360-1380.

meaningful and genuine," first, because due to the highly politicized and tightly controlled public sphere only in the private sphere people could express themselves openly, and, second, because of the shortage of goods "connections played an essential role, whether the need was for spare parts to fix a car or for products that were rarely available in stores."[192]

Evidently, neither social atomization nor "strong ties," that are excluded from public sphere, is conducive to the strengthening of civil society, the development of which is facilitated, it is argued, by broader social interactions transcending the limits of family relations and close friendships. Such "weak ties" are more likely to "link members of different small groups than are strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups."[193] Civil society profits from social networks characterized by relatively weak and hence permeable boundaries for such networks facilitate cooperation among citizens.

Contemporary students of civil society mostly agree with Alexis de Tocqueville in that social interaction, especially outside the narrow confines of one's family, contributes to the development of broader, less selfish, and more socially engaged attitudes.[194] Jeffery Mondak and Adam Gearing, for example, asserted: "Although some forms of political participation can occur despite the absence of social interaction, it is difficult to overstate the pivotal role civic engagement plays in mass politics. People who do not interact with one another may fail to develop an appreciation for any form of communal good, and thus they may be limited in their capacity to see politics in terms of general rather than purely personal interests. Talk – actual face-to-face discussion about politics and society – is an essential ingredient for the emergence of an effective citizenry."[195]

Robert Putnam, in turn, argued that "dense but segregated horizontal networks sustain cooperation within each group, but networks of civic engagement that cut across social cleavages nourish wider cooperation" which facilitates democratic governance.[196] Paraphrasing Tocqueville, Putnam asserted that civil society organizations served as *"schools for democracy."* As Howard explained it, the fact that "autonomous organizations exist and flourish allows ordinary citizens to interact with one another outside of their networks of family and close friends and thereby develop greater trust, tolerance, and bargaining skills, all of which are beneficial for democracy. Furthermore, their experience

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[192] *Howard, Marc Morjé.* Op. cit. pp. 27-28.

[193] *Granovetter, Mark.* Op. cit. p. 1376.

[194] See *Gibson, James L.* Op. cit. pp. 53-54.

[195] *Mondak, Jeffery J.; Gearing, Adam E.* Civic Engagement in a Post-Communist State // Political Psychology, Vol. 19, 1998. pp. 615-637. p. 616.

[196] See *Putnam, Robert.* 1993. Op. cit. pp. 167-75.

with the organizations of civil society allows people to gain a greater sense of their own roles and capacities in a participatory democratic system, thus creating a more proficient and engaged citizenry. The more people participate in voluntary organizations of civil society – the more they internalize the norms and behavior of a participatory democratic citizenry, which can only strengthen the institutions and performance of a country's democratic government."[197]

Social networks, to the extent they are heterogeneous and politically relevant, also contribute to democratic values through the simple process of political discourse. Diana Mutz concluded that "cross-cutting exposure" (by which she meant political discussions with non-like-minded network members) contributed substantially to the development of democratic values in the American mass public. Thus, "weak" social networks that are politically relevant are conducive to the development of democratic values through processes of diffusion and through practice at democratic discussion.[198]

Experts argue that civic groups may contribute to democratic development and stability in two ways: internally, they may inspire habits of cooperation, solidarity, public-spiritedness, and trust; whereas externally, these networks tend to aggregate interests and articulate demands to ensure the government's accountability to its citizens. It is this infrastructure of groups, it is argued, that actually makes democracy work.[199]

The concept of "strong / weak ties," in turn, corresponds with another important sociological concept of *trust*. It is important to point out in this regards that the concept of general trust presupposes trust not only in close relatives and friends but also in unknown people (*cf* "weak ties"). In contrast with interpersonal trust, which structures the relations with a socially close and, consequently, personally known partner (*cf* "strong ties"), general trust concerns any potential partner, however socially remote he is. *Institutional* or *"vertical" trust*, in turn, might arise in the relationship with the third party: a judge, an arbiter, a mediator, the justice system, or the state as a whole.[200]

In Richard Rose's opinion, one of the sides of the process of modernization consists in supplementation of interpersonal with institutional trust. The scholar used the term "pre-modern" to refer to the tendencies to solve everyday problems exclusively with the help of close relatives and acquaintances

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[197] *Howard, Marc Morjé.* Op. cit. p. 46.

[198] *Gibson, James L.* Op. cit. p. 54. See also *Mutz, Diana C.* Cross-Cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice // American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, № 1, March 2005. pp. 111-26.

[199] *Bae, Junghan.* Op. cit. p. 1.

[200] *Oleinik, Anton.* A Distrustful Economy: An Inquiry into Foundations of the Russian Market // Journal of Economic Issues. Vol. XXXIX, № 1, March, 2005. p. 8.

when a rational bureaucracy does not exist. The same practices become "anti-modern" if they result from the willingness to turn aside all formal institutions due to distrust in them.[201]

As previously mentioned, post-totalitarian societies are likely to face the problems of the lack of mutual trust, sense of efficacy, solidarity, communication skills, associational life, and participation in public affairs as well as other important civic attitudes and habits. Transformation of political culture in such societal contexts retains special significance for, as Claus Offe noted, "the institutional reorganization of post-totalitarian societies cannot be regarded as successfully completed until this subsequent rooting of the new regime in the values and loyalties of the population has been achieved."[202]

The variables that will interest us in the comparative analysis of West German and Russian societies are thus *interest in politics, the feeling of political efficacy, political participation*, *social trust,* and *support for democratic values*. I will try to explore how attitudes toward self (civic attitudes, and primarily, the feeling of political efficacy) and toward others in politics (trust, cooperative competence) as well as toward the political system changed in the cause of post-totalitarian transformations. In the comparative analysis I will focus on citizens' participation in political processes and on their readiness to associate as important characteristic of civil society agents.

The data presented in this chapter drew upon several different sociological sources.

The data on West Germany come, primarily, from various surveys conducted by the German and American scholars in the postwar period. Beginning in 1945, public opinion surveys were conducted on a regular basis to assess the progress of the Western allies' reeducation programs by the Opinion Surveys Section of the Office of Military Government of the United States for Germany (OMGUS).[203]

Prior to the 1959 *Civic Culture* survey, extensive studies of political attitudes and values had been conducted under official and semi-official auspices both by the Western occupation authorities and by the post-1949 German government. Since 1950, the Adenauer government's Press and Information

[201] *Rose, Richard.* Getting Things Done in an Antimodern Society: Social Capital Networks in Russia. In: *Dasgupta, Partha; Serageldin, Ismail* (eds.) Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000. pp. 157-59.

[202] *Offe, Claus.* Cultural Aspects of Consolidation: A Note on the Peculiarities of Post-Communist Transformations // East European Constitutional Review. Vol. 6, № 4, Autumn 1997.

[203] For summary and analysis of the polls taken between 1945 and 1949 see *Merritt, Anna J.; Merritt, Richard L.* (eds.) Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: the OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1970.

Office commissioned German polling organizations to conduct monthly surveys that in various ways were designed to examine German political culture.[204]

Since the late 1940s – early 1950s monthly surveys of domestic public opinion were carried out by the leading West German centers for public opinion research such as the EMNID Institute of Public Opinion in Bielefeld (*TNS Emnid Medien- und Sozialforschung GmbH*) founded in 1945 and the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research (*Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach*), a private conservative opinion polling institute founded in 1947.

In 1959 and 1960 public opinion surveys were administered within Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* project. Later studies, including *The Civic Culture Revisited* volume (1980) drew upon a large body of empirical data collected by the Allensbach and the EMNID institutes, as well as upon GETAS survey, an international random sample, directed by Max Kaase and Hans-Dieter Klingemann from Mannheim University; the German Electoral Data Project (GED) (1953-1976), and some other surveys.

Kendall Baker, Russell Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt's 1981 research, in turn, was based upon a timeseries of ten surveys of German political behavior conducted in the following election years: 1953, 1961 (three surveys), 1965 (two surveys), 1969 (two surveys), 1972, and 1976. These data have been made available to researchers as the result of a joint archival project of the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) in Michigan, the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) in Cologne, and the Zentrum für Unfragen, Methoden, und Analysen (ZUMA) in Mannheim.

The data on post-Soviet Russia come primarily from the public opinion surveys carried out since the late 1980s by a Russia's leading non-governmental polling and sociological research organization the Levada Analytical Center (till 2003 - All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center, VCIOM).

Another source of data on Russian society is a longitudinal cross-cultural measurement of variation of values carried out in four waves in 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 within Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues' The World Values Survey project. The nationally-representative samples from Russia were also included starting with the second wave in The Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB), an annual general public survey carried out from 1990 to 1998.

Relevant data on the Russian public opinion are also found in the publications by Jeffrey W. Hahn (1991, 1993, 2001, 2005), James L. Gibson (1996, 1998, 2001), Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul (2001), Stephen White (2000), Lev Gudkov, Boris Dubin, and other scholars.

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[204] *Jarausch, Konrad H.* After Hitler. Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995. Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 213-14.

3.2 Political Culture in West Germany

It is important to point out that the analysts of the postwar period were mostly united in their evaluations and descriptions of German society. Already in 1944 Friedrich von Hayek underscored the lack of democratic traits in what he called a "typical German." He wrote: "Few people will deny that the Germans on the whole are industrious and disciplined, thorough and energetic to the degree of ruthlessness, conscientious and single-minded in any tasks they undertake; that they possess a strong sense of order, duty, and strict obedience to authority, and that they often show great readiness to make personal sacrifices, and great courage in physical danger. All these make the German an efficient instrument in carrying out an assigned task and that has accordingly been carefully nurtured in the old Prussian state and the new Prussian-dominated Reich. What the "typical German" is often thought to lack are the individualist virtues of tolerance and respect for other individuals and their opinions, of independence of mind and that uprightness of character and readiness to defend one's own convictions against a superior which the Germans themselves, usually conscious that they lack it, call *Zivilcourage*; of consideration for the weak and infirm, and of that healthy contempt and dislike of power which only an old tradition of personal liberty creates."[205]

In his 1965 study on *Society and Democracy in Germany* the sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf addressed the issue of the structural obstacles to liberal democracy in Germany by asking: "Why is it that so few in Germany embraced the principle of liberal democracy? What is it in German society that may account for Germany's persistent failure to give a home to democracy in its liberal sense?"[206] Dahrendorf thus tried to explain what characteristics of the German society had prevented the establishment of a democratic order in the country and made an attempt to apply an instrument of knowledge to the analysis of German society that may also promote its change.[207]

Dahrendorf linked the problems of liberal democracy in Germany with the absence of certain social structures on which the constitution of liberty could be based and located the causes of his country's "structural incapacity for democracy" in its modernization deficit, which he attributed to conflict aversion, the monopoly of elites, and withdrawal into private life. These flaws, according

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[205] *Hayek, Friedrich von.* The Road to Serfdom. Routledge Press, 1944. p. 152.

[206] *Dahrendorf, Ralf.* Society and Democracy in Germany. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967. p. 14.

[207] Ibid. p. 15.

to the author, prevented the establishment of democratic institutions, for "where the effective equality of autonomous citizens is lacking; where conflicts are not regulated rationally, but allegedly "solved" and in fact suppressed; where elites either cannot or do not want to compete with one another in cohesive diversity; where people are oriented to private rather than public virtues – the constitution of liberty cannot thrive."[208]

The poor state of the German political culture became particularly revealing during the immediate postwar period when the first opinion surveys conducted by The Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) were published. The earliest OMGUS surveys disclosed little popular enthusiasm for political activity alongside with high levels of indifference to the public affairs and low levels of participation. In a situation of total economical, political and moral collapse typical were such comments as "Politics is a dirty business" and "One is a politician for ten years and then lands in a concentration camp." In April 1946, three-quarters of the respondents flatly said, if they had a son leaving school, they would not like him to pursue a political profession.[209]

In September 1946, just before referenda on provincial constitutions and elections to provincial parliaments, a series of questions demonstrated that only one in five potential voters was sufficiently interested to have even the barest information on the issues at stake. Indeed, just a few expressed interest in politics or reported being active politically. Nine in ten AMZON respondents indicated in May 1946 that they were personally doing everything possible to help rebuild Germany – but only 7 percent agreed to help carry out the census of October 1946 voluntarily, 6 percent did voluntary work in their local community, and no more than 4 percent were members of political parties. Moreover, as many as 40 percent claimed no preference for any political party.[210]

To add to this, AMZON Germans were inclined to ascribe responsibility for governance to officials rather than to voters: asked about poor governance, 38 percent held government officials responsible and 26 percent the voting public, with 12 percent assigning responsibility to both. Even two years later in May 1949 two-thirds continued to prefer leaving politics to others, only 38 percent believed their fellow citizens to have any interest in political affairs.[211]

As the country struggled to rebuild, the great majority of the German people succumbed to political apathy. Observers from the U.S. military government explained the widespread retreat into private life by claiming that

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[208] Ibid. p. 373.

[209] See *Merritt, Richard L.* Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995. pp. 328-30.

[210] Ibid.

[211] Ibid.

the Germans, suffering "from the consequences of the long Nazi dictatorship and the impact of the recent total defeat," were "much too preoccupied with questions of survival such as food and shelter" to think of anything else. As a result of such traumatic experiences, "only a minority regarded" a fresh start as an "opportunity," while the majority thought of it as an "onerous obligation."[212]

The public reaction to the adoption of the Basic Law on 23 May, 1949 was similarly apathetic. In his study *The German Polity* the political scientist David Conradt wrote that, "The declaration of ratification hardly evoked any celebration… In a national survey conducted at the time, 40 percent of the adult population stated that they were indifferent to the constitution, 33 percent were 'modestly interested' and only 21 percent were 'very interested.' Only 51 percent, in another survey conducted in 1949, favored the creation of the Federal Republic; the remainder of the sample were either against it (23 percent), indifferent (13 percent), or undecided (13 percent)."[213]

It should be pointed out that these attitudes of German citizens persisted in the postwar period, revealing considerable stability. After more than a decade of experience with the Federal Republic observers acknowledged that democratic attitudes were still in short supply. Numerous studies of the postwar period continued to convey the impression that the lack of democratic tradition was a major obstacle to a democratic political culture. Theodor Adorno (1959), Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963), Ralf Dahrendorf (1965), Karl Jaspers (1966), Steven Warnecke (1970), Kurt Sontheimer (1973), and other researchers generally agreed upon such characteristics of the German political culture as "pragmatic," "detached," "almost cynical," and "passive."

In his well-know 1959 lecture on *The Meaning of Working through the Past* (Was *bedeutet*: *Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit*?) that was published and broadcast over radio, Adorno pointed to the fact that "the system of political democracy […] has not become naturalized to the point where people truly experience it as their own and see themselves as agents (*Subjecte*) of the political process. […] Using the language of philosophy, one indeed could say that the people's alienation from democracy reflects the self-alienation of society."[214]

In 1963 Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* concluded, that "In Germany a passive subject orientation persists and has not yet been balanced by

[212] See OMGUS, "Report of the Military Governor" № 1, August 1945, "Political Situation," 1-2. In: *Jarausch, Konrad H.* Op. cit. p. 130-31.

[213] *Conradt, David P.* The German Polity. New York: Longman, 1982. p. 18.

[214] *Adorno, Theodor W.* The Meaning of Working Through the Past. In: *Adorno, Theodor W.* Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. Trans. by Henry W. Pickford, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. pp. 89-104.

a participation orientation."[215] Verba observed that, "the orientation to politics in Germany is in terms of the specific outputs of the political system and the individual sees himself as either the beneficiary or not the beneficiary of this output [...] His view of himself as a participant tends to be rather passive – one fulfills obligations rather than participated in the decision-making process of government."[216]

In seeking to explain the pattern of German political culture, Almond and Verba essentially posited the following 'independent variables': low levels of social trust and cooperative activities; a subject-oriented socialization process in the family and school; and, a residual variable, the "bitter" and "traumatic" historical experience.[217]

Even after the outburst of civic activism during the 1968 student movement, experts continued to state the persistence of the old culture. In 1970, for instance, Steven Warnecke pointed to the "continued existence of attitudes among substantial segments of the electorate which prevent a sense of responsibility for politics and political efficacy from developing, impede the legitimation of the role of public opinion, prevent the individual from seeing society as a emanation from himself and others, and impede the voter from perceiving government as the executive committee of society."[218]

Similarly, in the early 1970s Kurt Sontheimer argued that "democratic consciousness" in Germany "is a collection of attitudes and behaviors which is not strong enough to stand the test of any serious crises of the system."[219] He noted that "Germans have placed their desire for harmony, for a national community binding the whole population together, above their interest in fair competition and open contest [...] In Germany more than anywhere else the individual feels that he is neither in a position to do anything about the situation nor to leave the mark of his political activity by participation in political life."[220]

Generally speaking, despite rather successful establishment of democratic institutions, "the cultural process of adopting the spirit of democracy remained difficult, as authoritarian thought patterns and habits of behavior tended to

[215] *Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney*. 1989. Op. cit. p. 362.

[216] *Verba, Sidney.* Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture. In: *Verba, Sidney; Pye, Lucian* (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965. p.151.

[217] *Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney*. 1989. Op. cit. p. 251.

[218] *Warnecke, Steven*. The Future of Right Extremism in West Germany // Comparative Politics, № 2, July 1970, p. 646.

[219] *Sontheimer, Kurt.* The Government and Politics of West Germany. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1973. pp. 65, 69-70.

[220] Ibid.

persist."[221] Even after the founding of the Bonn Republic, domestic observers detected "greatest distrust [toward] and internal rejection" of the newly implanted form of government, coupled with a quest for genuine participation that one might call "perhaps somewhat romantically, a German organic and functional democracy." This contradictory mixture of outright skepticism and inflated expectations produced both dissatisfaction and apathy: "It should be said clearly that all efforts toward a truly lived democracy still lack the broad resonance that is needed."[222]

However, despite the researchers' almost unanimously negative characteristics of the West German political culture, opinion polls taken in the postwar period reflected a gradual turn away from authoritarian patterns of thought and a tentative embrace of democratic values.[223] According to the survey data, the most drastic attitudinal change took place in the late 1960s and, particularly, in the early 1970s. The changes in postwar political culture were thus intrinsically linked with the West German protest student movement of the late 1960s.

The German student movement (also called *68er-Bewegung,* or movement of 1968) grew mostly out of the main student organization Socialist German Student Union (*Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund, SDS*), which used to be a college organization of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) since 1946. After its exclusion from the SPD in 1961 for "left deviation," it became the leading organization in the Extraparliamentary Opposition (*Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, APO).

It is noteworthy that this protest movement of young people emerged largely as a reaction against the perceived authoritarianism and hypocrisy of the German government. The students demanded democratization of society, in general, and educational system in particular; they required reforming of the curriculum and asked for dealing with Germany's National Socialist past. Among other issues, the student movement's activists strongly opposed the planned passing of German emergency legislation (*Notstandsgesetze*) – the German Emergency Acts which would allow the government to limit civil rights, restrict freedom of movement and to limit privacy and confidentiality of telecommunications correspondence in case of an emergency.

Alternative lifestyles, the right to abortion and equal rights for women, environmental rights and other New Politics issues were also associated with the APO and the SDS as its best known representative. The methods of protest

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[221] *Jarausch, Konrad H.* Op. cit. p. 139.

[222] Ibid.

[223] Ibid. p. 145.

employed by the students such as sit-ins and demonstrations were generally similar to the United States anti-war movement of that time.

Although the student movement existed for a relatively short period of time, reaching its height in 1968 (its membership peaking at 2,500 at that time) and being actually dissolved in 1970, its overall activity as well as agenda impacted the German society a lot. In the first instance, it can be argued that the movement of 1968 brought about a transformation of West German political culture. From that point onward West German society has shown a shift towards a more democratic political culture.

First of all, throughout the 1950s the proportion of Germans expressing at least a general *interest in politics* never exceeded 30 percent. In 1952, for example, only 27 percent of the population thought of themselves as interested in politics. However, in the late 1960s the percentage of those interested in politics crossed the 40 percent mark and by 1977 half of the adult population reported they were interested in politics.[224]

The *frequency of political discussion* with friends, neighbors and within the family, as reported by respondents, also continuously showed a marked increase over time. In 1953, political discussion was dismally low with over 60 percent of the electorate admitting to rarely or never discussing politics. Already by 1959 the German electorate was much more likely to discuss politics. The number of uninvolved citizens declined to fewer than 40 percent. Further evidence of this trend was the gradual increase in political discussion through the 1965 election with the most drastic increase taking place between 1965 and 1969.[225]

As for *political efficacy*, it was alarmingly low till the end of the 1950s for only about a quarter of the population felt they had a say in what the government did and little more than a tenth saw means other than voting for influencing politics.[226] Nevertheless, in the late 1960s and particularly in the early 1970s a gradual increase in political efficacy did finally take place. If in 1959 around 70 percent of the population agreed with the statement "People like me

[224] *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. pp. 239-41.

[225] *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 39, *Meulemann, Heiner.* Value Change in West Germany, 1950-1980: Integrating the Empirical Evidence // Social Science Information, Vol. 22, № 4-5, 1983. pp. 784-85.

[226] *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. (1981) specified that several of the questions that have been repeatedly used to measure political efficacy were included in the 1959 Almond and Verba survey and in subsequent studies of German political culture. These questions measure the feelings of efficacy as disagreement with the following propositions: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things;" "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me really can't understand what's going on;" "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think."

have no say in what the government does" and only 27 percent disagreed with it, in 1972 and 1976 the latter figure increased to 40 percent. In 1953, 45 percent of the population said that one cannot do anything against "things that one can be dissatisfied with in the government," but in 1979 only 26 percent did so.[227] Conradt observed that the proportion of German respondents who felt competent to influence national legislation they considered unjust rose from 38 percent in 1959 to 59 percent in 1974.[228] Moreover, approximately 40 percent of the respondents in the 1972 survey thought that politics is understandable and that an average person can have some say in political affairs.[229]

Generally speaking, West Germans attributed increasing importance to political matters in their personal lives as they were becoming more convinced in their personal ability to influence politics. The feeling of political efficacy increased together with the feeling that politics is important for one's personal existence. In 1953, 65 percent of the population agreed with the statement: "What happens in politics is very important; it affects my personal well-being"; by 1974, however, this figure rose to 78 percent and by 1979 it stabilized at 71 percent.[230]

Furthermore, these attitudinal changes led finally to the considerable increase in *political participation*. According to David Conradt, "By the mid-1970s West Germans were participating in politics at rates no less than citizens in older democracies like the United States and the Netherlands and in some areas (party membership, attendance at political meetings, etc.) had even higher levels of political participation. Also in a 1976 survey of the populations' attitude towards certain "unconventional modes" of political participation found substantial political support, especially among the younger age groups, for participation in rent or tax strike, boycotts, demonstrations, citizen-initiative groups and petition drives. There was little support, however, for no more extreme forms of political activity."[231]

So alongside conventional political participation, political involvement has taken on new forms of expression. Such methods like demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts, strikes, civil action groups, petitions, etc. developed historically in the context of various civil rights movements. A 1974 comparative study by Max Kaase and Alan Marsh on the development of "unconventional" forms of political action in five Western industrialized societies came to the conclusion

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[227] Institut für Demoskopie, 1981.

[228] *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. p. 232.

[229] *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 28.

[230] *Meulemann, Heiner.* Value Change in West Germany, 1950-1980: Integrating the Empirical Evidence // Social Science Information, Vol. 22, № 4-5, 1983. pp. 784-785.

[231] *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. pp. 248-49.

that the political action repertory expanded between 1959 and 1974 in the Federal Republic in particular.[232]

According to the calculations carried out by the Ministry of the Interior in Bonn, the number of demonstrations in the Federal Republic quadrupled from approximately 1300 to around 5000 per annum between 1970 and 1982. This rise gives an impressive indication of increasing participation in political life, with its considerable effect on public opinion and the media. The big jump took place in 1980, when the number of demonstrations passed the 4000 mark. At the same time, according to the Interior Ministry, violent forms of political articulation did not increase during this period, but tended rather to decline.[233]

Kendall Baker and his colleagues pointed to the particularly sharp increase in political involvement during the 1969 and especially 1972 election campaigns: "[1969] election, which was characterized by high levels of citizen participation, saw the emergence of voter initiative groups (*Wählerinitiativen*). Over a third of the electorate claimed to discuss politics daily during the 1969 campaign. At the time of the 1972 election, citizen involvement rose to an even higher plateau. Voting turnout in 1972 was the highest in the history of the Federal Republic, and American-style electioneering tactics proliferated. To culminate this trend of increasing politicization, the 1973 European Community study found German levels of political discussion to be the highest in the European Community."[234] Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann also documented a substantial increase in political interest for the period between 1952 and 1973.[235]

Conradt observed that these changes in attitudes toward participation coincided with the emergence in the late 1960s of a qualitatively new form of participatory behavior for Germany - *citizen-initiative groups (Bürgerinitiativen)*. By the late 1970s there were about 3000 such groups in the Federal Republic with a total membership of about 2 million (according to observers, they had more

[232] *Kaase, Max; Marsh, Alan.* Political Action Repertory. Changes Over Time and a New Typology. In: *Barnes, Samuel* et al. Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. Beverly Hills, 1979. As observrved pointed out, it was characteristic of the Federal Republic that the new political action repertory met with approval above all amongst teenagers and young adults, more so than in comparative countries.

[233] *Zinnecker, Jürgen.* Political Culture of West German Youth, 1954-1984. Universität-Gesamthochschule-Siegen, Forschungsschwerpunkt Historische Mobilität und Normenwandel in Siegen, 1987. p. 91.

[234] *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 39.

[235] *Noelle, Elisabeth; Neumann, Erich Peter.* (eds.) Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung, 1965-1967. Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1967. p. 213.

members than the political parties). In 1978 Meulemann noted the emergence since the 1960s of about 15,000 different grassroots groups.[236]

These groups, the purposes of which ranged from protesting hikes in streetcar fares to the prohibition of nuclear power plants, tried to influence policy decisions, particularly concerning the environment, atomic energy, consumer and neighborhood issues. Most of them, drawing the bulk of their membership from younger, well-educated, middle-class segments of the population, had often only one issue and operated at the local level. Nonetheless, surveys showed that over a third of the adult population was contemplating membership in some citizen-initiative group. Given the passivity found in the 1959 study, the emergence of these groups, especially on this scale, attested to the changes that took place in political participation during the 1960s and 1970s.[237]

Die Zeit journalist Rolf Zundel pointed to the appearance of "thousands of initiatives that are often known only locally; lobby for a better – or at least different – form of city planning, organize assistance for foreigners, and speak out for children's playgrounds, protection against noise, aid for the elderly, the re-socialization of prisoners, and much more. Some initiatives are short-lived spontaneous movements, some become traditionalist associations."[238]

According to the study conducted in the early 1970s by the German Institute for Urban Studies, which examined 1,400 citizens' initiatives, 16.9 percent of them were concerned with environmental protection; 15.8 percent with daycare facilities and playgrounds. Traffic issues were the focus of 11.8 percent, followed by schools (8.1 percent), urban development (8.0 percent), and marginal groups (7.1 percent). There were even some purely commercial initiatives (2 percent) and at least one third of all citizens' initiatives made up the social self-help organizations.[239]

It is important to bear in mind, however, that citizen– initiative groups did not appear all of a sudden but that they owed their emergence, primarily, to the protest student movement of the late 1960s without which they would have been arguably unimaginable.

As Paul Hockenos explained, in the aftermath of the Socialist German Student Union's dissolution, the student movement's activists scattered across the left side of the republic's political spectrum, the overwhelming majority taking the reformist path. Importantly, Hockenos underscored that the radical path represented by the activity of the violent left-wing groups, the most well-

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[236] *Meulemann, Heiner.* Op. cit. p. 453.

[237] *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. pp. 248-49.

[238] *Zundel, Rolf.* Anschlag auf die Parteien oder Ventil der Verdrossenheit? (An Attack on the Parties or a Vent for Dissatisfaction?) // Die Zeit. 5 August, 1977.

[239] Ibid.

known of which was *The Red Army Faction* (*Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF)* or *Baader-Meinhof Group,* was followed by a clear minority. Between 1969 and 1972, some 300,000 young people aged 18-25 joined the SPD inspired by the reforms of Willy Brandt's government. No less important, Hockenos argued, was the fact that former 1968ers took their ethic of self-initiative and do-it-yourself politics into local communities by forming single-issue grassroots citizens-initiatives. Consequently, many thousands of *Bürgerinitiativen* mushroomed across the republic in the early 1970s.[240]

These numerous post-1968 grassroots initiatives born of the student movement had the greatest impact on the Federal Republic as they linked up during the 1970s to form powerful "new social movements": the environmental, the anti-nuclear energy, the women's, and the peace movement. These mass movements, in turn, mobilized millions of ordinary Germans considerably extending the social base of the middle-class, university-based 1968 movement.[241]

The most influential of the new social movements was the environmental movement of the 1970s. Combining extra-parliamentary student opposition of the 1960s and antinuclear movement, the environmental popular movement evolved in the 1970s into a strong political force whose political considerations extended opposition to nuclear energy far into other areas, especially energy, growth, and economic policies.

In 1972, 16 citizen groups founded the Federal Association of Citizens' Initiatives for Environmental Protection (*Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz, BBU*), which would soon comprise more than a thousand affiliated action groups and more than 300,000 individual members.[242] In 1975, the non-governmental League for the Environment and Nature Conservation (*Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, BUND*) was founded as a federation of already existing regional groups, uniting about 40,000 members.[243]

Being to some extent a continuation of the student movement of the 1960s environmentalists shared certain similarities with the extra-parliamentary student opposition of the 1960s. Among these similarities Rolf Zundel mentioned, first, the profound disappointment in the establishment. Besides, like the members of the student movement, environmentalists also had a very strong sense of being an elite and unwillingness to compromise. Also similar to the student movement, exceptional rights for the participants were grounded on the basis of an unusually higher moral aim (the motto for the draft of the BBU action

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[240] *Hockenos, Paul.* The 1968 Debate in Germany // Open Democracy, 2 May, 2008.

[241] Ibid.

[242] *Mayer, Margit; Ely, John* (eds.) The German Greens: Paradox Between Movement and Party. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998. p. 32.

[243] Currently BUND has 390,000 active members, 2,200 local groups and 16 state organizations.

catalog is: "When justice becomes unjust, then resistance becomes a duty"). Widespread in the initiatives was the certainty that they represented the most important instrument of grassroots democracy and that the people had a voice through them. It did not matter that at the moment this was a minority (depending on the survey, between 20 percent and 40 percent of the population opposed to nuclear energy at that time).[244] Subsequently the environmental movement gave birth to the Green Party (*Die Grünen*) that won representation at the national level in 1983.

Thus, evidence from several sources indicates the advent of a more active and involved German electorate in the aftermath of the student movement. Clearly, by 1972 the German public was involved in a full range of participatory activities. The overwhelming majority of Germans voted in national and federal state (*Land*) elections, discussed politics and expressed high interest in political affairs. Even in the more demanding forms of campaign activity – showing party support and attending meetings – sizable minorities said they were politically active.[245]

If in 1959, 44 percent of *The Civic Culture*'s German sample reported that they belonged to some voluntary organization, by 1967 this German proportion has risen to 50 percent, and in 1975 fully 59 percent of a national sample reported that they were members of at least one organization. Perhaps more important is the fact the proportion of respondents who noted that they were active in these organizations increased at a faster rate than mere membership. In 1959 Almond and Verba found that only 7 percent of German respondents had been active participants in one of the voluntary organizations. As the data show, this proportion of active members had increased to 10 percent by 1967 and 17 percent by 1975.[246]

As previously mentioned, the ability to form groups and make coordinated actions is linked with such social value as *trust*. In *The Civic Culture* German political culture was portrayed as having a relatively low level of general social trust, - the finding that corresponded to most descriptions of postwar Germany as a privatized, if not anomic society.[247] In the absence of social trust, more suspicion, distrust, isolation, and lower levels of social cooperation

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[244] *Zundel, Rolf.* Op. cit.

[245] *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 39.

[246] *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. pp. 248-249.

[247] See *Tenbruck, Friedrich H.* Alltagsnormen und Lebensgefühle in der Bundesrepubli. In: *Löwenthal, Richard; Schwarz, Hans-Peter* (eds.) Die zweite Republik. 25 Jahre Deutschland - eine Bilanz. Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1974. pp. 289-310.

were identified in West German political culture than in the Anglo-American case and even Mexican counterparts.[248]

   As the survey data show, however, the low level of trust found in the 1959 study (19 percent) represented an increase from the levels found in 1948 (9 percent). At least, Germans during that period became more, not less, trusting of their fellow citizens. And this tendency has only increased over time. By the 1970s Germans perceived their social environment as less hostile than in the early postwar period. When asked the general question as to whether "there are more evil-minded (*bösewillige*) than good-minded (*gutwillige*) people" almost half of the respondents in 1949 (46 percent) perceived the "evil-minded" as outnumbering the "good-minded." By the mid-1970s, however, the proportion of pessimists had dropped to only 16 percent. Perhaps more significantly, there were no important differences between age or social-class groups in the 1976 responses.[249]

   There also appeared to be a significant decline in social isolation or privatization. When asked whether they had "few or many" acquaintances, over a fourth (26 percent) of Germans in 1957 reported that they had "few friends." By the early 1970s only 8 percent were in this category. During the same period the proportion indicating that they had many acquaintances increased from 42 percent to 57 percent.[250] It means that the importance of weak ties in social interaction has grown.

   As noted previously, numerous studies of German political culture underscored the lack of democratic tradition as a serious impediment to the country's democratization. In *The Civic Culture* Almond and Verba concluded that *democratic attitudes* were still in short supply after more than a decade of experience with the Federal Republic. Similarly, in the early 1970s Kurt Sontheimer still concluded that "democratic consciousness" in Germany "is a collection of attitudes and behaviors which is not strong enough to stand the test of any serious crises of the system."[251]

   The general conclusions drawn from the public opinion surveys conducted regularly by the Western Allies since 1945 were not very optimistic. During the early 1950s researchers found lingering support for the principles and institutions of earlier German regimes, including the Third Reich. More than half of respondents agreed with the conclusion that National Socialism was a good idea that was badly carried out.[252] Other old authoritarian reflexes, manifested

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[248] *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. pp. 253-54.

[249] Ibid.

[250] Ibid.

[251] *Sontheimer, Kurt.* Op. cit. p. 65.

[252] *Jarausch, Konrad H.* Op. cit. p. 145.

primarily in patriarchal claims to superiority, continued to influence thinking and behavior.

However, in the following years, particularly during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the survey research has found a steady increase in supportive attitudes toward key values of liberal democracy. This made careful observers suggest that the traditional characteristics of the German political culture were actually changing.

For instance, survey data from 14 separate surveys performed by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research between 1950 and 1968 indicated a steady increase in favor of political competition. Notably, within the younger age cohorts and among those who perceived their economic condition as favorable this variable increased the fastest.[253]

On the basis of longitudinal analyses of data collected by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research, Bradley Richardson (1973), R. Boynton and Gerhard Lowenberg (1973), David Conradt (1978, 1980, 1981) documented increasing support for components of a democratic system. Furthermore, Max Kaase (1971), Kendell Baker (1973), William Chandler (1974), and Walter Jaide (1976) presented data from youth samples which suggested that democratic values and political interest became common among German youth.

Such political events as the 1969 change in government, record voting turnouts and the emergence of widespread citizen-initiative groups also indicated an increase of support for democratic principles. Over time almost all survey studies have indicated increasing support for democratic values (such as tolerance, freedom of expression, interest in political events, etc.) alongside an increasing sense of identification with the present political order (i.e. Germans increasingly considered themselves to be better off in the Federal Republic than under any other 20th century political regime).

In his 1965 study *Society and Democracy in Germany* Ralf Dahrendorf quoted the question posited four times by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research: *"Two men talk about how a country should be governed. Which of the two opinions comes closest to your own – the first or the second?*

One says: "I like it best if the whole people places the best politician at the top and confers on him the entire power of government. Together with a few selected experts he can then make clear decisions. There is not much talk, and things really get done".

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[253] *Merelman, Richard M.; Foster, Charles R.* Political Culture and Education in Advanced Industrial Societies: West Germany and the United States // International Review of Education, Vol. 24, № 4, 1978. p. 453.

The other says: "I prefer it if several people have a say in the state. Sometimes there is some hither and thither before things are done, but it is not so easy to abuse the power of government".

In 1955, 55 percent of respondents agreed with the second statement (while 31 percent with the first and 14 percent remained undecided); by 1957 the number of this viewpoint supporters has risen to 60 percent (26 percent, 14 percent), by 1960 to 62 percent (21 percent, 17 percent), and by 1962 to 66 percent (18 percent, 16 percent).

A very similar trend could be observed in respect to the question: "Do you believe that it is better for a country to have several parties so that different opinions may be represented freely or only one party so that there is as much unity as possible?" Between 1951 and 1961 the multiparty system consistently gained in support from 61 to 73 percent.[254]

These data made Dahrendorf conclude that more than two thirds of Germans in 1965 accepted the principle of government by conflict and that this principle seemed firmly established in the Federal Republic as opposed to the Weimar Republic.[255] Wilfried Röhrich, in turn, observed in 1983 that freedom of press and information were high ranking political values and rights, evaluated as perhaps the most powerful control-institution of the government.[256] Participative and communicative orientations referring to the core of democratic political culture thus seemed to have changed significantly since the mid-1960s in the direction of "civic" culture.

The fact that many Germans began to move beyond conventional political activities into more activist and assertive roles (which was reflected, among other things, in emergence of thousands of citizen-initiative groups across the country) certainly testified to democratization of West German political culture. Numerous citizen-initiative groups groups, while clearly expressing the frustration and dissatisfaction of citizens against powerful government and business interests, nevertheless, reflected the internalization of democratic values and rising participation at least in the output side of the system. They also indirectly represented a demand on the system for greater democracy and citizen participation in decision-making. According to Richard Merelman and Charles Foster, the appearance of the citizen-initiative movement appeared to be a symptom of the development of the middle class activism in Germany and

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[254] Institut für Demoskopie. Jahrbuch 1958-1964. Allensbach, 1965.

[255] *Dahrendorf, Ralf.* Society and Democracy in Germany. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967. p. 204.

[256] *Röhrich, Wilfried.* Die verspätete Demokratie. Zur politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Köln: Eugen Diedrichs Verlag, 1983. pp. 197ff.

exhibited many of the characteristics of American civil, environmental and consumer groups.[257]

Another sign of West German democratization, according to Konradt Jarausch, was the emergence of a critical public sphere that was willing to defend the "free constitutional state, based on the rule of law."[258] Jarausch pointed to the development of a critical discourse on democracy that advocated a broader social self-determination in the early 1960s. According to him, this new appreciation for democracy that went beyond politics enlarged the concept into a demand for a continuous transformation of society and culture. Since the mid-1960s there has been a growing understanding that West Germany needed to break with its remaining authoritarian structures in the pre-political realm. Jarausch quoted, for instance, the German sociologist Willy Strzelewicz who in the 1964 publication did not consider the concept of democracy as "a completed condition with regard to, for example, the constitution"; instead, he understood it as "a process that is far from finished and consists not only of political, but also social, economic, and cultural relationships in society."[259] Such an expansive notion of democracy that aimed at a liberalization of basic convictions and behavior implied, thus, a comprehensive reform of the "economy, family, and school."[260]

In his important 1965 public intervention Karl Jaspers underscored that "democracy means self-education and information of the people. It means that people learn how to think, that they know what's going on, that they make judgments. Democracy constantly spurs the process of enlightenment."[261]

Going far beyond the democratic right to vote, such intellectual demands for more participation appealed especially to young people who had grown up in the Federal Republic and were indignant at the remnants of authoritarian practices and relations. One crucial element of the generational rebellion of 1968 was therefore the leftist call for the "mobilization and practice of an emancipatory and democratic counterpower, codetermination, and self-determination in all subsystems of society."[262]

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[257] *Merelman, Richard M.; Foster, Charles R.* Political Culture and Education in Advanced Industrial Societies: West Germany and the United States // International Review of Education, Vol. 24, № 4, 1978. p. 453.

[258] *Jarausch, Konradt.* Op. cit. p. 143-44.

[259] *Jarausch, Konradt.* Op. cit. p. 144. See also *Strzelewicz, Willy*. Industrialisierung und Demokratisierung der modernen Gesellschaft Verlag fur Literatur und Zeitgeschehen. Hannover, 1964. 45 ff., 51 ff., 73 ff.

[260] *Jarausch, Konradt.* Op. cit. p. 144.

[261] *Jaspers, Karl.* The Future of Germany. Trans. and ed. by E.B. Ashton. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1967. p. 15.

[262] *Jarausch, Konradt.* Op. cit. p. 144. *Vilmar, Fritz.* Strategien der Demokratisierung. 2 Bände, Darmstadt, Neuwied, 1973.

In his reflections on *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Jürgen Habermas formulated a justification of public discussion as a critical precondition for civic freedom. Instead of understanding democracy merely as a series of political game rules, he portrayed self-government as a social process of arriving at common understanding through debate in a sphere characterized by "critical publicity." Similarly, Ralf Dahrendorf claimed that only a fundamental liberalization of the Federal Republic would be able to truly realize the "socially founded constitution of freedom." Due to the persuasiveness of such analyses, democracy became a catchword of the 1960s, expressing a general desire for more cultural openness and public participation.[263]

3.3 Political Culture in Russia

In this section of the chapter I will present an overview of the way citizens' attitudes and orientations towards political system developed in the post-Soviet Russia.

Analyzing Russian political culture developments, it is worth pointing to the fact that the Soviet rule lasted almost seven times longer than the Third Reich. The fact that the impact of totalitarianism on citizens in the Soviet Union was much more long-term and enduring than in Germany is being recurrently brought about as one of the main differences of the two totalitarianisms.[264]

A uniquely devastating impact of the Soviet rule, in general, and the Stalin's reign of terror, in particular, on the society was indeed noted by many researchers. According to Allen C. Lynch "if any society approached the ideal type of atomization, in which the vertical links between individual and the state supplanted the horizontal ties binding individuals to each other through work, residence, class, social and personal interests, civic associations, and even family, it was the Soviet Union under Stalin from the late 1920s until the dictator's death in March 1953."[265]

One of the most discerning and subtle observers of the Soviet society at the time of Stalin's reign of terror Nadezhda Mandelstam described the social environment of that period of time in the following way: "Nobody trusted anyone else, and every acquaintance was a suspected police informer. […] After 1937 people stopped meeting each other altogether, and the secret police were

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[263] Ibid.

[264] See for e.g. *Drabkin, Yakov* et al. (eds.) Totalitarizm v Evrope XX veka: Iz istorii ideologij, dvizhenij, rezhimov i ih preodolenija. Moscow: Pamjatniki istoricheskoj mysli, 1996.

[265] *Lynch, Allen C.* How Russia Is Not Ruled. Reflections on Russian Political Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 55.

thus well on the way to achieving their ultimate objective. Apart from assuring a constant flow of information, they have isolated people from each other and had drawn large numbers of them into their web, calling them in from time to time, harassing them and swearing them to secrecy by means of signed statements. All such people lived in eternal fear of being found out and were consequently just as interested as regular members of the police in the stability of the existing order and the inviolability of the archives where their names were on file."[266] Mandelstam then concluded that "the loss of mutual trust is the first sign of the atomization of society in dictatorships of our type, and this was just what our leaders wanted."[267]

Other researchers have also underscored that one of the primary objectives of Stalinism was precisely the destruction of civil society so that potential threats to monocratic rule could be exterminated. To achieve this aim the regime "destroyed all self-organized forms of intermediate public organization and replaced them with transmission belt organizations whose purpose was to monitor society, mobilize it behind the leadership's program, and convey orders from the top downward."[268]

Describing the Soviet society in general, Tatiana Vorozheikina observed that the nationalization of economy and of all spheres of social life signified the complete exclusions of individual initiative in the structuring of interest groups: "The state and the society were merged and inseparable, both in reality and in social consciousness, and were intended to function strictly according to considerations of the public good. Principally, the *nomenklatura* system of administration and the special role of ideology ensured the integrity of the social system. *Both the state and the society were based on principles that negated the role of individuals as subjects in the achievement of personal aims and excluded private interests from the realm of social significance.*"[269]

Nevertheless, the unprecedentedly lengthy exposure to totalitarianism and the destruction of social links by the overwhelming state during the Soviet period did not prevent the Soviet (and then ex-Soviet) citizens from expressing a mass support for democratic reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thousands of activists were coming to the streets in those years in support of

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[266] *Mandelstam, Nadezhda.* Hope Against Hope: a Memoir. Modern Library, 1994. pp. 34-35.

[267] Ibid. p. 94.

[268] *Bernhard, Michael.* Civil Society after the First Transition: Dilemmas of Post-Communist Democratization in Poland and Beyond // Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 29, № 3, September 1996. p. 314.

[269] *Vorozheikina, Tatiana.* Clientelism and the Process of Political Democratization in Russia. In: *Roniger, Luis; Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe.* Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994. p. 56. (Italics added)

democratization. The scholars who could start conducting sociological research in the Soviet Union starting with Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost'* and *perestroika* found the results "unexpected in that they indicated the existence of a good deal more support for democratic values and institutions than would have been predicted by the continuity thesis."[270] For instance, Jeffrey Hahn's analysis, based on research in Yaroslavl' in 1990 suggested that attitudes, values, and beliefs about democracy among Russians were not altogether different from what was found in other industrialized democracies, including the USA. Generally speaking, these findings were independently confirmed in a number of other studies by James Gibson et al. (1992), William Reisinger et al. (1994), Gibson (1996) based on survey research conducted in the early 1990s.

At the initial stage of the Russian transformations, independent civic activism indeed flourished so that it filled some observers with hope for a quick civil society development in post-communist Russia. Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* starting from in 1987 which was manifested in a freed public access to information, permitted limited discussion in the official media, the partial renewal of the state bureaucracy and the suspension of the criminal prosecution for freethinking. This new policy facilitated the struggle within the Communist Party and the emergence of an informal democratic opposition movement which despite its significant heterogeneity appeared rather massive.

Importantly, the period of the late 1980s was marked not only a sweeping wave of political demonstrations and rallies across the country, but also by attempts to unite opposition forces on the common democratic platform. In summer of 1988, for example, the representatives of informal civic movements submitted a conjoint appeal to the 19th All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held in Moscow from June, 28th to July, 1st 1988, calling "to transform the party from the organization ruled by the caste of degenerate partycrats into a real political organization."[271]

However, this surge of involvement in various forms of public activity, including mass protests, strikes and demonstrations, as well as the creation of thousands of new informal organizations, stimulated by Gorbachev's policy of relaxing controls on political expression and political participation, appeared

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[270] *Hahn, Jeffrey W.* 2005. Op. cit. p. 151.

[271] Among the informal groups who signed the appeal were such groups as "Civil Dignity," "Community" (*Obshina*), "Social Initiatives Club," "Democracy and Humanism," "Perestroika," "Memorial," "The Moscow Tribune," who in the second half of the 1980s put forward ideas that largely supported by the general public. *Drabkin, Yakov* et al. (eds.) Totalitarizm v Evrope XX veka: Iz istorii ideologij, dvizhenij, rezhimov i ih preodolenija. Moscow: Pamjatniki istoricheskoj mysli, 1996. pp. 489-90.

rather short-lived. The burst of activism actually faded away within the first post-communist years.

Hahn's research, replicated in Yaroslavl' in 1993 and 1996, led him to conclude that, "By almost all the measures of diffuse support, including political efficacy, political trust, electoral commitment, and political interest, there has been an overall drop."[272] As Archie Brown has pointed out, 1990-91 were years of excitement and high expectations among Russians, but "a decade later there was much more disillusionment."[273] Especially after 1993, many Russians seemed to become increasingly disillusioned about what democracy in Russia meant.

The drop noted by many observers occurred indeed by almost all political culture variables. The only variable which appeared more or less stable over time was *interest in politics*, but even in this case there has been an evident decline. According to the Levada Center data, 47 percent of respondents in 1990, 51 percent in 1995, and 49 percent in 1999 expressed at least some *interest in political affairs* while 35, 46 and 51 percent respectively expressed low or no interest at all. Of those interested in politics 33 percent in 1993, 44 percent in 1995 and 45 percent in 1999 reported discussing political matters with friends, but only around 1 percent in 1994, 1.5 percent in 1995 and 3 percent in 1999 said they had took part in any real political actions such as partaking in rallies and demonstrations. Despite the relatively high level of interest throughout the 1990s, these figures allow concluding that, first, the interest in politics has been declining, and second, that the expressed interest appeared rather declarative.

The later surveys conducted in the 2000s continued to show that about 60 percent of the adult population in Russia was not interested in politics. When asked directly whether they "personally were ready to take a more active part in politics," 77 percent of respondents in both 2006 and 2010 answered negatively.[274]

The sense of *political efficacy* in the Russian citizens also appeared to be incredibly low throughout the 1990s. In 1998 only 6 percent thought they could exercise some influence on the city in which they lived; and just 3 percent thought they had some opportunity to 'make Russia a better place.'[275]

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[272] *Hahn, Jeffrey W.* Regional Russia in Transition*: Studies from Yaroslavl.'* Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. p. 106.

[273] *Brown, Archie.* Political Culture and Democratization: The Russian Case in Comparative Perspective. In: *Pollack, Detlef; Jacobs, Jürg; Müller, Olaf; Pickel, Gert* (eds.) Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe: Attitudes in New Democracies. Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003. p. 21.

[274] *Gudkov, Lev; Dubin, Boris; Zorkaja, Natalja.* Postsovetskij chelovek i grazhdanskoe obshestvo. M.: Moskovskaja shkola politicheskih issledovanij, 2008. p. 60. See also: Russians on the State-Society Relations. The Levada Analytical Center, 26 February – 2 March, 2010.
<http://www.levada.ru/press/2010031602.html>

[275] *Rose, Richard.* Getting Things Done with Social Capital: New Russia Barometer VII. Studies in Public Policy № 303, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 1998. pp. 58-59.

In 2000, when asked about the extent to which 'people like you can have a direct influence on the actions of central government' (through casting a vote in elections, participation in public rallies and demonstrations, public discussions, etc.), 85 percent of the respondents expressed the opinion that they had no influence on the decisions of the authorities. In 2006 the proportion of those who perceived themselves as powerless to affect governmental decisions increased to 87 percent and in 2009 to 92 percent with only about 1 percent of respondent taking the opposite view.[276]

Similar picture was unveiled when the respondents answered the same question with reference to the local level of decision-making: in 2009 91 percent of Russians acknowledged that ordinary citizens could exercise no or only some insignificant influence over the process of local government in their city, town or village.[277] Similarly, when asked about the opportunity ordinary citizens had to make use of the rights with which they had nominally been endowed under the post-communist Constitution, the overwhelming majority (88 percent) agreed largely or entirely that it was difficult for them to do so.[278] In another survey 60 percent said that their vote would not change anything.

As opinion polls show, most Russians believe that their involvement in political activity is futile, and have little confidence that government serves their interests. Participation in organized forms of political activity (that is, not a mere declarative interest in politics or simply talking about politics with others) is low. These low levels of political participation are a reflection of the low level of confidence in political institutions and the widespread view that ordinary individuals have little influence over government.[279]

To compare, in postwar Germany, as shown before, the percentage of those who believed than ordinary people have some say in what the government does has grown from 27 percent in 1959 to 40 percent in 1972.[280]

Membership in voluntary associations in contemporary Russia is also extremely low. According to the Levada Center survey data, in 2006 only around 1-2 percent of those expressing at least some interest in politics *participated in some political activities* like public actions, demonstrations, rallies or meetings of political parties and associations. No more than 1 percent of the respondents took part in the activities of social movements and organizations of any type, more often only about 0.5 percent. Up to 2 percent participated in various

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[276] Public Opinion - 2009. The Levada-Center Yearbook. Moscow: Levada-Center, 2009. p. 25.

[277] Ibid.

[278] *White, Stephen; McAllister, Ian.* Dimensions of Disengagement in Post-Communist Russia // Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 20, № 1, 2004. pp. 84-85.

[279] See *Remington, Thomas F.* Politics in Russia. London: Longman, 2006. p. 385.

[280] *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 28.

motorists, hikers, hunters, etc. clubs and associations. Even smaller proportion of Russians took part in such activities more or less regularly, at least once a month.

As for the readiness to participate in social organizations and movements, the respondents were more willing to get involved in the local, most close to them groups (courtyard landscaping, local homeowners associations, etc.) or charitable initiatives (assistance to children, the poor, etc.). Upon the whole, the declarative willingness to participate in any other types of social initiatives and movements did not exceed, according to the Levada Center data, the permissible in such polls statistical error.[281]

The study of the civil society in Russia conducted by the Levada Center in 1999 – 2000 showed that more than 90 percent of the population did not belong to any organization. Most manifestations of initiative or self-organization of citizens were limited to participation in the activities of parent-teacher committees (2 percent), sports or recreational clubs (2 percent), veterans' organizations (1.5 percent), amateur or youth (1 percent) and religious groups (less than 1 percent). Even youth clubs (such as football fans' clubs) had less than 1 percent of members and supporters, while only 0.2-0.3 percent of the adult population participated in the activities of entrepreneurs' unions or human rights organizations and only half percent reported being a member of a political party (these data are statistically insignificant). 80 percent of Russians did not even contemplate any organizational membership or intended to support any of non-political NGOs, even by making a one-time donation.[282]

According to 2007 survey, less than 5 percent of adults belonged to at least one group – any sports or recreational club, literary or other cultural group, political party, local housing association, or charitable organization and only two-thirds (64 percent) of this subgroup attended the meetings of any of these groups at least once a month. It thus turned out that only 1-3 percent of Russians were actually involved in the activities of women, youth, religious and any other voluntary associations and groups – the figure that actually falls within the margin of error.[283]

Although around 8-10 percent of Russians have lately reported being members of trade unions, only 1-2 percent of them participate in such activities at least 2-3 times a year.[284] According to the Levada Center data, about 5-8 percent of Russians have reported attending church at least once a month since

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[281] *Gudkov, Lev; Dubin, Boris; Zorkaja, Natalja.* Postsovetskij chelovek i grazhdanskoe obshestvo. M.: Moskovskaja shkola politicheskih issledovanij, 2008. pp. 64, 77.

[282] Ibid.

[283] Ibid. p. 77.

[284] NB: These data were provided to the author by the Levada Analytical Center experts in summer 2010.

1991.[285] Although attending religious services as well as trade union membership are normally perceived as rather passive forms of participating in public life, yet even when these and other types of participation are taken into account, the majority of the population in Russia appear to be outside any voluntary public associations.[286]

These figures are hardly comparably with those noted in postwar Germany where the membership in voluntary organization has grown significantly since the end of World War II. As shown previously 44 percent of Germans reported their belonging to some organization in 1959, 50 percent in 1967 and 59 percent in 1975. Furthermore, the proportion of respondents who reported that they were active in these organizations increased in the same period from 7 percent in 1959 to 10 percent in 1967 and to 17 percent in 1975.[287] The recent data on Germany have shown that in 2004 approximately one third of the citizens devoted time to some form of volunteering and assumed longer term tasks and duties in clubs, societies, initiatives or projects. Another 34 percent in 2004 was actually involved in some organization, but did not assume any concrete voluntary task or duty.[288]

When asked about the reasons for their massive nonparticipation and not joining any organization 50 percent of Russians named lack of interest ("I am just not interested; I just don't want to belong to any organizations") and 18 percent said that they "find these organizations completely useless." When these two options are combined one sees that a total of 68 percent of Russians have very negative views toward voluntary organizations. 21 percent of Russians responded affirmatively to one of these two options: "Nobody has invited/offered me to join any organizations," or "I do not really know of the activities of any of these organizations; if I knew more, maybe I would consider participating." 6 percent of Russians name the lack of time as the reason for their non-involvement ("I am interested in these activities but I don't have the time to participate").[289]

Though some researchers reported an increase in the number of registered organizations in Russia during the 1990s, Marc Morjé Howard expressed skepticism regarding focusing on such statistics when analyzing civil society in

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[285] Religion and Church. The Levada Center data at <http://www.levada.ru/religion.html>.

[286] *Remington*, *Thomas F.* Op. cit. p. 385.

[287] *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. pp. 248-49.

[288] *Rosenbladt, Bernhard.* Volunteering in Germany. Results of the 1999 Representative Survey on Volunteering and Civic Engagement. Volume 1: General Report. Munich, 2000. p. 13.

[289] *Howard, Marc Morjé.* Op. cit. p. 104.

post-communist countries of Eastern Europe.[290] In his opinion, first, the statistics on the number of organizations are misleading, as many of the organizations counted either have disappeared as quickly as they appeared or have been leading a "pseudo-existence" that corresponds little with their putative goals and activities.[291] Second, since so many organizations were completely dependent on Western grants for their funds and support, they used to be more beholden to the requirements of Western donor agencies than to the larger public whose interests they were supposed to serve. Third, and perhaps most important, without the energy, sense of purpose, and legitimacy that an active membership provides, many organizations can have only a limited influence on the policy-making process.[292]

Trust is another variable which experienced a visible decline in post-Soviet Russia. Again, despite the perpetual destruction of human trust during the Soviet rule, the level of general trust during the *perestroika* period was relatively high (and much higher than in the post-Soviet era). In 1989, 52 percent of the Levada Center respondents said that most people can be trusted, while only 41 percent claimed that one has to be careful in dealing with others. In 1991 this ratio changed to 34 and 42 percent respectively. Throughout the 1990s a gradual decline of general trust took place and the proportion of Russians expressing more distrust than trust reached 74 percent in 1998 and 76 percent in 2005. The situation stabilized at that point and since the mid-2000 sociological polls have shown a constant high level of distrust towards other people in the society with no more than 22-27 percent of respondents expressing the conviction that people in general can be trusted.[293] It is evident, however, that, unlike postwar Germans, post-Soviet Russians have become less, not more, trusting of their fellow citizens.

In the first instance, this lack of trust is expressed in a strong sense of distrust of any kind of public organization that a lingering number of citizens in Russia feel and a general satisfaction with their own personal networks (accompanied by a sense of deteriorating relations within society overall). Howard underscored that the social contacts of the majority of Russians

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[290] Lev Jacobson, Boris Rudnik, and Sergei Shishkin showed that the number of organizations in the country has almost doubled from 1995 to 1997, and even the 1995 totals appeared much higher than they were in the early 1990s. See *Jacobson, Lev; Rudnik, Boris; Shishkin, Sergei.* "Russia" in Civicus, The New Civic Atlas. Quoted in: *Howard, Marc Morjé.* Op. cit. p. 51.

[291] *Howard, Marc Morjé.* Op. cit. p. 152.

[292] Ibid. See also *Carothers, Thomas*. Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington, DC.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999. *Ottaway, Marina; Chung, Theresa*. Debating Democracy Assistance: Toward a New Paradigm // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, № 4, October 1999. pp. 99-113.

[293] Public Opinion - 2009. The Levada-Center Yearbook. Moscow: Levada-Center, 2009. p. 25.

remained limited to the persisting family and friendship networks – private, particularistic, ascriptive relationships which do not transcend the limits of particular traditional groups.[294]

According to the research of informal social circles, conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2007, 69 percent of young people under 26 and 87 percent of the 'fathers' generation keep in touch with their relatives, 65 and 68 respectively mix with the close circle of 'old' friends and 68 and 66 respectively with their colleagues at work. Informal social circles of only 15 percent of the youth and 7 percent of adults include people sharing their hobbies or interests, and only 5 percent of both young people and adults socialize with like-minded individuals sharing common political or religious views.[295]

This widespread distrust is manifested, among other things, in one's inability to empathize, to understand other people. To exemplify, this inability was manifested in the perception of the so-called "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine by the Russian public. In Lev Gudkov's opinion, Russians general suspicion and distrust of the Ukrainian activists' sincerity expressed in opinion surveys pointed to the inability of most respondents to understand other people's enthusiasm and feelings of elation. Gudkov claimed it to be one of the key features of the post-totalitarian, post-Soviet population. As he explained, "The reason is not, of course, that people living in post-totalitarian Russia are essentially stupid, nor that they have failed to develop an ability to understand the feelings of others. It is far more the case that the inability to empathize is linked to the tendency to assume that other people, whether they are friend or foe, are compelled by the lowest motives."[296]

As for the Russians' *support for liberal democracy* and its key values such as tolerance, freedom of expression, respect for human and minority rights, the overall picture appears confusing. In the 2006 Levada Center survey, for instance, 57-60 percent of respondents expressed the conviction that Russia needs democracy, and 26 percent disagreed with it. But although the majority of Russians seem to share belief in the importance of democracy, about two-third of the population do not have a clear idea of what democracy means, what kind of

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[294] *Howard, Marc Morjé.* Op. cit. p. 145.

[295] The Youth of the New Russia: Values and Priorities (Molodezh' novoj Rossii: tsennostnye prioritety). Analytical Report, Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, 2007. <http://www.isras.ru/analytical_report_Youth_7_2.html>

[296] *Gudkov, Lev.* Russia's Systemic Crisis. Negative Mobilization and Collective Cynicism // Osteuropa. Special issue 2007. < http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-13-gudkov-en.html>

political system Russia has today or what system would be desirable. Russians' ideas about democracy are indeed very vague and controversial.[297]

Among the main characteristics of democracy the Levada Center respondents primarily name economic prosperity – 39 percent in 2009 and 47 percent in 2008, as well as order and stability (37 percent in 2009 and 41 in 2008). Furthermore, when asked in the period of 2001-2007 what contemporary Russia needs more – order or democracy – 68-75 percent argued that Russia needs order above all, even if meeting this end would require some violations of democratic principles and restrictions of liberal freedoms.[298]

Though Russians normally acknowledge importance of such freedoms as the freedom of expression, the freedom of press and the freedom of religion, the overwhelming majority of them (94 percent in 2009) usually choose to learn news from the totally state-controlled television. Furthermore, 79 percent of those surveyed in 2009 considered television to be the most trustworthy source of information. These data show that appreciation of the abovementioned freedoms has been rather declarative.[299]

Stephen White, analyzing the state of Russian political culture in the 1990s, observed that for about a quarter of Russians democracy meant "freedom of speech and conscience; but almost as many thought it meant 'strict legacy,' or 'order and stability,' or for about a fifth a 'prospering economy.' Just 7 percent in the mid-1990s thought it meant that the leading positions in government should be elected, and only 3 percent associated democracy with minority rights."[300]

White also stressed the general unwillingness of Russians during the 1990s to tolerate the views of others for they were, for instance, "very strongly attached to death penalty: it had the support of the great majority of Russians, and about a quarter thought it should be applied even more frequently than in the past. There was equally little understanding of minority rights, a particularly sensitive indicator of democratic values. A substantial number believed that society should 'liquidate' all prostitutes (18 percent), and even more thought they should be 'isolated' (23 percent). Similar proportions favored the 'liquidation' of homosexuals (22 percent), and drug addicts (26 percent), and of children born

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[297] See *Gudkov, Lev* et al. 2008. Op. cit. p. 49.

[298] Notably in 2000, the first year of Putin's rule, this figure reached 81 percent. See: Public Opinion – 2009. Annual Report. Moscow: Levada Center, 2009. p. 32.

[299] Ibid. p. 124.

[300] *White, Stephen.* Russia's New Politics. The Management of a Postcommunist Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. p. 275. See also Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia: Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny, № 2, 1995. pp. 59-60. *Gibson, James L.* 'A Mile Wide But an Inch Deep': The Structure of Democratic Commitments in the Former USSR // American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 40, № 2, May, 1996. pp. 396-420.

with birth defects (18 percent); as these and other findings suggested, Russians were 'considerably more intolerant than citizens in the West.'[301]

According to Levada Center estimates, since the mid-1990s the importance of electing a democratic government has been asserted by no more than 7-16 percent of the respondents.[302] Besides, in the course of the 2000s only 5-7 percent noted importance of a guarantee of minority rights.[303] Only 8-12 percent of those surveyed in the same period agreed that under any circumstances human rights of individuals should be put above the interests of the state.[304]

In a recent 2009 survey 51 percent of the respondents expressed a preference for a strong leader over a democratic government (which was valued by 30 percent).[305] In the same year, 63 percent of Russians stated that the concentration of almost all power in the hands of ex-President Vladimir Putin benefits the country, while 40 percent expressed a conviction that Russia was on its path towards democracy.[306]

When asked what type of democracy Russia needs, 18 percent of those surveyed in 2009 preferred the one that existed during the Soviet Union times, 38 percent believed that Russia needs a very special form of democracy that would fit national traditions and specific Russian features, and only 18 percent stressed the importance of establishing democracy similar to the one that had been formed in the developed countries of Western Europe and the USA. Additionally, 73 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that Russian democracy should not copy Western models.[307]

The research project *The Soviet Man* (*Homo Sovieticus, Sovetskij Chelovek*) conducted by the Levada Analytical Center since 1989 and indented to identify the main trends in the development of Russian society conceptualized the strong continuities of the Soviet legacies in the post-Soviet period. Within the project five waves of all-Russia public opinion surveys were conducted in 1989, 1994, 1999, 2003 and 2008. In 2005 the head of the project Yuri Levada stated that "the twenty years that have passed since the start of reforms in Russian society have not resulted in the emergence of a "new" (contemporary, democratic, civic, etc,)

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[301] *White, Stephen.* Op. cit. pp. 274-5. See also: *Gibson, James L.; Duch, Raymond M.* Political Intolerance in the USSR: The Distribution and Etiology of Mass Opinion // Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 26, № 3, October, 1993. p. 300.

[302] Public Opinion – 2009. Annual Report. Moscow: Levada Center, 2009. p. 103.

[303] Ibid. p. 32.

[304] Ibid. p. 26.

[305] Ibid. p. 31.

[306] Ibid. p. 86, 35.

[307] Ibid. p. 30-31.

base for self-identification and self-assertion of the Russian people."[308] Based on the results of their studies the sociologists concluded that characteristics of the Soviet man remained the real reference point.

As illustrated by most of the Levada Center polls, Russian society as a whole is characterized by weak citizenship and lack of trust in social relationships. In this context, the building of democratic institutions is quite problematic, in so far as the norms and practices of Russian society reflect the authoritarian and non-democratic norms and practices at the top.

However, in the recent years the number of changes has occurred on the societal level and it is important to note this new trend. In the recent study on *New Social Movements in Russia*, the director of the Independent Institute of Collective Action (IKD), the sociologist Karine Clément has noted an increase in social protest in Russia since the mid-2000s arguing that the emerging grassroots social initiatives and networks could potentially challenge the dominant model of power relationships.

In the first instance, Clément pointed to a growing number of participants in collective actions, especially starting from the winter of 2005 when some 500,000 people participated in massive demonstrations across Russia for the defense of the social benefits system. Furthermore, Clément considered these demonstrations that became the most massive social upheaval in the past decade to be the starting point for the new social movements in Russia. She wrote: "Tens of thousands of people, mostly pensioners but also young leftist, trade union and human rights activists and so on, took to the streets of almost every town, in some cases for days, to protest against a law that threatened social security rights. This first wave continued for several months and forced the government to accept a compromise. After the end of 2005, protest actions flared up against the new housing code and the current so-called 'communal' (housing) reform."[309]

Afterwards, protest actions and other non-institutional forms of citizens' mobilization occurred more frequently. Besides, hundreds of grassroots local initiatives were undertaken by so-called 'initiative groups' of people at the micro-level of their household, neighborhood or town. Monitoring of collective

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[308] *Levada, Yuri.* "Homo Sovieticus": Limits of Self-Identification // Russia in Global Affairs, № 2, April - June 2005. pp. 60-70.

[309] *Clément, Karine.* New Social Movements in Russia: A Challenge to the Dominant Model of Power Relationships? // Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 24, № 1 March 2008. p. 73. See also: *Kleman K., Mirjasova O., Demidov A.* Ot obyvatelej k aktivistam. Zarozhdajushiesja sotsial'nye dvizhenija v Rossii. Moskva: Tri kvadrata, 2010.

action conducted by IKD showed an average of about 10,000 participants per week in collective actions from the beginning of 2006 to March 2007. [310]

An important feature of social protest, according to Clément, is the rise of self-organizing initiatives, independent of formal institutionalized political parties or power representatives. For example, problems linked with the housing reform caused a growing mobilization of housing committees, neighborhood associations and groups of community leaders, or simply residents who are more active than the average over the issue of management of buildings and lands. Just like in Germany in the aftermath of the student movement, collective action and grassroots initiatives in present-day Russia usually start with the defense of one's direct and very concrete or pragmatic interests: not to be expelled from their home, not to pay excessive communal charges, to protect the park in front of the house, to get support for medication and so on. Local campaigns are mounted on specific practical issues, such as combating plans to build an apartment house or a parking lot on a local recreation ground, to turn people out of workers' hostels, or police brutality, etc. [311]

The organizational forms of these grassroots initiatives vary from extended all-Russian associations or unions like the Russian Motorist Federation (FAR), the car owners union Freedom of Choice (*Svoboda vybora*), the Active Citizens of Russia Movement (TGIR), the Soviets Coordination Union of Russia (SKS), Homeowners Associations (*tovarishestva sobstvennikov zhilya*), the all-Russian movement of 'deceived co-investors' who are fighting for apartments they have paid for in advance, as well as numerous local initiatives. The latter may include local associations of housing owners, associations of the joint owners of buildings, citizens' action coordinating councils, independent trade unions, as well as different initiative groups, like the group of the inhabitants of Moscow suburban town Butovo town, or the group of homeowners from the Moscow suburban community of Rechnik. [312]

Apart from associations aimed at protection of individual and working rights of citizens, there have lately emerged a number of initiatives supporting more common public good issues like the protection of environment or preservation of cultural heritage. To exemplify the latter case, one can recall the movement against the construction of the a 400-metre Okhta Centre "Gazprom" skyscraper in the historic centre of St Petersburg, as well as regular protests organized by the social movement Architectural Control (*ArchNadzor*) which

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[310] Ibid. For more information about these movements see also *Clément, Karine.* La contestation de gauche et les mouvements sociaux émergents. Paris: CERI, 2006.

[311] *Clément, Karine.* 2008. Op. cit. p. 75.

[312] Moscow Police Block Property Owners' Protest // RFE/RL, 29 February 2010.

unites several organizations aimed at preserving Moscow's architectural heritage.[313]

Among environmental initiatives recently launched in various parts of the country in attempt to conserve environmental areas and protect the natural resources the movements in defense of the Khimki Forest Park near Moscow and the famous Lake Baikal near Irkutsk can be singled out.[314]

Particularly active in the last year has been the so-called Blue Bucket society (*Obshetvo sinikh vedyorok*) with their biting criticism and protest against the impunity of state officials who routinely use blue flashing lights on their vehicles to violate traffic rules and drive recklessly.[315]

Among the most searched for all-Russian NGOs since early 1990s has been the Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia (*Soyuz Komitetov Soldatskikh Materei Rossii*) providing legal advice to soldiers and their families about their rights and conscription laws, as well as intervening on behalf of soldiers who are facing abuse and hazing from their superiors and other more senior soldiers (*dedovshchina*).

Political protest has also seen new forms of expression in the recent years. Some new political groups and associations as the Left Front, the anti-fascist movement, the Solidarity movement, among others, have emerged. Additionally, political opposition have continuously organized regular protests and demonstrations like the Dissenters' March (*marsh nesoglasnykh*) – a series of political opposition protests that took place in 2006-2008 in different cities of Russia (Moscow, St Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Chelyabinsk, Voronezh, etc.) and the Strategy-31 (*Strategia-31*) demonstrations – a series of civic protests in support of the right to peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 31 of the Russian Constitution held in Moscow on the 31st of every month with 31 days since July 2009.[316]

However, the main problem with the new networks that have appeared in the past several years in Russia, as Clément underscored, is that nearly all of

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[313] "Gazprom, Get Your Phallus out of St Petersburg" // France 24, 12 October, 2009; Protest over St Petersburg tower // BBC News, 10 October, 2009.

[314] *Chirikova, Yevgenia.* The Battle for Khimki Forest // Open Democracy, 17 March, 2010. *Chizhova, Lyubov; O'Flynn, Kevin.* Battle for Russia's Lake Baikal Heats Up // RFE/RL, 13 February, 2010. Siberians Hold Competing Rallies Over Reopening Of Baikal Paper Mill // RFE/RL, 13 February, 2010.

[315] *Halpin, Tony.* Moscow Drivers Unite in Blue Bucket Protest against Nihilism on Roads // The Times, 27 April, 2010.

[316] *Birch, Douglas.* Russians take to the streets, show what might have once been called 'American spirit' // Associated Press, 14 April, 2007 <http://www.unknownnews.org/070414-Moscow.html>; *Zarakhovich, Yuri.* Russians Protest Putin's Rule // Time, 4 March, 2007. *Torocheshnikova, Mariana.* What is Strategy 31? // Open Democracy, 30 July, 2010.

them have no formal status or formally elected executive bodies, i.e. they are largely not institutionalized. Besides, the overall protest numbers, as we have seen from the polling data appear sociologically insignificant. Sociological polls are not able to fix such a micro-sociological phenomenon as the growth of scattered collective actions on a lesser scale (except for the 'pensioners' upheaval'). As previously shown, the opinion polls data show a maximum of 1-3 percent of the population being involved in protest actions. [317]

However, although Russian society can still be generally considered as highly fragmented and passive in the realm of social or collective action, the research on emerging social movements gives evidence of the possibility for collective action to occur and for more activists to become involved in it.[318]

In the next section of this chapter I will turn to comparative analysis and explanations of changes in citizens' attitudes and political behavior in West Germany and Russia.

3.4 Comparative Analysis of Citizens' Attitudes and Participatory Orientations in post-WWII West Germany and post-Soviet Russia

A number of studies in the field of personal psychology and interpersonal relations present personal development as a progressive movement on a maturity continuum from *dependence* to *independence* to *interdependence.* On the maturity continuum, *dependence* is the paradigm of *you* (you take care of me; you come through for me; if you didn't come through, I blame you for the results) and it corresponds to the period of infancy characterized by total dependence of a child on other people, adults or seniors, who direct, nurture, and sustain him. To grow from childhood to young adulthood, one must grow more *independent* (physically, mentally, emotionally and financially) becoming inner-directed and self-reliant. *Independence* is thus the paradigm of *I* (I can do it; I am responsible; I am self-reliant; I can choose). However the highest level of personal maturity is reached at a time when an independent, self-reliant and capable individual becomes increasingly aware of the interdependence of human life. *Interdependence* on the maturity continuum is the paradigm of *we* (we can do it;

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[317] Karine Clément believes that the only way to catch the trend is to choose activist networks as a preferential polling target. In her view, an attempt to do so can be found in *Patrushev, Sergei* (ed.) Sotsial'nye seti doveriya, massovye dvizheniya i instituty politicheskogo predstavitel'stva: opyt 'starykh' i 'novykh' demokratii v usloviyakh globalizatsii (Social Networks of Trust, Mass Movements and Institutions of Political Representation: Experience of 'Old' and 'New' Democracies). Research Paper. Moscow: Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2007.

[318] *Clément, Karine.* Op. cit. p. 69.

we can cooperate; we can combine our talents and abilities and create something greater together). As Stephen Covey put it, "Dependent people need others to get what they want. Independent people can get what they want through their own effort. Interdependent people combine their own efforts with the efforts of others to achieve their greatest success."[319]

Metaphorical transfer of the 'maturity continuum' paradigm on social relations permits comparing the period of infancy (*dependence*) with a social system characterized by state paternalism, on the one hand, and by social and psychological infantilism, on the other. As a personal immaturity is manifested in over-dependence on the others (adults or seniors), similarly, social infantilism is revealed in a society's dependence on the overwhelming state, which plays the central if not the only role in shaping economic, political and social relations.

Research of post-totalitarian societies, in turn, suggests that a totalitarian system's disintegration promotes, at least to some extent, a paradigm of independence in social relations. The system collapse accompanied by an inevitable separation of an individual from the state leads to emergence of a highly individualistic society, in which private interests tend to dominate over public interests and concerns.[320]

Following this line of reasoning, a mature society, in turn, is the one where values of interdependence reign supreme. Interdependence, enabling citizens to "choose and decide on the effective form of collective existence" (Ortega y Gasset) is a crucial value for civil society development.[321] Citizens in a mature society, thus, try to combine their own efforts with the efforts of others to achieve their goals through getting access to the vast resources and potential of other individuals.

As it appears, the difference between civil and totalitarian societies lies precisely in the presence of an autonomous social agent – *an agent of civil society* – who is characterized by awareness of his independence and autonomy, on the one hand, and by readiness to interact and cooperate with other people or social actors, on the other.

Since solidarity is based on the desire to cooperate and work together, cooperation of individuals is inconceivable without mutual respect and observance of certain rules of cooperation, or 'the rules of the game', shared by all participants of the social process. Differently, the employment of solidarity mechanisms creates a society as a system of persistent relations based on common values, a sense of belonging and mutual interest.

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[319] *Covey, Stephen R.* The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People. Free Press, 2004. p. 49.

[320] See *Dahrendorf, Ralf.* Op. cit.

[321] *Ortega Y Gasset, José.* The Revolt of the Masses. W. W. Norton & Company, 1994. p. 48.

Thus, the disintegration of the Soviet system and the consequent liberalization of economic relations, certainly, led to certain liberation of an individual from the overwhelming governmental control. The insolvent state, forced to take off most of its former liabilities, had to leave the society alone with its hardships and vis-à-vis the devastating 'shock therapy.' This situation heightened people's sense of insecurity, on the one hand, but, on the other, it contributed to the citizens' greater independence and autonomy, or, in psychological terminology, to their greater maturity. Just like eaglets pushed out of the nest by the mother are taught thus to fly on their own, the separation of an individual from an all-controlling, repressive state was inevitably accompanied by his increasing independence (though painful and complex this separation process did take place in post-Soviet Russia).

It is important to point out that individual behavior in the situation of a large-scale social change may take different forms. According to cultural theorists, changes in political cultures that occur in response to social discontinuity should initially exhibit considerable formlessness (Eckstein) or, using definitions of the same phenomenon – anomie (Durkheim) or deinstitutionalization (Merton). As a result of social upheavals culture loses coherent structure, becoming highly entropic. In his 1949 study of the bases of deviant behavior Robert Merton conceptualized possible behavior outcomes under conditions of cultural discontinuity. One of them is the conformity with authority that tends to be ritualistic or else self-serving, opportunistic (by this compliance without commitment is meant). Another possible reaction is retreatism as withdrawing from the 'alien' larger society into the smaller, more familiar worlds of family, neighborhood, village, and the like (an increased "parochialism" in Almond and Verba's scheme of concepts). The third likely response to the experience of cultural decay as conceptualized by Merton is rebellion against, and intransigent resistance to, authority. However, as Harry Eckstein underscored, since similar reactions are always likely to be costly and call for much energy, retreatist behavior into parochial worlds or ritualistic conformity are more likely.[322] Our analysis of West German and Russian societies in a situation of a former system collapse confirmed this thesis.

In this respect one can argue that the 'new Russian individualism' of the post-Soviet period was to some extent a direct continuation of the opportunistic individualism of the Soviet society, reflecting skepticism not only towards the stated norms of the old, socialist order, but also towards the principles of

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[322] *Eckstein, Harry.* A Culturalist Theory of Political Change // The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, № 3, September 1988. pp. 797-98. *Merton, Robert K.* Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe: Free Press, 1949.

democracy and civil society. As Alfred Evans observed, "The assumption that almost all others are engaged in amoral individualism leads to a low level of trust in fellow citizens, which discourages a commitment to voluntary associations that seek positive social change."[323]

However, post-Soviet Russia was no exception in this regards as seen from analysis of the postwar West German developments. In 1965 Ralf Dahrendorf noted that in the Federal Republic "a world of highly individual values has emerged" and such qualities as "discipline, orderliness, subservience, cleanliness, industriousness, precision, and all the other virtues ascribed by many to the Germans as an echo of past splendor have already given way to a much less rigid set of values, among which economic success, a high income, the holiday trip, and the new car play a much larger part than the virtues of the past."[324] Generally speaking, Dahrendorf positively assessed the spread of values informed by the patterns of economic life throughout the whole of German society, for, in his view, "people who have grown accustomed to seeking individual happiness are unlikely candidates for totalitarian organization" and "economic elites of a market order are ill-suited to the monopoly of political leadership groups that characterize modern totalitarianism."[325]

At the same time, Dahrendorf who was known to be a strong proponent of public values avowedly admitted that private virtues thriving in Germany cannot be regarded as social as they are in no sense virtues of participation. "If, in a society of private virtues, the individual takes part in the social and political process, this remains "external" to him and he reserves the chance of retreat. This is why the prevalence of private virtues may become an instrument of authoritarian rule," – the author stated.[326] He claimed that, though the prevalence of the contractual values of public virtues is not a sufficient condition of the constitution of liberty (as similar prevalence characterizes also totalitarian regimes) it is "a necessary condition of liberal democracy" for "without it liberal institutions cannot flourish."[327]

As we have seen, the virtues that Dahrendorf defined as 'public' have been eventually formed in postwar West Germany, but have not become widespread in post-Soviet Russia. Unlike West Germany, the individual, partially formed in Russia as a result of the collapse of the Soviet state and further economic liberalization, continued to view personal freedom as freedom

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[323] *Evans, Alfred B. Jr.* 2005. Op. cit. p. 102.

[324] *Dahrendorf, Ralf.* Op. cit. p. 441.

[325] Ibid. p. 442.

[326] Ibid. p. 302.

[327] Ibid.

to follow solely his own, rather than social interests, and remained devoid of persistent organic links with other individuals.

The Federal Republic of Germany provides indeed a good example of how a previously authoritarian, historically discontinuous regime comes to acquire the cultural underpinnings of democracy.[328] In their 1981 study *Germany Transformed*: *Political Culture and the New Politics* Kendall Baker and his colleagues concluded: "In just three decades the Federal Republic has experienced a massive transformation of political and social norms and values: from a traditional social order and a war-ravaged economy to a progressive advanced industrial society; from a country plagued by severe conflicts and cleavages to a highly stable, integrated society in which democratic political system constructed after World War II seems to enjoy substantial legitimacy."[329]

Most of the analysts have focused on the following sources of change in the West German case: (1) system performance and eventually the absence of any credible alternative to liberal democracy; (2) postwar socioeconomic modernization; and (3) the changes in postwar socialization patterns, primarily, due to transformations of the educational system.[330] In this section, therefore, I will focus on these variables while comparing the two cases.

3.4.1 System Performance

Experts on Germany mostly agree that system performance has contributed to the long-term growth of political efficacy in the Federal Republic. In the postwar period West Germans got a chance to participate in the new system, based on the rule of law and the separation of powers, and this engagement, in turn, increased the citizens' confidence in their ability to influence public matters. As a result, there has been a steady increase in the political skills and resources of the German electorate. Differently, as West Germans have become familiar with the democratic process of the Federal Republic, they have come to believe that they can affect political decision-making. In this way, the functioning democratic system performance contributed to the growth of civic norms in Germany.[331]

Additionally, G.R. Boynton and Gerhard Loewenberg (1973), David Conradt (1980), Kendall Baker (1981), Konardt Jarausch (2006), and other observers agreed that the performance of the political and economic system was

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[328] *Merelman, Richard M.; Foster, Charles R.* Political Culture and Education in Advanced Industrial Societies: West Germany and the United States // International Review of Education, Vol. 24, № 4, 1978. pp. 443-465.

[329] *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 9.

[330] See *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. p. 256; *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 31.

[331] See *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 35.

an important factor in the increase of system support and the growing appreciation of democracy in the first two decades following the war.

According to Konradt Jarausch, it was its practical performance that allowed the Federal Republic to win the numerous skeptics over to democracy for "Bonn could point to better 'results' than earlier Weimar and East Berlin and due to the visible improvement in its living situation, the undecided majority that placed little faith in the Germans' ability to govern themselves gradually became convinced that a democratic polity could master practical problems of everyday life."[332] Jarausch also stressed that in domestic politics West German citizens were most impressed by the remarkable stability of the Adenauer cabinets, especially when compared to the governmental crises that afflicted the Weimar Republic and the Fourth Republic in France. As economic prosperity and social support measures reached ever greater segments of the population by the beginning of 1950s, satisfaction with the democratic system grew appreciably.[333]

Notably, if in 1953 just over half of the electorate favored a democratic form of government, by 1967 the number of respondents who believed democracy was the "best form of government" reached 74 percent. Differently, about half of the West German adult population in 1953 and about a fourth in 1967 was still dissatisfied, undecided, or unwilling to make an evaluation as to whether or not democracy was the "best form of government" for Germany. By 1972, however, fully 90 percent of the adult population was "satisfied" with democracy in the Federal Republic. By 1976 there was a strong consensus on the basic character and structure of the West German democracy.[334] According to the eighth *Eurobarometer* published by the European Community, since 1973 the West German satisfaction with the political system of democracy (78 percent) reached first place in Europe.[335]

Thus, a consensus about the liberal political institutions of the new republic eventually developed in the postwar West Germany, and republican political institutions became secured by broad agreement in the political class and population.[336]

In Russia, by contrast, the system non-performance became, as it appears, one of the main reasons for the growing disengagement and skepticism. First of

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[332] *Jarausch, Konrad H.* Op. cit. p. 141.

[333] Ibid. p. 142.

[334] *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 25. *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. pp. 233 – 34.

[335] The EC average was 54 percent (France – 49 percent, Italy – 19 percent). Allensbach, IFD-Umfrage 2178, February/March 1976.

[336] See *Moses, Dirk A.* German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. pp. 5-6.

all, a severe decline of the Russian economy in the 1990s and the necessity to struggle for one's existence in a situation of a serious economic crisis made many Russians frustrated and apathetic. As Thomas Remington observed, "The withdrawal from active political participation results from the shattering of the expectations for change that rose to unrealistic levels in the late 1980s and the early 1990s" and "reflects disillusionment with how conditions have turned out."[337]

The drastic consequences of the economic reform were discussed before, so we won't focus much on them here. Suffice it to say that frustration of mass hopes led to the mass disillusionment with politics, in general, and democracy, in particular. The latter was thought to blame for the failures of transition. Russians were indeed increasingly dissatisfied with the development of democracy in their country and more so than their counterparts in the other former republics of the USSR, in Eastern Europe and in the European Union.[338]

In 1991, only 15 percent of the Russian respondents were 'satisfied with the way democracy [was] developing in their country,' while 67 percent were dissatisfied; five years later, in 1996, satisfaction was down to 8 percent and dissatisfaction had reached 82 percent.[339] By the end of 1998 satisfaction the existing political system was down to 5 percent. Since 1997 and till 2003 43-48 percent of the Levada Center respondents continued to call the Soviet system "the best political system" with no more than 30 percent favoring democracy. Since 2005 the support for democratic system of government in Russia never exceeded 15-19 percent.[340] In marked contrast to West Germany where democratization was proceeding smoothly, support for democracy in Russia has been deteriorating.[341]

The fact that democracy as "a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens" was not formed in Russia is also crucial, as it seems, in explaining the low levels of political efficacy and weakness of civil society in the post-communist period.[342]

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[337] *Remington*, *Thomas F*. Op. cit. p. 381.

[338] *White, Stephen.* 2000. Op. cit. p. 275.

[339] Ibid. See also: Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, № 2. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, 1992. Annex Figure 8, and № 7, Annex Figure 4.

[340] Public Opinion - 2009. The Levada-Center Yearbook. Moscow: Levada-Center, 2009. p. 31.

[341] *Bernhard, Michael; Karakoç, Ekrem.* Civil Society and the Legacies of Dictatorship // World Politics, Vol. 59, № 4, July 2007. pp. 539-567. *Rose, Richard; Shin, Doh Chull.* Democratization Backwards // British Journal of Political Science 31, April 2001.

[342] *Karl, Terry Lynn; Schmitter, Phillippe.* What Democracy Is… and Is Not // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, № 3, Summer 1991. p. 76.

While Russia's first President Boris Yeltsin concentrated preponderant power in the institution of the Russian presidency, he neglected the strengthening of political parties, the national parliament and the fragile civil society institutions, which would have provided channels of potential influence for organized interests to reward the mobilization of support from large numbers of citizens.[343]

According to political analyst Tatiana Vorozheikina, structuring of the civil society subject in post-Soviet era depended crucially on political will of the new Russian leaders, on their willingness to establish representative institutions. However, a mass political movement and grassroots organizations were not perceived by the Russian new political bosses as autonomous political actors – their support was expected, while independence of their actions was not recognized: "The political sphere was viewed by the groups who came to power in Russia in 1991 purely instrumentally, as a means of pressure in their struggle for access to power controls. [...] Government authorities of the Russian Federation actually absorbed the most active elements of informal democratic movements of the late 1980s, thereby weakening the capacity of grassroots, non-partisan democracy. As a result, democratic potential, political institutions as well as non-political public sphere were severely undermined."[344]

As Junghan Bae described this process, in order to mobilize social support for the unpopular neo-liberal reform policies, the Yeltsin administration tried to initiate its own social movements from above. For that purpose they exploited organizational resources of the existing independent *Democratic Russia* (*Demokraticheskaja Rossija*) movement, providing regional subgroups – if supportive – with material and administrative assistance. Although radical leaders of the *Democratic Russia* sharply criticized such attempts of the Administration to subordinate the movement to the government, they had no other options but to leave or be expelled. As a result, a hybrid of social movements and governmental organizations – *Choice of Russia* (*Vybor Rossii*) – was created in June-October 1993 and participated as a quasi-party in the State Duma elections of 1993. The remaining segments of the Democratic Russia

[343] See *Evans, Alfred B. Jr.* A Russian Civil Society? In: *Evans, Alfred B. Jr.; Henry, Laura A.; Sundstrom, Lisa McIntosh* (eds.) Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment. New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2005. p. 102.

[344] *Vorozhejkina, Tatiana.* Gljadja nazad: vozmozhnye al'ternativy v razvitii perestrojki // Puti Rossii: 20 let peremen. Moskovskaja vysshaja shkola social'nyh i ekonomicheskikh nauk, 2005. pp. 26-27.

movement either disappeared from the public scene or became part of a democratic opposition *Yabloko* party.[345]

In this manner, the administrative-bureaucratic system of governance has almost totally superseded moral solidarity from the sphere of public social relations which led to the almost complete absence of social networks and organizations independent from the overwhelming state. The limited socio-institutional resources continue to result in persistent shortage of social solidarity, the lack of positive interest in others, apathy and atomization.[346]

It can be asserted that the Russian society remained immature largely due to the persistence of the old structure of 'institutions' which impeded social development and stifled social organization.

The fact that Russia experienced not a differentiation, but rather a decomposition or dissolution of the former Soviet institutions was posited in the works by Stephen White (2000), Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin (2002, 2007, 2008), Richard Sakwa (2005), Tatiana Vorozheikina (2008), and other observers.

In 2000 Stephen White pointed to this peculiarity of the Russian 'transformation' by stating that "in Russia, it had been less a 'transition to democracy' than a reconfiguration that incorporated many features of the old regime together with some more pluralist elements that had themselves in most cases been introduced before the end of communist rule."[347] Richard Sakwa later agreed that "the Soviet system as a whole did not dissolve but instead it fragmented, and great chunks of the old system remain firmly lodged in the post-Communist body politic."[348]

"What's going on, – noted in one of the articles on this subject Lev Gudkov, – can be better described as a dissolution of the Soviet totalitarianism and separation of some areas of social life from the former rigid centralized structure of administration and control – a process which is expected to go on for two-three generations."[349] Gudkov observed that "the main institutions – the structures of power, army, courts, prosecutors, political police, education, etc. – are preserved or only slightly changed in terms of its organization and functioning. And, most importantly, their organization or constitution has

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[345] *Bae, Junghan.* Underdeveloped Civil Society in Russia: Origin, Development and Differentiation of Independent Social Organizations in the Transforming Russia // Slavic Research Center News, № 13 (9). 16 May 2005.

[346] See *Gudkov, Lev* et al. 2008. Op. cit. p. 78.

[347] *White, Stephen.* 2000. Op. cit. p. 289.

[348] *Sakwa, Richard.* Partial Adaptation and Political Culture. In: *Whitefield, Stephen* (ed.) Political Culture and Post-Communism. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2005. p. 52.

[349] *Gudkov, Lev.* Itogi putinskogo pravlenija // Vestnik obshestvennogo mnenija. № 5, 2007. pp. 25-26.

remained practically unchanged. The power still remains unbalanced, uncontrolled by any social forces or institutions, guided only by its own material interests and the desire for self-preservation."[350]

Marc Morjé Howard asserted that for lasting societal change to occur the new institutions should be authoritative and binding, not weak and incoherent. Otherwise people will be less likely to change their behavioral patterns to adapt to them, since they can easily continue behaving as before.[351] In the Russian case it was precisely the weakness of democratic institutions and sometimes even the lack of institutional framework within which democracy could be practiced that prevented development of civic skills and political efficiency vital for supporting and consolidating a democratic system. Equally important, the weakness of civil society as a result of institutional deficiency meant that many citizens would lack the institutional representation and leverage otherwise normally provided by active voluntary organizations.[352]

It should be pointed out that largely due to the political system non-performance a comprehension of the essence of democracy in Russia has not taken place and, consequently, the essential changes in political culture of its citizens have not occurred. In the mass consciousness democracy became associated not with ideals of state led by 'the rule of law,' not with values of civil society or civic freedom, but with the chaos and 'wild capitalism' of the 1990s, it became firmly equated with poverty and degradation. Consequently, the majority of people have perceived the concepts 'democracy' and 'the state' as mutually exclusive. In this context, strengthening of a centralized government and heightening of all forms of state control became viewed as an effective means for 'overcoming' the so-called 'democratic system.'[353]

3.4.2 Transformations of Social Structure

System performance, nevertheless, is only one explanation for the long-term growth of supportive attitudes and political efficacy in West Germany. Another important source of change was the *changing character of postwar German society* that was linked with overall system performance and presumably caused by it. One of the hallmarks of this change was the overall transformation of the German social structure.

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[350] Ibid.

[351] See *Howard, Marc Morjé.* Op. cit. p. 19.

[352] Ibid. p. 146.

[353] *Trudolyubov, Maxim.* Milk and Honey. In: *Kuchins, Andrew; Trenin, Dmitry; Trudolyubov, Maxim* (eds.) Rough Crossing: Democracy in Russia. Carnegie Moscow Center, 2004. p. 64.

As noted previously, the postwar German economy has seen phenomenal recovery in nearly all sectors, earning the label of Economic Miracle (*Wirschaftswunder*). The individual income of German workers experienced a nine times increase between 1950 and 1978 (in 1950 the average German worker earned 250 DM per month, but by 1978 his earnings had risen to about 2250 DM per month). Along with affluence have come increases in education (despite the rigid educational system, the number of students admitted to universities has increased), the use of the mass media, and other elements of an advanced industrial society.[354]

Notably, most observers of West German society such as Norman Nie, Bingham Powell and Kenneth Prewitt (1969), Philip Coverse (1972), Kendall Baker et al. (1981), and others used to name the rise of income and the expansion of higher education among the most important prerequisites of societal change in the Federal Republic. Experts typically found such factors as *income, status* and *education* important sources of change for they helped furnish the sorts of skills and resources necessary for political commitment, as well as the self-confidence and the access to the political system that nourish a sense of political efficacy.[355] Education was believed to be strongly related to feelings that one can influence the government, suggesting that the cognitive skills and political resources represented by this indicator were crucial to the growth of civic norms and behavior.[356]

Additionally, higher-status individuals were expected to participate in politics more than others, partially because they were allegedly more assured of ability to influence the government through participation. In 1969 Norman Nie, Bingham Powell and Kenneth Prewitt, among others, saw participatory norms as an important intervening link between social status and participation. They argued that "political life styles of citizens will not be markedly changed until extensive industrialization alters the status structure of society and thereby increases the overall level of political information, attentiveness and so forth."[357] In their argumentation the authors actually followed Seymour Martin Lipset who as early as 1960 pointed to the Western phenomenon of "upper class liberalism,"

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[354] See *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 10.

[355] See, for e.g. *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 31. *Converse, Philip E.* Change in the American Electorate. In: *Campbell, Angus. Converse, Philip E.* (eds.) The Human Meaning of Social Change. New York, 1972.

[356] *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 35.

[357] Ibid. p. 35, 10. See also *Nie, Norman H.; Powell, G. Bingham Jr.; Prewitt, Kenneth.* Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships American Political Science Review, 63. September 1969. p. 826.

arguing that individuals at higher points at the social hierarchy are more likely to support democratic regimes.[358]

Kendall Baker conceptualized the effects of the Economic Miracle on West German society and politics as follows: "The spread of affluence and the dramatic growth of the mass media have increased the amount of political information available to the electorate. The expansion of educational opportunities has gradually increased the political sophistication of the public. Greater leisure time has increased the opportunities to participate in politics. Thus, the economic development of postwar Germany has contributed to a dramatic rise in the political awareness and involvement of the German electorate."[359]

Notably, although the Economic Miracle was decisive in establishing the foundation of the West German democracy, economic and safety priorities *per se* eventually declined in importance and in the 1970s and 1980s they were being supplemented by postmaterialist values like the quest for more participation at work and in politics. This shift was vividly expressed in the changes in political agenda. Political concerns in Germany have clearly broadened beyond economic questions to a group of postindustrial, or the so-called New Politics issues. For example, since the 1970s terms such as "educational crisis" (*Bildungsnotstand*) and "quality of life" (*Qualität des Lebens)* have entered the German political vocabulary, while issues like environmental protection, divorce reform, legalization of abortion, and codetermination *(Mitbestimmung*), meaning in a broad sense participation in decision making, have increased in salience.[360]

Furthermore, while political realities had formerly been taken for granted, interest and engagement in politics in the postwar period became gradually seen as a chance for personal self-fulfillment. If previously professional achievement had served as a means of individual self-realization, in the decades following the end of World War II work as an end in itself faded away in favor of extrinsic work motivation – work as a means toward other ends.[361] As Heiner Meulemann conceptualized, this new orientation shift was accompanied by the decrease of acceptancy, or taking social reality or social tradition for granted. As Meulemann explained, the decrease of acceptancy implies "that meaning in life can no longer be taken for granted, but has to be created in a way that is effective and valid in everyday life."[362] The increase of political interest stood, according to

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[358] *Lipset, Seymour Martin.* Political Man. Garden City: Doublebay, 1960.

[359] *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 11.

[360] Ibid. pp. xi, 11. See also *Inglehart, Ronald.* The Silent Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.

[361] See *Meulemann, Heiner.* Op. cit. p. 782.

[362] Ibid. pp. 792-93.

Meulemann, for the increasing importance of politics as a source of meaning and as means of achieving codetermination. Sharing broader horizons and having an impact on processes far removed – these feelings, in the author's view, were giving more and more sense of orientation to the citizens of the Federal Republic.[363]

Indeed, the survey data confirmed that whereas in the 1950s politics were seen by the vast majority of Germans as a private matter, which was considered rather unseemly to talk about in society, by the 1980s it has become part of everyday discourse. In the early 1980s the respondents thought it was extremely important that one can take part in discussion and express criticism. It led the sociologists Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Edgar Piel to conclude that politics in the 1980s could be understood better as a "correlate of social communication."[364]

Additionally, in the 1980s observers noted the growing concern for the society's future both among young people and adults. In 1983 Werner Fuchs conceptualized this transformation in the following manner: "The way in which life in society is experienced in terms of time has undergone a radical transformation in the last few decades; the relationship between future and present has fundamentally changed. Instead of immeasurability open future – as was still conceived of during the 1950s – future now only seems to exist as a function of present-day decisions. […] This new experience of time then spread definitively in the course of the ecological discussion that started in the early 1970s. […] Future possibilities, indeed the possibility of a future at all, becomes dependent upon measures and developments of today. The future becomes present. According to the new patterns of experience of time, future is 'not decided in the future, but today: it is becoming more and more a force field incorporating irreversible processes, which are caused and allowed every day in society.'"[365]

As previously shown, in post-Soviet Russia there was no similar growth of citizens' engagement in political life except for a short period largely in the last Soviet years. Since then, the overall civic activity has seen a substantial decline. In explaining this trend the relevance of such variables as *income, status* and *education* in relation to the Russian case can further be tested.

In fact, in the last decade Russia has seen considerable increase by some of these variables. In the first instance, from 1992 to 2005 the number of university

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[363] Ibid.

[364] *Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth; Piel, E.* (Hrsg.) Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1978 – 1983, Band VIII. München, 1983. p. 122.

[365] *Fuchs, Werner*. Jugendliche Statuspassage oder individualisierte Jugendbiographie? // Soziale Welt 34, 1983. pp. 341-71.

students in Russia almost tripled, growing from 2.7 to 6.8 million.[366] Russia's economy after the 1998 financial crisis, when the government defaulted on foreign debts and the national currency collapsed, has also been expanding steadily. Since 2000, mainly due to the increase in oil and gas prices, the economy made real gains of an average 7 percent per year, which allowed the World Bank to declare in 2007 that the Russian economy had achieved "unprecedented macroeconomic stability."[367]

Furthermore, income growth in post-1998 crisis period, although was much more modest than in the postwar Federal Republic, but still noticeable. Since 2000 real incomes in Russia more than doubled while poverty halved. The proportion of population living below the poverty line decreased from 30 percent in 2000 to 14 percent in 2008. In the period between 2000 and 2008 the average wage increased from 2,200 rubles ($90) to 12,500 rubles ($500), and the average pension, from 823 rubles ($33) to 3,500 rubles ($140). Most importantly, wages and benefits have been growing faster than inflation (by 20 -25 percent in 2007).[368]

Nevertheless, despite the visible increase in all the abovementioned variables, Russia did not see a significant increase of civic activity. The question arises: Why the social change in Russia has not occurred and what were the impediments on the way of change?

The major problem lies, as it appears, in the fact that the post-Soviet system in Russia was neither considerably changed, nor modernized. Starting with the early 1990s scholars have pointed to the fact that the new Russian system was characterized not by institutional differentiation and strengthening of democratic institutions but by the prevalence of clientelism and corruption.

Initially used to explain hierarchical patron-client relationships in traditional rural societies, the concept of *clientelism* has been often used to characterize entire political systems, based non on formal, depersonalized, modern institutions, but on quite unequal, hierarchical, clientelist relations. Clientelism represents a form of personal, dyadic exchange usually characterized

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[366] Diplomnyj shirpotreb. Peregrev rynka vysshego obrazovanija snizhaet ego kachestvo // Kommersant, № 34 (3365), 28 February 2006.

[367] In 2000: 10 percent, 2001: 5.7 percent, 2002: 4.9 percent, 2003: 7.3 percent, 2004: 7.2 percent, 2005: 6.5 percent, 2006: 7.7 percent, 2007: 8.1 percent, 2008: 5.6 percent. See *Rozhnov, Konstantin. Russia attracts investors despite its image* // BBC News, 30 November, 2007.

[368] Russia's Economy under Vladimir Putin: Achievements and Failures // RIA Novosti, 1 March, 2008.

by a sense of obligation, and often also by an unequal balance of power between those involved.[369]

If political modernization refers to the processes of differentiation of political structure and secularization of political culture which enhance the capacity – the effectiveness and efficiency of performance – of a political system, informal systems of clientelism and patrimonialism, it is argued, are "key contributors to stifling popular participation, subverting the rule of law, fostering corruption, distorting the delivery of public services, discouraging investment and undermining economic progress."[370]

Although clientelism takes on a variety of forms, according to Robert Kaufman's definition it always manifests the following characteristics: (1) the relationship occurs between actors of unequal power and status; (2) it is based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, it is a self-regulating form of interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of which depends on the return that each actor expects to obtain by rendering goods and services to each other and which ceases once the expected rewards fail to materialize; (3) the relationship is particularistic and private, anchored only loosely in public law or community norms.[371]

The prevalence of clientelism in the Russian post-Soviet system was noted and examined in the works by Tatiana Vorozheikina (1994), Mikhail Afanasiev (1997), Thomas Rigby (1998), Lilia Shevtsova (2002), Karine Clément (2008), and other observers.

In this regards the scholars have generally underscored the impressive historical continuities in Russia. David W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith summarized these findings, stating that the Russian tsars ruled through grants of property to the nobility and this practice carried over to the Soviet period. The Soviet system was marked by hierarchical chains of dependence between party leaders and their underlings. Reliable *apparatchiks* were rewarded with preferred access to consumer goods and perquisites such as vacation homes and better

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[369] *Eisenstadt, Shmuel; Roniger, Luis.* Patrons, Clients and Friends. Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. p. 48-49. *Piattoni, Simona* (ed.) Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001. *Piattoni, Simona.* Clientelismo. Scambio, sistema, strategia. Unpublished manuscript, University of Trento, 2004.

[370] The Sociology Guide at <www.sociologyguide.com/political-modernization/index.php>. *Brinkerhoff, David W.; Goldsmith, Arthur A.* Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming. Prepared for U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Democracy and Governance under Strategic Policy and Institutional Reform. December 2002.

[371] *Kaufman, Robert R.* The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-Politics: Prospects and Problems // Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 16, № 4, 1974. pp. 284-308. *Brinkerhoff, David W.; Goldsmith, Arthur A.* Op. cit. p. 3.

schools. This legacy of patrimonial rule also continued to shape public administration in the post-communist era, for example in the appointment of business "oligarchs" (in fact former members of the Soviet *nomeklatura*) to key positions in Moscow, and in the attitudes and behaviors of Russian civil servants toward citizens.[372]

The scholars underscored that in neo-patrimonial systems bureaucrats' allegiance focuses upwards toward their superiors who can reward them and, as a result, the state exists to serve the rulers, not the ruled. Consequently, a service orientation toward citizens is not simply absent, it is a foreign concept. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith have stressed this prevalence of the old patrimonial attitudes among present-day Russian civil servants.[373]

According to Tatiana Vorozheikina, "the undermining of *nomenklatura* patron-client relations at the outset of the democratization process has regenerated itself throughout the polity and will long be one principle determinant."[374] The researcher has argued that "access to government property has become one of the prime forms of payment in patron-client networks" and that "by privatizing government property into the hand of politically loyal groups and individuals, political figures both widen their political base and create an entirely new legally unhindered economic base of the future."[375] Notably, Vorozheikina pointed to an ideological justification for the growth of corruption invented by the new commercial and government elites who actually justified corruption as a quick path to the formation of middle class owners, who in theory would support economic reforms.[376]

As previously noted, the 1993 Constitution in Russia actually established an authoritarian presidential regime which concentrated real power within the presidential structures. As a result, using Vorozheikina's formulation, "organizational chaos and the presence of competing groups within the ever-expanding ranks of the president's subordinates increased the significance of patron-client relations as the system's only structural factor."[377]

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[372] *Brinkerhoff, David W.; Goldsmith, Arthur A.* Op. cit. p. 3.

[373] Ibid. See also *LaFraniere, Sharon.* Russia Pushes Reform of Soviet-Era Civil Service: Aides to Putin Say Corrupt, Ineffective Bureaucracy Stifles Country's Economic Advancement // Washington Post, 15 July, 2002. p. A-13.

[374] *Vorozheikina, Tatiana.* Clientelism and the Process of Political Democratization in Russia. In: *Roniger, Luis; Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe.* Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994. p. 118.

[375] Ibid. p. 114.

[376] Ibid.

[377] Ibid. p. 117.

Communist Party bosses, who had access to state property and government funds, quickly figured out ways to take advantage of the economic reforms. Privatization of state-owned companies turned into deals for government allies who picked up public assets at bargain prices and deregulation of capital accounts made it easier to ship ill-gotten wealth abroad. According to Joel Hellman, leaders of the countries plagued by clientelism tend to exploit market distortions during the early stages of the transition to capitalism, siphon off the gains, and then block further reforms that would undermine their special advantages.[378] That is what actually took place in post-Soviet Russia.

The superpresidentialism combined with nondivision of state and property actually led here to privatization of state property by the former *nomenklatura* and to formation of nationwide pyramids of patrons and clients. Therefore, social status which taps the position or rank of a person or group within the society in post-Soviet Russia was generally not earned by one's own achievements (by which modern societies are characterized), but turned out to be of a hierarchic origin: people appeared in the stratification system by their loyalty or kinship (which reminded more of ascribed status in traditional societies).

During the years of the Putin rule, as Lilia Shevtsova observed, "the shady structures and client-patronage relations that had prevailed in Russian politics during the 1990s, the merger of power and money, the lack of transparency in decision-making, and the increase in favoritism and nepotism led to the formation of oligarchic capitalism with criminal overtones and the distortion of the market."[379] The Putin's fight against *oligarchs* led to culmination of interests and property formerly 'divided' between several *oligarchs* with the Kremlin administration creating a corporatist state.

Evidently, in a similar situation it would be naïve to expect from high status Russians – both bureaucrats and businessmen, – whose position and wealth equally depend not on their personal achievements, but primarily on loyalty to their patrons, much independence, critical stance and civic activity.

Such improbability is confirmed by the preliminary results of the Research Development Initiative *Particularities of Power in the Post-Soviet Context: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Studies of Bureaucracy*, based on the interviews with Russian bureaucrats. The sociologist Karine Clément, analyzing these results in

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[378] *Brinkerhoff, David W.; Goldsmith, Arthur A.* Op. cit. p. 26. *Hellman, Joel.* Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-communist Transitions // World Politics, Vol. 50, № 2, 1998. pp. 203-34.

[379] *Shevtsova, Lilia.* The Political Dimension of Economic Reform under Vladimir Putin: Obstacles, Pitfalls, and Opportunities // NBR Analysis, Vol. 13, № 2, 2002.

2008, concluded: "In their interpersonal relationships, bureaucrats seem to observe the rule according to which the most important condition to secure one's position in the hierarchy is to demonstrate loyalty to the persons one is dependent on (business groups or power groups). This appears to be the only constraint; all other things are permitted, including breaking the law (provided this is not too overt). Another interesting point is that one can exercise power as one wishes so long as the appearances of democracy and loyalty to the higher power are respected; the form of behavior counts more than its content. If these two principles (strong subordination and observance of appearances) are violated, punishment will follow, generally by being fired, from time to time by being subject to juridical or tax investigations, and less frequently by imprisonment."[380]

As for the business elites, the notorious case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former head of the Yukos oil company, whom civic activity and expressed independence cost his company and freedom, taught the Russia's most rich a clear lesson. After the president of the largest Russian enterprise was convicted on tax and fraud charges and imprisoned in a Siberian penal colony while his company was dismantled the representatives of the Russian businesses are likely to beware of getting involved in any independent political or civic activities.[381]

Unlike postwar Germany where affluence and educational level appeared core factors of societal change, the structure of post-Soviet society revealed an opposite picture. The recent opinion polls in Russia have shown that the younger and the better-educated cohorts reveal the highest levels of conformism and compliance. To illustrate, during the March 2010 regional elections the ruling United Russia (*Yedinaya Rossia*) party was supported by the youngest, the most well-to-do and high status voters. It was voted, for instance, by 84 percent of the 18-14 year old age group, by 65 percent of respondents with high education, and by 67 percent of the large cities' dwellers.[382]

As we have seen, the nature of status and income in Russia, being essentially unmodern and anti-modern, could not (and still cannot) contribute to the country's modernization and democratization. It leads us to conclude that such factors as – *income*, *status* and *education* – acquire relevance only in case of modernization of the political system and social relations and formation of the framework of formal, depersonalized and functioning institutions within which

[380] *Clément, Karine.* New Social Movements in Russia: A Challenge to the Dominant Model of Power Relationships? // Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 24, № 1, March 2008. pp. 68 – 89.

[381] See *Rozhnov, Konstantin.* Russia Attracts Investors Despite its Image // BBC News, 30 November, 2007.

[382] Public Opinion in 2010. The Levada Analytical Center data.

citizens can freely express their views, articulate their interests, and achieve co-jointly their common goals.

Differently, it is rather an institutional context which structures income and status formation that matters not income and status *per se*. Using Ralf Dahrendorf's formulation, "Not prosperity as such, but the type of individual participation in its advantages is a source of anti-totalitarian strength, because it is categorically opposed to the notion of planning every step of life and regards "the whole" as a marketlike, unplanned co-ordination of individual wishes."[383] In a system where status and income are determined by one's place in a hierarchy, or in 'a vertical of power,' such an 'unplanned coordination' is likely to become an improbable occurrence.

3.4.3 Educational Reforms

In this section I will address the changes in secondary and higher education in the two analyzed cases.

According to Gert-Joachim Glässner, the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and the obligation of the Western Allies to 'reeducate' the German people laid the very basis for a democratic Germany. Glässner argued (and it is hard not to agree with his view), that even if compliance had little if anything to do with firm convictions, it opened a starting point down the road to democracy.[384]

Indeed, in the early postwar period, "reeducation became a catchall term, a synecdoche for the occupation in general."[385] The Western allies and especially the United States were highly committed to an extensive program of reeducation designed to change German political values and attitudes so that the formal democratic institutions established after the war, in contrast to those of Weimar Republic, would have widespread popular support.

General Lucius Clay later wrote in his memoirs, "…The reconstruction of German education meant that the Germans had to overcome both physical and spiritual devastation. Many German school buildings had been destroyed, others badly damaged, and still others were occupied either by troops or by displaced persons. Teaching staffs contained many ardent Nazis; in one city more than 60 percent of the teaching staff had belonged to the party. Textbooks were so

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[383] *Dahrendorf, Ralf.* Op. cit. p. 442.

[384] *Glässner, Gert-Joachim.* German Democracy: From Post World War II to Present Day. Berg Publishers, 2005. pp. 166-67.

[385] *Fisher, Jaimey.* Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation, and Reconstruction after the Second World War. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2007. p. 15.

impregnated with Nazi ideology that even mathematics problems were expressed in military terms and logistics. German youth learned to add and subtract guns and bullets rather than apples and oranges."[386]

Democratizing the defeated Reich was among the essential war aims of the Allies who mentioned it in the Potsdam Agreement as a general, but distant task for the future. The reeducation program included the removal of active Nazis from teaching positions, major changes in the school system as well as a massive nationwide campaign of political education designed to reach Germans at every age and socioeconomic level.[387] In theory at least, "reeducation entailed the most extensive plan in recorded history to induce rapid cultural change in an entire population."[388]

As it appears from various reports of that period, the Western and particularly American officials mostly feared the continuation of the authoritarian teacher figure in the West German classroom. Moreover, they shared the belief that education already long before Hitler had never been democratic. OMGUS educators and military officials alike realized that teacher training colleges would have to combat not only the legacy of National Socialism, but the ideas of *Kaiserreich* educators that dominated pre-1918 German schools, stifling the growth of independent thinking, critical observation, and participatory practices, and carried by many older teachers through the Weimar Republic and into the Third Reich.[389]

So, OMGUS officials illustrated their ideal of the democratic teacher in widely-circulated publications on how the German educator should perform within the classroom. No longer should a teacher be seen as an authoritarian figure that lorded over his class for, as the US officials believed, this reinforced the tendency of Germans to respect strong leadership and to obey and fear the leader. Likewise, the teacher should not be seen as a representative of the state, as Germans were also believed to put the state before the individual.[390]

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[386] *Clay, Lucius D.* Decision in Germany. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1970. p. 299.

[387] *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. p. 213.

[388] *Merritt, Anna J.; Merritt, Richard L.* (eds.) 1970. Op. cit.

[389] *Puaca, Brian Michael.* Drafting Democracy: Education Reform in American-Occupied Germany, 1945-1949 // Carolina Papers "Democracy and Human Rights," №. 2, Fall 2001. p. 34. See also *Bookbinder, Paul.* Weimar Germany: The Republic of the Reasonable. New York: Manchester University Press, 1996. p. 11.

[390] *Puaca, Brian Michael.* Op. cit. See also "A Summary Statement of Military Government Regulations and Directives Relating to School Reform," undated, p. 1; Records Relating Primarily to Cultural Exchange and School Reopenings, 1945-49; Records of the Education Branch; Records of the Education and Cultural Affairs Division; Records of the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone; Records of the U.S. Occupation Headquarters, WWII, RG 260; NACP.

American military officials published suggestions in professional teacher publications outlining how teachers should instruct young Germans in the ways of democracy: "The theoretical knowledge of all events in democratic states is not enough, even if it is essential; it must be completed through deep-rooted habits as well as through corresponding attitudes. These habits and these attitudes can only be achieved through long-standing experience and participation in group work of democratic character and through the development of individuality, self-confidence, and initiative in every detail. It belongs to the realm of the school to offer as many opportunities as possible in order to offer experiences which lead to this goal."[391]

OMGUS officials regarded active participation in democratic practices as critical to the successful adoption of democratic ideals and encouraged the integration of such practices into the classroom.[392] Suggestions for explicit ways by which the German teacher could incorporate democracy into the classroom included debates, parliamentary practice, class elections, student clubs, school newspapers, and daily questions to the teacher. In addition to establishing democratic practices that the Americans deemed fundamental, these proposals would also erode the position of the teacher as authoritarian power, a holdover from the pre-WWI period. These changes were meant to ensure that the nationalistic authoritarian teachers of previous times would not return to German classrooms. Instead, the new teacher-student relations would be an indispensable component of postwar German democracy.[393]

OMGUS officials also tried to stress social studies in the education of both German students and teachers by suggesting that "emphasis should be given to the attainments of democratic modes of living."[394] As noted above, they provided German educators with examples of democratic in-class practices (such as class

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[391] *Puaca, Brian Michael.* Op. cit. pp. 22-23. See also Erziehungsabteilung der Militärregierung des Landes Hessen, "Zwanzig Vorschläge für Gemeinschaftskunde" // Der deutsche Lehrer 5, 1947. p. 49.

[392] These "democratic practices," in many cases, fall under the term social studies, which the Americans encouraged German teachers to adopt. The American understanding of a classroom work was based, primarily, on the writings by John Dewey. For Dewey, the classroom was a miniature community in which the child learned cooperation and participation (democracy) through group work. See, for example, *Dewey, John.* Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916. pp. 100-02.

[393] *Puaca, Brian Michael.* Op. cit. p. 23.

[394] Ibid. See also "A Summary Statement of Military Government Regulations and Directives Relating to School Reform," undated, p. 1; Records Relating Primarily to Cultural Exchange and School Reopenings, 1945-49; Records of the Education Branch; Records of the Education and Cultural Affairs Division; Records of the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone; Records of the U.S. Occupation Headquarters, WWII, RG 260; NACP.

elections, debates, etc.) in hopes of encouraging similar types of activities in German classrooms. Expanding on this understanding of social studies, other officials believed social studies to be synonymous with democratic cooperation. They envisioned teachers working toward this goal in three ways: through direct participation in such activities; by observation of activities of the community in which there is evidence, or lack of evidence, of democratic cooperation; and by directed study of democratic cooperation and the subsequent analysis, evaluation and utilization of these practices under the leadership of democratic teachers.[395]

As a result of instituting a two-fold process of removal and renewal (or simultaneous denazification and teacher training), OMGUS wielded substantial control over the elementary teaching profession. While it is true that many Germans were frustrated with what they believed to be a flawed denazification process, these efforts proved to be beneficial to German education long after 1945. The crucial determinant of the postwar renewal in the field of secondary education was the removal of truly devoted Nazis from Germany's classrooms.[396]

Importantly, OMGUS authorities also motivated German educators to rewrite the existing school textbooks, having devised the criteria for textbook evaluation at the outset of the Occupation. American education officials, who evaluated each book based on objectives, accuracy, student maturity and interests, ease of comprehension, relating of learning experiences, learning activities, study aids, and illustrations, benefited thus the highly important textbooks renewal.[397]

Despite significant resistance to these changes from the majority of German citizens, including teachers, the impact of the Occupation in the sphere of educational reform was no less significant than in the other realms of social life. Although not much change occurred during and after the Occupation, the important change in the school system did eventually take place in the mid-1960s when the efforts of the Western Allies united with the endeavors of democratic-oriented German educators started giving fruit. Since that time-point the

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[395] "Methods of Teaching Democratic Cooperation in Elementary and Secondary Schools," p. 8; Records Relating Primarily to Cultural Exchange and School Reopenings, 1945-49; Records of the Education Branch. Records of the Education and Cultural Affairs Division; RG 260; NACP. In: *Puaca, Brian Michael.* Op. cit. p. 46.

[396] *Puaca, Brian Michael.* Op. cit. p. 26.

[397] "General Criteria for Use in the Evaluation of Textbooks and Manuscripts Submitted for Publication as Textbooks for Use in German Schools," December 1947; Records Related to Education, 1945-1948; Records of the Education Branch; Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division; Records of the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone; Records of the U.S. Occupation Headquarters, WWII, RG 260; NACP.

observers began to note that the German schools generally rated independence and self-determination, the capability of discussion and critique in the classroom.

In his recent study of the West German postwar educational reforms Brian Puaca (2009) persuasively argued that long before the protest movements of the late 1960s, the West German educational system was undergoing meaningful reform from within. Although politicians and intellectual elites paid little attention to education after 1945, administrators, teachers, and pupils initiated significant changes in schools at the local level. The endeavors by these actors resulted in an array of democratic reforms that signaled a departure from the authoritarian and nationalistic legacies of the past. Puaca described the changes as follows: "Exchange programs inaugurated during the occupation expanded in the 1950s and provided Germans practical experience with the workings of democratic society. Student government and student newspapers offered pupils a wealth of opportunities to acquire personal experience with both the rights and responsibilities of those living in a democracy. A new generation of history and civics textbooks published in the 1950s introduced innovative pedagogical practices to the postwar classroom. Arguably even more important was the new conception of democratic citizenship that appeared in these volumes. The emergence of political education ensured that young Germans would gain a new conception of their role in Germany, as well as their relationship to other countries, regions, and peoples. Postwar training and continuing education courses for teachers improved their knowledge of new subject matter – such as recent history and political education – and also exposed them to innovative teaching methods that became increasingly commonplace in the schools. These postwar reforms indeed made German pupils and teachers alike more 'conscious of their rights and freedoms,' […] as well as of their responsibilities and duties as citizens."[398]

In the 1950s the system of civic and political education (*politische Bildung*) was introduced by the Federal Republic's government. Civic education refers to a wide system of public education and scientific socially-oriented research. This system, that became a vivid example of effective analysis and search for the ways of overcoming social problems, has covered schools and higher educational establishments, state, public and private organizations and foundations. They have carried out educational research and museum projects focusing on different age and social groups and dealing with acute historical, social and political problems. The integrating centre of this system has been the Federal Agency for Civic Education (*Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, BPB*), created in 1952 in the

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[398] *Puaca, Brian.* Learning Democracy: Education Reform in West Germany, 1945–1965. New York: Berghahn, 2009. p. 193-94.

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structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It has divisions on the local levels (*Landeszentrale für politische Bildung*) which fulfill large-scale education work aimed at popularizing democratic and liberal values as fundamentals of the German state and society. In the 1960s a subject "civic education" was introduced in West German high schools.

The BPB mission states: "Considering Germany's experience with various forms of dictatorial rule down through its history, the Federal Republic of Germany bears a unique responsibility for firmly anchoring values such as democracy, pluralism and tolerance in people's minds."[399] An important part of the BPB activity is the publication of the results of social, historical, political research. Besides, the BPB has been publishing a weekly newspaper *Das Parlament*, informing of the Bundestag and Bundesrat activities, of the German parliamentary life and political events in other countries.

German civic education institutions work in close cooperation with private foundations (many of them are also supported by the state) and the educational organizations which deal with problems of youth historical education and aim at prevention of extremism within the young people. Such work is conducted, among other organizations, by Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Volkswagen Foundation, etc.[400]

The system of civic education alongside with other endeavors in the educational field has certainly played an important role in the development of democratic political culture in Germany. To illustrate this trend, a 1971 ten-nation comparative study found out that students aged 10 to 14 in West Germany were more likely to report that their instructors encouraged independent expression in the classroom than their counterparts in such "classic" democracies as the USA, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Judith Torney and her associates also found that "civic education" teachers in the Federal Republic spent many hours in lesson preparation, emphasized political history, and willingly discussed many issues in class. West German students reported that expression of opinion in class was encouraged. The same study found that German respondents ranked higher in their support for democratic norms than students in the USA, the Netherlands, Finland, or Italy. Thus, the traditional

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[399] BPB Mission Statement at <http://www.bpb.de/die_bpb/PE8IKY,0,0,The_Federal_Agency_for_Civic_Education.html>

[400]*Smirnov, Dmitrij.* Opyt demokraticheskogo vospitanija v stranah Evropy (na primere politicheskogo obrazovanija Federativnoi Respubliki Germanii). <http://rusgermhist.ru/RusRaboti/RusSmirnov/Smirnovreportrus-2-01.htm>

emphasis upon the "authoritarian" German child-rearing style has become very difficult to support with empirical evidence.[401]

As for the German postwar higher education, after 1945 the Allied powers in the western occupation zones also had to confront the issues regarding the role of the university in the coming German democracy. In 1947, the British occupation authorities formed commissions of inquiry for university reform with German academic and community representation, and in the next year they presented their recommendations, the so-called *Schwalbinger* and *Hamburger Gutachten* (also known as the "Blue Report").[402] The British officials recommended (and the American allied authorities concurred with these aims) greater contact between the university and the public sphere, a form of general education to counter the specialization of research, and a greater emphasis on teaching.[403]

In 1948, the Free University was founded in West Berlin. The newly found university sought to realize Humboldt's ideal of a community of scholars by ensuring direct student representation on university decision-making bodies. It subsequently was referred to as the "Berlin model."[404]

The Blue Report and the "Berlin model," however, were initially rejected by the West German universities, which had soon regained administrative autonomy in accordance with the Allied policy. The German university, therefore, saw no fundamental structural reform practically for two postwar decades.[405] Among the reasons for the rejection of structural reform were the general preoccupation with repairing the physical damage to the buildings (according to experts' evaluations, some 60 percent of German university infrastructure was destroyed during the war), as well as considerable resistance

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[401] *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. p. 253. See also *Torney, Judith* et al. Civic Education in Ten Countries: An Empirical Study. International Studies in Evaluation VI. New York, Halsted Press, 1976. pp. 110, 221.

[402] *Moses, Dirk A.* German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. pp. 132-33. See also *Phillips, David.* Pragmatismus und Idealismus. Das "Blaue Gutachten" und die britische Hochschulpolitik in Deutschland bis 1948. Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 1995.

[403] See the comments of James M. Read, head of the Education Section of the American High Commission in Frankfurt in his "Wie steht es mit den Universitäten. Konservativer Lehrkoerper – Mangelender Kontakt mit der Oeffentlichekeit" // Deutsche Universitaets-Zeitung, Vol. 6, № 11, 1951. pp. 6–7.

[404] *Tent, James F.* The Free University of Berlin: A Political History. *Bloomington*: Indiana *University* Press, 1988.

[405] See *Robinsohn, Saul B., Kuhlman, Kaspar.* Two Decades of Non-Reform in West German Education. In: *Phillips, David* (ed.) Education in Germany: Tradition and Reform in Historical Context London and New York: Routledge, 1995.

of most professors who held dear the old ideals of their autonomy and distance to the world of politics and society.[406]

As the historian Waldemar Besson asserted in the late 1960s, "Immediately after 1945 the German university felt itself to have been one of Hitler's victims. It took time and hard thinking to realize that the German university belonged at least in part to the anti-democratic mainstream of German history, and that it carried a heavy responsibility for the rise of Nazism."[407]

In spite of the initial rejection of the Blue Report, the Allied powers' efforts were certainly not in vain. Konrad Jarausch later pointed, for instance, to a surprising success of the Western Allies' intellectual efforts in one area in particular, namely, in establishing the discipline of political science in the universities during the 1950s as a U.S.-oriented "science of democracy."

The occupation powers pressed for the resumption of this interrupted tradition in order to provide a kind of "driver's education for politics" that would nourish a more broadly based political education. The founding fathers of the new discipline, including Theodor Eschenburg and Eugen Kogon, were decided democrats who had been trained as jurists, historians, and journalists. Returning emigrants from the United States also played an important part in establishing the new discipline; these included the conservative Arnold Bergsträsser in Freiburg, who strove to develop a scholarly basis for responsible citizenship, and the liberal Ernst Fränkel at the Free University of Berlin, the author of an analysis of the dual character of the Nazi dictatorship who wanted to see German democracy follow Western models. Jarausch concluded that, "With the methodological turn of the second generation toward behavioral science and quantification, the social science reclaimed their connection to the international standards established by American researchers and continued to serve as conduits of Western ideals."[408]

Besides that, the Allied recommendations became an important starting point for many German intellectuals who shared the belief in importance of the suggested ideas. In fact, some younger scholars were not content with the state of affairs in the postwar German university. Student leaders were particularly concerned about the restorative policies of university management and about the failure of a "new beginning" in the 1940s; they regretted the lack of fundamental reform, criticized the university's reversion to an apolitical posture and insisted on the implementation of the reforms recommended by the Blue Report, namely,

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[406] See, for instance, *Tellenbach, Gerd.* Zur Selbstorientierung der deutschen Universität // Die Sammlung, 1, 1945–46. pp. 530–43.

[407] *Besson, Waldemar.* Letter to the editor of *Minerva* // Minerva, Vol. 6, № 4. Summer 1968. pp. 614–17.

[408] *Jarausch, Konrad H.* Op. cit. p. 121.

an orientation to social praxis, communication of scholarship to the public, and adult education.[409]

Among those who advocated the reform were political scientists Hans Heigert, Peter van Oertzen and Wolfgang Abendroth, a leftist Roman Catholic and later director of the Institute for Political Education in Tutzing Manfred Hättich, an editor of the Deutsche Universitäts-Zeitung and a journalist Ivo Frenzel, professor of education in Tübingen Andreas Flitner, university professor and federal director of the SDS from 1952 to 1955 Hans Tietgens, the Frankfurt legal historian Herman Coing, the author Helmut Becker, the sociologist and university professor Ralf Dahrendorf, and one of the future most influential sociologists and social philosophers Jürgen Habermas.

For instance, Peter van Oertzen already in 1948 attacked the old ideal of detachment claiming that "otherworldliness and specialized narrowness, irresponsibility, and to some extent even dangerous political retardedness dominate in the academic world so much that one cannot expect a self-purification." He called for the social engagement in the same terms as the Blue Report.[410]

The older generation of intellectuals, like Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Karl Jaspers, Arnold Gehlen, Carlo Schmid, Arnold Bergsträsser, also shared this concern about the end of humanism in an "administered world," notwithstanding their own ideological differences.[411]

During the late 1950s, Habermas and his Frankfurt colleagues Ludwig von Friedeburg, Christoph Oehler, and Friedrich Welz undertook surveys of student political attitudes in order to test their democratic political orientation. The survey results, which were published and interpreted in the well-known book *Student und Politik*, showed that the traditional apolitical culture of 'pure knowledge' and *Bildung* had continued largely unchanged since the war.[412] It was precisely this apolitical concentration on private virtues by non-Nazi scholars

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[409] See *Moses, Dirk A.* German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

[410] *Oertzen, Peter von.* Reform vor Autonomie // Goettinger Universitäts-Zeitung, № 6, 1948. p. 5.

[411] *Gehlen, Arnold.* Man in the Age of Technology (English translation by Patricia Lipscomb) New York, 1980; *Schmid, Carlo.* Mensch und Technik. Die sozialen und kulturellen Probleme der zweiten industriellen Revolution. Bonn, 1956; *Bergstraesser, Arnold.* Die Technik und das Kulturproblem des 20. Jahrhunderts, 1959. In his Politik in Wissenschaft und Bildung, 2nd ed. Freiburg, 1966. pp. 142–58; *Horkheimer, Max; Adorno, Theodor W.* Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans. by John Cummingsl Boston, 1971. *Jaspers, Karl; Ernst, Fritz.* Vom Lebendigen Geist der Universität / Vom Studieren. Heidelberg; Lambert Schneider, 1946. English translation: *Jaspers, Karl.* The Idea of the University. London: Peter Owen, 1960. [1944].

[412] *Habermas, Jürgen* et al. Student und Politik. Eine soziologische Untersuchung zum politischen Bewußtsein Frankfurter Studenten. Neuwied and Berlin, 1961.

and students, coupled with a traditional German anticommunism, that had rendered the Weimar university so vulnerable to National Socialism. The authors found that a majority of West German students were not particularly committed to democracy, and they doubted whether the students would defend republican institutions were antidemocratic forces to rise again. The students, Friedeburg concluded, had drawn no implications from the country's experience with National Socialism; they were hostages of "consumer coercion" and were beguiled by the "culture industry." Habermas observed that many students held pragmatic, potentially authoritarian political views devoid of "utopian impulses." It was necessary, therefore, for education to take a "critical" stand.[413]

The major debate on the role of university occurred between Jürgen Habermas and those who sided with his view that educational institutions should unite theory and practice and his opponents, primarily, the social philosopher, the secretary of state for education in the Social Democratic administration in Northrhine-Westphalia between 1966 and 1969 Hermann Lübbe, who advanced an idea of the separation of theory and practice.

In the height of the education debate in the mid-1960s, the federal chancellor Ludwig Erhard proclaimed education expansion and access a priority of his inaugural speech in 1963. In the same year, the Max Planck Institute for Education Research (*Max Planck Institut für Bildungsforschung*) was established in West Berlin. By that time critical of the present state of the German university were intellectuals from different ideological camps.

In 1965 Ralf Dahrendorf who held at that time an advisory post on education policy with the Baden-Württemberg and who had participated in the development of the reform conceptions stated that "the lack of experimental attitude and the distrust of common sense may be called causes of hierarchical stagnation of the German university."[414] Dahrendorf was convinced that "the absence of institutionalized liberal procedures in the academic sphere is one of the structural obstacles to liberal democracy in Germany."[415]

In the University General Plan of 1967 Dahrendorf proposed a "differentiated comprehensive university" that would integrate all existing institutions of higher education into a unified system, divided into a "short study" of three years, and a "long study" for a smaller number of qualified candidates for whom traditional research and teaching would be guaranteed.

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[413] *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. pp. 128-30. *Friedeburg, Ludwig von.* Zum Verhältnis von Jugend and Gesellschaft. In: *Friedeburg, Ludwig von.* (ed.) Jugend in der modernen Gesellschaft. Cologne, 1966. p. 184; *Habermas, Jürgen.* Zum Einfluß von Schul- und Hochschulbildung auf das politische Bewußtsein von Studenten. In: Ibid., p. 430.

[414] *Dahrendorf, Ralf.* Op. cit. p. 163.

[415] Ibid.

The latter was partly realized in 1966 in the new University of Constance, a small research-focused institution of three thousand students without professional faculties, based on the natural and social sciences.[416]

This idea, however, was criticized by Habermas who believed that the rigid stratification of courses of study and cap of four years, as was the case in many Anglophone universities, would prevent the "healthy problematization" of academic questions that cultivated critically minded students and which was "politically necessary." West Germany, he argued, could not afford to copy other countries until it had learned to master the practical consequences of technical progress.[417]

When in 1966 the Council of Science and Humanities (*Wissenschaftsrat*) presented a set of recommendations (very similar, in fact, to the reform conceptions of Dahrendorf and Lübbe), which sought to limit study to four years of regimented courses with an automatic cancellation of student enrollment after that time, not only the conservative *Rektorenkonferenz* opposed them for their alleged infringement of academic freedom and pedagogization of undergraduate teaching, but also students, especially at the Free University in Berlin, actively joined the debate.[418] They opposed the recommendations for precisely the same reason, denouncing it as "technocratic" university reform. This was on the eve of what later would be called "1968-movement."[419]

It is worth mentioning that among German intellectuals who contributed to the debate on the role of university in the postwar period were Wolfgang Abendroth, Theodor Adorno, Helmut Becker, Arnold Bergsträsser, Waldemar Besson, Hermann Coing, Ralf Dahrendorf, Andreas Flitner, Ivo Frenzel, Hans Freyer, Arnold Gehlen, Jürgen Habermas, Manfred Hättich, Hans Heigert, Wilhelm Hennis, Werner Hoffmann, Max Horkheimer, Karl Jaspers, Hermann Lübbe, Peter van Oertzen, Friedrich Meinecke, Helmut Schelsky, Carlo Schmid, Eduard Spranger, Gerd Tellenbach, Hans Tietgens, Ernst Topisch, and many

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[416] *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. p. 157. See also Ralf Dahrendorf's interview with *Der Spiegel* (October 9, 1967), pp. 54–62.

[417] *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. p. 158. See also *Habermas, Jürgen.* Zwangsjacke für die Studienreform. Die befristete Immaktrikulation und der falsche Pragmatismus des Wissenschaftsrates // Der Monat, 18. November 1966, pp. 7–19. Reprinted in his *Hochschulreform und Protestbewegung*, Frankfurt, 1969. pp. 92–107.

[418] *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. p. 157. *Schöne, Wolfgang.* Universität oder Berufsschule? // Der Monat, 18, December 1966. pp. 38–46. See also his Kampf um die deutsche Universität. Hamburg, 1966; *Kloss, Günter.* University Reform in West Germany. The Burden of Tradition // Minerva, Vol. 6, № 3, Spring 1968. pp. 323–53.

[419] *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. pp. 157-58.

other influential educators, writers, journalists, political scientists and social philosophers.[420]

As in postwar Germany, the transformations launched in the Soviet society in the mid-1980s, certainly, could not leave the Russian education system untouched. Political conditions for education reforms in Russia after the *perestroika* period were indeed quite favorable.

The processes of selection and financing of textbooks in the 1990s were considerably decentralized becoming the responsibility of the regions and schools were granted a significant amount of autonomy and independence. The change of the political climate and orientation towards democratic values, development of a dynamic and competitive textbook market after 1991 (Kaplan et al. 1999; Maier 2005), an urgent need for better quality textbooks, as well as an open information climate could provide an important impulse for renewal.

However, these positive factors were again not taken advantage of in the post-Soviet Russia. Russian school was reformed neither in terms of content, nor in terms of methods of teaching. One of the main obstacles on the way of change became, as it appears, precisely the preservation of old methods of teaching, not seldom dogmatic and authoritarian. As the group of observers focusing on the introduction of modern pedagogical methods in Russian schools concluded in their 1995 report: "Essentially authoritarian treatment of pupils has very little changed and unproductive methods of teaching are still dominating."[421]

Similar conclusion was made in the empirical research of history teaching in high schools of the Yaroslavl' province performed in 1992 by the group of the British experts. Describing the teaching methods in Russian schools, the authors of the report stated: "There is little or no involvement of the pupils in the process of a discipline. This has a number of limiting results: There is little or no problem solving. We saw no evidence of pupils undertaking tasks which required them to reach conclusions through their own investigations. Learning was of a passive receptive kind – the transmission model. There is little or no pupil discussion at any level. The absence of oral work outside the answering of teacher questions and declaiming is striking. There is little or no attempt to differentiate tasks to meet the needs of able and slower learning pupils."[422]

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[420] For the details of the debate see *Moses, Dirk A.* German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. pp. 131-59.

[421] *Majer, Robert.* Sily demokratizatsii v Rossii. Prepodavanie istorii i podgotovka shkol'nyh uchebnikov // Rossija i Germanija na puti k antitotalitarnomu soglasiju. Moscow: IVI RAN, 2000. p. 218.

[422] *Nichol, Jon.* The Russia/Yaroslavl' Primary History Project // International Society for History Didactics: Information. Vol. 17, № 2, 1996. p. 121.

In 1995 Vladimir Barabanov and Piotr Baranov also concluded regarding the advancement of modern pedagogical methods that, "The basic authoritarian nature with which students are treated has frequently changed very little while unproductive teaching methods continue to prevail."[423] Within this context the observers also mentioned the traditional "glorification of teachers as knowledge bearers," which blocked the transfer of more student-oriented teaching methods.

In the following chapter I will focus more on the problems of the school education content in relation to history teaching. I would like to finish this section by making some comments of the higher education situation in post-Soviet Russia. In this regards it should be first pointed out that in Russia there was no intellectual debate on the role of university similar to the one that had taken place in postwar Germany. As a result, post-Soviet higher educational establishments preserved many features of their Soviet-time predecessors (and arguably in some respects even worsened them).

The situation with social sciences in Russia also considerably differed from the German case. Formally social sciences such as sociology, political science and culturology have been taught at Russian universities since the late 1980s. These disciplines were 'legalized' in the Soviet Union following the reduction of the Communist Party's control over the government in 1988 as well as Gorbachev's 1989 decision to allow other political associations coexist with the CPSU. These processes resulted in abolishment of Article 6 of the Constitution on the guiding role of the CPSU on 14 March, 1990. Ten years later (by early 2000s) more than 100 sociology and 300 political science departments functioned at Russian universities across the country.

However, unlike West Germany where the denazification process had effectively rooted out Nazi influence and ideology at universities by removing an average of 30-50 percent of Nazis from the faculty, in post-Soviet Russia the faculty and staff of higher educational establishments mostly remained intact.[424]

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[423] *Barabanov, Vladimir; Baranov, Piotr.* Geschichte als Lehrfach im heutigen Bildungssystem Rußlands // Beiträge zur historischen Sozialkunde, Vol. 26, № 2, 1996. p. 78.

[424] For example, by the September of 1946, 138 instructors and assistants (96 and 46 respectively) of one of the leading German Heidelberg University had been dismissed. This number amounted to just over half (51.1 percent) of the 270 members of the teaching staff listed at Heidelberg in the summer of 1944. See: Office of Military Government, Land Württemberg-Baden, Annual Report, August 19, 1946, NARA, RG 260, Records of the Education and Civil-Religious Affairs Division, Box 916, File: "Higher Institutions of Learning (Reports in English)."; *Remy, Steven P.* The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification *of a* German University. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. p. 152. At another German University - University of Göttingen - the first two years of denazification resulted in the removal/dismissal of 28 percent tenured faculty (29 of 102) and 34 percent of junior faculty and academic assistants suffered dismissal.

Former instructors of Marxism-Leninism, scientific communism, history of the CPSU, scientific atheism, socialism, political economy, dialectic materialism (diamat), etc. were quickly turned into sociologists, political scientists, culturologists, psychologists, and PR specialists, and a little bit later - into political strategists and experts on political PR and advertising. Thus the people who formerly constituted the Soviet educational *nomenklatura* gained control over the process of teaching social sciences at universities in the post-Soviet period. Managing academic institutions and university departments, these functionaries defined the nature of professional reproduction, selection of graduate students and junior faculty, as well as learning themes and objectives.

As the former instructors of Marxism-Leninism and dialectical materialism started teaching political sciences, sociology and culturology (especially in provincial universities), their distorted understanding of the role, ends and structure of social sciences was unavoidably imposed on the learning process. It is noteworthy that political and social sciences departments became focused, primarily, on preparation of marketing, advertising, PR specialists, political consultants, and so on. At the same time no courses on democratic theory and democratization have been virtually taught at universities' social science departments. Even those social science faculties and programs that tried to conform to international standards of teaching continued to exhibit the flaws lingering from the Soviet model of higher education. Firstly, there have been extremely rigid institutional barriers between different departments and branches as interdisciplinary relationships and forms of education remained weakly developed. Besides, there has been an overall gap between research and teaching of social sciences. The latter was already enshrined in the institutional division of research institutions, on the one hand, and universities, on the other.[425] Evidently, without structural transformation of the Russian school and university, further changes in these key social institutions transmitting values and norms appear unlikely.

See: *Schneider, Ullrich.* Zur Entnazifizierung der Hochschullehrer in Niedersachsen 1945-1949 // Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte, 61, 1989, pp. 325-46.

[425] See *Gudkov, Lev.* O polozhenii social'nyh nauk v Rossii (On the State of Social Sciences in Russia) // Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, № 77, 2006. *Laruelle, Marlene.* The Discipline of Culturology: A New "Ready-made Thought" for Russia? // Diogenes, № 204, 2004. pp. 21-36.

3.3 Conclusions

In this chapter we have focused on political orientations of citizens of Russia and Germany as we tried to analyze the changes that took place (if they did) on the level of political culture in the two countries.

As we have seen, despite a rather protracted period of citizens' apathy and non-participation, West German political culture has experienced a gradual turn away from authoritarian patterns of thought to a tentative embrace of democratic values. The gradual increase in political interest and political discussion, in political efficacy, general trust, and, eventually, political participation, finally occurred with the most drastic increase by practically all analyzed variables taking place in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These changes have coincided with (or, arguably, were caused by) the emergence of, first, the highly active protest student movement of the 1968, second, thousands of civic initiative groups across the country, and, subsequently, the new social movements of the 1970s-1980s: the environmental, the anti-nuclear energy, the women's, and the peace movement. It is important to point out that though making of a liberal, modern Germany is usually understood as a top-down process − guided by the Allies and the country's founding fathers, but processes from below were equally, if not more crucial in transforming German society.[426]

In fact, the opposite situation was found in post-Soviet Russia where the wave of public activity subsided within the first post-communist years and since then there has been an overall decline by practically all variables of political involvement. With some minor exceptions of rare and nonsystematic citizens' activism the overall picture, as the survey data show, has largely remained unchanged.

Only in the recent years (approximately since 2005) some grassroots initiatives and networks have begun to appear in Russia. These new independent endeavors have united both those eager to assert their interests and rights, as well as those ready to fight for more general public good issues like protection of environment or preservation of cultural heritage (e.g. a number of homeowners and car owner associations, environmental and cultural heritage organizations). Surely, these new networks and grassroots initiatives, founded on weak ties, provide an interesting aspect of further investigation.

As noted previously, among the most important sources of change of West German political culture were the postwar system performance,

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[426] *Hockenos, Paul.* The Grassroots Republic: How Intellectuals, Students and Civic Movements Changed German Culture // The Atlantic Times, May 2009.

socioeconomic modernization, and changed socialization, linked with the transformation of the educational system.

1. In the first instance, system performance has contributed to the long-term growth of political efficacy in the Federal Republic. The new system, based on the rule of law and the separation of powers, provided citizens with numerous chances of participation in the political system which, in turn, led to a steady increase in the political skills and resources of the German society. Differently, as West Germans were getting acquainted with the democratic processes of the Federal Republic, they were getting more and more involved in them, and this involvement, in turn, made them more assured that they can affect political decision-making. In this way, the democratic system performance contributed to the growth of civic norms in Germany. As most observers agreed, the performance of the political and economic system was an important factor in the growth of system support and the growing appreciation of democracy in the first two decades following the war.

In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, the emergence of super-presidential regime and non-performance or absence of democratic institutions resulted in low levels of political efficacy and weakness of civil society, impeded social development and stifled social organization. The weakness or sometimes lack of an institutional framework within which democracy could actually be practiced prevented in many respects the development of civic skills and political efficiency that are vital for supporting and consolidating a democratic system.

2. Another important source of change was the *changing character of postwar German society*, the transformation of the German social structure which was facilitated, primarily, by the rise of affluence and the expansion of higher education in the postwar period. The Economic Miracle led to the considerable increase of income and educational opportunities which, in turn, eventually brought about postmaterialist, New Politics issues (such as environmental protection and codetermination) high on political agenda.

Due to the growing self-confidence and citizens' sense of dignity, politics was acquiring more relevance in everyday life as it provided citizens with a new meaning in life and chances of self-expression. Consequently, new forms of participation and thousands of citizens-initiatives across the country became the manifestation of this newly born political consciousness and increased political efficacy.

At the same time, the survey data presented in this chapter have shown that the post-Soviet Russia has experienced no similar growth of civic engagement except for a short late Soviet period which was followed by protracted ebb. In explaining this trend the relevance of such factors as *income,*

status and *education* (that affected the German cultural transformations) in relation to the Russian case was surveyed.

As it was shown, the post-Soviet system became characterized not by institutional differentiation and strengthening of democratic institutions, but by quite archaic unequal, hierarchical, clientelist relations. It means that high status and wealth of the new Russian elite have depended not on their personal achievements, but primarily on loyalty to their patrons. This forced us to conclude that such factors as *income, status* and *education* acquire relevance only in case of modernization of the political system and formation of the framework of formal, depersonalized and functioning institutions. Only in this case these variables seem to positively affect cultural democratization.

3. Finally, thanks to the Western Allies' 'reeducation' program in the immediate postwar years German secondary and high school saw considerable change. The Western Allies, and especially the United States, were indeed highly committed to an extensive program of reeducation designed to change German political values and attitudes so that the formal democratic institutions established after the war would have widespread popular support.[427]

First of all, due to the denazification process, most active Nazis were removed from Germany's schools, school teachers were trained, the new text-books were developed by the German educators under supervision of the Allied authorities, and new teaching methods were eventually introduced into traditionally authoritarian German classrooms. In this way, the Western occupation opened a starting point down the path to a more liberal and modern German school.

Despite the substantial initial resistance to change in the German society, the Allies policies eventually started producing fruit. In the early 1950s new social science disciplines, the importance of which was systematically stressed by the OMGUS officials, were introduced in West German educational establishments – political education in schools and political science in universities.

Western Allies and democratically oriented German educators also succeeded in the long run in changing the authoritarian patterns of teacher-student relationships. Since the mid-1960s the observers have generally acknowledged that the schools in Germany generally rated independence and self-determination, the capability of discussion and critique in the classroom.

The establishment of exchange programs between the United States and West Germany, the formation of student government organizations and student newspapers, the publication of revised history and civics textbooks, the

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[427] *Conradt, David P.* 1989. Op. cit. p. 213.

expansion of teacher training programs, and the creation of social studies curriculum all contributed to the advent of a new German educational system in the postwar period. The subtle, incremental reforms inaugurated during the first two postwar decades prepared a new generation of young Germans for their responsibilities as citizens of a democratic state. As Brian Puaca conceptualized, "The driving force behind the reforms that continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s came from within. If it was American officials who had laid the foundation, it was the Germans who had actually constructed and outfitted the schools in which a new generation of young citizens now studied.[428]

Equally important, the Allied recommendations became the reference point for many German intellectuals who in the 1950s and 1960s actively debated the role of the postwar university and took part in designing its fundamental reform. The most progressive scholars (like Habermas) insisted on bringing the university closer to social life. Importantly, this debate also involved German students who actually brought the education reform issue to the agenda of the 1968 protest movement.

Unfortunately, no similar intellectual debate on the role of school or university took place in post-Soviet Russia. As a result, Russian secondary schools, as well as universities preserved many features of the Soviet educational establishments, including the old patterns of teacher-student relationships.

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[428] *Puaca, Brian.* Learning Democracy: Education Reform in West Germany, 1945–1965. New York: Berghahn, 2009. pp. 193-94.

Chapter 4

Transformations of Collective Memories in Post-WW II West Germany and Post-Soviet Russia

4.1 Theoretical Framework

Societies inevitably endure periods of instability and uncertainty of the future. These periods of social crisis prompt an awareness of the crucial importance and significance of the past, which at such times "returns with a vengeance."[429] Numerous crises during the second half of the 20th century have caused large-scale social and political transformations. This has sparked significant interest in the problems of "collective memory" - the phenomenon defined by historian Charles Maier as the universal "hunger for memory."[430]

The problem of memory retains particular significance in societies emerging from repressive totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. In these social contexts, appeal to the past is primarily linked to the necessity of finding new grounds for collective identification. Examples of these societies include the post-WWII Federal Republic of Germany and the majority of the former Soviet bloc countries of Eastern Europe, including the former USSR republics. The unprecedented revival of memories in these societies underscores the close link between the concepts of collective memory and collective identity cited in several studies.[431]

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[429] *Müller, Jan-Werner* (ed.) Memory and Power in Postwar Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2002. p. 3.

[430] *Maier, Charles S.* Op. cit. p. 149.

[431] The processes of collective identity and collective memory were identified, for instance, in the works by Jan Assmann. *Assmann, Jan.* Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und

However, the problem of memory in post-totalitarian societies is not limited to the issue of collective identification caused by the destruction of the former national identity. There is remarkable difficulty over the very recovery of memory in a society emerging from tight state control. The repressive nature of any dictatorial or totalitarian regime is manifested not only in blocking the possibility of reproduction of individual memory and experience, but also in the deliberate destruction of memory *per se*.

It is certainly no coincidence that the Nazi Auschwitz concentration camp survivor Primo Levi, while describing later his experience, defined the whole history of the Third Reich as the "war against memory."[432] The witnesses to Stalin's reign of terror also testified to the fact of memory destruction in the Soviet society. According to Nadezhda Mandelstam, the widow of the poet Osip Mandelstam, who died in a Siberian Gulag in 1938, "the elimination of witnesses was, indeed, part of the whole program" of Stalin's reign of terror.[433]

Another important witness of that period was the poet Anna Akhmatova. Her tribute to human suffering, inspired by Stalin's purges in the 1930s and the arrest of her only son Lev Gumilyev, was given in a series of poems collected under the title *Requiem.* She argued that working through this experience of "memory killing" would take no less than a century, for "the dead keep silent, and the alive keep silent as well otherwise risking of becoming dead."[434]

The important consequence of totalitarian system collapse is thus not only an acute identity crisis necessitating the search for a new collective identity, but the liberation of individual memory previously repressed under the dictatorship. The emergence of freedom of expression as a result of the repressive regime collapse is an important prerequisite of the social memory recovery.

This liberation of memory, however, does not guarantee retrieval of memory in formerly repressed societies. As the sociologist Lev Gudkov argued, "all that individuals go through, and above all their unreflected suffering, vanishes unless it is taken up by specialized institutions, unless it is channeled into other means of cultural reproduction and, accordingly, unless private opinions are sanctioned by some authority that ranks as supra–individual."[435]

politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen. München: Deck, 1999. See also: *Gillis, John.* Memory and Identity; Smith, Anthony. Myths and Memories of the Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

[432] *Levi, Primo.* Conversazioni e interviste. Torino: Einaudi, 1997.

[433] *Mandelstam, Nadezhda.* Hope Against Hope: A Memoir. Modern Library, 1999. p. 89.

[434] *Chukovskaya, Lydia.* Zapiski ob Anne Akhmatovoi v 3 tomakh (The Akhmatova Journals: 3 volumes), Moscow: Vremya, 2007. Vol. 2, p. 532. Vol. 3, p. 54.

[435] *Gudkov, Lev.* The Fetters of Victory. How the War Provides Russia with Its Identity // Eurozine, 3 May 2005. pp. 3-4.

In the book *In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics after Auschwitz* Wulf Kansteiner also observed that "all memories, even the memories of eyewitnesses, only assume collective relevance when they are structured, represented, and used in a social setting. As a result, the means of representation that facilitate this process provide the best information about the evolution of collective memories, especially as we try to reconstruct them after the fact."[436]

Therefore *the problem of retaining, reproduction and distribution or transmission of memory* in the new socio-political context gains special importance in the former repressive regimes. Studies of post-totalitarian societies should therefore focus on the ways that these societies deal with memories of the past and the ways they reconcile themselves to these memories. It is important to research and understand the ways in which agents of collective memory structure and represent their memories. The scholars' task here, following Kansteiner's formulation, is "to find out *what stories about the past matter to whom and how they have been distributed.*"[437]

The concept of "collective memory" in social studies has lately become rather an attribute of certain groups or communities of memory than a society as a whole. Communities of memory (or remembering collectives) may be composed of almost any groups: claim making political and intellectual counter-elites, civil society groups, grassroots organizations, groups of victims, survivors, veterans, religious groups, and even formal institutions such as educational and judicial organizations and mass media. They mediate between the individual memories and the national or official memories, expressed in official speeches, commemorations, and the official versions of national history.[438] The communities of memory often struggle for the presentation of their versions of the past and make claims in the public sphere. In this way they try to exert influence on the "politics of memory" which determines which aspects of history will appear nationally significant and collectively remembered (or conversely forgotten).

The appearance of the communities of memory in totalitarian states is virtually not possible. Totalitarian states are characterized by what Sabine Arnold defined as an "occupied memory." This concept refers to the repressive and manipulating control of the process of memory-formation by state authorities. By means of a manipulative approach towards history every member

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[436] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics after Auschwitz. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006. p. 21.

[437] Ibid. p. 25.

[438] *Rousso, Henry.* Le Syndrome de Vichy: De 1944 à nos jours. Le Seuil, coll. Points / Histoire, № 135. Paris, 1990.

of the community is forced to follow a certain set of norms of action; norms which determine each member's place in the community.[439]

Following Aleida Assmann's differentiation between the specific tasks social memory can perform, Arnold showed that the difference between storage and revision on the one hand ("storage memory") and identity-formation and creation of meaning ("functional memory") is dissolved in case of an occupied memory.[440] The access to archives in totalitarian states is restricted or prohibited. Under these circumstances independent arrangement, exhibit, processing, interpretation and representation of memory are blocked and historiography is just producing myths for the sake of a certain notion of identity instead of undermining them.[441]

It is thus reasonable to suggest that the emergence of "communities of memory," or the formation of collective memories of various social groups, and their claim-making in the public sphere requires the emergence of a definite type of political structure. A prerequisite of such a differentiation is the realization of the principle of pluralism and competition, as well as a certain degree of freedom in the political sphere. Only in such context will different groups get an opportunity to transmit their experiences and versions of the past and so contest with other rival memories.

In societies where the content of collective memory is a result of permanent coordination (or rather struggle) in the intellectual and political arenas, the official version of the past may appear dominant, but it is by no means the only memory discourse in a given society.[442] Neither identity nor memory in pluralistic societies are monolithic; they both can vary in accordance with real social dynamics, produced as a result of the ongoing process of public approval of the various positions and interests, crystallized in the process of social interaction, and ultimately determining what Hannah Arendt called 'the human condition of plurality.'[443]

Observers warn about the dangers of the state monopoly over the collective memory. James Booth, for example, noted that "the political memory-

[439] *Sabine, Arnold.* Stalingrad im sowjetischen Gedächtnis. Kriegserinnerung und Geschichtsbild im totalitären Staat. Bochum: Projekt Verlag, 1998. p. 18.

[440] *Assmann, Aleida*. Funktionsgedächtnis und Speichergedächtnis. Zwei Modi der Erinnerung. In: *Platt, Kerstin; Dabag, Mihran* (eds.) Generation und Gedächtnis. Erinnerung und kollektive Identität. Wiesbaden: Opladen Verlag, 1995. *Assmann, Aleida.* History, Memory, and the Genre of Testimony. Poetics Today. International Journal for Theory and Analysis of Literature and Communication, 27, 2006. pp. 261-73.

[441] *Folk, Christian.* Stalinism, Memory, and Commemoration: Russia's Dealing with the Past // The New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 6, № 2, 2009.

[442] Memory and Power in Postwar Europe. Op. cit. p. 21.

[443] *Arendt, Hannah.* The Human Condition. University of Chicago Press, 1958.

identity of a nation-state tends to 'nationalize' collective memory and banish the group memories of minorities, immigrants, and the powerless generally."[444] Simultaneously, Booth underscored "insurgent politics of memory-identity" can "disrupt a unitary, all-absorbing official story of the past," whether "to restore a collective memory suppressed under dictatorship" or "insist on the plurality of memory groups as against a homogenizing national narrative."[445]

In modern communities and states in which an open and controversial discourse on history (or at least the possibility to it) exist and where "principles and norms are reappropriated and reiterated" by all participants in the discourse on history and the past, mythologization of the past can arguably be prevented. In such communities the process of identity-formation and self-perception can only proceed on the ground of discussion and negotiation in the public sphere.[446]

It is possible to hypothyze that in societies with a functioning public sphere the official memory, notwithstanding its stability, will be able to respond to changing social assessments, demands and circumstances.[447] On the contrary, the absence of a public sphere able to produce and broadcast social meanings in conjunction with the deliberate marginalization or absence of the groups able to create and transmit those meanings will block the possibility of retaining and reproducing of any collective memory version differing from the official one.

The collective memory study can thus contribute to a better understanding of the political culture transformations in post-totalitarian contexts. The shift in political culture of post-totalitarian societies can be traced through the appearance of "multiple, diverse, and fluid memory discourses, with different institutional fields operating according to different rules and interacting with each other in different and shifting ways." [448]

As noted previously, due to the repressive character of the former regime the problem of collective memory in post-totalitarian societies gains special significance. Such societies face responsibility of dealing with the legacy of its anti-human and profoundly criminal past.

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[444] *Booth, James W.* 2007. Op. cit. p. 175.

[445] Ibid. p. 176.

[446] *Folk, Christian.* Stalinism, Memory, and Commemoration: Russia's Dealing with the Past // The New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 6, № 2, 2009.

[447] See, for e.g., *Olick, Jeffrey K.* The Sins of the Fathers: The Third Reich and West German Legitimation, 1949-1989. Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1993; *Olick, Jeffrey K.* Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany // American Sociological Review, Vol. 64, № 3, June 1999. *Pearce, Caroline.* Contemporary Germany and the Nazi Legacy: Remembrance, Politics and the Dialectic of Normality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

[448] *Bourdieu, Pierre.* The Field of Cultural Production. New York: Columbia University Press. 1993.

As we are trying to analyze the implications of democratic transitions the question of responsibility and establishment of a state based on new values different from those practiced by totalitarian regime also gains importance. The values of human life and human dignity require elaborating new identity which is inconceivable without comprehension of the essence of the repressive past, learning from the country's history and remembering it in full.

According to the French historian and political scientist Bruno Groppo, the problem of a new national identity in the former dictatorships is inextricably linked with the issue of working through their repressive pasts. Groppo argues that the society which intends to be called democratic cannot refuse requital, ignore the necessity of redemption and making the judgment, punishing the responsible for crimes and murders otherwise the very bases of the public contract will be threatened. A traumatic past cannot be mastered or overcome as long as the society refuses to analyze it in full, to establish the truth about the crimes, to condemn the responsible and, to the extent that it is possible, to indemnify the victims. Impunity of those who bear the responsibility for the crimes accomplished during the dictatorship undermines the basis of a democratic society.[449]

The German term '*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*', that used to be translated into English as 'overcoming' or 'mastering the past', has been commonly used to describe public confrontation with the National Socialist past in postwar West Germany and attempts to 'come to terms with' this past. The German historian Helmut König defined the concept of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* as a set of actions and knowledge on the basis of which new democracies refer to the predecessor states, perceive structural, personal and mental legacy of totalitarian regimes, and are working through their own history.[450]

Another concept of 'working through the past' (*Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit*) put forward by the philosopher Theodor Adorno in the postwar period had a connotation of an ongoing, open-ended obligation. In the 1967 publication *The Inability to Mourn* (*Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern*) the German psychologists Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich also stated the necessity of the active process of 'remembering, repeating, working through' *('erinnern, wiederholen, durcharbeiten')* – originally drawn from Freudian psychology – with relation to memory of the National Socialist past.[451]

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[449] *Groppo, Bruno.* Kak byt' s "temnym" istoricheskim proshlym? (Dealing with a "Dark" Historical Past) // The Public Lecture, Moscow, 25 February, 2005.
<http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2005/02/25/groppo.html>
[450] *König, Helmut.* Erinnern und vergessen // Osteuropa, № 6, 2008. pp. 27-40.
[451] *Pearce, Caroline.* Contemporary Germany and the Nazi legacy: Remembrance, Politics and the Dialectic of Normality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

The Russian philosopher and philologist Sergei Averintsev also shared a belief that *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, mastering the past or overcoming the totalitarian past is the task that all nations that have gone through a totalitarian experience have to face.[452]

As argued in the previous chapter, transition to democracy should be expressed in the change of values and norms and in the formation of a democratic political culture. In a post-totalitarian society, however, there is another, no less important criterion of democratization – working through the criminal past carried out in the public sphere. Orientation to democracy in the state which had a repressive, antihuman regime at office should be expressed in the active public work aimed at barring the way to this past's repetition. This work can be considered successful no sooner than anti-totalitarian consensus starts to dominate in the public opinion.

In this chapter I will focus on the ways post-totalitarian West German and Russian societies dealt with their respective repressive pasts. At first, I will present an overview of the ways the dominant collective memory narratives of the Nazi and Soviet pasts developed in the corresponding national contexts, highlighting the most vivid and symbolically important events, public speeches, etc. Then I will turn to analysis of these developments focusing on the issues of (1) unidimensionality vs plurality of collective memory discourses; (2) the role of collective memory in forming national identities; (3) the problem of institutionalization and transmission of memory.

My major interest would be in finding out what memory discourses emerged and how they impacted both the political culture and national identity of each analyzed society.

4.2 Collective Memory of the Nazi Past in West Germany

4.2.1 1950s

As a result of military defeat, total surrender and transition under the control of the occupation authorities, postwar Germany suffered the strongest complex of national defeat – political, economic, social, and personal. Soon after the end of World War II the Allied authorities launched the denazification program in the occupied country. By the middle of July 1945 tens thousand high ranking officers of the Elite Guard (SS), the Security Agency (SD) of the SS, the Secret State Police (*Gestapo*), local leaders of the Nazi Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche*

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[452] *Averintsev, Sergei.* Overcoming Totalitarian Past // Religion in Eastern Europe XXIV, 3. June, 2004. p. 29.

Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP), security guards of concentration camps, high ranking Nazi officials had been arrested. All in all by the beginning of 1947 the American authorities had removed 292,089 persons from public or important private institutions and excluded an additional 81,673, while the British removed 186,692 and excluded 104,106.[453]

The International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg established in pursuance of the Agreement signed on 8 August, 1945 by the governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the Provisional Government of the French Republic was vested with power to try and punish persons who committed crimes against peace, war crimes or/and crimes against humanity.[454] The IMT indicted twenty-four Nazi leaders on four counts: conspiracy to wage aggressive war, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, defined as "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds."[455] Additionally, several Nazi organizations, including the Reich Cabinet, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Elite Guard (SS), and the Secret State Police (*Gestapo*) were declared criminal, and the General Staff and High Command of the Nazi government were condemned by the Tribunal as "a ruthless military caste."

As for the German public, the overwhelming majority of Germans regarded the end of war not as liberation from the Nazi rule, but as a national catastrophe, a terrible tragedy of state destruction and military defeat. Consequently, people lapsed into self-pity and self-justification. In the middle of the postwar devastation, they were more interested in the exigencies of day-to-day survivals than in learning the truth about the Nazi crimes, unveiled during the denazification program and especially during the 1945-46 Tribunal. Most Germans either rejected or perceived the so-called victor's justice of the Nuremberg trials with considerable suspicion, believing that the 'collective guilt' argument and the idea of citizens' responsibility for the crimes of Nazism were imposed on them by the Allies – the winners in the war. Consequently the condemnation of the Nazi leaders by the Nuremberg Tribunal was viewed not as a fair punishment for the crimes, but merely as the result of military defeat. Since

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[453] *Friedmann, Wolfgang.* The Allied Military Government of Germany. London: Stevens and Sons, 1947. p. 332.

[454] Charter of the International Military Tribunal <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp>

[455] Of the twenty-four indicted Nazi leaders, one had committed suicide while in custody, three were acquitted and nineteen were found guilty – three were sentenced to life in prison, four to prison terms from ten to twenty years, and twelve to death (including Hermann Göring who committed suicide the night before his scheduled execution).

the fall of 1945 the counter-thesis about collective innocence of Germans as the people seduced and then betrayed by the Nazis started taking root.

Describing Germans' postwar state of mind in 1945-6, the philosopher Karl Jaspers observed, "The horizon has shrunk. People do not like to hear of guilt, of the past; world history is not their concern. They simply do not want to suffer any more; they want to get out of this misery, to live but not to think. There is a feeling as though after such fearful suffering one had to be rewarded, as it were, or at least comforted, but not burdened with guilt on top of it all."[456]

The historian Jürgen Kocka has written that in 1945 "people tried to survive in the ruins. The horizon got narrower. You weren't making world history any more.., instead you were standing in line for rations and exchanging coffee for margarine..."[457] Two years later, in April 1947, the publicist Eugen Kogon described the state of German society as follows: "Millions and millions in this country of ruins and intolerable psychic and physical suffering are trying to understand the sense of what is going on. But the majority wishes to know nothing about true interrelation and deep sense of events.... This part of the nation wishes to recognize nothing. And it actually looks so as if it was the largest part of the German nation. And day by day it is only growing..."[458]

In the summer of 1947 the weekly *Die Zeit* acknowledged that the socially-psychological situation of that time was defined by "the annulment of the past from collective memory" manifested in a general attitude: "I need not know about all these, I have absolutely different cares."[459]

Hannah Arendt, who in 1950 highlighted Germans' inability to confront the past, their repression of its most unbearable aspects, and silence about its most appalling crimes, wrote: "But nowhere is this nightmare of destruction and horror less felt and less talked about than in Germany itself. A lack of response is evident everywhere, and it is difficult to say whether this signifies a half-conscious refusal to yield to grief or a genuine inability to feel. Amid the ruins, Germans mail each other picture postcards still showing the cathedrals and market places, the public buildings and bridges that no longer exist. And the indifference with which they walk through the rubble has its exact counterpart in the absence of mourning for the dead, or in the apathy with which they react, or rather fail to react, to the fate of the refugees in their midst. This general lack of emotion, at any rate this apparent heartlessness, sometimes covered over with

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[456] *Jaspers, Karl.* Die Schuldfrage [English translation: The Question of German Guilt. Fordham University Press; 2nd edition, 2001. p. 21.]

[457] *Kocka, Jürgen*. Zerstörung und Befreiung: Das Jahr 1945 als Wendepunkt deutscher Geschichte. In: Geschichte und Aufklärung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1989. p. 127.

[458] *Kogon, Eugen.* Über die Situation // Frankfurter Hefte 2, № 1. 1947.

[459] Die Zeit. 12. Juni. 1947.

cheap sentimentality, is only the most conspicuous outward *symptom of a deep-rooted, stubborn, and at times vicious refusal to face and come to terms with what really happened*."[460]

Arendt, thus, linked a lack of reaction to the destruction to inability to mourn the dead or to confront what happened. Later she suggested that twelve years under "totalitarian" rule and subsequent destruction destroyed Germans' ability to speak. This repression of the past and silence about it were inextricably linked in her very pessimistic account of the postwar period and its prospects.[461]

The historian Helmut Dubiel also observed that most West Germans were unified by their unwillingness to accept any responsibility for the past, their self-identification as victims - of National Socialism, bombs, and the Red Army - and their demands for the release of those deemed guilty by the postwar tribunals of the Allies.[462]

Such victimization, concentration on German sufferings at the expense of the sufferings of the real victims of the Third Reich can be regarded as a defensive strategy of responsibility avoidance. Indeed, the more Germany was seen as a victim, the more difficult it was to for Germans feel moral responsibility for their real roles in the Holocaust and the Second World War. In pursuing this path of "collective amnesia" and victimization people used different defensive strategies such as avoidance, repression, denial, a selective remembering (Moeller 2003), a type of negative memory (Bodemann 1998), deliberate diversion and displacement onto other topics that could diffuse the issues of the past and guilt.

These general attitudes inevitably got reflected in the West German politics of the late 1940s and 1950s. Since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949, West Germany's political leaders focused on democracy, stability and integration with the West, which took precedence over critical reflection on the past. Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic, was of the view that, to quote Jeffrey Herf, "democracy was possible, provided that it was inaugurated by a period of silence about the crimes of the Nazi past."[463] Herf underscored that German politicians had learned quickly that an open attempt to come to terms with the past antagonized a significant bloc of voters that could

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[460] *Arendt, Hannah.* The Aftermath of the Nazi Rule: Report from Germany // Commentary 10, № 4, 1950. pp. 342-53. (Italics added)

[461] *Fisher, Jaimey.* Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation, and Reconstruction after the Second World War. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2007. pp. 5-6.

[462] *Dubiel, Helmut.* Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte: Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in den Debatten des Deuttschen Bundestages. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag. 1999.

[463] *Herf, Jeffrey.* Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. p. 225.

make the difference in elections. The lesson was that one could speak openly about the Nazi past or win national elections, but not both.[464]

Moreover, as Wulf Kansteiner observed, Adenauer pursued politics of history that combined "extreme leniency" for the Nazi perpetrators with general "normative distancing from National Socialism."[465] For the purposes of social stability and integration with the West, Adenauer and the members of his administration sought to settle accounts quickly with perpetrators and victims. They acknowledged many victims of Nazism, including the vast majority of the German population, but recognized only a very small number of Nazi perpetrators.[466]

Indeed, under Adenauer there was a wide-scale amnesty of war criminals and many former Nazis were allowed to resume their previous positions, particularly in the teaching, legal and medical professions. The '131 Law', for example, granted pensions and the possibility of re-employment to 150,000 persons who had been employed in the civil service or armed forces in 1945. Adenauer even appointed some former Nazis to his Cabinet, including Hans Globke, who was a key figure in formulating the Nuremberg Race Laws. Such approach to the politics of memory let Norbert Frei use the term "politics of the past" *(Vergangenheitspolitik)* to describe "the amnesty and integration of former supporters of the Third Reich and the normative split from National Socialism" at that period.[467]

As Caroline Pearce summed it up, by the mid-1950s, German atrocities in the Second World War had largely been reduced to a myth of demonization, whereby Hitler and a few associates were deemed responsible and the rest of the nation were portrayed as 'politically "seduced" individuals, who had ultimately even themselves become "victims" of the war and its consequences'.[468]

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[464] Ibid. p. 203.

[465] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics after Auschwitz. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006. p. 6. See also: *Frei, Norbert.* Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1996. pp. 397, 406. *Brochhagen, Ulrich.* Nach Nürnberg. Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Westintegration in der Ära Adenauer, Hamburg: Junius, 1994.

[466] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. p. 7.

[467] *Pearce, Caroline.* Contemporary Germany and the Nazi Legacy: Remembrance, Politics and the Dialectic of Normality. Caroline Pearce Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. p. 14. See: *Frei, Norbert.* Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1996. [Translation into English by Joel Golb: Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. p. 397.]

[468] *Pearce, Caroline.* Op. cit. p. 14.

The politics of memorialization also reflected the general understanding of victimhood. Instead of erecting monuments and memorials to the victims of Nazism, in 1952 the 'Memorial for the Expelled Ethnic Germans' was erected in Berlin, listing the cities 'lost' after the war, such as Danzig and Köningsberg.[469] The erection of such a monument was symptomatic of where the immediate postwar commemorative sympathies of many Germans were.[470]

Additionally, the official postwar language of memory vividly abounded in general and vague formulas about "unspeakable crimes" committed "in the name of the German people" and equally vague appeals to remember human suffering have informed countless official speeches directed at the citizens of the Federal Republic and foreign observers since the 1950s.[471]

Jeffrey Olick, who conducted a qualitative discourse analysis on public speeches by the West German political leaders over four decades from 1949 till 1989, pointed to "a number of grammatical, syntactical, and rhetorical moves that gird up the rejection of collective guilt, both in explicit arguments about it as well as in more passing portrayals of the past that reinforce it."[472] He noted that images of the past often employed passive constructions (e.g. "the crimes that were committed"). They were almost always actorless (e.g. "the misfortunes that met us"), or at very least perpetrated by an alien clique (e.g. "…National Socialism bestowed upon us," or "megalomaniacal rulers brought us…"). The past was often portrayed as something wholly beyond human control, as with the frequent use of metaphors like "catastrophe" or "forces of destruction."[473] Furthermore, descriptions of what exactly went on in the concentration camps – beyond vague references like "destruction" or "what happened to the Jews" or "all that" – are rare."[474]

According to Olick, "The accumulation of such rhetorical patterns accomplishes substantially more than simply to repudiate the collective guilt thesis. To describe an abstract, impersonal, organizations, or isolated social force as the origin of events separates the common people as well as most elites from

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[469] NB: The 'Memorial for the Expelled Ethnic Germans' was removed in 1972.

[470] *Niven, William.* Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich. London and New York: Routledge 2001/2002. p. 206.

[471] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. p. 7. See also: Herf, *Jeffrey. Divided Memory*: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. pp. 282-83.

[472] *Olick, Jeffrey K.* The Sins of the Fathers: The Third Reich and West German Legitimation, 1949-1989. Ph.D. Diss., Yale University, 1993. pp. 80-81.

[473] The reference to the past as a catastrophe was a common one during the immediate postwar period, especially following the famous Friedrich Meinecke's *The German Catastrophe*: *Meinecke, Friedrich.* Die deutsche Katastrophe. Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen, Wiesbaden: Eberhard Brackhaus. Verlag. 1946.

[474] Ibid.

connection to what happened; there is no bond with the perpetrators (whatever the facts of their popularity may have been). Characterizing the events with naturalistic metaphors reinforces that it was beyond control of the audience. And the lack of anything more than vague reference to the specificity of the crimes passes up the opportunity to forge a sympathetic bond with the victims, while a more evocative language is reserved for focusing attention on the suffering of the common German, exactly those whose support the new government requires."[475]

Olick pointed to the fact that both first leaders of the Federal Republic – the first chancellor Konradt Adenauer (in office 1949-1963) and the first Federal President Theodor Heuss (1949-1959) – spent substantial time in their inaugural speeches (*Regierungserklärung*) constructing, discussing, and distancing themselves from images of the past.

In his 1949 inaugural address Adenauer, for example, focused on German suffering, the unfairness of the German situation, and on what needs to be done to reestablish Germany's image as a reliable nation. Speaking about the German prisoners of war he mentioned that "the fate of these millions of Germans, who now for years have born the bitter lot of captivity, is so heavy, the suffering of their families in Germany so great, that all people must help finally to give back these captives and displaced to their homeland and families."[476] Similar was the focus of President Heuss in his 1949 inaugural address as well as in his later speeches. In one of his official statements on occasion of the Federal Republic's sovereignty on 5 May, 1955, for instance, he mentioned the shame "into which Hitler had forced us Germans," locating thus the blame in Hitler's hands and presenting the German people as having this fate forced upon them.[477]

Similarly, in the speech opening the constituent session of the new German Parliament in Bonn on 7 September, 1949 Paul Löbe vaguely mentioned "a tremendous amount of guilt" (*Riesenmass an Schuld)* that a criminal system has burdened us with."[478] When speaking about victims, he stressed the sufferings of German prisoners of war, widows, and expellees, remembered the war-dead from other countries in passing and did not mention Jewish victims at all.

Both Jeffrey Olick and Helmut Dubiel (who reviewed the debates of the West German parliament, the "membrane between state and society," from its founding in 1949 through the end of the 1990s) agreed that the leaders of the new Federal Republic spent great energy rejecting theses of collective guilt and

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[475] Ibid.

[476] *Olick, Jeffrey K.* 1993. Op. cit. p. 102.

[477] Ibid.

[478] *Löbe, Paul.* Rede als Alterspräsident des ersten Deutschen Bundestages, 7. September 1949 <www.mitmischen.de/index.php/Common/Document/field/pdffile/id/7026/filename/Paul+L%F6b e+zur+Er%F6ffnung+der+ersten+Sitzung+des+Bundestages+(1949).pdf>

responsibility. It was preferable to portray the German nation as wretched and suffering. A suffering was perceived to be brought about by a small criminal clique led by Adolf Hitler.

Importantly, as Olick underscored, the strategies of remembering aimed at leaving the uncomfortable past behind as quickly as possible recurred not only throughout the Adenauer era, but across other times and in different contexts. They mixed with other elements and other issues in different circumstances, constituting, however, an enduring pattern in the rejection of collective guilt, which used to form an important part of West German political culture. Generations of German politicians, intellectuals and consumers have spent an extraordinary amount of time and effort, of elaborate avoidance and selective confrontation to advance a state of normalization and historicization.[479]

Nevertheless, although the trajectory of memory aimed at forgetting and leaving behind the Nazi past as quickly as possible was dominant in the early postwar period it was not the only memory narrative even at that point. It is noteworthy that there developed from the very start another trajectory challenging the defensive and apologetic official memory narrative.

In a radio address broadcast to Germany on 8 May, 1945 Germany's most famous living writer, Thomas Mann, who spent the period of the Nazi rule in exile, declared that "our shame lies open to the eyes of the world," and that "everything German, everyone who speaks German, writes German, has lived in Germany, is affected by this shameful revelation." "Humanity shudders in horror at Germany!" said Mann.[480]

As early as 1946, the publications by the eminent German philosophers such as Karl Jaspers's *Question of Guilt (Die Schuldfrage)* and Friedrich Meinecke's *The German Catastrophe (Deutsche Katastrophe)* also called on Germans to reflect on the Nazi past and shape a new future. Importantly, in his work, which was actually a course of lectures taught at Heidelberg University in 1945-46, Jaspers provided a terminology for subsequent thinking about the issue of guilt and responsibility of Germans for the Nazi past. The philosopher distinguished among four different kinds of guilt: criminal (for violations of law), political (for acts of one's state), moral (for submission to immoral orders), and metaphysical (for human depravity in general). With this exhaustive typology, it was clear that

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[479] *Olick, Jeffrey K.* 1993. Op. cit. p. 129.

[480] *Brockmann, Stephen*. German Culture at the 'Zero Hour.' In*: Trommler, Frank; Brockmann, Stephen (eds.)* Revisiting Zero Hour 1945: The Emergence of Postwar German Culture. Humanities Program Report 1. Washington, DC: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1996. pp. 8-9. See also: *Zeller, Bernhard* (ed.) "Als der Krieg zu Ende war:" Literarisch-politische Publizistik 1945-1950. Munich: Kösel, 1973. p. 261.

for Jaspers everyone bore some guilt for what had happened, whether because one had committed crimes, tolerated those crimes, or simply existed within a society in which such things could occur.[481]

Along with political and criminal responsibility for the evil deeds Jaspers particularly emphasized the significance of moral responsibility of each person: "It is never simply true that "orders are orders." Rather – as crimes even though ordered (although, depending on the degree of danger, blackmail and terrorism, there may be mitigating circumstances) – so every deed remains subject to moral judgment."[482] The philosopher also tried to convince his fellow citizens in the "truthfulness" and "right" of the Nuremberg trial: "The national disgrace lies not in the tribunal but in what brought it on – in the fact of this regime and its acts. The consciousness of national disgrace is inescapable for every German. It aims in the wrong direction if turning against the trial rather than its cause."[483]

Jaspers believed the process of national self-judgment and national self-criticism to be crucial for the future of Germany. In this context, the philosopher called his contemporaries to dialogue, to the national consent, to overcoming of barriers of bias and mistrust, to learning "to see things from the other's point of view" and "to talk with each other." For, according to Jaspers, only "in learning to talk with each other we win more than a connecting link between us. We lay the indispensable foundation for the ability to talk with other peoples."[484]

Undoubtedly Jaspers' book became a remarkable phenomenon in a cultural life of the postwar Germany its force being in appeal to personal responsibility of every individual – the appeal ignored at that moment by the majority of his contemporaries eager to get back safely to the old ways.

Eugen Kogon was one of the first German critics to suggest that what was happening in West Germany was rather a "restoration" than a "renewal." In 1947 he wrote: "The old ways continue, they have not been eliminated; through mistakes, failures, weakness, and all sorts of stupidity on all sides, they are poisoning existence and crippling our thought, our actions, they besmirch our feelings, they overshadow all hope."[485] A year later Kogon's evaluation was largely confirmed in an opinion poll suggesting that 57 percent of Germans

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[481] *Olick, Jeffrey K.* 1993. Op. cit. p. 217.

[482] *Jaspers, Karl.* Op. cit. p. 25-26.

[483] Ibid. p. 48.

[484] Ibid. p. 21.

[485] *Kogen, Eugen.* Die unvollendete Erneuerung: Deutschland im Kräftefeld 1945-1963. Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1964. p. 65.

living in the Western occupation zones believed that National Socialism was "a good idea but badly carried out idea."[486]

This belief in the foundation of the Federal Republic to be a restoration rather than a new beginning, a continuity rather than a rupture, was shared by other representatives of the West German intellectual elite. One of them, the journalist Walter Dirks, who in 1950 was writing about what he called "the restorative character of the epoch" (*"der restaurative Charakter der Epoche"*), suggested that "the recreation of the old world has occurred with such force that all we can do right now is accept it as a fact of life."[487] Five years later Kogon wrote again that, "Restoration […] exactly reflects our social condition," suggesting that the West German restoration implied a politics "of traditional 'values,' means and forms of thought, of seeming certainties, of the recreation of well known interests as much as possible, a politics of lack of imagination."[488]

As Dirk Moses underscored, by the mid-1950s left-wing commentators observed with dismay the reestablishment of the old elites and the resurgence of ex-Nazis in public life, in different professions, and in the economy after the very popular amnesty laws of 1949 for war criminals (including *Einsatzgruppen* commanders), and especially after the 131 law of 1951 that permitted "burdened" civil servants to reclaim their jobs. They were speaking of a creeping "renazification" and arguing that a moral cleansing and a radical new political beginning did not occur. "What our reality is can be seen in the tenured judge who broke the law, doctors who once worked in the euthanasia programs and now practice privately, pampered functionaries of a brutal state who now again have a state function," wrote the novelist, the member of the literary *Gruppe 47* Siegfried Lenz.[489] Another member of this group, the writer Wolfdieter Schnürre, in turn, noted: "Soon the Nazis, who were never really removed from power and who were declared harmless by the law, inherited the democracy and, with the camouflage of bonhomie and joviality, trickled into the public offices, the economy, politics, justice, journalism, medicine, the arts, and academia."[490]

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[486] *Kocka, Jürgen.* p. 127. In: *Noelle, Elisabeth; Neumann, Erich Peter* (eds.) Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung, 1947-1955. Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1956.

[487] *Dirks, Walter.* Der restaurative Charakter der Epoche // Frankfurter Hefte 5, 1950. p. 942.

[488] Quoted in *Brockmann, Stephen.* Op. cit. p. 33. See also: *Kogen, Eugen.* Die unvollendete Erneuerung: Deutschland im Kräftefeld 1945-1963. Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1964. pp. 146-47.

[489] *Moses, Dirk A.* German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. p. 110. See also: *Lenz, Siegfried.* Die Politik der Entmündigung. In: *Walser, Martin* (ed.) Die Alternative oder brauchen wir eine neue Regierung? Reinbeck, 1961. pp. 133–34.

[490] Quoted in *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. p. 110. See also: *Schnurre, Wolfdieter.* Das falsche Gleis. In: *Walser, Martin* (ed.) Die Alternative oder brauchen wir eine neue Regierung? Reinbeck, 1961. p. 69.

Contemporary historian Karl Dietrich Bracher pointed out that the integration of these people had dire consequences for public culture. The Social Democrat Hans Tietegens commented that "When concentration camps are supposed to be made up for by autobahns, something must be wrong with the spiritual-intellectual (*seelisch-geistig*) economy." The *Deutsche Universitäts-Zeitung* also worried in 1952 about intellectual conformity of "planned opinion formation" due to nationalist resentments and prejudices.[491]

The philosopher Jürgen Habermas was also indignant that Germans did not take seriously enough the crimes that had been committed by many of them and in their collective name and by integration of the former Nazis into the new political order. For him, thus, the foundation of the Federal Republic was hardly the new, moral beginning for which he had hoped: "The first great political disappointment came with the formation of the government in 1949," wrote Habermas later.[492]

Already in the 1940s the first artistic attempts to come to terms with the criminal past took place. In 1945-46 Wolfgang Staudte directed the first postwar film *The Murderers Are Among Us* (*Die Mörder sind unter uns*) dealing with German responsibility for mass killings of civilians in the occupied territories on the Eastern Front.

It is also noteworthy that during the 1940s and 1950s important records of the Nazi crimes in the form of personal accounts of the Holocaust survivors started to appear. For instance, the article *Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations* by the Austrian-Jewish psychologist Bruno Bettelheim who spent eleven months in 1938-39 in Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps saw light as early as 1943. It was followed by Vassily Grossman's 1944 publication *The Hell of Treblinka (Ad Treblinki),* in which the Russian war reporter collected some of the first eyewitness accounts of the survivors, as well as presented descriptions of the Nazi-German Treblinka and Majdanek extermination camps and of the Nazi ethnic cleansing in German occupied Ukraine and Poland. Notably, Grossman's article was disseminated at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal as evidence for the prosecution.

In 1946 a book on the *SS-State* (*Der SS-Staat, das System der deutschen Konzentrationslager)* by an avowed opponent of Nazism and a former

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[491] Quoted in *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. pp. 110-11. See also: *Bracher, Karl Dietrich.* Rechtsradikalismus in der Bundesrepublik // Colloquium, 10:2, 1956. pp. 9–11. *Tietgens, Hans.* Unbewältigte Vergangenheit // Kulturarbeit, 10:4, 1958. pp. 73–76. Editorial, "Konformismus," // Deutsche Universitäts-Zeitung, 7:2, 1952. p. 5.

[492] Quoted in *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. pp. 111-12. See also: *Habermas, Jürgen.* Die Normalität einer Berliner Republik, Frankfurt, 1995. p. 33. *Dews, Peter* (ed.) Habermas: Autonomy and Solidarity. London, 1986. p. 74.

Buchenwald prisoner Eugen Kogon became one of the first accounts of the German camp system. Simultaneously, another account of the concentration camp universe was presented in 1946 *L'Univers concentrationnaire* by the Buchenwald camp survivor, a French writer David Rousset.

Another influential eyewitness's account could be found in the 1946 book *Man's Search for Meaning (Ein Psycholog erlebt das Konzentrationslager)* by an Austrian-Jewish neurologist and psychiatrist Viktor Frankl who spent almost two years and a half in several Nazi concentration camps. A year later an Italian-Jewish chemist and writer Primo Levi wrote his first book *If This is a Man (Se questo è un uomo, 1947)* chronicling his experiences as an Auschwitz concentration camp inmate. A German translation of the 1947 book *The Human Species (L'Espèce humaine)* by a former inmate of Buchenwald, Gandersheim and Dachau, a French writer Robert Antelme appeared in 1949. Other important survival narratives included *The Diary of Anne Frank*, published in Germany in 1950, as well as some of the Elie Wiesel's novels, the best known of which was *Night* (1958), that were based on his experiences as a prisoner in the Auschwitz and Buchenwald concentration camps.[493]

In 1955 the German public could get acquainted with the German translation of the first systematic research of totalitarian regimes *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), performed by a German-Jewish political theorist Hannah Arendt who managed to escape Nazi Germany to the United States in 1941. In this research Arendt traced the roots of Stalinist Communism and Nazism and revealed important structural similarities between the two regimes.[494] In this connection, one should also mention the appearance in 1956 of the German edition of Gerald Reitlinger's research *The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (Die Endlösung: Hitlers Versuch der Ausrottung der Juden Europas 1939 - 1945).*

The extensive research of German society continued after some members of the Frankfurt School (*Frankfurter Schule*) such as Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer returned to Germany from exile after the war to continue their work at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt am Main. The Institute was reopened in 1950 and in 1951 the researchers from the Frankfurt School launched a "group study" that aimed to create a kind of psychological profile of Germans. This work actually continued the study conducted by Adorno and his American colleagues Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson,

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[493] Elie Wiesel (b. 1928), a Romanian-born Jewish writer, was as a prisoner in the Auschwitz and Buchenwald concentration camps from 16 May, 1944 till 11 April, 1945. Some of his works present personal accounts of the Holocaust - *And the World Kept Silent* (1956), *Night* (1958), *Dawn* (1961), *Day* (1962), *A Beggar in Jerusalem* (1970), *One Generation After* (1970), *Twilight* (1988).

[494] *Arendt, Hanna.* The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harvest Books, 1973.

and Nevitt Sanford from the University of California, Berkeley on *Authoritarian Personality* (1950).

The results of the Frankfurt School research, showing that the majority of Germans still considered Hitler to be one of the greatest Germans in history after the first chancellor of the united German empire Otto von Bismarck, were published in 1955 and received then minimal attention. However, the quality of the research, as well as the activeness, devotion and competence of its leaders, made the Frankfurt School "an academic and moral compass to a young federal republic."[495]

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As the brief overview of the memory discourses that have emerged in the first postwar decade reveals, the historical culture of the Federal Republic of Germany since its foundation has followed two closely intertwined but diametrically opposed trajectories represented by the two opposing political languages. In his recent study on *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past*, the intellectual historian Dirk Moses underscored that although both languages were generally committed to a German republic, they had, at the same time, very different political visions of its future. Trying to fashion narratives of legitimacy for their respective visions both groups laid claims to the German past, interpreting it in a strikingly different manner. To put it another way, in their debates postwar German intellectual and political elites utilized two languages of republicanism. Moses defined them as "redemptive" and "integrative" languages, the former expressing the "Non-German German" wish for a republic separated from corrupted national traditions, and the latter articulating the "German German" imperative for positive, national continuities.[496]

Thus, redemptive republicans argued for a purely ahistorical political identity; they regarded German national subjectivity as irredeemably polluted, and sought to construct a political community cleansed of national ideals and values. It was to recast Germans as essentially non-German, that is, as European citizens of a republic, as bearers of "postconventional" or "postnational" identity.[497]

The alternative reaction of conservative politicians and intellectuals (whom Moses calls "integrative republicanists") was primarily defensive. It was

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[495] Frankfurt School Intellectuals Returned to Shape Postwar Germany History // Deutsche Welle, 9 December 2009. <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4994615,00.html>

[496] *Moses, Dirk A.* German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. pp. 5, 72-73.

[497] Ibid. p. 235.

to protect the integrity of the national ideal by ascribing the causes of the disaster to another source. It created narratives to prove that German history before 1945 had not been a one-way street to 1933 or 1941 in order to permit Germans to retain basic trust in their history, to feel good about being German despite the Nazism and the Holocaust so that German nationality would not be stigmatized. While left-wing intellectuals persisted in wanting Germans to abandon national identity altogether, their conservative counterparts, resisted the leftist stigmatization of German history and identity by entreating traditions as trustworthy sources of identification.[498]

The interpretations of the role and origins of the National Socialism were also polarized. From the conservative perspective, Nazism was a totalitarian movement designed and brought about by a small criminal clique (e.g., Gerhard Ritter). Consequently, the Nazi era was regarded as a total break in German history and Germans in this assessment were seen as victims of Nazism. The left-liberals, in turn, argued in favor of a *Sonderweg,* conception of German history that saw National Socialism as the inevitable result of the way German society had developed (e.g., Fritz Fischer, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Hans Mommsen).

Different approaches to the past determined the different key points they highlighted. If the left-wing liberal thought used to focus on the victims and survivors of the Third Reich and Holocaust (Jews, Gypsies, mentally disabled, the Soviet POWs, etc.) and to engage – to a greater or lesser extent – with the problem of bystanders and perpetrators of the "Final Solution," the conservative mind-set generally either equated all victims within all-victims-together paradigm, or ignored the suffering of anyone but the German people who could be portrayed as the victims of the Third Reich, the Soviet Army, or the Allied bombings. In this victimization paradigm the German POWs, expellees from the Eastern territories, the victims of the Allied bombings, etc. became major focus of attention.

Complaints about too much memory have also been regularly heard from the conservative camp whose representatives used to demand that Germany be allowed to become a "normal nation" and that the tainted past be finally "mastered," i.e. left behind (notably, in the article that actually triggered the Historians' Dispute of the mid-1980s Ernst Nolte lamented *The Past That Will Not Pass*).

Left-wing liberals (e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Theodor Adorno, etc.), in turn, strongly argued against the move toward closure (*Schlussstrich*) or "mastery" (*Bewältigung*) of the past, believing it was absolutely essential to sustain the

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[498] *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. pp. 72-73. See also: *Heck, Alfons.* The Burden of the Hitler Legacy. Frederick, Colo., 1988.

memory of the Holocaust as a part of the German present. Furthermore, they preferred the Adorno's notion of 'working through the past' (*Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit*) to 'mastering' or 'coming to terms' with the past (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) and insisted that this dynamic process should be an ongoing, open-ended obligation.

Certainly, individual attitudes and assessments were not always ideologically determined. They could transcend ideological lines and party politics to a degree, running along the fault-lines of generational difference, family background or even simply diversity of personal opinions. Nevertheless, the right-wing dichotomy has been very typical of debates on the National Socialist past in Germany in the postwar period.[499]

It is noteworthy also that this dichotomy was, to an extent, generationally determined. If the apologetic, defensive memory was particularly pronounced among the conservative members of the war generation who had experienced the Third Reich as adults, the second mind-set reflected the approach of the liberal members the postwar generation who were born during or after the war. As for the representatives of the so-called Hitler Youth generation, born between 1922 and 1932 and socialized in the youth organizations of the Third Reich, they were actually split between the two mind-sets. Moses convincingly proved that of all three the paradigm of the Hitler Youth generation, which representatives actually entered the postwar academia, the legal profession and subsequently political arena in the 1960s-1980s, had the greatest impact on Germany's infrastructure of cultural memory.[500] The survey of the birth dates of the leading intellectuals of the two ideological camps appears to confirm the truthfulness of this argumentation for the representatives of the Hitler Youth generation indeed seem to dominate in both groups.

Among the most prominent 'Non-German German' left-liberal intellectuals were the leftist publicists Eugen Kogon (b. 1903), Walter Dirks (p. 1901), Rudolf Augstein (b. 1923), the writers, primarily members of the literary circle The *Gruppe 47*, Hans Werner Richter (b. 1908), Siegfried Lenz (b. 1926), Alfred Andersch (b. 1914), Günter Grass (b. 1927), Heinrich Böll (b. 1917), Wolfdieter Schnürre (b. 1920); the sociologists Ludwig von Friedeburg (b. 1923) and Ralf Dahrendorf (b. 1929), the political scientists Peter von Oertzen (b. 1924), Werner Hoffmann (b. 1922), Kurt Lenk (b. 1929), and Jürgen Seifert (b. 1928), the philosophers Karl Jaspers (b. 1883), Theodor Adorno (b. 1903) and Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929); the psychoanalytics Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich (b. 1908 and 1917); the educator Hans Tietgens (b. 1922); the historians Hans-

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[499] *Niven, William.* Op. cit. p. 196.

[500] *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit.

Ulrich Wehler (b. 1931), Fritz Fischer (b. 1908), Jürgen Kocka (b. 1941), Hans Mommsen (b. 1930), Martin Broszat (b. 1926), Heinrich August Winkler (b. 1938), Eberhard Jäckel (b. 1929), Wolfgang Scheffler (b.1929) and Wolfgang Mommsen (b. 1930).

On the other, conservative, side were the historians Ernst Nolte (b. 1923), Andreas Hillgruber (b. 1925), Karl Dietrich Bracher (b. 1922), Hellmut Diwald (b. 1924), Klaus Hildebrand (b. 1941), Rainer Zitelmann (b. 1957), Hagen Schulze (b. 1943), and Michael Stürmer (b. 1939); the political scientist Wilhelm Hennis (b. 1923), the writer Martin Walser (b. 1927), the philosopher Hermann Lübbe (b. 1926), the journalist Joachim Fest (b. 1926), to name just a few.

As noted previously, from the end of the Second World War until the late 1950s the conservative trajectory of memory dominated the public sphere. However, this situation got gradually changed in the following decade. And from that point onward the historical culture of the Federal Republic represented an on-going confrontation, interaction, clashes of the two antagonistic but dialectically related – conservative and liberal – collective memories of the traumatic past.

4.2.2 1960s

Many observers of the postwar West German memory development agree that the change of times in terms of collective memory transformation was marked by Theodor Adorno's lecture entitled *What Does Working Through the Past Mean?* (*Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?*) published and broadcasted over radio in 1959. This lecture posed a high critical standard for German political culture. According to Adorno, the Federal Republic was more concerned with getting beyond the past, with avoiding difficult memory through what Adorno called "an unconscious and not-so-unconscious defense against guilt," than with the genuine working through that would be required to "break its spell."[501] The latter would demand an act of clear consciousness, a continual self-critical engagement a difficult process very similar to the work of psychoanalysis.

Adorno's concept of "working through" the past was drawn from the Freudian psychoanalytic theory, which conceptualized silence as a form of defensive suppression, withholding, a block to self-realization, and emphasized verbalization in the therapeutic situations as a means of achieving understanding and insight of the self and its modus operandi. Adorno transferred this

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[501] *Adorno, Theodor W.* Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit? English translation: The Meaning of Working through the Past. In: *Adorno, Theodor W.* Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. Trans. Henry W. Pickford. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. pp. 89-103.

interpretation to the societal level opposing a critical self-reflection, i.e. a serious working upon the past, to the widespread defensiveness against guilt and general desire to close the books on the past.

According to Adorno, the defensive unwillingness in the Federal Republic to confront its traumatic past – at both the personal and official levels – indicated not the persistence of fascist tendencies against democracy (such as neo-Nazi activism) but of fascist tendencies within democracy which in his view was potentially more menacing.[502]

As Jeffrey Olick conceptualized, highly profound and influential Adorno's analysis, emblematic of a growing shift in German political culture, formed part of the mood in which a new generation later challenged the structures, policies, and attitudes of the early Federal Republic, particularly regarding the memory of the Nazi period. Against earlier positions, this new mood emphasized continuities rather than ruptures between the Third Reich and the Federal Republic.[503]

The late 1950s and early 1960s were also marked by an intellectual confrontation with such literary works as Heinrich Böll's *Billiards at Half Past Nine* (*Billard um halb zehn*), Günter Grass's *The Tin Drum* (*Die Blechtrommel*) and Uwe Johnson's *Speculations about Jakob (Mutmassungen über Jakob)*, all published in 1959 and breaking new ground with unapologetic examinations of German complicity with Nazism. Also, the publication of *The Diary of Anne Frank*, along with the play and film, provided Germans an emotional access to the Nazis' victims. Likewise, Wolfgang Staudte's film, *Roses for the Public Prosecutor* (*Rosen für den Staatsanwalt*, 1961) in a form of comedy presented the rehabilitation of the infamous *Blutrichter*, the Nazis' judicial arm, in the postwar Federal Republic.[504]

One should also bear in mind some important institutional changes in the sphere of memory politics that took place in the same period. The major institutional change occurred in 1958, when justice ministers of the federal states (*Länder*) came together to establish the Ludwigsburg Central Office of the State Judicial Authorities for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (*Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen* or *Zentrale Stelle*). The opening of such an institution was necessitated by an emerging awareness that a large number of Nazi crimes that had occurred outside Germany had remained uninvestigated. The fact became particularly

[502] Ibid. p. 90.

[503] *Olick, Jeffrey K.* Op. cit. pp. 547-49.

[504] See *Hockenos, Paul.* The Grassroots Republic: How Intellectuals, Students and Civic Movements Changed German Culture // The Atlantic Times. May, 2009.

evident during the 1957-58 Ulm trial of Gestapo and SS officers responsible for crimes along the German-Lithuanian front.

Established due to rather practical motivations and despite its apparent dissonance with other governmental strategies and attitudes with regard to the past, the Central Office in Ludwigsburg was to have a significant impact on the prosecution of war criminals and in bringing such issues before the public.

In the years since 1958, the Central Office carefully researched the historical details of the Nazi genocide, focusing at the initial stage only on the crimes that occurred outside Germany and were committed against civilians and later extending its activity on investigations of all categories of war crimes without limitations in time or extent. All in all, since its formation, the Central Office has helped (sometimes in collaboration with foreign agencies) track down and prosecute almost 7,000 Nazi criminals. Due to the investigation work performed by this institution the Nazi past and the details of the "Final Solution" were again and again brought before the German public through a number of trials involving former personnel of the extermination camps.

It is noteworthy that the attention of the German public was indeed being drawn to the problem of the Holocaust more and more frequently. The public attention was attracted, first, by a wave of anti-Semitic vandalism which occurred in 1958-60. News about the resurgence of anti-Semitic activity in Germany was followed in 1961 by the TV news on the Jerusalem trial of one of the chief 'architects of the Holocaust,' *SS-Obersturmbannführer* Adolf Eichmann, who had been in charge of facilitating and managing the logistics of mass deportation of Jews to ghettos and extermination camps in German-occupied Eastern Europe. Furthermore, in 1963-65 Germans could follow the news on a series of the so-called Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials (*der Auschwitz-Prozess)* of the former Auschwitz-Birkenau death and concentration camp's mid- to lower-level officials for their roles in the Holocaust.

Both the highly televised Eichmann trial as well as the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials, running from 20 December, 1963 to 10 August, 1965 and charging twenty two defendants under German penal law, presented in detail the horrors and scale of the Nazi genocide. Notably, in the course of the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials approximately 360 witnesses were called, including around 210 survivors. During the trials the historians Helmut Krausnick, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Hans Buchheim, and Martin Broszat, associated with the Munich Institute for Contemporary History (*Institut für Zeitgeschichte*) founded in 1949, wrote expert opinions for German courts, serving as expert witnesses for the prosecution. Their research helped settle legal disputes about compensation for victims of the Nazi regime and the reinstatement of former civil servants who had lost their positions during the Allied occupation. Additionally, especially in

the 1960s, they supported renewed efforts to bring Nazi perpetrators to trail. Their research for the courts formed the core of the first systematic German inquiries into the development of the "Final Solution" and the concentration camp universe.[505] Subsequently, the information gathered by the historians served as the basis for their 1965 book, one of the first thorough surveys of the SS based on SS records, *Anatomy of the SS State* (*Anatomie des SS-Staates*).[506]

The courts' proceedings were largely public and served to bring many details of the Holocaust to the attention of the public in the Federal Republic and abroad. They inspired, for instance, the noted 1965 play *The Investigation* (*Die Ermittlung*) by Peter Weiss, which was composed of direct excerpts from the trial transcripts, and can be read as a catalogue of defense mechanisms, repressions, and excuses by perpetrators. Together with Rolf Hochhuth's 1963 play *The Deputy* (*Der Stellvertreter*), criticizing the role of the Catholic Church during the war, Weiss's play became an important cultural contribution to the development of the critical memory narrative in the 1960s.

Importantly, the proceedings of the Eichmann trial were also reported in detail by such famous foreign authors as Harry Mulisch and Hannah Arendt, and the translations of their works in German followed immediately. Harry Mulisch's *Case 40/61* was published in Germany in 1962 and Hannah Arendt's book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* based on her reports on the Eichmann trial for *The New Yorker* in 1963.[507]

Despite the fact that most Germans (58 percent) continued to state they felt no guilt for the annihilation of the Jews, the detailed public presentation of, and attention to, the trial undoubtedly impacted attitudes towards the past in the West German society at large.[508] The trials brought before the public, which now included a younger generation grown up after the war, a vivid and detailed picture of the appalling Nazi crimes and the overall brutality of the Nazi system of annihilation.[509] It can be argued that the further changes of the West German political culture brought about largely by the representatives of the younger

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[505] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. pp. 37-39. The expert opinions were published in Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ed., Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, 2 vols. Munich, Germany: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 1958 and 1966.

[506] *Buchheim, Hans; Broszat, Martin; Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf; Krausnick, Helmut* (Hrsg.) Anatomie des SS-Staates, 2 vols. Walter-Verlag, Olten, Freiburg, 1965.

[507] *Mulisch, Harry*. Strafsache 40/61. Eine Reportage über den Eichmann-Prozess, Köln, DuMont Schauberg, 1962. *Arendt, Hannah.* Adolf Eichmann. Von der Banalität des Bösen // Merkur: Deutsche Zeitschrift Fur Europaisches Denken 186, Vol. XVII, № 8, August 1963.

[508] *Deutschkron, Inge.* Israel und die Deutschen: das schwierige Verhältnis Deutschkron. Verlag der Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln, 1970. p. 152.

[509] *Olick, Jeffrey K.* Op. cit. pp. 265-66.

generations of Germans have been conceived during this period of early confrontations with the Nazi past.

An additional major moment of official confrontation with the horrors of Nazism presented itself in the 1965 Bundestag debates on persecutions of the Nazis and the Statute of Limitations (*Verjährungsdebatten*). According to the West German Basic Law, the statute of limitations on prosecuting Nazi criminals was to come into effect after twenty years what meant that after 8 May, 1965 it would no longer be possible to prosecute anyone for the crimes committed under the Nazi dictatorship. As a result of extensive public debates in the Bundestag, the limitation on prosecuting Nazi criminals was delayed for four more years. Then, in 1969, it was extended for another ten years until in 1979 the statute of limitations was finally eliminated altogether.[510]

Their importance notwithstanding, the general effect of the abovementioned transformations in the public sphere appeared then quite limited and marginal. In fact, the selective judicial attempts of coming to terms with the past coexisted with a general, dispersive, and diverse inability and unwillingness to face the problem of the criminals and the criminal potential in the midst of modern German society. Observers who examined prosecutions of former perpetrators, the discourses surrounding the Eichmann and Auschwitz trials in the early 1960s, as well as the debates over the Nazi prosecutions and the statue of limitations of 1965 have generally agreed that the court decisions illustrated German society's "peace with the perpetrators" and that the prosecutions constituted appeasement rather than confrontation, representing a legal policy which "most important objective was to avoid public debate."[511] In a recent study of these issues Marc von Miquel, for example, has argued that a new mode of addressing the Nazi past that emerged at that time used to stress legal over historical complicity and details over larger context. As a result, "Auschwitz could be discussed, but alongside new forms of silence."[512]

Indeed, the unwillingness to deal with perpetration was reflected in all spheres of Germany's historical culture. One of the vivid and tragic examples of general unwillingness to confront the problem of the Nazi past was the Berlin Senate's refusal in 1965 to support the project of the historian and Auschwitz

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[510] For an extensive discussion of the *Verjährungsdebatte* of the 1960s, see: *Miquel, Marc*. Ahnden oder Amnestieren?: Westdeutsche Justiz und Vergangenheitspolitik in den sechziger Jahren. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2004.

[511] *Miquel, Marc*. Explanation, Dissociation, Apologia: The Debate over the Criminal Prosecution of Nazi Crimes in the 1960s. p. 53. In: *Steinweis, Alan S., Gassert, Philipp* (eds.) Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975. New York, Berghahn, 2005.

[512] Ibid. p. 59.

survivor Joseph Wulf who tried to create a Holocaust memorial and document center in the house where the 1942 Wannsee Conference had been held and where Reinhard Heydrich had announced Hitler's decision to exterminate the Jews of Europe. Several days before Wulf, totally frustrated, committed suicide he had written to his son, "I have published 18 books about the Third Reich and they have had no effect. You can document everything to death for the Germans. There is a democratic regime in Bonn. Yet the mass murderers walk around free, live in their little houses, and grow flowers."[513] It is noteworthy that it took almost three decades for Wulf's project to be finally realized in Berlin.

The television programs of the 1960s also used to avoid any direct and self-critical engagement with the history of the "Final Solution," providing only indirect and deflected glimpses of the Holocaust.[514] The same avoidance of the issues of National Socialism and the Holocaust until right into the 1960s was characteristic of many German schools. As the curriculum for history lessons in Germany was treated chronologically, some teachers preferred to go through the syllabus in such a way that the most recent period of history could either no longer, or just cursorily, be dealt with at the end of compulsory education.[515] So until the end of the 1960s the Nazi period either was not taught at all (the final examination followed the Bismarck era) or was treated totally unemotionally and superficially.[516]

The recognition of the postwar eastern border along the Oder-Neisse line (actually lost by the postwar Germany following the decision of the Allied powers at the 1945 Potsdam Conference) as permanent was long regarded in the Federal Republic as unacceptable and the school atlases in the 1960s continued to present the prewar borders, marking the lands east of the Oder-Neisse line as being "administered by Poland."

As for the academic historians, the "Final Solution" was not their central research topic in the first postwar decades and most of them, with rare exceptions, adopted a defensive tone, arguing that the Holocaust had been but a doing of Hitler and his criminal clique. Such an 'intentionalist' view of the "Final Solution" seen as a result of a long-term plan going back to the foundations of

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[513] *Lehrer, Steven.* Wannsee House and the Holocaust. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, 2000. p. 134.

[514] See *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. p. 115.

[515] See *Heyl*, *Matthias.* Holocaust Education in (West*)* Germany: Now and Then, 1997. <http://www.fasena.de/download/english/Heylpercent20(1997e).PDF>

[516] *Herbert, Ulrich.* Vor der eigenen Tür – Bemerkungen zur Erforschung der Alltagsgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus. In: *Galinski, Dieter; Herbert, Ulrich; Lachauer, Ursula* (Hg.) Nazis und Nachbarn. Schüler erforschen den Alltag im Nationalsozialismus, Reinbek. 1982. p. 10.

the Nazi Party in 1919 mostly associated with conservative historians was dominant in the first postwar decades.

In the 1960s, however, this established paradigm began to be challenged by several left-liberal scholars such as the Hamburg historian Fritz Fischer and the representative of the so-called Bielefeld School Hans-Ulrich Wehler. These authors became the most famous proponents of the negative version of the *Sonderweg* (*special path*) thesis arguing that Nazism was the inevitable result of the German historical development and that the way German culture and society during the German Reich had developed inexorably culminated in the Third Reich. Both scholars agreed that the aggressive expansionist foreign policies of the German Empire (the 'social imperialism,' as Wehler put it), especially under Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-1918) were a device that allowed the German government to distract public attention from domestic problems, to impede democratization and modernization, and to preserve the existing social and political order.[517]

In Wehler's opinion since 1871 the unified Germany retained values that were aristocratic, feudal, anti-democratic and pre-modern. Wehler also asserted that the effects of the traditional power elite to maintain power up to 1945 "and in many respects even beyond that" took the form of "a penchant for authoritarian politics; a hostility toward democracy in the educational and party system; the influence of preindustrial leadership groups, values and ideas; the tenacity of the German state ideology; the myth of the bureaucracy; the superimposition of caste tendencies and class distinctions; and the manipulation of political anti-Semitism."[518]

Fritz Fisher, in turn, was the first historian who challenged the widely shared opinion that held all European powers equally responsible for the outbreak of the First World War and provided evidence that the German side had been primarily responsible for the outbreak of the war due to particularly expansionist war aims of its government. In his groundbreaking 1961 book *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegzielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914–1918* (published in English as *Germany's Aims in the First World War*), followed by his

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[517] Hans-Ulrich Wehler's major works of that period include: Sozialdemokratie und Nationalstaat. Nationalitätenfrage in Deutschland 1840–1914. Diss. (1962). Bismarck und der Imperialismus (1969). Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871–1918 (1970). Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918 (1973).

[518] Quoted in *Hamerow, Theodore S.* Guilt, Redemption and Writing German History // The American Historical Review, Vol. 88, February 1983. pp. 67-68.

other influential writings, he argued that Germany had deliberately instigated the First World War in an attempt to become a world power.[519]

In the late 1960s some other historians, particularly in such influential works as Martin Broszat's *The Hitler State* (1969) and Karl A. Schleunes's *The Twisted Road to Auschwitz* (1970), continued to challenge the prevailing intentionalist interpretation of the Holocaust's origin as a realization of a long-term program or plan by a small group of Nazis led by Hitler. The representatives of the emerging in the late 1960s and early 1970s functionalist school of historiography actually revealed the active engagement of the medium and lower ranking German officials, representatives of businesses and civil servants in the making of the policies that led to the Holocaust casting thereby blame for the "Final Solutions" wider than it had been accepted before.

Meanwhile the authoritarian tendencies in West German political life continued to prevail reaching their climax in the 1960s.[520] They were most vividly manifested in the *Spiegel Affair* (*Spiegel-Affäre*) of 1962 when a dozen representatives of *Der Spiegel* magazine were illegally arrested for critical publications, the magazine's offices and journalists' homes were aggressively searched with thousands of documents being confiscated and the magazine being accused of treason.

The same tendencies manifested, as noted previously, in the politics of the new coalition government run by the CDU Chancellor and former NSDAP member Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (in office 1966-1969). Despite the opposition, the government enacted in 1968 The German Emergency Acts which would allow it to limit civil rights, restrict freedom of movement and to limit privacy and confidentiality of telecommunications and correspondence in a case of emergency. The government also refused to recognize the postwar borders along Oder-Neisse line, to establish normal relationships with GDR and other Eastern neighbors, and repeatedly required the recognition of Germany's right to possess nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the mid-1960s were marked by a growing activity of the radical right-wing groups. Since 1964, the neo-Nazis, i.e. the people opposing the

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[519] *Fisher, Fritz.* Krieg der Illusionen: Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914 (1969). Bündnis der Eliten: Zur Kontinuität der Machstrukturen in Deutschland, 1871–1945 (1979). Hitler war kein Betriebsunfall: Aufsätze (1992).

[520] See the analysis of these tendencies in: *Jaspers, Karl.* Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik München. R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1966 [English translation: The Future of Germany. Chicago; London, 1967]; *Dahrendorf, Ralf.* Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, R. Piper & Co Verlag, München, 1965 [English translation: Society and Democracy in Germany. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967}.

very idea of "overcoming" the Nazi past, possessed an organizational center the National Democratic Party of Germany (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD*), which having lost the *Bundestag* elections, got nevertheless into *Landtags* of several federal states.

This general tendency made some leading German intellectuals beat an alarm. The psychoanalysts Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich in their 1967 publication *The Inability to Mourn* (*Die Unfaehigkeut zu trauern*) underscored the necessity of "a political working through of the past" and pointed to the failure of West Germany to fulfill it. The psychoanalysts claimed that in the Adenauer era, from 1949 to 1963, West Germans had collectively suppressed memories of their Nazi past and had failed to acknowledge the crimes committed in the name of National Socialism. As the authors asserted, "after the enormity of the catastrophe that lay behind it, […] the country seems to have exhausted its capacity to produce politically effective ideas"; as a result, political life froze into "mere administrative routine."[521]

Following Freudian theory and developing Adorno's argumentation the Mitscherlichs stated the necessity of the active process of 'remembering, repeating, working through' ('*erinnern, wiederholen, durcharbeiten*') with relation to the memory of the National Socialist past. They argued that unless people confronted the past and worked through the memories and implications of what had happened they could not truly get beyond those memories and events. They compared this to mourning a death of a loved one; a process that needs to be worked through before one can move on with one's life in a healthy way.[522]

Importantly, the Mitscherlichs' book was preceded by the 1966 publications by Theodor Adorno *Education after Auschwitz* (*Erziehung nach Auschwitz*) and Karl Jaspers *The Future of Germany* (*Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?*).

The essay of Adorno, initially broadcasted over radio, was devoted to the issue of the origin of Nazi crimes and the dangers of their repetition. Adorno analyzed in it social and psychological conditions which facilitate the formation of an "authoritarian personality" and transformation of a person into accessory, a participant in a crime or an executioner. Adorno formulated "the premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happen again," the task to create "an intellectual, cultural, and social climate in which a recurrence would

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[521] *Mitscherlich, Alexander; Mitscherlich, Margarete.* Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern: Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens, 1967 [English translation: The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior. New York: Grove Press, 1975.]

[522] Surrendering Freedom, Confronting the Past. Facing History and Ourselves, 2010. <http://tj.facinghistory.org/reading/surrendering-freedom-confronting-past>

no longer be possible, a climate, therefore, in which the motives that led to the horror would become relatively conscious."[523]

In his book on *The Future of Germany* (*Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?*) Jaspers, who viewed the Third Reich as a criminal regime with which the mankind could not coexist, argued that prevention of the awful past recurrence required maximum "truth and veracity." The philosopher regarded a true revolutionary change of the way of thinking as the major political and moral goal for the Federal Republic. He called on his compatriots to create "a clear, new historic consciousness": "Today, after a great, fateful caesura, we have to make a new start in approaching our own history. The bare facts have not changed, but the emphasis has."[524]

Jaspers' sharp critique of the West German conservative circles was caused by "a vacuum in political consciousness," by forgetting the past, by the fear of the truth. According to the philosopher, the political and moral task to found a new state in 1945 had not been performed to that day: "It was much easier to restore our living conditions than to regain our freedom of thought and political will."[525] "The last twenty years have shown that the Germans have not changed," concluded the author. The people did not become "democratically minded": "We have a parliamentary from of government and call it democracy, although in its present run it obscures rather than stimulates a democratic spirit. It not only fails to appeal to the citizens' sense of responsibility; it cripples it. It will not let them become citizens in the full sense of the word."[526]

Jaspers argued that people become ripe for democracy by becoming politically active and by accepting responsibility for solving concrete problems. In his view the "vacuum in political consciousness" manifested in the fact that Germans "still have no heartfelt political goals, no sense of standing on self-made ground, no inspiring will to freedom", that they "still have neither roots nor an ideal in politics, no sense of where we come from or where we are going, and hardly a present concern other than with our private welfare, with the good life, and with security."[527] This state of things could be overcome, in his view, only by eliminating any untruth from the core of the national political consciousness, by wanting freedom on the basis of the instances found in German history, when freedom existed but fell into decay, and by addressing the tasks in the present

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[523] *Adorno, Theodor.* Erziehung nach Auschwitz [Education After Auschwitz]. In: Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft II. Gesammelte Schriften, Band 10.2, 1966.
[524] *Jaspers, Karl.* The Future of Germany. Chicago; London, 1967. p. 89.
[525] Ibid. pp. 171, 57.
[526] Ibid.
[527] Ibid.

world situation. After all, he argued, "there is always a chance that ultimately man will conquer the unreason in himself."[528]

Notably, little by little intellectual, judicial, and social endeavors undertaken by intellectuals, civil society groups, and other social agents started taking root. The pursuit of "working through" the past that initially was a primarily intellectual preoccupation directed at relatively small audiences, became actually significantly amplified by the protest student movement of 1968. At that point even limited confrontation with the Nazi past was "no longer restricted to a discursive level but was increasingly anchored socioculturally."[529]

As Habermas's former doctoral student Hauke Brunkhorst has written, "'1968' was the 'hour of the intellectuals' because for the first time in German history the socially critical role of intellectuals was institutionalized."[530] Henceforth, as Dirk Moses conceptualized, politically committed professors and graduates in education, the media, and cultural life generally were in a position to effect the political culture of the Federal Republic and make it live up to the ideals contained in the Basic Law.[531]

As discussed in Chapter 3, over the course of the 1960s West Germany's campuses became the sites of protest against the establishment and status quo. In the mid-1960s student activists campaigned to reform Germany's anachronistic universities and screen Nazi-tainted professors and administrators. As the size of the student protests grew, so did their scope and the students' critique of the political system and German postwar society. The student activists pushed for a reform of those aspects of German society that had not been radically changed after 1945. To this end, they emphasized and criticized the lines of continuities that linked the Third Reich and the Federal Republic. The young activists were particularly enraged by the fact that the German elite and the capitalist order had easily survived the catastrophe they had caused.[532]

Thanks to the student movement which in the mid-1960s added a critical and very distinct voice to the discussions about the meaning of the Nazi past, West Germany's historical culture as a whole underwent substantial

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[528] Ibid. pp. 59-61, 173.

[529] *Schmidtke, Michael.* The German New Left and National Socialism. p. 189. In: *Steinweis, Alan S., Gassert, Philipp* (eds.) Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975. New York, Berghahn, 2005.

[530] *Brunkhorst, Hauke.* Die Intellektuelle im Land der Mandarine. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987. p. 131.

[531] *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. p. 203.

[532] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. p. 39. Se also: *Postone, Moishe.* After the Holocaust: History and Identity in West Germany. pp. 233-51. In: *Harms, Kathy; Reuter, Lutz R.; Dürr, Volker* (eds.) Coping with the Past: Germany and Austria after 1945. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990.

transformation. As the memory historian Wulf Kansteiner explained, by the late 1960s the political elite clearly faced a confluence of mutually reinforcing interpretations of the past, emanating from different spheres of West Germany's historical culture, that called into question some basic tenets of the political memory of the postwar years. As a result of these developments, politicians lost the leadership role in memory politics that they had occupied during the first ten years of the republic.[533]

The turning point during what historians used to call the "long 1960s" (by which the period stretching from the late 1950s to the early 1970s is meant) marked if not a general shift in historical consciousness, but an increasing diversification and fragmentation of West German's historical culture. The latter were caused, as it appears, by the establishment and significant expansion of the public sphere. According to Kansteiner, from that point forward, there were at least three major and more or less independent arenas of historical reflection: the visual media of cinema and especially television, working in close cooperation with the popular illustrated press; the national political scene that was covered extensively in the national highbrow press; and a large variety of specialized yet interconnected intellectual settings, including theater, art cinema, literature, law, architecture, and academic history. For about ten years, from the late 1940s to the late 1950s, as Kansteiner argued, those arenas had been surprisingly compatible. But they subsequently evolved in different directions, with television and politics continuing to favor consensual, defensive formats of collective memory, whereas some of the intellectual subfields, for example, law and literature, developed more critical types of historical reflection that challenged the conservative mainstream.[534]

Although real institutional changes in terms of memory have taken root very slowly, they did eventually take place due to the insistence of different social agents – agents of civil society. To illustrate, increasing criticism of organizations of former prisoners and survivors of the Nazi concentration camps in the mid-1960s forced local and state authorities to overcome their total passivity in confronting the past atrocities.

At first efforts aimed at turning the places of former concentration camps into the "sites of memory" (*lieux de mémoire*) belonged almost entirely to the former camps' inmates. Certainly, these initial attempts of survivors and their relatives to erect memorials, restore buildings and house displays of documents and "remainders" were very modest and their activities kept a very low profile,

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[533] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. pp. 218-19.

[534] Ibid. pp. 216-17.

particularly in terms of financing.[535] Notably, the emerging memorial sites were long perceived as centers of commemoration for certain groups of victims or their families, not as places for Germans to reflect on their nation's crimes. Any initial efforts to go beyond abstract or "general" commemoration of "the victims," attempts at documentation, with its inevitable focus on the crimes, were resisted. Only gradually, due to the persistent pressure exerted by organizations and committees of former prisoners and given the continued evidence of right-wing radicalism in West Germany, did the realization set in that memorial sites should also function as places of historical enlightenment.[536]

In 1965 the first serious permanent exhibition was constructed within the grounds of the former Dachau concentration camp (*Gedenkstätte Dachau*)[537] (the project was financially supported by the Bavarian state government) and in 1966 a document centre (*Dokumentenhaus*) was opened in the Bergen-Belsen Memorial Site where the first Jewish memorial had been erected by the former prisoners back in 1946. In 1965 Neuengamme Memorial Site (*KZ-Gedenkstätte Neuengamme*),[538] erected in 1953, was also expanded (a document center was added to it only in 1981).[539]

However, it took at least another decade until in the mid-1970s when a new generation of West Germans started actually transforming the former concentration camps' sites into "sites of learning" – places to explore what individual perpetrators of Nazism might have been like and how their individual victims had to suffer.

4.2.3 1970s

The change of power (*Machtwechsel*) as a result of September 1969 parliamentary elections and the subsequent formation of the first Social Democratic government in the history of the Federal Republic marked an important phase of transition in the official politics of memory.

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[535] *Lüdtke, Alf.* 'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany // Journal of Modern History, Vol. 65, № 3, September 1993. pp. 555-6.
[536] Ibid. See also *Niven, William.* Op. cit. pp. 14, 24.
[537] http://www.kz-gedenkstaette-dachau.de/
[538] Neuengamme memorial site (*KZ-Gedenkstätte Neuengamme*) is located at Jean-Dolidier-Weg 75 in Bergedorf. A first memorial was erected in 1953 on the site of the former camp garden. It was expanded in 1965, and a document house" was added in 1981. <http://www.kz-gedenkstaette-neuengamme.de/index.php?id=20>
[539] In fact, the focus was only on the main camps, e.g., Dachau or Neuengamme, but not on its dozens-and during the war, even hundreds - of subcamps (*Aupenlager*). The first study that mapped the local camps is *Frobe, Rainer* et al. Konzentrationslager in Hannover: KZ-Arbeit und Riistungsindustrie in der Spatphase des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Hildesheim, 1985.

Though like its predecessors the new government had to adopt an integrative approach focusing on the needs of the contemporaries of the Third Reich, it could not ignore the impulses emerging from the younger generation of Germans, whose support was determinant of the SPD's victory.[540] The new Social Democratic leaders - Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974) and Federal President Gustav Heinemann (1969-1974) - thus tried to shape the cultural memory of the Nazi past for the benefit of generations whose members had no personal memories of the Third Reich.

The SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt, who had himself actively resisted the Nazis and had been forced to leave Germany for Norway to escape Nazi persecution in 1933, adopted the politics of memory aimed at reconciliation and recognition of moral responsibility for the Nazi crimes. In 1970, with Brandt at the head of the West German state, the Bundestag held its first ever formal commemoration of 8 May, where Brandt pronounced his famous formulation stating that "no one is exempt from history."

Brandt also attempted to rebuild West Germany's relationship with the countries of the Eastern Bloc, pursuing in his government's New Eastern Policy (*Neue Ostpolitik*) paths of rapprochement and reconciliation that had been regarded as impossible by his predecessors in office.[541]

On 7 December, 1970 Chancellor Brandt signed the treaty with Poland (Treaty of Warsaw) recognizing the Oder-Neisse line between Germany and Poland as a permanent border, not to be changed by force. This was accepted as a "result of history" (*die Ergebnisse der Geschichte*). On the same day Brandt knelt down after laying a wreath at the memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943, the gesture seen as an obvious sign of the recognition of German guilt for what happened under the Nazis and during the war.

The image of Brandt's kneeling became, thus, in the minds of many Germans and Poles a powerful symbol of reconciliation policy based on moral principles and of the emergence in the Federal Republic of a growing acceptance of collective responsibility for the past crimes.[542] Thirty years later, at the dedication of Willy Brandt Square in Warsaw on 6 December, 2000, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder recalled how "this image of Willy Brandt kneeling had become a symbol of accepting the past and of understanding it as an obligation for reconciliation, as an obligation for a common future. Like so many

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[540] *Edinger, Lewis J.* Political Change in Germany: The Federal Republic after the 1969 Election // Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, № 4, July 1970. pp. 549–78.

[541] *Bender, Peter.* Die "Neue Ostpolitik" und ihre Folgen: Vom Mauerbau bis zur Vereinigung, 3rd Revised and Enlarged Edition, München, 1995. pp. 152–53, 179–80.

[542] *Marrus, Michael R.* Official Apologies and the Quest for Historical Justice. Toronto: Munck Centre for International Studies, 2006. p. 12.

Germans and Poles I will never forget this image. It has come to be a reminder and a political credo for entire generations."[543]

Back in the 1970s, however, the Brandt's signing the Warsaw Treaty and his kneeling in front of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising Memorial, symbolizing a radical break with the old course of the West German foreign policy, polarized German society. The Chancellor was heavily criticized by the conservative CDU/CSU opposition for betrayal of national interests, and for "wallowing in masochism." The cover of the popular *Der Spiegel* magazine, which came out a week later, posed the question, "Should Brandt Have Knelt?"

The attacks, however, did not make Brandt, who was awarded in 1971 the Nobel Peace Price for the *Ostpolitik*, change his policy. During the 1971 Week of Brotherhood he stated that, "The name of Auschwitz will remain a trauma for generations. Illusions are not allowed: the injuries that in the dark twelve years were done to the soul of the people of the victims and to the soul of the people of the perpetrators will not heal so rapidly. For the image of man was injured, man that we understand as the image of God." He thus drew the specific as well as general lessons: "This experience – it is the actual catastrophe of humanity, more than all wars and their horrors – burdens Jewry, not only Israel; and it burdens us Germans. Here the reference to the youth that was given the freedom of unaffectedness does not help. *No one is released from the responsibility of history*."[544]

Furthermore, Chancellor Brandt, President Heinemann and his successor President Walter Scheel (1974-1979) became the first federal government officials to sponsor exhibits and museums for the teaching of contemporary German history, breaking, thus, prolonged official silence on the crimes of the Third Reich. On 6 May, 1975 in the 30th anniversary of 8 May, 1945 address President Scheel remarked that, "Only if we don't forget can we again be proud to call ourselves Germans." Commenting on this statement, Bill Niven has pointed to the shift in 8 May commemoration in the 1970s "towards integrating self-critical awareness of the Nazi past into West-German self-understanding in the present, and one away from the vague, self-pitying and inculpatory tone of the 1950s and 1960s."[545]

In 1973 Federal President Gustav Heinemann initiated the first nationwide German history school competition, which evolved in a regular annual project. Interest in one's own history was to help develop in the younger generation of Germans the consciousness of responsibility. It was argued that without this knowledge of history the past could not be worked through. Therefore,

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[543] Ibid.

[544] Quoted in *Olick, Jeffrey K.* Op. cit. p. 301. (Italics added).

[545] See *Niven, William.* Op. cit. p. 105.

organizers of history competitions tried to focus young participants' attention not on simple retelling of the well-known events of 1933-1945, but on exploring German history, particularly from local and regional perspectives. Among the questions formulated by the organizers were such as, "How in everyday life the criminal character of the regime was manifested?"; "What laws were abused and why so many people actively supported the regime and/or adapted to it?" and, finally, "What should your outlook and your behavior aimed at peaceful co-existence of peoples be like?"

Since 1973 over 115,000 students have taken part in more than twenty students competitions on German history for the President's award and have submitted more than 25,000 papers in which their searching for clues to the past in their local areas got reflected.[546] Focusing on a different topic or question each time the competition that successfully has functioned till these days has stressed exploratory learning, or learning by discovery, and has demanded rather high level of autonomy on the part of participants. Competitors conduct on-site research, interview people, find newspaper articles, documents, publications, old photos, family papers, and use other archival materials in their projects. The final presentations are in a variety of forms including books, collages, exhibitions, and video documentations. The competitions, thus, have become a valuable not only in developing historical skills and understanding in young people, but also in preparing the way for future studies by historians.[547]

It is important to point out that some works by German school students indeed contained valuable information on various aspects of the history of the Third Reich. For instance, on the basis of numerous documentary sources collected by young participants the Körber Foundation together with German Evangelical Church organized in the mid-1980s a mobile exhibition devoted to the destinies of the Soviet prisoners of war and *Osterbeiters*.[548]

Historical and political education as well as historical and political didactics were gradually becoming elements of German system of education, creating thus conditions for "working through" the past in German schools. History didactics (*Geschichtsdidaktik*) as a science of history learning has become an independent scientific discipline dealing with the important category of

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[546] *Giersberg, Dagmar.* History, an Eye-Opening Experience – Young People Search for Clues about the Past. June, 2008. < http://www.goethe.de/ges/pok/dos/dos/ern/lag/en3501814.htm >

[547] *Roberts, Martin.* German History. A Pupils' Competition for the Federal President's Prize. <http://www.euroclio.eu/site/index.php>

[548] *Boroznyak, Alexander.* Kak nemetskie shkol'niki uchastvujut v postizhenii natsistskogo proshlogo. In: Proshloe, kotoroe ne uhodit. Ocherki istorii i istoriografii Germanii 20 veka. Ekaterinburg, 2004. pp. 174-91. *Boroznyak, Aleksandr.* Protiv zabvenija. Kak nemetskie shkol'niki sohranjajut pamjat' o tragedii sovetskikh plennykh I osterbaiterov. Moscow: Pik, 2006. p. 58.

'historical consciousness,' including the mental operations (emotional and cognitive, conscious and unconscious), through which experienced time in the form of memory is used as a means of orientation in everyday life.[549] In the 1970s and 1980s this category evolved into one of the key categories of history didactics. This increased interest in pedagogy and didactics reflected the awareness that young people needed to be informed, especially in view of the danger of neo-Nazism.[550]

In the 1970s academic history also underwent significant transformations. The usual methods of historical analysis were strongly challenged by the rise of the history of everyday life (*Alltagsgeschichte*) that rapidly evolved in an influential popular movement. As Wulf Kansteiner explained, *Alltagsgeschichte*, as an intellectual movement, "represented a critical appropriation of a number of different traditions: the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt school, in particular, Habermas's writings, and the writings of independent Marxist philosophers such as Ernst Bloch; the phenomenological and ethnological traditions of German sociology, reaching as far back as Edmund Husserl; the debates on fascism that occupied West Germany's leftist intellectuals in the 1960s; and various imports such as Anglo-American anthropology (for instance, Clifford Greetz's), Michel Foucault's theory of power, and Peirre Bourdiue's theory of practical action, as well as microhistorical and neo-Marxist role exemplars such as the works of Carlo Ginzburg, Natalie Davis, and E.P. Thompson."[551]

Institutionally, the movement drew support from several West German research institutions like the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, the Max Planck Institute in Göttingen, the Open University in Hagen, and most important, from a large number of local, grassroots initiatives loosely organized in an association of history workshops. Especially the latter were firmly rooted in the new social movements. Originally, however, history workshop movement of the 1970s (just like multiple citizen-initiatives of the same period) evolved from the protest student movement of 1968, whose critical stance on the past gave rise to the intellectual as well as organizational side of *Alltagsgeschichte*. Importantly, some projects within everyday history framework were launched by highly motivated, liberal historians outside academia.[552]

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[549] *Rüsen, Jörn.* The Didactics of History in West Germany: Towards a New Self-Awareness of Historical Studies // History and Theory 26, 1987. p. 275-86. *Rüsen, Jörn.* What is Historical Consciousness? - A Theoretical Approach to Empirical Evidence. Paper presented at Canadian Historical Consciousness in an International Context: Theoretical Frameworks, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC. 2001. p. 2.

[550] *Niven, William.* Op. cit. p. 26.

[551] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. pp. 65-67.

[552] Ibid.

However, as a popular phenomenon, *Alltagsgeschichte* went far beyond a definite number of local projects, producing a wave of publications aimed at the general audience, resulting in an unprecedented wave of exhibitions and new museums, and sparking new ways of doing history, such as the history workshops.[553]

Although *Alltagsgeschichte* was initially not focused on the Holocaust theme only, this topic soon attracted much research interest. As a result, many local and regional studies finally gave voices to the victims of the Nazi policies of persecution and extermination, primarily its Jewish victims. Increased interest in the history of everyday life, both within and outside academia, produced a wave of publications which provided details about life in the Third Reich to generations whose members had no personal memories of the period.[554] In this way *Alltagsgeschichte* considerably broadened the social involvement in the process of confronting the Nazi past, thoroughly transforming West Germany's historical culture. More and more Germans, especially young people, started realizing the necessity to remember the victims. They took part in student competitions, were getting involved in history workshops or participating in the educational projects within former concentration camps' sites.[555]

Perhaps most important, however, is that *Alltagsgeschichte* gradually changed West German television, especially its image of Nazism. Although German public television had always addressed the topic of Nazism, albeit often in a detached, "objective," and heavy-handed manner, beginning in the late 1970s a new generation of television producers and executives bought and produced large numbers of programs that presented the history of the Third Reich from the perspective of an average citizen. Visually attractive and cast in popular formats, such as docudramas and TV films featuring standard, popular plot types, these programs were very successful with audiences. Late 1970s, as Wulf Kansteiner asserted, were also marked by the onset of *the survival paradigm* on television.[556]

Starting in 1978 television makers started interviewing survivors both in Germany and abroad and the first wave of survival narratives, thus, consisted of documentaries and features which developed the dialectic of suffering and

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[553] On the origins and further developments of the history workshops in Germany, see *Frei, Alfred.* Geschichtswerkstätten als Zukunftswerkstätten. Ein Plädoyer für aufklärerische Geschichtsarbeit. In: *Paul, Gerhard; Schoßig, Bernhard* (eds.) Die andere Geschichte. Geschichte von unten, Spurensicherung, Ökologische Geschichte, Geschichtswerkstätten, Köln: Bund, 1986. pp. 258-85.

[554] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. p. 46.

[555] *Lüdtke, Alf.* 'Coming to Terms with the Past': Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany // Journal of Modern History, Vol. 65, № 3, September 1993. pp. 555-6.

[556] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. pp. 65-67.

survival on the basis of individual case studies. The second wave of survival narratives, however, was directly linked to the success of the US-made *Holocaust* TV miniseries (1978) aired in January 1979.[557]

The film *Holocaust* that dramatized the fate of German-Jewish Weiss family forced German audiences to confront the human dimension of the Nazis' mass murder. Importantly, the film was watched by more than 20 million Germans, i.e. by more than 50 percent of the country's adult population, reaching thus more people than any other broadcasting of the German television networks that dealt with the topic of contemporary history up to that date. The percentage of younger people among the viewers was remarkably high: about 56 percent of the viewers were people who had completed only elementary schooling, and about 15 percent were only 8 to 13 years old.[558]

Furthermore, *Holocaust* TV miniseries caused immense and intensive response of the thousands of viewers. Although the ground for the response had been prepared by the networks in advance (weeks before the actual dates, preparatory broadcasts and press previews partially outlined the film and its story; schools were provided with information packages and the network managers stirred public debate), the reaction was totally unexpected.

The film was shown in parts on four consecutive evenings. After each part the viewers were offered open-ended opportunities to phone in and ask questions or offer comments. Panels of specialists represented by survivors of the Holocaust and professional historians were available to answer questions and exchange opinions on the film as well as on German fascism in general. But no one could predict the emotional outpouring that the broadcast of the NBC miniseries caused.[559]

During four evenings the WDR studio received about 10,000 incoming telephone calls. According to the Jewish historian Julius Schöps, who witnessed the public's reaction, "For many people in the Federal Republic, *Holocaust* was an emotional introduction, the first encounter with the almost incomprehensible horrors of the Nazi regime. More than just a few became aware for the first time that they had repressed the murder of the Jews that was committed in the name of the German people and had previously avoided dealing with the past. […] Over the course of the four evenings on which *Holocaust* was broadcast, there were more and more voices who claimed not to have seen, heard, or known anything. Some were ashamed, blamed themselves, some cried. […] Most calls revolved around the concepts of "forgetting," "guilt," and "How could it have

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[557] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. pp. 115-16.

[558] *Lüdtke, Alf.* Op. cit. p. 545.

[559] Ibid. pp. 544-45.

come to that?" I could not help feeling that many callers felt the need to talk with someone to let out their feelings of sadness, consternation, and shame."[560] Schöps added that anyone who took note of the initial telephone response to the film was left with the surprising impression that there had been no sustained discussion in the Federal Republic of the Nazi past up to that time.[561]

In the survey conducted after the broadcast to explore the reactions the film generated among the audiences more than 80 percent of the respondents told that in their view the film presented an appropriate interpretation of the situation and living conditions under Nazism. And more than half of the respondents acknowledged to have talked to relatives, friends and colleagues about the film. Among those who had watched the film, votes approving a "moral obligation of Germany to pay compensation and restitution" increased remarkably (45 percent accepted this line before the broadcasting, while 54 percent of those who had watched it agreed afterward). Also, the statement that all adults during Nazism "shared at least some guilt" was rated positive by more people after they had watched the film (16 percent before, 22 percent afterward).[562]

Critics argued that the showing of the miniseries accomplished much more than the historical research, extensive educational activities in schools and in the media had achieved during the previous years. Thanks to this rather non-intricate film millions of viewers for some hours became able to replace quite common attitude of bystanders by sympathy and identification with the sufferings of Nazi victims. For the first time in the postwar period most West Germans started to realize, quoting the historian Hans Mommsen, that "the burden of the Nazi past has not been lightened" and that "the historical consequences of the "Thousand Year Reich" have not been resolved."[563]

Furthermore, the film also semantically affected the historical discourse: following the broadcast the term *the Holocaust* has gained widespread acceptance and has become widely used in Germany to refer to the extermination of the European Jews, euphemistically defined by Nazis as the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" (*Endlösung der Judenfrage*).

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[560] *Schöps, Julius H.* Angst vor der Vergangenheit? Notizen zu den Reaktionen auf 'Holocaust' ["Fear of the Past? Notes on the Reaction to 'Holocaust'"]; In: *Märtesheimer, Peter; Frenzel, Ivo* (eds.) Im Kreuzfeuer. Der Fernsehfilm 'Holocaust.' Eine Nation ist betroffen [In the Crossfire. The Television Film 'Holocaust.' A Nation is Moved]. Frankfurt am Main, 1979, pp. 325-27.

[561] Ibid.

[562] *Lüdtke, Alf.* Op. cit. p. 545.

[563] *Mommsen, Hans.* Die Last der Vergangenheit. In: *Habermas, Jürgen* (ed.) Stichworte zur "Geistigen Situation der Zeit." Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979. p. 164.

It can be argued that the film showing also affected rethinking of the past in the religious circles of West Germany. The "working through" of the past by Christian churches, which gradually led to the recognition of moral and political responsibility for the catastrophe, was linked to the fact that after Hitler's rise to power the churches – Protestant and Catholic, European and American – could speak in support of Jews, but never did so.[564]

The moral issues, in particular, the attitude of the papacy during World War II and the Holocaust had been critically assessed by historians and artists already in the early postwar period. For instance, as early as November 1950 historian Léon Poliakov was one of the first to address these problems in his article *The Vatican and the 'Jewish Question' - The Record of the Hitler Period-And After* that appeared in the influential Jewish journal *Commentary*. In 1963, due to the publication of the *Der Stellvertreter* by the German playwright Rolf Hochhuth, the discussion of Poliakov's initial investigations in this area took on worldwide significance. In 1968 the Jewish philosopher Emil Fackenheim wrote: "The Gentile world shuns Auschwitz because of the terror of Auschwitz—and because of real or imagined implication in the guilt for Auschwitz."[565]

The recognition of responsibility by the church representatives, however, came much later and was linked, to a large extent, to the general shift in perception of the Nazi crimes in German society after the broadcast of the *Holocaust* miniseries.

In December 1979 on the occasion of the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Holocaust, a man who helped spiritually prepare the way for changes in Christian–Jewish relations, the Lutheran theologian Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt wrote: "Today Auschwitz stands for us like a judgment upon our Christianity, upon the way we as Christians were and are today… Auschwitz is for us a call to change. Not only our behavior, but our beliefs themselves must change. Auschwitz must not only lead to consequences for ethics but also for Christian belief. Auschwitz calls us to hear God's word today, transformed from the ways in which it was handed down to us by teachers of theology and preachers in past generations. This change affects the essence of Christianity as we have understood it up to now."[566]

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[564] *Lezov, Sergei.* Christianity after Auschwitz at <http://www.vehi.net/asion/lesev.html>

[565] *Fackenheim Emil* L., Jewish Faith and the Holocaust, in: Philosophy in the Age of Crisis, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.

[566] *Marquardt, Friedrich-Wilhelm.* Christsein nach Auschwitz // Freiburger Rundbrief: Zeitschrift zur christlich-jüdischen Begegnungen. Dezember, 1979. XXXI Folge. Nummer 117-120. p. 87. Also: *Marquardt, Friedrich-Wilhelm; Friedländer, Albert Hoschander*. Das Schweigen der Christen und die Menschlichkeit Gottes. Gläubige Existenz nach Auschwitz, München 1980. pp. 9 – 10.

The recognition of the church's responsibility for the genocide was expressed, in particular, in the declaration "Toward Renovation of the Relationship of Christians and Jews" made by the Synod of the Evangelical Church of the Rhineland in January 1980.[567]

Notably, in the same year when the US-made TV miniseries *Holocaust* transformed the West German public opinion the screen adaptation of the Günter Grass's novel *The Tin Drum* (*Die Blechtrommel*, 1979) by the German film director Volker Schlöndorff won an Oscar Academy Award for Best Foreign Film as well as the Palme d'Or at the 1979 Cannes Film Festival.

4.2.4 1980s

The political elite of the Federal Republic could not definitely ignore the shift in the media discourse and public perception of the Nazi crimes in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. In an immediate, symbolic reaction to the television film *Holocaust*, in July 1979, the parliament abolished the statute of limitations for murders committed during the Nazi period, an option politicians had rejected for several decades. During the following years, West Germany's political leaders slowly and tentatively shifted their attention toward the victims of the "Final Solution."

In 1985, in response to the growing attempts of the right-wing extremists either to deny the Holocaust, the existence of the gas chambers, or to diminish the scope of extermination of the Jews (the so-called "revisionism" or "negationism" *(Negationismus))*, a new Section 130 was inserted into the German Criminal Code in 1985 (later revised in 1992, 2002, and 2005) to punish the so-called "Auschwitz lie" (*Auschwitz-Lüge*). According to subsections 3 and 4 of the 130 Section, "Whosoever publicly or in a meeting approves of, denies or downplays an act committed under the rule of National Socialism of the kind indicated in Section 6.1 of the Code of International Criminal Law, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine" (Section 130.3) and, "Whosoever publicly or in a meeting disturbs the public peace in a manner that violates the dignity of the victims by approving of, glorifying, or justifying National Socialist rule of

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[567] Landessynode der Evangelischen Kirche *im* Rheinland*:* Synodalbeschluss zur Erneuerung des Verhältnisses von Christen und J*ü*den. 11. Januar 1980.
<http://www.horstkannemann.de/erneuerung.html>.

arbitrary force shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than three years or a fine" (Section 130.4).[568]

Representatives of the public, who argued that the new section would limit the freedom of expression and who, therefore, questioned the imposition of criminal legal notion of "the Holocaust denial" as a means of coming to terms with the past and insisted instead on political education, could not get their way because of the specificity of the German past.[569]

Furthermore, in 1994 the country's Federal Constitutional Court confirmed that Holocaust revisionism is not protected under the Basic Law's guarantee of freedom of expression: "In weighing the importance of free speech against that of individual rights, courts must consider on the one hand the severity of the offense caused by Holocaust denial to the Jewish population in light of the suffering inflicted upon it by Germany. On the other hand, the opinion expressed is not particularly deserving of protection," the Constitutional Court judges wrote, "stemming as it does from a claim of fact that has been proven untrue. This court has consistently protected the personal honor of those defamed above the right of others to make patently false statements."[570]

Perhaps the most vivid and symbolically important event of the 1980s was the Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker's (1984-1994) speech delivered on 8 May, 1985 in the Bundestag during the Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the End of the War in Europe and of National Socialist Tyranny.

In his speech Weizsäcker presented a clear moral evaluation of the Third Reich, stressing the importance of "working through" the traumatic past. He stated, "All of us, whether guilty or not, whether old or young, must accept the past. We are all affected by its consequences and liable for it. The young and old generations must and can help each other to understand why it is vital to keep alive the memories. It is not a case of coming to terms with the past. That is not possible. It cannot be subsequently modified or made not to have happened. However, anyone who closes his eyes to the past is blind to the present. Whoever

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[568] § 130 Volksverhetzung. Bundesministerium der Justiz. Trans. by Michael Bohlander. <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html>

[569] For further analysis and references, see *Stein, Eric.* History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the "Auschwitz"- and Other - "Lies" // Michigan Law Review 85, November 1986. pp. 277-323. *Meier, Horst.* Das Strafrecht gegen die "Auschwitzlüge" // Merkur 12. December 1994. pp. 1128-1132.

[570] Freedom of Speech and Recent Legal Controversies in Germany <http://www.fpp.co.uk/ActionReport/AR14/GermanGovt0798.html>

refuses to remember the inhumanity is prone to new risks of infection. … [L]et us face up as well as we can to the truth."[571]

For the first time a national leader called the 8th of May "a day of liberation" (not a day of capitulation): "It liberated all of us from the inhumanity and tyranny of the National Socialist regime. Nobody will, because of that liberation, forget the grave suffering that only started for many people on 8 May. But we must not regard the end of the war as the cause of flight, expulsion and deprivation of freedom. The cause goes back to the start of the tyranny that brought about war. We must not separate May 8, 1945, from January 30, 1933."[572]

While retaining the focus on German victimhood that had dominated West German's historical culture for three postwar decades, Weizsäcker integrated and named all victims of National Socialism – Jews, the Sinti and Romany Gypsies, the homosexuals, the mentally ill, the Communists, etc. In his speech Weizsäcker also managed to pay tribute to the paradigm of Holocaust uniqueness or exceptionalism advanced by left-wing intellectuals and, primarily, by Jürgen Habermas. The Weizsäcker's speech, integrating, thus, the main ideas and appeals of the leading German philosophers such as Jaspers, Adorno, Mitscherlich, Habermas presented an attempt to introduce the political program of antifascist consensus in a West German society. This endeavor was characterized by the *Suddeusche Zeitung* as the "courage of truth comprehension."[573]

However, despite the important Weizsäcker's intervention and legal attempts to prevent the Holocaust denial, the general official tendency of the 1980s was aimed not at "working through" the past but at "normalization" of Germany's history. Already in the mid-1970s, after the transfer of power to conservatives, following the 1973 oil crisis, a general economic downturn, and the rise of neoconservative ideology, the CDU governments' leaders have predominantly pursued normalization path portraying West Germany as "a Normal Nation," one with the same problems as other Western states and with a history that included "highs as well as lows." Beginning less dramatically with the pragmatist Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982) in 1974 and entering a more authentically neoconservative phase with Federal President Walter Scheel

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[571] *Weizsäcker, Richard von.* Speech in the Bundestag during the Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the End of the War in Europe and of National Socialist Tyranny, 8 May, 1985. In: *Hartman, Geoffrey* (ed.) Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.

[572] Ibid.

[573] Suddeusche Zeitung. 9. Mai 1985.

(1974-1979) in the mid-1970s, normalization continued to be a catchword in the 1980s.[574]

Since the early 1980s the Kohl's CDU government (1982-1998), signaled its intention to inaugurate a "spiritual-moral change" (*geistig-moralische Wende*) in German society in order to repair what was believed to be the cultural damage of "1968" which had allegedly weakened or even destroyed the basis for common values and a shared sense of belonging of West Germans. Thus, part of neo-conservatives agenda was in fostering a degree of national pride in order to counter what was seen as the wider population's lack of emotional attachment to their German identity and to the West German state. The intention to normalize the West German present above all meant addressing the way the Nazi past had come to impinge on national identity. A German normality, for Kohl, would imply, first, that the Hitler period should be "historicized" – the twelve years of the National Socialist dictatorship should be viewed as one historical era among many others and not as an inevitable culmination of a national story doomed to disaster from the very beginning – and, second, that the war-time experiences of ordinary Germans should be approached with emphatic understanding.[575]

If Brandt's idea of reconciliation was based on humility and a sense of guilt, Kohl's was based on erasure of the difference between Germans and their victims, on, in other words, the exculpations of Germans under Hitler.[576] In developing this all-victims-together narrative Kohl wished to encourage greater historical consciousness, with special emphasis on the positive, legitimating features of the German past.

In his inauguration address of March 1983 Chancellor Kohl brought up the 750s anniversary of Berlin to occur in 1987, which the government developed as a significant symbolic moment. Additionally, he announced the plans for two historical museums: a German Historical Museum to be opened in Berlin during the celebration year, and a collection on German history to be opened later in Bonn.

Naturally, left-wing politicians and intellectuals were anxious with ethnically nationalist basis of the conservative identity project, rehabilitating the

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[574] See *Olick, Jeffrey K.* The Sins of the Fathers: The Third Reich and West German Legitimation, 1949-1989. Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1993. *Olick, Jeffrey K.* What Does it Mean to Normalize the Past? Official Memory in German Politics since 1989 // Social Science History, Vol. 22, № 4, Winter 1998. pp. 547- 71.

[575] *Ensink, Titus; Sauer, Christoph* (eds.) The Art of Commemoration: Fifty years after the Warsaw Uprising. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co, 2003. pp. 86-87.

[576] *Niven, William.* Op. cit. p. 105.

language of *Heimat*, *Vaterland*, *Volk*, and nation.[577] They regarded the nationalist rhetoric of neoconservatives in the framework of politics of normalization as relativizing and apologetic and strongly opposed their agenda.

For instance, since the early 1980s Social Democrats opposed Kohl's government endeavors to rehabilitate those Germans who had served the Third Reich, demanding to ban the highly controversial reunions of former Waffen-SS members. Their demands, however, were repeatedly blocked by Kohl's government, and in 1983 the veterans' organizations of the Waffen-SS were removed from a list of extremist right-wing groups on which the West German Ministry of Interior was required to make annual reports to Parliament.[578]

Left-wing intellectuals and politicians were particularly indignant at the symbolic reconciliation performed on the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II in 1985 by Helmut Kohl and Ronald Reagan at the Bitburg German military cemetery, where among the graves of the German soldiers there were some graves of the Waffen-SS troops' members.

Intellectual polarization in treating the past brought about the Historian's Dispute *(Historikerstreit)* – the major intellectual event of the 1980s, summarizing a whole series of debates on German identity and coming to terms with the past.

The dispute was actually launched by conservative historian Ernst Nolte's article published in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on 6 June, 1986 entitled *The Past that Does Not Want to Pass Away* (*Die Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will*). In a short response to the Nolte's article in which he denied the historical singularity of Auschwitz, characterized by him as a reaction to and imitation of similar events in the Soviet Union and thus "a mere technical innovation," Jürgen Habermas rejected this position and accused Nolte as well as some other right-wing historians (in particular Andreas Hillgruber and Kohl's historical advisor Michael Stürmer) of seeking to whitewash the German past. Habermas was especially concerned that Nolte's argument undermined the thesis of the Holocaust uniqueness. In his *Die Zeit* publication Habermas argued that conservatives had violated the prior consensus stipulating that "after Auschwitz we can only create national self-confidence by selectively appropriating our more suitable traditions" through rigorous self-critical examination.[579] Instead, he claimed, conservative historians now engaged again in "reviving a sense of

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[577] *Weigelt, Klaus* (ed.) Heimat und Nation. Zur Geschichte und Identitaet der Deutschen.Mainz, 1984. pp. 9–14.

[578] See Bitburg Controversy // Encyclopedia Judaica.
<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0003_0_03029.html>

[579] *Augstein, Rudolf* (ed.) Historikerstreit: Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung. Munchen: Piper, 1987.

identity naively rooted in national consciousness."[580] Habermas, in turn, insisted that the only acceptable patriotism for the Federal Republic was a "constitutional patriotism" (*Verfassungspatriotismus*), rooted in a commitment to and identification with the democratic political order and the German Constitution, as well as in attachment to the Western community of values. At the same time such patriotism, in his view, could be secured only by placing consciousness of Auschwitz at the center of collective identity.[581]

The debate, in the center of which were the views of Ernst Nolte and Jürgen Habermas, but which involved many other influential neoconservatives (Andreas Hillgruber, Klaus Hildebrand, Rainer Zitelmann, Hagen Schulze, and Michael Stürmer, Joachim Fest) and left-liberals (Hans Mommsen, Jürgen Kocka, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Martin Broszat, Heinrich August Winkler, Eberhard Jäckel, and Wolfgang Mommsen) excited immense public interest in West Germany. Between 1986 and 1988, the Historian's Dispute produced some 1,200 texts, ranging in size from single newspaper articles to extended monographs, with as many as a hundred articles per month at one point.[582] As the historian Charles Maier summed it up, "This debate has signaled an important moment of German national self-interrogation. It has produced the major discussion of historical responsibility and national consciousness of the last two decades."[583]

Notably, the intensified public concern about the Nazi legacy in the Federal Republic coincided or rather commenced (just like in the 1960s) a new wave of Holocaust research. The study of the Holocaust from everyday history perspective has continued to strengthen the survivors and witnesses paradigm in historical research in the 1980s. As Saul Friedländer has pointed out, "The *Alltagsgeschichte* of German society has its necessary shadow: the *Alltagsgeschichte* of its victims," and this growing understanding led to the increasing penetration into the daily life of the victims of the Third Reich.[584] In the 1980s new collections of Holocaust survivors witnesses' accounts and several important works analyzing previous evidence saw light. One of them was the 1982 work by Monika Richarz who edited autobiographical writings of German Jews about life

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[580] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. p. 45.

[581] *Moses, Dirk.* Op. cit. p. 232. See also: *Habermas, Jürgen.* Eine Art Schadensabwicklung: Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung. In: *Augstein, Rudolf* (ed.) "Historikerstreit" Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung. Munchen: R. Piper. 1987. pp. 62 – 76.

[582] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. p. 57. However, the impact of the debate on the broader public should not be overestimated. The dispute was conducted almost exclusively in the print media – newspapers *Die Zeit* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.*

[583] *Maier, Charles S.* Op.cit. pp. 1-2.

[584] *Friedländer, Saul.* Memory, History and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe. Indiana University Press, 1993.

in Nazi Germany breaking with the historiographical convention which had represented "the Jews as nameless, passive victims of an all-powerful machinery of destruction."[585]

Both German and foreign historians and historiographers continued to probe more deeply into the history of the Nazi genocide. In 1980 Hermann Langbein's *People in Auschwitz* (*Menschen in Auschwitz*) was published and in 1985 Raul Hilberg revised and republished his three-volume edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*.[586]

The last Primo Levi's book *The Drowned and the Saved (I sommersi e i salvati)*, where he tried to analyze the motives of people's actions in the concentration camp, appeared in 1986.[587] Without making judgments but focusing on the evidence and posing questions, Levi tried the analyze the problematic aspects of the victims' world, examining, for example, the so-called "grey area," in which Jews themselves did the Germans' dirty work for them and kept the rest of the prisoners in line. "What made a concert violinist behave as a callous taskmaster?" asked the author, for instance.

Gradually the figure of a Holocaust survivor has becoming not only an important object of inquiry, but one of the key symbolic figures in the German public sphere. Starting in the 1980s German school opened their doors to the witnesses of the Nazi era, who talked with students about the struggle for survival and persecution in the National Socialist state. Oral history, i.e. preserving the personal experiences and memories of the contemporaries of the past events has become a generally accepted method of studying modern history.

As for the television, in a response to the astounding success of the *Holocaust* TV miniseries, starting in early the ZDF has commissioned, purchased and broadcasted Holocaust fiction showing the everyday histories of Nazi anti-Semitic policies. The ZDF productions of Lion Feuchtwanger's *Geschwister Oppermann* (1983) and Ralf Giordano's *Die Bertinis* (1988), both directed by Egon Monk, *Die Durchreise* (1993) by Peter Weck, *Regentropfen* (1982) by Harry Raymon

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[585] Quoted in *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. p. 47. See also: *Richarz, Monika.* Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland: Zeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte 1918-1945, Vol. 3. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlsgsanstalt, 1982. pp. 7, 40. Another publication: *Hilberg, Raul* (ed.) Im Warschauer Getto. Das Tagebuch des Adam Czerniaków 1939–1942, Beck, München 1986. (Original: The Warsaw diary of Adam Czerniaków. Prelude to doom. Stein, Day, New York, 1979).

[586] *Langbein, Hermann.* Menschen in Auschwitz. München, Ullstein, Frankfurt 1980. The first edition of Hilberg's 1961 research appeared in Germany in 1982 and revised edition in 1992. *Hilberg, Raul.* Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden. Durchgesehene und erweiterte Taschenbuchausgabe in drei Bänden. Olle & Wolter, Berlin 1982. urchgesehene und erweiterte Taschenbuchausgabe in drei Bänden, S. Fischer, Frankfurt an Main, 1990/1991.

[587] German Edition: *Levi, Primo.* Die Untergegangenen und die Geretteten, übers. v. Moshe Kahn, Hanser, München 1990.

and Michael Hoffman presented really successful narratives of persecution and survival during Nazism. Additionally, the ZDF purchased and showed international television bestsellers like Dan Curtis's miniseries *The Winds of War* (1983) after Herman Wouk' novel, Robert Enrico's *Der Schrei nach Leben* (1983), Brian Gibson's *Murderers Among Us: The Simon Wiesenthal Story* (1989), Daniel Mann's *Playing for Time (1980),* Alan J. Pakula*'s Sophie's Choice* (1982) and other films.[588]

In March 1986 West German television broadcasted in prime-time (except for Bavaria) the Claude Lanzmann nine hour-long film *Shoah* (1985) consisting of interviews with witnesses, victims and perpetrators of the Holocaust and the discussions of their visits to different places - Chełmno, where gas vans were first used to exterminate Jews; the death camps of Treblinka and Auschwitz-Birkenau; and the Warsaw Ghetto.

Besides, a number of TV programs about Nazi anti-Jewish policies shown from the survivors' perspective presented a vital addition to Germany's television landscape as they exposed German viewers to a historical perspective, which had been insufficiently represented in Germany's historical culture for many years.

At the same time attentive critics continued to stress that the identification of the viewer with perpetrators and bystanders of the "Final Solution" was problematic. Wulf Kansteiner summed up the representation of Nazi crimes in the Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen (ZDF) programs in the following way. "The programs do not present the perspective on the crimes which was most familiar to the contemporaries of Nazism among the viewers, i.e., the perspective of bystanders and perpetrators. Instead, television selectively supplied the point of view of the victims projected after the fact; it conducted an imaginary dialogue with the survivors and thus, at least on a symbolic level, circumvented the very result of the mass murder which made a real dialogue and a possible reconciliation with the victims impossible. By means of television Germans have seen some images of persecution which they or their forefathers have themselves witnessed, for instance the pogroms of 1938, or the deportations of Jewish citizens. But more often television brought eyewitness accounts and real and reenacted images of scenes which even most contemporaries have never seen with their own eyes: Jews in their embattled homes, Jews in hiding, Jews on their way to the ghettos and camps, the foreign world of the concentration camp universe, and survivors interviewed in foreign countries. Television became the window to the hidden world of persecution. It satisfied the curiosity born from the desire to see what one has only heard or read about. In comparison, some

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[588] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. p. 116.

crimes which did occur close to home right under the eyes of German citizens, 'Euthanasia,' the abuse of the forced laborers and POWs, the local camps all over the country, these visually more familiar and maybe also more threatening images are not reproduced on television. Most important, these events are never represented from the perspective of the German population in ways which urge viewers to identify with that population's point of view and deal with the legacy of silence."[589]

Kansteiner argued that according to its television image, the Holocaust was a crime without perpetrators and bystanders, at least until the early 1990s. German television had made a considerable effort to give faces and voices to survivors, but it never thought to identify the people who committed the crimes or those who watched the catastrophe unfold and remained passive. Kansteiner maintained his argument by quoting the critical commentary by Barbara Sichtermann who wrote in the context of the 1988 broadcast of *Die Bertinis*: "If television wants to critically reflect the past, including the NS past, the perpetrators have to begin to appear on the screen, as subjects and not as caricatures."[590]

The resounding resignation of the Bundestag President Philip Jenninger in 1988 due to a falsely construed Bundestag speech on the 50th anniversary of the 1938 anti-Semitic "Night of Broken Glass" *(Kristallnacht)* pogrom vividly revealed the fact that confronting perpetration was still highly problematic during the 1980s and that the tainted past was far from being either "worked through" or "left behind." Jenninger's attempt to explain the racist behavior of his compatriots, rather than focusing on the suffering of the Jews, was seen as having broken a taboo, caused a political storm and cost the speaker, who resigned his Bundestag presidency on 11 November, 1988, his post. Interestingly, one year after the incident, the Jewish community leader Ignatz Bubis, who later became chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany (*Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland*), used several passages of Jenninger's speech, underscoring that the content of Jenningers speech had not been wrong, just his performance of

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[589] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Entertaining Catastrophe: History of the Screen and the Book: The Reinvention of the Holocaust in the Television and Historiography of the Federal Republic of Germany // New German Critique 90, Fall, 2003. pp. 135-62.

[590] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* 2006. Op. cit. pp. 122-23. See also: *Sichtermann, Barbara.* Das Tabu // Die Zeit, 11 Novermber, 1988.

it.[591] The reading of the speech indeed suggests that Jenninger actually urged his compatriots to identify with the perspective of the Holocaust bystanders.[592]

4.2.5 1990s and beyond

The conservative trajectory aimed at normalization of history continued after the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification of the two parts of Germany in 1990. Helmut Kohl, who won a landslide victory in the first since the Weimar Republic all-German 1990 elections and formed his forth cabinet, reinforced the normalization politics combining both the all-victims-together and the anti-totalitarian paradigms.[593]

In 1992, two years after unification and without parliamentary consultation, Chancellor Kohl declared his intention to make a building known as the *Neue Wache* in Berlin united Germany's central national memorial to 'the victims of war and the rule of violence.' In 1993 the *Neue Wache* was rededicated as the "Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Victims of War and Tyranny." Another new site, Bonn's House of History, which was supposed to become one of united Germany's main historical museums, alongside the German Historical Museum in Berlin, was launched on 14 June, 1994.

Notably, in the conception of the House of History, plans for which date back to the 1980s, a leading role was played by the conservative historians such as Hans Möller, Klaus Hildebrand, Michael Stürmer, and Andreas Hillgruber. Consequently, as Bill Niven observed, in both sites National Socialism, war and its effects were presented as natural catastrophes, with the Germans as their main victims and the significance of the Holocaust was played down.[594]

However, though the mid-1990s represented for some politicians and historians, and for some members of the general public, a symbolic act of closure, several important events that took place in the public sphere in the 1990s managed to counteract this will to forget, ensuring that the postunification trend toward a more intense preoccupation with the Nazi past was not impeded.[595]

In 1992 a long ago planned Joseph Wulf's project was finally realized and House of the Wannsee Conference Memorial Center was established in Berlin. In

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[591] *Schmalz, Peter.* Keiner hat etwas gemerkt // Die Welt, 1 December, 1995.

[592] See *Jenninger, Philipp.* Rede am 10. November, 1988 im Deutschen Bundestag // Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 November, 1988. <http://www.mediaculture-online.de/fileadmin/bibliothek/jenninger_rede/jenninger_rede.html>

[593] See *Niven, William.* Op. cit. p. 198.

[594] Ibid. pp. 200-201.

[595] Ibid. p. 137.

the same 1992 a foundation was set up to oversee the transformation of the *Prinz-Albrecht-Gelände* site that formerly housed the Gestapo, the SS and the SD into a documentation center. Although the so-called *the Topography of Terror* project was inaugurated in the long run only on 6 May, 2010, it was important that this decision marked a practical implementation of the idea dating back to 1983, when historians and Berlin's SPD had drawn attention to the historical importance of this 'place of the perpetrators.'[596]

Another important public debate and controversy was caused by the publication in 1996 of the book *Hitler's Willing Executives. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* authored by Harvard University scholar Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, the son of the Holocaust survivor in the Ukrainian ghetto.[597] Goldhagen's book, which was a reply to Christopher Browning's 1992 publication *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*, posited that ordinary Germans not only knew about, but also supported, the Holocaust because of a unique and virulent "eliminationist anti-Semitism" in the German identity, which had developed in the preceding centuries. Goldhagen argued that, "Historically, the expression of nationalism, particularly in Germany, has gone hand in hand with the expression of anti-Semitism, since the nation was in part defined in contradiction to the Jews. In Germany and elsewhere, nationalism and anti-Semitism were interwoven ideologies, fitting hand in glove."[598]

The public controversy and a world-wide debate facilitated by the Goldhagen's assertion of the existence of a long-standing historical tradition of "eliminationist anti-Semitism" in Germany let some historians speak of an extension of the *Hitorikerstreit*.[599] Goldhagen's greatest achievement, however, was that he brought to light the incontrovertible facts of participation of many police units in extermination operations, showing through numerous examples how ordinary soldiers participated in the mass murder of the Jews.

Another contribution to the critical reflection on the Nazi past and the problem of perpetration in the public sphere was made by a groundbreaking

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[596] Ibid. p. 203. *Rürup, Reinhard* (ed.), Topography of Terror. Gestapo, SS and Reichssicherheitshauptamt on the „Prinz-Albrecht-Terrain". A Documentation. Berlin: Willmuth Arenhövel, 1989.

[597] *Goldhagen, Daniel J.* Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York: Vintage, 1997.

[598] *Goldhagen, Daniel J.* Op. cit. p. 45. Goldhagen himself referred to the following work: *Almog, Shmuel.* Nationalism and Anti-Semitism in Modern Europe, 1815-1945. London: Pergamon Press, 1990.

[599] *Eley, Geoff* (ed.) The "Goldhagen Effect": History, Memory, Nazism – Facing the German Past. Ann Arbor, 2000. *Niven, William.* Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich. London and New York, 2002. *Kattago, Siobhan.* Ambiguous Memory: The Nazi Past and German National Identity. Westport, Conn., 2001.

exhibition entitled *War of Annihilation. Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 1944 (Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944*) produced in 1995 by historians Hannes Heer and Gerd Hankel from the Hamburg Institute for Social Research (*Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung).* The exhibition, that challenged the established view of the "unblemished" German armed forces (*Wehrmacht*), asserted with the help of written documents and photographs that the Wehrmacht was "involved in planning and implementing a war of annihilation against Jews, prisoners of war, and the civilian population."[600]

In April 1997, *Die Zeit* journalist Benedikt Erenz commenting on the effect of the exhibition wrote that "seldom has a contemporary-history exhibition made such an impact on so many people."[601] Seen by an estimated 1.2 million visitors, the traveling exhibition caused a huge controversy and was accused of inaccuracy and blackmail, which made the organizers suspend the display in 1999 and wait for a review of its content by a committee of historians.

The committee's report in 2000, however, stated that accusations of forged materials were not justified. "The fundamental statements made in the exhibition about the Wehrmacht and the war of annihilation in 'the east' are correct," stateed the report. "It is indisputable that, in the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht not only 'entangled' itself in genocide perpetrated against the Jewish population, in crimes perpetrated against Soviet POWs and in the fight against the civilian population, but in fact participated in these crimes, playing at times a supporting, at times a leading role. These were not isolated cases of 'abuse' or 'excesses'; they were activities based on decisions reached by top level military leaders or troop leaders on or behind the front lines."[602] The committee recommended that the exhibition be reopened in revised form, presenting the material, and as far as possible leaving the formation of conclusions to the viewers.

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[600] Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation 1941-1944: An outline of the exhibition. Hamburg Institute for Social Research, 2004. p. 34.

[601] Die Zeit, 11 April 1997.

[602] Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation 1941-1944: An outline of the exhibition. Hamburg Institute for Social Research, 2004. p. 36.

The revised exhibition *Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation 1941-1944* (*Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges 1941–1944)* travelled from 2001 to 2004 and since then, it has permanently been opened at the German Historical Museum (*Deutsches Historisches Museum*) in Berlin. Later the two versions of the exhibition as well as the reaction of the public were reflected in Michael Verhoeven's 2006 documentary *The Unknown Soldier* (*Der unbekannte Soldat*).

The topic of *Wehrmacht* criminality due to the efforts of the exhibition organizers moved, ineluctably, to the centre of public discourse. Just like Goldhagen's book, *Crimes of the Wehrmacht* exhibition vividly showed that criminality was a cohesive element in the Third Reich, linking politics, bureaucracy, the SS, the army and the 'ordinary' German soldiers and reservists. Together with other important public endeavors such the opening of House of the Wannsee Conference Memorial Center, and the Topography of Terror project all based on the pathbreaking research of the mechanisms and psychology of perpetration and all causing massive discussions in the public sphere the exhibition considerably advanced the so-called perpetrator research *(Täterforschung)* in Germany and abroad.

Historical research focusing on the Nazi extermination system started in the 1970s - 1980s when caused by the general interest in *Alltagsgeschichte* new publications about the death squads (*Einsatzgruppen)*, the death camps, and the war of extermination on the Eastern front considerably advanced the German historiography of the Holocaust.[603]

However, the 1990s marked the period in which perpetrator research was considerably developed. New wave of publications included the studies of individual perpetrators such as Ulrich Herbert's biography of one of the leaders of the Gestapo and later of occupied France and Denmark Werner Best (1996), in-depth research of the Nazi concentration camp system by Ulrich Herbert, Karin Orth, Christoph Dieckmann, Wolfgang Sofsky, as well as prosopographical studies of major institutions such as the Security Agency (SD) of the SS by Michael Wildt (2003).[604] Some of the best works of the 1990s provided regional

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[603] *Krausnick, Helmut; Wilhelm, Hans-Heinrich.* Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen des Sicherheitsdienstes und des SD 1938-1942. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1981; *Kogon, Eugen* et al. (eds.), Nationalsozialistische Massentötungen durch Giftgas. Frankfurt: Fischer, 1983; Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, 6 vols. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1979-1988.

[604] *Herbert, Ulrich.* Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft, 1903-1989. Bonn: Dietz, 1996. *Sofsky, Wolfgang.* Die Ordnung des Terrors: Das Konzentrationslager. S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1993. *Herbert, Ulrich. Orth, Karin. Dieckmann, Christoph.* Die nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager: Entwicklung und Struktur.

studies of the origins and realization of the "Final Solution" in occupied Eastern Europe. Such authors as Walter Manoschek, Dieter Pohl, Thomas Sandkühler, Christian Gerlach sought to understand what concrete, local factors had contributed to the development of genocidal policies and how these local factors had interacted with political directives from Berlin.[605]

The scholars focus was also shifting towards the social and psychological dimensions of perpetration. For instance, the sociologist Wolfgang Sofsky, basing on Eugen Kogon's research, outlined the perspectives of studying the concentration camp as a social system.[606] To Sofsky belongs an extremely important conceptualization that "perpetrator research forces one to accept the unwelcome insight that the transformation of human beings into mass murderers requires little time and will power. Neither long biographical adaptation nor time consuming indoctrination appear necessary."[607]

The research launched in many respects by Christopher Browning, Jonah Goldhagen, the Hamburg Institute for Social Research historians and expanded by Aly Götz, Yehoshua Büchler, Michal Unger, Michael Alberti, Bogdan Musial, and other German and foreign historians showed that participation in the murder was widespread, generally knowing and willful and that the perpetrators themselves were generally quite 'normal' people. The hidden menace of such a 'banality of evil' has turned perpetrator research into one of the prevailing social study areas in Germany until these days.[608]

Göttingen: Wallstein, 1998. *Wildt, Michael* Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (Generation of the Unbound: The Leadership Corps of the Reich Security Main Office), Hamburger Edition HIS, 2003.

[605] See *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. p. 47. See also: *Manoschek, Walter.* "Serbien ist judenfrei:" Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42. München: Oldenbourg, 1993; *Pohl, Dieter.* Von der "Judenpolitik" zum Massenmord: Der Distrikt Lublin des Generalgouvernements 1939-1944. Frankfurt: Lang, 1993; *Sandkühler, Thomas.* "Endlösung in Galizien: Der Judenmord in Ostpolen und die Rettungsinitiativen von Berthold Beitz 1941-1944. Bonn: Dietz, 1996; *Gerlach, Christian.* Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord: Forschungen zur deutschen Vernichtungpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1998. *Gerlach, Christian.* Kalkulierte Morde. Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944. Hamburg, Hamburger Edition, 1999.

[606] *Sofsky, Wolfgang.* Analyse des Schreckens. Eugen Kogons «Der SS-Staat» und die Perspektiven der KZ-Forschung, Wiesbaden, 1995.

[607] *Sofsky, Wolfgang.* An der Grenze des Sozialen: Perspektiven der KZ-Forschung. In: *Herbert, Ulrich. Orth, Karin. Dieckmann, Christoph.* Die nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager: Entwicklung und Struktur. Göttingen: Wallstein, 1998. p. 1154.

[608] See, for instance: *Longerich, Peter.* Tendenzen und Perspektiven der Täterforschung // *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 14-15, 2 April 2007. *Gerhard, Paul.* 'Von Psychopathen, Technokraten des Terrors und "ganz gewöhnlichen" Deutschen: Die Täter der Shoah im Spiegel der Forschung' In: *Paul, Gerhard.* Die Täter der Shoah: Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?

Furthermore, in the course of the 1990s, the Holocaust research has developed into an international scholarly discipline with several centers, research institutions and academic programs specializing in it. Among the institutions founded in the 1990s were the International Institute for Holocaust Research at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem in Israel (1993), the Fritz Bauer Institute in Frankfurt am Main in Germany (1995), the Uppsala Program for Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Sweden (1998), and the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington (1998). The Polish Center for Holocaust Research at the Polish Academy of Sciences was established in Warsaw 2003, and the International Primo Levi Studies Center (*Centro Internazionale di Studi Primo Levi*) was created in Turin, Italy in 2008.

The public focus on the motives of the average Germans who had implemented the "Final Solution" finally made the perpetrators a focus of inquiry of German television producers. The ZDF 1990 series such as *Hitlers Helfer (Hitler's Henchmen, 1996, 1998*) and *Hitlers Krieger (Hitler's Warriors, 1998*) authored by Guido Knopp inquired into the motives of the Nazi leadership while ignoring the "average" perpetrators of the genocide. Despite the fact that Knopp's programs were strongly criticized as presenting the Third Reich too superficially and as "editing history" so as to play down the role of the German public in building and supporting the Hitler regime, his programs had really high ratings and attracted significant public attention.[609]

Similarly powerful and controversial appeared the best-selling semi-autobiographical novel by German law professor and judge Bernhard Schlink *Reader* (*Vorleser*) published in 1995 and also tackling the problem the Holocaust perpetration. In a very human and sympathetic manner the novel portrayed a former concentration camp guard whose secret illiteracy had profoundly affected her actions in the past as well as fatally undermined her defense during the Auschwitz trial.

Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002. *Welzer, Harald.* Täter: Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2005.

[609] *Bebber, Frank van.* Aversionen gegen Herrn K. Geschichtssendungen von Guido Knopp sind beliebt. Historiker kritisieren die Qualität der Berichte // Der Tagesspiegel, 25 September 2006. *Kümmel, Peter*. Ein Volk in der Zeitmaschine. Guido Knopp, der Starhistoriker des ZDF, organisiert Pauschalreisen in die NS-Vergangenheit. Seine Ausflüge sind beliebt. Das Fernsehpublikum fühlt sich bei ihm vor allem Bösen gut beschützt // Die Zeit, 26 February 2004. In 2004 a group of international historians warned that documentaries like those produced by Knopp could reduce important historic facts to mere infotainment. Knopp has been criticized for rewriting history by leaving out the role of the Wehrmacht in the cruelties of World War II. Alle waren Opfer // Die Zeit, No. 48/2006, 23 November 2006. Unter Wölfen // Der Spiegel, 28 November 2006.

The German attitudes towards the Nazi era were also affected by the German release of the Steven Spielberg's film *Schindler's List* in 1993.

Additionally, in the 1990s Germany was also engaged in stormy disputes regarding the memorial "for the murdered Jews of Europe" in Berlin. The idea of its construction belonged to the journalist Lea Rosh who in 1989 founded a support group and started collecting donations. With growing support, the Bundestag passed a resolution in favor of the project, in April 1994 a competition for its design was announced and in November 1997 Peter Eisenman's plan emerged as the winner of the competition.

Notably, in October 1998 the well-known German writer Martin Walser used the occasion of his acceptance speech for the Peace Prize of German Booksellers to refer to the Holocaust Memorial planned for Berlin as the "monumentalization of shame," questioning at the same time "why in this decade the past is presented as never before."[610] Walser's critique of the "instrumentalization" of the past, his charge that a "routine of accusation" had led to a meaningless ritual of mourning in Germany, and his admission that he was "beginning to look away [from] the relentless presentation of our shame" prompted a sharp response from Ignatz Bubis, head of the Central Council of Jewish Communities in Germany, who accused Walser of "intellectual arson" and countered that if Walser could no longer stand to look at the "horror of Auschwitz" it was because "he had never looked" in the first place. [611]

The so-called Walter-Bubis debate was influenced (but not totally dominated this time) by the usual right-wing dichotomy typical of debates on the National Socialist past in Germany. As a result of this debate, support for the memorial became associated with those who wanted to remember the Holocaust, criticism of it with those who wanted to forget. The SPD and Green parliamentarians, having no personal experience of Nazism, in turn, were aware that young people could not commemorate without first being informed of what it was they were supposed to be commemorating. But the general agreement that commemoration should be less abstract and symbolic, more 'concrete' was a result of intense discussion of Walser's speech.[612]

In the course of the thrashing out of these conflicting views in the public realm, it became a truism for politicians and intellectuals to argue that the memorial (that was, by the way, inaugurated only on 10 May, 2005) was not as important as the debate surrounding it. Indeed the discussion was itself a kind of

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[610] *Niven, Bill.* Op. cit. p. 181.

[611] *Moeller, Robert G.* What Has Coming to Terms with the Past Meant in Post-World War II Germany? From History to Memory to the History of Memory // Journal of Central European History, Vol. 35, № 2, June 2002. p. 225.

[612] *Niven, Bill.* Op. cit. p. 181.

memorial. One 1,200-page compendium of articles on the subject appeared under the title *The Memorial Debate – The Memorial? (Der Denkmalstreit – das Denkmal?)*.[613]

In the 1990s the history of what became known itself as "overcoming the past" itself became an independent subject of historical research – a development running more or less parallel to the emergence of public debates over the Holocaust and the Germans, the Wehrmacht' crimes in World War II, slave labor and reparations, as well as over the forms and appropriate degree of social-historical memory.[614]

The persistence of discussions and the continual presence of the Nazi past in the German present-day public sphere mean that "working through" the past has indeed evolved in Germany into an on-going public obligation. Notably, during commemoration held in 2005 upon the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder expressed his "shame for the deaths of those who were murdered and for the fact that, the survivors, were forced to go through the hell of a concentration camp." He emphasized the fact that "the vast majority of the Germans living today bear no guilt for the Holocaust. But they do bear a special responsibility."[615]

The fact of a constant public recognition of the German national guilt by the country's leaders testifies to the high level and strength of the antifascist consensus in modern Germany. And it confirms that the traumatic page of German national history is by no means closed.

The same argument may refer to any social fields of the German life such as education, literature, television, etc. As Stephen Brockmann conceptualized: "The paradox is that Nazi crimes rarely present in broad public discourse during the immediate postwar period have become ever more present, ever more visible, and ever more broadly addressed with the passage of time, to the point where it would be no exaggeration to say that reflection on the Nazi past has become the primary intellectual and spiritual contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany to world culture, indeed a source of its very identity."[616]

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[613] *Heimrod, Ute; Schlusche, Günter; Seferens, Horst* (eds.) Der Denkmalstreit—das Denkmal? Die Debatte um das "Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas" (Eine Dokumentation), Bodenheim: Philo Verlag, 1999.

[614] *Frei, Norbert.* Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. p. xi.

[615] *Schröder, Gerhard.* "I Express My Shame." Speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. 25 January, 2005. <http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/schroeder.htm

[616] *Brockmann, Stephen.* German Culture at the 'Zero Hour.' In*: Trommler, Frank; Brockmann, Stephen* (eds.) Revisiting Zero Hour 1945: The Emergence of Postwar German Culture. Humanities Program Report 1. Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1996. pp. 24-25.

Postwar German literature was preoccupied with coming to terms with the Nazi era and the Holocaust. As the German scholar Jochen Vogt has written, from the beginning up through the 1980s, postwar West German literature, has made National Socialism in all its dimensions its most important theme.[617] According to Brockman, since 1960s "German political and literary culture has been a continuous process of mourning."[618]

In the late 1980s Jürgen Habermas suggested that Germany's postwar identity was based on an attempt to understand Auschwitz. In Habermas's view "unfortunately, in the cultural nation of the Germans, a connection to universalistic constitutional principles that was anchored in convictions could be formed only after—and through – Auschwitz."[619] The writer Günter Grass strengthened this conception of Auschwitz as a contributing factor in German identity when he wrote: "Nothing, no national emotion, no matter how idyllically tinted, not even any protestations of the amiability of those born too late, can relativize or easily do away with this experience, which we as the guilty have had with ourselves, and which the victims have had with us as unified Germans. We will not get around Auschwitz. We should not even attempt such an act of violence, no matter how much we might wish to do so, because Auschwitz belongs to us, it is a permanent scar on our history, and it has, on the positive side, made possible an insight which might run like this: now, finally, we know ourselves."[620]

As for the German television, Wulf Kansteiner showed that between 1963 and 1993 ZDF broadcasted on impressive number of programs which dealt with the Nazi past and its postwar legacy. In the period of 31 years the station aired 1,217 shows totaling over 87,000 minutes of airtime. The ZDF station has consistently dedicated between 1 and 1.5 percent of its program time to the task of educating and informing its viewers about Germany's problematic past and about contemporary efforts of mastering its legacy. Each year the ZDF produced or purchased between 30 and 50 programs on Nazism with an average length of 71 minutes each. Statistically the viewers could expect one program on the topic

[617] *Vogt, Jochen.* "Erinnerung ist unsere Aufgabe:" Über Literatur, Moral und Politik 1945-1990. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991. p. 12.

[618] *Brockmann, Stephen*. Op. cit. p. 23.

[619] *Habermas, Jürgen.* The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate (ed. and trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989. p. 227.

[620] *Grass, Günter.* Schreiben nach Auschwitz. Frankfurt: Luchterhand, 1990. p. 42. Grass's reference to those literally "born afterwards" ("nachgeboren") is of course a critique of Chancellor Kohl's "grace of late birth." For an alternative English translation, see *Grass, Günter.* Two States—One Nation? Trans. Krishna Winston with A.S. Wensinger. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990. p. 123.

every nine days. Since the station's administration has never developed any guidelines regarding the quantity of historical programming in general and of programming on Nazism in particular, the figures attest to the editorial staff's continuous commitment to the project of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*.[621]

For most Germans, the Holocaust is not an event that happened in a faraway place in some distant past, but is a living part of their recent history. To a large extent, the credit is due to the German educational endeavors. Importantly, teaching about Nazi dictatorship and the Holocaust at schools is not limited to a niche in the history syllabus. Instead, it is discussed again and again in different ways, in a number of subjects, and at different points in time.[622]

In his article on *Holocaust Education in Germany* Gunter Wehrmann described this process as follows: "The treatment of the Nazi period in all its aspects – Hitler's rise to power; his establishment of a dictatorship in Germany; the abolition of the rule of law; the persecution of all kinds of political opponents; the racially motivated persecution of the Jews, culminating in the Holocaust; the reticence and opposition of German citizens; and, Germany's instigation of World War II - is compulsory teaching matter at all types of schools in Germany and at all levels of education. The Holocaust viewed as the most important aspect of the period of Nazi rule is treated in various school subjects in different ways. In *history classes*, the Nazi period is dealt with in the context of 20th century German, or world, history. Students who pass the *Abitur* exam, the prerequisite for university study at the age of 18 or 19, receive a formal historical presentation of German history in the 20th century twice - during their final two years before graduation and at 9th or 10th grade level.

In *civic studies and current affairs classes*, the lessons from the Holocaust are related to the teaching about Germany's political institutions and about the values that govern political life in a democratic society. When current affairs are discussed - such as antisemitic incidents and rightwing extremism in Germany and elsewhere; ethnic cleansing in Bosnia; and, the Middle East conflict - teachers emphasize the importance of tolerance and the rule of law as lessons to be learned from the Holocaust.

In *religion or ethics classes*, the Holocaust is discussed with reference to the guilt and responsibility of those Germans who did not risk their lives to fight National Socialism or to protect Jews. Since the notion of interreligious tolerance and the knowledge of other world religions are subjects of religious studies

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[621] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics after Auschwitz. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006. p. 136.

[622] *Wehrmann, Gunter*. Holocaust Education in Germany. The German Information Center. Trans. by Laren Dentone, Kelly Grace, Devan Peel. 1998.

courses at German public schools, the teacher will often arrange a meeting with members of the organized Jewish community, a visit to the local synagogue, or to a Holocaust memorial or museum.

The fate of the Holocaust victims and what Germans did or did not do during the Third Reich often become subjects of *German literature classes*, when the works, novels, short stories, and plays of authors such as Alfred Andersch, Ilse Aichinger, Heinrich Böll, Günter Grass, Rolf Hochhuth, Marie-Luise Kaschnitz, Siegfried Lenz, and others are discussed in the context of teaching about contemporary German literature.

A visit to a Holocaust memorial or a Holocaust museum at the site of a former concentration camp is a standard feature of school excursions. In fact, the largest category of visitors at former concentration camps is often German high-school students led by their teachers.

The objective of teaching about the Holocaust is not limited to educating students about historical facts. Instead, the primary political and educational objective for confronting young Germans with their country's darkest past and their ancestors' guilt is, above all, to make them understand the consequences of Hitler's dictatorship, the uniqueness of the Holocaust, and to make them appreciate the values and institutions that protect freedom and democracy."[623]

The following quotations from government education documents serve as illustrations of the philosophy of Holocaust education in Germany today.

Paragraph One of the Berlin school law, whose mandate dates back to the immediate post-war period and the goal of re-education, expresses the consensus of all the federal states on the education priorities: "The goal must be the education of individuals, capable of standing resolutely against Nazi ideology and all other violent political belief systems. They must also be able to build a state and society based on democracy, peace, freedom, and human dignity. Individuals must be aware of their responsibilities toward society, and their behavior must recognize the basic equality of rights for all human beings, respect every honest conviction, and understand the necessity for progressive social conditions as well as peaceful understanding among nations."[624]

Gunter Wehrmann quotes the syllabus directive issued by the education ministry of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia for the treatment of the Holocaust in 9th grade *Realschule* history classes emphasizes the importance of democratic institutions and ideas. The directive entitled "From Anti-human Ideas to the

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[623] *Wehrmann, Gunter*. Holocaust Education in Germany. The German Information Center. Trans. Laren Dentone, Kelly Grace, Devan Peel. 1998.

[624] Quoted in: *Ehmann, Annegret.* Competences in the Media and Information Society, Paper for Workshop III of the European Conference of the BPB "NECE – Networking European Citizenship Education," Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 23 - 26 July, 2004.

Extermination of Human Lives" reads in part as follows: "Students should learn to recognize: the destruction of a democratic government based upon the rule of law; the enforcement of the Führer's principles; total regimentation of the population through propaganda; discrimination and terror, and the anti-human ideas of the prerogative of an Aryan race form the basis from which Hitler could unleash a world war and embark upon the systematic destruction of human lives." Wehrmann explains that, "According to a document prepared by the North Rhine-Westfalia ministry of education, directives for Holocaust teaching in *Hauptschulen* stipulate among other things that: (1) Teaching must seek to counter obliviousness to the past and critically examine tendencies toward a "normalization" of German historical awareness. The examination of the causes of the success of National Socialism in Germany must therefore be a focal point in teaching. (2) Teaching is to be devised in such a way that students realize the present and future significance of remembering National Socialism. Therefore, teaching of these topics had to address the questions associated with the responsibility of later generations, and the present manifestations of neo-Fascism and neo-anti-Semitism. (3) Teaching must, in particular, convey the perspective of the victims and give students the opportunity to learn about everyday life under National Socialism in a vivid and tangible way."[625]

In the next section of this chapter I will dwell on the development of collective memory narratives in post-Soviet Russia.

4.3. Collective Memory of the Soviet Past in Russia

4.3.1 1980s

Although *de jure* the post-Soviet period started with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, an important point of departure in terms of socio-cultural transformations was the *perestroika* period of the second half of the 1980s. It was launched by the last Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991), who announced at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1986 a new policy of restructuring (*perestroika*) defined by him as "the conference of development of democracy, socialist self-government, encouragement of initiative and creative endeavor, improved order and

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[625] *Wehrmann, Gunter*. Holocaust Education in Germany. The German Information Center. Trans. by Laren Dentone, Kelly Grace, Devan Peel, 1998.

discipline, more glasnost, criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of our society; […] utmost respect for the individual and consideration for personal dignity."[626]

The introduction of "openness" (*glasnost*), as one of the most important elements of *perestroika*, finally broke the silence regarding the past and let suppressed memories of the Soviet history come to the surface. In 1987 on the 17th anniversary of the October Revolution Gorbachev admitted that mass repressions of Party members and other Soviet citizens had taken place under Stalin and announced that it was time to fill in the blanks of the country's history.

As a consequence of these developments, an explosion of revelations about the nature of the Soviet system took place. In the first instance, the world of the Soviet concentration camps began to unfold as the Gulag survivors' and witnesses' accounts and other previously forbidden writings about the Stalin era began to appear. Notably, in 1987-1990 the majority of the texts that had been either previously disseminated via underground channels within the country (*samizdat*) or had been smuggled abroad (*tamizdat*) were for the first time 'officially' published in the Soviet Union.[627]

Among the most important works of the Gulag survivors published largely in the period between 1987 and 1990 were autobiographical Varlam Shalamov's *Kolyma stories (Kolymskie rasskazy, 1954-73)*, Eugenia Ginzburg's *Journey into the Whirlwind* (*Krutoi marshrut*, 1967, 1975-77), Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago (Arkhipelag Gulag, 1973–78)* and *The First Circle* (*V kruge pervom 1968)*, Yuri Dombrovsky's *The Keeper of Antiquities* (*Khranitel' drevnostei*, 1964) and *The Faculty of Useless Knowledge (Fakul'tet nenuzhnykh veshei, 1975)*, Vassily Grossman's *Life and Fate (Zhizn' i sud'ba, 1963)* and *Forever Flowing* (*Vse techet*, 1961), and Anatoly Rybakov's anti-Stalinist saga *The Children of Arbat* (*Deti Arbata*) written in the 1960s. Additionally, memoirs by Nadezhda Mandelshtam (1960s-1970s) as well as the works by Lydia Chukovskaya – a short novel *Sofia Petrovna* (1939—1940), *Descent Into Water (Spusk pod Vodu*, 1972) and her legendary *The Akhmatova journals (Zapiski ob Anne*

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[626] *Gorbachev, Mikhail.* Perestrojka i novoe myshlenie dlja nashej strany i dlja vsego mira. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoj literatury, 1988 Perestroika. [English translation: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. New York: Harper, 1988.]

[627] Etymologically, the word *samizdat* is made out of the Russian *sam* (self, by oneself) and *izdat* (abbr. *izdatel'stvo*, i.e. publishing house), meaning thus "self-published." As the former political dissident and writer Vladimir Bukovsky defined it, "I myself create it, edit it, censor it, publish it, distribute it, and get imprisoned for it." In: *Bukovsky, Vladimir.* I vozvrashaetsa veter… (And the Wind returns...) New York, Chronika, 1978. p. 126. *Tamizdat* (*tam*, "there") refers to literature published abroad often from smuggled manuscripts.

Akhmatovoi) – that all had been forbidden during the Soviet times finally became available for the Russian readers in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Importantly, the demand on these publications was immense. The scale of popularity of the theme can be easily traced through the unprecedented growth of the circulation of journals and magazines in which the abovementioned texts appeared. For instance, the circulation of *Druzhba narodov* magazine after it published Anatoly Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat* in 1988 grew from 119,000 in 1985 to 775,000 in 1988, and in 1990 it exceeded 1,000,000 copies. *Novyi mir*—the journal that had been most active in combating Stalinism during the Khrushev's *Thaw* and had been destroyed in 1970—had a circulation of 425,000 in 1985. At the beginning of 1989, however, its circulation had already reached 1.5 million; and in the summer of that year, when *Novyi mir* began to publish *The Gulag Archipelago*, its circulation exceeded 2.5 million. The circulation of one of the glasnost' flagships *Ogonyek* weekly grew from 1.5 million in 1985 to 3.5 million in 1989.[628] Some observers noted that during the perestroika "it has become more interesting to read than to live."[629]

At the beginning of 1987 Tengiz Abuladze's film entitled *Repentance* (*Pokayanie*) powerfully raised the problem of coming to terms with the Stalinist era legacy. The film symbolically represented the society burdened with its criminal past through the dictator's corpse, which, no matter how many times it was buried, returned to haunt his successors because his crimes had not been publicly condemned.[630]

From the end of 1986 onward in a new environment of weakened state censorship intellectuals, writers, artists, filmmakers, as well as ordinary citizens were finally starting to talk openly about their country's long-suppressed past. The truth about such aspects of the Soviet history as collectivization, forced industrialization, the mass reprisals and terror of the 1930s, the deportation of entire peoples, postwar anti-Semitism and reprisals became gradually unveiled and discussed.[631] Historian Maria Ferretti described the situation as follows:

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[628]"Ob itogakh podpiski na tsentral'nye gazety i zhurnaly na 1989 god," Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1989, № 1, p. 139. On the popularity of history novels, see also *Lurie, S.* Kak ugodit' chitateliu // Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, № 6, 1988. pp. 43–50; *Shvedov, S.* Literaturnaia kritika i literatura chitatelei // Voprosy literatury, № 5, 1988. pp. 3–31.

[629] *Chuprinin, Sergei.* Predvestie. Zametki o zhurnal'noi proze 1988 goda // Znamja, № 1, 1989. p. 211.

[630] On the perception of this film, see, for example, *Bitov, Andrei*. Portret khudozhnika v smelosti // Moskovskie novosti, № 7, 1987. p. 13; *Anninskij, Lev.* V kom delo? Zametki ne o kino // Znamja, № 6, 1987. pp. 197–209; and *Ionin, Leonid.* "…I vozzovet proshedshee" // Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, № 3, 1987. pp. 62–72.

[631] On the ideas brought about by the Russian intellectuals during perestroika see, *Aron, Leon.* The Politics of Memory // Russian Outlook, 8 September, 2008.

"From late 1987 onward, daily and weekly newspapers—and television, too—began filling in the "blank spots." They faced the problem of restoring to memory entire pages of national history, individuals, and events that had been erased from the past (for example, the disastrous situation during the first months of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) or the fate of the Bolshevik old guard and of the opposition under Stalin). These publications provided readers with factual and documentary proofs of events pictured in fiction and film. In the same period, open discussions were held, featuring clashes of opinion on the sources of Stalinism and its place in Russian history as a whole and in the more narrow time span of its postrevolutionary history."[632]

Publicists, writers, social scientists such as Yuri Karyakin, Ludmila Savraskina, Dmitry Furman, Yuri Afanasiev, Grigory Pomerants, Vasily Selyunin, Vladimir Kantor, Alexander Shindel', Alexander Tsypko, Anatoly Rybakov, Tatiana Zaslavskaya, Andrei Sakharov, Mikhail Gefter, Lev Karpinsky, Yuri Levada, Vyahceslav Ivanov, Daniil Granin, to name just a few, were actively involved in the process of "working through" the past, an "honest labor of self-discovery."[633] According to Leon Aron, "This national act of acknowledgment was thought to be more than a tribute to the dead. […] The horrors of Stalinism had to be recognized in shame and remorse, shuddered and wailed over, forever and unequivocally condemned, and, most important, redeemed by the creation of a state and society that would never allow the country to be ruled by terror."[634] As one of the critics formulated it in the 1989 *Znamya* magazine publication, it was imperative "to create such social, political and state structures that would firmly block any negative tendencies and any tilt toward self-exterminating past."[635] Such mechanisms would not work without a moral overhaul, and such an overhaul was impossible without unflinching self-discovery. Above all, perestroika needed a most sober, most merciless burning out (*vyzhiganie*) of any self-delusion.[636]

Washington Post correspondent David Remnick called the process taking place in the Soviet Union during the perestroika as "the return of history."[637]

[632] *Ferretti, Maria.* Memory in Disorder. Russia and Stalinism // Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 41, № 6, November/December 2003.

[633] *Karyakin, Yuri.* Stoit li nastupat' na grabli? (Do We Really Want to Step on a Rake?) // Znamya 9, September 1987. p. 219.

[634] *Aron, Leon.* The Politics of Memory // Russian Outlook, 8 September, 2008.

[635] *Shindel', Alexander.* Svidetel (A Witness) // Znamya 9, September 1989. p. 217.

[636] *Aron, Leon.* Op. cit. See also: *Karyakin, Yuri.* Chto budet, esli i eta perestroika pogibnet? (What Will Happen If This Perestroika, Too, Perishes?) // Moskovskie novosti, 5 June, 1988.

[637] *Remnick, David.* Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire. New York: Random House, 1993. p. 7.

Another foreign observer Adam Hochschild compared Russia to "a person who endured unimaginably terrible suffering as a child, then for many years was strictly forbidden ever to mention it, and who now at last, in middle age, was able to speak" and "the words came pouring out."[638] "It is hard to recall another case where the government and press of a major country were so preoccupied, almost daily, with events that had happened forty or fifty years before," confessed the impressed Hochschild.[639]

In 1988, riding the wave of this sentiment the International Historical-Enlightenment Human Rights and Humanitarian Society Memorial was created with the goal of perpetuating the memory of Stalin's victims. The organization began collecting documents and testimony, laying the foundation for a list of victims of reprisals. Local branches of the association collected information all across the Soviet Union. For this reason, the first serious studies of Soviet concentration camps, published already in the 1980s, were written by members of Memorial.[640]

A year later in 1989 the Moscow historical literary society *The Return* (*Vozvrashenie*) was founded by former prisoners of the Gulag. It started collecting witnesses' accounts – memoirs, diaries, letters, literary works and photographs, etc. – of former camps' inmates, organized meetings of former political prisoners, held conferences, and published the journal *Volya* containing articles on the camps and the totalitarian system primarily written by former prisoners.

Meanwhile, the need to create completely new history textbooks became urgent and some teachers and young historians took the initiative and began to write them.[641] The previously taught version of the country's history was so distorted that the national high school examination in history, required for graduation and the diploma, was abolished in 1988.[642] The exam was restored the next year, but the old textbooks remained banished and new ones were readied for the 9th and 10th grades (the junior and senior years).[643]

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[638] *Hochschild, Adam.* The Unquiet Ghost: Russians Remember Stalin. New York: Penguin Books, 1994. p. xxii – xxiii.

[639] Ibid.

[640] *Ferretti, Maria.* Memory in Disorder. Russia and Stalinism // Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 41, № 6, November/December 2003. See, for example, Sistema ispravitel'no-trudovykh lagerei v SSSR, 1923–1960: spravochnik, comp. N. Okhotin and A. Roginsky. Moscow, 1988.

[641] *Svirskiy, V.* Istoriya umalchivaet (History Omits) // Izvestia, 21 July, 1987.

[642] *Ovchinnikova, I.* Ekzamen otmenyon. Istoriya ostayotsya! (The Examination Is Abolished. History Remains!) // Izvestia, 10 June, 1988.

[643] *Belaya, M.* Ekzamen budet, no uchebnikov poka net (There Will Be the Exam, but So Far There Are No Textbooks) // Izvestia, 8 February, 1989.

4.3.2. 1990s

It is important to point out that the period which the famous Russian actor and himself a former prisoner in Stalin's camps Georgy Zhzhyonov called the time "of societal penitence and moral cleansing," appeared rather short-lived.[644] Already in 1991 the opinion polls started revealing the growth of defense reactions in the social and cultural periphery, as 62 percent of the respondents lamented that the press "devotes too much attention to the theme of Stalin's repressions" (only 16 percent thought that "too little"), that it "smears the heroic past," etc.[645] The theme of Stalinism was soon excluded from the public discourse.

The surveys vividly showed a decline of interest in the crimes of the Stalin period over the 1990s. If in 1989 36 percent of the respondents listed the mass repressions among the most significant events in the country's history, in 1994 this opinion was shared only by 18 percent. This trend continued: in 1999 the number was reduced to 11 percent and in the 2003 poll mass repressions were mentioned already by less than 3 percent of those surveyed.[646]

Certainly, there are several reasons for the removal of the theme of Stalinism and repressions from the public memory of the post-Soviet society. Most likely that the new ruling elite who actively used history as a weapon in struggling against their political opponents was in charge of this ousting and even repression of memory.

The first Russian President Boris Yeltsin (in office 1991-1999) selected the strategy of opposing himself to the Communist Party led by Gorbachev, portraying it as the embodiment of all Soviet times horrors. The breakup argument was validated through representation of the October Revolution as a kind of accident of history that "had derailed Russia from its natural track and plunged it into the 'black hole' of Soviet non-history."[647]

The pre-revolutionary imperial Russia, in turn, became chosen as a symbol of Russia's lost greatness and as an ideal, a promise for a better future, and the new Russian politics was legitimized through appeals of a return to the lost "normalcy." As Maria Ferretti put it, Yeltsin's representation of history

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[644] *Zhzhyonov, Georgy*. Sud'ba naroda i cheloveka (The Fate of People and of the Individual) // Komsomol'skaya pravda, 7 November, 1988.

[645]*Gudkov, Lev.* Russkij neotraditsionalizm i soprotivlenie peremenam (Russian Neotraditionalism and Resistance to Changes) // Otechestvennye zapiski, № 3 (4), 2002.

[646] Ibid.

[647] *Ferretti, Maria.* Nostalgia for Communism in Post-Soviet Russia. Paper presented at the Workshop "The Legacy and Memory of Communism in Europe," EURHISTXX, Paris, 17 December, 2007.

"founded on a mythical image of pre-revolutionary Russia, whose inheritor and restorer Yeltsin proclaimed himself to be, while Gorbachev incarnated all the horrors of Soviet history."[648] Yeltsin indeed presented himself as a symbol of the breakup with the criminal Soviet regime and promised the national revival which had to be manifested in the return to the period prior the year 1917. He positioned himself as the leader called to revive the former Russian imperial greatness.

The verbal idealization of the imperial Russia was accompanied by the revival of symbols and rituals of that period (the double-headed eagle, a tricolor, various official ceremonies, and the return to pre-Revolutionary political terminology), and by the building or reconstruction of ancient Russian architectural monuments destroyed in the Soviet period primarily Orthodox churches and cathedrals, the most well-known being the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, dismantled in the 1930s and rebuilt under the patronage of Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov (in office 1992-2010) in the 1990s.

Observers also pointed to the relevant innovations introduced to the school textbooks. For instance, in the 1993 history textbook for 8-graders *History of the Fatherland* (*Istoriia Otechestva)* by Boris Rybakov and Alexander Preobrazhensky (which had a circulation of 2.6 million copies), Russian 14 year-olds could find maps and charts describing the contributions made by both the Rurik and the Romanov imperial dynasties to the growth of Russia's territory. Additionally, the textbook devoted much space (32 pages out of 289 pages) to Peter the Great and his major social and economic reforms.[649] As Joseph Zaida conceptualized, "Although the students learn that under Peter tsarist rule became absolute, he is portrayed as a great builder of symbolic power. One of his major reforms included his civil and military service division ranks (*tabel o rangakh*). To consolidate the centralization of power and the monarchy, he also popularized the design of the Imperial Coat of Arms (Ivan III used it in 1497, as his royal seal, the year that marked the centralization on the state), the now-renowned czarist two-headed eagle symbol that was resurrected after the fall of the familiar hammer and sickle in 1991 to decorate official Russian documents and the new parliament house."[650]

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[648] Ibid. See also her analysis of the process of revision of the past and its implications, In: *Ferretti, Maria.* Percorsi della memoria: il caso russo // Passato e presente, 2003/2, pp.17-35.

[649] *Rybakov, Boris; Preobrazhensky, Alexander*. Istoriia otechestva: Uchebnik dlia 8 klassa srednei shkoly (History of the Fatherland: Grade 8 textbook). Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1993. pp. 188-220.

[650] *Zajda, Joseph.* The New History School Textbooks in the Russian Federation: 1992-2004 // Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 1469-3623, Vol. 37, № 3, 2007. pp. 291 – 306.

Thanks to the myth representing the October revolution and the establishment of the Soviet regime as an interruption of the normal line of the Russian state development, the entire Soviet period could be effaced from the history of the country, simply set aside. The perception of Communism as a foreign, imported phenomenon alien to the Russian history and transformation of the Bolsheviks into the real source of all evil, relieved Russian authorities as well as the Russian people of the responsibility for the crimes of the Soviet regime (of which most leaders of the new Russia had been once a part). No longer were they obliged to repent or "work through" the past that was "a black hole," a rupture, a non-history. In this context even the plan to erect in the Russian capital a monument to the victims of Stalinism, first proposed as far back as the Khrushchev era and later revived during the *perestroika*, has not been carried out.[651]

Thus, at the initial stage, particularly during the period of Yeltsin's high popularity, the myth was attractive and found a ready welcome in the public as it presented a simple solution to the insolvable problem of guilt and responsibility. Furthermore, it allowed Russian citizens to improve their opinion of their own country and of themselves. The survey data revealed an apparent link between the improved self-assessment of the Russian citizens and their declining interest in the crimes of the Stalin era. If at the end of 1989, when the exposure of Stalinism reached its peak, shame over the past was dominant, by the middle of the 1990s the prevailing feeling was pride in their national history.[652]

Maria Ferretti conceptualized this consequences of leaving the past behind in the following way: "This vision of the past, the way in which it is constructed, made it possible to set Stalinism easily aside and thereby dispense with the crushing weight of collective guilt, which had previously haunted society and had in the end fractured the country's collective identity, breaking the image Russia had of itself. By this operation, Russia not only liberated itself from a past whose weight had proven too heavy to bear by constructing an acceptable past. It also acquired a consolatory virtual past, capable of salving the wounds of the real history, replacing it with an imaginary history: had it not been for the accident of the revolution, then we, today, would be as rich as the West, or even richer. This virtual past not only has the function of permitting the construction of a positive identity. It is also […] a promise for the future, for if such a past

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[651] *Ferretti, Maria.* Memory in Disorder. Russia and Stalinism // Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 41, № 6, November/December 2003.

[652] Sovetskij prostoj chelovek. Opyt sotsial'nogo portreta na rubezhe 1990-h, Moscow, 1993. pp. 36, 202-208; *Dubin, Boris.* Proshloe v segodnjashnih otsenkah rossijan // Monitoring obshestvennogo mnenija, № 5, 1996. pp. 28-34.

would have been possible without the revolution, that means it can be returned to by picking up the path where it was abandoned—which the radicals in fact promised to do. This reassuring sort of 'future past' was particularly important at a moment of grave social crisis, marked also by the loss of orientation and identity: at one and the same time it provided Russians with anchorage in the past, giving them a feeling of being rooted in the longue durée of national history, while reassuring them about the future, making it less threatening."[653]

The usable past thus offered Russians both liberation from a sense of guilt about the past and a promise for a better, more radiant future. However, as the general disillusionment with Yeltsin's attempts at liberal reform grew and the social and economic crisis in Russia aggravated, it was getting more and more evident that "catching up" with the West in terms of well-being was a much more complicated task than it had been initially perceived. In this context of disenchantment with the liberal democratic project which did not bring the desired prosperity, the nostalgia for the Soviet era has taken root. By that time the crimes of Stalinism had long ceased to dominate the national agenda, but the memories of once belonging to a "strong" state "respected" and "feared" on the international stage, as well as memories of an alleged stability and well-being during the Soviet times haunted the people who used to depend on the state in most aspects of their lives.

Importantly, it was initially the denigrated during perestroika as a time of stagnation, lack of freedom, and 'doublethink' Brezhnev era that started gaining in popularity first and which gradually become seen as the 'golden age' of the Russian history. If in 1994, 36 percent of respondents regarded the Brezhnev era mostly positively, in 1999 this number had reached 51 percent; meanwhile, the number of those who evaluated that period negatively was reduced from 16 percent to 10 percent.[654]

Although the level of well-being during the time when Leonid Brezhnev was a General Secretary (1966-82) was far from the standards established in the same period in the West, it was depicted in the recollections of some segments of the population as "a time of stability, relative comfort, and group solidarity, dramatically different from the incomprehensible, troubled contemporary life."[655]

According to Ferretti, another, not secondary component of this nostalgic feeling for the Soviet era was nostalgia for lost identity. As the historian explained it, "Carefully fostered by propaganda, the identity proposed to Soviet

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[653] *Ferretti, Maria.* 2007. Op. cit.

[654] *Levada, Yuri.* Ot mnenij k ponimaniju. Sotsiologicheskie ocherki 1993-2000. Moscow, 2000. p. 451. *Ustiuzhanin, Vasily.* Pochemu tak tianet prizhat'sia k grudi genseka // Komsomol'skaia pravda, 19 December 1996. p. 1.

[655] *Ferretti, Maria.* 2003. Op. cit. p. 63.

citizens [in the Brezhnev era] was centered on a sense of belonging to a country whose authority and strength were recognized throughout the world; a country, moreover, which was in a certain manner superior to others by virtue of its messianic role. One of the powerful symbols of this success was the conquest of space, whose most celebrated hero was the cosmonaut Gagarin, the first man to be sent into the cosmos."[656]

Since turning the Soviet Union into the second-greatest world power was mostly due to a determining role it played in the victory in World War II (which is known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), the victory over Nazi Germany was soon turned into the main symbol structuring the Russian national identity.

As Yeltsin's regime was drifting into authoritarianism after the recourse to force in October 1993 and establishment of superpresidential regime in December, it was employing more often the legitimation patterns used by its Soviet predecessors. Most important, since the mid-1990s the regime started reintegrating the symbol of victory in the war and interpretation of the events of the war created in the Brezhnev period into the Russian official politics of memory.

If for the political elite reactivation of the symbol of remembrance "victory in the war" served as an instrument of power consolidation, legitimizing and sustaining the regime that was getting more and more authoritarian, for the Russian population, in turn, it became attractive for several reasons. On the one hand, the re-integration of the Great Patriotic War into national memory (as a continuation of the process started during the Brezhnev era in 1965) provided a necessary basis for positive national identification replacing the fading pre-revolutionary ideal. It also compensated for the disappointments of the previous years – the disintegration of the USSR, the failure of the post-Soviet reforms, the noticeable weakening of mass hopes, and the disappearance of the illusions of *perestroika* that have furnished the content of a traumatic experience of national failure.[657]

The symbol thus helped Russians improve their own image and image of the country through whitewashing history previously full of nascent doubts about its creditworthiness and justifiability. The latter were linked with the truth about the criminality of the Soviet regime that emerged during the *perestroika* period. As the victory in the war has been progressively gaining in relevance, the memory of Stalinist repression, on the contrary, has faded. In fact, it appeared so that the memory of the victory actually ousted or replaced the memory of terror.

[656] *Ferretti, Maria.* 2007. Op. cit.

[657] *Gudkov, Lev.* The Fetters of Victory. How the War Provides Russia with Its Identity // Eurozine, 3 May, 2005.

As the chairman of the International Memorial Society Arseny Roginsky observed, "Victory means the Stalinist era, and the terror means the Stalinist era. It is impossible to reconcile these two images of the past, except by rejecting one of them, or at least making serious corrections to it. And this is what happened – the memory of the terror receded. It has not disappeared completely, but it has been pushed to the periphery of people's consciousness."[658]

The politics of memory, following the Soviet traditions of dealing with history, immediately got a reflection in the school history textbooks. Observers of Russian school textbooks of the 1990s noted that they paid little attention to the Soviet repressions and mass deportations of ethnic groups.[659] At the same time teaching history in schools was becoming viewed as a means of patriotic upbringing which was mostly achieved through the study of the Great Patriotic War.[660] If in early 1990s some textbooks portrayed a critical view of the war presenting specific figures of the enormous losses of the Soviet army, these specific figures were not mentioned in the more recent history textbooks.[661]

As the Stalin's leadership became inseparable from the triumph of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany, the Stalin's rule in general became justified and rehabilitated. Despite the enormous human loss of which the broad public by that time had been more or less aware, Stalin's regime could be nevertheless seen as legitimate and praiseworthy because of the victory in the war that seemed to justify the enormous loss of human lives during the Stalin's reign of terror. "The implication is, – explained analyst Maria Lipman, – that individuals may have been cowed, and that the ferocious state treated them mercilessly, but the state was the vehicle that inspired Russia's victory in World War II, its greatest achievement of the 20th century."[662]

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[658] *Roginsky, Arseny.* The Embrace of Stalinism // Open Democracy, 16 December, 2008. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/russia/article/The-Embrace-of-Stalinism>

[659] See *Kaplan, Vera.* The Reform of Education in Russia and the Problem of History Teaching // Education in Russia, the Independent States and Eastern Europe, Vol. 17, № 1, 1999. pp. 3-19.

[660] *Lebedkov, Alexander.* Dialogues about War. Patriotism from the Point of View of Methodology // Pervoe Sentiabrya, 41, 1-9. 2004. <http://ps.1september.ru/articlef.php?ID=200404116>

[661] For instance, the textbook edited by Ostrovsky *Istoriia otechestva* (1992), mentioned that some 2 million Red Army soldiers were captured during the June 1941-May 1942 period. The battle of Kiev resulted in 600,000 captured soldiers, and the early phase of the battle for Moscow resulted in the destruction of 5 Soviet armies and the capture of 663,000 soldiers (pp. 22-37). These specific figures are not mentioned in the more recent history textbooks. Students discover that some 6 million Soviet prisoners of war died in captivity (p. 61). See: *Ostrovsky, V.* (ed.) Istoriya otechestva 1939-1991: Uchebnik dlia 11 klassa srednei shkoly (History of the Fatherland: Textbook for Grade 11). Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1992. See *Zajda, Joseph.* The New History School Textbooks in the Russian Federation: 1992-2004 // Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 1469-3623, Vol. 37, № 3, 2007. pp. 291 – 306.

[662] *Lipman, Maria.* Russia's Search for an Identity // The Washington Post, 3 November, 2009.

It was in this context that the image of Stalin was restored, the dictator being presented as the author of the victory, the leader who gave back to Russia the power it had lost with the revolution, assuring it of a preponderant place in the world. If in 1989 Stalin was mentioned among the most important and authoritative figures of the Russian history by only 12 percent of the respondents, in 1994 the number of his admirers increased up to 20 percent, and in 1999 – up to 35 percent.[663] If in 1990 only 8 percent of the respondents considered Stalin the most positive character in history of the country, in 1997 this viewpoint was already shared by 15 percent. And if in 1990 Stalin was regarded as the most negative character in the country's history by 48 percent of Russians, in 1997 this number decreased to 36 percent.[664]

The Soviet nostalgia, as Maria Ferretti underscored, has constituted a powerful driving force for the intensification of nationalistic sentiments, which since the mid-1990s has acquired an ever-growing place in the ideology of Russia. Simultaneously the national isolationism manifested in the revival of the Russian "unique path" mythology started developing rapidly. According to public opinion surveys, the number of people convinced that Russia must choose its own path instead of following Western "chimeras" has grown steadily since the beginning of the 1990s. 54 percent of the respondents in 1994 and 59 percent in 1995 agreed that Russia should follow its unique path of development[665] and by 1999 the number of this view's proponents reached 69 percent.[666]

The more evident became the authoritarian features of the post-Soviet Russia and the stronger became the disappointment of Russian society, the more space was occupied by the nationalistic sentiments and values in the discourse of power, ousting the democratic values to which postcommunist Russia initially appealed. Since the beginning of the first Chechen war launched in 1994, imperial syndrome alongside aggressive nationalism continued to expand their positions. The growth of nationalism reached its peak with ascent to power of

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[663] *Levada, Yuri.* Ot mnenij k ponimaniju. Sociologicheskie ocherki 1993-2000. Moscow, 2000. p. 453. The positive views of Stalin have increased from 19 percent to 53 percent between 1998 and 2003. *Levinson, Aleksej.* Ljudi molodye za istoriju bez travm // Neprikosnovennyj zapas, № 4 (36), 2004.

[664] *Levada, Yuri.* Nevyuchennye uroki Oktiabria v zerkale obshestvennogo mneniia // Obshchaia gazeta, № 44, 1997.

[665] *Dubin, Boris.* Zapad, granitsa, osobyj put': simvolika "drugogo" v politicheskoj mifologii Rossii (The West, The Border, and the Unique Path: Symbolism of the "Other" in the Political Mythology of Contemporary Russia) // Monitoring obshestvennogo mnenija, № 6 (50), 2000. p. 29.

[666] Russia Should Have Its Unique Path. Public Opinion Fund (FOM), 18 June, 1999. <http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/power/of19992402>

Vladimir Putin who made imperial ideas of state superiority and isolationism the basis of Russia identity's and of the government ideology.[667]

The Soviet repressive past continued to interest only a small group of intellectuals, largely historians working on it. As for this professional work on the Soviet history and the problems of its repressive past, it is worth mentioning that with the partial opening of the archives historians got access to the information previously closed for any access for decades. The intensive historians' work in the archives let observers define the 1990s as "the decade-long 'archival period' of work on Soviet history."[668] Generally speaking, the historical research of the Stalin period during the 1990s was characterized by accumulation of new, primarily, archival sources, and by obtaining basic knowledge about the Soviet leaders as well as about the structure, functions and activities of the Soviet repressive organs.

In the 1990s a number of important biographical studies by Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, Dmitry Volkogonov, Alexandr Kozlov and other historians saw light.[669] Additionally, the publications of several reference works as well as general research on the history of the repressions, camps, prison and other repressive Soviet institutions have significantly contributed to historiographical developments and opened up new prospects for future research. In this regards the reference works edited by Mikhail Smirnov (1998), Nikita Petrov and Konstantin Skorkin (1999), Alexandr Kokurin and Nikita Petrov (1997, 2003) can be pointed out.[670]

Another group of historians such as Sergei Krasil'nikov and Viktor Danilov (1992-96), Viktor Shashkov (1993), Tatiana Slavko (1995), Viktor Danilov et al. (1999) focused on the mass repressions of peasants, forced collectivization

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[667] *Ferretti, Maria.* 2003. Op. cit. pp. 39, 69.

[668] *Khlevniuk, Oleg.* Stalinism and the Stalin Period after the "Archival Revolution" // Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Vol. 2, № 2, Spring 2001. p. 319.

[669] *Volkogonov, Dmitry.* Vozhdi. Trilogija. 6 vols. Triumf i tragedija. Politicheskij portret Stalina (1992). Trockij (1992). Lenin. Politicheskij portret. (1994). *Kozlov, Alexandr.* Stalin: bor'ba za vlast'. Rostov na Donu, 1991. *Antonov-Ovseyenko, Anton.* Portret tirana. Moscow, 1994. Berija. Moscow, 1999.

[670] *Kokurin, Aleksandr; Petrov, Nikita* (eds.) Lubjanka VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB. 1917-1960. Spravochnik. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnogo fonda "Demokratija", 1997. *Smirnov, Mikhail* (ed.) Sistema ispravitel'no-trudovykh lagerei v SSSR, 1923–1960: Spravochnik. Moscow: Zven'ia, 1998; *Petrov, Nikita; Skorkin, Konstantin* (eds.) Kto rukovodil NKVD, 1934–1941: Spravochnik. Moscow: Zven'ia, 1999; *Kokurin, Aleksandr; Petrov, Nikita* (eds.) GULAG (Glavnoe upravlenie lagerei), 1917–1960. (The GULAG. The Main Administration of Camps). 1917-1960). Moscow: Materik, 2000.

and dekulakization, and "special resettlement" (*spetssylka)* of "kulaks."[671] The research of the departmental subdivisions of the Gulag and the camps was done by Vasily Makurov (1992), Olga Elantseva (1994), Lyubov' Gvozdkova (1994), Viktor Berdinskikh (1998), Anatoly Shirokov (2000).[672] There also appeared publications, primarily by the Memorial historians, on the repressions of representatives of different ethnic groups and nationalities – Poles, Russian Germans, Jews, etc.[673]

On the basis of archives some research on the daily operations of the higher echelons of power and relations between Soviet leaders became possible.[674] Furthermore, the archives have in many ways shaped the nature of work on culture and science in the Stalin period – mainly research on the interrelationship between state and intelligentsia, mechanisms of censorship and ideological control, and so on. Here the works of Vitaly Shentalinsky (1995), Nikolai Krementsov (1997), Denis Babichenko (1997), and Leonid Maksimenkov (1997), Vladimir Esakov (2000) are worth mentioning.[675]

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[671] For instance, *Krasil'nikov, Sergei; Danilov, Viktor* (eds.) Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri, 1930–1945 gg., 4 vols. Novosibirsk: Ekor, 1992–96; *Danilov, Viktor; Manning, Roberta; Lynne, Viola* et al. (eds.) Tragediia sovetskoi derevni. Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy v 5 tomakh, 1927–1939. 2 vols. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999 - 2000. *Shashkov, Viktor.* Spetspereselentsy na Murmane: Rol' spetspereselentsev v razvitii proizvodstvennykh sil na Kol'skom poluostrove, 1930–1936 gg. Murmansk: Izdatel'stvo Murmanskogo gosudarstevennogo pedagogicheskogo instituta, 1993; *Slavko, Tatiana.* Kulatskaya ssylka na Urale, 1930–1936. Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv, 1995. *Krasil'nikov, Sergei.* Serp i Moloh. Krest'janskaja ssylka v Zapadnoj Sibiri v 1930-e gody. Moscow, 2003; Politbjuro i krest'janstvo: vysylka, spetsposelenie. 1930-1940. 2 vols., Moscow, 2005 – 2006.

[672] See, among other works, *Makurov, Vasily; Zhukov, A.* (eds.) Gulag v Karelii. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, 1930–1941. Petrozavodsk: Karel'skii nauchnyi tsentr RAN, 1992; *Elantseva, Olga.* Obrechennaia doroga: BAM, 1932–1941. (Doomed Road. The BAM: 1932-1941). Vladivostok: Izdatel'stvo Dal'nevostochnogo universiteta, 1994; *Gvozdkova, Lyubov'* (ed.) Prinuditelny trud. Ispravitelno-trudovyye lagerya v Kuzbasse (30-50-e gody) (Forced Labor. Correctional-Labor Camps in the Kuznetsk Basin). 2 vols. Kemerovo, 1994. *Berdinskikh, Viktor.* Viatlag. Kirov: V. Berdinskikh, 1998; *Shirokov, Anatoly.* Dal'stroi: predistoriia i pervoe desiatiletie. (Dalstroi: The Background and the First Decade). Magadan: Kordis, 2000.

[673] For example, see *Guryanov, Aleksandr.* Repressii protiv poliakov i pol'skikh grazhdan. Moscow: Zven'ia, 1997; *Shcherbakova, Irina* (ed.) Repressii protiv sovetskikh nemtsev: Nakazannyi narod. Moscow: Zven'ia, 1999. On the state-sponsored anti-Semitic campaigns of the 1940s see: *Kostyrchenko, Gennady.* V plenu u krasnogo faraona: Politicheskie presledovaniia evreev v SSSR v poslednee stalinskoe desiatiletie. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994.

[674] *Khlevniuk, Oleg.* Politbiuro: Mekhanizmy politicheskoi vlasti v 1930-e gody. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996. *Pikhoia, Rudol'f.* Sovetskii Soyuz: Istoriia vlasti, 1945–1991. Moscow: Rossiiskaya akademiya gosudarstvennoi sluzhby pri Prezidente Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1998; *Watson, Derek.* Molotov and Soviet Government: Sovnarkom, 1930–1941. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1996;

[675] *Krementsov, Nikolai.* Stalinist Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997; *Shentalinsky, Vitaly.* Raby svobody. V literaturnyh arhivah KGB. Moscow, 1995; *Babichenko, Denis* (ed.)

In the second half of the 1990s the first attempts to get into the everyday life of Stalin period, to analyze the Soviet society, its standards of living, and the daily behavior of ordinary Soviet citizens were undertaken by both Russian and Western authors.[676]

However, despite the importance of the work performed by historians in that period, experts expressed criticism that the decade of studies was marked by "the production of a large number of documentary publications and reference works" alongside "a depressingly small number of scholarly monographs."[677]

According to Oleg Khlevniuk, "The same picture can be observed in regard to specialized historical journals, in which substantive research articles have clearly made room for the publication of selected documents, memoirs, and current debates (*publitsistika*)."[678] Peter Holquist also suggested that "if there are any blank spots now, they lie more in our conceptualizations than in the archives themselves."[679]

Indeed, practically no generalizing works on the Stalin's reign of terror and totalitarian character of the regime appeared in the post-Soviet period. Galina Ivanova's 1997 monograph on *Gulag in the System of a Totalitarian State*

"Shchast'e literatury": Gosudarstvo i pisateli, 1925–1938. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1997; *Maksimenkov, Leonid*. Sumbur vmesto muzyki. Stalinskaya kul'turnaia revoliutsiia, 1936–1938. Moscow: Yuridicheskaya kniga, 1997; *Esakov, Vladimir* (ed.) Akademiia nauk v resheniiakh Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b), 1922–1952. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000.

[676] *Afanasiev, Yuri* (ed.) Sovetskoe obshestvo: Vozniknovenie, razvitie, istoricheskij final. 2 vols. Moscow: RGGU, 1997. Vol. 2: Apogej i krah stalinizma. *Osokina, Elena*. Za fasadom "stalinskogo izobiliia." Raspredelenie i rynok v snabzhenii naseleniia v gody industrializatsii, 1927–1941. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998; *Lebina, Natalia.* Povsednevnaya zhizn' sovetskogo goroda: normy i anomalii, 1920–1930-e gody. St. Petersburg: Izdatel'sko-torgovyi dom "Letnii sad," 1999; *Fitzpatrick, Sheila*. Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times. Soviet Russia in the 1930s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; *Filtzer, Donald*. The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in the Immediate Postwar Period, 1945–1948 // Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, № 6, 1999; *Shinkarchuk, Sergei.* Obshchestvennoe mnenie v Sovetskoi Rossii v 30-e gody. St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta ekonomiki i finansov, 1995; *Zubkova, Elena.* Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshchestvo. Politika i povsednevnost', 1945–1953. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999. *Davies, Sarah.* Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934–1941. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

[677] *Khlevniuk, Oleg.* Stalinism and the Stalin Period after the "Archival Revolution" // Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Vol. 2, № 2, Spring 2001. p. 327.

[678] Ibid.

[679] *Holquist*, *Peter.* Constructing a New Past: The Soviet Experience in the Post-Soviet Historiography. Paper presented to the conference "Russia at the End of the Twentieth Century: Culture and its Horizons in Politics and Society," Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 21 November, 1998.

was a rare exception.[680] Various aspects of the history of the Gulag, despite the existence of a major source base, have not been the subject of in-depth research and analysis. For instance, largely non-studied remained the development of camps as a social phenomenon of a particular type.

Another serious problem with historical research lies in the fact that this field of studies remained marginal and rather unpopular. Observers reported the number of Russian specialists seriously devoted to the study of Soviet history to be too small expressing concern that very few young researchers entered into the historical profession and were eager to work on the topics lined with the Soviet reign of terror in the 1990s.[681]

Some important sociological research of the Soviet society was conducted in the 1990s by the Analytical Levada Center sociologists. *The Soviet Man* (*Homo Sovieticus*) project directed by the organization's head Yuri Levada was launched in 1989. Since then five waves of all-Russia public opinion surveys were conducted in 1989, 1994, 1999, 2003 and 2008. The Russian sociologists just like their German colleagues from the Frankfurt school half a century before studied the human type that developed under the Soviet totalitarian regime and tried to trace continuities between the Soviet and post-Soviet social identification of individuals. Already initial results made the experts underscore a very high stability of attitudes of mass consciousness in post-Soviet Russia.[682]

Since 1992 the Moscow historical literary society *The Return* (*Vozvrashenie*) founded in 1989 has been publishing memoirs, poems and other literary witnesses of life in the Gulag. In 1996 the Andrei Sakharov Museum and Public Center "Peace, Progress and Human Rights" was founded in Moscow. The Museum's Permanent Exhibit developed by architect Evgeny Ass presented Soviet history as seen through the prism of political repressions and resistance to the regime. Since 1997 the museum has been collecting information on the authors of memoirs on the Gulag as well as on the monuments to the victims of political repressions erected within the territory of the former USSR in a project entitled "Memory of Lawlessness". As a result of this initiative the databases

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[680] *Ivanova, Galina.* GULAG v sisteme totalitarnogo gosudarstva (GULAG in the system of a totalitarian state), Moscow: MONF, 1997. *Ivanova, Galina.* Istorija GULAGa, 1918 — 1958: sotsial'no-ekonomicheskij i politiko-pravovoj aspekty. Moscow: Nauka, 2006.

[681] See *Khlevniuk, Oleg.* Op. cit.

[682] *Levada, Yuri.* "Homo Sovieticus." Limits of Self-Identification // Russia in Global Affairs, № 2, April - June 2005 <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_4953>

"Memoirs on Gulag and their authors" and "Monuments to victims of political repressions within the territory of the former USSR" were created.[683]

In the same 1996 the only Russian Museum for the History of Political Repression "Perm-36" built on the site of the former labor camp for political prisoners in the Perm region was opened for visitor admission.

Nevertheless, despite these important contributions by rather small groups of individuals (largely consisting of former victims of the Soviet regime or their children), the trajectory of memory aimed at critical assessment and "working through" the Soviet totalitarian past did not produce any series public impact in the 1990s. Since the mid-1990s the official politics of memory has been more and more dominating the public sphere, preventing the crystallization of any independent agents or communities of memory.

4.3.3 2000s

Since President Putin's rise to power in 2000 the state has been claiming practically absolute monopoly over the interpretation and the use of history in the public sphere. As the ruling elite were suppressing independent institutions (free elections, independent press and television outlets, political parties, etc.) and getting hold of the public sphere, it has been also intensifying its attempts to control national history and to impose the official version of memory of the national past. And the more official system of propaganda has been working in this direction, the more imperial and nationalistic sentiments have been dominating the mass consciousness. Thus, the growing authoritarianism of the 2000s was accompanied by the ever increasing nationalist and pro-imperial rhetoric and sentiments, alongside with the continuing devaluation of liberal values.

The developments of memory politics are most clearly visible in the memorialization of the Great Patriotic War the victory in which, as previously noted, was reintegrated into national identity as its core symbol already in the second half of the 1990s. Boris Dubin (2004, 2005, 2008), Lev Gudkov (2005), Arseny Roginsky (2008), Christian Folk (2009), Dina Khapaeva (2009) and other observers have repeatedly pointed to the continual increase of the significance of victory in the official politics of memory since Putin's rise to public office.

If in 1996, 44 percent of those surveyed mentioned the victory in the war in response to the question, "What makes you personally most proud in the

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[683] See electronic databases "Monuments to victims of political repressions within the territory of the former USSR" (http://www.sakharov-center.ru/projects/bases/monuments/) and "Memoirs on GULAG and their authors" (http://www.sakharov-center.ru/gulag/).

country's history?" in 2003 the figure was 87 percent.[684] Approximately the same number of the respondents (75-85 percent) has traditionally named the victory over Nazi Germany as the greatest moment of history, the most important event that determined Russia's fate in the 20th century. The opinion polls show that victory in the Great Patriotic War is the most potent symbol of identification in present-day Russia.[685]

It is often noted that the war in Russia is still discussed in the news media as if it was a recent event and not an increasingly distant history. The annual Victory Day parade on May 9th, broadcasted all over Russia by all major television channels, is held with great pomp and with symbolic demonstration of force. Thousands of personnel participate in the traditional military parade on the Red Square which after the 17 years of break starting in 2008 has featured a large-scale display of the country's military hardware.[686]

It is important to point out that the symbol of "victory in the war," powerfully exploited by the Kremlin administration in the 2000s, has greatly contributed to the justification and legitimization of a uncontrollable power, "a strong, authoritarian regime, disregarding costs in the name of the interests of state power, which thus legitimizes all kinds of policy."[687] Despite numerous evidence attesting that the country actually won the war despite, not because of, some of Stalin's actions (such as his decimation of the officer corps through repeated purges, his secret deal with Hitler, and his manifest lack of preparedness), due to the state propaganda, official monopoly over the public sphere and passing on of history, the victory became linked with the figure of generalissumus Stalin. Although historians have confirmed that the enormous death toll of the Soviet citizens during the war was largely the result of Stalin's disdain for the lives of his own men and of the atrocious bungling of Soviet commanders, the general public has continued to view it as a noble sacrifice necessary for gaining victory in the war and, similarly important, turning the Soviet Union into the great empire and world superpower.[688]

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[684] *Gudkov, Lev.* The Fetters of Victory. How the War Provides Russia with Its Identity // Eurozine, 3 May, 2005.

[685] Ibid.

[686] *Bigg, Claire.* Russia: Is The USSR Back In Vogue? // RFE/RL, 5 May, 2008.

[687] *Ferretti, Maria.* Nostalgia for Communism in Post-Soviet Russia. Paper presented at the Workshop "The Legacy and Memory of Communism in Europe," EURHISTXX, Paris, 17 December, 2007.

[688] According to a recent opinion poll, 49 percent think that twenty-seven million dead was a fair price to pay for victory. See: *Khapaeva, Dina.* Ocharovannye stalinizmom // Neprikosnovennyj zapas, Vol. 55, № 5, 2007.

At the same time, the general acceptance of the symbol of victory helped Russians avoid the toilful and inevitably complex process of critical self-assessment, rationalization and subsequent making up for the failures of structural transformations, bringing about new alternative programs of development. The Russian population, instead, generally accepted the model of the omnipotent state clinging consciously or unconsciously to the image of Stalin as the embodiment of the great power and state. As Lev Gudkov put it, "Victory does not only crown the war, but as it were purifies and justifies it, at the same time withdrawing its negative side from any attempt at rational analysis, tabooing the topic. It makes it impossible to explain the causes and course of the war, or to analyze the actions of the Soviet leaders and the nature of a regime that subordinated all spheres of social existence to its preparations for the war. The victors' triumph masks the ambiguity of the symbol. Victory in the war retrospectively legitimizes the Soviet totalitarian regime as a whole and uncontrolled rule as such; justifies the "costs" of Soviet history and the accelerated military-industrial modernization – the repressions, famines, poverty, and enormous numbers of deaths after collectivization; and creates a version of the past that has no alternative and provides the only possible and significant framework for interpreting history."[689]

The memory of victory also replaced the genuine memory of the war – of its everyday hardships, of everyday struggles for life, of the 1941 invasion, of imprisonment and terror, of evacuation, etc. It actually repressed a number of uncomfortable facts from mass consciousness such as "the aggressive nature of the Soviet regime, Communist militarism and expansionism, which were the reason for the USSR's expulsion from the League of Nations after its attack on Finland; the fact that World War II began with a joint attack on Poland by two partners and then allies – Hitler's Germany and the Soviet Union; the human, social, economic, and metaphysical cost of war; and the responsibility of the country's leadership for the beginning and course of the war, and the consequences of the war for other countries."[690]

The symbol of victory thus became (or, to be more precise, was intentionally made) a kind of a stumbling block on the way of any critical rationalization of the Soviet history. Any attempt to critically assess the glory of that triumph often defined as "sacred" is tabooed and perceived as hostile. Russian authorities reject any critique of the USSR's role in defeating Nazi Germany. For instance, in May 2005 on the 60th anniversary of the end of World

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[689] *Gudkov, Lev.* The Fetters of Victory. How the War Provides Russia with Its Identity // Eurozine, 3 May, 2005.
[690] Ibid.

War II in Europe, Putin strongly rejected the Bush administration's request that he denounce the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.[691]

Any attempts to revisit the history of war and its implications, to unveil the truth about it within the country are also vehemently resisted. In February 2009 a television documentary about the Red Army's enormous death toll during World War II *Rzhev: Marshal Zhukov's Unknown Battle (Rzhev: Neizvestnaya Bitva Georgia Zhukova)* aired on Russian television caused a fierce backlash in Russia. Some indignant viewers even demanded to arrest the film's narrator, the TV journalist Alexei Pivovarov, accusing him of treason.[692]

Several high-ranking members of the Russian government, in turn, called for a new law based on Holocaust denial legislation in Germany that would criminalize any attempts to revisit the Soviet Union's role in World War II. The ruling *United Russia* party also proposed a draft law that would make it a criminal offence to "infringe on historical memory in relation to events which took place in the Second World War."[693]

At the same time the opinion surveys revealed that most Russians remained unaware of the implications of the war history. For instance, 41 percent of those surveyed in the recent Levada Center opinion poll were unaware of the secret protocol included in the nonaggression pact, signed on 23 August, 1939 by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and his German counterpart Joachim von Ribbentrop that divided up Northern and Eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet "spheres of influence."[694] In a July 2009 survey 61 percent of Russians said they did not know that Soviet troops invaded eastern Poland in September 1939.[695] Furthermore, many Russians remained unaware – intentionally or unintentionally – of the Red Army's wartime atrocities such as mass rape of the

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[691] *Mendelson Sarah E., Gerber Theodore P.* Failing the Stalin Test. Russians and Their Dictator // Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, № 1, January/February 2006. p. 6.

[692] *Rzhev: Marshal Zhukov's Unknown Battle* (2009) tells the story of the little-known battles of Rzhev—a town on the upper Volga River—in 1942 and 1943, in which more than a million Soviet soldiers were killed. Along with battlefield reenactments, the film includes interviews with veterans on both sides, notably several German survivors who said the Red Army's human-wave attacks used Soviet troops as little more than "cannon fodder." See *Ewers, Justin.* Film Spurs Russia to Squelch Criticism of Soviet War Tactics // World War II, July 2009.

[693] *Ewers, Justin.* Film Spurs Russia to Squelch Criticism of Soviet War Tactics // World War II, July 2009.

[694] USSR and the Beginning of World War II. The Levada Analytical Center survey, 20-23 August, 2010. <http://www.levada.ru/press/2010083011.html>

[695] The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Soviet Invasion of Poland in the Autumn of 1939. The Levada Analytical Center survey, 17-20 August, 2009.
<http://www.levada.ru/press/2009082401.html>

German women in the final war period or of the Katyn massacre of the Polish officers carried out by the Soviet secret police NKVD in April–May 1940.[696]

On 15 May, 2009 Putin's successor President Medvedev (2008-present) set up a special commission to investigate and counter falsified versions of history that damage Russia's "international prestige" in order to "defend Russia against falsifiers of history and those who would deny Soviet contribution to the victory in World War II."[697] He empowered the commission—led by the presidential administration chief of staff, Sergei Naryshkin and comprising senior military, government and intelligence officials—to launch inquiries, unearth historical documents, and call government and expert witnesses, as well as formulate possible policy responses for the president to consider. Medvedev noted that attempts to falsify history had become intolerable and that in his view "such attempts are becoming more hostile, more evil, and more aggressive." "We must fight for the historical truth," said Medvedev in his video blog.[698]

As the state has been claiming a monopoly on the creation of history and passing on of memory, it's been trying to use the teaching of history in Russian educational establishments to promote a sense of national identity (Vladimir Berelovich 2002; Robert Maier 2005; Karen Till 2006; Joseph Zajda 2007; Aleksandr Kiselev 2008; Ekaterina Levintova and John Batterfield 2009).

To begin with, in 2001 the cabinet of ministers headed then by Prime-Minister Mikhail Kasyanov paid close attention to the content of several history textbooks and criticized them. In 2002 the Ministry of Education launched a competition aimed at creating new history textbooks for 9th – 11th graders that would contribute, among other things, to "nurturing patriotism, civic and national consciousness, historical optimism, respect for the historical and cultural heritage of the peoples of Russia and the world, the formation of key social competencies."[699]

In November 2003, Russian authorities with the approval of President Putin himself removed Igor Dolutsky's *National History of the 20th Century (Otechsetvennaja Istoria: 20 vek)*—a text known for its thorough and meticulous

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[696] Russians on the Problems of Russian-Polish Relations. The Levada Analytical Center, 16-19 April, 2010. <http://www.levada.ru/press/2010042705.html>

[697] President's Decree № 549 on Creation of "Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests," 15 May, 2009. <http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=052421>

[698] Quoted in *Osborn, Andrew.* Medvedev Creates History Commission // Wall Street Journal, 21 May, 2009. See also the transcript in Russian in Medvedev's blog at <http://blog.kremlin.ru/post/35/transcript>

[699] Quoted in *Berelovich, Vladimir.* Sovremennye rossijskie uchebniki istorii: mnogolikaja istina ili ocherednaja nacional'naja ideja? // Neprikosnovennyj zapas, № 4 (24), 2002.

discussion of Stalin's repressions, his role in World War II as well for its critique of Putin's regime—from public schools. Dolutsky's textbook was stripped of its Education Ministry license just days before the December parliamentary elections. Since then, the Ministry of Education decreed that, in view of new state standards in education, all history textbooks had to be examined and evaluated by panel of experts, including the Federal Experts Council on History, the Academy of Sciences, and the Academy of Education.[700]

The same month, on the eve of the parliament elections, while addressing history teachers Putin stressed that "textbooks should really present historical facts; they should inspire, especially among young people, a feeling of pride for their own history and for their country."[701] Referring to the 'numerous' complaints of the war veterans Putin directed the Russian Academy of Science to examine all history textbooks used in schools throughout Russia and report the results by 1 February, 2004.

In April 2005, in his annual spring address to the Russian parliament Putin declared that "the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century"[702] Putin argued that "for the Russian people, it became a real drama. Tens of millions of our citizens and compatriots found themselves outside the Russian Federation."[703] It is noteworthy that 78 percent of the respondents later agreed with this statement.[704]

In a few years under Putin's administration guidance high school history textbooks have been virtually rewritten. At a Kremlin-organized meeting convened in June 2007 to discuss "Contemporary Issues of Teaching Modern History and Social Sciences," Putin again criticized existing history and social science texts for devoting too much emphasis to "black pages" in Russia's history and argued that "we must not allow others to impose a feeling of guilt on us."[705] According to him, Russia has fewer "problematic pages" than "do some countries, and they are less terrible than in some countries." "In any event, -

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[700] *Zajda, Joseph.* The New History School Textbooks in the Russian Federation: 1992-2004 // Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 1469-3623, Vol. 37, № 3, 2007.

[701] *Putin, Vladimir.* Opening address at a meeting with history school teachers, Moscow, Russian National Library, 27 November, 2003.

<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2003/11/27/1829_type84779_56332.shtml>

[702] Putin address to nation: Excerpts // BBC News, 25 April, 2005.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4481455.stm>

[703] Ibid.

[704] *Mendelson Sarah E., Gerber Theodore P.* Failing the Stalin Test. Russians and Their Dictator // Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, № 1, January/February 2006. p. 6.

[705] Excerpts from Transcript of Vladimir Putin's meeting with Participants in the National Russian Conference of Humanities and Social Sciences Teachers, 21 June, 2007.

<http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/06/21/2137_type82917type84779_135471.shtml>

stated Putin, - we have never used nuclear weapons against civilians, and we have never dumped chemicals on thousands of kilometers of land or dropped more bombs on a tiny country than were dropped during the entire Second World War, as was the case in Vietnam. We have not had such bleak pages as was the case of Nazism, for example."[706]

On the occasion two new textbooks were unveiled, one on history and another on social studies *(Obshchestvoznanie)*, written largely by Kremlin political consultants and intended as guides for teachers and for new textbooks to be introduced in 2008. Both manuals reflected the dominant themes of official discourse, including strong statehood and national sovereignty, hostility towards the United States and a laudatory treatment of President Putin who allegedly restored Russian strength despite American efforts to isolate the country. "We see, - states the history textbook's last chapter, - that practically every significant deed is connected with the name and activity of President Putin."[707]

Authors of the new teachers' handbook appear to have the explicit aim of reversing what one of its editors, Alexander Filippov, deputy head of the National Laboratory of Foreign Policy, a research institute affiliated with the Kremlin, called a "propaganda offensive" directed from both inside Russia and abroad. According to him, the old, Yeltsin-era books dwelt too much on the evils of Soviet rule, which implied "Russia has no place in the company of the so-called civilized nations," and also that Russia, "as a successor of a totalitarian regime, is doomed forever to repent for this regime's real or invented crimes."[708]

The editor of the social studies manual Leonid Polyakov explained their purpose as follows: "We are developing a national ideology that represents the vision of ourselves as a nation, as Russians, a vision of our own identity and the world around us… Teachers will then be able to incorporate this national ideology, this vision, into their practical work in a normal way and use it to develop a civic and patriotic position."[709]

Furthermore, the textbooks propagate the "sovereign democracy" concept invented by the Kremlin's chief ideologist and first deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, to justify the authoritarian nature of Putin's regime. The social

[706] Ibid.

[707] *Finn, Peter.* New Manuals Push a Putin's-Eye View in Russian Schools // Washington Post, 20 July, 2007.

[708] Quoted in *Owen, Matthews; Nemtsova, Anna.* Back To the USSR. By Pushing a Patriotic View of History and the Humanities, the Kremlin is Reshaping the Russian Mind // Newsweek International, 20 August, 2007.

[709] Excerpts from Transcript of Vladimir Putin's meeting with Participants in the National Russian Conference of Humanities and Social Sciences Teachers, 21 June, 2007. <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/06/21/2137_type82917type84779_135471.shtml>

studies textbook, edited by Polyakov, states that "the regime of sovereign democracy is the ideal form of action of any political system," bearing a resemblance to the statements made in the Soviet era about the superiority and universal validity of the Soviet system.[710]

The historical texts in a history guide *The Modern History of Russia: 1945-2006,* edited by Alexander Fillipov, view Stalin's reign of terror through the lens of strong leadership in a long line of autocrats going back to the czars and asserting that Russian history at times demands tyranny to build a great nation.[711] The history manual assessed Stalin as "the most successful leader of the USSR." "As for the methods of coercion used toward the ruling bureaucratic elite, the goal was to mobilize the leadership in order to make it effective in the process of industrialization, as well as in rebuilding the economy in the postwar period," the manual stated. According to the authors, "This task was fulfilled by means of, among other things, political repression, which was used to mobilize not only rank-and-file citizens but also the ruling elite."[712]

According to the chairman of Memorial Arseny Roginsky, "In the new history textbooks Stalinism is presented as an institutional phenomenon, even an achievement and the terror is portrayed as a historically determined and unavoidable tool for solving state tasks. This concept does not rule out sympathy for the victims of history. But it makes it absolutely impossible to consider the criminal nature of the terror, and the perpetrator of this crime."[713] Roginsky, however, believed that, "The intention is not to idealize Stalin. This is the natural side-effect of resolving a completely different task – that of confirming the idea of the indubitable correctness of state power. The government is higher than any moral or legal assessments. It is above the law, as it is guided by state interests that are higher than the interests of the person and society, higher than morality and law. The state is always right – at least as long as it can deal with its enemies. This idea runs through the new textbooks from beginning to end, and not only where repressions are discussed."[714] Another critic, a historian Nikita Sokolov, believed that the manual was so equivocal on Stalin's terror that "his crimes are being taken into the shadows." According to Sokolov, the introduction of the textbooks is "very dangerous" because it brings the country back to unified

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[710] See the discussion in *Abramov, Aleksandr.* Sovereign Democracy in Schools // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 31 October, 2007.

[711] *Kramer, Andrew E.* New Russian History: 'Yes, People Died, But...' // International Herald Tribune, 15 August, 2007.

[712] Quoted in *Finn, Peter.* New Manuals Push a Putin's-Eye View in Russian Schools // Washington Post, 20 July, 2007.

[713] *Roginsky, Arseny.* The Embrace of Stalinism // Open Democracy, 16 December, 2008.

[714] Ibid.

thinking, for "the president and the presidential administration believe we lack the national self-confidence to confront and debate the past."[715]

Similar critique, however, has no place in the officially monopolized public space. One of the history textbook's contributors Pavel Danilin, an editor at Kremlin affiliated the Effective Policy Foundation, who wrote the chapter on "Sovereign Democracy," bluntly expressed his intentions on his web blog in response to criticism from teachers who argued the book was nothing else but the crude Kremlin propaganda. "You will teach children in line with the books you are given and in the way Russia needs," wrote Danilin. He continued, "To let some Russophobe (expletive), or just an amoral type, teach Russian history is impossible. It is necessary to clear the filth and if it doesn't work then clear it by force."[716]

The negative reaction to those individuals and organizations who have opposed the Kremlin politics of memory has not been only verbal. On 4 December, 2008 the St Petersburg office of the Memorial Society housing information on the victims of the Soviet political repressions was raided by the police and the entire electronic archive, representing twenty years of work, was confiscated. According to the office director Irina Flige, Memorial was targeted for being on the wrong side of Putinism, specifically in dissonance with the idea "that Stalin and the Soviet regime were successful in creating a great country."[717] Only after several months of struggle and international pressure were hard drives as well as optical discs and some documents returned to Memorial on 6 May, 2009.[718]

Besides, in the fall of 2009 a Russian historian and professor of history at Arkhangelsk's Pomorsky University investigating the fate of Germans deported by Stalin during World War II was imprisoned, his computer and all his hard drives have been seized by the FSB.[719]

Meanwhile, high evaluations of Stalin and the Soviet regime, particularly among the Russian youth, continued to grow. The survey conducted by St

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[715] Quoted in *Finn, Peter.* New Manuals Push a Putin's-Eye View in Russian Schools // Washington Post, 20 July, 2007.

[716] Ibid.

[717] *Galpin, Richard.* Stalin's New Status in Russia // BBC News, 27 December 2008; *Kosinova, Tatiana.* Eleven hard disks // Open Democracy, 15 December, 2008.

[718] On 20 March, 2009 the court of Dzerzhinsky District decided that the search in Memorial office with confiscation of 12 hard-drives with information about victims of political repressions was carried out with procedural violations, and actions of law enforcement bodies were illegal.

[719] *Wingfield-Hayes, Rupert*. Russia seizes Stalin-era research // BBC News, Moscow, 16 October, 2009. *Harding, Luke.* Russian historian arrested in clampdown on Stalin era. Authorities seize research into Arctic gulags in latest move to suppress evidence of political repression // Guardian, 15 October, 2009.

Petersburg sociologists in 2008 revealed a high moral evaluation of the Soviet past by the Russian population - 44 percent of the respondents believed that the Soviet past had a positive influence on the morality of contemporary Russians, and 50 percent said it had a positive effect on the development of the national culture.[720]

About half of young people aged between 16 and 29 (51 percent) surveyed in June 2005 agreed that Stalin was a wise leader, while 39 percent disagreed. A majority (61 percent) thought Stalin should receive credit for victory in World War II; only 28 percent thought he should not. Similarly, 56 percent thought that he did more good than bad, and only one-third disagreed. Opinion was about equally divided over whether he had been a cruel tyrant: 43 percent agreed, and 47 percent disagreed. On one hand, 70 percent concurred that he had imprisoned, tortured, and killed millions of innocent people. Yet, about 40 percent agreed with the statement that people today tend to exaggerate Stalin's role in the terror.[721]

Furthermore, according to the Levada Center 2007 poll, around 40 percent of Russians believed that the Gulag system and mass repressions should be less discussed as there is no need to rake up the past and 68 percent of the respondents thought is unnecessary to find and call to justice those guilty in the repressions and violence of the past.[722]

In 2008 the architect of the Soviet Gulag system Joseph Stalin was voted one of the greatest historical figures in the nationwide television project.[723] At the end of August 2009 a fragment of Stalin-era Soviet national anthem, removed in the 1950s during Krushev's period of de-Stalinization, was re-inscribed at Moscow's Kurskaya metro station which reads: "Stalin reared us on loyalty to the people. He inspired us to labor and heroism." To add to this, in 2010 the Moscow government came up with plans to display billboards with Stalin's portraits in Moscow as part of World War II Victory Day celebrations. Memorials to Stalin have begun to appear in several regions of the country. At the same time no state-sponsored monument to the victims of the Stalin's reign of terror has been established.

Against this background even some official acts that might be regarded as positive does not produce an impression of change. This may refer, for instance,

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[720] *Khapaeva, Dina.* Ocharovannye stalinizmom // Neprikosnovennyj zapas, Vol. 55, № 5, 2007.

[721] *Mendelson, Sarah E., Gerber, Theodore P.* Soviet Nostalgia: An Impediment to Russian Democratization // The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, № 1, Winter 2005 - 2006. p. 87.

[722] 1937-38 Repressions in Public Opinion. The Levada Analytical Center, 10-13 August, 2007. <http://www.levada.ru/press/2007103001.html>

[723] Nikolai II and Stalin Top List of Famous Russians // The Other Russia, 17 July, 2008. *Galpin, Richard.* Stalin's New Status in Russia // BBC News, 27 December, 2008.

to Putin's marking the Day of Memory of Victims of Political Repressions and the 70th anniversary of the Great Purge on 30 October, 2007 with a visit to the Butovo Grave Memorial Complex, a former firing range of the People's Commissariat (Ministry) for Internal Affairs just outside Moscow, where mass executions were held in the 1930s and the 1940s.[724] The same can be said about President Medvedev's address on 30 October, 2009 which was published in his video blog. In the address Medvedev condemned Joseph Stalin's crimes and called on the nation not to forget about past political repression or its victims. Calling Stalin's repressions "one of the greatest tragedies in Russian history" Medvedev expressed concern that "even today it can be heard that these mass victims were justified by certain higher goals of the state." But according to him "no development of a country, none of its successes or ambitions can be reached at the price of human losses and grief."[725]

This statement, which led the state-controlled television news, was so sharply at odds with official rhetoric of the past decade that observers strongly hesitated in evaluating it. As Maria Lipman explained it, "Medvedev's address may have sounded radical," but many Russian observers are "skeptical that the president's words would actually bring change" for "the number of alarming signals of Stalin's rehabilitation is growing. And in general over the year and a half of his presidency, Medvedev's often well-intended rhetoric has not been matched with policy."[726]

Furthermore, the President's internet address remained largely unnoticed by the public. According to the recent survey, only 6.6 percent of respondents saw or read it and only 14.6 percent heard about it, and of these 426 respondents, only 194 (9.6 percent of the total sample), identified the theme correctly.[727]

The public interpretations of history in a totally state-controlled media environment seem to reflect the controversial impulses coming from the official realms. On the one hand, as it was shown before, Russians approve of Stalin and give tribute to him for the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The Levada Center February-March 2003 poll marking the 50th anniversary of the dictator's death found that "53 percent of respondents approved of Stalin overall, 33 percent disapproved, and 14 percent declined to state a position. 20 percent of those polled agreed with the statement that Stalin "was a wise leader who led the USSR to power and prosperity,' while the same number agreed that only a

[724] *Shchedrov, Oleg.* Putin Honors Stalin Victims 70 Years after Terror // Reuters, 30 October, 2007. Purge Victims Remembered in Russia // Russia Beyond the Headlines, 14 November, 2007.
[725] *Lipman, Maria.* Russia's Search for an Identity // The Washington Post, 3 November, 2009. The transcript in Medvedev's video blog at <http://blog.kremlin.ru/post/35/transcript>
[726] *Lipman, Maria.* Op. cit.
[727] *Gerber, Theodore P.* Op. cit.

'tough leader' could rule the country under the circumstances in which Stalin found himself. Only 27 percent agreed that Stalin was 'a cruel, inhuman tyrant responsible for the deaths of millions,' and a similar percentage agreed that the full truth about him is not yet known."[728] 30 percent of those surveyed in the Levada Center December 2003 polled expressed the conviction that "whatever errors or defects are attributed to Stalin, the most important thing is that under his leadership, our people came out the winner in the Great Patriotic War."[729]

On the other hand, in the recent Levada Center May poll, conducted in May 2010, 49 percent of respondents stated that the reason for huge losses in the first war years was in Stalin's errors such as purging the military of top officials, failing to prepare for combat and abandoning millions of Soviet prisoners of war. When asked to identify the guilty of huge losses in the war, 30 percent of Russians named Stalin personally and 20 percent named the Soviet leadership and the Communist Party, of which the dictator was the leader at the time.[730]

According to the recent research on Russian public attitudes toward history and contemporary issues performed by Sarah Mendelson and Theodore Gerber in cooperation with Levada Center, nearly 75 percent of those sampled would like to have a complete picture of the extent of the repressions in the Stalinist period and 83 percent expressed an opinion that the government ought to do more to commemorate victims. 88 percent of those who heard about repressions (17 percent total and 35 percent of the 20-29 age group actually never heard of them) expressed the view that they were not justified.[731]

According to the sociologist Alexandr Etkind, "surveys reveal the complex attitudes of a people who retain a vivid memory of the Soviet terror but are divided in their interpretation of this memory. Far from demonstrating an outright denial of the Soviet catastrophe, the vast majority of Russians show knowledge of their history. In their attitude towards this history, Russians are split almost evenly. It is not the historical knowledge which is at issue but its interpretation, which inevitably depends upon the schemes, theories, and myths

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[728] More Than Half of All Russians Positive About Stalin // Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty *Newsline*, 5 March, 2003.

[729] The Levada Analytical Center survyed arranged to coincide with Stalin's anniversary, 7-10 December, 2002. <http://www.levada.ru/press/2007122004.html>

[730] The Great Patriotic War in Public Opinion. The Levada Analytical Center, 21-22 May, 2010. <http://www.levada.ru/press/2010061804.html>. Russians Blame Stalin for WWII Losses: Poll // The Times of India, 20 June, 2010.

[731] *Gerber, Theodore P.* Russian Public Attitudes toward History and Contemporary Issues. Presentation of the results of the survey conducted by the Levada Analytical Center in January-February 2010 in 55 regions of Russia. The International Memorial Society, Moscow, 24 September, 2010.

that people receive from their scholars, artists, and politicians."[732] Etkind has defined the process taking place in contemporary Russia as "making sense" of the trauma (as opposed to La Carpa's two typical responses to a trauma "working through" and the obsessive "acting out" of it).[733] As he has conceptualized, "In the period of terror, the power which affirms its sovereignty by creating zones of exception, denies responsibility for the abuses committed in these zones. But with the passing of time and with the scale of abuses revealed, the sovereign changes his strategy. His last resource is a sacrificial interpretation, which presents victims as sacrifices, and suicidal perpetrators as cruel but sensible strategists. Approximately half of the Russian population believes in this. They explain the Soviet terror as an exaggerated but rational response to actual problems which confronted the country. Many believe that the terror was necessary for the survival of the nation, its modernization, victory in the war, etc. If it was necessary in the past, it can be desirable in the present and possible in the future. Making sense of the catastrophic past is a performative act, "an interpretation which transforms what it interprets."[734]

The trajectory of memory aimed at "working through" the past in contemporary Russia remains extremely marginal. Though some efforts in this direction are taken by a handful of intellectuals, they mostly remain largely unnoticed by a more general public and practically non-rationalized in the public sphere.

However, in the 2000s a significant number of reference works and collections of documents on the Soviet history of repressions continued to be appear. The publication of *The History of Stalin's Gulag* in seven volumes by Russian Political Encyclopedia publishing house (ROSSPEN) revealed a deeper exploration of the complex and cumbersome set of documents.[735] The result of

[732] *Etkind, Alexander.* Post-Soviet Hauntology: Cultural Memory of Soviet Terror // Constellations, Vol. 16, № 1, May 2009. pp. 182 – 200.

[733] *La Capra, Domenic.* Writing History, Writing Trauma. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

[734] *Etkind, Alexander.* Op. cit. p. 193.

[735] Istoriya stalinskogo Gulaga. Konets 1920-h - pervaja polovina 1950-h godov: Sobranie dokumentov v 7-mi tomah. T. 1. Massovye repressii v SSSR. Otv. rel. N. Vert, S. V. Mironenko. Otv. sost. I. A. Zjuzina. M.: ROSSPEN, 2004. T. 2. Karatel'naja sistema: struktura i kadry. Otv. red. i sost. N. V. Petrov. Otv. sost. N. I. Vladimirtsev. M.: ROSSPEN, 2004. T. 3. Ekonomika Gulaga. Otv. red. i sost. O. V. Khlevniuk. M.: ROSSPEN, 2004. T. 4. Naselenie Gulaga: chislennost' i uslovija soderzhanija. Otv. red. A. B. Bezborodov, V. M. Hrustalev. Sost. I. V. Bezborodova (otv. sost.), V. M. Hrustalev. M.: ROSSPEN, 2004. T. 5. Spetspereselentsy v SSSR. Otv. red. i sost. T. V. Tsarevskaja-Djakina. M.: ROSSPEN, 2004. T. 6. Vosstanija, bunty i zabastovki zakljuchennyh. Otv. red. i sost. V. A. Kozlov. Sost. O. V. Lavinskaja. M.: ROSSPEN, 2004. T. 7. Sovetskaja repressivno-karatel'naja politika i penitentsiarnaja sistema v materialah Gosudarstvennogo

the project was also the collective monograph *Gulag: Economics of Forced Labor*, published in 2005.[736] Several important collections of documents were published in the same period by the Democracy International Foundation in "Russia. 20th Century. Documents" series.[737]

The 2000s were also marked by appearance of several new reference works such as the works by Aleksandr Kokurin and Nikita Petrov (2002), Nikita Petrov and Konstantin Skorkin (2010) and historical studies of the law enforcement agencies (Gleb Aleksushin 2005).[738] The research of "special resettlements" (*spetssylka)* of peasants was also continued by Sergai Krasil'nikov (2009, 2010) and other historians.[739]

Notably, several collections of the camp survivors were published the *Russian Way* (*Russkij Put'*) publishing house, including the collection of eyewitnesses' accounts edited and compiled by Alexander Solzhenitsyn.[740]

As noted previously, in the late 1990s some historians (Leonid Borodkin, Oleg Khlevniuk) underscored a need to move from the identification and publication of documents to the preparation of articles and monographs in studying the Soviet history. Unfortunately in the 2000s again there appeared practically no generalizing works on the Soviet centralized system of prison labor. The major work in this regards was performed by an American journalist Anne Applebaum who traced the origins and expansion of the Gulag system on

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arhiva Rossijskoj Federatsii: Annotirovannyj ukazatel' del. Otv. red. V. A. Kozlov, S. V. Mironenko. Otv. sost. A. V. Dobrovskaja. Sost. B. F. Dodonov, O. N. Kopylova, V. P. Naumov, V. I. Shirokov. M.: ROSSPEN, 2005.

[736] *Borodkin, Leonid; Gregory, Paul; Khlevniuk, Oleg* (eds.) GULAG: Ekonomika prinuditel'nogo truda. (GULAG: The Economics of Forced Labor) Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005.

[737] For instance, Gulag. Glavnoe upravlenie lagerej. 1918-1960. Moscow: Mezhdunarodny fond "Demokratiya", 2005. *Kokurin, Aleksandr; Petrov, Nikita* (eds.) Stalinskie stroiki GULAGa. 1930 – 1953. Moscow: Mezhdunarodny fond "Demokratiya", 2002.

[738] *Kokurin, Aleksandr; Petrov, Nikita* (eds.) Lubyanka. Organy VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB. 1917-1991. Spravochnik. Moscow: Mezhdunarodny fond "Demokratiya", 2002. *Petrov, Nikita; Skorkin, Konstantin* (eds.) Kto rukovodil NKVD, 1941–1956: Spravochnik. Moscow: Zven'ia, 2010. *Aleksushin, Gleb.* Istorija pravoohranitel'nyh organov. Samara: Izdatel'stvo ANO «IA VVS» i ANO «Retrospektiva», 2005.

[739] *Krasil'nikov, Sergei.* Serp i Molokh. Krest'janskaja ssylka v Zapadnoj Sibiri 1930-e gody. Moscow: ROSSPEN, Fond Pervogo Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yltsina, 2009. *Krasil'nikov, Sergej; Salamatova, Marina; Ushakova, Svetlana.* Korni ili wepki. Krest'janskaja sem'ja na specposelenii v Zapadnoj Sibiri v 1930-h - nachale 1950-h gg. Moscow: ROSSPEN, Fond Pervogo Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yltsina, 2010.

[740] Pozhivshi v GULAGe. Sbornik vospominanij. M.: Russkij put', 2001. Sost. A. I. Solzhenitsyn. Moscow: Russkij put', 2001. *Gojchenko D. D.* Skvoz' raskulachivanie i Golodomor. Svidetel'stva ochevidtsa. Moscow: Russkij put', 2006. *Zal'tsman M.* Menja reabilitirovali… Iz zapisok evrejskogo portnogo stalinskih vremen. Moscow: Russkij put', 2006.

the basis of newly accessible Soviet archives as well as scores of camp memoirs and interviews with survivors. Presenting the life-and-death cycle of the Soviet Gulag from arrest by the secret police through interrogation, to deportation and hard labor, Applebaum detailed camp life, including strategies for survival, discussed the various ways of calculating the camps statistics as well as the meaning of the Gulag in the international community of memory.[741] The translation of Applebaum's work became available for the Russian audience in 2006.[742]

Important publication in 2008 on *Political Systems in Russia and the USSR in 20th century* was authored by Igor Dolutsky and Tatiana Vorozheikina (2008).[743] Several studies of the Soviet society were performed by the Russian sociologists such Elena Zubkova's (2000) research of the postwar Soviet society and Oleg Kharkhordin's (2002) study of the "Russian personality."[744]

Sociological studies of the Soviet society and the Soviet personality as its main "institution" (following Yuri Levada's definition) was proceeded in the 2000s by the Levada Center sociologists under *The Soviet Man* project.

Several important works on repressions of the artists also appeared in the 2000s. The poet and writer Vitaly Shentalinsky, the Chairman of the *Committee for the Literary Inheritance of Writers,* spent more than twenty years on investigating how a large number of Russian writers had been persecuted during the Stalin era. In the 2000s he published two volumes *The Denunciation of Socrates* (*Donos na Sokrata*) in 2001 and *Crime without Punishment (Prestuplenie bez nakazanija)* in 2007 which made a trilogy together with his first 1995 book *The Slaves of Freedom.*[745] Three volumes by literary critic Benedict Sarnov *Stalin and Writers* highlighting the destinies of Russian authors living during the Stalin reign of terror appeared in 2008-2009.

Positive endeavors notwithstanding, the overall picture of literature devoted to the Soviet past has been really controversial for in bookstores the works about the history of Communist terror have coexisted with a wide range

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[741] *Applebaum, Anne.* Gulag. A History. New York: Doubleday, 2003.

[742]*Applebaum, Anne.* Gulag. Pautina Bol'shogo terrora. Moscow: Moskovskaja shkola politicheskih issledovanij, 2006.

[743] *Dolutsky, Igor; Vorozheikina, Tatiana.* Politicheskie sistemy v Rossii i SSSR v XX veke. Hrestomatija. Uchebno-metodicheskij kompleks v 4-h tomah. Moscow, KDU, 2008.

[744] *Zubkova, Elena.* Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshestvo: politika i povsednevnost'. 1945-1953. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000. *Kharkhordin, Oleg.* Oblichat' i litsemerit': genealogija rossijskoj lichnosti. SPb; Moscow: EUSPb, Letnij Sad, 2002. Also his: The Collective and the Individual in Russia. A Study of Practices. Berkeley, 1999.

[745] The English translations of the books came on the market much earlier than the Russian originals. *The Denunciation of Socrates* as *Arrested voices* (1993) and *The Slaves of Freedom* is translated in English as *The KGB'S Literary Archive* (1995).

of books that take a much more positive view of Stalin and his regime. Likewise on television, praise of Stalin and his henchmen has appeared side by side with series and programs based on works by Alexander Solzhenitsyn and other chroniclers of Stalin's repression.[746]

According to Alexander Daniel, the Memorial society TV monitoring has revealed that Russian television networks annually show around 300 programs on the Soviet past, but the interpretations of the past they present differ a lot. Anti-Stalinist programs and series coexist with those openly apologetic or estheticising the image of the Soviet dictator (like, for example, the 2007 Russian TV 40-part series *Stalin live* aired by *NTV* channel).

At the same time some positive initiatives in popularizing history of the repressive past in the media space are worth mentioning. For instance, since 2003 a journalist and historian Nikolai Svanidze has been producing the TV documentary series, *History Chronicles with Nikolai Svanidze*, about Russian 20th century history in which a highly critical view of the Soviet regime in general and Stalin's reign of terror in particular is presented. The war history documentaries by TV reporter Aleksei Pivovarov such as *Rzhev: Marshal Zhukov's Unknown Battle (Rzhev: Neizvestnaya Bitva Georgia Zhukova*, 2009), *Moscow. Autumn 1941* (*Moskva. Osen' 1941*, 2009), and *Brest. Heroes of the Fortress (Brest. Krepostnye geroi*, 2010) have also contributed to a better understanding of the Soviet past.

The 2000s were also marked by several important television adaptations of the anti-Stalinist novels. *Children of the Arbat (Deti Arbata*) 16-part television series based on the Anatoly Rybakov's trilogy and directed by Andrei Eshpai were aired on the *Channel One* network in 2004. In late 2004, the same *Channel One* broadcasted a TV-series directed by Dmitry Barshevsky and consisting of 22 episodes based on Vasily Aksyonov's anti-Stalinist trilogy *Generations of Winter (Moskovskaya saga*, 1994*)*.

In 2005 one of Varlam Shalamov's Kolyma short stories, *The Final Battle of Major Pugachoff* (*Poslednij Boi Majora Pugacheva*), was made into a 4-part series of the same name by Vladimir Fatyanov. In December 2005, a 10-part series television adaptation of Mikhail Bulgakov's *Master and Margarita* novel directed by Vladimir Bortko was aired by the *Rossiya* TV channel. In January 2006, the *Rossiya* aired miniseries on Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle* (*V kruge pervom)* directed by Gleb Panfilov. Solzhenitsyn himself helped adapt the novel for the screen and narrated the film. In 2007 the *Rossiya* TV channel aired a 16-part series based on the life and works of Varlam Shalamov's *Lenin's Testament* (*Zaveshanie Lenina*) directed by Nikolai Dostal'.

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[746] *Lipman, Maria.* Op. cit.

Some initiatives aimed at remembering the horrors of Stalinism are continuously undertaken by some civil society groups, primarily by the Memorial Society and its branch organizations. For example, since 2007 the Memorial Society has annually held commemoration of the victims of the Great Terror by reading their names near the Solovetsky stone in Moscow on The Day of the Political Prisoners on October, 30th. In some provincial centers descendants of the victims come annually to the local memorials.

Since 1999 the Memorial Society has conducted annually the all-Russia school history competition "Man in History: Russia – 20th Century." Unfortunately, unlike its German counterpart, the Russian history school competition has not been turned into a national project supported by the state and consequently it has been unable to attract as much public attention and reach the scale of the school history competition in Germany.

According to the Sakharov Museum and Public Center August-September 2007 exhibition in Moscow, there are now over 1000 monuments and memorial plaques at various sites of the Gulag within the territory of the former Soviet Union: stones, crosses, obelisks, bells, bas-reliefs, and angels. The overwhelming majority of these memorials resulted from grassroots initiatives by the former victims of the Gulag or their relatives.

These important contributions notwithstanding, upon the whole, the attitudinal change on the societal level in Russia did occur, as the public opinion surveys reveal, and the alternative memory trajectory has remained marginal and non-institutionalized. The Russian state has virtually been not involved in the work of remembrance and commemoration.

In the next section of the chapter I will turn to the comparative analysis of the collective memory transformations in postwar West Germany and post-Soviet Russia.

4.4 Comparative Analysis of Collective Memory Transformations in Postwar West Germany and Post-Soviet Russia

The presented overviews of collective memory narratives in post-WWII West Germany and post-Soviet Russia seem to confirm the Alexander Etkind's statement that "the cultural memories of Russian and German terror developed in such different ways that they seem to defy comparison."[747] However, there were several important similarities in the processes of memory structuring in both countries especially at the initial stages of transformations.

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[747] *Etkind, Alexander.* Post-Soviet Hauntology: Cultural Memory of Soviet Terror // Constellations, Vol. 16, № 1, May 2009. p. 184.

In the first instance, in both German and Russian societies a desire to leave the traumatic, shameful pasts behind as quickly as possible was very high. Such an approach to the past became associated with various avoidance strategies and defense mechanisms that reflected the general unwillingness of people to acknowledge their complicity and accept responsibility for their roles in the criminal regimes. Public opinion of both nations was inclined to embrace an approach to the shameful past described as far back as in 1885 by Friedrich Nietzsche in his *Beyond Good and Evil*: "'I have done that' says my memory. I could not have done that – says my pride and remains implacable. Finally, my memory gives up."[748]

This avoidance tendency was manifested, among other things, in presenting the events of the past as actorless, portraying them as something wholly beyond human control, as well as in the frequent use of metaphors, such as the concept of "catastrophe" in relation to the Holocaust or the concept of "unjustified repressions" in relation to the Stalinist mass murders, arrests, and deportations. Etkind noted that the concept of "unjustified repressions" widely used in Russia starting from the Khrushchev de-Stalinization campaign was "always mentioned in the plural [as] a formula for senseless acts of violence which do not specify agency and therefore, elude responsibility."[749] Thus, according to the observer, "'Unjustified repressions' means, exactly, self-imposed, meaningless social catastrophe."[750]

Another important strategy of avoidance and defense mechanism widely employed in Germany and Russia was the notion of victimhood. Presenting themselves as victims of the Third Reich and focusing excessively on their own sufferings helped many Germans to avoid moral responsibility for their roles as Holocaust perpetrators, bystanders, and collaborators. The same argument may refer to millions of Russians who together with President Putin lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century" and chose to view it as a great personal drama rather than a liberation from totalitarianism.[751]

Another similarity is that, quoting Etkind, both national cultures were "familiar with attempts at particularizing their respective catastrophes and insisting upon the methodological principle of incomparability."[752] Several other myths were created and widely exploited in both national contexts. One of them

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[748] *Nietzsche, Friedrich.* Jenseits von Gut und Böse In Werke. Bd. III. Edited by Karl Schlechta, Frankfurt a.M./Berlin/Wien: Hanser Verlag, 1972. p. 71.

[749] *Etkind, Alexander.* Op. cit. p. 184.

[750] Ibid.

[751] Putin's Address to Nation: Excerpts // BBC News, 25 April, 2005.

[752] *Etkind, Alexander.*Op. cit. p. 185.

was the incomprehensibility claim stating that the traumatic past cannot be comprehended and, consequently, rationalized and discussed.

Another popular myth in both West Germany and Russia can be defined as a "rupture myth" as it was expressed in presenting the repressive totalitarian regime as a rupture in the national history. The 'intentionalist' school in West Germany, for instance, traditionally portrayed the Third Reich as a creation by a small group of Nazi leaders led by Hitler and thus used to regard Nazism as a phenomenon alien to German history. Importantly, intentionalist view of history was a prevailing historical discourse in the first postwar decades. Similarly, the myth representing the October revolution and the establishment of the Soviet regime as an interruption of the normal line of the Russian state development, as well as the perception of Communism as a foreign, imported phenomenon alien to the Russian history were dominant in Russia during the immediate post-Soviet period.

It is noteworthy that the consequences of the general tendency to close the books on the past and to forget its uncomfortable implications as quickly as possible also appeared quite similar in the both national contexts.

It can be argued that the new regime's drift into authoritarianism occurred in the post-Soviet Russia with the emergence of a 'rupture myth' and with the political elite's appeal to a pre-Revolutionary 'ideal'. The nostalgic idealization and mythologization of the imperial Russia led to the growth of imperial and nationalistic sentiments. Those sentiments, in turn, restored continuity of the post-Soviet Russia not only with the pre-revolutionary, but also with the Soviet era.

It is linked, primarily, with the fact of quite evident continuity of the two regimes - the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, - which appeared much more close in the principles and methods of state-building, exercise of power, and in their national policy, than they were represented by the new Russian state ideologists. As Ghia Nodia justly argued, "The Russian imperial nationalist tradition completely coincided with communist principles."[753] Additionally, centuries-old citizens' unfreedom, punitive, repressive bodies of the imperial Russia afford reasonable grounds for assertion that the Russian Empire was not as an antipode, but rather a forerunner of the Soviet Union. There is also enough ground to assert that Stalinism was a fruit of a lingering Slavophile idea of a 'unique Russian path' as well as traditional Russian longing for a 'firm hand.'

The eulogy of the imperial epoch concealed in itself a danger of return to inherent in it (as well as in the subsequent Soviet era) authoritarian methods of government. Idealization of the prerevolutionary Russia and the efforts at

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[753] *Nodia, Ghia.* Nationalism and Democracy // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, № 1, 1992.

establishing the continuity with it meant refusal to recognize that the Russian autocracy in its methods of government adhered in many respects to the principles, similar to those practiced by the Bolsheviks. Thus, an attempt of the new Russian state to become the successor of "the greatness" of the Russian Empire became an obstacle in the way of democratization, promoting nationalism and rejection of the responsibility for the past.

Since the idea of reviving pre-revolutionary tradition became a distinctive feature of the Yeltsin regime, as soon as it started losing its legitimacy with the citizens' growing disenchantment and disillusionment, the rhetoric as well began to loose its attractiveness and persuasiveness. But even thought the nostalgic image of the imperial past was turned into "an insipid picture and a model of empty rhetoric," its implicit nationalistic components were still kept.[754]

It is therefore not surprising that the disappointment in Yeltsin's reforms led not to the strengthening of democratic attitudes (the potential of which by that moment had already been lost), but to the increasing nostalgia for the Soviet past. This nostalgia was manifested, for example, in the emphasis on certain symbolic figures and events of those years (like the flight of Yuri Gagarin into outer space and the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War). Moreover, as noted previously, this process was accompanied by the growth of positive evaluations of the Soviet leaders, including the figure of Stalin, as well as the revival of the Russian "unique path" mythology.

Interestingly, however, that in the West German case some historians underscored the importance of a strong disposition to put the past away and start afresh for the postwar restructuring. According to the historian Tony Judt, for instance, the process of a "collective amnesia" in postwar Europe in general and Germany in particular has provided a necessary foundation for the transformations. Judt argued that, "Without such collective amnesia, Europe's astonishing postwar recovery would not have been possible. To be sure, much was put out of mind that would subsequently return in discomforting ways. But only much later would it become clear just how much postwar Europe rested on foundation myths that would fracture and shift with the passage of years. In the circumstances of 1945, in a continent covered with rubble, there was much to be gained by behaving as though the past was indeed dead and buried and a new age about to begin. The price paid was a certain amount of selective, collective

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[754] *Ferretti, Maria.* Memory in Disorder. Russia and Stalinism // Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 41, № 6, November/December 2003. p. 63.

forgetting, notably in Germany. But then, in Germany above all, there was much to forget."[755]

In his article on *Seven Types of Forgetting* Paul Connerton also conceptualized that it would be impossible to return to self-government and civil administration in Germany if the purge of Nazis continued to be pursued in a sustained way. So stopping to identify and punish active Nazis was necessary after 1945 in order "to restore a minimum level of cohesion to civil society and to re-establish the legitimacy of the state in societies where authority, and the very bases of civil behavior, had been obliterated by totalitarian government."[756] Connerton defined such forgetting as "prescriptive" for it was believed to be in the interests of all parties to the previous dispute and it could therefore be acknowledged publicly.[757]

According to another historian Wulf Kansteiner, the memory paradigm aimed at working through the past became possible in West Germany "precisely because the conservative contemporaries of the Third Reich were so successful in managing the present, that is, the challenges of economic and ideological reconstruction."[758] Kansteiner noted that these achievements of the conservative elite "forced their critics and younger competitors to return to the sins of the past and use them as political leverage" at a later stage.[759]

The idea that forgetting was necessary and justified seems, however, ambiguous and problematic. Forgetting means disclaiming responsibility for the past and similar strategy, as both the Russian and German experiences have revealed, may lead to the rise and strengthening of authoritarian tendencies as well as to the growth of aggressive nationalism in political and social life. Though Judt, Connerton and other authors mentioned the necessity of oblivion at the initial stage of transformations, it is unclear whether the government and society will be ready and willing to return to and "work through" the formerly "forgotten" or neglected issues in the future.

Another problem with such argumentation is linked with the fact noted by James Booth, namely, that, "the past has a habit of returning involuntarily, in an almost Proustian fashion." "More than that, forgetting, - continued Booth, especially if it is forgetting of our past injustices and our responsibility for them (or of our past benefactors and our debt of grateful remembrance to them),

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[755] *Judt, Tony.* The Rehabilitation of Europe. In: Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. The Penguin Press, 2005. p. 61.

[756] *Connerton, Paul.* Seven Types of Forgetting // Memory Studies, Vol. 1, № 59, 2008. p. 62.

[757] Ibid.

[758] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics after Auschwitz. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006. p. 6.

[759] Ibid.

savors of a wrong, of the violation of a duty, or, as Habermas writes, of the debt of atoning remembrance."[760] Booth insisted that, "Time and human volition cannot erase the fact of what has been done, and since we are our past as well as our future, they cannot erase the presence of the past, although they can, of course, repress recognition of it. They also cannot absolve us of the moral burdens that we, individually and collectively, assume for our past, although, again, the recognition of that moral imperative can be denied. Denying it does not free us from its reality, and although nothing within or among us may call us back to that past, there are likely others who will awaken us from the sleep of forgetting and seek to force us to do the work of remembrance."[761]

Thus the past has a way of breaking through forgetting (or forgetfulness) and it might have serious socio-psychological implications. As Sigmund Freud stated in his famous 1919 essay *The Uncanny*, the repressed past may turn into new and strange forms and it threatens to return as the uncanny. Freud's formulas, reminds Etkind, defined the uncanny as a particular form of memory, one which is intimately connected to fear: **"**The higher the energy of forgetting, the stronger is the horror of remembering. The combination of memory and fear is, precisely, the uncanny."[762]

"What we conceal and what we fear are one and the same," wrote Dmitry Furman in a 1988 collection of the *perestroika* period essays *There Is No Other Way* (*Inogo ne dano*).[763] He continued asserting that, "If hiding the truth is the sign of fear, revealing it is inseparable from the disappearance of the dread."[764]

In the light of these arguments the advantages of forgetting (or its 'gains', using Judt's formulation) appear highly problematic. Although, as Paul Ricoeur conceptualized, the phenomenon of forgetting is an indispensible component of cultural memory, the choice made by societies in this regard is likely to determine their identity and socio-political development. Ricoeur, therefore, insists on "the duty of memory" as the imperative of justice stating that "the duty of memory is the duty to do justice, through memories, to an other than the self."[765]

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[760] *Booth, James W.* 1999. Op. cit. p. 259.

[761] Ibid.

[762] *Etkind, Alexander.* Op. cit. p. 197. See also: *Freud, Sigmund.* Das Unheimliche (1919). English translation: The Uncanny. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVII. Ed. and trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1955.

[763] *Furman, Dmitry.* Nash put' k normal'noy kul'ture (Our Path to a Normal Culture). In: *Afanasiev, Yuri* (ed.) Inogo ne dano. Moscow: Progress, 1988. p. 570.

[764] Ibid.

[765] *Ricoeur, Paul.* Memory, History, Forgetting. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. p. 87.

Therefore the major source of change of the cultural situation in West Germany was, as it appears, not in forgetting about the national catastrophe, but rather in alternative remembering or in the appearance of alternative versions of memory and interpretations of the past in the immediate postwar years.

Indeed, in the decades following the end of World War II West Germany has seen a remarkable turnabout in the memory of the Third Reich marked by the reinvention of the Holocaust remembrances and the revaluation of the meaning of victimhood. As Alon Confino asserted, in the last sixty years German public sphere became not simply more inclusive of the victims of the war, but dominated by them.[766]

Certainly, this turnabout marks a profound difference in the way collective memory of the totalitarian past developed in the Federal Republic in comparison with post-Soviet Russia. While in Germany the memory of the criminal Nazi past was gradually obtained, which led to its rethinking and to subsequent "working through" it in the public sphere, in Russia one could observe an opposite phenomenon – the work of memory, launched during the *perestroika* period gradually subsided and was ousted, leading to intensification of imperial ambitions and nationalistic sentiments.

It is certainly no easy matter naming the exact reasons for that slow but steady shift of the West German public consciousness which occurred in the mid-1960s and the early 1970s. There is also no single explanation of memory suppression that has dominated the public opinion in Russia since the early 1990s. Certainly in both cases the confluence of several factors should have been at work. At least in the German case, as conceptualized by Jürgen Habermas, "retrospective interpretation of 8 May, 1945 as a 'liberation day' became a result of the collective decades-long educational process."[767] Certainly, the reasons for getting over general forgetting and victimhood in the West German society represent a major analysis interest.

The literature on West German collective memory contains a wide range of explanations for the origins of its unusually self-critical historical culture. The cultural historian Wulf Kansteiner names some of the factors that have influenced the formation of such culture in Germany. In the first instance, the importance of foreign influence on the West German politics of memory is emphasized. Some scholars argued that in the wake of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1960-1961 and a sustained GDR propaganda campaign against former Nazi in positions of power, the West German elite was forced to revise

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[766] *Confino, Alon.* Remembering the Second World War, 1945–1965: Narratives of Victimhood and Genocide // Cultural Analysis, Vol. 4, 2005. pp. 50, 58.

[767] *Habermas Jürgen.* A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany. Polity Press, 1988. p. 162.

the policy of leniency.[768] Other experts used to highlight the accomplishments of a small group of liberal jurists in the state administrations, who convinced regional politicians to found a Central Agency for the prosecution of Nazi crimes. Starting in 1958, The Central Office for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (*Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen*) in Ludwigsburg launched the first systematic German effort to research the crimes of the regime and bring perpetrators to trial.[769] At the same time, a new democratic spirit held sway over West German's public sphere. Historians pointed to the rise of a protest environmental movement which brought tens of thousands of demonstrators into the streets, and a thriving intellectual scene, which produced its own critical memory events.[770] These critical voices were amplified by the national press corps, whose members played a key role in scandalizing anti-Semitic behavior and the shortcomings of the courts in their dealings with old and new Nazis.[771]

This overview of factors brings us to the first most evident source of change in West German post-WWII collective memory, namely, "the diffusion and multiplication of social memories, […] directed explicitly against some overarching national political memory."[772]

4.4.1 Official Memory Contested: Emergence of the Communities of Memory

In the introduction to this chapter we mentioned that change in the realm of collective memory is associated with the appearance of "multiple, diverse, and fluid memory discourses, with different institutional fields operating according to different rules and interacting with each other in different and shifting

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[768] *Frei, Norbert.* Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1996. *Brochhagen, Ulrich.* Nach Nürnberg. Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Westintegration in der Ära Adenauer, Hamburg: Junius, 1994

[769] *Miquel, Marc von.* Ahnden oder amnestieren*?:* Westdeutsche Justiz und Vergangenheitspolitik in den sechziger Jahren. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2004. *Dudek, Peter.* Der Rückblick auf die Vergangenheit wird sich nicht vermeiden lassen. Zur pädagogischen Verarbeitung des Nationalsozialismus in Deutschland (1945 - 1990). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995.

[770] *Müller, Jan-Werner.* Another Country. German Intellectuals, Unification, and National Identity. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000.

[771] *Bergmann, Werner.* Antisemitismus in öffentlichen Konflikten. Kollektives Lernen in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik 1949-1989. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1997. *Schiessler, Hanna* (ed.) The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. pp. 214-15.

[772] *Booth, James W.* 1999. Op. cit. p. 261.

ways."[773] We hypothized then that official narratives of the past are likely to change when the variety of actors become involved presenting their versions of the past or contesting the official memory narrative. In this section of the chapter I will analyze this source of change in relation to the cultural transformations in the two analyzed cases.

As for the German case, Wulf Kansteiner has imagined the social geography of West German collective memory in the form of a pyramid with a complex interior structure. The imagined pyramid revolves around three axes that influence all arenas of collective memory. First, there is the obvious divide between conservative and liberal collective memories of Nazism, which splits the pyramid into two antagonistic but dialectically related halves. In addition, all interpretations of the past have been the product of cross-generational competition and cooperation that involves at least three important age groups – the war, Hitler Youth, and postwar generations. Finally, collective memories of the Third Reich and its crimes have been constructed in many different professional and social settings, which vary tremendously in size and social status and can be divided into three general hierarchical categories.

The top of the imagined pyramid is filled with elite discourses, such as professional historiography, that feature restrictive entrance criteria for authorized speakers. The members of such elite groups strive to reach general public, but in practice, they either communicate among themselves-producing detailed, ambitious professional memories of Nazism – or reach an audience located in the second broad layer of the pyramid, which Kansteiner designates as the politically and culturally interested public. He posits that the interested public, representing perhaps 15 to 25 percent of the population, consists of the readers of the national press and consumers to highbrow TV. This group takes an active interest in the cultural products of the elite; its representatives selectively listen to the historians, novelists, auteur filmmakers, and museum designers – often by way of the national press – who provide them with relatively complex and self-reflexive texts. In the day-to-day reproduction of the Germany's public sphere, this politically and culturally interested public can be relatively clear differentiated from the majority of citizens (readers of the *Bild-Zeiting* and *Hör-Zu*, viewers of Guido Knopp's TV productions, and members of Germany's famous pub culture - *Stammtischkultur*).[774]

As Kansteiner's pyramide reveals (and as it was previously shown in the overview of the German case), the German memory discourse was and at times remains relentlessly polarized. However, as it appears, it is precisely this

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[773] *Bourdieu, Pierre.* The Field of Cultural Production. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
[774] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. pp. 319-20.

polarization and resulting struggle for memory that became a productive basis for changing the German political culture.[775] The struggle of different generations and different groups of intellectual elites for the renewal of national culture, on the one hand, and the struggle for its preservation, protection, normalization and destigmatization, on the other hand, has been productive for both the transformation of national political culture and for the formation of a stable political system in the postwar period. The domestic public debate and contestation over the narratives of the past (Art 2006) made West German democracy, according to the precise definition of the intellectual historian Dirk Moses, primarily a "discursive achievement."[776] The political consensus about the liberal political institutions of the new republic emerged out of a protracted and bitter public discussion about the meaning of the German past for the Federal Republic's present and future.[777]

It is important to point out, however, that the pursuit of what got expression in the German terms of 'working through the past' (*Aufarberung der Vergangenheit*) and 'coming to terms with the past' *(Vergangenheitsbewä1tigung)* was initially a predominantly intellectual preoccupation.[778] The first makers of a critical and aware Federal Republican identity were West German intellectuals – social philosophers, educators, film directors, and writers. Notably, the critic Frank Schirrmacher in the 1990s called German literature itself a "production center of West German consciousness."[779]

The critical and conscientious trajectory of memory, however, was considerably intensified in the 1960s during the students' revolts and further extended its support base in the 1970s marked by the emergence of massive social movements. Notably, historians today tend to view the demonstrations and debates of the 1960s as a consequence rather than a cause of the critical memory paradigm for, it is argued, "they did not alone initiate confrontation with the Nazi past, but rather dramatized and popularized an ongoing process."[780] The 1960s are thus best viewed as an important, if limited, reorganization of West German policies towards the Third Reich that began to

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[775] *Moses, Dirk A.* German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. pp. 32, 37.

[776] Ibid. pp. 10, 50.

[777] Ibid. p. 10.

[778] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. pp. 216-17.

[779] *Schirrmacher, Frank.* Abschied von der Literatur der Bundesrepublik // Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 October, 1990. pp. 1-2.

[780] *Gassert, Philipp; Steinweis, Alan E.* (eds.) Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975. New York: Berghahn, 2006. p. 21.

"reverse the direction of memories from exculpation to criticism" in the Federal Republic rather than definitively resolving them.[781]

In the subsequent period of the 1970s and 1980s marked by the mass popularity of the history of everyday life *(Alltagsgeschichte)* the population as a whole and not just intellectuals or their subgroups became gradually involved in the process of confronting the Nazi past. As Kansteiner observed, "In the course of the 1970s and 1980s, West Germans would come to embrace emotionally engaging, biographically concrete, and visually entertaining formats for the representation of Nazism."[782]

The historical disputes of the 1980s and 1990s – the Bitburg controversy and the Historians' Debate of the mid-1980s, numerous museum exhibitions, film, and television dramas about the Nazi past, etc. – also attracted much attention and involved many people in the relevant discussions.

Thus one of the dominant factors of "working through" the past in West Germany was an emergence of *a critical public sphere in which the leading German intellectuals constantly made judgments and evaluations, trying to rationalize the German national past and national identity*. The official narratives of the past in West Germany gradually changed through processes that involved a variety of actors, including intellectual and artistic groups, numerous civil society actors, religious groups, activists on the left and right, academics, teachers, writers, artists, and numerous mass media outlets.

In Russia, as it was shown, the condemnation of Stalinism in the intellectual discourse quickly receded into the background. The problems of Soviet totalitarianism were seldom discussed in post-Soviet Russian literature, artistic space, and in social sciences. The historical research of the Soviet past is still far from being complete. Many archival funds of the Stalin era continue to remain inaccessible to researchers. There are practically no generalizing works on the Soviet totalitarianism which makes an overall picture of the regime highly mosaic and unsystematic. Besides, there are very few thorough scientific and public discussions of these problems in the public space.[783]

Furthermore, observers point to the widespread resistance to any coming to terms with Russia's violent past. According to Allen C. Lynch, "in striking contrast to post-Nazi Germany, except for a brief period in the late Gorbachev era, there has been virtually no movement in Russian society to bring to account – either politically or legally – those implicated in the mass murders of the Stalin

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[781] Ibid. p. 25.

[782] *Kansteiner, Wulf.* Op. cit. p. 239.

[783] *Boroznyak, Aleksandr.* Preodolenie totalitarnogo proshlogo: germanskij opyt i rossijskaja perspektiva. In: Proshloe, kotoroe ne uhodit. Ocherki istorii i istoriografii Germanii 20 veka. Ekaterinburg, 2004. p. 16.

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period. Unlike in post-Nazi Germany, which continued with war crimes prosecutions on its own past after the end of Allied occupation (the most significant post-Nuremburg trials having taken place in the early- to mid-1960s), not one person connected with these crimes has even been brought to trial, much less convicted, in post-Soviet Russia. And unlike post-1968 West Germany, no social movement in Russia has initiated a public discussion to identify and hold to account those responsible for the crimes of the past and thereby to influence the political culture of the country. Russian intellectuals are virtually silent on this issue. Few appear interested in trying to identify and understand who were, to invoke Daniel Goldhagen's words, Stalin's "willing executioners."[784] Lynch refers to Timothy Garton Ash's work in which he recalls more than 2,400 movements worldwide seeking to establish political and/or legal justice for crimes of mass violence committed in the living past; that count represents virtually every country in the world, save Russia.[785]

Although many Russian and foreign observers note the successful efforts of some civil society organizations and, above all, the efforts undertaken by the Memorial Society in structuring an alternative memory space (Etkind 2009), one has to acknowledge that this trajectory of memory in Russia remains really marginal, fragile and non-institutionalized.

As noted previously, the memory of the Soviet past in the contemporary Russian discourse is almost totally monopolized by the state. Since the mid-1990s the dominance of the official politics of memory has been growing, preventing the crystallization of any independent agents or communities of memory. Since Putin's rise to power in 1999, the state has been claiming nearly absolute monopoly over the interpretation, the use and the reproduction of national history.

4.4.2 Transformation of Values and Identity: Introduction of New Symbols

Change in collective memory narratives, as it was already mentioned, is closely linked with change of collective identification. Transformation of identity in the former dictatorship is to be expressed in bringing about new identification patterns, new values, principles and symbols, which would subsequently lead (if consistently realized) to new patterns of state-society relations. These changes are to be manifested, above all, in the embrace of values of human life and human

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[784] *Lynch, Allen C.* How Russia Is Not Ruled: Reflections on Russian Political Development. Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 61.
[785] Ibid.

dignity and rejection of state violence and repressions as the basic features of a totalitarian rule. A democratic state will observe the freedom of expression and allow dissent thus acknowledging the potential agency of independent individuals and society as a whole (not viewing them merely as objects of state policies). The establishment of a democracy in a former dictatorship will require, therefore, "a symbolic cut between past and present […] as a form of ritual renewal."[786] What are then those new symbols or symbolic structures that would signalize a change of identity in a post-totalitarian state? This section of the chapter will explore the symbolic structure and social values that were adopted by the two analyzed post-totalitarian German and Russian states and societies.

It was mentioned before that in the German case the memory of the Nazi dictatorship - of which the Holocaust is an integral part - and its traumatic legacies were in the center of the West German identification shaping its collective memory as well as state policies. Such symbols as the Nazi concentration camp and the symbolic figure of the Holocaust survivor and witness became the central symbolic structures of the West German national identity.

The concentration camp may certainly be regarded as the quintessential expression of a totalitarian rule. This assumption determines the relevance and importance of the concentration camp as a cultural symbol. In her seminal work on the Soviet Gulag Anne Applebaum insightfully observed that, "In Stalin's Soviet Union, the difference between life inside and life outside the barbed wire was not fundamental, but rather a question of degree. Perhaps, for that reason, the Gulag has often been described as the quintessential expression of the Soviet system. Even in prison-camp slang, the world outside the barbed wire was not referred to as "freedom" but as *bolshaya zona*, the "big prison zone", larger and less deadly than "the small zone" of the camp, but no more human – and certainly no more humane."[787]

Referring to the Soviet concentration camps, the Russian writer and the Gulag survivor Varlam Shalamov argued that "the camp theme […] is a basic, fundamental question of our day." "Is the destruction of human beings by the state not the main issue of our time, our morality?" asked one of the most important witnesses of the Soviet Gulag.[788] According to Shalamov it was "a subject-matter that can freely accommodate a hundred writers of Solzhenitsyn's

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[786] *Corradi, Juan; Gagen, Patricia Weiss; Garretón, Manuel Antonio* (eds.) Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992. p. 10.

[787] *Applebaum, Anne.* Gulag. A History. New York: Doubleday, 2003. pp. xxviii – xxix.

[788] *Shalamov, Varlam.* On Prose. In: *Shalamov, Varlam.* Neskol'ko moikh zhiznei (Several of My Lives), Moscow: Respublika, 1996. pp. 425-33.

rank, and five Tolstoys."[789] He based this conviction of his on the assertion that "a camp is world-like." This idea emphasized that the theme of resisting inhuman circumstances, resisting the cogs of the state machinery, was universal and eternal. It made Shalamov conclude, "My stories are basically advice to a man on how to act in a crowd."[790]

The vision of a concentration camp as a universe ruled by specific logics was also presented in many works by the Nazi camp survivors and witnesses, primarily, Primo Levi. Based on Levi's writings, Giorgio Agamben later conceptualized that "since camps were permanent zones of exception from law, life in these zones could not be expressed in terms which were meaningful outside of these zones. Suspended in the luminal space between social and biological deaths, the victim's life was "bare"; it was not subject to any legal, political, or religious order. Essentially, it was the life of an animal, of chattel. In the Soviet camps, these people were called "the soon-to-be-dead" (*dokhodiagi*); in Auschwitz, they were called "muslims" (*Musselmen*).[791] To define the status of the victim of a "state of exception", Agamben developed the concept of Homo Sacer, "a human victim that may be killed but not sacrificed," arguing that only that life which has value may be sacrificed.[792]

The transformation of values in post-WWII Germany got manifested in the gradual acceptance of responsibility for the criminal deeds of the former regime and reinvention of the values of human life and human dignity. The growing understanding of the homicidal nature of the camp's universe turned it into one of the most important public symbols called to guarantee that the future will not bring a repetition of the past atrocities.

As previously mentioned, since the mid-1960s many of the former Nazi concentration camps' sites have been turned into the sites of memory and learning, the Holocaust memorial and document centers being erected and developed within the grounds of the former camps. Numerous trials of the former concentration camps' officials for their roles in the Holocaust made the German public confront the problems of victims and perpetrators of the Third Reich in the 1960s and 1970s. Subsequently, in the 1970s and 1980s the figure of the Holocaust survivor (as a person who can bear witness of what had actually happened) was turned into one of the most important symbolic figures. This became, as it appears, one of the main signs of the Germany's cultural renewal.

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[789] Ibid.

[790] Russkij Sever (The Russian North), № 4, 23-29 January, 2002, p. 17.

[791] *Etkind, Alexander.* Op. cit. p. 192.

[792] Ibid. See also: *Agamben, Giorgio.* Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. New York: Zone Books, 1999. *Agamben, Giorgio.* Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. p. 83.

In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, both the abovementioned symbols – the concentration camp and the figure of a witness - remained largely neglected. Instead, a mythological construction of victory in the war has dominated the official memory discourse as well as the public opinion, thereby preventing the rationalization of the Soviet totalitarian past. Additionally, a war veteran became an important symbolic figure in the construction of the past in the official memory discourse. This figure that had been actually introduced during the Brezhnev era continued to dominate the post-Soviet public realm together with the Brezhnev era's vision of the war history. The victory myth and the war veteran figure as its indispensable part actually ousted the memory of the Gulag and repressions from the mass consciousness in which there has been no room for mourning, contemplation, and reflection for the victims of the regime.[793]

Since the act of witnessing is always an individual act of free will (only a witness himself and only in a given moment can decide whether to testify or not) this act cannot be ritualized. While the symbolic figure of the witness contradicts history as the ceremony, the war veteran figure, by contrast, promotes ceremonization. Pompous celebrations of the annual Victory Days on 9 May seem to confirm this statement.

Another problem with the war and victory myth is that it renders an essentially anti-modern connotation. As Lev Gudkov explains it, the myth is "'switched on' mainly by mechanisms of the conservation of the social whole that prevent society from becoming more complex and functionally differentiated. Memories of the war are required above all to legitimate a centralized and repressive social order; they are built into a general post-totalitarian traditionalization of culture in a society that has not been able to cope with budding social change. This is why the Russian authorities constantly have to return to those traumatic circumstances of its past that reproduce key moments of national mobilization."[794]

It is therefore not surprising that the appeal to different cultural values and symbols led in the long run to totally different cultural and political consequences in West Germany and Russia.

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[793] On the symbolic veteran figure see: *Dubin, Boris.* 'Krovavaja' vojna i 'velikaja' pobeda. O konstruirovanii i peredache kollektivnyh predstavlenij v Rossii 1970–2000 godov *(*The 'Bloody' War and the 'Great' Victory. On Construction and Transfer of Collective Representations in Russia of 1970-2000) // Otechestvennye zapiski, № 5, 2004. *Folk, Christian.* Stalinism, Memory, and Commemoration: Russia's Dealing with the Past // The New School Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 6, № 2, 2009.

[794] *Gudkov, Lev.* The Fetters of Victory. How the War Provides Russia with Its Identity // Eurozine, 2005.

In the first case, revaluation of the political-cultural values centered on the victims of Nazism became a cornerstone of the national identity. The memory culture dominant in contemporary Federal Republic was formed as a result of an open critical discussion and acceptance of guilt. Consequently, the cultural reproductive institutions were involved in this work of memory: Holocaust teaching was integrated into the school curriculum, television and other institutions of culture contributed to confronting the past in the public sphere. All these endeavors contributed to a generational change in perspective. "For younger Germans today, - Bill Niven asserts, - the National Socialist past is not so much a source of personal shame, as, increasingly, a reminder of the importance of taking moral responsibility in the present and future."[795]

As Niven justly argued, "Myths can only be disposed of if the process of enlightenment reaches deep into society."[796] In his *Facing the Nazi Past* the author recalls that Hannes Heer has pointed out that the first generation of Germans to ask the question 'Father, where were you?' was the 1968 generation. But this generation, according to Heer, had formulated this question as a self-righteous accusation: 'We can handle things differently today'. According to Heer, 'Only if we can supplement the question 'Father, where were you?' with the question 'On which side would I have stood? How would I have reacted?' will we be able to bring this war to an end once and for all.'[797]

Such a shift from a self-righteous to a more judicious, even self-critical assessment of the role of others was identified in Germany by many commentators primarily in their analyses of the effects of *The Crimes of Wehrmacht* exhibition in the 1990s. One newspaper reported that the important question for the 250 classes of schoolchildren that have seen the exhibition in Marburg was the personal one of 'How would I have behaved?' which meant that they examined the strength of their own moral reserves.[798]

In Russia, by contrast, there are practically no public institutions that rationalize and "work through" the totalitarian past. The absence of the public sphere and functional cultural institutions able to retain and reproduce critical treatment of the past, has led to creation of a largely forgetful and cynical society. In this context, the Soviet Gulag system architect is voted one of the greatest historical figures in the nationwide TV project, his reign of terror is regarded in the history textbooks as an example of the most "effective management" in the

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[795] *Niven, William.* Op. cit. p. 160.
[796] Ibid. p. 154.
[797] Ibid.
[798] Ibid. p. 160.

country's history, while 35 percent in the 20-29 age group confess to have never heard of the repressions.[799]

The nostalgia for the Soviet past coexists with the myth of "the unique Russian path" and a strong imperial complex. The idea of a "great Russia" and its rebirth (or preservation) has become the central idea of various ideological programs of the post-Soviet *intelligentsia*.[800] While in Germany the nationalistic sentiments have gradually subsided, in Russia, by contrast, they have been experiencing in the last years a steady growth.

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Trying to trace the reasons for continuity and change in German and Russian national identities and collective memories of their totalitarian pasts the factor of imperial status loss, as it appears, is worth considering. It may be argued that the Federal Republic's rather successful confrontation with its totalitarian legacy was due to the loss of its imperial status after World War II which motivated Germans to actively search for a new identity. Reinventing national identity and obtaining a brand new national image and status were indeed important goals of West German transformations. Russia, by contrast, did not have similar motivation and continued wishing to preserve and restore its former military-imperial status.[801] The imperial status factor may be thus viewed as determinant in explaining the specific nature of political, economic and public transformations in the analyzed cases.

Such reasoning is, however, not deprived of defects. In the first instance, though after its military defeat in World War II Germany, unlike Russia, totally lost its imperial status it did not loose its imperial and nationalistic ambitions. According to the OMGUS surveys conducted in the American zone of the occupation in the late 1940s, 52 percent of the respondents agreed that territories such as Danzig, Sudetenland, and parts of Austria should be returned to Germany, 39 percent shared anti-Semitic views, and 48 percent believed that

[799] *Gerber, Theodore P.* Russian Public Attitudes toward History and Contemporary Issues. Presentation of the results of the survey conducted by the Levada Analytical Center in January-February 2010 in 55 regions of Russia. The International Memorial Society in Moscow, 24 September, 2010.

[800] See: *Gudkov, Lev.* Russian Neotraditionalism. // The Russian Public Opinion Monitor, № 2, 1997. pp. 25-32; *Gudkov, Lev.* Russkij neotraditsionalizm i soprotivlenie peremanam (Russian Neotraditionalism and Resistance to Changes) // Otechestvennye zapiski, № 3 (4), 2002.

[801] See *Klyamkin, Igor.* Rossijskaja vlast' na rubezhe tysjacheletij // Pro et Contra, Vol. 4, № 2, Spring 1999.

some races were more fit to rule than others.[802] Furthermore, a substantial number of Germans continued to sympathize with Nazi ideology as well as with other reactionary ideas.

Nationalist tendencies in politics also persisted. Earlier it was noted that the 1960s were marked by the activization of neo-Nazis, as well as by Kiesinger's government actively lobbying projects of authoritarian anticonstitutional emergency laws, the refusals to recognize the postwar borders with Poland along the Oder-Neisse line, etc. So the very fact of disintegration of empire can hardly be considered as an imperial complex panacea. It seems more reasonable to conclude that democratic political culture and tradition gradually taking root in West Germany deprived nationalist sentiments of a chance to prevail.

At the same time, though Russia unlike postwar Germany entered the period of liberal-democratic transformations remaining the nuclear power which had not suffered a military defeat, it had not been doomed, as it appears, to the failed reforms. The possibility of achieving public consensus and creating a modern democratic state was rather high in the early 1990s when the popularity of democratic ideas and leaders was still high. In this way the imperial syndrome and the problems of finding new national identity could have been overcome.

Obviously, the predominant atmosphere of hopes and renewal of the *perestroika* and the early post-Soviet period was in many respects linked with a newly found popular faith in democracy as the best way of solving private and public problems. However, the disappointment in the post-Soviet reforms put an end to those unsteady convictions and hopes. The inconsistent implementation and incompleteness of the reforms, undemocratic methods employed by the new Russian elite, the growth of authoritarian tendencies in politics and the subsequent discredit of democratic ideals led to the revival of imperial, nationalist sentiments in the Russian society.

Thus military defeat in itself did not relieve Germany of imperial complexes and ambitions. At the same time the majority of Russians did not start seeking the restoration of its lost military-imperial status immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although in political cultures of the both nations authoritarian traditions were strong, it did not mean the predetermined outcome of their development. It is possible to assume that Russia and Germany were equal in their nationalist predisposition as well as in their democratic potential. All depended on the choices that would be made by the two societies and by the tendencies that would prevail in them in the long run: authoritarian or democratic. It is important to underscore, however, that the trajectories of the

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[802] *Merritt, Anna J.; Merritt, Richard L.* (eds.) Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: the OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949. Urbana*:* University of Illinois Press, 1970. pp. 31, 38-40.

socio-political development in both cases largely depended on the ways the two societies would confront the legacies of their respective totalitarian pasts.

The historian Maria Ferretti, among other researchers, has pointed to a close link between completing "mourning" and constructing a democratic identity, as well as between a melancholic attitude toward the past and the growth of authoritarian ideologies—above all, nationalism. Ferretti has argued that to the extent that mourning demands that individuals perceive the past as a common heritage for which they share equal responsibility with others, that volitional act makes them active subjects of political life who will actively participate in promoting the changes that are necessary to prevent the past from recurring. This is, according to the author, precisely the link between mourning and democratic values. On the contrary, melancholic attitudes toward the past and passive contemplation of the catastrophe deprive individuals of their sense of responsibility. They see themselves only as victims and, instead of taking on responsibility for the past, they nostalgically long for what existed "before." In perceiving the past only as a result of unknown, higher forces, individuals do not become active participants in political life. On the contrary, they search for the patronage of a firm hand and authoritarian power, which are the basis of all nationalism.[803]

Thus, the more plausible explanation of a gradual shift in West German public consciousness can be found, as it seems, in initially strong orientation of West German political elite towards political democracy with its system of values.

As one the most influential West German thinkers Jürgen Habermas put it, "Germans who found themselves to the west of the Soviet zone of occupation had drawn the better lot, and not only from a material point of view: the conditions for a change in mentality were also objectively better. The reestablishment of the democratic constitutional state, the inclusion of the Federal Republic in the Western alliance, and the fundamental improvement in economic conditions were the major changes in direction. In addition, encumbrances that had still plagued the Weimar Republic were pushed aside: Prussian centralism, the imbalance and the split between religious denominations, the primacy and the tradition-forcing power of the military, and, above all, the political significance of elites rooted in traditional social structures. Moreover, the superpower lineup, made for a beneficial primacy of interior politics, and the economic upswing of the period of reconstruction created a space for constructing and developing a welfare state. Finally, not only the loss of

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[803] *Ferretti, Maria.* Memory in Disorder. Russia and Stalinism // Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 41, № 6, November/December 2003.

national sovereignty but also our own interests ultimately facilitated an energetically pursued integration into the European Economic Community. Thus, in an increasingly prosperous society, citizens were able to acquire confidence in their political order."[804]

"My thesis, - continued Habermas, - is that the Federal Republic has become politically civilized only to the degree that the obstacles of our perception of a heretofore unthinkable breach in civilization have been swept away. We had to learn to publicly confront a traumatic past. That a liberal political culture could develop in a highly developed civilized society such as Germany only after Auschwitz is a truth difficult to grasp. The fact that it developed because of Auschwitz, because of reflection on the incomprehensible, is less difficult to understand if one considers what human rights and democracy meant at heart; namely the simple expectation that no one will be excluded from the political community and that the integrity of each individual, in his or her own otherness, will be similarly respected."[805]

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[804] *Habermas, Jürgen.* A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany. Polity Press, 1998. p. 162-63.
[805] Ibid.

4.4.3 Institutionalization of Collective Memory Discourses

It is important to point out that the change of identity in post-WWI Germany would have been impossible without the profound structural or institutional transformation of the German political and cultural sphere. The formation of effective democratic institutions became, as it appears, the basic guarantee of overcoming totalitarian legacy in the Federal Republic. The basis for this overcoming was certainly laid by the denazification program which helped to remove moral and legal protection from the Nazi regime-forming state institutions – Wehrmacht, courts, the police, industry, science, educational system, mass media, etc. As Lev Gudkov conceptualized, "Without a forced fixation of the truths traumatizing national consciousness in the practical activity of various institutions ethical, publicist or theoretical thought would not have, most likely, not only developed, but would not have probably emerged at all, as reveals the experience of GDR – the country, which has gone through two different forms of totalitarianism and which till now has not yet recovered from this experience."[806]

The denazification program, conducted by the Allied authorities in the immediate postwar period, and its positive contribution to the German future transformations should be certainly given tribute. By characterizing a war of aggression the Nuremberg Tribunal presented not only a moral-ethical estimation of this war, but formulated an accurate legal position laying the foundation for international law. Thanks to the denazification program, the Nazi ideology and leaders were condemned and the most active Nazis were removed from the positions of power in state structures, public and private organizations.

Moreover the denazification process in general and the Nuremberg trial in particular increased West Germans' awareness of the Nazi era. In December 1945, 84 percent of the American zone respondents indicated that they had learned something new from the trial: 64 percent specified the concentration camps, 23 percent the extermination of Jews and other groups, and 7 percent the character of the Nazi leaders; one out of eight (13 percent) said that he had known nothing about the evils of National Socialism prior to the trial.[807]

On the other hand, it is clear that neither the denazification process nor the trial brought about significant changes of the German political culture. This fact

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[806] *Gudkov, Lev.* "Totalitarism" as a Theoretical Framework // Negativnaja identichnost'. Stat'i 1997-2002 godov. M.: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, «VCIOM-A», 2004. p. 436.

[807] [Interestingly that those who tended to justify Nazism appeared more prone not to favor democracy (42 percent) and prefer security (70 percent) to individual freedoms (22 percent)] *Merritt, Anna J.; Merritt, Richard L.* (eds.) Public Opinion in Occupied Germany. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1970. p. 34.

is confirmed, primarily, by the general unwillingness of the population to reject Nazism completely. The surveys conducted in the period from November 1945 till December 1946 showed that an average of 47 percent expressed a conviction of National Socialism being a good idea only badly carried out; by August 1947 this figure had risen to 55 percent remaining fairly constant throughout the whole occupation period. At the same time the share of respondents thinking it a bad idea dropped from 41 to about 30 percent.[808]

Besides, 18 percent of Germans were convinced that "only a government with a dictator is able to create a strong nation"; 29 percent believed that "the publication of no book that criticizes a government or recommends any changes in government should be permitted"; 37 percent denied that "extermination of the Jews and Poles and other non-Aryans was not necessary for the security of Germans."[809]

However, despite the fact that the denazification process did not produce considerable shift towards a more democratic public consciousness, it nevertheless laid the foundation and created significant preconditions for its further formation. It became a reference point for Germans, a painful experience to which they would still refer decades later.

In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, no similar process has taken place. Though the Communist regime was formally condemned as well, it was never outlawed. The leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet special services, state employees and others regime officials were neither lustrated, nor prohibited to perform political or public activity in future. There have been no retributions against Communism and no systematic assessment of its role over the 70 years of its existence. As Nancy Adler correctly asserted, "Thus far, no institutional way has been found to judge the crimes of Soviet rule. Nor do the Russians have a concept like the German *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* to describe the process of coming to terms with the national past. Though a far cry from the official amnesia that was practiced throughout much of the Soviet period, state-sponsored acknowledgement of past repression is still limited in Russia. Not only were individual perpetrators not brought to justice, but also, the system itself in which they operated was not brought to justice. The fact remains that KPSS [CPSU] was never condemned. Since it was also never banned, the Party faithful do not even have to regroup under another name."[810]

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[808] Ibid. p. 32, 171.

[809] Ibid. p. 31.

[810] *Adler, Nanci.* In Search of Identity: The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Recreation of Russia. In: *Barahona De Brito, Alexandra; González-Enríquez, Carmen; Aguilar, Paloma*. (eds.) The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 2001. p. 301.

Although an attempt to put the Communist Party on trial was undertaken, it did not succeed, first of all, because it presented a defense of the new Russian power against the attempt of the CPSU restoration. The very fact that the Constitutional (and not the Criminal) Court set the stage for this trial speaks volumes.[811] Though the trial was actually won by Yeltsin and the unconstitutional activity of the CPSU was acknowledged it did not, however, mean a full and final condemnation of the Communist Party and its leaders. Furthermore, as the overwhelming majority present at the court hearings from both parties, had been previously members of CPSU, such a condemnation was fairly possible.

Thus, the real trial – the trial over the crimes committed during the 73 years of communist rule – did not occur. And with each passing year the probability of such trial is getting more unlikely. Nevertheless, according to the former Soviet dissident historian Vladimir Bukovsky, as those events are passing by, the more crimes are being committed while the people's interest in the 30-80 years' old events is subsiding. Theoretically the possibility of persecuting those responsible for the regime crimes still exists in Russia. For, according to Bukovsky, "our inspectors, our judges who falsely convicted us for political reasons are still alive. Alive also are the psychiatrists who recognized us mentally sick and who exposed us to forced-treatment in psychiatric hospitals used by the regime. The diagnoses from of those who have gone through psychological reprisals in the USSR have not been cancelled till now."[812] Though Bukovsky believes that there is a lot of people who should bear responsibility for the crimes of the Soviet regime he reveals no optimism regarding the possibility of bringing them to justice in modern Russia. He posits that until the present Russian regime is at office any trial over the CPSU or any serious condemnation of the past atrocities is unlikely.[813]

Upon the whole, unlike the practice of denazification in West Germany, anticommunist criticism in post-Soviet Russia was rather superficial and short-lived. Quoting Lev Gudkov, it "was mainly aimed at discrediting the legitimate legend of the ex–authorities but it did not deal with the institutional system of totalitarianism itself. Nor was it accompanied by a deep moral reappraisal of the past. As a result, the conservative reaction to changes and the pressure caused by them, the crisis, partial pauperization, the loss of prestige and status by the ex-

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[811] As those who were present then at the Constitutional court hearings witnessed, during the trial the claimants were not allowed to mention such terms, as "crime" and "a criminal organization."

[812] Interview with Vladimir Bukovsky. In: *Agaev V.* Kommunizm - sud istorii? Obzor Nemetskoj volny // Deutsche Welle, 15 May, 2001.

[813] Ibid.

privileged groups have brought to the surface of public realm old symbols and values of totalitarian society."[814]

Certainly, the choices the elites of the analyzed countries made in both managing the present and representing the past got reflected in the cultural institutions. The treatment of the past is connected to such institutions of cultural transmission as schools and universities, media, museums, national libraries, national holidays and remembrance days, commemorations, as well as the veneration of places (graveyards, war monuments, concentration camps sites, etc.).

As we have seen, the rebuilding of cultural institutions in West Germany was largely determined by a serious effort to confront the horrors of the Nazi dictatorship and by searching for safeguards in order to prevent history from repeating itself. Most important, however, is that confrontation with the Nazi period of history was integrated into in the country's educational institutions (both in the curricula and textbooks) as the main agents of systematic cultural transmission.

The treatment of the Nazi period in all its aspects has been turned into compulsory teaching and learning matter in all types of schools in Germany and at all levels of education. The duties of both federal and state offices include the history of the Nazi period, the history, culture, and politics of the state of Israel, and, since 1980, the documentation of memorials to victims of National Socialism in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Standing Conference of State Cultural Ministers (*Kultusministerkonferenz, KMK*) has stressed the necessity to focus intensively on National Socialism and its crimes, since this part of German history is closely bound to basic constitutional values and "the credibility of the Federal Republic as a free and democratic constitutional state."[815]

German textbooks teach about the crimes of the Third Reich making the readers confront its shameful legacy. Yasemin Soysal wrote that German textbooks "reflect a condemnation of the Nazi past," and provide "extensive and negative coverage of the Nazi history as a time of violence, persecution, death, and destruction."[816]

As for Russia, the persistence of authoritarian methods of school teaching in the post-Soviet schools has been noted in the previous chapter. The content of

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[814] *Gudkov, Lev.* «Totalitarism» as a Theoretical Framework // Negativnaja identichnost'. Stat'i 1997-2002 godov. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, "VCIOM-A", 2004. p. 419.

[815] *Ehmann, Annegret.* Competences in the Media and Information Society, Paper for Workshop III of the European Conference of the BPB "NECE – Networking European Citizenship Education," Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 23 - 26 July, 2004.

[816] *Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu*. Identity and Transnationalization in German School Textbooks // Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 30, № 2, 1998. p. 57.

history school program as well as the government's approach to history teaching has not undergone significant change. The Soviet Gulag as well as the Holocaust are not present in the Russian school curricula. A study from 1997 found that, "it is unfortunate that Russian schools have failed to address the Holocaust when teaching modern history."[817]

History textbooks have been intently monitored and roughly censored by the Russian authorities despite the fact that there has existed since the mid-1990s a formal procedure of expertise and classification of textbooks.[818] School history texts thus remain the instruments in the Russian process of ideological transformation and nation-building.[819] The Russian bureaucrats are not known for plans to introduce any school programs on civic education similar to that in West Germany (at the same time their intentions to introduce the basics of the Orthodox culture into the secondary school curriculum are well-known).

German commemoration (in comparison with Russian) as well reflects an extraordinarily high level of reflection and apology about the national past. As James Young wrote, "Berlin and its environs are rich with excellent museums and permanent exhibitions on the Holocaust […] from the Wannsee villa to the Topographie des Terrors, from the new Jewish museum on Lindenstrasse and the Spielberg video archives it will house, to the insightful exhibitions at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen."[820] Other notable memorials include the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, the Memorial to the Bookburning at Bebelplatz, Street Signs in the Bavarian Quarter and the Neue Wache, rededicated in 1995 as the "Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Victims of War and Tyranny." No similar national museums and memorials are found in the Russian capital.

To add to this, West Germany and then unified Germany have pursued highly apologetic policies of remembrance. Since 1995 the Germans have celebrated Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27th - the day Auschwitz was liberated. On November 9th Germany commemorates the anniversary of the Night of Broken Glass (*Kristallnacht*), a massive nation-wide anti-Jewish pogrom

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[817] *Poltorak, David; Klokova, Galina.* Ob izuchenii Holokosta // Prepodavanie istorii v shkole, № 7, 1997. p. 35.

[818] The two most notorious cases here are prohibitions of the textbooks *The Modern History of the 20th Century* (*Noveishaja istoria: 20 vek*) by Alexander Kreder (in 1997) and *National History of the 20th Century (Otechsetvennaja Istoria: 20 vek)* by Igor Dolutsky (in 2003) by the Russian authorities.

[819] See *Zajda, Joseph.* The New History School Textbooks in the Russian Federation: 1992-2004 // Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 1469-3623, Vol. 37, № 3, 2007. p. 291.

[820] *Young, James A.* Berlin's Holocaust Memorial // German Politics and Society, Vol. 17, № 3, Fall 1999. p. 55.

that took place on 9-10 November, 1938. Even though November 9th was the day on which the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 and the country was finally reunified, Germans chose a different date to commemorate the country's unification – October 3rd. In early March the annual Week of Brotherhood (*Woche der Brüderlichkei*) is traditionally celebrated. This annual event, supported primarily by the Societies for Christian-Jewish Cooperation, has often included addresses by the Federal Republic's government leaders, and thus has been an important moment for remarks on the Nazi past and the legacies of anti-Semitism, as well as on how the past might be overcome.[821]

Annual commemorations on May 8th have long served as a decisive referent in German political culture posing a central question for German identity: Was Germany defeated or liberated on that date?[822] This has thus become a day of critical reflection on the national past.

In Russia, in turn, May 9th - Victory Day (*Den' Pobedy*) - has become one of the biggest national holidays, a day of victory celebrating the Soviet army's triumph over Hitler's Germany. It has not evolved into a day of mournful commemoration of the dead, the human suffering, and the material destruction.[823] It is commemorated with a huge military parade, hosted by the President on Red Square in Moscow. Similar parades are organized in all major Russian cities. It is also the day to commemorate the dead soldiers (flowers and wreaths are laid on wartime graves) and to pay tribute to war veterans (special parties and concerts are organized for them).

While actively remembering its effort in defeating Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War, Russian society forgets about the trauma of the Gulag and crimes committed in its name in other former states of the Soviet Union.[824] The Day of Memory of Victims of Political Repressions on October 30th is by no means a national event – it is remembered by a handful of dissidents and the former victims. As we have seen, public officials avoid giving public apologies, building monuments, discovering the mass graves, reconstructing concentration camps, or opening archives in Russia. A critical approach to Russia's past has been replaced by a "patriotic consensus" (Sperling 2001) that has expressed a Russian concept of identity.[825]

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[821] *Olick, Jeffrey K.* 1993. Op. cit.

[822] *Olick, Jeffrey K.* 1999. Op. cit.

[823] *Gudkov, Lev.* The Fetters of Victory. How the War Provides Russia with Its Identity // Eurozine, 3 May 2005.

[824] *Folk, Christian.* Op. cit.

[825] *Sperling, Walter.* "Erinnerungsorte" in Werbung und Marketing // Osteuropa 51, 2001. pp. 1321-1341.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

5.1 Summary and Main Findings

This dissertation has addressed transformations of political culture in the two post-totalitarian societies of post-World War II West Germany and post-Soviet Russia. More specifically, in this work I have tried to discover and understand determinants of political culture transformations and the factors affecting democratic consolidation in the analyzed cases. Realizing that the complexity of post-totalitarian contexts cannot be grasped without attention to different spheres or levels of change – political, economic, social and cultural, – since the beginning of the research process I was inclined towards the study of the interplay between different levels of post-totalitarian transformations in fostering democratic political culture.

Following this logic, I started the research by addressing in **Chapter 2** the political context of post-totalitarian transformations in postwar West Germany and post-Soviet Russia. On presenting the review of the political reforms in both cases I turned to the comparative analysis of the political transformations trying to address the set of questions posed in the introduction to the chapter: Has a political system in each case been formed and has it replaced the command-administrative system? Have there been created mechanisms of horizontal accountability in the form of effective system of "checks and balances"? Have the lessons of the past regarding the collapse of the former totalitarian system been taken into account in both analyzed transformations?

The comparative analysis has revealed that as a result of the postwar transformations a political system (as a system of independent institutions) was created in the Federal Republic of Germany where the representative institutions of the parliamentary republic became the main centers of decision-making. In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, the super-presidential regime established with

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the adoption of the 1993 Constitution significantly limited accountability of the executive to the legislative and other braches of power. Consequently, the real centers of power in Russia were concentrated not within the formal representative institutions, but in nontransparent structures of the Presidential Administration and Federal Security Service (FSB). This absence of horizontal accountability, in turn, reduced efficiency of vertical accountability in a form of electoral competition.

Taking into account the utmost importance of economic transformations for societies which face the necessity of reforming their political and economic systems simultaneously, in the same chapter I also explored how the economic reforms had affected the two analyzed transformations. Economic transformations in the analyzed contexts interested me as an essential condition of political system consolidation during the exit from totalitarian rule.

As the analysis of the postwar West German development revealed, the Economic Miracle accelerated consolidation of the new German state. Citizens of the Federal Republic became for the first time convinced that democracy was compatible with economic growth. While during the Weimar period many had tended to look back at the authoritarian but more economically successful German Empire, for the majority of the Economic Miracle contemporaries the financially safe, democratic present seemed the best of all periods.

In Russia, by contrast, unprecedented economic recession took place in the era of post-Soviet "democratization." It is not surprising therefore that democracy, associated with the chaos of the 1990s, became linked in the public opinion with poverty and humiliation. To illustrate, by 1998 72 percent of the respondents approved of the pre-1985 period and only 35 percent positively estimated the existing regime.[826]

The experiences of West Germany and Russia, thus, confirmed that through rising of living standards economic development provides a political regime with necessary legitimacy and long-term sustainability. Besides, as was shown in the following Chapter 3, economic development can positively affect cultural changes which, in turn, facilitate democratic consolidation. It favors the development of interpersonal trust and tolerance, and leads to the distribution of post-materialistic values with their priority of self-expression and participation in decision-making.

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[826] *Rose, Richard; Shin, Doh Chull.* Qualities of Incomplete Democracies: Russia, the Czech Republic and Korea // Compared Studies in Public Policy. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, № 302, 1998. p. 21.

Upon the whole, the general understanding of the institutional context of transformations in the two cases provided an important basis for further analysis of cultural transformations in West Germany and Russia.

This dissertation has employed and developed a view of political culture as a system of symbols and meanings that determines both the collective identification and the citizens' attitudes toward politics and their role within the political system. This understanding of political culture has defined a twofold analysis of political cultures in West Germany and Russia from both attitudinal and symbolic perspectives.

In **Chapter 3** political culture transformations in the two cases have been analyzed from the individual-level perspective. The rationale behind that chapter was to offer an overview of the political culture developments from the perspective of citizens' orientations towards political system and their participation in it. Thus, in that chapter I analyzed transformations of West German and Russian societies along such variables as *interest in politics, the feeling of political efficacy, political participation, social trust*, and *support for democratic values*. Differently, the study investigated how attitudes toward self (civic attitudes, and primarily, the feeling of political efficacy) and toward others in politics (trust, cooperative competence) as well as toward the political system changed in the course of post-totalitarian transformations in the two analyzed societies.

As was discussed in Chapter 3, despite a rather protracted period of citizens' apathy and non-participation, West German political culture has experienced a gradual turn away from authoritarian patterns of thought to a tentative embrace of democratic values. The gradual increase in political interest and political discussion, in political efficacy, general trust, and, eventually, political participation, finally occurred with the most drastic increase by practically all analyzed variables taking place in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These changes have coincided (or, arguably, were caused by) with the emergence of the highly active protest student movement of 1968, thousands of citizen-initiative groups across the country, and, subsequently, the new social movements of the 1970s-1980s – the environmental, the anti-nuclear energy, the women's, and the peace movements.

In post-Soviet Russia one could observe an opposite situation – the wave of public activity subsided within the first post-communist years and since then there has been an overall decline by practically all variables of political involvement. With some minor exceptions of rare and nonsystematic citizens' activism the overall picture, as the survey data have shown, has largely remained unchanged. Only in the recent years (approximately since 2005) some grassroots initiatives and networks have begun to appear in Russia. These new independent

endeavors have united both those eager to assert their interests and rights, as well as those ready to struggle for more general public good issues like protection of environment or preservation of cultural heritage. Surely, these new networks and grassroots initiatives, founded on weak ties, provide an interesting aspect of further investigation.

The comparative research has discovered (confirming some of the conclusions previously made by other authors) that among main sources of change of West German political culture on the individual level were overall system performance, socioeconomic modernization that impacted the change of social structure, and the transformation of socialization patterns in which political values are formed and through which they are transmitted. The latter change in the German case, as it was shown, was largely determined by the educational reforms which affected both the content and the structure of secondary and higher education.

As it was argued, sociopolitical modernization of the West German society was closely linked with the transformation of political system (discussed in Chapter 2), creation and well-performance of democratic institutions as well as with the overall rise of affluence and the expansion of higher education in the postwar period. These factors transformed the social structure in direction to a more participatory citizenry increasingly concerned about public matters.

It was shown also that post-Soviet Russia experienced no similar growth of civic engagement except for a short late Soviet period which was followed by protracted ebb. The system in Russia was not sufficiently modernized and democratized in the post-Soviet period and became characterized not by institutional differentiation and further strengthening of democratic institutions, but by quite archaic unequal, hierarchical, clientelist relations. The unchanged structure of state-society relations stifled the formation of independent civil society agents.

The relative growth of civic activity in Russia in the recent years has been linked, as it appears, with the overall economic and income growth which has taken place in the last decade. However, the problem with these groups is that most of them have no formal status and are not institutionalized, and in the context of authoritarian political system their future is quite uncertain. In any case, this new phenomenon is certainly of interest and requires further investigation.

In **Chapter 4** I turned to the explanatory analysis of the symbolic dimension of political culture that affects the legitimation of polities and the formation of national identity. In this part of the dissertation I explored the determinants of West German and Russian collective memory narratives regarding their respective totalitarian pasts and investigated how these

narratives have evolved in the course of exit from totalitarian rule. More specifically, my intention was to understand the ways in which democratizing West Germany and Russia had confronted their totalitarian legacies and how they had remembered their respective totalitarian regimes – the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. At first I reviewed how the collective memory discourses in each country evolved across time. On presenting the developments in both cases, I turned to the analysis of the sources of change (and continuity) in official discourses of traumatic historical events.

I have shown that the decades following the end of World War II, and especially since the late 1960s, West Germany has seen a remarkable turnabout in the memory of the Third Reich marked by the revaluation of the meaning of victimhood, the reinvention of the Holocaust remembrances and placing them in the center of German identity. I have argued that the major sources of change in the cultural situation in West Germany was, first, diversification of memory narratives and the appearance of alternative versions of memory and interpretations of the past in the postwar period, i.e. the 'alternative remembering' that challenged and contested the official memory narratives. Second, change in the official narratives of the German repressive past was due to the transformation of social values and the basis of collective identification that manifested in the introduction and sustaining of new symbols (for e.g. the Holocaust survivor and the concentration camp) and symbolic events (for e.g. the liberation of Auschwitz and the *Kristallnacht*). Finally, the cultural change was brought about and further sustained through institutionalization of the new collective memory discourses in such institutions of cultural transmission as schools and universities, mass media, museums, national libraries, national holidays and remembrance days, commemorations, as well as the veneration of places (graveyards, war monuments, concentration camps sites, etc.).

While in Germany the memory of the criminal Nazi past was gradually obtained which led to its rethinking and to subsequent "working through" it in the public sphere, in Russia, by contrast, the work of memory launched during the *perestroika* period gradually subsided and was ousted, leading to intensification of imperial ambitions and nationalistic sentiments. As we have seen, the memory of the Soviet past in the contemporary Russian discourse has remained almost totally monopolized by the state. Since the mid-1990s, the dominance of the official politics of memory has been growing, preventing the crystallization of any independent agents or communities of memory. By imposing such symbols as the victory in the Great Patriotic War and the figure of the war veteran the dominant official memory narrative pushed the theme of the Gulag and repressions to the periphery of mass consciousness. Furthermore, the symbol of victory in the war, as it was shown, has retrospectively legitimized the

Soviet totalitarian regime as a whole and Stalin as its leader justifying the "costs" of Soviet history and the accelerated military-industrial modernization (such as the repressions, famines, poverty, and enormous numbers of deaths after collectivization).[827] If West German cultural institutions – schools and universities, mass media and museums, etc. – have reflected a high level of reflection and apology about the national past, Russia has considerably lacked public institutions rationalizing and "working through" the totalitarian past in the public sphere. A critical approach to Russia's past has been replaced by a "patriotic consensus" (Sperling 2001) that has expressed a Russian concept of identity.

For this concluding chapter I set the task of untangling how these multiple transitions in political and cultural spheres affected each other and overall social development in the two cases. On the one hand, I would like to explore how political change and institutional transformations in post-totalitarian societies have affected political culture. At the same time, I will try to see how collective memory discourses influenced the national identity and political processes in post-WWII West Germany and post-Soviet Russia. Additionally, I will also focus on the sources of change or mechanisms through which change in the analyzed political cultures has occurred.

5.2 Mutual Effects of Transitions: Interplay between Institutional and Cultural Levels of Post-Totalitarian Transformations

In this section I will focus on the interplay between different levels of post-totalitarian transformations (more specifically between the levels of institutional change and transformations of political culture and collective memory) and its role in fostering democratic political culture.

The core research goal of the comparative historical analysis of transformations in postwar West Germany and post-Soviet Russia was to investigate the sources of cultural change, or, differently, the factors bringing about change in citizens' attitudes and behavior, affecting a social turn from authoritarian to democratic patterns of thought and behavior. Within this general framework there was a more specific task to understand how institutional transformations in the post-totalitarian societies of West Germany and Russia affected their political cultures.

Upon the whole, the analysis of democratization in the two cases revealed a close link between the institutional and cultural levels of transformations.

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[827] See *Gudkov, Lev.* The Fetters of Victory. How the War Provides Russia with Its Identity // Eurozine, 3 May, 2005.

While in Germany the establishment of functioning democratic institutions (discussed in Chapter 2) contributed to the long-term growth of political efficacy and civic skills, in Russia, by contrast, the emergence of a super-presidential regime and non-performance or absence of democratic institutions resulted in the low levels of political efficacy and weakness of civil society, impeded social development and stifled social organization. As it was shown in Chapter 3, in the West German democracy, based on the rule of law and the separation of powers, citizens got numerous chances of participation in the political system which, in turn, led to a steady increase in the political skills and resources of the German society. Differently, as West Germans were getting acquainted with the democratic processes of the Federal Republic, they were getting more and more involved in them, and this involvement, in turn, made them more assured that they can affect political decision-making. In this way, the democratic system performance contributed to the growth of civic norms in postwar Germany. Most observers agreed that the performance of the political and economic system was an important factor in the increase in system support and the growing appreciation of democracy in the first two decades following the war. It can be argued therefore that the change of identity in post-WWII West Germany would have been impossible without the profound structural or institutional transformation of the political sphere. The formation of effective democratic institutions, as it appears, became the basic guarantee of overcoming totalitarian legacy in postwar Germany.

In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, the weakness or sometimes lack of an institutional framework within which democracy could actually be practiced prevented in many respects the development of civic skills and political efficiency that are vital for supporting and consolidating a democratic system. The social involvement remained extremely limited due to the conservation of the old structures and further non-development of democratic institutions (such as the rule of law, strong legislature and more broadly a competitive political system, independent media and courts, etc.) which impeded social development and stifled social organization.

As for the causation of the correlation between political democratization and citizens' involvement in political affairs, it is noteworthy that changes in individual political attitudes and behavior in postwar West Germany lagged behind institutional and economic changes for almost two decades. One can argue that political culture has begun to 'catch up' with the democratic structure only since the late 1960s – early 1970s. The analysis of the German case thus seemed to confirm the arguments made by Brian Barry, Dankwart Rustow, and other observers who had asserted that political culture should be viewed as the effect and not as the cause of political processes. Indeed, in the Federal Republic

the change of political culture followed institutional transformation, Germany thus representing the case in which "democracy made democrats" rather than vice versa. In Russia, as it appears, the failed political democratization became the main obstacle on the path of democratization of political culture and, more broadly, of democratic consolidation. Following this formula, it can be argued that in Russia the lack of democracy has resulted in the lack of democratic citizens, and, consequently, in the lack of democratic political culture.

As for the interplay between the transformations of political culture and collective memory, it is noteworthy that while there was a temporal gap between politico-economic reforms and transformations of political culture, the processes of the civic culture emergence and the critical collective memory development in West Germany, on the contrary, coincided. Moreover, challenging of the existing official memory narrative was at the core of the protest student movement of the late 1960s. In the period often referred to as the "long 1960s" the West German society was taking on not only a more active role in managing social matters, but was also taking a greater moral stance on their nation's past. In fact, historically this new critical stance vis-à-vis the past coincided with grassroots movements and new forms of civil society that implicitly questioned traditional German attitudes and replaced them with more modern views of authority, civic engagement, nationalism, militarism and other concepts.[828] Thus the overall growth of civic activity in the late 1960s and the 1970s, manifested in the appearance of the protest student movement and the spread of thousands of local citizens' initiatives across the country, actually coincided with an increasing diversification and fragmentation of West Germany's historical culture.

The interdependence of general civic involvement and critical treatment of the repressive past was also vividly revealed in the Russian case. As was shown, the overall decline of political participation since the early 1990s in Russia has also coincided with a decline of interest in the topics of mass repressions and other Soviet crimes and the growth of defense reactions in the social and cultural periphery.

5.3 The Sources of Political Culture Change: Expansion of the Public Sphere and Institutionalization of Value Change. Socialization and Generational Change

One of the main sources of change in the West German postwar political culture was an emergence and subsequent *expansion of a critical public sphere* in which the

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[828] See *Hockenos, Paul.* The Grassroots Republic: How Intellectuals, Students and Civic Movements Changed German Culture // The Atlantic Times. May, 2009.

representatives of political, artistic, academic, educational and civil society elites persistently rationalized the national present and past, articulated, debated, and negotiated different interests, values, positions, policies, viewpoints, etc. Linked with the public sphere expansion was *the institutionalization of new democratic values and their subsequent transmission through cultural and educational institutions*. The latter component was decisive, in turn, in sustaining new political values and in further transmitting them to the next generations. Differently, the institutionalization of new values, principles and norms was crucial to guaranteeing their transmission and continuity across the succession of generations as the new cohorts could internalize these new values in the process of their socialization. In the following sections I will dwell more on these sources of cultural change in the two analyzed cases.

5.3.1 Expansion of the Public Sphere

As noted previously, the expansion of the public sphere in the Federal Republic affected equally more broad democratization processes as well as the processes linked with the critical confrontation with the Nazi past. Thus the embrace of the new values of human life and human dignity, civic engagement and codetermination in the public sphere and in different cultural institutions went along with the 'coming to terms' with the traumatic past in the same settings. These processes, in turn, fundamentally transformed the German national identity and considerably furthered democratic consolidation in the country.

It is noteworthy that since the late 1960s the public sphere in West Germany (understood as the space where meanings and interests are articulated, debated, distributed and negotiated) has involved several independent arenas of struggle for new political and social issues, as well as for more critical reflection on the past: the national and regional political scenes, television, the national and regional press, and a large variety of specialized yet interconnected intellectual settings, including cinema, literature, law, and academic history and social sciences.

In those settings, on the one hand, numerous civil society agents – environmental activists, student movement leaders, representatives of trade unions and teachers' associations, etc. – struggled for representations of their interests and for furthering of such issues as educational reform, environmental protection, urban development, legalization of abortion, codetermination of workers, etc. Consequently, the growing engagement of civil society actors and the promotion by them of the above-mentioned New Politics issues produced, as we have seen in Chapter 3, a change in basic orientations toward politics and the

political system, bringing about a greater citizen input. Furthermore, this value 'struggle' and subsequent value change in Germany considerably affected the state-society relations and the overall political agenda. Most notably, the increased citizens' involvement and the rise of New Politics concerns have weakened the traditional social basis of German politics.

At the same time, numerous intellectual, religious and artistic groups, various groups of victims, survivors, veterans, and other 'communities of memory,' as well as activists on the left and right, academics, teachers, writers, artists, lawyers, and journalists were simultaneously involved in the process of 'coming to terms with' the repressive past in the public sphere. Consequently, the public confrontations with the Nazi past have gradually become an intrinsic part of West German democracy.

In Russia, the public sphere that has emerged as a result of the Soviet system collapse, has been, on the contrary, constantly narrowing. On the one hand, it was linked with the weakness of civil society and citizens' disengagement throughout the 1990s. This meant that independent initiatives in the public sphere were rather weak and unsystematic and that civil society agents that would make claims regarding political or memory-related issues simply did not appear. On the other hand, the public space has gradually been monopolized by the ever more authoritarian state. Since 2000 under Putin's presidency significant limitations of freedom, primarily the freedom of expression and association, as well as the elimination of the public sphere settings such as free parliament, civil society, mass media, etc. severely undermined the public sphere in Russia.

5.3.2 Institutionalization and Transmission of Values

Perhaps even more important is the fact that the new values gaining recognition in the public sphere were institutionalized in West German cultural institutions. The latter were increasingly integrating the new democratic values and searching for safeguards in order to prevent history from repeating itself.

Initiated by the Western Allies, the process of 'working through' the traumatic past was substantially expanded by the West German society and state that have been seeking for means to deal with the former injustice, alleviate the suffering of the victims, to minimize the possibility of a repetition of what had happened, to comprehend the causes of the crimes committed and to document them. Incidentally, this procedure has not only ended, but it has become an essential part of national and cultural identity of contemporary Germans.

'Coming to terms' with the National Socialist past in West Germany began with the legal action: punishing the perpetrators, the rehabilitation of victims of Nazism, the revision of racial laws and, most important, the prosecution on Nazi crimes in the German courts. Upon the whole, in the period between 1945 and 1997 a total of 912 trials were held in the German courts involving 1,875 defendants accused of homicidal crimes committed during World War II in the service of National Socialism.[829] This process that actually took decades to fulfill was accompanied by a historical study of National Socialism and by a critical evaluation of norms and values of the Nazi period in different cultural institutions – mass media, museums, and most importantly schools and universities as the main agents of systematic cultural transmission. These steps were inspired by the society's and government's intention to make an antihuman nature of Nazi value system known to the public and to counter it with democratic values.

In Russia the already mentioned absence of the public sphere able to produce and broadcast social meanings in conjunction with the deliberate marginalization or absence of the groups able to create and transmit those meanings has blocked the possibility of retaining and transmitting any collective memory versions differing from those superimposed on the existing cultural and educational institutions by the state. As we have seen, the democratic values and norms as well as the memory of the Soviet Gulag and repressions have been integrated neither into the Russian political and legal institutions, nor into its national holidays and commemorative traditions; neither into national museums, nor into schools and universities, etc.

5.3.3 Socialization and Generational Change

As mentioned previously, such sources of change as the public sphere expansion and institutionalization of democratic values and norms are vital for sustaining new political values and in further transmitting them to the next generations.

Gabriel Almond et al. (1980, 2006) observed that political cultures are sustained or changed as people acquire their attitudes and values. Differently, citizens usually acquire norms, attitudes, values and patterns of behavior in the process of political socialization. If political socialization refers to "learning process by which the political norms and behaviors acceptable to an ongoing political system are transmitted from generation to generation," then the sources

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[829] The Prosecution of National Socialist Homicidal Crimes before Courts in West Germany and the Federal Republic, 1945-1997. A short Introduction on Statistics and Priorities. <http://www1.jur.uva.nl/junsv/JUNSVEng/WGermpros.htm>

from which individuals acquire these norms and attitudes and the experiences through which they internalize them are many.[830] It is the abovementioned public sphere settings and various cultural institutions that transmit norms, values and behavior and help individuals internalize different types of political attitudes at different points in the life cycle. These agencies, among which the school is arguably the most influential (Verba 1964), also play a major role in resocializing the population after the system's crisis or disintegration.

Political cultures that are normally subject to continuity may, however, experience change (as the example of postwar West Germany has vividly revealed). It happens once old institutions are destroyed or undergo some crisis causing discontinuities in the socialization process. When new institutions are formed, next cohorts are being socialized under them as they age. It is precisely the character of these new institutions that determines whether the new cohorts will socialize differently and will acquire new values and norms or not.

Karl Mannheim (1928, 1952) underscored that new generations emerge in response to a series of formative events that are perceived as challenges to the prevailing social and political order. System crises and other potentially formative event may not be constitutive of a political generation as long as there is no similar response, i.e. if these occurrences are not perceived as contradicting structural elements of the political culture associated with the previous order. Differently, if individuals do not translate the lessons drawn from shared historical experience into political practice and do not transmit their values and norms through cultural institutions, their experience will not suffice to form a generational change. If there is no change in socialization patters, new cohorts are unlikely to socialize differently under new institutions and the change in political culture is unlikely to occur. However, any system crisis as well as the destruction of traditional political beliefs and values may open a window of opportunity for new generations to emerge. For, as noted previously, these social collectives emerge in response to a perceived crisis of traditional political beliefs and values.[831]

The analysis of political culture transformations in West Germany has revealed that institutionalization of new values and principles was crucial to guaranteeing their transmission and continuity across the succession of generations as the new cohorts could internalize them in the process of their socialization.

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[830] *Sigel, Roberta.* Assumptions about the Learning of Political Values // The Annul, Vol. 361, September 1965.

[831] See *Luecke, Tim.* Blast from the Past: The Generation of 1914 and the Causes of World War II. APSA 2009. Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009.

Based on different socialization experiences of postwar West Germans, the students of Germany typically distinguish at least three rather well-defined generations in the postwar Federal Republic: (1) the pre-war generation, (2) the so-called "Hitler Youth" generation, and (3) the postwar generation.

The pre-war generation which socialized before the First World War and lived through the Third Reich as adults, is also known as the West German "founder" generation for the majority of the immediate postwar elite, including the Federal Republic's first chancellor Konrad Adenauer (b. 1876) belonged to it.[832]

The generation in between, the so-called "Hitler Youth generation" of those born between 1922 and 1932 and socialized in the youth structures of the Third Reich (1933-1945), is often referred to as the "generation of 1945," or "forty-fivers," because the collapse of the Nazi regime and beginning of liberal freedoms became the turning point of their lives and the beginning of their as well as the country's intellectual and emotional (*geistige*) reorientation.[833] The same age cohort is also referred to in literature as "skeptical" (Schelsky 1957), "forty-eighters" (Marcuse 2000), "betrayed," "searching," and "reconstruction" generation.[834]

Finally, the postwar generation was the first cohort that socialized in the postwar Federal Republic. It became also known as the "1968 generation," or the "sixty-eighters," for its representatives formed the bulk of the protest student movement of the late 1960s. The members of this cohort that came of age in the years of the Economic Miracle in the late 1950s and in the 1960s were born between the late 1930s and the early 1950s (ca. between 1937 and 1953).[835]

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[832] See *Pfetsch, Frank R.* Die Gründergeneration der Bundesrepublik. Sozialprofil und politische Orientierung // Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 27, 1986. pp. 237–51; *Recker, Marie-Luise.* 'Bonn ist nicht Weimar.' Zur Struktur und Charakter des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Ära Adenauer // Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 44, 1993. pp. 287–303.

[833] *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. p. 51. See also *Kaiser, Joachim.* Phasenverschiebungen und Einschnitte in der Kulturellen Entwicklung. In: *Broszat, Martin* (ed.) Zäsuren nach 1945: Essays zur Periodisierung der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990. pp. 69–74. Claus Leggewie follows him in "The 'Generation of 1989': A New Political Generation?" In: *Monteath, Peter; Reinhard Alter* (eds.) Rewriting the German Past: History and Identity in the New Germany. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997. pp. 103–14.

[834] *Marcuse, Harold.* Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933-2001. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. p. 51.

[835] *Marcuse, Harold.* Generational Cohorts and the Shaping of Popular Attitudes towards the Holocaust. In: *Roth, John; Maxwell, Elizabeth* (eds.) Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide. London: Palgrave, 2001. Vol. 3. pp. 652-63.

Naturally, the social conditions under which representatives of different generations of Germans socialized largely defined their outlook, habits and behavioral patterns. German cohorts socialized before and during World War II lived though long periods of economic hardship and felt the destructive consequences of the war. Both an older generation of Germans born during the period of German Empire (1871-1918), and the Hitler Youth generation born in the Weimar Republic period (1918-1933) lived under autocratic regimes. Younger Germans born during or after World War II, by contrast, have grown up in the period of rapid social change, economic advancement, and international stability. Importantly, they were raised in democratic political setting of the Federal Republic.

This cohort of younger Germans that reared in the material and personal security of the postwar years have developed value priorities very different from the concerns of their elders. As a consequence of the affluence and social change of the postwar period, the attention this younger generation paid to traditional socioeconomic cleavages lessened, and individual attitudinal forces replaced social and cultural forces as determinants of political behavior. Kendall Baker et al. (1981) have shown, for instance, that the development of party identification in Germany has had a distinctive generational component.[836]

In the early 1980s when the members of the first cohort socialized into the political system of the Federal Republic reached the ages of 45-54, many observers acknowledged success of their socialization in terms of the political culture change. As noted previously, in comparison with the 1950s skepticism and ignorance have declined and the willingness to engage in public matters has risen noticeably since then.[837]

It is noteworthy that the research conducted by Frederick Weil has revealed that the older cohort (which he defines as "Nazi cohort") lagged initially in embracing the new West German democracy after 1945 due to the socialization and propaganda its members experienced under the Nazi regime. Notably, however, later sociological studies by Weil (1982, 1987), Kendall L. Baker et al. (1981), and others have discovered that the views of older cohorts have subsequently converged with those of the younger cohorts. Though the weakening of traditional social cleavages has led to great differences between the formative experiences of the younger and older cohorts, the elder Germans eventually caught up with the younger generation in internalizing democratic values and principles. This was mostly due to the performance of the new

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[836] See *Baker, Kendall L.* et al. Op. cit. p. 12.

[837] *Zinnecker, Jürgen*. Op. cit. p. 101.

democratic institutions, the rise of affluence, the constellation of international relations, as well as the other change-determinant factors previously discussed.[838]

While the role of the postwar generation in bringing socio-cultural change in Germany is commonly emphasized, it is important to remember that the activization of young people in the late 1960s became a consequence rather than a cause of the reformist cultural paradigm. As Dirk Moses (2007) convincingly proved it was "forty-fivers" who actually had the greatest impact on West Germany's postwar restructuring. Having entered the postwar academia, the legal profession and subsequently political arena in the 1960s-1980s, "forty-fivers" saw their mission in ensuring that the Federal Republic "as a project of consolidation and reform" would succeed.[839] The representatives of this cohort, as opposed to the 'rebellious' postwar generation of the late 1960s, "were radical reformers rather than revolutionaries." However, it was mostly due to the efforts of this cohort "committed to a democratic and republican system of government, even if they disagreed about its precise meaning" that the next generations of German citizens could socialize under different institutions.[840]

Arguably, similar function in the Russian case could be performed by the so-called "sixtiers" (*shestidesyatniki*). The representatives of this cohort born approximately between 1925 and 1945 were socialized during World War II and during a more 'liberal' period of Khrushev's *Thaw* when, following Stalin's death in 1953, repressions and censorship in the Soviet Union were partially reversed and millions of Soviet political prisoners were released from Gulag labor camps. Though they themselves could not possibly form a separate generation as they were raised and socialized under the Soviet institutions which remained rather uniform throughout the Soviet history, they could contribute to changing the institutions under which the post-Soviet cohorts would socialize.

In this regards the *perestroika* period, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet regime and the formation of independent Russian state in 1991 could become real formative events (Mannheim) constitutive of a new post-Soviet generation. The discontinuities caused by the Soviet system collapse have certainly produced vastly different life experiences for different age cohorts in Russia. The cohorts that were born in the 1980s and 1990s and came of age in the post-Soviet period had vastly different socialization experience from the older 'Soviet' cohorts. Undoubtedly, young Russians were raised in a much more liberal political and economic environment and could enjoy a much more open access to information

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[838] *Weil, Frederick D.* Cohorts, Regimes, and the Legitimation of Democracy: West Germany Since 1945 // American Sociological Review, Vol. 52, № 3, June 1987. pp. 308-24.
[839] *Moses, Dirk A.* Op. cit. p. 54, 64.
[840] Ibid. p. 64.

and to different sources of media. Furthermore, they grew up with few limitations on their right to travel, to hold foreign currency, to practice the religion of their choice, to choose the spheres for their self-realization, etc.

On the surface this group indeed seemed to acquire a set of preferences about the economy, the polity, and the world that were distinct from those of their parents (the cohort that had been socialized under the Soviet regime but experienced its collapse and had thus to be productive in two radically different systems) and from those of their grandparents, who were socialized and worked mostly in the Soviet system.[841] As Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul have reported based on the 1999–2000 survey data, younger Russians between 18 and 39 years of age appeared more likely to support free market, embrace democratic ideas and express more concern for individual liberties. However, the authors have acknowledged that these values' support in the analyzed group appeared to be rather declarative. As McFaul concluded in his 2002 publication, "[T]he embrace of democratic values has not influenced behavior to the extent that we might expect from the polls. Russia's youth value the ideas of democracy. But, like the rest of society, they do not believe that their democratic system works very effectively and therefore are unwilling to invest much time or effort in the democratic enterprise. In fact, Russia's youth appear to be *less* engaged in the political process than any other age cohort in Russia. They vote with less frequency. They join groups less often. They are extremely inactive in social and political organizations... They have weak partisan affiliations. Even university students do not identify firmly with Russia's ideological parties."[842] Furthermore, other studies of the Russian youth have suggested that the 'post-Soviet' cohort has shared many of the traditional and conservative attitudes, especially regarding the country's past, with the older of cohorts of Russians.[843]

This data confirm once again that, though the liberalization policies launched by Gorbachev and his team in the mid-1980s facilitated the growth of democratic orientations, Russians failed to internalize and institutionalize the democratic system of values. The explanation can be found primarily in the unchanged socialization patterns that are basically in charge of transmission of values. To illustrate, there appeared a striking similarity in the ideological and political values that were represented in the schools textbooks and in the values and beliefs shared by the majority of the population. While, according to observers, the history textbooks in the 1990s represented, "a contradictory

[841] *McFaul, Michael.* Generational Change in Russia // Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 11, № 1, Winter 2003. pp. 64-78.

[842] Ibid.

[843] *Mendelson, Sarah E., Gerber, Theodore P.* Soviet Nostalgia: An Impediment to Russian Democratization // The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, № 1, Winter 2005 - 2006.

combination of the ideological symbols of nationalism, Westernization, and a reinterpretation of communism," the Russian political culture quite similarly resulted in "a contradictory bundle of values and beliefs" in which "a sturdy core of commitment to democratic values" was "accompanied by pronounced disillusionment with the way democratization and market reforms have worked out in Russia."[844] High levels of nationalistic attitudes in the public opinion also coincided with the ideas that permeated school textbooks.

As this dissertation has shown, the systematic rationalization and institutionalization of the new meanings of social and cultural changes in post-Soviet Russia has not taken place. Instead, mass cynicism and cultural amnesia manifested in the absence of common memories, values and norms have formed a hard core of mass orientations. It is this hard core that is transmitted to and inculcated in the young persons as they socialize under institutions of contemporary Russia.[845]

Patriotic official rhetoric and heroic myth-making hinders the creation of alternative political language and collective memory versions as well as formation of independent elites and institutions that could form a basis for new social solidarity. Nevertheless, until such solidarity emerges, the political culture change in Russia will arguably remain a delusion.

5.4 Concluding Remarks

The conclusions drawn from the comparative historical analysis of cultural transformations in post-World War II West Germany and post-Soviet Russia seem to emphasize differences of the two cases more than similarities. At the same time, without comparison, as Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin observed, it would have been "impossible to evaluate the extent of difference."[846] Based on Kershaw and Lewin's argument that "comparative analysis welcomes both sameness and difference," this study was actually aimed at drawing lesions from

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[844] *Lisovskaya, Elena; Karpov, Vyacheslav*. New Ideologies in Postcommunist Russian Textbooks // Comparative Education Review, Vol. 43, № 4, November, 1999. p. 523. *Remington*, *Thomas F*. Politics in Russia. In: *Almond, Gabriel A*. et al. (eds.) Comparative Politics Today. A World View, 8th edition. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006. p. 381.

[845] See *Dubin, Boris.* Pokolenie: sociologicheskie granitsy ponjatija (Generation: Sociological Borders of the Concept) // Monitoring obshestvennogo mnenija: ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny, № 2 (58), 2002.

[846] *Kershaw, Ian; Lewin, Moshe* (eds.) Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p. 4.

post-totalitarian democratizations in the two cases rather than searching for sameness or similarities in them.[847]

Most important, the comparative research of different aspects of transformations in the two national contexts has shown that democratization is a complicated process that cannot be reduced to the task of addressing political institutions and evaluating their performance. The analysis of post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian democratization should enhance transformations on the cultural level, as well, including explorations of both individual and symbolic dimensions. The congruence between culture and structure that has often perceived as an important prerequisite of successful democratization presupposes not only emergence of civic culture and citizens' participation but also the transformation of the whole "program of culture" (using Yuri Levada's formulation). Differently, it requires no less a national identity that is congruent with democratic principles and institutions and that is likely to transmit values and norms conducive to consolidating and sustaining the political system of democracy. As both experiences of West Germany and Russia have revealed, collective memory transformations are crucial to democratic consolidation and relevant identity formation. For, as the Russian case has vividly revealed, post-totalitarian societies that deny, repress, or narrowly define pasts that include state-organized terrorism are likely to continue to bear signs of the regimes from which they emerge.[848] The German experience, in turn, has provided us with invaluable conclusion that democratization is a matter of choice rather than path dependency.

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[847] Ibid.

[848] *Dubiel, Helmut.* Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte: Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in den Debatten des Deuttschen Bundestages. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1999. pp. 200-201. Quoted in *Moeller, Robert G.* What Has "Coming to Terms with the Past" Meant in Post-World War II Germany? From History to Memory to the "History of Memory" // Central European History, Vol. 35, № 2, 2002. pp. 223-56.

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