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The Role of Italy in the development of a European Security and Defence Policy

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XX Cycle

By

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To Belfort and Susanna
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VITA AND PUBLICATIONS

VITA

October 1, 1975  Born in Rome, Italy

2000-2001 Fellowship
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2002-2003 Master Degree in European Political and Administrative studies
College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium

2002-2005 Journalism traineeship, registered to the National roster since October 2005

2004-2005 Visiting Fellow, EU-ISS, Paris

2006-now Senior Analyst, Research Department, Finmeccanica SpA, Rome

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PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS


C. Catalano ‘La Corte Penale Internazionale e le immunità dei peacekeepers’ in Affari Esteri n 138, April 2003, pp.414-425

C. Catalano ‘Le missioni di polizia dell'Unione Europea nella gestione civile delle crisi’ in G. Picco (eds.) Terrorismo, pace e il ruolo dell’Europa nella soluzione dei conflitti in Futuribili, Primavera 2007


Various other articles and publications in non-academic journals
The thesis will define Italian contribution to European integration in the field of Security and Defence Policy. The first objective of this research is to describe how Italy placed itself in the debate on the development of ESDP if compared to the Franco-German couple and the British approach: two opposing views dominated this debate: Atlanticism and the “autonomous” approach to European Defence. The former has been supported by the UK and other countries; The latter has been supported by the Franco-German couple and other countries. Italy has often placed in between, by assuring conformity of the European initiatives with NATO, while promoting a stronger cooperation in a European framework. The thesis analyses in depth the Italian defence policy, the contribution to the European military and civilian capabilities and operations, the participation of Italian high brass in ESDP and NATO structures, the industrial interests in European defence industry and in the intergovernmental cooperation in armaments. The research utilise the Foreign Policy Analysis method, by means of a three level: transatlantic level (relations between US and European allies through NATO); European (relation between Anglo-Italians and Franco-German approaches) internal (the interests of main Italian stakeholders: Politicians, Military, Diplomats and Industry). The main findings are that Italy had given to the ESDP a more sound contribution than expected. This is mainly due to the cooperation with the UK and the bureaucratic interests of the internal administrative actors. Italy is together with France is the first troops contributor for the EU military capabilities. The British-Italian cooperation has led to new concepts for the ESDP, such as the headline goal and has boosted the military operation in the bilateral, NATO, and ESDP framework. Italy has been leading in the civilian capabilities and operations, in particular in Police Missions and Civil Protection. The Italian defence industry is emerging as a key actor in the European and US markets. The lack of a consistent national security and defence policy, because the ruling class is not interested, boosts the bureaucratic interests of the administrative élites that are shaping the role of Italy in the development of ESDP.
The issue of Italy’s role in developing a European convergence in Defence and Security policy is not well covered in the International Relations or European studies literature. There is a quite wide literature on the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) in academic and Think Tank’s publications. However, these usually cover specific subjects, such as the ESDP operations or the NATO-EU relations. Few studies deal with the national approach in defence, but these usually regard France and the UK, and sometimes Germany. Italy is rarely mentioned in these studies, unless it is treated as part of Southern Europe, together with Spain, thus downsizing its ambitions as are of ‘big four’ in the Atlantic and European communities. Italy’s role in the European integrations is usually treated from an historical or economic point of view. There are interesting works on European History by Antonio Varsori, Giuseppe Mammarella, Paolo Cacace or Sergio Romano but they focus mainly on the timeline from the 1950s to the 1980s. The Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome publishes researches on Italian foreign and security policy, but usually these papers are related to very specific issues. A good attempt to fill this gap was the book on European Defence authored in 2007 by Antonio Missiroli and Alessandra Pansa, but it was an ‘Italian book on ESDP’, not a ‘book about Italy in ESDP’. Even the post-1945 studies on Italian defence are quite rare, and usually funded by the MoD, while only Leopoldo Nuti has written academic research on the Italian security policy in the 1960s and 1980s, and on the Iraqi crisis in 2003. Therefore this subject had the advantage to cover a gap in the literature.

In the opinion of the author, a study on the national contribution of a major European Member State in a relevant policy area could be more interesting than a more theoretical subject, and suitable to the empiricist approach and education background of the author himself. This subject was a natural choice due to the author’s origin, family, and educational and working background. Moreover, in the early twenty-first century there has been a growing interest in
security and defence policies at the national or European level. Furthermore, due to recent events, Atlanticism and Europeanism have become two sensitive subjects.

The scope of this doctoral dissertation is to define the Italian contribution to the ESDP. In particular, The thesis tries to answer to the questions raised by the role of Italy as an actor in ESDP, if compared to the Franco-German couple and to the British contribution, and the bureaucratic interests of the domestic administrative elites by the criteria set in the following chapters.

The scenario includes the need for Italy to balance between Atlanticism and European integration in defence matters and to maintain a position in the Mediterranean area.

The first objective of the research project is to define whether Italian policy-makers had a clear plan, set objectives, and promoted ideas for the integration in European foreign policy, or whether they simply followed the common trends of European federalism. Italy has been sometimes regarded as a “follower” rather than a “leader” in European integration. Italy is a founding member of the European Communities (EC) and one of the bigger Member States of the European Union (EU), but its role in European integration is sometimes considered not to be very influential. In fact, being a fierce supporter of Europeanism, Italy is often willing to uncritically accept every measure that could promote European integration regardless of Italian interests and its foreign policy aims.

The second objective of this research project is to define how Italy placed itself in the debate on the development of an European security policy. Two opposing views have dominated this debate: Atlanticism, and the project of an autonomous defence policy not relying on NATO assets. The former has been supported by the UK and other countries, while the latter has been supported by the Franco-German couple. Italy has often placed itself in between, by assuring conformity of the European initiatives with NATO and promoting a stronger co-operation in the European cadre.
Since the Second World War, Italian foreign policy has always followed two key points of reference: the loyalty to the US through the active participation in NATO, and the support of European integration. Hence, it is important to assess how Italy succeeded in reconciling the Atlanticists with the supporters of a European autonomous policy, whether this approach has been successful, and whether it could have influenced other countries.

The final scope of the research is to analyse the Italian policy-makers objectives for European integration in this field. Special attention would be paid to the internal debate, that may have influenced international choices.

The purpose of the dissertation is to analyse the issue at stake by means of Foreign Policy Analysis tools, by taking into account that foreign policy decision-making is first and foremost a domestic debate influenced by external events.

The thesis has been carried out mainly through the secondary literature, an extensive review of newspaper related to the events, parliamentary hearings, interviews with practitioners, official documents, and when applicable internal documents.

The analytical framework includes three levels-of-analysis: at the international, national and domestic bureaucratic agencies level:

Firstly, the international and supranational level dealing with the transatlantic link by means of NATO and the convergence of national policies in European security and defence matters in the EU. The main actors are the US, France, Germany and the UK. This scenario implies the struggle between the Franco-German couple to support the development of an autonomous European defence and the British and Atlanticist countries approach that fiercely defends the role of the Atlantic Alliance in the European common defence.

Secondly, the Italian foreign and security choices is compared to the European Allies, and its position towards the US and the other EU Member States, as a staunch supporter of European integration. The Italian government is the main actor and its interaction and
intergovernmental relations with the other Member States is the object of the analysis.

Thirdly, the domestic bureaucratic agencies level, in order to assess the role of the administrative élites in shaping foreign policy choices. The main actors are the administrative elites and stakeholders, such as the ruling class, diplomats, military including the Carabinieri, and the national defence industry.

In particular, it is vital to understand if Italy pursued national interest objectives in its choices, or if other assumptions shaped its decision-making, for instance the administrative interests of bureaucratic elites. It is also to ascertain the Italian position in comparison with the Franco-German couple and the Atlanticist countries as the UK. In that sense a special focus shall be turned on British-Italian relations in defence matters.

The conclusions, based on the empirical analysis developed in the paper, will assess whether these assumptions are true or not.

The key research questions

The dissertation will try to answer these research questions:
What is the position of Italy in comparison with the Franco-German couple and the UK in the convergence of national policies in the area of European Defence?
Did Italy succeed in balancing its Atlanticism with both the ESDP development and a Mediterranean policy?
Did Italy pursue the particular bureaucratic interests of its administrative elites, in particular the diplomats, military, Carabinieri, defence industry, as opposed to genuinely national interest?
The structure

The first Chapter deals with why Italy adopted its distinctive approach to Atlanticism, Europeanism and Mediterranean policy, introducing the main principles and trends in the Italian foreign and security policy. By means of an analysis of the historical record in the Cold War period we would identify the key elements in Italy’s foreign policy useful to understand the subsequent events. The behaviour of the ruling class and of the diplomats will be specifically covered in the chapter.

The second Chapter deals with when and why the ESDP was developed. By taking a descriptive approach on the historical record, we will analyse the reaction of the Europeans, and in particular the Italians, to the emerging international crises. Indeed, the recent international crises since the Gulf War are said to have boosted the need for a common European response by means of CFSP and ESDP. The national governments initiative will be described in detail to assess their influence on the events.

The third Chapter considers what are the main issues for Italy’s security and defence. The role of the military and their bureaucratic interests are analysed in detail, and there is a survey on the military peacekeeping operations. Contemporary issues such as the professionalization of the armed forces are also covered by the Chapter.

The rest of the doctoral thesis is mainly devoted to how the concepts of ESDP are implemented through the analysis of the three main ESDP fields: the military capabilities, the civilian capabilities, and the (transnational and institutional) European defence industry cooperation.

The fourth Chapter deals with the development of military capabilities, including the support to the WEU and the cataloguing process. In this perspective the British-Italian cooperation in defence matters will be particularly analysed.
The fifth Chapter is focused on NATO-EU relations. A description of the dispute between Europeans on the issue is necessary to introduce the main conceptual developments of the military aspects of ESDP. We will assert that NATO-EU relations are pivotal in European Defence. The Chapter also analyses the bureaucratic interests of the military in senior positions in NATO and the ESDP bodies.

The sixth Chapter deals with the civilian capabilities. This mainly focused on police missions and on the Carabinieri influence in conceiving the European policing and peacekeeping, such as the MSU. We will cover the development of police concepts and structures, including the establishment of Eurogendarmerie. The relations between the European PFMS, and their cooperation in the FIEP framework will be particularly dealt with. The competition and cooperation between the Gendarmerie and Carabinieri receive special attention.

The seventh Chapter deals with the European transnational defence industry cooperation. The European consolidation scenario will be described together with the creation of national champions like BAE Systems and EADS. The issue of European collaborative programmes will be raised by analysing the A400M case-study and the reasons for Italy abandoning the programme. The leading Italian defence industry Finmeccanica would receive a special attention in the consolidation scenario and in its “multi-domestic market” strategy towards the UK and the US.

The eighth Chapter is focused on the European institutional cooperation in defence industry. We will describe the groupings to which Italy takes part, and the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The bureaucratic interests of the military and the defence industry on the matter will be assessed.

Finally we will draw up the conclusions, in order to assess the effective role of Italy in ESDP.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND TRENDS IN ITALIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

In this introductory Chapter we will draw up the main principles of the traditional Italian foreign and security policy, thus identifying its main trends.

First, pre-war Italy has been often labelled as an undependable ally due to its switching sides during the two world wars. The Chapter will analyse this assumption and it will then turn to post-war Italian foreign policy.

Secondly, the post-war policy was indeed based on continuity by establishing a ‘three pillars’ foreign policy composed of European, Atlantic, and Mediterranean Pillars. The changes in traditional principles of foreign policy determined by these choices will be assessed. In particular, the influence on the definition of national interest, before and after the Euro-Atlantic choice will be discussed.

Thirdly, the ‘Chair Policy’ will be defined as a key factor in determining national policy-making and its participation to the international community.

In conclusion, the agents of continuity will be identified in terms of the domestic actors who shaped foreign policy-making. In particular, the diplomatic corps is an actor with strong bureaucratic interests and its role as an agent of continuity in foreign policy making will be deeply analysed.
1.1 The traditional trends and principles

1.1.1 Bandwagoning: an undependable ally

“In two world wars Italy has showed herself to be an ineffectual and undependable ally, having switched side in both wars (...) in 1940 Italy stabbed France and UK in the back”

Bandwagoning - by switching sides to join the winner - is regarded as a traditional trend in Italian foreign policy, in particular during the First and Second World War. This attitude cost Italy the bad reputation of an undependable ally. The post-war politicians tried to live down this reputation.

According to Waltz’s neo-realism, states tend to balance the power of the most powerful coalition by allying with the weaker, because the first concern of states is not to maximize power but keep their position. By contrast if states want to maximize their power they would join the stronger side and not form balances but a forge a world hegemony. However Waltz recognises that careful judgement is needed; balancing is not a universal pattern of political behaviour:

“Whether political actors balance each other or climb on the bandwagon depends on the system structure”.

The anarchic world he describes is similar to the Eighteenth century European scenario, where power was a privilege for the big players such as the Hapsburg Empire, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Russia, while the small principalities struggled to survive by building alliances and looking for protection from the biggest powers. For the smallest and weakest states point of view, bandwagoning rather than balancing was a way to survive. In that realpolitik world, the small Italian states

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3 Waltz, op. cit. p.125
provided picturesque battlefields for big countries’ power struggles, and they were often invaded or destroyed during European wars of succession. The strategically positioned Alpine Dukedom of Savoy struggled to survive, by switching sides and bandwagoning, by joining the conquerors when it was going to be defeated in a world of state of nature where only the strongest could survive: “Casa Savoia (...) passerà da uno schieramento all’altro ma ci guadagnerà.” For this small country bandwagoning was a sensible behaviour where gains were possible even for the losers and where losing did not jeopardised security. The smallest states were not would-be leaders. They were too small to compete, and thus they behaved just as the members of political parties in the presidential elections:

“soon as someone looks like the winner, nearly all jump on the bandwagon rather than continuing to build coalitions intended to prevent anyone from winning the prize of power. Bandwagoning, not balancing, becomes the characteristic behaviour”. The Kingdom of Italy unified by the Savoy inherited this strategy. Looking for a security provider, it allied with Napoleon III’s France in the late 1850s, to re-ally in 1869 with Bismarck’s Prussia against France and the Hapsburg Empire, and eventually building a Triple Alliance in 1882, with Prussia and the Hapsburg Empire against France. All these shifting alliances were typical of Bismarck’s realpolitik era. Until the First World War, Italy made secret deals of non-belligerence with France, while renewing the Triple Alliance. In a speech to the Reichstag on 8 January 1902, the Chancellor, Bernhard H. K. von Bülow, dismissed these initiatives by comparing Italy to a faithful spouse who just shifts partners during a Walz. When the First World War burst out in 1914, Italy waited one year, asking the Hapsburgs for territorial compensations. Not having been satisfied, it turned to the Anglo-French alliance making a secret deal on

4 Ludovico Incisa di Camerana La vittoria dell’Italia nella terza guerra mondiale (Bari : Laterza, 1996), p. 62
5 Waltz, op.cit., p. 125-126
territorial acquisitions. This policy did not pay off, as Italy did not obtain everything it asked for at the Versailles peace talks. Fascism tried to differentiate itself by maintaining continuity in alliances. By striking the ‘Pact of Steel’ with Hitler, Mussolini decided to follow his ally to the end. On the other hand, recent studies discovered that Mussolini was not very keen on starting a war with the British, and would eventually try to negotiate with Hitler an Italian withdrawal and neutrality, but the Pact and Hitler’s personal ascendance prevented him from doing so.7

A negative interpretation of pre-war Italian foreign policy choices is that they were not based like the British imperial tradition on trade, nor on military power like Prussia, nor on clear objectives like France. Italy aimed at immediate gains and perpetual manoeuvring, thus producing a purely transitional foreign policy.8 The Italian strategic concept was totally opposed to that of the British Empire, which had an anti-hegemonic role in the European balance of power, while Italy tried to hold the balance of power in any situation, according to the ‘peso determinante’ (decisive weight). The balance of power principle was created during the Renaissance by Italian states to avoid the hegemony of the Republic of Venice over the Peninsula. However, the ‘peso determinante’ is more significant in crisis rather than in stabilised scenarios. It made Italy a destabilizing element in the first half of twentieth century.

1.1.2 The Chair policy

The politica della sedia (Chair Policy), according to Ambassador Pietro Quaroni’s definition, explains the need of Italy to take part in any international fora, even if no particular interest is at stake. It is just the opposite of De Gaulle’s “empty chair policy”. This is a consequence of the fear of being marginalised, and it has its roots in the diplomacy of Camillo Benso Earl of Cavour.

The unified Kingdom of Italy was admitted only after 1870 into the big powers’ “Concert of Europe”. Already in 1853, the Piedmont’s prime minister had earned international status by sending a small troop contingent to take part in the Sebastopol siege. Cavour understood that to raise the “Italian issue” he should prevent the Big Powers from accepting a settled map of Europe. The Crimean war allowed the small Savoy state to ally with the Anglo-French against hegemonic Russia, by following an Italian-wide national interest even against the Savoy’s specific economic interests, since they used to have strong maritime commercial ties with Southern Russia. This allowed Cavour to be invited to the Paris peace conference and to endear the Big powers to the cause of national independence, in particular France and the UK, against the Hapsburg Empire. According to Cavour’s realism, the national intervention should be based on sound national interest and clear objectives, make use of available capabilities, and not become an end to itself.9

The Chair policy was typical of the mid-nineteenth century. For example Napoleon III’s strategy was to break European equilibrium, and convene an international conference where he, as a chairman, would be able to shape European balance of power according to his will yet this was a strategy that only Bismarck was able to perform.

Mussolini himself was a frequent attendee of European conferences, and an occasional chairman, such as the Munich conference in 1938, and he even justified entering into war with France in May 1940, with the need “to sit at the table of the Peace conference”, although he over-estimated his military capabilities and under-estimated the long-term consequences of the Nazi conquest of Europe. After the Second World War Italy could not sit on the winners’ side of the Peace Table. It, therefore, had to conceive a new strategy to avoid marginalisation and find its place in the Cold War scenario.

9 Incisa, op.cit., pp. 62-63
1.2 The three Pillars

1.2.1 De Gasperi’s Atlantic choice and Europeanism

In the post-1945 period, Italy set two foreign policy priorities: Atlanticism and Europeanism, as key principles or ‘Pillars’. These formed an indissoluble Euro-Atlantic concept of loyalty, and a reference for defining the country’s status in the Western block during the Cold War scenario. This shifting from ceaseless activity to a motionless foreign policy, made domestic and foreign observers wonder whether an Italian foreign policy still existed. However the Euro-Atlantic operation was necessary to redeem Italy from its reputation as an undependable ally and to replace fascist nationalism with a European post-nationalism.

“Inella attuale situazione internazionale, in presenza dei due blocchi, (...) l’unica politica nazionale dell’Italia è quella della solidarietà con i popoli liberi, ossia (...) la politica nazionale è la stessa politica internazionale e supranazionale(...) Su tali premesse la nostra decisione di aderire all’alleanza atlantica è stata dettata da una chiara visione della realtà prima ancora che dalla affinità di sentimenti o dalla identità delle preoccupazioni (...) Ma è soprattutto l’unione europea che sta in cima ai nostri pensieri e in testa ai nostri interessi. La comunità europea vuol dire la pace assicurata tra la Francia e la Germania, vuol dire una modesta ma permanente funzione dell’Italia nel concerto europeo, vuol dire l’apertura al mercato comune di lavoro e il graduale accesso alle comuni risorse, vuol dire se non la fine certo la compressione degli egoismi nazionali e la liberazione delle energie popolari”

In his last speech, Alcide De Gasperi, the first post-war Prime Minister of the Christian Democrats (DC), made his political testament, thus

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11 Incisa, op.cit. p. 48-49
justifying his Atlantic choice and Europeanism in the Cold War scenario, and thus stating four principles:

1) foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy;
2) pacifism and international stability including economic wealth and full employment
3) an international standing for Italy
4) abandoning a nationalistic foreign policy, that had caused the world war, and replacing national interest with European ideals

First, the nexus between the domestic and international policy works in two-ways: the Italian foreign policy objectives are defined by domestic policy interests, originating in electoral reasons or local interests, such as for instance the De Gasperi-Gruber agreements on South Tirol; on the other hand, because of his experience in the Hapsburg empire, De Gasperi was less prone to local interests and he favoured international or supranational solutions. As we will discuss later, the supranational idea was a driving force for imposing discipline on domestic policy by means of an ‘external tie’. Second, pacifism stemmed from his Roman Catholicism, but his position evolved according to a ‘realistic approach’ to promote economic development, thus eliminating class struggle rhetoric, and he developed a ‘federal’ approach to help Italy out of its irrelevance and acquire an middle power standing. In his options, the Atlantic choice assured comparative advantages such as political stability and a security umbrella, while economic progress was assured by the Europe. The realism won over his personal belief: De Gasperi joined the Atlantic Alliance, notwithstanding the strong Vatican opposition. Third, by mentioning the need for an international standing, De Gasperi paid a tribute to the ideals of the ‘Risorgimento’, which were deeply rooted in the cultural and economic élites. Fifth, in relation with the ideals of the élites, the last theme is crucial: the need to eradicate the fascist regime and its nationalistic roots, coincides with the reinterpretation of national interest, replaced by Europeanism and

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Atlantic loyalty. Therefore, the aim was to convince the Italian élites to adopt European idealism, on the grounds of an increased international status: Italy would obtain a supremacy of ideals by becoming the herald of a united Europe, and by accepting any limitation to sovereignty on the condition that it led to a federation of European states based on the US or Swiss models.\textsuperscript{14} De Gasperi’s position was by no means close to Altiero Spinelli’s Federalist Movement, because he was aware that European states had been based for too long on the Nation State principle to abandon it. De Gasperi’s position evolved from a neutral and nationalistic approach (from his appointment in 1946 to the rejection of the Brussels treaty of March 1948) when he was absorbed by domestic politics and post-war reconstruction and he rejected the Brussels Treaty because of his pacifism and distrust for military alliances, thus straining US-Italian relations.\textsuperscript{15} He converted to an opportunist pro-European position (from the DC victory in general elections of April 1948 to the Schuman plan), to avert marginalisation, and to define an international status by joining the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{16} Eventually his position evolved to European idealism, and the struggle for the European Defence Community (EDC) (from February 1951 to his death).\textsuperscript{17} De Gasperi’s conversion to Europeanism occurred at the Franco-Italian meeting at Santa Margherita Ligure in February 1951, when he agreed

\textsuperscript{17} Luigi Ballini e Antonio Varsori (ed.) L’Italia e L’Europa (1947-1979) Vol.I (Soveria Mannelli; Rubbettino, 2004) p.79
to support the Pleven Plan, which allowed the rearming of Germany in a European army framework. The Italian military opposed the EDC, but idealism won over pragmatic realism, when he realised that the plan could provide the backbone for establishing the US of Europe. During the EDC negotiation, he insisted that “nostra Patria Europa” was required to replace the Nation State’s ‘homeland’. Moreover, European security should be based on an institutional framework: a Parliamentary Assembly should be established for the democratic control of the army and to set guidelines for further integration.

Therefore, De Gasperi gave a federal blueprint in art.38 of EDC Treaty, providing for the EDC Assembly to draft the project of a European Federal Constitution for the establishment of a European Political Community (EPC). De Gasperi modelled the EDC Assembly on his experience as an MP of the Italian minority in the Austro-Hungarian Parliament: in a multiethnic Parliament, the minorities could consult, negotiate and take common positions. The EDC Assembly should be based on the same principles. The Hapsburg emperor acted as a guarantor of stability, and this role should be replaced by the US which granted security, by means of NATO and OECD. Public opinion considered the Marshall plan and the OECD as means to impose the ‘American way of life’, while the ruling class saw it as a way to strengthen transatlantic relations, hoping that Washington could help in maintaining domestic stability. However, De Gasperi eventually

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18 Pastorelli, *op. cit.*, p. 187, and 204
20 Pastorelli, *op.cit.* p.192
proposed that the commitments of European states to NATO should be transferred to the EDC.  

The EDC Treaty was signed on 27 May 1952 and the draft treaty on a European constitution was ready on 10 March 1953. It assumed an EPC superstructure that should in the long-term absorb both ECSC and EDC. The EDC Treaty and the Constitution were presented to states for ratification. However France and Italy postponed the parliamentary debate. De Gasperi resigned in Summer 1953 because of illness, but he kept on lobbying for EDC and EPC. He died on 19 August 1954, and on 30 August 1954, the French national assembly rejected the EDC treaty and EPC for good. The EDC was De Gasperi’s major contribution to European construction. For it, he lavished innovative ideas and active lobbying efforts. However, actual results were limited because the EDC and the EPC were rejected. Maybe they were ahead of his time, but the transfer of sovereignty in defence matters is even today a too sensitive subject in state sovereignty.

**Martino the sign of continuity:** If De Gasperi set the key choices, Gaetano Martino implemented his decisions establishing the Euro-Atlantic pillar. A Centre-Right Liberal, he served as a Foreign Minister (1954-1957), and as European Parliament president (1962-1964). Martino supported the British proposal to establish the Western European Union (WEU) to overcome the EDC deadlock, and the WEU commitments improved the British-Italian relations. In Martino’s view the WEU was not only a security agreement, but a tool to promote political integration: the NATO and WEU should be interlinking and

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24 Pastorelli, *op.cit.*, p.199
mutually reinforcing organisation. Martino’s main contribution rests with the promotion of the Messina Conference in June 1955 that led to the signature of the Rome Treaties in March 1957. According to a realist view, the federalism should save Europe from the Cold War marginalisation, and so he favoured the British approach supporting closer integration with the US in an ‘Atlantic Community’. In Martino’s view, the end state of the Rome Treaties was to lead to a European federation inspired by American federalism, not influenced by nationalism. Then the integration of the transatlantic market should create a Euro-Atlantic community stemming from NATO security regime. Therefore, European unification and NATO were part of a ‘complementary’ process they are not ‘alternative’ to each other, but should merge in a single process:

“L’Alleanza Atlantica e l’unità europea non sono né in vicendevole contrasto né in posizione alternativa o concorrenziale ma costituiscono i due diversi aspetti e momenti di una stessa operazione politico-economica (...)L’integrazione europea è parte essenziale dell’integrazione atlantica ed è in questa compresa come il meno è compreso nel più.”

Martino was a federalist and a fierce Atlanticist, his aims were political rather than security oriented, and he could envisage a revision of NATO balances, but not autonomous policies. His successors would be bolder in reasserting the need to rebalance the Alliance looking for regional autonomous role.

26 Gaetano Martino “Unione europea Occidentale” speech at the WEU, Paris, December 1956, in ‘Fondo Martino’ of the Senate Archives, Rome
1.2.2 “Neo-Atlanticism”: enter the Mediterranean Policy

“Neo-Atlanticism” is a foreign policy course that re-emerges from time to time during Centre-Left governments in Italy. If the Cold War forced conformity to the Euro-Atlantic commitment, the progressive DCs, by reasserting Atlantic loyalty, tried to compensate the frustrating second tier role in NATO with a Mediterranean hegemony. It started with President of the Republic, Giovanni Gronchi, (1955-1962). The President has an honorary role, but he started a national-pacifist “presidential foreign policy”. In 1956, a loosening of US-Soviet relations left Italy with a free hand to an increased role in the Mediterranean to fill the gap left by France and the UK after Suez or even as honest broker in direct negotiations with the Soviets. For this reason he often clashed with the government, including the Foreign Minister Martino, who represented the Euro-Atlantic orthodoxy. Therefore, the US saw Gronchi as an undependable ally, as opposed to De Gasperi and Martino’s loyalty. Gronchi’s national-pacifism was short-lived, and was implemented only when Amintore Fanfani was Prime Minister (1958-1959).30

The Mediterranean policy deserved the greatest autonomy. Fanfani, Foreign Minister since February 1966, supported pro-Arab positions on the ground that if the West took pro-Israeli positions the Arabs would lean to the Soviets. To tell the truth, he tried to reduce French Mediterranean influence, according to a nationalistic plan that replicated those of De Gaulle: he had to convince the Arabs that Italy was an anti-colonialist country. France took part in the Suez expedition and fought the Algerian war, Italy had no stains in his curriculum, but was more economically and socially frail than France. Fanfani’s efforts were limited by the moderation of the Italian government.

Moro: The 1970s were dominated by the oil crises, and the lack of natural resources forced Italy to adopt a pro-Arab policy, thus straining relations with the US. Moreover, the attitude of Aldo Moro (Foreign Minister 1969-1974, and Prime Minister, 1974-1976) towards the US

30 Romano, op. cit. pp. 100-105, 214
evolved negatively throughout his office. In 1971, the Ambassador in Washington Egidio Ortona noted that Moro’s increasing distrust towards the US was caused: first, by the fact that the US did not hold Italy in great esteem; second, because after the “Watergate” scandal, Moro considered the US as a decadent power; and third by diverging US-Italian views on international affairs. Therefore Moro began a strong Pro-Arab policy. However, Arab countries did not consider this stance as consistent, because Italy was too prone to US influence and it never took a clear position towards Arab-Israeli wars. Speaking at the UN General Assembly during the Six Days War, Moro took a formally non-partisan position, by demanding the Assembly to take a position for the resolution of the crisis. Considering that the majority of the Assembly was formed by third world countries, including many Arab States that considered Israel an occupying country, Moro’s proposal to entrust the Assembly to decide on the crisis could be regarded as being indirectly pro-Arab. It was in the wake of the Yom Kippur war and the first Oil crisis that Italy, looking desperately for energy, sided with the Arabs, thus alienating Israel. In the European framework, the French and Italians forced a recognition of Palestinian right to negotiate on Middle East crisis, while Dutch, Germans and Danes were more cautious. The pro-Arab choice was evident, when Moro reported to Senate:

“In sede multilaterale, poi, non abbiamo mancato di dare un leale contributo all’ONU che l’Italia considera la sede naturale per la risoluzione del conflitto. (..) desidero poi precisare che è del tutto infondata la presunta utilizzazione di basi NATO in Italia da parte degli Stati Uniti per l’assistenza militare ad Israele. A tale riguardo ricordo che l’uso delle basi NATO è disciplinato da precise regole dell’Alleanza, le quali vengono rigorosamente osservate. Da parte italiana ci si è sempre astenuti e ci si astiene da ogni intervento, in particolare da

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31 Varsori op. cit p.181
32 Romano, op.cit, p. 142-145
Moro denied the US access to airspace – together with France - and to NATO bases. Although, from a legal point of view, both positions respect of UN and NATO commitments are legitimate, their partisanship was clear. In fact, in the Washington Energy conference in February 1974, the Italian delegation had to conform to US and European positions, and only France backed the Arabs. At the end of the day, the pro-Arab choice only succeeded in alienating US sympathies. When in September 1974, President Giovanni Leone and Foreign Minister Moro visited Washington, they were shocked by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s definition of Italy as NATO’s weakest link, because it had a strong PCI and it was too close to Middle Eastern troubles. The domestic difficulties forced Italy to maintain Atlantic loyalty to prevent downgrading.\(^{34}\) The Italian role in NATO was fully restored only by the decisive decision to accept the “Euromissiles”.

### 1.2.3 The Atlanticist Socialists

Since the late 1950s, the progressive DCs had tried to enlarge electoral basis to maintain their ruling party status by including PSI, which, after the Soviet intervention in Budapest revolt in 1956, started to escape from PCI influence.\(^{35}\) This created an Atlanticist Socialist faction in the PSI that would emerge during the 1980s with the first PSI premiership of Bettino Craxi.

To create a Centre-Left government, Fanfani assured the Atlantic loyalty, by deciding in March 1959 to accept the deployment in Italy of Jupiter missiles launchers. However, the secret agreement

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\(^{34}\) See Romano, *op. cit*, p. 176, 186-187 and Varsori *op. cit*, p.183, 187, see also Incisa *op. cit.*, p. 51

\(^{35}\) See Ian Budge at alii *The politics of New Europe* (London : Longman, 1997) pp. 74-75
between Robert Kennedy and the Soviet Ambassador to Washington that resolved the Cuban missile crisis asked for a trade-off by removing the Jupiters from Italy. In December 1963, the first Centre-Left government with Socialist participation was formed after diplomatic consultation.  

The Euromissiles: The “Euromissiles” dispute on the deployment of nuclear medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) dominated Euro-Atlantic debate in the late 1970s. The Soviets had deployed SS 20 MRBM:s thus threatening to decouple European NATO countries from the US security. In 1977, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt asked the US to deploy MRBM:s in Europe, as a sign of good will that they would not dismantle European defence, but Germany was not willing to accept US missiles unless another European country would share the burden. Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga agreed to receive NATO missiles on national soil, helping Germany out of its predicament. The NAC decided to deploy MRBM:s in Italy and Germany on 12 December 1979.  

In the Euromissiles crisis, Italy proved to be a reliable and crucial ally, even more than Germany, although the decision was facilitated by the fact that public opinion was not very interested in the issue. Cossiga’s initiative contributed to improve Italian image as a loyal Atlanticist, and proved that Italian politicians could take controversial decisions provided that they were willing to accept their consequences.  

The new prime minister Giovanni Spadolini, leader of the Republican party and a fierce Atlanticist, supported Cossiga’s decision. According to Lelio Lagorio, a reformist Socialist, Cossiga started to negotiate with the US, and then proposed a deal to the PSI, whose new leader Bettino Craxi saw a great chance for PSI to acquire international standing. Lagorio was the first Socialist to be appointed Defence Minister with the secret task of concluding the US

36 Romano, op. cit. p. 123,126  
37 See Incisa, op.cit, p. 56  
38 Romano, op. cit. p.208-209, and Varsori, op.cit.p. 204  
39 Varsori, op.cit. p. 212
negotiations. On 7 August 1981, at a Cabinet meeting he could state that the deal was struck, to the great surprise even of Spadolini.\textsuperscript{40} In August 1983, Craxi became the first Socialist prime minister. He was assisted by Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti and Defence Minister Spadolini. While Andreotti shared most of Craxi’s positions on the Mediterranean, Spadolini stuck to Atlantic loyalty. Craxi’s government was fiercely Atlanticist, so the decision on US missiles was not challenged. In October 1983, president Reagan sent a letter to Craxi to underline the relevant decisions that would be taken by NATO nuclear planning group, and the need to convince national public opinion on the importance to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent by showing Atlantic solidarity.\textsuperscript{41} Notwithstanding the political demonstrations, on 16 November 1983 the Parliament approved the government motion on US missiles deployment in Comiso, in Sicily.\textsuperscript{42} Craxi’s strong position, as compared to other countries’ positions on Euromissiles, was positively appreciated by the US. Craxi and Andreotti were pragmatic Atlanticists and suggested that the US speed up the negotiations with the Soviets.\textsuperscript{43} The Italians were lucky enough, because the deployment of missiles in Comiso was never completed. In Washington in December 1987, US and Soviets signed an Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty to remove all MRBM’s from Europe.\textsuperscript{44} On the other hand, the removal of missiles from Comiso was not positive for the Italians, as it underlined an increasing irrelevance of NATO’s Southern flank.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Sigonella:} Craxi’s attitude towards Middle East was totally different from Reagan’s: In a letter sent in 1983 to Craxi, Reagan expressed indignation over the Lebanon bombings, which had killed US and French troops, and announced new anti-terrorism measures, asking for

\textsuperscript{40} Marco Nese ‘Quando la crisi dei missili coinvolse l’Italia «Così il Pci decise di non creare problemi»’ in: \textit{Corriere della Sera}, 18 August 2008
\textsuperscript{41} Letter from US president Reagan to Italian Prime Minister Craxi, 25 October 1983, unofficial translation into Italian by \textit{Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministeri, Ufficio del consigliere diplomatico} in Archivio Craxi, Rome.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Quando la crisi dei missili coinvolse l’Italia} cit.
\textsuperscript{43} See Varsori, \textit{op.cit.} p. 219
\textsuperscript{44} For INF See Budge \textit{op.cit.} p. 27
\textsuperscript{45} Varsori, \textit{op.cit.} p. 235
Craxi’s opinion. A worried Craxi noted on the letter “Badini, che facciamo?” asking his diplomatic advisor ambassador Antonio Badini for advice. This difference of attitudes was illustrated by the Sigonella affair. On the morning of 7 October 1985, the Lauro flagship ‘Achille Lauro’ cruiser was hijacked by four men of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), off the Egyptian shore. The hijackers seized as hostages the 70 passengers aboard and directed the ship to Tartus, in Syria, but when the Syrians refused permission to enter the harbour the hijackers became desperate, and declared that they would start killing hostages.

According to recent accounts, the hijacking was unintentional and occurred only after the crew discovered the Palestinians were carrying explosives in their luggage. As they were not prepared to hijack the ship and manage the hostage situation, their leader Abu Abbas told them to surrender and the hijackers gave themselves up to Egyptian authorities at Port Said on 9 October, by releasing the hostages, in exchange for a promise of safe-conduct and a plane to take them to Tunisia. The US authorities had no account of killings, but it was discovered that a wheelchair-bound US national, Leon Klinghoffer had been killed and his body thrown into the sea. Reagan vowed to bring the perpetrators to justice, being very sensitive to terrorism matters. The US had sharp memories of the Iranian hostage crisis since 1980, and the hijacking to Beirut of a TWA flight in June 1985. Reagan did not want the US to be passive in the face of terrorism. Therefore the National Security Council (NSC) sent the Navy SEAL counterterrorist unit to arrest the hijackers, and on 10 October, the Egyptian airliner transporting the hijackers and Egyptian officials was forced to land by US Navy aircraft at Sigonella military airport, Sicily, which was under Italian sovereignty. On the ground things got into trouble, the Carabinieri encircled the SEALs, who had encircled the Italian Air Force security guards, who provided for a security cordon to the Egyptian airliner. Italian forces would not take any initiative without the Prime Minister’s direct order, while the US administration asked for the

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46 unofficial translation of letter of US president Reagan to Italian prime Minister Craxi, 19 September 1983 (2 November 1983), Archivio Craxi, Rome
immediate delivery of Palestinians informing Italy, that they intended to file papers for the extradition of perpetrators to be trialled in a US court for murdering a US citizen. Italy took a dim view of the US extralegal action against the airliner. Craxi challenged US request, claiming Italian jurisdiction and at the end Reagan had no choice except to acquiesce in the Italian handling of the hijackers. Following a strong US note of protest, the Italians went on to arrest the perpetrators, prosecuting them since the incident had occurred on an Italian vessel, and leading to 25-year prison sentences. Craxi had faced his most momentous decision, and shown his independence of the US. He thus received an internal counterattack from pro-American government members who forced him to resign on 16 October, he then debated with Reagan at the New York G7 summit, and on his return, Craxi obtained the required majority in the vote of confidence.

The Sigonella affair was very controversial and still stimulates debate. Craxi stressed his strong-willed image to public opinion, claiming to be able to defend both Atlantic loyalty, as in the Euromissiles affair, and his autonomous Mediterranean policy. The public’s ostensible support for Craxi and Andreotti in the Sigonella affair seems to confirm an increasingly national pride to resist pressures from the traditional ally. Craxi did not take an anti-American stance, but just defended national sovereignty, he succeeded in pursuing the national interest, but his action strained relations with the US. He kept his promises to Egyptian president Mubarak on the safe-conduct of the hijackers. Moreover if the US had used force, this would have resulted into an armed conflict between SEALs and Egyptian security on the airplane, thus causing a serious diplomatic

48 Martini op. cit. 126-129 and Prados, , op.cit. p. 26
50 Varsori, *op.cit.* p. 222-223
incident with Egypt - a major Arab moderate country and party to Camp David agreement - that had spent its reputation on the mediation, would not accept a safe-conduct violation, and would react, with the support of other Arab moderate countries, jeopardising all Western policies towards Middle East. Craxi’s Atlantic loyalty was not questioned and his main foreign policy choice was “Comiso” not “Signonella”, the former was a deliberate choice, and a watershed in the Cold War, the latter just an episode in bilateral relations, with more emotional emphasis. 

1.2.4 The Post-Cold War: Changing Paradigms?

The end of the Cold War might have given an opportunity to revise the three pillars. In 1989, thanks to its geopolitical position and Atlantic loyalty, Italy found itself on the winner’s side without having fired a single shot; while the Europeans had ‘free hands’ in pursuing their national interests, Rome had rather to have ‘clean hands’ (mani nette). As Hill and Andreatta argued Italy has not taken the opportunity to rethink its foreign policy. This could have implied pursuing an autonomous middle power policy, giving up the Euro-Atlantic loyalty, or starting a multilateral strategy. However the agents of tradition (diplomats, military Atlanticist lobbies, and public opinion’s Europeanism) but also a ruling class too old, both physically and psychologically, to deviate from the Cold War paradigm, contributed to the sclerosis of strategic thinking. Eventually, the political system collapsed under the bribery scandals (mani pulite) and the majority system law elections in 1992 and 1994 wiped out the existing ruling

52 Incisa op.cit, p.20
class creating a bipolar party system, usually labelled the Second Republic. This interrupted the emerging central-eastern European initiatives and favoured Germany.\textsuperscript{54} Because in the 1990s, instead of joining the resurgent internationally proactive Germany, Italy clashed with it in the Central-Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and the UN reform. Germany allied with France and even Spain joined the group to reduce Italian influence.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{ICE:} Foreign Minister, Gianni de Michelis, promoted the “\textit{Pentagonale}” agreement (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia) signed during the Italian Presidency in Venice in August 1990. This turned into “\textit{Iniziativa Centro-Europea}” (ICE) with the accession of other Central-Eastern European states. The ICE’s official scope was to facilitate these states’s EU accession; the secret Italian objective was to prevent these states from falling under German economic influence. The initiative also involved Yugoslavia and if successful could have saved the federation from its dissolution.\textsuperscript{56} The main problem was that the ICE was not sustained by investments, while the Germans were injecting direct investments into the area. Eventually, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland decided to establish a “Visegrad group” to better coordinate the receipt of German and US direct investments and to prepare for European accession. The ICE was the first episode of a little war with Germany. The Germans won over Italy partly because they had more resources and allies, but also because they were keen on diverting Italian interests from Central-Eastern Europe to the Mediterranean area, though this often had a negative effect for Italy.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{54} Stephen C. Calleja ‘The South’ in Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel \textit{The geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic integration} (London, New York: Routledge, 2005) p. 113
\textsuperscript{55} See Incisa, \textit{op.cit}, p XI, p. 76
\textsuperscript{56} See also Grieco E. e Guazzzone L, ‘continuity and change in Italy’s security policy’ in Roberto Aliboni (ed.) \textit{Southern European security} (London: Pinter Publisher, 1992) p. 73
\textsuperscript{57} Incisa, \textit{op.cit}, p. X and 73-74
The UNSC Reform: Since the mid-1970s, the Member States started to coordinate their positions within the UN framework, and Italy and Germany were very keen on this issue. Recognition of European cooperation in the UN was underlined by the European council in a statement on 17 July 1975, endorsing at the highest level the ministers’ decisions. The EC had representations at the UN in Geneva and New York. As a final contribution to the exercise, during the Italian presidency, the Political Committee in September 1975 approved that Foreign Minister Rumor should speak at the UN General Assembly on behalf of both Member States on European Political Cooperation and Community matters.58

In the 1990s, Germany and Italy clashed on the UNSC reform. In 1992, India put forward a reform to enlarge the composition of UNSC, and a working group started in 1993 to study the reform.59 Germany abandoned the support to the EU seat, and together with Japan, it claimed a permanent seat at the UNSC. The US, France and the UK endorsed the German request. France and the UK did it to oppose the Italian request for a EU single permanent seat. Italy might have claimed a permanent seat, considering its UN contribution to budget and peacekeeping, but it decided to oppose new permanent seat, because it was not sure it could obtain one, and in order to promote a EU single voice in the UNSC.

Beniamino Andreatta had forecast a more pro-active role for Italy for instance in the UN and he conceived proposals for the UNSC reform.60 These were fought for by Ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci, and his successors, in New York. In 1988 UN General Assembly approved a resolution proposed by Ambassador Fulci, which ruled out the UN reform to be approved by a 2/3 majority of all UN countries, not of the voting countries alone. The proposal was to prevent the UN to approve a UN reform without a vast majority. Therefore Italy started a diplomatic initiatives to build a large coalition. In 1995 Italy allied

58 Nuttall op.cit. p. 138
59 UN General Assembly, Resolution on the Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council (A/RES/47/62), 11 December 1992
60 See Nino (Beniamino) Andreatta La riforma dell’Onu (Rome : Arel 2005)
with Egypt, Mexico and Pakistan, in the ‘Coffee Club’ which opposed any enlargement of permanent members. The group grew to 50 members. Italy put forward an innovative proposal to create a category of semi-permanent seats, which rotated more quickly: the countries would be selected on criteria based on troops and financial contribution to the UN. Eventually Italy succeeded in blocking German request, but it did not obtain an EU permanent seat, although it could be claimed that in this way it reached its main objective not to be marginalised by Germany.

1.3 The Constant Factors

1.3.1 Continuity and consistency

The three Pillars remained unquestioned and foreign policy continued to follow the same trends despite governments coming one after the other during the so-called first Republic, when the Prime Ministers served in office for no more than nine months on average. How was this possible? first of all, during the first Republic - or rather the first phase of the Italian Republic – the DC stayed loyal to the Euro-Atlantic pillar and it had always been the ruling party, that provided the coalition government with the key ministers, including the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. A certain continuity was assured by reconfirming the Foreign Minister of the outgoing government: Giulio Andreotti had served as Foreign Minister in succession in several governments. In the Second Republic, three Centre-Left governments followed each other from 1996 to 2001 but a certain consistency was provided by confirming Lamberto Dini as Foreign Minister.

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Second, ruling class selection was made by political parties on grounds of cooptation and loyalty to majority leaders, rather than a system of merit. Furthermore, especially during the First Republic, ‘gerontocracy’ was the main principle of the ruling class. Innovation is not frequent in policy-making, because politicians tried to support the same ideas throughout their career. So old men tended to support ideas which were innovative when they were young. The Second Republic’s ruling class created a new generation of politicians, whose political education had occurred during the First Republic, so they too remained tied to old ideologies and paradigms, and sometimes acted as agents of conservation.

Third, in order to pursue a consistent foreign policy, the policy tended to be delegated to the professional diplomatic corps, which often had no clear instruction from the government. It thus followed the traditional choices, and conducted an independent foreign policy staying loyal to the three-pillar principles.

The First Republic’s ruling class established the Atlantic and European choice as “non-statute internal principles”. Once the principle was included in the unwritten constitution of the Republic, the ruling class could be relieved from taking specific positions in foreign policy, thus allowing local politicians to manage their domestic problems and the need to be re-elected.62 The ruling class devolved the daily management of foreign policy to the diplomats and the strategic decision-making power to the US at the global level, and to Europe at the regional level. Just as some states devolve monetary policy by entering the US dollar zone, Italy devolved its foreign and security policy to the US. The major concern of the ruling class was to make their electoral base and opposition parties accept US decisions, that are not made to please Italian public opinion. Military and strategic devolution of power to the US worked well during the Cold War. On the other side, the devolution of foreign policy to Europe did not work so well, first because Europe is not a national state, second, because Europe does not have a coherent foreign policy, and third, because

Italy, as a major Member State should help to shape foreign policy convergence, not follow it.

After the end of the Cold War, however, this subsidiarity had to be revised. During the Cold War, US and Italian interests had collided in the Mediterranean and Middle East, but the Soviet threat had forced Italy – that just tried to reassert its key role as a US ally in the region - to subordinate its national interest to that of its security provider. The fall of the Berlin wall made the two allies’ differences surface, as exemplified by the US attitudes towards Libya and Iran cutting across Italy’s pro-Arab Mediterranean policy.63

In conclusion, the establishment of the Centre-Right and Centre-Left coalitions, personified respectively by Silvio Berlusconi and Romano Prodi, raised the external conflicts between parties to a level never experienced before. This meant that the common practice in Parliamentarian democracies of bipartisanism in foreign policy became an odd event in actual Italian politics.

1.3.2 National interest and external ties

The strength of élite particular interests and also the poor performance of political decision-making in foreign policy choices, raises the problem of national interest. Since the Second World War, the national interest has been closely connected with a fascist-nationalist approach to politics. For this reason the term was deleted from the political vocabulary for the period 1945-1994. European integration set the principle of an ‘external tie’ for economic policy that was developed by Italian politicians in order to discipline the scattered public finances. The scarcity of public finances has always been a problem for the Italy since its reunification. With the ‘external control’, Italian politicians succeeded in raising taxes, without paying negative electoral effects, as they could justify their action on the grounds that “Europe asked for it”. This was the case for the Amato government’s heavy financial law in 1992 that provided for Lira to re-enter the EMS, and for Prodi’s Euro-tax. The external tie is also the

63 Incisa, op.cit. p. 68
reason why Italy tends not to protest at ECB initiatives in monetary policy, unlike France and Germany for instance.

In his interpretation of collusive delegation, Mathias Koening-Archibugi argues that policy-making in an intergovernmental body allows national governments to avoid parliamentary control on certain issues, and as a result it creates a democratic gap. This is particularly true of the EU. A government with weak national support is spurred in boosting intergovernmentalism and external decision-making to legitimise its domestic authority: a weak government is more inclined to delegate its competencies to intergovernmental bodies, where it can exercise limited powers because these competencies may have strong ties and social pressure at the domestic level. In Italy this became evident with the external ties set at Maastricht, while European integration is more advanced in economic issues rather than in CFSP because national governments have more autonomy in the latter. So that major Member States should have no interest in developing CFSP because they already carry out an independent foreign policy.

Italy is more limited in conducting an independent foreign policy, so it tries to utilise CFSP to its capabilities. This is particularly true for defence matters, whose decision-making process involves intergovernmental bodies such as the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or European Council and the EU Council where discussion of these issues may be treated confidentially without Parliamentary or public opinion intervention. On one side there was limited confidence in party politics, while on the other the main foreign policy issues had to be kept out of Parliament in order to avoid debates that could endanger international obligations through empowering small parties within a coalition. For example in the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) Italy’s position was due to the need to avoid domestic political controversy, by seeking to transfer the decision-making process on security and defence to the European level.64

Hill and Andreatta asserted that defence issues have not been subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, thus giving the government and the

64 Mathias Koenig-Archibugi ‘Collusione intergovernativa e politica estera dell’Unione Europea’ in Filippo Andreatta (ed.) La Moneta e la spada, (Bologna : il Mulino, 2007) pp. 61, 67-69, 72, 76, 92
military a considerable freedom of action. On the contrary Cold War Italian governments were willing to transfer national sovereignty to international organisations to remove defence issues from political debate. The main problem is that Italy’s objective was to take part in international organisations and processes, rather than try to lead. Therefore, the delegation of decision-making in foreign policy to external organisations downplayed the problem of the national interest and raised the fear of marginalisation.

1.3.3 The Fears of Marginalisation and exclusive clubs

In the post-1945 with the redefinition of the national interest in foreign policy, the Chair Policy reached its climax. To have its own chair at an international body or conference has become for Rome no longer a tool – to utilise to pursue rational objectives - but the end in itself. Yet the lack of consistent end objectives and limited capabilities reduced the efficiency of Italian foreign policy. Italy just became a “lunching power”, a country that assessed its international standing, not on its influence and by pursuing objectives, but on the invitations it received. Therefore, Italy’s Chair Policy looked for international recognition such as the inclusion in G7 summit, the club of wealthiest world powers, obtained also thanks to diplomats’ discreet efforts. French president Giscard D’Estaing did not originally invite Italy to the Rambouillet summit 1975, because it was not considered as politically stable or economically liable. However, the US feared that Italian exclusion would boost PCI influence in the country and Italian diplomacy played its cards well. Thus Italy obtained a role disproportionate to its effective capabilities, thanks to its geopolitical position and internal communist threat:

“come un debitore diventa tanto più autorevole e corteggiato quanto più alto è il debito e numerosi i suoi creditori, così un paese può

65 Christopher Hill and Filippo Andreatta ‘Italy’ in Howorth, Jolyon and Menon, Anand (Ed.) The European Union and National Defence policies (London : Routledge, 1997) p. 68, 81-82
66 Varsori, op. cit. p. 187, see also Incisa op. cit., p. 51, 66
On the other hand, Italy was excluded from the summit between the US, France, Germany and the UK at Guadalupe, in January 1979, which created an informal standing group of the Atlantic Council, because:
   a) it had political instability with short-term governments;
   b) PCI was very influential;
   c) domestic terrorism was very dangerous, as showed by the Moro assassination, and US General Dozier kidnapping
   d) the defence budget was low and mainly directed to personnel expenses;
   e) the armed forces were equipped with obsolescent armaments and poorly trained conscripts.

The same elements that allowed admission to the to G7, made it lack the requirements for a politico-military club.

The Chair Policy has a military equivalent in the need to “show the flag”. Costs and benefit are not assessed in deciding the participation in an international mission or armaments programme. This implies the urge for the military to take part in every peacekeeping mission, in any operational theatre, even if national security or national interest is not affected and to take part, even if with symbolic participation in the major international armaments programme.68

The capabilities-expectations gap of Italy forced it to overstretch its military commitment into international missions abroad these did not result in an improved representation within international and European institutions, as Italy “punched below its weight”.

**European Directorates:** In Europe, Italy’s main objective is to avoid to be left out, and to keep its founding Member State and big four status. Member States’ initiatives raised for Italy the growing risk of marginalisation and being excluded from the various “clubs” that were shaped on certain policy areas.

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67 Romano *op. cit.* p. 204
68 See further Chapter VII ‘industrial transnational relations’
Prime Minister, Amintore Fanfani, was annoyed by the aim of the French president, Charles De Gaulle, to form a *directoire* in foreign policy by means of the two Fouchet plans, or to transform Europe in a French-led ‘Third Force’. De Gaulle assertiveness in Europe had spoiled the equal partnership of the three Big Member States, and the Franco-German axis would have just cut Italy out of European decision-making. The Elysée Treaty was signed on 23 January 1963, however, the German Parliament added a pro-NATO preamble, and watered down De Gaulle expectations for an autonomous European defence. In this diplomatic war, Fanfani sided with the US-British position and he supported British membership application to the EC. Italian politicians proposed to build up an Anglo-Italian realtionship as opposed to the Franco-German couple that the Elysée Treaty had failed to establish. Ambassador Pietro Quaroni observed that nobody had asked the British if they agreed with the plan. Italian support for British membership was a strategy to reduce French influence, and to promote both pro-European and pro-American at the same time. However on the long term, British membership would cause an incompatibility between Atlanticism and Europeanism in defence matters.

In September 1994, the Schäuble-Lamers unofficial position paper of the Christian Democratic parliamentary group proposing a ‘Core Europe’ composed of the Six founding Members ‘minus Italy’ created big concerns among Italian DCs. The external priority was the stabilisation of central-eastern Europe and its accession to the EU by 2000, so that another external pillar with Russia should be added to NATO transatlantic pillar. The paper dismissed the British approach by rejecting any “opt-out” clause, or “Europe à la carte”. The EU should be based on a “Core Europe” identified by membership of the EMU, with Franco-German hegemony. Italian-German relations have already been strained by the German strict interpretation of EMU rules, and the

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69 Romano, *op. cit.* p. 120-123, 151 see also Nuttall, *op. cit.*, p. 39-40
70 See Romano, *op. cit.* p. 134
clashes on the UNSC reform.\textsuperscript{72} The Maastricht criteria should identify the division according to a “Core Europe” or “multispeed Europe” or according to Beniamino Andreattà’s definition a “wedding cake Europe”, with Core Europe taking the cream. One possible option, to cope with the Franco-German technical trap, was to promote a stronger European federalism, in which Italy, as a founding member could take a relevant position.

Prodi’s government set as its main objective to access the nascent Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) because an exclusion risked to leave Italy off the European decision-making and from any further European development. Notwithstanding the German opposition, Italy struggled for admission to the EMU that was granted in 1999, after many sacrifices by the tax-payers or the Schengen area to which it acceded five years after its establishment in 1992.

This is why Italy tends to support common institutional mechanisms such as “enhanced cooperation” rather than exclusive decision-making or consultative groups and fora that are deemed more reliable, pioneer groups, or “hard core” of countries, which may leave Italy out.

The fear of being marginalised and excluded from the core of the EU or fears of being considered a second-rank country in the international system has been a challenge for the whole post-war generation of Italian diplomats and a constant of the foreign policy choices at the bottom-up level, from the bureaucratic elites to the Prime Minister.

1.3.4 \textbf{The influence of bureaucratic élite: the Diplomats}

According to Hill and Andreattà’s ‘domestic explanation’ Italy suffers a lack of State authority that results in extensive bureaucratic politics and makes it dependent on sub-rational log-rolling among political factions, so that decision-making is subject to domestic brokerage and a precarious political balance rather than from rational choice in the light

\textsuperscript{72} See Also Desmond Dinan, \textit{Europe Recast} (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p.284, and Id. \textit{Ever Closer Union} cit. p.174; Camerana, \textit{op.cit},p. 87
of external circumstances. Taking for granted the inactivity of the ruling class, foreign policy decision-making may be defined as a top-down process: Italian governments react to external events occurring in the international and European scenarios and they react to the initiatives of their counterparts. On the other hand, this reaction is boosted by a bottom-up process resulting from the pressure of bureaucratic elites, which assumed responsibility in pursuing interests for the sake of the Nation.

Just as the ruling class devolved global and regional strategy to the US and to Europe respectively, they devolved the daily management of foreign policy to the diplomats, who became more and more independent and powerful:

“L’Italia ha inoltre potuto contare su una diplomazia nel complesso efficiente; tra gli anni Quaranta e gli anni Cinquanta, con l’apporto di figure esterne alla carriera (Tarchiani, Brusio, Carandini ecc.) essa giocò una funzione politica di primo piano, ad esempio in rapporto alla scelta atlantica, mentre a partire dagli anni Sessanta la sua influenza tese a diminuire ma il corpo diplomatico continuò a gestire in maniera spesso valida l’”ordinaria amministrazione”’.

Just to give an example of diplomats’ autonomy, in January 1949, during the Atlantic Alliance negotiations, Alberto Tarchiani, Ambassador in Washington, presented to the State Department a formal request of admission and a memorandum advocating Italian accession to Atlantic Alliance. The US informed the negotiating parties of this request by stating that this ‘changed things’ in membership. However it emerged that this was a Tarchiani personal initiative with no official backing from Rome. In any case the Allies considered Italy for NATO membership thanks to this initiative.

In March 1957, the US Deputy President Richard Nixon visited Rome, and President Gronchi wrote a letter calling for US-Italian special relationship in the Mediterranean. However, when his Cabinet transmitted the letter to the Farnesina for sending it to the Washington, the Secretary-General, Ambassador Alberto Rossi Longhi, together

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73 Hill and Andreatta ‘Italy’ cit. p.67
74 Varsori, op.cit. p. 249
with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister Martino, decided not to forward not allowing a “presidential foreign policy” which did not conforming to the Euro-Atlantic pillar.

The main function of the diplomats is to assure the coherence in foreign policy in daily businesses. They had the difficult task of conducting a consistent foreign policy, very often without any clear instruction from a short-lived government that sometimes had no particular objective. As a consequence, Italian ambassadors abroad followed a discretionary foreign policy, taking as a reference the Euro-Atlantic loyalty of Italian foreign policy.

To describe this attitude, Ambassador Luigi Vittorio Ferraris coined the term of “ambasciatore fai da te” (do-it-yourself ambassador) who, being accustomed to receive unclear or no instructions at all from Rome - because the government had not a coherent position, took autonomous decisions by taking into account the two pillars and thus becoming his own foreign minister. Like admirals at sea, who recognise no superior authority other than God himself, Italian ambassadors had no other concern than staying loyal to Atlanticism and Europeanism, by recognising no superior authorities, not even the foreign minister or prime minister themselves.

Therefore, Italian diplomacy’s distinct sets of goals and concerns were to preserve the Atlantic link while, at the same time, search for ways to advance the cause of European integration in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Conventional wisdom implies that if no national interest is pursued, this paves the way for the pursuit of particular interest by lobbies. This would have happened for diplomacy, if the two pillars had not been set and established even in the cultural education of young diplomats. The professional diplomats recognised, better than the rhetoric of the ruling class, that a European common foreign policy did not exist, butd might be achieved.

During the Cypriot crisis in February 1975, Ambassador Roberto Ducci, Political Affairs Director General at the Farnesina, conferred with US secretary of state Henry Kissinger to obtain US

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75 Luigi Vittorio Ferraris ‘La diplomazia come arte del “fai da te”’ in Limes, 4, 1994
agreement for a European initiative towards Cyprus. Kissinger lamented the lack of military capabilities of the Europeans, and then he asked who for the EU was going to lead the negotiation to solve the dispute. Ducci replied that the Irish presidency would start negotiations, then would pass on the baton to the Italians, and if needed Luxembourg would conclude the negotiation. “Luxembourg? You see, Roberto, to Luxembourg!” said Kissinger before leaving the room. Ducci understood that the system of temporary presidencies could not work, and a sound CSFP was doomed to failure, if a principle of formal equality was maintained, for instance, between Luxembourg and Germany. European Diplomacy based on six-month presidencies failed again in coping with the Yugoslav crisis in early 1990s. Therefore, professional diplomats - those mastering the black arts of diplomacy, or those simply negotiating on the daily foreign policy agendas - would focus on bilateral relations and bilateral actions, leaving European ideology to the rhetoric of the ruling class and to the other technical administrative branches. It was not an easy job, as we will see in the following chapters.

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76 Arrigo Levi interview with Ambassador Roberto Ducci ‘L’Europa senza politica estera’ in *La Stampa*, 25 March 1979, quoted in Incisa, *op. cit.* p. 68
Conclusion

The assumption of continuity in Italian foreign policy-making has been central to this examination of the historical record. The Euro-Atlantic choice succeeded in downplaying the undependable ally tradition by setting the two pillars for Italian foreign policy. Europeanism and Atlanticism replaced the national interest, and in particular the European Treaties created an external tie, that was often exploited by Italian ruling class in order to constrain the population, without paying its political price in general elections.

Italy’s Atlantic and European choices did not emerge from abstract ideals, but were conceived as rational choices in the Cold War scenario. The Atlantic choice stemmed from the need to obtain a security agreement from the US, on territorial defence from the Soviet threat, and the European choice stemmed from the need to boost economic development, and to coordinate it with the other Western European countries. De Gasperi and Martino aimed at convincing and persuading the electorate, so they transformed these rational choices into ideals, in order to win the political support of public opinion. The political leaders who followed simply just reasserted the ideals, in order to justify their own political aims. After De Gasperi, the progressive DCs led a more assertive regional policy, adding the Mediterranean policy as a third pillar. Then Neo-Atlanticism reasserted the need for a role of Italy on the international stage. A loosening of the Cold War made leaders think that Italy could exert an honest broker role between the two blocks. There Italy could project influence in the Mediterranean and towards Arab countries, and later the economic dependence on oil and gas forced it to adopt a pro-Arab attitude.

The end of the Cold War found Italy well entrenched into Europeanism, having doubts on Atlantic solidarity and keeping an eye on the Mediterranean. The end of the Soviet threat was creating a gap in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean that someone could fill. De Michelis was the only politician who could challenge the three pillars policy and establish a new approach with the because he understood the importance of catching up with the South-Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, and including them in an economic and
security framework. Italy, however, was not well prepared to fill it, and it did not have the tools - to undertake a truly independent foreign policy.

Apart from the bandwagoning strategy removed by Atlantic loyalty and European idealism, all the other traditional trends were maintained. In particular, the Chair policy has been a key factor in shaping foreign policy-making, and it has been utilised to measure the success of policy choices. It also overstretched the Italian armed forces and industry by forcing them to take part in any international initiative regardless of its political objectives or economic return.

Last but not least, the diplomatic corps seems to be the major agent of continuity, and due to the inefficiency of national governments it also tended to replace it in policy-making, according to the “do-it-yourself ambassador” model. Diplomats tend to have strong bureaucratic interests, that in their minds, they make coincide with raison d’État. The fact that the ruling class delegated actual policy-making to diplomats, who are not usually known for being particularly pro-active or original, thus explains the continuity in post-war foreign policy and also its flatness and the lack of originality, because it was transformed into a technical exercise, except when politicians of high standing were available.
CHAPTER II
THE CRISES THAT SHAPED EUROPEAN DEFENCE

The chapter is dedicated to contemporary security issues. After having examined the Italian foreign policy trends in the first Chapter, we should now see the Security and Defence policy in action by analysing the Italian and European contribution in solving the security crises that arose in the last few years. First, we will analyse the international crises since the end of the Cold War, which shaped the development of an European Defence, from the Gulf War and its influence over the Maastricht Treaty to the Kosovo. The Italian initiatives will be assessed, in particular as regarding the promotion of the WEU. There will be an insight into the Centre-Left foreign policy in boosting European integration, and above all its role in the Western Balkan Crises. In particular, the Kosovo war will explain the role of Italian participation in NATO and the need to develop a European Security and Defence capability.

Secondly, there will be an attempt to define the main features of Silvio Berlusconi’s foreign policy, including the shift to a personal foreign policy and the challenge to the traditional three pillars policy. In the latter, pro-American and Euro-sceptic choices will be analysed in depth and assessed by surveying the events and the main speeches. The events that followed 9/11, and the effort to promote a European constitution will also be analysed in depth, comparing the action of the Bush administration and Blair’s premiership to the Franco-German axis, identifying the two opposing camps that emerged as a result of the Iraqi war, their influence in Europe, and particularly their impact on Italy.
2.1 From Kuwait to Kosovo

2.1.1 The Gulf War and the Maastricht Treaty

‘L’Europe est une histoire de crises’

The end of the Cold War questioned European, transatlantic and Mediterranean paradigms. European countries were caught by surprise by the collapse of the Soviet Union and they had to confront a different international scenario without a clear and identifiable framework. NATO was put into question and this was seen as a chance to broaden European integration into foreign policy and security matters.

Liberals were optimistic, hoping that the transition to a market economy in central-eastern Europe would boost economic cooperation by means of the international organisations. These events led to the globalization process and the establishment of World Trade Organisation (WTO), but they soon lost momentum at the beginning of twenty-first century. The biggest result of liberal hopes was of course the EU Eastern enlargement that could be seen as originating from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Realists were more concerned in re-establishing a balance in the European security regime, including the fate of the Soviet arsenal and the stability of the Confederation of Independent States. The realists’ new security regime involved a new role for NATO, and the WEU. The international crises in the Persian Gulf and in the Western Balkans would soon give the realists an opportunity to promote their approach.

The Gulf War: The invasion of Kuwait on 3 August 1990 occurred during the Italian Presidency. In January 1991, De Michelis and his diplomatic advisor Baldocci prepared a memorandum on the Gulf Crisis that was disseminated to Member States. This advocated a UN intervention, and asked for Iraqi withdrawal by 15 January in

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78 For the Liberal and Realist debate on European security see: Ian Budge at alii The politics of New Europe (London : Longman, 1997) p. 19-31
conformity with UN resolutions. The UN would then loosen the Iraqi embargo, and above all, call a CSCE-like international conference to solve the Middle East problem; Saddam linked his withdrawal to the Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. The memorandum had no follow through, so De Michelis supported military intervention, hence, at the IGC in 1990, De Michelis advocated WEU integration into EU, apparently to create European military capabilities; but really to legitimise the First Gulf War military intervention to domestic public opinion. Europe had always been a means for the ruling class to legitimise controversial political decisions. The Gulf War was a lost chance for Europe, as it did not register EU or Member States participation, but rather the autonomous initiatives of a few European countries: the twelve Member States, took twelve different positions, without any convergence between them. It did not help European collaboration, but at least it pointed out the problem to be resolved by the IGC for Maastricht Treaty.

**The tricht Treaty:** Rome Council in October 1990 called for an IGC, which opened in December 1990 with two sessions on EMU and European political union (EPU). The IGC would move beyond economic integration to closer integration in foreign policy and even in security matters. De Michelis was pro-active in pushing the EPU, but Italy ran into problems during the negotiations; it favoured a federal approach, but feared to be relegated to the second-tier EMU; it favoured a stronger political dimension for the EC, it soon realised that a credible foreign policy was not a priority for the big Member States. Italy often advocated an increased role for WEU, because until the mid-1980s little had been done within the WEU framework, when Defence Minister Spadolini supported a WEU revitalization of the military

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80 Ludovico Incisa di Camerana *La vittoria dell’Italia nella terza guerra mondiale* (Bari: Laterza, 1996), p.18
81 Desmond Dinan *Ever Closer Union* (Basingstoke: Routledge, 1994) 2nd edition, p. 133; 136
cooperation of NATO European countries. In 1987 it adopted the “Platform on European security interests” which called for more cohesion on defence by WEU countries, and reiterated the centrality of NATO. The Platform was used as a framework for the minesweeping mission in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and for the European military presence in the Gulf War in 1990-1991.

In the Gulf War, Europe had experienced a huge technological and military capabilities gap in relation to the US. Therefore, the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, London speech on security and defence in March 1991 advocated the incorporation of the WEU into the EU and a loosening of defence ties with the US. Since the initiatives to develop a European Defence dimension within WEU were taking place outside NATO, it had the potential to be a real challenge to NATO and to the US, which was not willing to accept an increased European role in security issues.

The WEU was to provide the EU with the military means, according to France and Germany, by being incorporated into it, or from the Atlanticist perspective of the UK and the Netherlands to serve as a bridge between NATO and the EU. The incorporation of WEU into the EU could oust NATO from being the main provider of European security, thus creating a “fortress Europe”. Italy took an ambiguous position, and instead of backing Franco-German initiatives for a stronger European defence, and abandoning the long standing proposal to make the WEU the strong-arm of the EC, it realigned with the British in advocating the centrality of NATO in European defence matters. An Anglo-Italian joint declaration on European Defence dispelled the impression that the negotiations pitted UK against the other Member States on every issue. Maybe this position was caused by Italian fears of a resurgent Franco-German couple that would have cut out Italy of the major league and forced it to realign with the British. In any case, the UK and Italy have always shared the principle

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83 Dinan Ever closer union cit. p. 143
84 Dinan Ever closer union, p. 140
85 See Varsori, op. cit. p. 243
of NATO centrality in European defence. During the negotiations the UK refused to merge the EC with the WEU to prevent it from performing military operations.\(^{86}\)

The Maastricht Treaty stated WEU to be “an integral part of the development of the EU”, but reaffirmed the centrality of NATO.

The disputes between the allies forced the Maastricht Treaty to adopt a CFSP as the second pillar of the EU and a tentative security and defence dimension. The Maastricht Treaty was the last Cold War act, as it was signed on 9-10 December 1991, a few days before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and it had been influenced by the Yugoslav crisis.

### 2.1.2 Western Balkan crises and the Amsterdam Treaty

Italy watched the dissolution of Yugoslavia without any particular concern except for sending two armoured vehicles to the Gorizia border. Only De Michelis was active in trying to save the Yugoslav confederation; he brokered an agreement in Brioni in July 1991 to try to reconcile Belgrade, with Ljubljana and Zagreb. So, Italy shifted from a pro-Croatian and pro-Slovenian attitude, to eventually a pro-Serbian attitude, but without being able to open channels with Belgrade.\(^{87}\)

At the end of 1991, Italy was reluctant to recognise the independence of secessionist Slovenia and Croatia, but would agree if a common position were reached by the Member States. Germany forced the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, and ousted Italy from its privileged relations with these neighbouring countries. Tudjman’s Croatia even started a dispute with Italy over borders. Italian forces were not welcomed in Yugoslavia: an Italian helicopter of the EU Monitoring Mission was shot down by a Serbian Mig on 7 January 1992, and a guerrilla portable missile shot down a G-222 military airlifter on 3 September. But Italy did not retaliate.\(^{88}\)

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\(^{87}\) Incisa *op. cit.* pp.60-62

\(^{88}\) See Varsori *op.cit.* p. 242
Italy was also excluded from the Contact Group, which was created in 1992, by France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US in response to the Bosnian crisis. The Contact Group, which meets monthly at the Foreign Minister level, includes four of the five UNSC Permanent Members and the countries that contribute the most in peacekeeping in the Western Balkans. Apart from its troop contribution, Italy realised that its foreign policy in the Western Balkans was going to be doomed to irrelevance.

In 1994, the Berlusconi government’s main foreign policy initiative was its opposition to Slovenian accession to the EU. This was mainly due to the memory of the so-called “Foibe”: the ethnic cleansing of Italian nationals in Yugoslav-controlled territories by Tito’s partisans in 1945. The Foreign Minister, Antonio Martino, claimed the restitution of refugees’ goods, but he soon realised he had no support from public opinion nor from the other Member States. Susanna Agnelli, who replaced him as Foreign Minister, also tried without any success to negotiate with the Slovenians, but receiving no external support. In 1992, the EU had allowed Greece to veto the recognition of fYROM under the constitutional name of “Macedonia”; two years later, the EU decided that Slovenia’s accession negotiations to the EU could not be vetoed by Italy. Therefore, in 1995, Italy took part in NATO air raids on Serbian forces to enforce peace in Bosnia, by providing NATO with access to airspace and bases, and with fighters bombers. However, participation was very discreet in order not to cause public opinion reaction, which mildly supported intervention, and not to provoke Serbian retaliation. On the other hand, Italy took strong diplomatic positions towards the Allies. The Dini government maintained that NATO could not intervene in Yugoslavia without UNSC authorisation, and on 14 September 1995, Foreign Minister, Agnelli, refused the deployment of USAF F-117 Stealth at Aviano military airport until Italy’s interests in

90 Sergio Romano *Guida alla politica estera italiana. Da Badoglio a Berlusconi* (Milano : Rizzoli 2002) p. 262-263
91 Incisa *op.cit.* pp.60-62
the region were recognised. This position was successful: during August and September 1995, the Contact Group under US lead had already invited Italy, Spain, and Canada to attend a few meetings. After Italy’s refusal to let the US make use of its airbases, it was admitted as a permanent member of the Contact Group. The Dayton agreement in December 1995 had brought to an end the war in Bosnia, and Italy took part in the NATO operation IFOR to enforce the agreement.

**The Amsterdam Treaty:** The Maastricht treaty mandated the holding by 1996 of an IGC to rectify the shortcomings of EU Treaties, in particular in security and defence policy. Member States were also invited to propose reforms. The Reflection Group (composed of national, commission and council delegates) met at Messina in June 1995 and presented its final report to Madrid Council in December 1995. The report advocated the introduction of “flexibility” or “enhanced cooperation” in the treaty to allow Member States to better co-operate in certain fields by means of the existing institutional framework. Italy feared the creation of ‘core’ cooperations outside the Treaty’s framework, while it supported the open and ‘enhanced cooperation’ to be established within a legal framework. At the Turin Council on 28 March 1996, that launched the 1996-1997 IGC Prime Minister, Dini, and Foreign Minister, Agnelli, tried to promote ‘enhanced cooperation’ in various fields including CFSP.

Prodi’s government decided to re-ally in the negotiations with France and Germany. The Franco-German couple, however, had weakened. Jacques Chirac had replaced Mitterand in 1995, and after

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93 Italy also joined the Local Contact Group in Bosnia, composed of Contact Group countries’ embassies in Sarajevo, to be renamed as ‘Quint’ after the exclusion in 1998. See Catherine Gegout ‘The Quint’ in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, no 2 June 2002, pp. 331-344.

94 Incisa, *op.cit*, p.23
calling for elections in 1997, he was forced to cohabit with Lionel Jospin’s Left-Wing government. The Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, had little contact with Chirac being forced to collaborate with Jospin. On the other hand, Tony Blair’s New Labour won the elections in 1997, and he started to reshape British European policy.

In December 1995, Chirac and Kohl proposed that the flexibility should take place in the institutional framework, thus reassuring Italy on their intentions, and the introduction of “enhanced cooperation”, although the negotiations should decide the interested fields. The “enhanced cooperation” was the major innovation in the treaties, and allowed to prevent a ‘core Europe’.

On CFSP, Italy and the Franco-Germans agreed on a deeper integration. The development of CFSP was supported by all Member States, who just disagreed on the methods. A consensus was found on establishing a secretariat with Commission elements, while France pushed for appointing a “Mr CFSP”, and a compromise was found in appointing a High Representative for CFSP. Moreover a Policy planning and early warning Unit was established at the Council secretariat. Germany, Italy and Benelux wished to improve CFSP decision-making, they failed to overcome unanimity rule, but introduced “constructive abstensionism” by means of “emergency brake” allowing Member States not to take part to CFSP-related decisions, thus allowing other Member States to do so.

The CFSP was not yet a credible tool for Western Balkans crises challenges, and Member States had to rely for security on national resources or NATO. Neither the Contact Group nor NATO became involved in Albania in 1997, to Italy and Greece’s great frustration, and Italy was able to manage Albanian crisis situation with the “Alba” military observer assistance mission. The Kosovo crisis would force Italy to overcome the biggest taboo: declaring war on a sovereign country.

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95 Dinan, *Ever closer union*, p. 176-177
96 Dinan, *Europe recast*, p.285
2.1.3 D’Alema and Kosovo war

The Kosovo Crisis in 1999 was a milestone in the history of the European defence development, as we will further speculate. The Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, UK and US) was not able to stop the crisis escalating, and the Rambouillet talks in February 1999, promoted by French president Chirac, were a failed last diplomatic attempt because the Contact Group differed on many issues. Moreover, the US, UK and France decided that France and the UK should co-chair, leaving off Germany, Italy, and the EU.

Chirac’s negotiation strategy was very simple: to lock people in a room until they came out with an acceptable solution, as he would later do in December 2000 for the Nice Treaty. However, the negotiators in this case were not able to provide the Serbs with an acceptable solution, and European NATO countries, in particular Italy and Greece, were not willing to use military force to ensure an agreement. The US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, even encouraged the Kosovar Albanians of UÇK to negotiate on a text that the Serbs were neither willing nor able to accept. The Rambouillet Agreement proposed by the US and British delegations and signed by the UÇK on 18 March 1999 called for NATO to occupy Kosovo for at least three years; annex B granted to NATO free access in the whole of

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97 For a survey on Kosovo war and its doctrinal bases see: Adam Roberts, ‘NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over Kosovo’ in: Survival, Vol. 41, no. 3 (1 October 1999)
99 Rambouillet leading negotiators were: Christopher Hill of the US, Wolfgang Petritsch of Austria, Boris Maisorki of Russia, Hubert Védrine of France, Robin Cook of the UK
Yugoslavia. This was seen by the Serbs as just a provocation, an excuse to start bombing.  

On 22 October 1998, Massimo D’Alema had replaced Prodi after the fate of his government. The D’Alema government had been formed to grant a stable majority to assure respect of the Atlantic commitments: Prodi lost the vote of confidence on 7 October and on the NAC decided the activation order on 13 October to trigger NATO intervention. The outgoing Defence Minister, Beniamino Andreatta, supported Atlantic loyalty and implemented the Activation Order by granting NATO access to bases in the national territory. However, by recalling constitutional constraints, the outgoing Prodi government limited the use of Italian armed forces to the ‘integrated defence’ of national soil (this was clearly a reference to Art.V of the North Atlantic Treaty); every other deployment abroad had to be authorised by the Parliament.  

The D’Alema government was prepared to authorise the participation of armed forces in Kosovo intervention: in November Italian troops in FYROM were included on an equal basis with British and French troops and in the nascent KFOR; in January 50 combat aircraft were put under NATO command. On 24 March 1999, D’Alema authorised the Italian Air Force participation in the NATO air campaign, although it was not easy to escalate from the ‘integrated defence’ to combat missions.  

In fact, the Parliament never authorised Italian participation; it was only informed of the start of the bombing. The only Parliamentary debate took place on 19 May 1999 when D’Alema reported to the

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100 Interview with Henry Kissinger in Daily Telegraph, 28 June 1999 and in The Guardian, 13 November 1999. Quoted in Bellamy op.cit p.31
101 Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (Governo Prodi) comunicato stampa 157 del 12 ottobre 1998
102 See the debate: Letter of Carlo Scognamiglio, Defence Minister, published in Corriere della Sera with the title “Il governo D' Alema nacque per rispettare gli impegni Nato”, 7 June 2001; Letter of Romano Prodi published in Corriere della Sera with the title “Attacco contro Milosevic fu il mio governo a dire sì”, 8 June 2001; Letter of Francesco Cossiga published in Corriere della Sera with the title “Prodi non aveva i voti per rispettare gli impegni Nato”, 10 June 2001
House of Deputies on the bombs that could endanger fishing in the Adriatic.  

The D’Alema government changed Italy’s Defence policy on Kosovo. Conventional wisdom reckons that D’Alema’s post-communist legacy forced him, for the first time since the Second World War, to declare war on Yugoslavia, considering it a test of a mature democratic leader and his Atlantic loyalty. European leaders, such as New Labour Tony Blair and Social-Democrat Gerhard Schroeder, had accepted the principle of humanitarian war, so in order to feel part of the European social-democrat family (rather than a post-communist family that opposed NATO’s war and fraternized with Serbian former communist fellows) D’Alema had to go to war. The principles of humanitarian intervention, and its connections to international solidarity, were the only tools to keep his ruling coalition together: its unreformed communists supported the government, but also encouraged peace demonstrations against Kosovo intervention. Although, there are a few references to the democratic responsibility of the international community in humanitarian intervention, the backbone of D’Alema’s political thought is still the “chair policy”:

“con il Kosovo noi siamo entrati in tale gruppo. Non sta scritto in nessun documento ufficiale, ma di fatto è nato attorno al Kosovo una specie di club. Questo nuovo status dell’Italia è un dato forse impalpabile ma importante è una conquista che potremmo anche perdere.”


104 See Romano, op. cit. p. 269-270; Cfr.: Varsori Antonio ‘How to support Atlantic Alliance and European Integration in Italy?’ in Gérard Bosswat, Nicolas Vaicbourdt (ed.) Etats-Unis Europe et Union Européenne. Histoire et avenir d’un partenariat difficile 1945-1999 (Bruxelles- Berlin; Peter Lang 2001) p. 147

105 On Tony Blair, see ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ speech given at the Economic Club of Chicago, on 24 April 1999.

106 Massimo D’Alema, interview with Federico Rampini Kosovo, gli Italiani e la guerra (Milano; Mondadori, 1999)
D’Alema had succeeded in finding recognition for his new role and his need to be accepted by other Western leaders had been satisfied. He might have asked the Allies anything and he would have been satisfied. However, he contented himself with a pat on the back. Unfortunately, Italy was also included in the claim that Yugoslavia filed against 10 NATO countries to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In any case, the Kosovo war boosted the need for a credible EU military capability and led to the inclusion of the ESDP in the Nice Treaty and to its further development.

The Centre-Left foreign policy choice was an evolution of the “chair policy”: Italy may have international standing when it is accepted into an exclusive club. Therefore, the Centre-Left started to consider EU as a club in which Italy should try to be accepted in exclusive circles and top positions; failure to do so would cause the marginalisation, and feed the disillusions that Italy would lose weight in international politics. This trend would become more evident when Centre-Left opposition would blame Berlusconi’s government for anti-Europeanism, accusing him of damaging Italy’s international standing.

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107 Ostellino Piero ‘Serve un passo indietro per amore dell' Italia’ in: Corriere della Sera, 5 January 2002
108 ICJ “Legality of Use of Force” Case filed on 29 April 1999 (rejected by ICJ on 2 June 1999) by Serbia Montenegro v. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK and the US; ordinanze 81-82; 464; 622-623; 643, in Recueil ICJ, 1999; in International Law Material, 1999, p. 950. The trial has been repeatedly suspended, after the oral pleadings of preliminary objections in April 2004 it was again suspended by ICJ ruling.
109 See further Chapter IV ‘military capabilities’
2.2 The post-9/11 and the European disputes

2.2.1 A Comment on Berlusconi’s personal style

The first Berlusconi government in 1994 was too short to give any impression of his foreign policy style. According to some scholars, during the second Berlusconi government (2001-2006) there was a shift in priorities favouring Atlanticism over Europeanism, in the Iraqi Crisis, in the Constitutional Treaty negotiations, discarding the Mediterranean policy, and in starting an *entente cordiale* with Putin’s Russia. Berlusconi’s Atlantic preference and lack of enthusiasm for European integration was due to his personal foreign policy.¹¹⁰

On a more thorough analysis these assumption are not fully correct: Berlusconi favoured transatlantic relations, but he also pursued European priorities during the Italian Presidency in 2003, and the Euro-scepticism of his coalition members never became sound policy-making. According to Ambassador Gianni Castellaneta, who served as Berlusconi’s foreign policy advisor and Representative to Washington, the development of a strong ESDP should aim at engaging the United States in NATO.¹¹¹ There was a total shift from a pro-Arab to a pro-Israeli position in Mediterranean policy; this was due to 9/11 removing the pro-Arab option because of the special relationship with the US.

As Opposition leader (1996-2001), Berlusconi seemed to adopt a Europeanism close to the Franco-German positions, with some Thatcherite elements. Speaking in 1999 soon after the Kosovo Crisis, he advocated a new European role in foreign policy and defence, aimed at

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security for European citizens and humanitarian intervention by means of a European Army. However, the real objective of Italian European policy and its innovation is revealed in the pursuit of the national interest to obtain the largest national representation, after Germany, in the European Parliament. Berlusconi’s Europe was just a means to protect national interests in a way similar to the traditional French style.  

**The Ruggiero affair:** The Ruggero affair raised the issue of continuity in Berlusconi’s foreign policy, with the media accusing him of Euroscepticism. Ambassador Renato Ruggiero was appointed foreign minister to reassure the markets on foreign policy continuity. He behaved in “do-it-yourself ambassador” fashion considered himself free from governmental ties, and started to create friction with the government at large.  

Ruggiero’s dispute with his government was evident in the A400M affair: the government opposed the programme, Ruggiero challenged this decision, reasoning that A400M was the first step towards a common European defence industry. On the other hand, the Defence Minister, Antonio Martino, a Chicago school educated economist, was as Euro-Atlantic - stressing more on Atlanticism – in the tradition of his father Gaetano. Martino strongly opposed the claim that the participation in A400M could be a test of the government’s Europeanism. Ruggiero clashed again with the government by

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113 Rizzo Sergio ‘Dall’ Eni alla Farnesina, storia di un diplomatico che non esita a «sbattere la porta»’ in Corriere della Sera, 6 January 2002
opposing military intervention in Afghanistan thus causing some friction with the Bush administration. He eventually resigned.

The real issue at stake was foreign policy continuity or a new course: Ruggiero represented the traditional Europeanism, his disappointment with Berlusconi’s choices stems from the fact that unlike the Centre-Left, Berlusconi did not conform to the Franco-German position. Ruggiero’s resignation could be seen as a watershed for Berlusconi’s choices: abandoning the three pillars would restore the national interest, although Italy might lack the assets and resources needed to conduct an assertive national foreign policy, such as a balanced representation in the EC staff. The Euro-Atlanticism of the government was not at stake, there had been a change only in methods and the Centre-Right’s new course in Europe would be a way to emancipate Italy from Franco-German couple and promote a leaning towards the UK and Spain. The basic fact is that the Ruggiero affair had the effect of bringing into internal politics the controversies between the Franco-German couple and the British approach. The Europeanism – which since De Gasperi had been an undisputable bipartisan pillar of foreign policy – became a partisan ideology. The controversy between the Franco-Germans and Atlanticists found domestic partisans in the Italian parties respectively in the Centre-Left and Centre-Right. Berlusconi entered into a personal friendship with Atlanticist leaders. During the Italian Presidency in 2003 the media also stressed this polarisation of Europeanism, mainly for electoral reasons. However on coming to power, and confronting Realpolitik, the ruling parties became less Euro-sceptic or anti-American than they had been when they were acting in opposition.117

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116 Panebianco Angelo ‘Un po' di ragione e qualche torto’ in Corriere della Sera, 10 January 2002; Ostellino Piero ‘Serve un passo indietro per amore dell’ Italia’ in Corriere della Sera, 5 January 2002

117 See Antonio Missiroli ‘Italy’s security and defence policy – between EU and US, or just Prodi and Berlusconi?’ paper presented at the Colloquium on Italy’s approach to international issues, at the Centre of International Studies of the University of Cambridge, 16 March 2007 and published in Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Volume 9, Issue 2 August 2007 , pp 149 - 168
The removal from office of Ruggiero was a way for Berlusconi to reassert his power of initiative and start a personal style. A few months earlier, in June 2001, after re-election Tony Blair made a similar move by replacing Robin Cook with a more pliable figure such as Home Secretary, Jack Straw, to pursue a more personalised foreign policy. It was a dramatic shift from the first term of Blair’s Europeanism and Cook’s ethical foreign policy. Probably, Cook was removed from office because he became too “Europeanised” and insufficiently pro-American.\textsuperscript{118} Berlusconi was following the same path of Blair, he became the foreign minister himself, starting the bilateral meetings and taking many trips to maintain a firm grip on policy-making.

**As foreign minister himself:** When Berlusconi temporarily assumed the Foreign Affairs competence, he also tried to reform the *Farnesina* and its old fashioned practices.

The post-Cold War era experienced a change of attitude in Diplomacy, because the *Farnesina* and the permanent representations abroad were no longer producing ideas, but they were rather selling them. Except from politico-military affairs, embassies were becoming a marketing department.\textsuperscript{119} Traditional diplomacy still had to get used to it. This trend became evident when Berlusconi as interim foreign minister, took the opportunity to scold the Diplomatic corps for being too “old fashioned”. Berlusconi suggested they boost trade promotion for Italian goods, and promised a big reform of the *Farnesina* in this sense. This was coldly accepted by the diplomatic establishment, and just a limited reform in the *Farnesina’s* Directorate-General followed, being internally prepared and then formally approved by the Cabinet.

The post-Cold War also experienced an increasing personalisation of politics resulting into a polarisation of politics. US President George

\textsuperscript{118} See Christopher Hill ‘Putting the world to rights: Tony Blair foreign policy mission’ in Anthony Seldon, Dennis Kavanagh *The Blair Effect 2001-5* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.385-386, 388 (quoted as: Blair foreign policy mission *cit.*)

\textsuperscript{119} Boris Biancheri *Accordare il mondo: la diplomazia nell’età globale* (Bari, Laterza, 1999) p. 148
Herbert Bush (1989-1993) devoted himself to the development of personal contacts with foreign counterparts. He undertook numerous trips all over the world, and he used to personally call political leaders to discuss important foreign policy issues. This working method is referred as “Rolodex diplomacy”. We may also find a well-known Italian tradition in Machiavelli’s Prince, who stressed on the value of personal diplomacy.

The personalisation of diplomacy was not new for Berlusconi, who claimed that during his first government in 1994, his personal relationship with Russian President Boris Eltsin had boosted Italian companies’ role in Russia’s industrial restructuring. This is a typical businessman strategy: business negotiations take place between the CEOs without the long preparatory negotiations typical of professional diplomatic bureaucracies. It is a simpler and somewhat naïve approach in international affairs. The bilateral summits and personal trips allowed Berlusconi to pursue a personal style, unlike the European Councils, where the diplomatic protocol could hold him back.

Berlusconi’s approach to build close personal ties with fellow leaders has been labelled as the cucù (Peekaboo) strategy, after he once popped out from behind a fountain to greet Angela Merkel of Germany, during a G8 summit. The Pekaboo strategy, however, is “successfully staking out national, and personal business, interests on the fringes of the European Union” it “might not go down well with some strait-laced Europeans but it was effective with Britain’s Tony Blair (…) and is now paying dividends with Muammer Gaddafi, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan.” Berlusconi lobbied for Italian big companies (ENI, FIAT and Finmeccanica) to build commercial ties chiefly with Libya, Russia and Turkey.

Berlusconi’s relation with US President George W. Bush was the most celebrated personal friendship, and the one that earned him a

121 Silvio Berlusconi opening speech at the “primo congresso nazionale di Forza Italia” Milano, 16 April 1998 in Id. L’Italia che ho in mente cit. p. 51
122 Guy Dinmore ‘Berlusconi finds fresh territory for his politics of peekaboo’ in Financial Times, 5 November 2009
pro-American reputation. According to Bush, the Berlusconi government’s stability was a key factor in building a personal relationship. Speaking at the US Congress in March 2006, Berlusconi claimed that Italy should act as an intermediary between the US and Europeans, by adopting an evolution of the British “bridging” approach; the EU should not become a ‘fortress Europe’ or compete with the US, as the division of the Western world would harm international security. NATO was the best way to maintain transatlantic link, and it should change from a defensive alliance to a security organisation open to other countries. Berlusconi endorsed the typical approach of ESDP as complementary to NATO, also shared by the UK. This approach was not new for traditional Italian Foreign Policy, however he put a strong emphasis on pro-Americanism, as in Gaetano Martino’s Euro-Atlanticism. The fact is that unlike in the 1950s when European developments and US interests coincided, the events in Iraq had transformed Euro-Atlanticism into two incompatible theories.

The personalisation contributed towards a fracture in the Euro-Atlantic pillar. Berlusconi broke ranks with the Franco-Germans and with Europeanist orthodoxy, and sought to forge a special relationship with the US, making a shift from traditional Europeanism to fierce pro-Americanism. But maybe this was just the sign of times.

2.2.2 The pro-American choice: Afghanistan

The 9/11 events caused heightened emotions in public opinion. A solidarity march for the New York population was organised in Rome in late September, but after that solidarity did not extend to other forms.

123 Marco Galluzzo ‘Bush: Berlusconi leader forte, ha reso l’ Italia stabile’ in Corriere della Sera, 1 March 2006
124 Silvio Berlusconi ‘L’Europa ha bisogno dell’America e l’America ha bisogno dell’Europa’ speech at US Congress in Washington DC, 1 March 2006, in Id. Verso il partito della libertà (Milano : Mondadori, 2006) p. 144-149
Berlusconi’s government was caught by surprise. He had been in office for just a few months since elections in May 2001. Initially he tried to contribute to a coordinated and multilateral response to the attacks. Italy proposed a special summit on terrorism, within the G8 framework, that was vetoed by the US. In the NAC, Italy enthusiastically voted for the application of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. European major States such as France, Germany, Italy and the UK offered cooperation to the US in the midst of the war on terrorism. However, it was soon to be discovered that the US wanted to act unilaterally outside any international organisational framework, including NATO, and without the aid of allies, except for the UK. The Europeans feared that the US might over-react, thus causing more harm to the relations with the Islamic states. However, the US attack on Afghanistan, to overthrow the Taliban regime, allegedly responsible for harbouring Al-Qaeda and promoting Islamic terrorism, was felt by the Europeans to be a reasonable reaction and received endorsement from UN Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001. Operation “Enduring Freedom” started on 7 October 2001.

NATO was not involved in the operations, because recalling the Kosovo experience, the US did not want to negotiate operations with allies while on mission. NATO just offered a back up; NATO’s naval assets were deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean to rotate with Sixth Fleet ships redirected to the Indian Ocean, and NATO AWACS were sent to the US east coast in “Operation Eagle Assist”. The Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, stated that the military task determined the coalition of the willing; allies should make significant military contributions to the mission and share US priorities.125

Berlusconi was thanked for offering troops to Afghanistan, but these were not needed as they did not offer value added to the “coalition of the willing’s” capabilities.126 Berlusconi was not pleased when in the

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125 Wyn Rees *Transatlantic-Counter terrorism cooperation* (London; Routlegde, 2006) p. 49; R. Penttila ‘the Role of G8 in international peace and security’ in *Adelphi Paper* 355 (London; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003) p. 47; 112-113

midst of Afghanistan operations, Blair started to build a “big three” directoire leaving off Italy with the meeting that took place at the Ghent Council in mid-October 2001.\textsuperscript{127} Blair became the self-appointed EU spokesman in the US.\textsuperscript{128} On 4 November 2001, before a visit to Washington, Blair hosted a dinner in Downing street inviting Chirac and Schroeder and setting up a de facto “Big Three” directoire. After fierce protestations, Blair was forced to send invitations also to the prime ministers of Belgium, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, and the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, to give the dinner a more institutional framework. Berlusconi only managed to get his invitation in time for the dessert.\textsuperscript{129} Blair realised he could not both rely on European solidarity in time of crisis, and ignore the EU’s procedures when they did not prove convenient.\textsuperscript{130}

European troops were called in for post-conflict stabilisation by establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under a UN mandate and British-led. The events of the Afghan war, with US-UK warfighting and other Europeans intervening in post-conflict suggested the famous colloquial expression that: “the United States does the cooking and Europeans wash the dishes”.\textsuperscript{131} However much Europeans were willing to fight in Afghanistan, they lacked a coherent coordination by means of NATO or EU, and above all, they lacked a European leadership.

\textsuperscript{127} Peter Riddell ‘Europe’ in Anthony Seldon, Dennis Kavanagh The Blair Effect 2001-5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 368 (to be quoted as “Blair Europe”)
\textsuperscript{128} Hill Blair foreign policy mission cit. p. 389
\textsuperscript{130} Hill Blair foreign policy mission cit. p. 394
2.2.3 The European rifts in the Iraq Crisis

Blair became a driving force for Atlanticist initiatives in the wake of 9/11. When first elected in 1997 Blair had a European commitment to give the UK more influence over the EU. His approach to foreign policy had been similar to Churchill’s three circles with a preference for the special relationship.\(^{132}\) After the 9/11, however, maintaining EU unity came second to transatlantic relations; he was not willing to jeopardise NATO for the sake of maintaining European harmony.\(^{133}\) Moreover, he was convinced that the US and Europe should act together in fighting terrorism, and a ‘resurgent Atlanticist identity’ shaped British security strategy after 9/11.\(^{134}\) Blair shared the European concerns that the US could overreact unilaterally, and this fear made him more concerned about the Bush administration’s intentions than those of his fellow European leaders.\(^{135}\)

Blair received backing from Berlusconi and Aznar in trying to ensure the US crusade did not decouple allies, and he was at the time a linking force with Chirac and Schroeder, who tried to bring him on to their side. On the other hand, Blair’s strategy contributed to European divisions because he had deliberately encouraged a bilateral approach as part of the 1998 “Step Change” programme, to boost British the imprint upon the EU. In practice, this bilateralism became associated with a pick-and-mix system of “promiscuous bilateralism”, which saw the British government forge loose coalitions around individual issues.\(^{136}\)

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\(^{133}\) Riddell Blair Europe cit. p. 362, 382

\(^{134}\) T Dunne “When the shooting starts’: Atlanticism in British security strategy’ in International Affairs (80)5 October 2004, p. 894

\(^{135}\) Riddell Blair Europe cit. p. 368; and Riddel Hug them close p.15; Rees, op. cit. p. 58

The forthcoming US intervention in Iraq was dividing the European allies into camps. The Atlanticists supported US intervention, and was exemplified in the run up to war in January 2003 by the “letter of eight” signed by the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. On the other side were France, Germany and Belgium. In the summer of 2002 and in the run up to German elections in September, Schroeder stated that he would offer no military or economic support to intervention in Iraq even if this was authorised by the UN. This statement strained US-German relations. President Chirac was going to restore a Franco-German couple opposed to Italy and the other Atlanticists, as the following events would reveal. In January 2003 France and Germany celebrated the Elysée Treaty and took the opportunity to coordinate a position on Iraq. In the NAC, they vetoed the US request to send aid to Turkey in case it was attacked by Iraq also in the UNSC, they, together with Russia, vetoed US intervention and blocked the British presidency of the UNSC to draft a specific resolution authorising military intervention in Iraq.

Blair failed in his attempt to reconcile the positions between Bush administration and opposing European critics. Blair had accepted the consequences of turning down the St.Malo spirit for a Common European Defence. At the end was compelled to take part to hostilities. The war in Iraq cost Blair, not only popular support, but also any possibility of becoming the leader Europe needed at that time.

It is noteworthy to remark on the certain eagerness displayed by Germany, Italy, Spain and now Poland, which usually acted as followers. They discovered the confidence to identify and assert their national interests, through the very process of CFSP. On the specific issue of Iraq, however, the CFSP was paralysed by the divergent

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137 José Maria Aznar, José Barroso, Silvio Berlusconi, Tony Blair et alii ‘United we stand’ in the Wall Street Journal, 30 January 2003
139 Hill Blair foreign policy mission cit. p. 407; Riddell Blair Europe cit.p. 371
perspectives of Member States. Moreover, Atlanticism was alive and kicking and not only in the “new Europe”, but unexpectedly in Southern European countries.

On Iraq, however, Berlusconi did not take a pro-active role. He did not take part in the Azores summit and this time no Italian troops were offered or sent to Iraq during the hostilities. But he took part in UN initiatives, for instance, when on 22 February 2003, Aznar visited Bush at his ranch in Texas, Blair and Berlusconi joined them in a four-way phone conversation to introduce a second UN resolution that would declare Iraq in breach of UN resolution 1441.

When the US declared the mission accomplished, Berlusconi sent a large contingent to the British-led area for the post-stabilisation period. Berlusconi was quite worried by the lack of public support for military intervention. On 30 January 2003 in a private meeting at Washington, Bush told him that a military intervention had not been decided upon yet, but there would be no other way for regime change in Iraq. When Bush needed Italian troops, he would say it directly without being concerned by public opinion because: “We lead our publics, we cannot follow our publics”.

This showed how the Italian and the US approaches to public opinion were totally different. In late 2005, while preparing a phased withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq by 2006, to avoid a Madrid-like terrorist attack at the March 2006 elections, Berlusconi claimed to have tried to stop Bush from starting the war. This was an electoral move to try to appease public opinion hostile to Iraqi occupation. Berlusconi’s


lack of enthusiasm for Iraqi intervention made him pay a reduced political price, compared to Aznar or Blair. In conclusion the increasing cooperation with the UK in the run up to war in military and defence matters, would shape the second part of the second Berlusconi government’s foreign policy with a tentative Anglo-Italian couple developing, opposed to the Franco-German couple.

2.2.4 The European Presidency and Constitutional Treaty

A resurgent national interest was Berlusconi’s stated approach towards European affairs. The Italian presidency programme stated the objective to approve the Constitutional Treaty by 2003, and to sign it in Rome possibly on 9 May 2004 or before the European Parliament elections in June 2004.\textsuperscript{144} So the national interest, or better Berlusconi’s personal interest was to sign a second ‘Rome treaty’. This was not an easy task in the wake of the Iraqi Crisis divisions.

The IGC was opened in Rome on 4 October 2003, and at the Naples “Conclave” in November, the Foreign Ministers agreed on the consolidated treaty for final approval at the European Council.\textsuperscript{145} This was supposed to resolve the remaining political disputes, which included: the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council decision-making, the composition of the Commission, and the number of National MEPs. The Conclave had suggested compromise solutions for the Commission and the MEPs, however, on QMV there were conflicting opinions among Member States, and there was no easy solution.\textsuperscript{146}

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{144} Giuseppe Mammarella, Paolo Cacace \textit{Storia e politica dell’Unione Europea} (Bari : Laterza 2005) p. 317; see also European Convention’s Rome Declaration of 18 July 2003
  \item\textsuperscript{145} Conclave dei Ministri degli Affari Esteri svoltosi a Napoli il 28 e 29 Novembre 2003, documento finale: proposta della presidenza CIG 52/03 e 52/03 add.1.
  \item\textsuperscript{146} Franco Frattini, Foreign Minister, ‘Comunicazioni del Ministro degli affari esteri sugli esiti del Vertice conclusivo del semestre di presidenza italiana dell'Unione Europea e conseguente dibattito’ Senato della repubblica, 22 gennaio 2004 (Rome : Senato, 2004)
\end{itemize}
The QMV was the crucial issue: the Constitutional Treaty asked for an extension of Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) to other fields including CFSP and ESDP; and it proposed a change in the weighting system of QMV. On this last issue, the European countries divided again into two opposing fields: the Franco-Germans and other “old Europe” Member States supported the “double majority” introduced by the draft treaty (majority required to verify the 50% of Member States and 60% of population), while Spain and Poland supported the Nice Treaty weighting system, which gave them a disproportionate power. Moreover, the newly accessing countries wanted a minority blocking veto to allow them to prevent the big countries to take decisions alone. Moreover, UK opposed to extension of QMV to CFSP, joined by Sweden, Ireland, Finland and the Baltic States, while France, Spain, and Benelux supported the extension. Italy this time acted as “honest broker”.

The Italian presidency was to act as honest broker in the European Council on 12-13 December 2003, to solve the final issues and approve the draft treaty on the basis of the presidency proposals.\textsuperscript{147}

The European Council reached important objectives for ESDP, such as the declaration on EU-NATO cooperation, the establishment of European Defence Agency (EDA) and the transatlantic declaration.\textsuperscript{148}

The IGC session started on 12 December evening with the presidency “confessionals” to find an agreed solution. The option for the Italian presidency was to isolate Spain and Poland, by assuring the British of their “red lines”, and bringing the UK onto the Franco-German side.\textsuperscript{149}

Blair promised to help in the negotiations, if Berlusconi would respect

\textsuperscript{147}Italian Presidency proposal was based on three documents: Progetto di Trattato costituzionale della Convenzione rielaborato dal Gruppo di esperti giuridici (ICG 50/03 e 50/03 ADD1); proposte di modifica della presidenza italiana (ICG 60/03 e 60/03 ADD1); proposte di modifica della presidenza italiana solo sulle questioni istituzionali di maggiore rilevanza: composizione della Commissione e del Parlamento Europeo e calcolo della maggioranza qualificata in Consiglio (ICG 60/03 ADD2).

\textsuperscript{148}See Chapter V ‘The NATO-ESDP relations and the administrative Interests’

\textsuperscript{149}Maurizio Caprara’s interview with Giuliano Amato ‘Saranno cruciali scelte e alleanze di Blair’ in Corriere della Sera, 12 December 2003
the British red lines on QMV. The strategy succeeded in preventing Blair from backing Spain and Poland, but having reached his goal, Blair decided not to publicly back any position. So he had a marginal role in the rest of negotiations, and did not help the presidency much. However, Spain and Poland stuck to their defence of the Nice Treaty. Seeing no room for negotiation and shortly before lunchtime, Chirac, Schroeder and Blair met Berlusconi asking him to terminate negotiations. The Italian Presidency announced the IGC session was closed without calling a plenary session and without approving a final draft treaty. The Italian Presidency had realised that radical positions were arising. Because Member States increasingly pursued national interests, these positions formalised in a Presidency proposal could undermine the whole constitutional process.

The Big Three directorate: When President Chirac intervened to terminate the IGC, he had clear in his mind that the only solution for European integration was a “multispeed process” by establishing a “Big Three” directorate that left out Italy. The joint Anglo-Franco-German initiative’s negotiation which started in November 2003 to put pressure on Iran to stop enriching uranium, did not invited the Italian presidency to join. The Italian exclusion was expressly required by Chirac, who did not want to share the glory with “Big Four”. After the failure to approve the treaty, an Anglo-Franco-German summit was called on 18 February 2004. However the trilateral summit did not get far. Blair saw the trilateral partnership as a chance to create ‘a clear agenda for Europe’ but he did realise that the ‘Big Three’ would only force him to legitimate Franco-German attempts to assert their leadership. European diplomatic circles regarded this trilateral summit

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150 Christophe Châtelot ‘La stratégie "agressive" de Varsovie ne convainc pas les autres Etats d'Europe centrale’ in Le Monde 12 December 2003
152 Frattini Comunicazioni del Ministro degli affari esteri January 2003 cit.
as self-defeating. Italy, Poland, Spain and other Member States opposed the directorate.154 Foreign Minister, Frattini, stated that a ‘more united Europe’ and not a ‘multitrack Europe’ was needed.155 Italian reactions pushed for a counter-directorate composed by the founding members or a Italian-Spanish-Polish directorate, but Foreign Minister Frattini discarded these, because traditional Italian Europeanism rejected exclusive clubs, although it favoured enhanced cooperation.156

The German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, visited Rome on 20 February and reported on the ‘Big Three’ summit. He stated that European integration could not leave Italy aside and a closer integration could only be obtained according to the treaties, by means of enhanced cooperation.157 In March, Blair also reassured Berlusconi that there was no other planned ‘Big Three’ summit, and he agreed on a bilateral summit in London with the Italian Prime Minister.158

The European Council under the Irish presidency eventually approved the Constitutional Treaty on 18 June 2004.

At the end of 2004, France and Germany undermined the US position on international security. At the Munich Transatlantic conference in October, Schroeder stated that NATO should be reformed and he proposed setting up a high level panel to revise it, but faced with a strong US reaction he failed to reformulate it and he did not even attend the following NATO summit. The re-election of Bush in November 2004 and his trip to Europe in February 2005, eventually convinced European leaders to reconcile with the US, overcoming the division of the Iraq Crisis.

154 Tony Barber ‘Berlusconi vents fury on 'big mess' in Berlin’ Financial Times, 17 February 2004; Judy Dempsey “Big three” shift seen to weaken German position’ in Financial Times, 17 February 2004
155 Franco Frattini ‘Exclusive summits will deepen Europe’s divisions’ in Financial Times, 18 February 2004
156 Paolo Cacace interview with president Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, in il Messaggero 1 March 2004 and Mammarella, Cacace op.cit., p. 318; Frattini Comunicazioni del Ministro degli affari esteri January 2003 cit.
157 Judy Dempsey ‘Fischer shifts away from two-speed EU’ in Financial Times, 29 February 2004
158 ‘UK denies big three meeting plans’ in EUobserver, 29 March 2004.
2.3 Contemporary issues

2.3.1 Prodi’s second government: looking for discontinuity

In 2006 the Centre-Left coalition won the general elections with a wafer-thin majority and a strong unreformed Communist parties’ support. Therefore, Prodi’s government proclaimed it would represent a change from Berlusconi in foreign policy. This was supported for electoral purposes by the coalition’s unreformed Communist parties. However, in practice as transatlantic relations would demonstrate, the Centre-Left policy would not differ much from previous policy. On the other hand, following the Centre-Left tradition, Prodi re-established a Mediterranean policy with the Lebanon mission, and Foreign Minister, D’Alema, adopted a Neo-Atlanticist style.159

Iraq withdrawal: After the elections, the terrorists started in Iraq an attack on the Italians, looking for casualties and hoping that the unreformed Communist parties would force Prodi to approve a early withdrawal, as had happened for Spain.160 Prodi stated that he considered the occupation in Iraq a grave error, and he would propose to parliament the troops’ withdrawal that would conform to the agenda agreed with the Iraqi authorities, the UK and the US. The unreformed Communist parties asked for immediate withdrawal by August 2006 to differentiate themselves from Berlusconi’s government’s phased withdrawal, and to claim discontinuity. A follow-on civilian mission with a residual military presence (800 troops) was also considered.161

In the meantime, Bush and Blair announced that British troops would be replaced with Iraqi security forces by the end of 2007.

159 See previous Chapter 1 para: ‘Neo-Atlantiscim: enter the Mediterranean policy’
160 ‘Bomba a Nassiriya. Morti tre italiani’ in Corriere della Sera 27 April 2006
161 ‘Prodi: «La nostra linea non cambia»’ in Corriere della Sera, 27 April 2006; ‘Prodi calls for Iraq withdrawal’ in BBC News online, 18 May 2006; Francesco Battistini interview with Oliviero Diliberto ‘Via da Nassiriya ad agosto, o anche noi siamo come Berlusconi’ in Corriere della Sera, 26 May 2006
“Iraqisation” was an exit strategy, and Blair discussed with Iraqi authorities a possible timetable for withdrawing the multinational forces, including US and British troops, by the end of 2007.\(^\text{162}\)

**The Lebanon:** In July 2006, Prodi’s first foreign policy initiative was the decision to contribute to UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon with a larger contingent. Italy, however, started to withdraw from Iraq, and the last Italian left the country in December 2006. Even the participation in Enduring Freedom was concluded, by withdrawing the Naval Task Force from the Persian Gulf and the liaison staff from Tampa, Florida. Like Zapatero, Prodi assured NATO of an increased presence in Afghanistan, and according to Italy’s Mediterranean policy, Prodi looked for a role in the Lebanon.\(^\text{163}\)

In mid-July, the destroyer ‘Durand de la Penne’ and C-130J were sent on humanitarian missions to repatriate nationals from Lebanon. Then at the G8 in Moscow it was decided to reinforce UNIFIL II under Italian leadership, not least because Italy had good military-to-military relations with Lebanon since 1982. The taking over of UNIFIL II was regarded as a success. On the other hand, it was not possible to launch a UN-mandated ESDP mission, and Rome had to wait through several months of cohabitation before an Italian general would replace the French commander of UNIFIL I, while the Germans assumed the Naval task force command, with a lesser commitment than the Italian navy’s.\(^\text{164}\)

**The votes on Afghanistan:** Although US administration proclaimed “business as usual”, the Prodi government was not appreciated by the

\(^{162}\) ‘Bush, Blair: Iraq war not as smooth as hoped’ in *CNN.com*, 26 May 2006

\(^{163}\) See also Franco Venturini ‘discontinuità all’italiana’ in *Corriere della Sera*, 29 June 2006

\(^{164}\) Compare with Antonio Missiroli ‘Italy’s security and defence policy – between EU and US, or just Prodi and Berlusconi?’ paper presented at the *Colloquium on Italy’s approach to international issues*, at the Centre of International Studies of the University of Cambridge, 16 March 2007 and published in *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Volume 9, Issue 2 August 2007 , pp 149 – 168)
US Ambassador in Rome, Ronald Spogli, who, at the Independence Day 2006 party, emphasised the points of disagreement with Italy.165

The Bush administration’s preference for the Berlusconi government was not just personal, but philosophical and political: Bush appreciated Berlusconi as a blunt, tax-cutting Atlanticist who supported the Iraq war. Prodi made clear that his foreign policy priority was Europe, not the US. The US distrust also stemmed from the strong influence of the unreformed Communits in Prodi’s coalition.166 Germany’s new Chancellor Angela Merkel was now leading on the transatlantic relations. Anyway, D’Alema succeeded in renewing transatlantic ties by building on the credibility earned in the Kosovo Crisis: while Prodi conducted the European policy, D’Alema led on the transatlantic relations in a Neo-Atlanticist style. The Prodi government, however, had a narrow majority in the Senate.

In January 2007, in the Chamber of Deputies, the unreformed Communist parties boycotted a vote on funding the military mission in Afghanistan, and only the decision on the expansion of US military base “Camp Ederle” in Vicenza was approved with a wafer-thin majority. The unreformed Communist ministers even marched in Vicenza against the expansion of the base. On 21 February 2007, D’Alema gave a speech in the Senate on foreign policy priorities in which he urged senators to approve the motion, which was non-binding. He called for consistency against the discontinuity invoked by the unreformed Communist parties, but he also claimed that denying the permission granted to the expansion of the base in Vicenza, would be regarded by the US as an hostile initiative.167

165 ‘Italia-Usa, rischio grande freddo e già ci sono le prime ricadute’ in Secolo d’Italia, 6 July 2006
166 Philip H. Gordon ‘Between Bush and Prodi, Europe will be the Stumbling Block’ translated into Italian in Id. “Tra Bush e Prodi lo scoglio sarà l’ Europa” in Corriere della Sera 12 April 2006
His speech did not appease the unreformed Communist dissidents, and D’Alema had announced that without a majority on foreign policy affairs, the government would resign. The Senate did not approve the motion; it was two votes shy of the required majority of 160. Therefore, the Centre-Right called for Prodi to resign, which he then did.\textsuperscript{168} However, the Centre-Left leaders agreed a non-negotiable list given by Prodi as conditions of his remaining in office, and the Parliament confirmed its confidence. The Prodi initiatives were a way to discipline the uneasy coalition, thus calling the Left-Wing to a more responsible behaviour.

In late-March Prodi again faced a dangerous vote in the Senate on the funding of the Afghanistan mission. This time the terrorists escalated their attacks on Italians in Afghanistan. The US, UK, Germany and the Netherlands criticised the Prodi government for negotiating to free Taliban prisoners in exchange for the Italian journalist, Daniele Mastrogiacomo, who was kidnapped on March 5. Critics said the deal would encourage more kidnappings.\textsuperscript{169} Berlusconi decided not to support the mission’s funding by abstaining and he stated that the US and UK were conscious that it was not a vote against NATO commitment, but a domestic matter.\textsuperscript{170} The Senate approved the funding of missions, including Afghanistan, although the required majority was only obtained with the Union of Christian Democrats opposition votes.

\textbf{2.3.2 Berlusconi’s third government, discontinuity with itself?}

The third Berlusconi government, formed after the April 2008 elections, was “post-heroic” compared to the previous. First, because Berlusconi had already obtained international recognition in his previous term, so “understatement” would be the tone of his third term’s foreign

\textsuperscript{168} ‘Italian PM hands in resignation’ in \textit{BBC News online}, 21 February 2007
\textsuperscript{169} Tony Barber ‘Afghan prisoner exchange damages Prodi’ in \textit{Financial Times}, 21 March 2007; and ‘Mastrogiacomo, il disappunto degli Usa’ in \textit{Corriere della Sera}, 21 March 2007
\textsuperscript{170} ‘Afghanistan: Berlusconi,Usa e Gb Conoscono Nostre Motivazioni’ in \textit{La Repubblica}, 27 March 2007
policy. Second, the international environment had changed: Blair and Aznar had left political life, while Bush was a lame duck; one Berlusconi option was, therefore, to reinforce the Merkel-Sarkozy Atlanticist position. Third, after the sub-prime crisis that hit the US and the UK particular, international security issues became less important than economic concerns.

Atlanticism v Russia: The Georgian crisis in August 2008 gave Berlusconi a dilemma: the US and UK were backing Georgia, a candidate for the NATO accession, but Berlusconi needed Russia’s friendship. Not only was he a personal friend of Vladimir Putin, but Italian companies had important interests in Russia: since 2006, Italian exports had increased by 18%, in particular in the Energy sector, and about 26% of all gas used in Italy was imported from Russia.

Italy was the first to intervene by sending a Red Cross medical team to Georgia on 17 August. Berlusconi became Russia’s best supporter in the EU, by claiming that the EU-Russia partnership should not be endangered by a temporary crisis, and that the EU should not escalate the crisis, especially as Russia was still a nuclear power.

The US took a more aggressive approach and signed an agreement with Poland for the installation of the Ballistic Missile Defence Programme. Russia considered that programme as a direct threat. However, the US goal was to develop within the EU a common response toward Russia.

Therefore, on 12 August, the French President Sarkozy, as acting EU President, agreed with the US to broker a six point cease-fire agreement between Russia and Georgia. On the other hand, the British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, attacked Russia’s aggression, and assured Georgia of an early accession to NATO. At the Foreign Ministers Council in Avignon on 5 September, the EU decided to send

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171 See Francesco Verderami ‘Soldati a Kabul, nucleare iraniano, i dossier che aspettano Berlusconi’ in Corriere della sera 27 May 2008
172 Interview with Cossiga ‘Silvio attento Zapatero vuole infangarti’ in Il Giornale, 20 May 2008
173 Frank Paul Weber ‘Face à Moscou, Berlusconi plaide pour une realpolitik’ in La Tribune, 3 September 2008
an EU police mission to South Ossetia, in cooperation with the OSCE. Foreign Minister Frattini mediated with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Georgian President Saakashvili on behalf of the EU, and reported to the Avignon Council. Frattini was praised by the Muscovite newspapers for defending Russia in Avignon.\(^\text{174}\) He supported a Barroso-Berlusconi-Merkel-Sarkozy Atlanticist position, to negotiate together with the US on the crisis, to find a compromise on NATO’s attitude towards Russia.\(^\text{175}\) The axis appeared only when Germany and Italy proposed a commission of inquiry into the UN framework on Georgian crisis, and when Berlusconi phoned Putin to ask him to accept the Sarkozy plan and the EU police mission.\(^\text{176}\)

However, Berlusconi’s appeasement of Russia met fierce opposition from US Vice President Dick Cheney. He stated that NATO countries should spend more on defence and take a stronger commitment in Afghanistan. Italy should reinforce its commitment and a priority should be to adopt more pro-active rules of engagement for Italian troops. He also called on Frattini to challenge Russian energy hegemony by approving a new EU energy strategy, and inviting Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia to negotiate on it.\(^\text{177}\) On 8 September 2008 Cheney met Berlusconi in Rome. Cheney celebrated the good US-Italy relations, and praised Italy’s large contribution to NATO missions. On the other hand, he deplored Russia’s aggression and supported NATO’s enlargement as a solution that could not threaten Russia.\(^\text{178}\) Berlusconi said that European efforts to defuse tension

\(^{174}\) Antonella Rampino ‘Ritiro dalla Georgia in un mese’ in \textit{La Stampa}, 9 September 2008

\(^{175}\) Interview with Franco Frattini ‘Il nostro Paese farà da ponte fra Russia, Georgia e Usa’ in \textit{Libero} 6 September 2008

\(^{176}\) Andrea Morigi ‘L’Europa entra in Georgia, l’Italia manda venti soldati’ in \textit{Libero}, 7 September 2008

\(^{177}\) ‘Cheney più armi alla Nato contro la nuova minaccia russa’ in \textit{La Repubblica} 8 September 2008; 8 September 2008; on governments priorities see: Francesco Verderami ‘Soldati a Kabul, nucleare iraniano, i dossier che aspettano Berlusconi’ in \textit{Corriere della sera} 27 May 2008

\(^{178}\) ‘Vice President Cheney’s Remarks with Prime Minister Berlusconi of the Italian Republic After Meeting’ the White House, Office of the Vice President, 9 September 2008
between Russia and the US had kept the conflict with Georgia from sparking a new Cold War. Berlusconi’s belief was that Russia had to remain a part of the West, making reference to the agreement establishing the NATO-Russia Council signed at Pratica di Mare on 28 May 2002.  

Berlusconi regarded the NATO-Russia agreement as the masterpiece of his personal foreign policy. But his preferential relations with Russia, once a value added of Berlusconi for NATO, now embarrassed him in front of the US. Berlusconi could not ask his partners to choose between Bush and Putin. So, again, the neutral “honest broker” role between US and Russia, supporting Sarkozy’s official mediator role, was the best option for Berlusconi. Therefore, the “bridging” role was just the result of a choice not to take sides. However, this “not choosing” was good for Berlusconi, who was invited by Bush as the guest of honour at the Columbus Day dinner on 13 October 2008. For a “lunching power” like Italy, such an invitation was recognition.

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Conclusion

A pro-American Prime Minister too close to Russia is a good example of the paradoxes of Italian foreign policy. These, however, are so complex that they cannot be analysed and understood by means of simple paradigms because decision-making is influenced by so many factors, rational and irrational, personal and public opinion-related, the international and domestic policy nexus. After all, in Italy foreign policy is just an element, indeed a minor element, in the broader policy-making process.

The post-Cold War period saw an opportunity to challenge the three pillars policy and replace it with an autonomous, rational and coherent Italian foreign policy. The ruling class was totally caught by surprise by the end of the Cold War. As soon as governments were ready to react, they were wiped out by the bribery scandals, and replaced with new men, who still had ties with the former political regime, yet who were insufficiently educated and unable to cope with the complex international situations they faced.

Italy was forced to show the flag in each Yugoslav crisis, overstretching its armed forces, without obtaining any sound economic return. In the Second Republic the Centre-Left governments were a sign of continuity in three pillars policy. D’Alema felt compelled to confirm his Atlantic loyalty by taking part in humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. But the Kosovo crisis raised the issue of European need for military capabilities if they wished to conduct crisis management operations.

In addition Italy had to reckon with Berlusconi and his personal style of foreign policy. Italian foreign policy was driven by events, as always, but it also followed a personal pattern, rather than the traditional three pillars. This was, however, a change of style, rather than a change of policy objectives, Italy is still Atlanticist and Europeanist, but international events have put an emphasis on a pro-American approach and hindered Italy from pursuing a Mediterranean policy.

The Iraq Crisis was a watershed in transatlantic relations and forced the Europeans to choose between the Atlanticist side, or the
Europeanist, anti-American bloc. Berlusconi allied with the Anglo-Saxons, thus building a friendship with Bush, and a special relationship with Blair. The UK became a bridge for Italy to strengthen relations with the US. Personal foreign policy seems to be a sign of times, as Bush and Blair tended to rely on personal contacts, as a re-enactment of Bush senior’s “Rolodex diplomacy”, and Chirac too was deeply influenced by personal feelings when choosing his allies. Notwithstanding, scholars claimed that no real change of priorities occurred in Italian foreign policy: the Atlantic Alliance remains the main security provider and the EU sets the economic rules. From the Italian view a credible European Defence should be developed in a complementary way to NATO. Furthermore, just as a loosening of Cold War ties made the progressive DCs reassert a role for Italy in the Mediterranean, so a loosening of the war against terror allowed Prodi to reassert a role in the Middle East, leading to intervention in Lebanon. Even good relations with Russia are a recurrent trend in traditional foreign policy dating back to the Kingdom of Savoy, and had just been interrupted by the Cold War.

The most remarkable change in contemporary Italian Foreign Policy is the change of style from the traditional ruling class’s understatement (DCs and Centre-Left) to Berlusconi’s ‘Pekaboo’personal style. However the third Berlusconi government while post-heroic (as compared to his previous one) could end up as even more traditionalist.

In conclusion the three pillars were not questioned even in the post-Cold War scenario because of a certain inefficiency on the part of the ruling class, but also because - as Iraqi events showed - public opinion could not conceive a shift in conventional wisdom on foreign policy. Therefore the inefficiency of the ruling class mirrored the public opinion’s lack of courage in facing the changing international scene, including such choices as developing a credible national military capabilities. Paradoxically, this had led to Italy’s more recent preference to deploy and overstretch its armed forces just to “show the flag”, rather than pursue coherent foreign policy objectives.
In Italy, defence matters assume a different light than in other European countries such as France, Germany or the UK. War-fighting and force deployment are easier said than done, and notwithstanding a good record of operations in the last few years, the military and the MoD have lost most of the status they enjoyed up until the Second World War.

First, we will examine the loss of reputation and the grip on reality that the Italian military had throughout the Cold War. In particular, it will describe how the choice of a limited sovereignty in military affairs was taken, thus influencing the armed forces deployment until today. Moreover, the concept of administrative interests will be introduced.

Secondly, we will list and describe the military operations abroad in which Italian forces have taken part. A special section will assess international operations, and try to outline their principles and structures.

Thirdly, the administrative interest will be merged with multinational structures and cooperation in military affairs, keeping in mind the difference between the European, Atlantic, and Mediterranean environments.

In conclusion we will tackle the contemporary issues of the Italian armed forces - in particular the process of professionalization - in relation to budget restraints. The last section will also introduce the contribution of the Italian armed forces to European defence.
3.1 **Sensitive Issues in defence**

3.1.1 **The Choice of a Reduced Military Sovereignty**

The Second World War armistice and the events resulting from 8 September 1943 showed that Italy was not able to provide itself with an autonomous defence, nor to defend its national territory.\(^{180}\) The military defeat buried the reputation that the armed forces had gained in the First World War.\(^{181}\) During the Cold War, Italian defence was kept at the minimum standards required by NATO commitments and the territorial defence was delegated to US and NATO allies.

After the war, the Italian General Staff recognised that the defence policy had huge gaps in accessing essential resources; the defence industry had not been able to provide the armed forces with the required quantity or quality of equipment, and the limited financial resources prevented them from procuring equipment and maintaining efficient military capabilities. The General Staff admitted that the new armed forces would be smaller and focused more on efficiency rather than on quantity. The armed forces’ objective should be self-defence and border defence. In case of a major war, troops will resist as long as they can, while waiting for military support from the UN (art.51 UN Charter) or the Allies (art.5 North Atlantic Treaty). Therefore, international military assistance agreements were crucial. Italian diplomatic traditions include security arrangements with foreign military powers, so, soon after the war, the Allied powers (the US and the UK) became a point of reference for the Italians.

Since 1943, the six division-sized “co-belligerent” troops of the Italian Liberation Corps had received British surplus equipment, but when the US replaced the British in equipping troops, Italy started to look accordingly to the US. US-Italy friendship became an indispensable alliance: Italy needed the US security umbrella and the US utilised the

\(^{180}\) Sergio Romano *Guida alla politica estera italiana. Da Badoglio a Berlusconi* (Milano : Rizzoli, 2002) p. 14

\(^{181}\) Ludovico Incisa di Camerana *La vittoria dell’Italia nella terza guerra mondiale* (Bari : Laterza, 1996) p. 84-86
national territory as a bridgehead in the Southern Flank including the Mediterranean and the Near East areas.\textsuperscript{182} Italian defence policy became more and more US-related, and relationships with the US were stabilised although they had not been formalised until 1947, when they started to conform with Italian interests.

In April 1948, the DC won the general elections, firmly establishing the country in the Western hemisphere. The Italian government and General Staff believed that the defence policy could be based on unconditional US military assistance, and therefore they didn’t deem it necessary to take part in the Brussels Pact negotiations. A few months later, government and military realised that these assumptions were false and they started to change directions in defence policy.\textsuperscript{183}

Since Italy’s admission to NATO, however, US-Italy relations had been characterised by what is referred to as a “scambio ineguale”, considering the uneven exchanges between the two countries that clearly identified a leader and a follower.

\subsection*{3.1.2 The Military Administrative Interests}

The Italian officer class took charge of the responsibility for the Second World War politico-military defeat, and the “ghost of 8 September 1943” shook the military’s identity, also causing an intergenerational clash between the junior officers, who had fought in the frontline, and the senior officers, who at HQs made the wrong decisions. This original sin deprived the officers’ class of the privileges they traditionally enjoyed. This did not happen for the diplomats, who shared the same responsibilities for politico-military wrongdoing, but who did not admit guilt.

Furthermore, as military and defence tasks were devolved to NATO and the US, the armed forces started to change their military

\textsuperscript{182} Incisa di Camerana, \textit{op.cit}, p. 89-90

\textsuperscript{183} Leopoldo Nuti \textit{The Italian military and the Atlantic Pact} in Di Nolfo Ennio (Ed.) \textit{The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later} (Berlin : De Gruyter, 1991) p.247-249
status into a huge bureaucracy. They just had to self-sustain their own organisation: the effective tasks were to train and maintain a large conscript force, and to provide an usual customer, not a discerning guest, for the national defence industry. Compulsory military service became a way to postpone the entry of younger Italians into the labour market and to shrink statistics on unemployment.

Since 1968, the Soixante-huitard spirit of students started to develop a strong anti-militarism for both ideological (Marxism) and practical (compulsory military service) reasons. Since the 1970s, legal and illegal exceptions to conscription became a rich ground for corruption and political clientelism. Affiliation with political parties or ideologies was increasingly a problem at the time, and the booking of personnel – from conscripts to career officers - was a standard rule that included reporting the political orientation of personnel, thus influencing their military career. Until the Lebanon mission in 1982, the military was decoupling from the grass roots and the officers were particularly allergic to judges, journalists and politicians.

Furthermore, the officer class experienced huge recruiting problems that did not allow a selection of high-standard candidates. These problems were not shared by the Carabinieri, who, thanks to their struggle against organised crime, had always been positively perceived with general consent. Another exception in recruiting were the junior reserve officers (AUC) that consisted of honor graduates from high schools and universities who volunteered for an officers’ course and a longer conscription. This longstanding tradition was resumed with the abolition of conscription, and replaced by a short-term contract for junior officers, thus causing again huge recruiting problems.

Therefore, by not being deployed on active duty, being decoupled from the citizenry, and being transformed into a large bureaucracy, the armed forces started to develop administrative interests. In the same way Plato describes in the “Republic” the change from Aristocracy to Oligarchy in ancient Greece, the officer class aims were no longer dreams of glory on the battlefield, but of highly-paid

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184 Fabio Mini Soldati (Torino, Einaudi : 2008) p. 29, 33
appointments. The officers did not long for commanding positions anymore, but for liaisons with national political institutions (the Quirinale or Parliament), military attachés in embassies, or secondment to international organisations such as NATO, OSCE and later the EU. Administrative interests in international organisations started to become a crucial factor in the officer class careers, although military attaché positions could have been a consolation game for officers who undeservedly got left behind.

Strong military activism since the 1980s, starting in Lebanon, had a positive effect on public opinion and officers’ recruitment.\textsuperscript{186} The military missions put things back into place, as commands on active duty in missions abroad are high-paid positions. Remuneration is restored for active duty, so that it is again the main objective for a military career.

3.1.3 Cold War forces

In the 1980s, the armed forces had 465,000-strength, and the Army had 260,000-strength – excluding Carabinieri - of which 189,000 were conscripts. The Army had 36 Brigades, compared to the professional force 11 Brigades in the 2005 order of battle. Army conscripts were poorly trained, service duty was reduced from 24 to 18 and eventually to 12-months in 1977. Only elite units received training for active duty, like the Alpini Mountain troops, the Bersaglieri battalions attached as specialised infantry to Brigades, paratroopers of the “Folgore” Brigade, the Grenadiers mechanised Brigade “Granatieri di Sardegna”, and the Venice-based amphibious command with the Lagunari “Serenissima” Rgt. Most of these units were attached to NATO-assigned Field Army consisting in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 5\textsuperscript{th} Corps and the 4\textsuperscript{th} Alpini Corps based in Northern-East Italy to stare off the Warsaw Pact’s attack.

Therefore, there were two kinds of armies: the NATO-assigned corps trained to NATO minimum standards and a “garrison force” of the territorial army in the seven Military regions. Exceptions were the Grenadier Brigade attached to the 8\textsuperscript{th} military region, to provide

\textsuperscript{186} Mini op. cit. p.11
ceremonial duties and territorial defence to Rome, and the “Folgore” Parachute Brigade traditionally stationed in Leghorn, Tuscany, in the 7th Military Region to act as a reaction force to be quickly redeployed by Air Force 46th Airlift Brigade based in Pisa. After the Irpinia earthquake in 1980, the Army started to redeploy elite units in Central and Southern Italy to build up a Brigade for force projection and disaster relief.

The Air Force and Navy enjoyed a better situation as the personnel undertook constant training in order to operate the equipment and to maintain interoperability with NATO forces. The Air Force and Navy were well integrated into NATO framework; the Army is integrated on a lesser extent except for Allied Military Force (AMF).187 In the 1970-80s, an Alpini paratrooper company was attached to AMF, thus constantly taking part in NATO winter exercises in Norway.188

The Navy had a pool of volunteers for specialised tasks such as service on submarines, the Battallion-size special forces-scuba group (COMSUBIN), and the Naval infantry “San Marco” Battalion. The Navy “San Marco” (marines are referred to as Marò) was reconstituted in 1965 as a 300-strength Operative Group with a logistic and service unit, and raised in 1995 to an Amphibious Group with a Regiment-size combat unit and support units. The Carabinieri (who, until 2002, were part of the Army) had a 100,000-strenght professional force highly trained in military and civilian police tasks, public order, and wartime territorial control. Being a full professional force the Carabinieri were also sent in international missions.189

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187 Interview with Italian military representative, SHAPE, 4 December 2007.
188 On Italian forces and NATO’s contribution in the 80s, see: Nigel Thomas NATO armies today (London, Osprey Publishing Ltd. : 1987) p. 23-25
189 For Further see Chapter VI ‘the Civilian capabilities’
3.2 From Lebanon to Lebanon: the international missions

Since the 1980s, armed forces have become increasingly involved in international missions abroad. Italian Peace Support Operations (PSOs) range from observation missions and humanitarian relief to tasks of combat forces in crisis management. This ranged from the Lebanon mission in 1982 and to the most recent Lebanon mission launched in 2006.

The first mission during the Cold War was to send a Red Cross Field Hospital (70 medical personnel) to Korea, in Jang Ding Po, from 1951 to 1954. The Navy and Air Force were more active than the Army: C-119 Airlifters of the 46th Air Brigade were sent to the Congo in the 1960s – two crews (13 personnel) were slaughtered in Kindu by the Congolese Regular Army on 16 November 1961 – a Navy fleet was sent to the South Chinese Sea to recover Vietnamese boat people in the late 1970s, an observation force of Helicopters (ITALAIR) began to take part in UNIFIL in Lebanon in 1979, and three Minesweepers in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) framework (10th Coastal Patrol Unit) were stationed in Sharm El Sheik in March 1982 to patrol the Tiran strait. Military observers took part in various UN missions from Sinai to Pakistan – an Army captain of UNTSO was killed in Suez at the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur War - however, no land force had ever been sent abroad before Lebanon.

After the Cold War, the relationship between military components and foreign policy was restored and even military activism became a trend in foreign policy. Therefore the armed forces were forced to change their status from a large conscript territorial army to a professional and projectable force.\textsuperscript{190}

Since the 1990s, Italian troops have been sent worldwide under UN framework in Namibia (UNTAG) 1989-1990, Somalia (UNOSOM) 1992-1993, Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 1993-1994; under UN authorisation in East Timor (INTERFET) 1999-2000, in NATO framework in Bosnia 1996-2004, in Kosovo (KFOR) since 1999 and in

\textsuperscript{190} Julien Tonon ‘Les Missions Militaires Italiennes à l’étranger’ in Notes Défense et Sécurité no. 13, IRIS, July 2007, p.1; Incisa, op. cit, p. 84
Afghanistan (ISAF) since 2003, in ESDP framework in FYROM (Concordia and Proxima) since 2003, Bosnia (EUPM) since 2003 and 2004 (Eufor). Other operations were performed in interventions of the coalition of states or peacekeeping operations outside the international organisation’s framework. In 1982, the Multinational Force was sent to Lebanon by France, Italy and the US in agreement with the host state but without UN approval, because the crisis situation might escalate.¹⁹¹

Other coalition operations include the first Gulf War in 1991, which had UNSCR authorisation, and Provide Comfort in Kurdistan soon after the first Gulf War; “Ippocampo” in Rwanda in 1994; in Albania, Pellicano 1991-1993, as a national mission and Alba 1997, where Italy acted as a leading nation planning a national peacekeeping operation in agreement with the host state and under UN approval. Since 2003, the coalition of states became a “coalition of the willing” with Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq. So Italy chose the UN framework for Africa or former colonial environments, NATO and later the EU framework for building security in the Western Balkans’ neighbourhood, and the coalition of states mainly with US or France and NATO allies for military interventions. The full list of missions abroad confirms the Italian commitment to multilateral organisations such as UN, NATO, OSCE and the EU as a constant in its politico-military foreign relations.¹⁹²

3.2.1 Lebanon

The missions in the Lebanon were, for Italy, the first large long-term projection of a military force in a non-stabilised environment since the Second World War. Defence Minister, Lelio Lagorio, was keen on

¹⁹² For a comment on Italian military operations, see the relevant Chapter in the annual IAI-ISPI publication L’Italia e la politica internazionale. See for instance Natalino Ronzitti, Lucia Marta, Nicoletta Pirozzi ‘Le missioni italiane all’estero: Afghanistan e Libano’ in Natalino Ronzitti, Alessandro Colombo (Ed.) L’Italia e la politica internazionale (Bologna : Il Mulino 2008) pp. 117-130
strengthening the military force to use it as a foreign policy tool for NATO or in the Mediterranean scenario.\textsuperscript{193}

The Lebanon mission of 1982 showed the “New Deal” in foreign and security policy that started with the Euromissile decision: for the Atlanticist Socialist interventionists it was a new start, while for the supporters of “Euro-Atlanticism” it was just an exception to the rule that the armed forces be exclusively deployed for territorial defence in a NATO framework.\textsuperscript{194}

In August 1982, the Spadolini’s government - gaining huge political consensus from both Atlanticist Socialists, progressive DCs and Left-Wing parties - authorised “Operazione Sfinge Azzurra” the deployment from 26 August to 12 September 1982 of a 600-strenght Battalion in the Multinational Forces in Lebanon to help exfiltrate PLO from Beirut.

The main obstacle the Army had to overcome was finding the required personnel. The conscript force was poorly trained and only deployable for national service. The solution was to raise a battalion formed by AUCs, NCOs and re-enlisted conscripts who volunteered for the task. The choice went to the Bersaglieri 2\textsuperscript{nd} Governolo Btn because according to the Army, they represented the “essential being of the Italian soldier” although some complaints about this choice originated from inter-corps jealousy. The additional personnel were hand-picked with volunteers from other corps. The Governolo was trained and deployed abroad as a single unit with good results.\textsuperscript{195}

The slaughters in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps forced a 1,200-strenght Brigade-size “ITALCON” to be deployed on 26 September to help to restore the Lebanese government’s sovereignty. ITALCON was composed of élite units such as paratroopers, Bersaglieri, Carabinieri, Cavalrymen and Marò. All servicemen, including conscripts, were asked to volunteer for the mission or leave, and the units were reinforced with volunteers from AUCs and re-enlisted

\textsuperscript{194} Lagorio \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{195} Giuseppe Lundari \textit{Italiani in Libano 1979-1985} (Milano : Editrice Militare Italiana, 1986)
conscripts. The paratroopers had two full professional units: the 9th Paracommando “Col Moschin” Btn and the 1st Carabinieri Parachute “Tuscania” Btn utilised for combat patrolling and specialised tasks. The 300-strength Navy “San Marco” was formed by professionals and conscripts who volunteered for the mission. The equipment also was intended for territorial defence and the uniforms were too heavyweight for hot weather while the heavy 7,62 mm Beretta BM-59 rifles utilised by the Army were good to mount guard, but not for patrolling. Navy “San Marco” was better equipped and armed with up-to-date 5,56 mm Beretta AR-70.

The French-Italian-US Multinational Force was composed of light infantry, with tank protection and artillery. France was assigned the area of responsibility in the city centre where the Christian-Maronite force was stationed, the US was assigned control of the airport and the Israeli lines, and ITALCON controlled a large area from the sea to the inland, including the Palestinian camps. The US favoured the Christian-Maronite faction that supported Israel, while France kept an eye on its former colonial interests, and Italy tried to maintain a neutral position by emphasising the humanitarian aspects. A Field Hospital with 100 medical officers and 130 Red Cross nurses was ITALCON’s added value.

The Air Force was stationed in the British air base in Cyprus, while a large Naval force cruised off the coast of Beirut. Italy sent a Naval Group (2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 4 frigates and other support ships). It was a huge effort, considering that the US Sixth fleet was composed of 20 ships. In any case, although the Navy and Air Force were lacking amphibious ships and airlifters, the logistic support and the effort to transport ITALCON and turnovers was satisfying. The MoD freighted ferryboats and airliners to provide additional transport capacity. In the following years, three Landing Platform Docks (LPD) were put into line.

In August 1983, the security situation declined because of the Sciite militia rising, and ITALCON was raised to 2,195-strength.

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196 See Lagorio op.cit.
Already in early 1983, Lagorio had thought about raising ITALCON to a 5,000-strength full Brigade as requested by Lebanese President, Amin Gemayel. Spadolini, then appointed as the Defence Minister, declined the Lebanese request in September 1983.198 In October, US marines and French paratroopers suffered heavy casualties as a result of terrorist bombings, and thus their forces were withdrawn. ITALCON was not subject to major terrorist attacks and suffered only one casualty and 80 injured, but the repercussions on public opinion were contained, also because the wounded were not reported by the general media.199

According to official records, ITALCON was not attacked directly because it maintained a neutral position and was very well-liked by the local population because it provided them with humanitarian relief and medical healthcare services. In any case, after the attacks, ITALCON also started to develop more stringent security measures and to procure force protection equipment such as flack vests and additional vehicle armour.

In November 1983, opposition parties asked for ITALCON’s withdrawal because in their opinion, ITALCON had changed its missions from humanitarian to military intervention. Spadolini decided to withdraw it on 20 February 1984. In March 1984, Marò and Carabinieri paratroopers were the last to leave Beirut. A total of 8,345 personnel took part in ITALCON 18-month missions with a 4-month turnover (6-months for Marò).200

For Italy, the Lebanon mission was a positive experience because it broke the isolation of the Italian armed forces, both in public opinion and toward the Allies. Moreover, the ruling class increasingly started to consider the armed forces as a foreign policy tool in anticipation of the military activism in 1990s.201

Spadolini’s government published a Defence White Book in 1985.202 Between 1975 and 1985, the defence budget was raised from 2,3

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198 Lagorio, op. cit.
199 On 15 March 1983 a Marò, Filippo Montesi, was killed during an ambush, and a few paratroopers were injured during the fight backs.
200 Lundari op. cit, p. 31, 43
201 Tonon op.cit, p.1
202 Varsori p. 214 and 220-221
to 2.7% GDP, and military doctrine shifted from a purely defensive military strategy to the defence of national interests by means of missions abroad.\textsuperscript{203} Italy pursued military activism by taking part in the main international missions, continuing the path opened by the Lebanon mission.

### 3.2.2 Gulf one naval operation

In the 1980s, the Navy was the only efficient service in the Italian armed forces. While the Army and Air force had equipment comparable to the US Vietnam-era – except for the Tornado fighters that entered into service in 1983 - the Navy succeeded in modernizing the fleet, thanks to the naval law of March 1975. So the Navy could line up three main battleships including the Vittorio Veneto flagship, missile launcher destroyers, state-of-the-art Maestrale-class frigates, new type Nazario Sauro diesel-propelled submarines, and a fleet of modern minesweepers. The new flagship carrier Garibaldi was to be launched in 1983, and it was bizarrely classified as an all-deck battle cruiser (incrociatore tuttoponte) due to a juridical dispute with the Air force that, according to a 1928 law, had exclusive competence on military aircrafts. A new law was required to create a small naval air component equipped with Harrier II fighters, and to transform the vessel from a large helicopter carrier into a Royal Navy-like VSTOL carrier. The modernization of the fleet was obtained by cutting unnecessary spending. In 1985, the Navy Budget amounted to Lire 2,783 Bn, and 30% was devoted to financing programmes authorised by the 1975 naval law. The Navy’s budgetary policy mainly spent resources for procurement, unlike the Army that spent most of its budget in salaries, personnel lodging and quartering, or the Air force that spent it for pilot training and flight allowances. Therefore, Navy officers received lower salaries, but sailed on state-of-the-art ships.\textsuperscript{204} Moreover, the technological innovations in electronics and automation reduced the

\textsuperscript{203} Incisa, \textit{op.cit}, p. 57

\textsuperscript{204} Interview with Senior officer, Italian Navy finance and supply corps.
number of crews, now composed of professional servicemen or volunteers. The efficiency attained by the Navy made it an ideal candidate for missions abroad. Moreover, a Naval fleet had less serious security dangers on missions than an air or land force, and reassured the Italian government’s casualty aversion. Since 1979, Navy minesweepers had taken part in MFO, and in 1984 the XIV Naval Group (4 minesweepers and a divers’ support ship) was sent to the Red Sea for minesweeping tasks. Italy’s only reaction to the Libyan missile attack in Lampedusa was the maritime surveillance mission “Girasole”.

So, when a Pasdaran light patroller attacked the Italian commercial ship “Jolly Rubino” on 3 August 1987, forcing the Italian government to react, the government was relieved to be able to send the fleet to join US and WEU Navies in the Persian Gulf. On 15 September 1987, the XVIII Naval Group began operation “Golfo Persico” (Gulf One) with 11 Maestrale-class Frigates, 6 minesweepers, 3 auxiliary ships, and 18 helicopters. The Group was employed for political reasons in non-combat tasks such as minesweeping, and the mission was concluded in December 1988. The skills of Italian sailors (many of them conscripts who volunteered for the mission) were internationally appreciated.

The Gulf One operation was defined as the first effective act of maritime power of the Italian Republic.205 However, a Parliamentary interrogation on 16 November 1987 questioned if the MoD’s decision not to allow journalists aboard the ships on operations was a breach of freedom of the press. The MoD answered that the size of the ships did not permit the satisfaction of all the journalist’s requests, nor the US, UK or French Navy embedded journalists. Freedom of the press was assured as the journalists were allowed to interview the Group commander, and to board the ships in port.206

205 See Giorgio Giorgerini Da Matapan al Golfo Persico. La Marina Militare italiana dal Fascismo alla Repubblica (Milano : Mondadori 1989, p.11)
206 Interrogazione di Patrizia Arnaboldi, “Sui motivi della decisione relativa alla esclusione della stampa dalla missione nel Golfo Persico” Interrogazioni con risposta scritte a interrogazioni, in Atti Parlamentari, allegato al resoconto
Furthermore, the Navy staff recognised that there was poor coordination between the Western Navies, due to the fact that in the WEU framework there was no forward strategy, and the participating states had no perception of national interest for Persian Gulf security.

3.2.3 Gulf Two operation, Desert Shield and Provide Comfort

Italy took part to the first war in the Gulf, and after a fierce parliamentarian debate, according to casualty aversions, it was decided to participate in the peace-enforcing mission to free Kuwait with the XX naval group and a Tornado fighter squadron, but no ground troops, to the big dismay of the Army.

The Navy operation in the Persian gulf (‘Golfo Persico 2’ as the Navy considered it a following of “Gulf one”) was carried out without any trouble, except for the Group commander, who made pacifist statements on 29 January 1991 trying to mirror the public opinion. He was forced to resign, so that the officers’ class was reminded by the ruling class that they were just to be zealous executors of orders, without political considerations. Since then, the Navy maintained a Media “black out” similar to the one of Gulf one.

A squadron of Tornado fighters was sent to Saudi Arabia as part of the “Desert Shield” and later the “Desert Storm” operation. The Squadron was raised by hand-picking crews from the three existing Tornado squadrons, and a small detachment of the Carabinieri was sent for Air...
base security. The solution of hand-picking personnel, as already utilised in Lebanon, was not successful this time.

The Air Force actively took part in bombings in Iraq, and in the first combat mission only one Tornado succeeded in stocking up on fuel from the US air tanker, and it continued the mission alone, soon to be shot down by Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery. Tornado crew pilot was captured and shown by Iraqi propaganda on CNN, thus causing great emotion in public opinion. The following bombing missions went on without any more trouble.

However, the air bombings showed European militaries the huge technological gap that existed with the US Armed Forces, as they had no smart bombs, recognition satellites, or Patriot missiles. The Air-land warfare concept experimented by the US showed that the future armed forces would be hi-tech and expeditionary.

Italy was in much more trouble because its most advanced aircrafts, the Tornado fighters, were of the IDS version equipped with conventional bombs, not comparable to the RAF and Saudi Air Force ADV version with advanced avionics. An increase in the defence budget and new procurement programmes were required to build a modern military tool, but the political circumstances were not propitious to raising the defence budget, as all European defence budgets were shrinking as a result of the end of the Cold War.

Moreover, so that the Army could also claim to have had its part in the Gulf, a task force of the “Folgore” parachute brigade was deployed in the “Airone” operation from April to July 1991, along with British, Canadian, Dutch, French, and US troops in the operation “Provide comfort” in Northern Iraq to provide humanitarian relief to the Curds. The lessons learned in Lebanon were applied and paratroopers were deployed to Zakho in Northern Iraq along with a Red Cross field hospital for CIMIC relations according to the best ‘Italian way’ of peacekeeping. The field hospital proved to be very useful in providing humanitarian assistance to the local population, and the Folgore canteen made itself proud by proving to be the best in Iraq. On the other side, paratroopers were equipped to test the latest of the advanced infantryman suite: lightweight desert combat dress, Kevlar helmets and vests, newly issued light weapons like the 223 in.
assault rifle AR70/90 Beretta and squad weapons like the FN/Beretta Minimi (M-249 SAW in the US inventory).

According to the lessons learned in Lebanon, the Brigadier General of Folgore enhanced force protection: additional barriers, sandbags and trenches were added to the Zakho military camp and paratroopers were forced to wear full combat dress, especially when photographers visited the camp. By paying too much attention to appearance, the full combat dress caused dehydration and sunstroke and more harm to soldiers than bullets.\textsuperscript{209} This episode reveals a hidden truth: Italian peacekeeping was becoming a question of form, not of substance, (or to say policy-making) and it was putting soldier’s lives in danger without any end results. The Italy’s political aims were unclear, and “Provide Comfort” was in reality an aid to the Turkish government to assure the neutralisation of Kurdistan. Therefore an increase in the missions abroad just to demonstrate their presence was going to stretch Italian military forces beyond their reach.

3.2.4 Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda

In 1993, a large Italian contingent was sent to the former colony of Somalia taking part in UNOSOM. In this context Brigadier General Bruno Loi, deputy head of the UN mission, clashed with US counterparts on the strategy towards the Somali population. In the summer of 1983, Loi, as Lieutenant Colonel, commanded a ITALCON parachute Btn, thus learning the Italian way of peacekeeping.

Therefore, it was the means, not the common interests, that divided Italy and the US. \textsuperscript{210} The US retained fighting lords of war such as General Aidid, their primary mission, while Italians were keen on the humanitarian side of the operation in order to win “hearts and minds”. With the change of government, Foreign Minister, Beniamino Andreatta, tried to appease the US and the UN HQ, but Brigadier Loi was then forced to resign. The contingent was still composed of

\textsuperscript{209} See also Mini, \textit{op. cit.} p. 36-37

\textsuperscript{210} Incisa, \textit{op. cit.} p. 68
conscripts and entire units volunteered for the mission as a band of brothers, notwithstanding the dangers of the unstable Somali environment. The mission also registered three casualties when checkpoint “Pasta” was ambushed by guerrillas. The ambush originally targeted Pakistani units, which were more unpopular with Somalis than the Western units. The mission recorded the highest number of casualties in Italian peacekeeping with 70 casualties, including deaths from disease. Somalia awakened public opinion making aware the fact that the “humanitarian peace builder” mantra for our international missions since Lebanon could not be welcomed in the host country’s environment, especially in Somalia were Italy reminded in the colonial era and had sent military advisors to former dictator Siad Barre.

The heavy casualties in October 1993 for the US “Ranger task force” in hunting down Aidid, and the consequent withdrawal of US forces in March 1994 showed that the Italian approach to the Somalia situation was more appropriate than that of the US, although the Italian contingent was also withdrawn in March 1994. In March 1995 Italian troops returned to back up the UNOSOM evacuation, showing high efficiency in the operation. UNOSOM proved to be unsuccessful because the humanitarian disaster was not resolved and Somalia was left on its own in a spiralling violent and criminal environment.

Alpini units were also sent to Mozambico to show the flag in the UN mission. Somalia and Mozambico showed that Italian troops could perform well in failed states of post-colonial environments, so that “Ippocampo” intervention with a few “Col Moschin” paracommandos was planned to rescue European nationals and to join French and Belgian operation “Turquoise” in Rwanda. These kinds of post-colonial missions were not foreign policy or defence primary objectives, were usually not welcomed and just demonstrated pro-UN interventionism.

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211 Mini op. cit. p. 84
212 Incisa, op. cit. pp. 64-65
A true foreign and security policy priority was about to intervene in the Western Balkans, where building security in the neighbourhood was at stake. These interventions were challenging, because a ground intervention could involve casualties, and intervention alongside NATO allies required strong interoperability and state-of-the-art equipment and tactics, in particular for an intervention in Kosovo that involved combat operations.

To implement the military aspects of Annex 1A of the Dayton agreement of 14 December 1995, the NAC launched, on 16 December, operation “Joint Endeavour” based on UNSCR 1031, by sending a NATO-led IFOR on 20 December 1995 with a one-year mandate. After the Bosnian elections in September 1996, the NAC concluded that a reduced military presence was needed and launched Operation Joint Guard/Joint Forge thus establishing a 32,000 strength SFOR based on UNSCR 1088 of 12 December 1996 to replace IFOR at the expiration of its mandate on 20 December 1996. SFOR was put under Saceur and since 19 February 2001, AFSouth has become a Joint Force Command for SFOR. NATO countries and a few non-NATO countries took part in the SFOR. The SFOR force has been shrunk by NAC since October 1999, and the periodic 6-month reviews of the SFOR force level brought to “option 2” in March 2000 to a reduction in personnel from 28,000 to 20,000. In March 2003 there were 12,000 personnel to be reduced to 7,000 in 2004, before the hand over to the EU. SFOR was composed of three multinational brigades each of which contained distinct multinational Battle Groups that were reinforced battalion task forces. In addition there were Tactical Reserve Forces and an Over-The Horizon Operational Reserve Force.

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213 NATO nations: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA. Non-NATO: Albania, Austria, Argentina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. as of March 2003, Source SFOR website
The Italian armed forces were sent to Bosnia beginning in August 1995 without the necessary resources.\textsuperscript{214} The only available professional unit, the “Col Moschin” 9\textsuperscript{th} Rgt. had been in theatre with the Forward Operative Base to prepare the terrain for the main force and the Bersaglieri of the “Garibaldi” Brigade were deployed in a tent camp but, considering the long-term stay, they re-utilised former Yugoslavian army barracks.\textsuperscript{215}

Italy contributed to IFOR and SFOR with 2,200 personnel in the Multinational Brigade North. Considering the restructuring of force levels the Multinational Brigade North was replaced by a 980-strength “Italian Battle Group” in the same area of responsibility. In a further revision of SFOR, on 2 December 2002, the Italian contingent was redeployed in the Multinational Brigade South-East and rotated in its command, and the Italian Battle Group merged with the German unit in a “IT-GE Battle Group” based on two national Btns. The IT-GE unit was reorganised as Task Force South-East on 21 May 2004. In 2004, before the replacement of Eufor, the Italian contribution (Italfor Bosnia) totalled 1,140 personnel.

At the end of the day, Bosnia provided a good training ground for the new professional force, and many élite units and most of the volunteers had a 4 or 6-month tour of duty in Bosnia that, considering the salary and the limited risk, was regarded as the most desired mission for soldiers.

\subsection*{3.2.6 Operation Alba}

In 1997 a major crisis burst out in Albania that had been an Italian protectorate until 1938, when it was annexed. This was informally re-established from the Summer of 1991, mainly to stop the massive illegal immigration of Albanians via the Italian Adriatic shores. Therefore, already in the Summer 1991, Italy launched the “Pellicano” mission,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{214} Incisa, \textit{op.cit}, pp. 64
\item \textsuperscript{215} Mini, \textit{op.cit}, p. 38
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
sending a national unarmed contingent, mainly composed of Army engineers, medics, and support personnel.216

During the Bosnian crisis, a consortium of unscrupulous politicians, bankers and organised criminals created financial “pyramids” that worked this way: with the mirage of easy profits banks attracted small investors paying them in cash with the money freshly deposited by the previous investors, so that small investors rushed to deposit more and more money into financially unstable banks. The bubble burst in November 1996 wiping out the savings of 70% of the Albanians, who started civilian disturbances, even looting military arsenals, thus causing many casualties. Moreover, internal instability caused a new wave of emigration, and the Italian government decided to intervene, considering the new wave as the first drop into an Ocean of new illegal immigrants. Italy decided on a full blockade of boat people and to send troops into Albania.

The OSCE Permanent Council expressed the need to intervene in Albania to restore public order in the resolution 160 of 24 March 1997. The GAERC on 24 March 1997 proposed to deploy a police force within CFSP framework to restore public order.

However, the failure to approve a European mission under the CFSP or WEU framework, forced Italy to proceed by itself, by preparing the ground for “Alba” mission. Considering that no International Organisation claimed the lead of the mission in Albania, UNSC offered the lead to Italy on 27 March 1997 and UNSC res. 1101(1997) of 28 March 1997 authorised the creation of the Multinational Protection Force to protect the humanitarian aid in Albania. Therefore “Alba” became an Italian-led multinational humanitarian mission under the auspices of the WEU and the blessing of the EU, hence “Alba” is a classical example of “coalition of the willing”. Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Romania, Spain Turkey, and later Belgium, Portugal and Slovenia decided to contribute with troops that reached the maximum strength of 3,500 personnel. Interviewed by RAI National Broadcast, the Italian commanding General asked by the journalist “in Alba, where is Europe?” replied

216 Incisa, op.cit, p.86
“it’s here” pointing his finger at his left shoulder bearing a small EU flag wore on Alba uniforms. Although the mission was officially within a multinational framework. Italian traditional Europeanism saw Europe just as a flag, because it had no real power.

On 29 June and 6 July 1997 the political elections took place, and the new Albanian Parliament was elected and installed in office. In August 1997, “Alba” was concluded with positive results, helping the transition of the Albanian population from instability and civil disturbances to normal life and moderate rule of law.

3.2.7 KOSOVO

Soon after the end of the war in Kosovo, Russian armoured units of SFOR left their assigned areas of responsibility in Bosnia and rushed into Kosovo to reach Pristina before NATO troops, and from 1999 to 2003 occupied the Pristina airport. Only the steadiness of British general Mike Jackson commanding the NATO troops, allowed them to avoid a new war.

KFOR started on 12 June 1999 with the end goal of creating a secure environment to allow refugees to return and to protect the UN civilian administration. Since 1998, the Italian contingent had been deployed in FYROM in NATO operation “Joint Guarantor” to rescue OSCE observer from Kosovo. Therefore, the Bersaglieri “Garibaldi” Brigade reinforced with a Carabinieri MSU and the Navy “San Marco” marines entered Kosovo at midnight of 12 June 1999 and reached their area of responsibility in Pec on 14 June 1999 to establish the Multinational Brigade West (MNB-W) under Italian command. The first NATO troops entering Kosovo commandeered billets and any available roof. KFOR started to build bases. The comfortable “Villaggio Italia” was built only in 2003, but Air Force engineers had built an air base in Dakovica in August 1999, and both structures were built in the long-term perspective to be given back to Kosovar civilian authorities. “Villaggio Italia” is just a small replica of US base Camp Bondsteel.217

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217 Mini, op.cit, p. 39
In January 2001, KFOR command and control structure established operational control transfer of authority from Saceur to AFsouth commander. In spring 2001, civilian disturbances called for a reinforcement of KFOR and the Navy “San Marco” Rgt. - withdrawn in January 2000 - was sent back to Kosovo, from March to May 2001. On 17 November 2001 the first political elections took place in Kosovo, and on 6 June 2002, considering the new security situation in the Western Balkans, NATO decided to reduce SFOR and KFOR strength according to 10 May 2002 NAC decisions: SFOR shrunk from the strength of 19,000 to 12,000 by the end of 2002; KFOR reduced brigade units and shrunk from 38,000 to 32,000 by the end of 2002, and finally to 29,000 by June 2003. In November 2002, in the KFOR review, MNB West and South were merged in a 10,000-strength MNB-SW under German and Italian rotational command.

The Over The Horizon Forces (OTHF) composed of 650-strength 187th Parachute Rgt. of the “Folgore” - until June 2004 - , and 160 Carabinieri from two companies of MSU/SFOR to reinforce MSU/KFOR – were quickly redeployed sent to reinforce KFOR and the MSU/KFOR to cope with the civil disturbances and interethnic tensions from mid-March of the until 18 April 2004. The paratroopers stayed until June 2004. Therefore, in anticipation of the political elections on 23 October 2004, in September NATO reinforced KFOR with 20,000 personnel of OTHF in operation “Determined Commitment 2004”. Between early October and mid-November 2004, 500 paratroopers of the 187th Rgt. of “Folgore” and 300 marines of the Navy “San Marco” of the OTHF strengthened KFOR. Since then, Army units have been assigned to the NATO Western Balkans Operational Reserve Force and OTHF to take part in the annual exercise “Determined Effort” in Kosovo.218

Since 1 January 2005, KFOR operation “Joint Guardian” was renamed operation “Joint Enterprise” and in the new KFOR revision, the MNB-SW was reorganised in mid-May 2006 into two Multinational Task Forces (MNTF): Italian-led MNTF-West and German-led MNTF-South. The ‘Italian way’ of peacekeeping continued its tradition with the inclusion of Red Cross nurses in the Italian contingent and it

218 SMD sull’operazione http://www.difesa.it/Operazioni+Militari

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opened a new chapter on 12 August 1999 when FM radio news broadcast in Albanian and Serbian languages “RADIO WEST” were launched by Italian CIMIC. Moreover, Military administrative interests got the best score with four KFOR commanders (see Table 1): 219

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>KFOR Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>Gen. Giuseppe Valotto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-present</td>
<td>Gen. Emilio Gay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Italian MoD)

Furthermore, from September 1999 to June 2002, the NATO operation “Allied Harbour–AFOR” was replaced by the Italian-led NATO operation “Communication Zone West” under KFOR command. The financial effort was adequate to administrative interest outcomes: in the first semester in 2000, financial effort amounted to Lire 277.869 m. 220 In the first semester in 2009, the military and police missions in Kosovo expenses reached € 97.540.539 for 2.405 personnel. 221

3.2.8 ISAF & Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan

In 2003, Italy first deployed troops in “Enduring Freedom”, the US-led operation to fight against terrorism and contributed also to UNSCR authorised ISAF that was officially put under NATO joint command in Brunsumm in 2006 by means of a UNSCR.

Therefore Italy deployed troops in two totally different missions and tasks. ISAF is mainly a post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction mission agreed on by the host government, and France,

219 Defence Minister, Arturo Parisi, ‘Comunicazioni sulla partecipazione dell’Italia Intervention alle missioni all’estero’ on Italian participation to military operations abroad’ IV Commissione Difesa, Senato della repubblica 26 July 2007 (Roma : Senato, 2007)
220 See legge 7 Marzo 2000 n. 44 and legge 10 agosto 2000 n. 228
221 decreto-legge n. 209, 30 November 2008
Germany, Spain and Italy agreed on this peacekeeping approach (Italy had 1,900 soldiers in Afghanistan, part of a 31,000-strong ISAF) while “Enduring Freedom” is a US-led combat operation that involved 70 countries of which 27 contributed with “force packages”. On 2 October 2002, Parliament approved the deployment of a 1,000-strength Alpini Rangers Rgt. reinforced with Carabinieri paratroopers and special force units of Task Force “Nibbio” with a 6-month mandate from 15 March 2003, to be relieved in June by the 187th Parachute Rgt of “Folgore” that ended its mission on 15 September 2003, as authorised by Parliament.222 Task force Nibbio’s mission has been considered the most dangerous since the Second World war. The Navy’s participation in “Enduring Freedom” was renewed until December 2006.223

Italian involvement in both missions caused some ambiguity. For this reason troops belonging to NATO countries are not welcomed by the local population as their tasks could be twofold. However, the decision to officially put ISAF under NATO control caused military expansion to the whole Afghani territory in 2005 and confusion with Enduring Freedom: on one side NATO accepted the US imposition to utilise the Brunssum HQ. On the other side, NATO and the US thought the situation was under control, while the territory was increasingly under Taliban-Pashtun control and attacks on NATO troops were skyrocketing.224

NATO is investing all its credibility and resources in Afghanistan, and it is asking for more troops to be contributed to NATO Countries, and above all it is asking France, Germany, Italy and Spain to remove caveats to combat tasks in their rules of engagement. These countries should join US, British and Dutch troops in fighting against the Taliban. Italian Special Forces are already fighting against the Taliban: the Task Force 45 (an Italian inter-service Special Forces unit) is operational in the Farah province in Western Afghanistan. Its activities are not known by the public. Italian political parties and public opinion cannot accept the use of combat troops as shown by

223 See Chapter 2 “the Lebanon”
224 Mini op. cit. p. 14-15
Prodi’s government crisis. Therefore, to win domestic political support, the Italian contribution to ISAF put emphasis on civilian reconstruction rather than on military action.

3.2.9 Iraq

Italian troops stationed in Iraq on a post-war stability and reconstruction mission named “Antica Babilonia”. The mission had nothing to do with the US aggression of Iraq, but it lacked however a legal basis, as it had not been authorised by UNSCR, nor was there any host government to agree on the stationing of troops. The legal basis was then provided by UNSCR 1511 (2003) that legitimised the coalition of the willing presence in Iraq.

The military mission, however, was in line with the “Italian way”. The Italian Joint Task Force Brigade strength was conceived for the protection of the force and rules of engagement were strict. The civilian-military cooperation acted as a peace-building component for a ‘non-intrusive’ role in relation to the local population, and acted in boosting civilian reconstruction.

As a typical example of the ‘Italian way’, the Carabinieri MSU Regiment was tasked with crowd control operations, patrolling, force security missions, training the local police, cultural heritage protection and archaeological police, and in humanitarian assistance which included controlling human rights abuse in Iraqi jails, and medical support.

When the Italian Joint Task Force arrived in Iraq, all the Iraqi authorities and institutional structures had totally collapsed and their re-establishment was prevented by the presence of tribes and political and religious leaders who disputed authority over the region and who constituted an increased conflict risk factor, either amongst themselves or against the Coalition Forces. Crime was almost non-existent and did not represent a direct threat, but public security should have been enforced for the sake of the local population. Anyway the situation has not improved enough since then to allow transition to the ‘combat replacement’ phase.
The Italian contingent succeeded in building good relations with the local population until the Nassiryia bombing in November 2003 hit the CIMIC HQ, and in particular the Carabinieri MSU support unit. This could be seen as a terrorist strategy to decouple the Italians from the local population. Therefore, security measures were increased for the physical security of the Libeccio compound with the execution of check-points in pre-planned or unexpected operations, and armed and armoured patrols, while the humanitarian assistance was limited to the bare essentials. The defence staff asked for more aggressive equipment such as attack helicopters, armoured and protected vehicles for force protection, but Parliament had trouble in authorising the deployment of the equipment.

Force protection was indeed the crucial issue for Coalition Forces in Iraq. On 21 January 2005, an Army crewman was killed by enemy fire, because his helicopter lacked the additional protection for the gunner that was required by his unit and not authorised by the General Staff and Parliament.

The Italian Joint Task Force lost part of its humanitarian approach and developed a security approach, and became more involved in active military fighting against guerrillas as shown in the “Battaglia dei ponti” in August 2004 that was shown on TV by RAINEWS24 causing big concerns in public opinion about deployment in Iraq, because a NCO could be clearly heard telling his sniper to “annihilate” enemies.225 Military jargon is not suitable for prime time.

In summer 2006, according to the decision of the Italian government, the Italian contingent was pulled out of Iraq, because troops were needed for a new mission. Only 50 military advisors were left in NATO HQ for training Iraqi armed forces. In three years, operation “Antica Babilonia” had lost 29 soldiers and 7 civilians.226

225 Maurizio Tarenta e Sigfrido Ranucci ‘Nassiriya agosto 2004: un giorno di guerra’ RAINEWS 24
226 ‘Bomba a Nassiriya. Morti tre italiani’ in Corriere della Sera 27 April 2006
3.2.10 UNIFIL

In July 2006, Israel fought against the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon starting an international crisis. UNIFIL I mission had been stationed in Lebanon since 1978, however a strengthening of the UN force was needed. Italy, now ruled by the Centre-Left with Prime Minister Romano Prodi, started intense diplomatic activity at the UNSC to strengthen UNIFIL I, thus resulting in UNSCR 1701 (2006) that raised the force of UNIFIL II.

Engagement in Lebanon also had a political meaning as it was opposed to Berlusconi’s US-friendly Iraq engagement and an initiative that would bring Italy back to UN multilateralism. Therefore, the Prodi government set UNIFIL II as a foreign policy priority, also bearing in mind the Centre-Left’s Mediterranean policy. The EU common position contributed to the success of UNIFIL II that was hailed as a major foreign policy achievement of Prodi’s government and a political masterpiece. The UNIFIL II had strong popular support and it was welcomed by Left-Wing parties, while the Centre-Right opposition parties just made a few formal objections. Prodi had also tried to launch the Lebanon mission in ESDP framework, to help the Middle East peace process. According to Centre-Left Mediterranean policy, the political aim was to show the US that the EU could be a credible security provider in the area.

On the other hand, a UN mission was a positive solution because it allowed large participation from Arab and Muslim countries, thus promoting multilateralism.

UNIFIL I was a typical UN peacekeeping mission commanded by a French General. Italian troops were deployed in the “Leonte” operation from September 2006, thanks to troop withdrawal from Iraq.227 Administrative interest, however, was not as successful as the political results. The Italian contingent was the largest in UNIFIL II, but Italy replaced France in UNIFIL II command only in February 2007 – with the appointment of General Claudio Graziano - and held temporarily the command of the Maritime Task Force of UNIFIL II,

227 See Chapter 2 “the Lebanon”
soon passing it on to Germany. Moreover, a statement on the UN mission’s lack of efficiency by the new UN peacekeeping Chief, General Castagnetti, caused diplomatic tensions with the UN and the eventual withdrawal of Castagnetti’s candidature (later appointed Army Chief of Staff)), thus postponing the change of UNIFIL II command. On the other hand, UNIFIL innovated UN peacekeeping by creating a Military Strategic Cell in DPKO to act as a link between DPKO and UNIFIL II in operational planning. The first commander was an Italian General, then replaced by a French while Italy kept the Deputy director position and 7 military officers in the staff.\footnote{See Ronzitti, Marta, Pirozzi \textit{op. cit.} p.127}

Italian troops performed well and the reminiscence of the 1982-1984 mission was still alive in the minds of the Lebanese population. The Italian-Lebanese Army officer networks were still working, thus contributing to the improvement of the security corner of the contingent.

The Lebanon security framework was acceptable, as long as the ceasefire was respected. The disarmament of Hezbollah militias in conformity with the ceasefire agreement was a sensitive issue for UNIFIL II. Although the disarmament should have been carried out by the Lebanese Army, Hezbollah could react and in this case UNIFIL II troops were supposed to intervene. So far, UNIFIL II has succeeded in restoring peace in Lebanon, and the Italian way of peacekeeping has worked well, although it showed that Italy cannot work alone or without EU Member States and that it is very difficult to launch an ESDP military mission in the Middle East.\footnote{See Tonon \textit{op. cit.} p.10-12}
3.3 Critical issues in the international missions

3.3.1 Decision-Making

“L’Italia ripudia la guerra come strumento di offesa ai popoli e come mezzo di risoluzione delle controversie internazionali (Art.11 Costituzione italiana)"

Art.11 of the 1948 Constitution is an excerpt from the Briand-Kellog Pact modified to allow participation in UN peacekeeping. Art. 52, 78 and 87 of the Constitution rule out armed forces’ status and the declaration of war by Parliament and the President of the Republic. The Constitution does not provide any rule on international crisis, PSOs or crisis management. The application of the 1941 law on forces’ deployment was limited towartime, therefore forces deployed in PSOs maintained peacetime rules also for combat missions. For instance, the Gulf Two captives were considered “absent without leave”.

A law of 31 January 2002 and a law of 31 July 2005 now rule the armed forces’ deployment in PSOs according to military rules and to relevant international law and international criminal law.

The institutional decision-making for authorising the deployment of troops abroad for PSOs requires a request from the government to Parliament, to be authorised by vote in the two chambers. A law or a government’s decree shall be adopted to finance the mission for one year. The financial authorisation is the main legal instrument of the democratic control on the armed forces. The MoD has to manage the force together with the other ministries related to the mission.

No specific framework for a decision-making structure has been institutionalised, notwithstanding the experience of recent operations. The political system was not suitable for crisis intervention situations: a solution envisaged after Kosovo Crisis was to attribute specific powers to the President of the Republic.230

In 2001 the so-called Ruffino resolution approved in principle by the Defence Committee of the Chamber of Deputies established that

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230 Massimo D’Alema, interview with Federico Rampini Kosovo, gli Italiani e la guerra (Milano, Mondadori : 1999)
the government be authorised by the President of the Republic and by Parliament in order to deploy military operations abroad. The ESDP requires an intergovernmental coordination for policy convergence in European defence, not for defence integration. So, European federalism theories do not help the national framework and no “external tie” is available as a reference for the national system. In any case, three elements are crucial in authorising a mission abroad: political framework, technical factors, and public perception.

The political framework: The government, Parliament and political parties have the decision-making power to launch a mission and for its continuous support. According to its Constitution, Italy participates in UN or UN-mandated missions. Multilateral missions promoted by an international organisation in which Italy takes part and in particular NATO, OSCE and the EU are considered equally legitimate UN missions.

The government and Parliament may choose coalition framework according to political aims and practice shows that contribution should be adequate to the EU’s big three contribution in NATO or US-led operations, or ESDP operations in the Western Balkans. Italian commitment to NATO and ESDP can be considered as a constant in national security policy.\textsuperscript{231} Iraq was a rift in multilateral approach: the mission was not under UN nor NATO framework, nor had it been generated on international consensus as Gulf Two in 1991 or Afghanistan in 2002.

On the other hand, it shall not be forgotten that foreign and security policy is taken hostage by domestic policy choices. Voting on mission financing, in particular for Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, has been a sensitive political issue in Parliament. Opposition parties usually vote against the financing, while Left-Wing parties oppose without mincing to any military mission. The political unrest about mission voting is of course not beneficial to the country’s image.

\textsuperscript{231} Tonon \textit{op cit}, p.7.
The technical factor: A few elements are required to project a self-sustaining force for at least 6 months in any scenario, such as the number of available and trained personnel, the quality of equipment, transport and logistics, rules of engagement and financial resources. Financial resources are very important, not only for operation expenses but also because the salaries of the personnel may be increased tenfold by operational allowances. Already in 1982, a private engaged in Lebanon’s Multinational Force earned $1,600 a month, instead of a standard salary of Lire 200,000 (around $110). Nowadays a private may earn €5,000 instead of the €1,200 standard salary. This system burdens the tax-payer and removes differences between salaries and responsibilities, as salaries between officers, WOs and soldiers are levelled out.

Public opinion: Public support is increasingly becoming a crucial issue. Public opinion has showed to be generally in favour of international missions, but there are of course exceptions. The majority of public opinion (78%) was against intervening in Iraq. The Vatican does not, however, play a major role in opposition to war, not as much as political parties insist on the “ethical” aims for the missions. Conventional wisdom puts strong emphasis on casualty aversion, although it is not as crucial as one may believe. Nassiryia casualties did not cause troops to withdraw from Iraq- on the contrary, although the population was largely against the intervention, it showed mourning and solidarity towards the troops. Even opposition parties, with the exception of the unreformed Communists, did not take a chance to speculate on withdrawal. The public opinion’s reaction to Nassiryia allowed Italy to avoid being defined as the West’s weaker link.

3.3.2 The Italian Way of Peacekeeping

Italy has developed an “Italian way” of peacekeeping, making a substantial use of “hearts and minds” civilian-military cooperation, with a strong civilian and police component, and a limited military

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232 Tonon op cit, p.2-3
fighting component. Reconstruction and state-building capabilities are particularly encouraged as shown by Italian-led Liaison and Observation Teams in Bosnia and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. The “way” is model has been successful on many occasions, and it is mainly drawn from the Western Balkans operations, in particular from the “Alba” model. Thanks to this the Italian troops are usually welcomed by the local population. The ‘Italian way’ is also aimed at improving security and territorial control, and to obtain a more efficient utilisation military and financial resources in the mission. The soft approach works better in peacekeeping than in warfighting.\textsuperscript{233} Soft rules of engagements and “caveats” may, however, cause troubles between Italians and Americans or the British, as is the case in Afghanistan, although the French and Germans have also experienced it. Italy considers its model to be the most appropriate for its armed forces and especially the most acceptable for its public opinion.

3.3.3 The overstretching of Forces

In early 2009, Italy deployed 9,000 personnel in 33 missions in 21 countries worldwide for a wide range of PSOs missions.\textsuperscript{234} The maximum deployment strength has reached 12,000 personnel. The total cost reach €1 Bn for 2007, on a total defence budget of €20 Bn.\textsuperscript{235} Therefore forces are stretched to the maximum considering the available resources. The MoD hopes to reduce the burden by employing state-of-the-art equipment to enhance projectability without increasing costs. However, the costs of operations also include high operational allowance for the personnel deployed. The costs of operations decrease the resources available for procurement and R&D budget, thus straining the equipment acquisition. In the long-term the current missions are straining future capabilities for future missions. In

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{233} Tonon \textit{op cit}, p.9-12 \\
\textsuperscript{234} See Decreto Legge n. 209, 30 December 2008, for the first semester 2009, authorised force was 8,686 personnel \\
\textsuperscript{235} Italian MoD, Nota aggiuntiva al bilancio della Difesa 2007
\end{flushleft}
the meantime, the militaries are getting by and “do with what they have got” the best they can. Although force protection is becoming a priority for ground forces, not enough is spent on protection.\textsuperscript{236} Any way, any service branch can make the best use of its available resources, only the Army experienced difficulties in this matter.

3.3.4 The Lack of a Coherent Strategy, Objectives and Return

In 2007, Italy was the first troop contributor to ESDP (together with Germany), the eighth contributor to UN peacekeeping, the fourth financial contributor to NATO (after the US, the UK and Germany) and the sixth financial contributor to the UN budget. However, Italy’s influence in international policy is by far smaller than that of France, Germany or the UK, thus colliding for its ambition for Carlo Maria Santoro’s “Media Potenza Regionale”. Italy does not have a permanent seat at the UNSC, although it succeeded in blocking Germany in having one and obtained a temporary seat for 2007-2009.

There is no Defence White Book identifying national security threats—the Italian Defence White Book of 2001 just depicts the security scenario and the contemporary armed forces' task at the time of publication. In the wake of the Western Balkan crisis, a few security analysts have brought up a debate on security threats.\textsuperscript{237}

On the one hand, an experiment for a study on national security and international threats was attempted under the auspices of Foreign Minister, D’Alema, with the publication of “Rapporto 2020” by a committee established by Farnesina that included representatives from the institutions and – this was the real innovation – leading exponents from Think Tank and industry community.\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{236} Mini \textit{op. cit.} p. 82
\textsuperscript{237} Incisa, \textit{op.cit,} p. 84-86
Notwithstanding the chance of a recovery for an autonomous foreign and security policy, Italy was neither able to set a clear agenda, nor to end states for its security priorities:\textsuperscript{239}

“Nel caso italiano, la politica si e sempre distinta per una grande vocazione interculturale e di cooperazione: atlantica prima, europea e atlantica poi, e infine europea, atlantica e mediterranea. Le operazioni hanno contribuito al prestigio nazionale e ai successi della nostra politica estera pur senza monopolizzarla o fagocitarla. I militari più maturi e impegnati sono cresciuti in professionalità, e assieme a loro è nata sul campo una nuova generazione di diplomatici in grado di dare agli interventi un quadro di riferimento e d’interesse più ampio. Nonostante questa grande crescita comune, la nostra politica non è riuscita né a selezionare impegni e priorità né a far decollare un vero «sistema paese» in grado di sostenere nelle operazioni la politica e la capacità progettuale italiana.” \textsuperscript{240}

Therefore, Italy has become a major actor in peacekeeping by not following a specific national interest, but a military ‘Chair Policy’.

The Crimean syndrome is clearly recognisable for Lebanon: in summer 1982, Defence Minister, Lagorio, remembers that Prime Minister, Spadolini, exulted when he was updated on the military preparation for the multinational forces in Lebanon by saying: “ma questa è una nuova Crimea! Io sono Cavour e tu sei Lamarmora!”\textsuperscript{241} Also Prodi was compared to Cavour for UNIFIL mission.\textsuperscript{242}

When intervening in a mission, Italy lacks a coherent strategy of national interest. Therefore, the definition of a clear “end state” for the missions is delegated to the international organisation or to the leading nation in case of a coalition. Contributing states have to agree on a common mission end state. Italy is not very keen on end states, although it is demanding on rules of engagement and a soft approach as shown by the “Italian way” of peacekeeping. Contributing states may differ on national approaches to peacekeeping as shown by Afghanistan. Therefore, the assessment of the success of a mission

\textsuperscript{239} Incisa, \textit{op. cit} pp. 64-65
\textsuperscript{240} Mini, \textit{op. cit} p.22-23
\textsuperscript{241} Lagorio, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{242} quoted in Tonon \textit{op. cit}
depends not so much on the stated aim – that is never easy to assess - but on the integration and the solidity of the contributing states.

Public opinion accepts the lack of political or economic return considering the mission to be more “morally acceptable” if it is “no pain, no gain”. There is an exception to the rule, and political aims do support Italian intervention. In these cases, the aims are not stated, so as not to loose the support of public opinion.

The economic interest in Iraq could be in natural resources. ENI had important interests in Iraq oil and in late 1990s it had obtained a concession in the Nassiryia region where Italian contingent was going to deploy. The Cabinet had also drafted a paper on possible economic exploitation of the region, as RaiNews 24 revealed, causing reaction in public opinion.243

Exit strategy is also a crucial issue when dealing with long-term missions or with missions with no withdrawal stated in UNSC resolution. After more than ten years, Italian troops are still stationed in Kosovo and Bosnia, while troops were withdrawn from Iraq more easily than was previously thought. Public opinion accepts troops withdrawn without any need for a specific exit strategy, which is needed more to justify the international commitment to the other contributing states or Allies.

Without a clear end-state it is not easy to assess the accomplishment of a mission nor to draw lessons learned. The negative aspects rests mainly with non-military elements: the political decision-making, financial resources, the control of the mission and the contrasting agendas of the actors involved.244 At the end of the day, the return is limited, and it is just the repayment of administrative interests, not of national or general interests. 245

244 Mini op. cit. p. 20
245 Mini op. cit p. 23
3.4 The transformation to a professional force

3.4.1 The Legislative Process

During the Cold War, there was no need for high-standard professional forces as nuclear weapons made the difference in winning the war. A large conscript-based Army was essential mainly for public order and for keeping unemployment data low. A General Staff joke said that: “il servizio militare non serve a nulla, se non a raddrizzare la schiena ai giovani”. Therefore, military conscription was conceived as an educational opportunity to introduce young people to civic virtues or as a compulsory “grand tour” to be sent away from home.

In the 1990s, the armed forces’ strength was reduced from 400,000 to 300,000, and then to 270,000. After the Kosovo War Prime Minister, D’Alema, supported the law to suspend compulsory military service and establish a professional force.

On 8 October 1999, a draft law was presented to the Chamber of Deputies and its report stated that the changing international scenario required an armed forces’ reform, including the establishment of a professional force and the temporary suspension of compulsory military service during peacetime. This could be re-established in an international crisis according to art.78 of the 1948 Italian Constitution. The professional force should be composed of volunteers serving for one or five years, and officers and WOs.

The draft law was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 14 June 2000 and by the Senate on October 12, and finally approved on October 24. The Law provided for:
- the suspension of military service from 1 January 2007;
- the class of 1985 being the last class of call;
- A 190,000-strength armed forces being by 2020, not including Carabinieri (set at 117,000-strength) and 43,000 civil servants. Service strength includes 59% of the strength for the Army, 18%

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246 Disegno di legge n. 6433 “Delega al Governo per la riforma del servizio militare”
Navy and 23% Air Force. The Officers and WOs component shall be increased as to the soldiers component;
- the volunteering of troops for a five year service, with maximum two-year renewals;
- the aid of honourably discharged personnel for re-employment in civilian life by means of a special body. 247

The Cabinet approved on 20 February 2001 a draft implementing the shift from conscription based to a volunteer force; recruiting and status of personnel. The legislative decree was approved on 4 April 2001. 248

Defence Minister, Martino, boosted the legislative process and the Cabinet approved in March 2003 a draft law anticipating the suspension of military service for two years to 1 January 2005. 249 Martino was very keen on the abolition of military service regarding it as unnecessary ‘tax’ for young people and asking for more professional forces able to cope with their new international tasks that in 2001 deployed 9,000 personnel.

Law 226/2004 suspended the military service and created a professional force, thus establishing on 1 January 2005 a one-year or four-year term of volunteer force. Therefore in 2005, armed forces were composed of both conscripts and volunteers. The status of volunteers was established by D.Lgs. n. 197/2005 250

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247 Legge 14 Novembre 2000, n. 331, “Norme per l'istituzione del servizio militare professionale”
248 Decreto Legislativo, 8 maggio 2001, n. 215 “Disposizioni per disciplinare la trasformazione dello strumento militare in professionale, a norma dell’articolo 3, comma 1, della legge 14 novembre 2000, n. 331”.
249 Finally approved by art.2 of legge 23 agosto 2004, n. 226 “Sospensione anticipata del servizio obbligatorio di leva e disciplina dei volontari di truppa in ferma prefissata, nonché delega al Governo per il conseguente coordinamento con la normativa di settore”.

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3.4.2 Open Questions

The General Staff was unhappy about the volunteer force. First of all, compulsory military service forced every young Italian to serve in the armed forces at troop or AUCs ranks, therefore the officer class could build a good network of relationships. Moreover, the General Staff was aware that the quality of recruiting was going to decrease as soldiers’ rank would appeal mostly to unemployed people from the most depressed areas.\textsuperscript{251} These assumptions clashed with the pre-requisite of high-standard training and professional personnel for force projections and missions abroad.

Another problem was the educational requisites for officers, WOs and troops. Before professionalisation, officers were high school graduates educated at Military school, and university graduates were recruited mainly for technical-administrative roles or AUCs. NCOs were required to have minimum standard education, while privates had no requirement. With the professionalisation volunteers are required to have minimum standard education; WOs are high school graduates educated at WOs’ school receiving a B.A. degree; career officers continue to be high school graduates educated at Military school receiving a B.A. degree and possibly a M.A. at advanced military school. University graduates are now recruited only in very small percentages and for technical branches or as specialists, and administrative officers are now educated at military schools. Considering that almost all volunteer recruits possess a high school certificate, the paradox is that troops, WOs and officers do have the same basic level of education. So, rather than ranks, it is now experience that makes the difference.\textsuperscript{252}

The main problem is that unlike the rest of the NATO Western Countries, officers are not recruited among University graduates, thus resulting in officers with a lower basic education. While education for volunteers and NCOs has been raised, it was a lost chance to increase the educational requirements for officers to Western best standards.

\textsuperscript{251} Mini \textit{op. cit.} p. 47-48
\textsuperscript{252} Mini \textit{op. cit.} p. 50
3.4.3 Budgetary issues

A critical issue for the professionalisation is the military budget. The budget of the Italian MoD is divided into “defence” (Funzione Difesa) and “security” (Funzione Sicurezza) components: the former finances the armed forces for military purposes, the latter includes the Carabinieri and finances mainly the Public Order and Disaster Relief budget. In many NATO countries, the “defence” budget devotes 70% to personnel salaries and pensions, leaving not much for modernisation, including procurement and R&D.

Moreover, before professionalization, salaries were composed by career NCOs and officers, while the conscript received a symbolic monthly payment. In the professional force, also the volunteers receive a real salary, according to Civil Servants’ standards. The strength has been reduced by half, but personnel and training expenses have more than doubled, leaving no room for a more efficient repartition of the budget. Furthermore, the main cuts to the budget were made in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2003 and 2004, just when additional funds were needed during the transition to professional force.253 In 2006, the “defence” budget reached the ceiling of 72.3% for personnel and 27.7% for operational expenses and investments (Equipment procurement and R&D).

There are two schools of thought:

1. those who think that the budget is too high tend to merge all items in the defence” and “security” budget.
2. those who ask for more budget tend to break up every single item.

A few media and the unreformed Communist parties tend to belong to the first group and military and the defence industry belong to the second group. According to SIPRI, in 2006, Italy ranked eighth in the list of world military spending, although it lost one position to Saudi Arabia in 2007.254

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253 Mini op. cit. p.64
In 2007, a member of the first group reported a MoD budget of €21.254 Bn. On the other side Defence Minister, Arturo Parisi acknowledged a total budget of €18 Bn, and breaking up the “defence” is only €14 Bn, while operational expenses and investments amounted to only €3,5 Bn. The Defence Minister thus succeeded in obtaining from Parliament another €1,7 Bn for investments, and €400 m for operational expenses. The 2007 MoD budget changed the course in budget trends with 61% personnel and 39% for operational expenses and investments. Some commentators think that the Centre-Left government raised the procurement budget just to sustain the defence industry and Shipbuilding.

Furthermore, Ministry of Industry (MAP) funds are supposed to finance the R&D of dual use programmes, but they tend to fund military procurement and life-cycle support. The increase of a procurement budget may harm the training and the operational efficiency, as well as recruiting expenses needed for the turnover of “old” soldiers.

In 2007, the Air Force invested €1.267 M in procurement, but divested €736 M from operations, resulting in a 30% cut in flight hours.

For the Navy, if a ship can stay out at sea for 50 days instead of the planned 150 days, it hurts training. The Navy operational efficiency

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255 M. Dinucci ‘Finanzaria a mano armata’ in Il Manifesto, 15 November 2006
257 See interview to Lorenzo Forcieri, undersecretary of Defence ‘Forcieri alza il muro intorno alle Fremm. La Difesa è un business irrinunciabile’ in Il Secolo XIX, 26 October 2006. Political comments are taken from Paolo Quercia (Ed.) Fare Italia nel mondo (Venezia : Marsilio 2009, p.430-431), a pubblcation of Farefuturo Foundation, chaired by Gianfranco Fini.
259 See Gasparini op.cit
260 Giovanni Caprara ‘Esercito tecnologico La rincorsa italiana’ in Corriere della Sera, 18 July 2008
decreased from 155,000 navigation hours in 1998, to 100,000 hours in 2000, to 36,000 hours in 2006 of which 1/3 was reserved for training. This means that the Navy can deploy only 4 ships for operational needs.262

The 2009 spending trends consider a 6.9% decrease in the total budget, and a reduction of 29% in the maintenance and operations budget and training, which may harm the operational efficiency of the armed forces in the long term. The Chief of Defence stated that the MoD needs to refer to industry to work on costs.263 On the other side, Italy devotes only €59 M in military R&D as compared to €700 M in France, so more needs to be done.264

The issue is an efficient use of the resources available. In 2007, the armed forces totalled 186,668 personnel, instead of 188,600 (authorised force) so there was a surplus of 42,000 officers and WOs and a lack of 69,000 NCOs and volunteers.265 But there are no big differences between ranks in education, military training or salaries, it is meaningless to discharge the officers in surplus and to pay their pensions, while recruiting troops that need basic training.

The General Staff utilises the order of battle as a justification for procuring new equipment: 6 Bersaglieri are worth one armoured vehicle for €1 m, 3 tank crews are worth one main battle tank for €2 m, one pilot is worth a fighter aircraft for €90 m, and 100 sailors are worth a frigate for €2 Bn.266 Moreover, when dealing with military vehicles: a main battle tank or three armoured vehicles make a second lieutenant, three main battle tanks and nine armoured vehicles make a captain; a

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261 Interview with Chief of Defence, General Vincenzo Camporini in DefenseNews, 2 February 2009.
262 See ‘Quattro unità in missione, le altre devono restare in Porto’ in La Stampa, 9 June 2008.
263 Interview with Chief of Defence, General Vincenzo Camporini in DefenseNews, 2 February 2009.
264 Interview with Chief of Defence, General Vincenzo Camporini ‘Spendiamo quasi tutto per gli stipendi’ in Corriere della Sera, 18 July 2008.
265 Speech by Air Force Major General Pasquale Preziosa, Pianificazione finanziaria e bilancio SMD, at ISTRID, 10 March 2007, quoted in Mini op. cit. p. 60
266 Mini op. cit. p.65
fighter aircraft makes a flying officer or a flight lieutenant, six aircrafts make a squadron leader and a frigate makes a commander plus another ten officers. This altogether speeds up the career and recruitment of many officers. It is a vicious circle, for military-industrial complex.

The justification of NATO and other international commitments is not real because peacekeeping missions totalled only 10,000 personnel plus 30,000 reserves and support, so armed forces’ strength of 100,000 personnel is sufficient for international and national service.

A European force for NATO or ESDP might be estimated at 150,000-strength including 1,000 tanks, 30 warships, and 300 fighter aircrafts, suggesting a total budget of €16 Bn. Therefore, Italy should provide the European force with 15,000 personnel, 25 tanks, 3 ships and 30 aircrafts, suggesting a national budget of €1.6 Bn, or about 10% of the actual “defence” budget. The Italian contribution could be reduced by half if all 27 Member States had a more balanced contribution to the European force.267

267 Mini op. cit. p. 69, 120-121
Conclusion

The Second World War and in particular the change of sides in 1943 have negatively marked the Italian armed forces. Since then the officer class has declined to accept responsibilities for national defence, thus allowing the choice of a reduced sovereignty. As a result, the officer class has developed strong administrative interests and decoupled from public opinion. The military operations in multilateral cooperation have restored the reputation of the armed forces a little; however, more needs to be done, to restore the role of the armed forces in Italian contemporary society. Moreover, public opinion has accepted only a specific “Italian way of peacekeeping” that removed any image of warfighting and stresses on post-stabilisation aid and reconstruction, reducing the role of the military to that of uniformed NGOs.

Military administrative interests in multinational structures was more successful in the Mediterranean environment rather than in the European or Atlantic because while in the latter two, the choice of reduced sovereignty limited the room to manoeuvre, and in the former, the armed services were able to build new connections and could compete with France on taking the regional leadership. The Navy has been particularly successful in the Mediterranean environment.

The process of professionalisation is still unresolved. Notwithstanding the actual open questions, the troops are performing well in operational deployment, much better than the available resources allow. The main issue is still a question of the capabilities-expectations gap, although part of the available resources is wasted in order to please administrative interests. The contribution of Italy to European Defence does not need more resources, but a more efficient use of available ones.
CHAPTER IV
THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Italy is one of the main contributors to the military capabilities and to the operations of the ESDP. However, its contribution to ESDP’s concept development has not yet been assessed. Therefore, we try in this Chapter to assess the Italian contribution both in ideas and in personnel to the development of the ESDP.

First, we analyse the support to European Defence in the WEU framework, and related structures including the Eurofor and Euromarfor. The contribution to WEU debates, such as the democratic control of European armed forces will also covered.

Second, we would analyse the position of Italy as regarding France and Germany’s ambition to develop a European Defence autonomous from NATO and the Atlanticist position supported in particular by the UK. The Italian government reaction to St.Malo would also be analysed. This would give us an opportunity to highlight the terms of the British-Italian defence cooperation within ESDP in conformity with NATO.

Third, we take a glance at the ongoing process of creating military capabilities in NATO and ESDP by means of NATO Response Force (NRF) and Battlegroup concepts. The status of NRF and of its elements will be covered. We describe the development of the Battlegroups concept and the contribution of France, Germany, the UK and Italy to it. We analyse deeply the Battlegroup generation process and the national contributions and rotations, to assess if Italy’s participation is symbolic or if it pledges an effective capability.

In conclusion we ask whether the NRF and Battlegroups represent added value or duplication in European Defence. The NATO-EU relationship, however, will be the object of the following chapter.
4.1 The Contribution to the ESDP’s development

4.1.1 Building on the WEU

In the early 1990s, the Europeans started to develop their own military capability outside of the NATO framework. This statement of intent was put into practice in some degree with the Petersberg tasks in 1992. These provided the WEU with operational capabilities for humanitarian tasks, peace-keeping and crisis management.\(^{268}\)

The “Eurocorps” was establishment in 1993 as a multinational force structure HQ at the disposal of the WEU. Eurocorps was based in Strasbourg, and composed by five framework nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain) it could include a 260-strength multinational force HQ to command up to 50,000 personnel under WEU or NATO command. Eurocorps disposable force structure incorporated the 5,000-strength Franco-German Brigade established in 1988. However, the US and British concerns over the Eurocorps’ European led to the decision that it should also be at the disposal of NATO.\(^{269}\) Therefore, Eurocorps had good operational record in NATO operations: it provided with HQs to SFOR in 1998-1999, KFOR in 2000, and ISAF in 2004. Italy did not join the Eurocorps as it regarded it as a Franco-German initiative to decouple from NATO. This is why it refused to join the Eurocorps from its inception.\(^{270}\)

Italy showed the political will to assume a proactive role in the development of European Defence, but it sometimes lacked the fundamental capabilities to support the European option, independent of its merit.\(^{271}\) The ruling class support of European Defence was

\(^{269}\) Ian Budge alii The politics of New Europe (London : Longman, 1997) p. 29-30
\(^{270}\) Antonio Missiroli ‘La Difesa Europea: politica, obiettivi, strumenti’ in Antonio Missiroli and Alessandro Pansa La Difesa Europea (Genova: Il Melangolo, 2007), p. 84.
unconditional—however, the military were more pro-NATO, above all the Navy and the Air force, which are the most NATO integrated services.\(^{272}\)

From the Maastricht Treaty, Italian efforts were directed mainly at strengthening European Defence by means of the existing WEU structures or by creating new bodies: Eurofor and Euromarfor were established having this in mind.\(^ {273}\)

**Eurofor, Euromarfor:** The new security situation had allowed the southern flank European states to play an increased role in Mediterranean security. France, Italy, and Spain, thanks to their participation in the EU, started to institutionalise naval cooperation in the Mediterranean by drafting contingency plans.

In 1995, in order to strengthen their military cooperation with the “Lisbon Declaration,” France, Italy, Portugal and Spain established a non-permanent land multinational force structure named Eurofor, with its Permanent HQ in Florence (94 personnel), and a naval multinational force named Euromarfor, led by a French carrier.\(^ {274}\) Eurofor and Euromarfor were conceived in WEU framework, but they could also be at the disposal of NATO and the EU. Euromarfor, in particular, challenged the predominant position of the US Sixth fleet, as each of these states had developed a carrier capability, although the French operated a real aircraft carrier, while the Italian, Portuguese and Spanish navy just procured small carriers with the capacity of operating just V- STOL Harrier-type. In the intentions of France, Italy and Spain, the establishment of the Southern flank security structures would assert a Mediterranean orientation in NATO and the EU, to counter what they perceived “as an increasingly Germanic Europe with his centre of gravity steadily moving north and east after the northern

\(^ {272}\) Missiroli *op. cit.* p.85  
\(^ {273}\) Interview with Admiral Guido Venturoni, formerly NATO military Committee Chairman, and Chief of Defence.  
and eastern enlargements”. 275 Eurofor’s decision-making body is represented by a high-level intergovernmental committee (CIMIN) composed of a Defence and Foreign Minister of the participating states. The CIMIN decides on the deployment of Eurofor assigned forces consisting in a Division-size multinational unit or a Brigade-size national unit for each participating country (5,000 personnel). So far, the Permanent HQ has been deployed in Albania in 2000 to provide KFOR with the HQ staff for a Brigade-size unit and in FYROM in 2003 for the EU operation ‘Concordia’. 276


**WEU capabilities:** The Italian WEU Presidency in 1997 initiated an audit of defence capabilities of the armed forces of the WEU countries to be able to perform the Petersberg Tasks. This had the intent on raising Europe’s awareness of the need for autonomous security and defence, despite the fact that European states are providing the same military units both for NATO and WEU, and units should “double hatting” in case of operations. The IGC for the Amsterdam Treaty reasoned that the WEU was supposed to become the strong arm of the EU. This was again opposed by the UK, Denmark and neutral states. A reference to: “the possibility of integration of the WEU into the EU, should the European Union so decide” was included in the Amsterdam Treaty, also incorporating the Petersberg tasks in CFSP. 277 However, the WEU

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276 See further, Chapter V, para ‘from the ESDI to ESDP’

277 Art. J 7.2 of title V of the TEU; ‘Petersberg Tasks’ are: ‘Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’; For comments see Desmond Dinan Ever
framework soon proved to be insufficient in developing European defence capabilities, as the WEU lacked the political and financial leverage on Member States.

### 4.1.2 Democratic Control and the ESDP institutions

The Italian contribution to ESDP’s development then reverted to more theoretical issues, such as the democratic control and the role of Parliaments within the WEU. Actually, the Parliament is losing its legislative role, while at the same time acquiring a democratic control on government activities, in particular in security and defence policy.

The Italian Parliament strongly supported the role of the WEU Assembly as a forum on European Defence, which still keeps items on its agenda on the role of national Parliaments in security and defence. Foreign Minister, Lamberto Dini, presented the governments’ agenda for the Helsinki Council to the joint Foreign Affairs Committees of the Italian Parliament on 2 December 1999. Both government and Parliament agreed that more should be done for institutional reforms to ensure coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP institutions. During the French presidency in 2000, the topic of a parliamentary role for the CFSP was discussed in meetings of the Chairmen of Foreign Affairs Committees of Parliaments in the EU, thus establishing a French-Italian-Swedish working party tasked with framing concrete proposals.

The final declaration of the Marseille WEU Council of 13 November 2000 made a reference to the part played by the WEU Assembly, although the wording did not go as far as the original text Italy had proposed. The so-called Amsterdam “left-over IGC” that resulted in the Nice Treaty did not take into account proposals in establishing the ESDP structures. On 28 November 2000 the Chamber of Deputies had

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278 Servizio Studi ‘Il ruolo dei Parlamenti per la pace e il disarmo’ Documentazione e ricerche no.11, 4 agosto 2008; Conferenza dei Presidenti dei Parlamenti dei Paesi del G8, Tokyo – Hiroshima, 1-2 settembre 2008 (Roma: Camera dei Deputati)
organised a sitting on Italian policy directions for Nice, it focused in particular on the democratic deficit. On 13 December 2000, Prime Minister Giuliano Amato, reporting to the joint meeting of the committees on the outcome of the Nice Summit, insisted on the value Italy attributed to building democracy in the common European institutions. So far, the proposals had no effective implementation.

The WEU came to an end in 2000: the Marseilles declaration transferred the WEU crisis management role and structures within the ESDP, and it ceased to exist on 1 July 2001. Only the WEU Assembly survived. The Nice summit on 6 and 7 December 2000 decided to structure ESDP with a Political Security Committee (COPS), a Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC) and a military staff (EUMS), but it did not equip it with a Parliamentary Assembly, nor did it delegate this competence to the WEU Assembly. The ESDP structures and decision-making process, however, were not established in the Nice Treaty: they were stated in the Presidency Conclusions, and then implemented by the EU Council decisions.

4.1.3 The Helsinki Headline Goal

The issue of the contribution of troops saw a more sound participation of Italy in ESDP. The participation in the definition of the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) in December 1999 saw an important role for General Vincenzo Camporini, then head of the office for Military Policy of the Joint Staff. At the Capabilities Committement Conference on 21

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281 Giovanni Gasparini ‘Italy and ESDP’ in Klaus Brummer (ed.) The South and ESDP: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (Gütersloh : Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007) p. 23.
November 2000, Italy and France pledged 20,000 personnel each, the biggest contribution to meet the HHG; the UK offered 19,000 and Germany 17,000 personnel. In particular, Italy pledged a land force with HQ capabilities, and 12,500 to 14,500 troops; an air component with aircrafts and HQ, and a naval task group. The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was supposed to become operational by 2003, and the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC) listed 117,000 personnel instead of 60,000 or, in other words, 15 brigades requested by the HHG. In November 2001, the Capabilities Improvement Conference committed further military and civilian capabilities to the HFC. Furthermore, the ECAP was established in 2001 to fill the gaps in European shortfalls, and an ECAP roadmap was launched under the Italian presidency. The Laeken Council, in December 2001, adopted the declaration of the operational capability of the ESDP.

In 2003, however, the ‘operational’ RRF was still a ‘virtual’ list of committed forces to the HFC of which 17% came from Italy and France. In February 2003, Italy and the UK again supported the

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282 Italy offered: Land forces included: one corps-level HQ available for six months and one division HQ for a year, an airmobile brigade on call for up to six months and three other brigades, one railway-engineering battalion, special forces, one CIMIC group, one Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) company. Air: a Combined Air component HQ), 26 Tornado and AMX combat aircraft, six CSAR helicopters, four C-130J transport aircraft (from 2003), nine tactical transport aircraft, two air refueling aircraft, three maritime patrol aircraft, two SHORAD units. Navy: A sea or shore-based maritime component HQ; one task group with one aircraft carrier (Giuseppe Garibaldi), one destroyer, three frigates, four patrol ships, one submarine, four MCM ships, two amphibious ships, one oceanographic vessel, eight helicopters.

283 For further see Chapter VI ‘Civilian Capabilities’


286 Italian MoD “Italy's Contribution to the European Defence” 18 August 2003. The forces included Land forces for up to four Brigades (alpine, airborne and armoured units; engineering assets and explosive ordnance disposal teams;
process for a new capability goal to overcome the HHG shortcomings.\textsuperscript{287} The Thessaloniki Council in June 2003 acknowledged that the EU still had limited capability, that it was not able to perform the Petersberg Tasks and that there were recognised shortcomings in the HHG. During the Italian Presidency, the informal meeting of Defence Ministers in Rome on 4 October 2003 agreed to increase EU interoperability by 2010, by pooling resources, doctrines and equipment and setting a new deadline for military cooperation.\textsuperscript{288} The Defence Ministers discussed the Italian presidency paper “A Path for Further Achievements in European Capabilities”. This paper together with the French non-paper “Towards a 2010 Headline Goal”, the EUMC paper, and the British implementation plan “The road to 2010”, were adopted by the GAERC on 17 November 2003, which also confirmed that the Petersberg Tasks would be revisited and redefined within a new Headline Goal to be met by 2010.\textsuperscript{289} In December 2003, the European Security Strategy prompted the institutions to revisit the HHG and ECAP process. The Headline Goal 2010 (HG2010) was approved by the GAERC on 17 May 2004 and endorsed by the European Council in June 2004. Beyond the continued efforts to make up key capability shortfalls, the HG2010 would focus on the need for qualitative improvements to put existing EU capabilities at the service

\textsuperscript{287} See *Vertice italo-britannico Dichiarazione sulla difesa e sicurezza* cit.

\textsuperscript{288} Andrew Beatty “New deadline for military harmonisation” in *EUobserver*, 6 October 2003

of the revised Petersberg tasks.  

To perform Petersberg missions, however, recourse to NATO assets and capability was required.

4.2  **British-Italian cooperation in ESDP**

4.2.1  *Italy’s reaction to St. Malo*

Italy’s top concern has always been the creation of a balanced European Defence not dominated by France and Germany, because this option would cause the “splendid isolation” of the UK, along with a Transatlantic drift. Therefore, between 1996 and 1998, Italy tried to build up an Atlanticist pole to balance France and Germany. The *entente cordiale* between the UK and Italy in creating an Atlanticist pole was interrupted by the St. Malo summit in December 1998, which caught the Italian government by surprise. The St. Malo declaration promised an Anglo-French convergence in “autonomous capacity to manage international crises” meaning a European Defence which was “independent” in a French way and “complementary” with NATO according to the British approach, thus causing potential clashes between Atlanticists and European federalists in Italy.  

The St. Malo agreement made Italy lose the honest broker role it tried to assume during the mid-1990s between French Europeanism and British Atlanticism. On the other hand, the UK had to reassure the US that NATO came first, and the EU would run operations only when the US were not involved. Just a few days after St. Malo, France questioned the UK’s commitment after the British participation in US-led raids in operation Desert Fox Iraq on 16 and 20 December 1998.  

This gave Italy an opportunity to rearrange defence cooperation with the UK. The British-Italian summit in London, on 20 July 1999, focused on the perspectives for developing European capabilities. The summit took place just one month after the Cologne

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291 See Missiroli *op. cit.* p. 7, 84.  
Council had decided to develop military capabilities for the ESDP. Therefore, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was willing to put ‘flesh on the bones’, while Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema (who had just been through Kosovo) was very keen on military issues. According to the British MoD, the poor coordination in European Defence was a major issue: European armies’ strength amounted to 2 M, and of these only 2.5% could be sent to the Western Balkans. The London Summit proposals launched a ‘European Defence capabilities initiative’ to be discussed at the Luxembourg WEU Ministerial meeting and the Helsinki Council. This included a time schedule to achieve goals for developing military capabilities to perform Peterberg tasks that included national capability goals to this end, and even setting some criteria, such as those set for the EMU. The criteria could be both qualitative or quantitative, such as the defence Budget as a percentage of GDP. The latter raised problems for most EU Member States, considering that even the UK and Italy had a very different profile in military spending. However, the common effort in Kosovo and the support of NATO showed that there was room for cooperation in defence. The UK also supported Italian initiatives in developing civilian capabilities and civilian-military cooperation in the ESDP. The capabilities’ initiative would be underpinned by the peer review of a MoD and Foreign Ministers GAERC per Presidency, to measure progress against the agreed criteria.  

The London summit has not been seen as central to the history of the ESDP. Nonetheless, it gave a significant contribution to it. The capability goal initiative was taken into consideration by the Helsinki Council in December 1999 in the HHG. Annual MoD and Foreign Ministers’ informal meetings at GAERC were also established. A British-Italian cooperation in defence would soon follow.  

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294 See ‘Dichiarazione sulla difesa e sicurezza’ Vertice italo-britannico, Villa Madama, 21 febbraio 2003, in particular “capacità militari”
4.2.2 A special relationship in defence matters

During 2003-2005, Italy and the UK cooperated extensively in defence affairs. An effective collaboration in defence started with the Anglo-Italian summit on 21 February 2003, because the IGC, Atlanticism, and the common efforts in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Iraq cemented this relationship. After the collapse of the British-Franco-German directorate, Blair was perhaps looking for allies, while Berlusconi could find a useful friend to get closer to the US administration. In any case, the British-Italian collaboration was fruitful. The UK has a longstanding military tradition, while Italy is building itself a reputation in civilian missions, particularly with humanitarian relief and police missions.

The Rome meeting on 21 February 2003 delivered a “Declaration on Security and Defence”. It contained a statement on collaboration and strengthening of NATO in order to implement Prague decisions and NATO transformation. The declaration stated that the UK and Italy’s mutual support in the role of NRF framework nations could serve as a model recommended by NATO. This included the exchange of personnel, common training and exercises, and mutual appointments of deputy commanders. Moreover, the UK and Italy pledged to collaborate on NRF generation. This approach could also be committed to RRF to promote a coherent development of NRF and RRF. Furthermore, the ESDP should be able to perform the full spectrum of the Petersberg tasks and the tasks identified by the Constitutional Treaty, and to deploy multiple operations at the same time in order to rapidly respond to crises. In this sense, the UK would cooperate with the Italian presidency to meet military and civilian capabilities of the HHG, and to develop new capability goals to help the EU and NATO perform their tasks. The ESDP would be developed in complementarity with NATO and therefore Italy and the UK welcomed the NATO-EU agreements on the Berlin Plus implementation
and supported a NATO-EU strategic partnership, thus opposing duplications. The UK and Italy would cooperate in Mediterranean security, as they cooperated in NATO operation “Active Endeavor”.295

After the end of the Italian presidency, an Anglo-Italian summit on 4 March 2004 followed the Anglo-Franco-German summit of 18 February 2004, in reassuring Italy of the British friendship. The joint declaration reaffirmed that in the Anglo-Italian approach, NATO continued to be the paramount in defence. Waiting for the Instanbul Summit, the two prime ministers reaffirmed the importance of NATO-EU strategic partnership, and they welcomed the achievements of the ESDP made by the Italian presidency by reaffirming their declaration of February 2003 while also committing to safeguarding ESDP advancement as proposed in the Constitutional Treaty. The EDA and the Battlegroups were considered as the two most important ESDP projects. Furthermore:

“L'Italia e il Regno Unito continueranno a sostenere l’espansione dell’ISAF in Afghanistan e a cooperare allo sviluppo del ruolo della Nato in Iraq.”296

This statement will assume importance with the following meetings, and it is the first stepping stone of an effective military operational collaboration.

The annual UK-Italy Summit in London on 13 July 2004 was a good opportunity to further collaboration. The importance of joint military operations was exemplified in the bilateral summit. Blair stated:

“I really do not think the relationship between Britain and Italy has ever been stronger (...) first is in respect of Iraq, where obviously Britain and Italy took a very strong position (...) we are also cooperating very strongly in Afghanistan.”297

The military cooperation was a crucial issue at that time, and regarding the ESDP, Italy and the UK:

295 *Vertice italo-britannico Dichiarazione sulla difesa e sicurezza* cit.
297 Opening remarks by Prime Minister Tony Blair in ‘Transcript of the joint press conference by the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Italy at the conclusion of the UK-Italian annual summit’ London, 13 July 2004
“agree to maintain a close reciprocal consultation on ESDP related questions, and reaffirm their joint commitment to the ongoing efforts to enhance ESDP capabilities, and to playing an active part in the work of the European Defence Agency.” 298

Italy and the UK endorsed the objectives of the recently signed Constitutional Treaty and the European Security Strategy, and welcomed the implementation of ”NATO-EU joint planning”. On NATO and ESDP they reaffirmed:

“our commitment to support the development of NATO-ESDP and of an Atlantic Alliance underpinned by a more capable and coherent European military effort. The EU and NATO must work ever more closely together in strategic partnership.” 299

This was not only a formal statement, because an enhanced military cooperation was to be taken in the leadership of the forthcoming military operations. In mid-2005 Italy was to become the lead nation of ISAF to be succeeded in May 2006 by the UK. On the other hand, the UK would lead Eufor missions for its first year and Italy would follow in December 2005, and thus an agreement on command rotation in Bosnia and Afghanistan was stated, strengthened by appropriate structures:

“Since we aim to have in sequence the command of military missions in Bosnia and in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2006, we have decided to set up a UK/Italy steering group in order to co-ordinate joint planning of those leading responsibilities. We are asking our Foreign and Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Defence Staff to set this up urgently.” 300

Together with the bilateral “Steering Group”, joint staff groups were also created. 301 British willingness to support Italian command options of Eufor was interpreted as an award to Italy for its committment to

298 UK-Italy Summit, Joint Statement, 13 July 2004
299 ibidem
300 Ibidem, see also executive summary of the UK-Italy Summit, Joint Statement 13 July 2004, point 7 and 9
301 See Claudio Catalano ‘the changes of ISAF command’ and Id. ‘An ever closer Italian-British military cooperation’ in Analisi Difesa no. 45-47 year 5, 2004
Bosnia, thus helping to free up British troops for Iraq.\textsuperscript{302} Moreover, building on SFOR’s success, Eufor would be crucial in demonstrating NATO-EU’s ability to work together.\textsuperscript{303} Blair reasoned:

\begin{quote}
“Britain and Italy are playing a major role in respect of Bosnia, where there will be a handing over of responsibilities to the European Force. Again, I think that will be a very important demonstration, not just of the cooperation between our two countries, but also of the fact that we see European defence very much as complementary to the NATO alliance, not in any sense in conflict with it.”
\end{quote}

Operations such as Eufor and ISAF required credible European military capabilities- therefore, Italy and the UK supported the EU and NATO in the transformation of Europe’s multinational forces by generating NRF and Battlegroups.\textsuperscript{305} Battlegroups were crucial in rapid crisis intervention in cooperation with the UN.\textsuperscript{306} Therefore, the UK and Italy would assure that NRF and Battlegroups were mutually reinforcing, and offered operational HQs and substantial contributions to generating Battlegroups, and eventually defence industry collaboration would underpin the military cooperation.\textsuperscript{307}

The Blair-Berlusconi meeting in Porto Rotondo, Sardinia, which followed on 17 August 2004, is well known for the Italian Prime Minister’s “bandana”. However, this was another chance to strengthen military collaboration. The private meeting between Blair and Berlusconi was mainly focused on a conference call to president Bush on the situation in Najaf, Iraq. The preparation of the meeting was masteminded by Giovanni Castellaneta, Italian Ambassador in Rome, Sir Ivor Roberts, ‘Parlare di Ottime Relazioni Italo-Britanniche è diventata quasi una formula di stile’ in \textit{il Riformista}, 13 July 2004.

\textsuperscript{302} Maurizio Caprara “Scambio di diplomatici fra Roma e Londra” in \textit{Il Corriere della sera}, 13 July 2004
\textsuperscript{303} \textit{UK-Italy Summit, Joint Statement}, 13 July 2004 cit.
\textsuperscript{304} Opening remarks by Prime Minister Tony Blair cit.
\textsuperscript{305} \textit{UK-Italy Summit, Joint Statement}, 13 July 2004 cit.
\textsuperscript{306} British Ambassador in Rome, Sir Ivor Roberts, ‘Parlare di Ottime Relazioni Italo-Britanniche è diventata quasi una formula di stile’ in \textit{il Riformista}, 13 July 2004
\textsuperscript{307} \textit{UK-Italy Summit, Joint Statement}, 13 July 2004 cit. and executive summary, point 8
Washington, to strengthen UK-US-Italy relations. The two Prime Ministers also discussed Finmeccanica-BAE Systems relations, thus leading to strategic decisions in industrial policy.

4.2.3 The cooperation in operations

It could be argued that British-Italian cooperation in ESDP started with cooperation in military operations and it ended with them. The last Anglo-Italian summit took place on 25 May 2005. Blair was looking for Italian support in the wake of the British presidency that could be troubled.

"if I can just pay this tribute to Italy and to its armed forces and to the Carabinieri as well, who also help in the training of police in Iraq."

A part from formal statements, Italian troops were strongly committed to military operations in 2005: in August 2005, the 7,000-strength Corpo d’Armata di Reazione Rapida based in Solbiate Olona replaced the Turkish command in ISAF, and Italian Generals assumed command of KFOR in September, and Eufor in December. On 1 July 2005, the Royal Navy handed over annual command of NRF Maritime Component to the Commander of Italian Maritime Force until June 2006. At the time, only the Navies of Italy, Spain and the UK were

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309 See Chapter VII ‘Industrial transnational relations’ para ‘Battle of Britain’

310 Paolo Filo della Torre ‘UE, Londra vuole l’asse con l’Italia’ in La Repubblica, 23 June 2005

311 UK Embassy in Rome press release ‘Blair E Berlusconi In Accordo Su Tutti Gli Argomenti Principali’ 27 May 2005

312 Carlo Mercuri ‘L’Italia guiderà missioni di pace in tre paesi’ in Il Messaggero, 31 May 2005
certified by NATO in assuming this command. In many cases British Generals transferred command to Italians and *vice versa*, showing that the UK-Italy Steering Group cooperated quietly but efficiently to make things work.

To better understand the closeness of British-Italian relations, Defence Minister Martino stated that John Reid, who was reappointed British Defence Minister in 2005, told him he had realised that in seven years only one thing had changed in British defence policy: the Italians had become ‘indispensable’.

The Prodi government broke ranks with Blair because of Afghanistan. At the European Council on 8 March 2007, Blair asked the Europeans to send more troops to Afghanistan. The British troops were to be increased from 5,200 to 7,700, in order to launch operation Achilles in Southern Afghanistan. Prime Minister, Prodi, and Foreign Minister, D’Alema, rejected this proposal. Italy had 1,938 troops in Regional Command West in Herat and Kabul, and it would maintain the same number of troops in the same area. This move was probably meant to appease the unreformed Communists in the coalition: a vote for military operations financing had just passed on the same day in the Chamber of Deputies without any reinforcement for Afghanistan, and the final vote at the Senate was scheduled on 27 March 2004. Prodi had a wafer-thin majority in the Senate. However, to show Atlantic solidarity, President Giorgio Napolitano presiding as the “Consiglio supremo di Difesa” decided on 1 April 2007 to increase force protection

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313 ‘La Marina Militare assume il Comando Marittimo della Forza di Reazione Rapida Nato’, in *Analisi Difesa* anno 6 no. 57
314 Interview with Antonio Martino in *Il Foglio*, 23 March 2007
by sending a squadron of A-129 attack helicopters and a few VCC Dardo. The British-Italian cooperation in military operations started with Afghanistan and ended with it. The UK started to look in other directions, and as a result, Italy lost a very important ally in European Defence.

4.3 The ongoing process: the Battlegroups

4.3.1 The original concept

The initial idea for Battlegroups concept stemmed from a reference in the HHG on the need for Member States to contribute “small rapid response elements available and deployable at high readiness”. The HHG focused on voluntary national commitments by means of a cataloguing process. This helped to identify shortfalls, however, the voluntary approach was limited in so far as the catalogues provided no guarantees regarding what assets, troops and resources were actually available. Moreover, the ECAP generation process had slowed down in 2002/2003 and had not prevented a considerable waste of resources spent on inefficient generation of military capacity. Thus:

“despite claims to the contrary, the Rapid Reaction Force never became fully operational. Consequently (..) EU leaders were in urgent need of something to show for the years of political effort that had gone into ESDP a visible, deployable military capability. Drawing largely on existing forces and requiring more capability coordination...”

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316 ‘Emergency: "Resteremo solo se possibile" Consiglio di difesa: "Nuovi mezzi a Kabul” in La Repubblica, 2 April 2007
317 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, Annex IV,
The Battlegroups idea was floated at the Franco-British summit at Le Touquet on 4 February 2003. Moreover, it arose from the experience of operation Artemis.  

This was the first major EU-led autonomous military crisis management operation launched in June 2003 in the DRC under the UNSC mandate. In July 2003 the Italian Presidency saw as crucial the NATO-EU synergies in rapid response forces. Italy added to its ESDP priorities the creation of a 'core EU Rapid Response Capability' to be mutually reinforcing and interoperable with NRF. This capability could be drawn from the existing Europe’s multinational forces. It should be rapidly deployable and sustainable, thus requiring pre-identified multinational deployable HQs. Coordination was needed between multinational HQs if the EU wanted to conduct concurrent operations. The Italian presidency scheduled a COPS visit to the Eurofor in Florence on 24 October 2003, and a workshop on 'The role of Multinational Forces in Europe' on 28 October 2003, to review the potential contribution of each multinational capability to EU-led operations. In addition to it, the London meeting on 24 November 2003 stated:

"we propose a new initiative, in which the EU would focus on the development of its rapid reaction capabilities to enhance its ability to

319 Tim Williams ‘Whose finger will be on the EU Battlegroups trigger?’ in Europe’s world, 27 March 2007
321 Giovanni Gasparini “Osservatorio sulla Difesa Europea” IAI, July 2003
322 According to the existing databases drawn by the EUMS, the multinational forces eligible for EU Rapid Response could be: Eurocorps, Eurofor, Euromarfor, the Franco-German Brigade, the British-Dutch Amphibious Corps, the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force.
323 The existing multinational HQs available to the EU are the Franco-German Brigade, the British Multinational HQ in Northwood, the Multinational Division Central, between Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and UK, Eurocorps, Eurofor and Euromarfor.
324 Daniela Manca ‘Italian Presidency plans for ESDP’ in European Security Review Number 19 October 2003, ISIS Europe
support the UN in short-term crisis management situations (...) the EU should aim to build on this precedent [operation Artemis] so that it is able to respond through ESDP to future similar requests from the United Nations, whether in Africa or elsewhere.”

The need was raised for a joint force package to strengthen the EU rapid reaction capability to support UN or reinforcing NRF.

“The EU should be capable and willing to deploy in an autonomous operation within 15 days to respond to a crisis. The aim should be coherent and credible battle-group sized forces, each around 1500 troops, offered by a single nation or through a multinational or framework nation force package, with appropriate transport and sustainability. (...) This initiative would contribute to the implementation of the joint declaration on EU/UN co-operation in crisis management. The development of such a capability would have wider benefits for the rapid reaction capability of the EU and the Member States. We welcome the progress already made in establishing the NATO Response Force, noting that forces are offered to both the EU and NATO on a voluntary case by case basis. We will work together to improve the links between the two organisations and to enhance their rapid reaction capabilities in a compatible manner.”

The Franco-British proposal was largely a compromise between the two countries’ visions, provided that the British did not want standing EU forces in competition with NATO. Anyhow, the Battlegroup initiative attracted a high level of political support throughout Europe. Foreign Minister Frattini, on behalf of Italian presidency, welcomed the proposal stating it was in accordance with the EU-UN agreements on crisis management of 24 September 2003. signed under the Italian Presidency. Diplomats were optimistic that the renewed British-French cooperation could strengthen the ESDP process.

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326 Ibidem
327 Williams op.cit.
328 Ministero Affari esteri, Nota Informativa, 24 novembre 2003; ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management’ signed by UN
4.3.2 The permanent structured cooperation

The Naples Conclave included the Battlegroup concept in the “protocol for permanent structured cooperation” of the Constitutional Treaty. “Structured cooperation” was established by the European Convention as a mechanism to allow:

“Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish structured cooperation within the Union framework.”

The Italian presidency draft proposal of 25 November 2003 challenged the Franco-German concept of structured cooperation and modelled it on the enhanced cooperation mechanism: the cooperation shall be permanent, in conformity with NATO committments, and the list of pMS shall be notified to the EU Council and authorised within three months by means of QMV, while accession to the existing cooperations was open to all Member States. France, Germany and the UK asked Italy to remove requirements on the quota of Member States. The final presidency proposal submitted on 29 November 2003 was welcomed by France, Germany and the UK and endorsed by Member States: structured cooperation shall be permanent, without minimum limits, and under the political control of the Council. Italian Foreign Minister Frattini said:

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Secretary-General and the Italian Prime Minister on 24 September 2003, see also ‘EU-UN cooperation in civilian crisis management operations’ Doc. 13846/1/04 rev 1

329 Judy Dempsey “‘Big three’ shift seen to weaken German position” Financial Times, 17 February 2004


331 Articles I-40(6), Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (18 July 2003); see also art. III-213.


"major steps" have been taken forward "overcoming very different starting positions (...) Today the founders of that group find their views are reflected in a common line on European defence". The UK ensured that the protocol set out participation in Battlegroups as the principal entry criterion for membership of structured cooperation. This had two effects: first, it prevented structured cooperation becoming a closed or exclusive club; second, it provided a strong political incentive for all Member States to make real investment in deployable, high readiness forces to contribute to a Battlegroup and hence be included in structured cooperation. Therefore the protocol for permanent structured cooperation did not include a list of pMS but set out requirements for Battlegroups to be open to any Member State which:

“have the capacity to supply by 2007 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as combat formations, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred in Article 111-210, within a period of 5-30 days, in particular in response to requests from the UN Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days.”

NATO commitments and Berlin Plus conformity were reaffirmed in the protocol. At the European Council in December 2003, a broad agreement was reached on permanent structured cooperation. However the failure to approve the Treaty endangered these results.

The idea of pioneer states or a core group of Member States was once again suggested by French President Chirac. The EC Commission was worried that Member States could take it upon themselves to operate

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334 Honor Mahony ‘EU sees breakthrough on defence questions’ in EUobserver, 29 November 2003
335 Letter from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence to the Chairman Select Committee on European Union Fourth Report ‘EU Battlegroups’ 19 February 2005, Annex A, Battlegroup Concept
outside EU institutional framework as the Nice Treaty did not allow them to move ahead in defence.\textsuperscript{337} Finnish general Gustav Hägglund, the EUMC Chairman felt that to speed up the ESDP process, this should be separated from the IGC and the Constitutional Treaty. Although General Hägglund was aware of Franco-German inspired plans to develop European defence among a smaller group of countries he suggested that the commonly agreed ESDP provisions should be lifted out from the Draft Treaty and be autonomously implemented by the European Council in March 2004.\textsuperscript{338} The ESDP provisions could be implemented autonomously from the Constitutional Treaty because they find legal basis in the existing Treaties (art. 18.2 and 25 TEU) and in the implementation of the decisions and conclusions of the European Councils and EU Councils.\textsuperscript{339} Defence was the only EU policy that wasn’t reformulated or delayed following the fate of the Constitutional Treaty because political and military leaders in practice implemented by means of autonomous intergovernmental decisions the key elements of permanent structured cooperation, and Battlegroups and EDA. The Member States administrative and industrial interests have sped them up.

4.3.3 The definition of the concept

The Battlegroup proposal was also endorsed by Germany. In fact considering that Germany has poor capabilities, it just reinforced the

\textsuperscript{337} Mihaela Gherghisan ‘Concern about defence co-operation outside EU’ in \textit{EUobserver}, 15 December 2003
\textsuperscript{338} ‘EU military chief impatient after summit breakdown’ in \textit{EUobserver}, 18 December 2003; ‘EU Military Committee chairman Gustav Hägglund wants to separate EU defence from constitution’ in \textit{Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition} 18 December 2003
position of France and the UK. An Anglo-Franco-German paper on the “Battlegroup concept” focused on rapidly tailoring Battlegroups for specific missions such as bridging operations to prepare the ground before a larger UN or UN-mandated mission relieved the Battlegroup. The paper was submitted to the COPS on 10 February 2004, and it received EUMC technical assessment on 18 February. The Brussels Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Defence meeting on 5 and 6 April 2004 supported the concept. In his report on EU military rapid response in April 2004, the High Representative Solana proposed a methodology for developing the capabilities required for rapid response. Therefore, the Battlegroup concept was endorsed at the GAERC on 17 and 18 May 2004, which concluded that commitments would be sought from Member States in order to achieve IOC in early 2005 and FOC in 2007. The EUMC agreed on the Battlegroup in June 2004, and this was integrated in the HG2010 and formally adopted at the European Council in June 2004. At their summit on 13 July 2004, Italy and the UK announced to intend to continue contributions to NRF and to provide substantial contributions to generating high-readiness battlegroups for the EU, and to make their respective multinational operational HQs available to commend operations using them. Defence Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the concept in the “Declaration on European Military Capabilities” of the Military Capability Commitment Conference on 22 November 2004 which set out priorities for the Battlegroups. A Battlegroup:

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340 See also the opinion of Antonio Missiroli quoted in Judy Dempsey “‘Big three’ shift seen to weaken German position’ Financial Times, 17 February 2004
341 See also Lindstrom op.cit. p. 11; for the document : ‘The battlegroups concept, UK, France, Germany food for thought’ in EU security and Defence – Core documents 2004, Chaillot Paper no. 75, February 2005, EUISS, p.10
343 UK-Italy Summit, Joint Statement, 13 JULY 2004, cit and executive summary, point 8
344 Committee on EU Fourth Report cit.
• is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations;
• is based on a combined arms, battalion sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements;
• could be formed by a Framework Nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States. In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria;
• it must be associated with a force HQ and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics.\textsuperscript{345}

The Battlegroups’ force packages should be flexible enough to deploy worldwide under UNSC mandate also in hostile environments:

“Battlegroups will be employable across the full range of tasks listed in the TEU Art. 17.2, and those identified in the European Security Strategy, in particular in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their size”.\textsuperscript{346}

In response to a crisis or to an urgent request by the UN, the EU should be able to undertake simultaneously two Battlegroup-size operations sustainable for a maximal period of 120 days by rotation.\textsuperscript{347} The EUMC work was concluded in October 2006 with the delivery of one single Battlegroup Concept document.

4.3.4 Troop contributions

To qualify as a Battlegroup, the force packages shall meet commonly defined and agreed standards and undergo a Battlegroup generation process. The Battlegroups for a EU autonomous operation could be formed nationally or by a multinational coalition of Member States led

\textsuperscript{345} “Declaration On European Military Capabilities” at the Military Capability Commitment Conference Brussels, 22 November 2004, para.9 ; see also EU Council Secretariat Factsheet “EU Battlegroups” EU Bg 02 November 2006
\textsuperscript{346} Declaration On European Military Capabilities cit, para 11; and Factsheet February 2007
\textsuperscript{347} Gerrard Quille, Note ‘EU Battlegroups’ Directorate-General For External Policies of the EU Directorate B - Policy Department -, DGExPo/B/PolDep/Note/2006-145, European Parliament, 12 September 2006
by a framework nation, which shall take operational command, and provide the Battlegroup with a Force HQs, and pre-identified transport and logistics elements. Interoperability and military effectiveness would be key criteria, because in principle, the Battlegroup proposal is open to all Member States, but France and Britain stressed that a high degree of interoperability in terms of training, equipment, command and planning should be needed as criteria for structured cooperation, in order to set the bar for the EU-25 to join in the emerging European defence. Big Member States are expected to generate individual Battlegroups or to act as framework nation, while smaller countries are expected to join multinational Battlegroups or in particular to contribute “niche capabilities” thus providing specific elements with added value. It is the responsibility of pMS to produce complete Battlegroups, either nationally or multinationally. The small countries providing niche contributions must ensure they are integrated into full Battlegroups, and not in individual units. The Battlegroup contribution involves a six-month rotations. The system to meet a Battlegroup commitment is flexible to accommodate the different national ways of contributions: Member States may draw on existing high readiness forces or generate specific formations for explicit periods of stand-by.

**Initial commitment:** The Military Capability Conference in 2004 drew commitments from 22 Member States, along with Norway, resulting in a initial thirteen Battlegroups commitments and a number of supporting niche capabilities, to be available by 2007:

- France
- Italy

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349 For terminology see also *Declaration On European Military Capabilities* cit., para 9-10
350 *Committee on European Union Fourth Report* cit.
351 Niche capabilities were provided by Cyprus (medical group); Lithuania (a water purification unit) Greece (the Athens Sealift Co-ordination Centre); and France (structure of a multinational and deployable Force HQ). See *Declaration On European Military Capabilities* cit., see also *Committee on EU Fourth Report* cit.
Spain
- United Kingdom
- France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and potentially Spain
- France and Belgium
- Germany, the Netherlands and Finland
- Germany, Austria and Czech Republic
- Italy, Hungary and Slovenia
- Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal
- Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania
- Sweden, Finland and including Norway as a third State
- United Kingdom and the Netherlands

Expectations ranged from 6 to 10 Battlegroups committed so the conference was officially a success, and moreover, the EU could have two or three of them available before 2007 based on existing capabilities and voluntary contributions under the HFC, in particular on existing formations in the UK, Italy and France.352 (see table 2)

France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, UK provided national Battlegroups, Germany did not, but it strongly contributed to five multinational Battlegroups. Italy and France contributed in total to four Battlegroups, while the UK contributed only to two, of which one consisted of the existing British-Dutch Amphibious Corps. Italy participation reflects a full range of formations and regional areas of interests. Italy had a national Battlegroup, an Italian-Hungarian-Slovenian Battlegroup revived the “Hexagonal initiative”, the Italian-Romanian-Turkish Battlegroup mirrored interests in the Eastern Balkans and the increasing relations with Turkish and Romanian Armies in the operations in the Western Balkans and Iraq, and the existing Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force was promoted to specialised Battlegroup giving the opportunity to name a ‘Mediterranean cooperation’ Battlegroup.

352 Quille European Security Review cit., pp.1-2
### TABLE 2
INITIAL BATTLEGROUP FORMATIONS, AS OF 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BATTLEGROUPS</th>
<th>PARTICIPANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Battlegroup</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Battlegroup</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Battlegroup</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Battlegroup</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French-German Battlegroup</td>
<td>France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French-Belgian Battlegroup</td>
<td>France, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battlegroup 107</td>
<td>Germany, Netherlands and Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German-Czech-Austrian Battlegroup</td>
<td>Germany, Czech Republic and Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian-Hungarian-Slovenian</td>
<td>Italy, Hungary, Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battlegroup</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-Italian Amphibious</td>
<td>Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battlegroup</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polish-led Battlegroup</td>
<td>Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Battlegroup</td>
<td>Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Ireland and Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-Dutch Battlegroup</td>
<td>United Kingdom, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkan Battlegroup</td>
<td>Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania and Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech-Slovak Battlegroup</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-led Battlegroup</td>
<td>Spain, Germany, France and Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian-Romanian-Turkish</td>
<td>Italy, Romania and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battlegroup</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: EU Council)

**Initial Operational Capability:** The IOC was reached on 1 January 2005, so that at least one Battlegroup was on standby every 6 months on a permanent basis. This was thanks to the UK and France which had each a Battlegroup for the first half of 2005, and to Italy which provided a Battlegroup for the second half. Each national Battlegroup operated under the authority of its own Operational HQ. In the first half of 2006, a combined Franco-German Battlegroup and the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Battlegroup with units from Greece and Portugal were available. In the second half 2006 only the Franco-German Battlegroup remained on call, reinforced by Belgian units. The Operational HQ in 2006 were provided by framework nations, France and Italy.
**Battlegroup generation process:** The certification of the Member States force packages would provide the EU with the necessary assurance that it is ready for a possible mission. The EUMC assisted by the EUMS monitors the Battlegroup certification process. A key requirement is that the interoperability shall be assured by Member States within each individual multinational Battlegroup through pre-deployment training of the national forces committed to the Battlegroups. There are different ways for generating Battlegroups, and the Operation Commander (to be appointed by the Council on a case-by-case basis) has the authority to tailor the command and control structure and the force package to the specific requirements of the operation. The Member States conduct the Battlegroup generation and are responsible for offering a complete package which has no fixed structure and thus provides Member States with the necessary flexibility that facilitates a smoother force generation and a broader spectrum of capability. The Battlegroups generation process for the FOC took place through Battlegroup Coordination Conferences (BGCC) chaired by the EUMS every six months. The planning horizon of the BGCC was five years. Member States indicate how they constitute a force package, the standby time and recurrence of it, considering that they may be different the next time they are offered. The first BGCC took place on 23 May 2005, and the last BGCC before FOC was held on 27 October 2006. The potential contributions from Member States filled all the slots and identified the operational HQs for most Battlegroups.

FOC was reached on 1 January 2007, in terms of a standby roster at least two Battlegroups are at the ready at any given time for six months, thus providing the EU with the capacity to undertake two concurrent operations even simultaneously. (see table 3)

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353 EU Council Secretariat, Factsheet, Eu Battlegroups Eu BG 02 November 2006 and Id, Factsheet, February 2007 p.2-3
355 Factsheet 2007 p.2-3
356 Declaration On European Military Capabilities cit., para 13-14, and Factsheet 2007 p.2-3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Battlegroup</th>
<th>participants</th>
<th>Framework Nation</th>
<th>Operational HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007-I</td>
<td>French – Belgian Battlegroup</td>
<td>Belgium, France, Luxembourg</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battlegroup 107</td>
<td>Germany, Finland, Netherlands</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Potsdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2</td>
<td>Italian - Hungarian - Slovenian Battlegroup</td>
<td>Italy, Hungary, Slovenia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balkan Battlegroup</td>
<td>Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Larissa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-1</td>
<td>Nordic Battlegroup</td>
<td>Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Norway, Ireland</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish-led Battlegroup</td>
<td>Spain, France, <strong>Germany</strong>, Portugal</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2</td>
<td>French - German based Battlegroup</td>
<td>Germany, <strong>France</strong>, <strong>Spain</strong>, Belgium, Luxembourg</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Battlegroup</td>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-1</td>
<td>Spanish Italian Amphibious Battlegroup</td>
<td><strong>Italy</strong>, <strong>Spain</strong>, Portugal, Greece</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battlegroup Greece</td>
<td>Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania (tbc)</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Larissa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The overall picture highlights a strong commitment by the Member States: 24 Member States take part in Battlegroups; only Austria and Malta did not participate and Denmark opted out. Three non-EU NATO countries take part: Iceland, Norway, and Turkey. Every national Battlegroup has an operational HQ, while for the multinational Battlegroups this is provided for by the framework nation or it is drawn from the system of multinational HQs according to “NATO/EU joint planning” document. For instance, the operational

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358 according to Article 6 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty of the European Union
HQ for Nordic Battlegroup in 2008, having Sweden as framework nation, was provided by the UK.\textsuperscript{359} Italy has a strong participation and pledges an operational HQ, it is the most non-EU NATO countries-friendly considering the Italian - Romanian - Turkish Battlegroup.\textsuperscript{360}

**Battlegroup deployment:** Battlegroups have not yet been deployed in operations. Formally, to deploy a Battlegroup unanimity should be reached in the EU Council. In practice, the Member States contributing to the Battlegroups on call are likely to have most influence on the decision-making. After all, it is those countries' parliaments that will have to approve the deployment of their forces.\textsuperscript{361} A Battlegroup seminar in the Czech Republic in November 2005 considered national decision-making. Winning timely political support at national level is essential for Battlegroup operations, and this demands a well-oiled political machinery. In Member States, such as Italy, constitutional provisions require national governments to receive formal parliamentary approval for military deployments, and the usual timetable for parliamentary consideration should be dramatically speeded up to meet the 15 days requirement. An EU decision could be artificially delayed to allow the Member States to take decision, but if the EU is to achieve the sort of rapid response it aspires to, this would be no real solution.\textsuperscript{362}

The Battlegroups have not been deployed so far because the Member States cannot agree on participating in a specific EU operation, or because of different opinions on how to use the units. For instance the EU-led autonomous mission Eufor in DRC in 2006 did not involve a Battlegroup. This was partly because Germany, framework nation of both Eufor DRC and the Battlegroup on call, publicly announced it would not provide all the troops required, and partly because the mission was already planned.\textsuperscript{363} This implies that for rapid response,
Battlegroups’ mission should be clearly spelt out before launching the operation.\textsuperscript{364} On the other hand, Sweden as Nordic Battlegroup framework nation in 2008, regretted that the EU did not allow it to be sent to Chad and the Central African Republic. Instead, the EU took almost one year to disengage its forces, including 200 Swedish troops, in the two countries. Anyhow, the Nordic battlegroup cost Sweden more than €100 M in the first half of 2008, even if it was not deployed.\textsuperscript{365}

Funding for Battlegroups operations within ESDP would follow the mechanism for ESDP military missions: “common costs” such as the operational HQs are divided between Member States on a GNP key, and all the rest is subject to the “costs lie where they fall” principle. Therefore, the majority of the costs would fall to the Member States of the Battlegroup on call.\textsuperscript{366} Given the voluntary rotational basis of Battlegroups this approach may discourage voluntary participation or sending the Battlegroups on call to ongoing operations as it happened for Eufor DRC.

The Battlegroups should not merely have become an end in themselves, but would be used as a catalyst for EU capability development. The initiative has already helped to make smaller, less useable forces more easily deployable, and has also proved to be a catalyst for defence reform in countries with less experience of international missions to meet HG2010.\textsuperscript{367} It could be argued that Battlegroups are merely a political tool and there is no sincere intent to use them in operations. However, if they are not used in the near future for Petersberg tasks, the Member States will to maintain and further develop the concept could greatly diminish as it happened for the NRF.\textsuperscript{368}

\textsuperscript{364} Williams op. cit.
\textsuperscript{365} ‘Sweden calls for rethink on EU battle groups’ in The Swedish Wire 4 June 2009; ‘Sweden leading rethink of EU battle groups’ defenceWeb, 14 July 2009
\textsuperscript{366} Committee on EU Fourth Report, cit. Annex A, Battlegroup Concept
\textsuperscript{367} Williams op.cit.
\textsuperscript{368} Kaitera, Ben-Ari op.cit. p.4
4.4 The NRF and the Battlegroups

4.4.1 The Nato Response Force and its constituents

As a consequence of Kosovo, the NATO developed a NATO Response Force (NRF). This is an initiative to which NATO countries formally committed at the Prague Summit in November 2002. The NRF is a high readiness, technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable force made up of land, air, maritime, and special forces elements that can be deployed at short notice under NAC authority as a stand-alone force for crisis response in the initial phase and capable of sustaining itself without external support for 30 days.369 The NATO countries commit forces to the NRF on a rotational basis so they can go through a process of training and certification, followed by an operational stand-by period of six months to make permanently available a combat-ready deployable NRF.370 Interestingly, an unspoken requirement is that NRF forces should be fully fluent in English.371 The NRF can undertake the following types of deployments:

- show of force and solidarity to deter aggression;
- stand-alone force for Article 5 or non-Article 5 operations;
- initial entry force facilitating the arrival of a larger force.


370 The NRF consists of an appropriately tailored brigade-size land component with forced entry capability of five battalions (one airborne, two air maneuver, and two mechanized infantry); a maritime component composed of a naval task force including a carrier battle group, an amphibious task group and a surface action group with mine countermeasure and support vessels, and an air component which comprises helicopters, UAVs, and 120 fixed-wing aircraft with needed support, command-and-control, and missile- and air-defense elements. Combat support and combat service support capabilities are integral parts of the NRF.

NRF command is exercised in theatre through a Deployable Joint Task Force HQ drawn from one of the three operational-level joint HQs according to the yearly rotation agreed until mid-2007:
- NRF 1 and 2: 15 October 2003 - end 2003 and January 2004 - mid July 2004 (Joint Force Command, Brunssum, the Netherlands);
- NRF 3 and 4: 15 July 2004 - end 2004 and January 2005 – end June 2005 (Joint Force Command, Naples, Italy);
- NRF 5 and 6: 1 July 2005 – 11 January 2006 and 12 January 2006 – 30 June 2006 (Joint Headquarters Lisbon, Portugal);
- NRF 7 and 8: 1 July 2006 – 10 January 2007 and 11 January 2007 – end June 2007 (Brunssum). (See Table 4).

### TABLE 4

**NRF Rotation Cycle**

(Source, NRF website)

153
On 15 October 2003, the NRF was inaugurated by the Saceur in Brunssum. The NAC on 1 December 2003 welcomed the Force generation conferences and national contributions for the first rotations of NRF which was to serve largely as a prototype while also providing an early capability.\textsuperscript{372} Italy, the framework nation of NRF 3 land component, sent a Battalion with service supports as ISAF operational theatre reserve force for the presidential elections in October 2004.\textsuperscript{373} The IOC was declared by NATO, on 13 October 2004, the NRF had approximately 17,000 personnel. One year later, NRF was employed for the first time for Hurricane Katrina and the Pakistani earthquake relief.\textsuperscript{374} These operations highlighted the capability shortfalls in strategic airlift, jurisdiction, and logistics/life support systems and triggered debates between NATO countries about the spectrum of missions the NRF should undertake in the future. France worried that the NRF could be involved in humanitarian tasks. Other NATO countries worried that if the NRF limited itself to high-intensity missions only, some NATO members will assume it will not be used and would not contribute to future rotations. Moreover, in the Pakistan mission, Spain, the framework nation, ended up paying NRF deployment’s full costs.\textsuperscript{375} The Saceur stated that principle of “costs lie where they fall” had been a huge disincentive, hence more of the expenses should be paid jointly by NATO countries, otherwise, many


\textsuperscript{373} Claudio Catalano “The changes of ISAF command” in Analisi Difesa.

\textsuperscript{374} For information on NRF operations and excercises see NRF website: \url{http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm}

\textsuperscript{375} Julianne Smith (ed.) Transforming NATO (...again), A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006 (Washington : CSIS, 2006) p.29-30
countries would hold back so as not to pay the full cost of operations during their rotation.\textsuperscript{376}

\subsection*{4.4.2 NATO forces in action}

At Riga Summit in November 2006, the Full Operational Capabilility (FOC) was declared with 25,000 personnel instead of the originally provisioned 21,000. NATO countries also agreed to share the costs of airlift for NRF short notice deployments as an incentive for countries to commit to future rotations of the Force.\textsuperscript{377} However, political disputes arose between NATO countries, and the US' initial decision not to contribute ground troops to the NRF was reversed by its decision to commit a 6,800-strength Marines Expeditionary Brigade to fill any existing gaps in the NRF 7 to obtain the FOC.\textsuperscript{378} The dispute arose because, as according to Prague declaration the NRF is also seen a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in NATO capabilities and, more generally, for NATO transformation.\textsuperscript{379} The spectrum of mission was enlarged also to non-combatant missions.\textsuperscript{380} France, for instance, welcomed the NRF as part of NATO military capability development, but denied any civilian committment, because NATO should not be a ‘swiss knife’ tool for global use.\textsuperscript{381} Furthermore, NATO countries disagreed on the Alliance’s commitment to Afghanistan that influenced the NRF development. At Riga, Foreign

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{376} ‘NATO’s future, Predictions of its death were premature’ in \textit{The Economist}, 23 November 2006
\textsuperscript{377} NATO press release ‘NATO Response Force declared fully operational’ 29 November 2006
\textsuperscript{378} See Smith \textit{op.cit.} p.30
\textsuperscript{379} Prague Summit Declaration \textit{cit.}, para 4.a. See also Antonio Missiroli ‘La NATO si ferma nella palude Afghana’ in \textit{Il Riformista}, 28 November 2006
\textsuperscript{380} ‘The NATO Response Force, Questions and answers’ 25 June 2007
\textsuperscript{381} Arnaud De La Grange ‘Paris s'oppose à la « dérive civile » de l'Organisation’ in \textit{Le Figaro}, 28 November 2006, see also ‘NATO’s future, Predictions of its death were premature’ in \textit{The Economist}, 23 November 2006
\end{footnotesize}
Minister D’Alema refused to send more Italian troops to Aghanistan.\textsuperscript{382} In the Franco-Italian summit in Lucca on 24 November, the two countries consolidated their opposition to the Afghanistan commitment. Germany also shared this position.

In late 2007, less than one year after its declaration, the FOC was no longer available: NATO reasoned that it was due to countries’ burden from operations.\textsuperscript{383} The NATO members diverted resources to Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq, and in June 2007 the US decided to diminish its contribution to the NRF, being frustrated by insufficient contributions by Europeans and in part by the high operational tempo. Therefore, at the NMC Conference in Canada in September 2007, the Chiefs of Defence decided to continue work on the reduced model of NRF known as Option 2.\textsuperscript{384}

At the Noordwijk informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers on 25 October 2007, the Europeans reaffirmed their full commitment to NRF and to develop a “graduated readiness” approach, meaning a strength reduction starting from NRF 10. This approach reshaped the Option 2 NRF around three elements: minimum core, limited core, and full core. This meant that the force was reduced to a 5,000 to 10,000-strong core element around which a full core can be structured when needed to be perform autonomously at least one lower-intensity task.\textsuperscript{385} The NRF has lost much of its impetus and support. (see Table 5)

\textsuperscript{382} L’Italia fa già abbastanza, da D’Alema nessuna apertura’ in \textit{La Repubblica}, 29 November 2006; Augusto Minzolini, ‘D’Alema a Bush, niente truppe’ in \textit{La Stampa}, 29 November 2006

\textsuperscript{383} NATO Speech Press briefing by NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai ‘The NATO Response Force, Questions and answers’ 21 September 2007

\textsuperscript{384} Kaitera, Ben-Ari \textit{op.cit.}, p.5

\textsuperscript{385} See NATO news ‘Allies discuss transformation agenda’ 25 October 2007; see also NATO News ‘NATO’s Response Force prepares for future missions’ 1-14 December 2007 Kaitera, Ben-Ari \textit{op.cit.}, p.5
**TABLE 5**

**NRF ROTATIONS, JANUARY 2008–JANUARY 2012.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NRF</th>
<th>Semestre</th>
<th>Rotations</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NRF-10</td>
<td>2008-1</td>
<td><strong>Germany/Netherlands, UK Maritime Force (UKMARFOR), Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (Naples)</strong></td>
<td>Joint Forces Command Naples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF-11</td>
<td>2008-2</td>
<td><strong>France</strong>, Spain, UK, Italy</td>
<td>Joint Headquarters Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF-12</td>
<td>2009-1</td>
<td><strong>Spain, STRIKE FORCE NATO, France, Italy</strong></td>
<td>Joint Headquarters Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF-13</td>
<td>2009-2</td>
<td>UK, Italian Maritime Force (ITMARFOR), Component Command-Air Headquarters Ramstein (AIR N) (Ramstein), <strong>France</strong></td>
<td>Joint Forces Command Brunssum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF-14</td>
<td>2010-1</td>
<td><strong>Germany, Italian Maritime Force (ITMARFOR), Component Command-Air Headquarters Ramstein (AIR N)</strong></td>
<td>Joint Forces Command Brunssum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF-15</td>
<td>2010-2</td>
<td>**EUROCORPS, France, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIR S), <strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>Joint Forces Command Naples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF-16</td>
<td>2011-1</td>
<td>Italy, Spain, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIR S), <strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>Joint Forces Command Naples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF-17</td>
<td>2011-2</td>
<td>Turkey, UK Maritime Force (UKMARFOR), Germany, Spain</td>
<td>Joint Headquarters Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF-18</td>
<td>2012-1</td>
<td><strong>Germany/Netherlands, (UKMARFOR), France, Spain</strong></td>
<td>Joint Headquarters Lisbon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NATO Rapid Deployable Corps:** As part of command transformation, NATO have developed NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC). These are multinational deployable HQs to lead up to 60,000 soldiers on a full spectrum of missions including warfighting. Currently there are six NRDCs designed to assume command of NRF land component under six-month rotation:

- The ARRC was established in 1992 and based in Rheindalen, Germany with the UK as framework nation;
- NRDC–IT at “Ugo Mara” Barracks in Solbiate Olona (Varese), Italy;
- NRDC–Spain in Valencia, Spain;

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386 Country names in bold have forces committed concurrently to the Battlegroups and the NRF; Taken from Kaitera, Ben-Ari *op. cit.*, p.6
The Eurocorps made a technical agreement with NATO in 2002 to be available as a rapid deployable HQ.\(^{387}\) Except for the Eurocorps and the ARRC the NRDCs were created within NATO in 2001. NRDC-IT is the Italian Army’s answer to NATO’s requirements. It is capable of commanding up to four divisions, combat support and service support units, able to deploy worldwide within 30 days. according to NRDC-IT force pool concept, Italy, the framework nation provides with 70% of personnel, and offers a command options to Brigade-size or Division-size multinational land force composed by British, Greek, Italian and other countries’ units, to operate as a stand-alone formation or under the authority of a higher HQ.\(^{388}\)

All NRDCs had a baptism of fire, mainly in ISAF.\(^{389}\) While the RRF was still on paper, NATO forces and structures started to be deployed on operations. Therefore, the EU had to develop more coherent concepts for rapid response for EU-led or UN mandated missions.

### 4.4.3 Mutually reinforcing or duplicating?

In the official language the Battlegroups concept is ‘complementary and mutually reinforcing’ with the NRF.\(^{390}\) A division of labour should create potential for synergies between the two initiatives if the types of mission would be complementary, rather than duplicative: the NRF is designed to participate in the full range of NATO missions, including

\(^{387}\) See Malgorzata Sosnicka, ‘Eurocorps and its relationship to NATO, WEU and EU’ in *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, autumn 2000, vol. 9, nº 4, p. 115-128

\(^{388}\) General Mauro del Vecchio, NRDC-IT Commander in 2004-2007, statement quoted in the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy, Brochure [www.nato.int/nrdc-it](http://www.nato.int/nrdc-it)

\(^{389}\) For NRDC-IT see Press release ‘The NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Italy return to Afghanistan’ 20 January 2009. See also *The changes of ISAF command*

\(^{390}\) *Declaration On European Military Capabilities* cit. para. 16
high intensity war-fighting, while the Battlegroups would mainly be deployed in UN-mandated missions with a limited scale of robust peace enforcement intervention.\textsuperscript{391} However, there is a potential for duplication if the missions tend to overlap. In any case, the Battlegroups are forced to build on NATO experience. First, because NATO developed through the years agreements on military standards and procedures for interoperability known as STANAGS, that could serve as a basis for Battlegroup interoperability discussions. Second, because the Battlegroups concept already draws on standard NATO doctrine: NRF land component is a land brigade configured tactically with 5 battlegroups.\textsuperscript{392} Third, because Battlegroups are smaller in size (not considering Option 2 NRF) are more land based, lack aerial and maritime components, and therefore would have to be supported by strategic enablers if they are to meet all their operational demands.

On the other hand, the Battlegroups may serve as a “stepping-stone” for Member States who want to contribute to the NRF, by developing their high readiness forces to the required standard and integrating small countries’ contributions into multinational units, thus helping to harmonise their commitments and avoiding duplications, considering that EU and NATO troops are “separable but not separate”.\textsuperscript{393} One interesting aspect of the Battlegroups is that neutral member states find them easy to join as they are not NATO-connected and are primarily designed for peacekeeping. Non-EU European NATO countries which are candidates for accession to the EU can participate in Battlegroups.\textsuperscript{394}

Given the membership overlap between the EU and NATO, the necessary interoperability is primarily a responsibility of individual countries. However, many defence experts doubt whether these have the resources for both the Battlegroups, the NRF and for intervening in demanding operations. The critics accuse the EU of creating a wasteful

\textsuperscript{391} Committee on EU Fourth Report cit., Annex A, Battlegroup Concept
\textsuperscript{392} Quille Parliament cit.
\textsuperscript{393} Select Committee on EU Fourth Report; cit annex A, Battlegroup Concept
\textsuperscript{394} Paul Reynolds ‘New force behind EU foreign policy’ in BBC News online, 15 March 2007; EU Factsheet “The EU Battlegroups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell” February 2005
rival army to duplicate NATO and break up the transatlantic alliance. Advocates of ESDP say that Europe needs its own forces to encourage investment in defence and to take part in missions, such as African peacekeeping, in which the US is not involved. In fact, in 2005, the EU and NATO have cooperated over AMIS in Darfur through a joint cell.  

The overstretching of forces is a serious financial burden, when added to operational deployment and force modernisation. Defence Minister, Martino stated:

“la Forza di risposta Nato: dobbiamo farci trovare pronti all’appuntamento, perché il governo si è ufficialmente impegnato per bocca del presidente del Consiglio a Praga. C’ è poi la Forza di reazione rapida europea, che comporta ulteriori sforzi. Insomma, i prossimi anni saranno decisivi (..) Per ciò che riguarda le risorse necessarie a finanziare questi impegni, sono certo che si troveranno: è in gioco la credibilità internazionale dell’ Italia”.  

On the other hand, the full success of NATO transformation is a priority for Italy to show its commitment to NATO. 

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395 The EU Battlegroups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell cit.; The Economist cit. (23 November 2006); Presidency Report on ESDP, Doc. 15891/05 cit. para IX. 57 and 59
396 Martino ‘Ecco perché ho detto no alla Nato’ in Corriere della Sera, 5 June 2003
Conclusion

In the development of military capabilities for the ESDP, Italy always tried to ally with the UK, because they shared a common vision of developing a European Defence in conformity with NATO. Italy tried to balance between France and the UK on European Defence. For this reason, although Italy hoped for a major role for the WEU in European Defence, it downplayed its support so as not to alienate the UK on this matter. While Italy and France are the biggest contributors to military capability catalogues, on the other hand they are often in competition and do not share the same vision on European Defence.

The Anglo-Italian cooperation had already started in 1999, and the British-Italian summit proposed to set a capability goal that was adopted by the Helsinki Council in the HHG. However, in 2004-2005, the British-Italian cooperation reached its climax because of the high operational tempo and mutual support during the respective presidencies. The Eufor intervention in Bosnia was a result of this collaboration, which was also very strong in ISAF one of the most demanding operations for the Europeans.

Moreover, Italy and the UK have endorsed the proposals to strengthen the European multinational military capabilities at the disposal of the EU and NATO. As a matter of fact, the need to intervene in difficult operations in distant scenarios forced NATO and the EU to develop similar concepts by means of NRF and Battlegroups. These initiative should have been mutually reinforcing, as requested by Italy and the UK, but in reality they could not have been. So far the deployment of NRF has generated few problems and because of the Afghanistan commitment, the NRF seems to have lost momentum even in Atlanticists states such as Italy. On the other hand, the Battlegroups have also created enthusiasm in the Member States because they are conceived to help the UN in PSOs. This view is consistent with Italian approach to multilateralism, and in this case it conforms with the France and Germany views. This explain why, in 2005 Italy refused to reinforce the NRF, fearing that it could be sent to Afghanistan in combat scenarios. Furthermore, Italy has been one of the more generous Member States in committing forces to the Battlegroups list.
The military version of the Chair policy overstretched Italian force to participate in a national Battlegroup and in other three multinational Battlegroups which, however, reflect the increasing military cooperation of Italy with Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and the older Mediterranean military cooperation with Greece, Portugal and Spain, as exemplified by the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Battlegroup. On the other hand, the Battlegroups still exist only on paper, and notwithstanding the huge participation in the roster, they have not yet seen action. This is partly because action would cause a series of problems for the Member States whose Battlegroup is on call at the time of deployment, as they would bear the major costs, and might have problems in rapidly obtaining the national parliamentary authorisation to deploy troops in the ESDP framework.

Therefore, it is still to prove whether the military capabilities, included in the HHG and the HG2010, and in particular the Battlegroups, are there to provide a true military capability for the Petersberg Tasks and the ESDP missions. In any case, these capabilities are a sound example of the military cooperation existing between the Member States, which try to generate disposable forces. In this way, the ESDP contributes to the mutual development of an increased military capability of the armed services of the Member States. This implies that the armed services are interested in maintaining a high level of interoperability with the other Member States and allies, which can be called to cooperate in military missions. Rather than an attempt to obtain more military efficiency in operations, these capabilities are a statement of the Member States of their political commitment to converge in European Defence.
CHAPTER V
NATO-ESDP RELATIONS
AND THE ISSUE OF ADMINISTRATIVE INTERESTS

The development of military capabilities for the European Defence closely involves NATO-ESDP relations. This relationship is crucial as NATO is the oldest and most successful alliance in which 22 out of 27 Member States take part. Italy has a unique approach to NATO and EU relations in European military matters. A fierce Atlanticist country, Italy is also a staunch supporter of European integration in any field, including security & defence. In this chapter we shall examine distinctive Italian approach to NATO-ESDP relations, thus assessing if the support of both policies is a comprehensive policy or a choice in order not to take one side.

First, we will start by focusing on the national approach and contributions to NATO and the ESDP. The role in the development of some issues will be assessed, along with the Italian reaction to the British, French, and German initiatives in European Defence.

Secondly, we will analyse in depth NATO-ESDP relations by examining the Berlin Plus arrangements, and the recent controversies regarding NATO-EU operational planning and HQs for ESDP missions.

In conclusion, we will try to assess Italian military administrative interests in NATO and ESDP structures. We will define the Italian attitude towards NATO and the issue of NATO military bases in national territory. This will be put into relation with the options for key positions of Italian officers in NATO military base structure, thus introducing the issue of military administrative interest towards NATO bodies. This will be crucial to assess if the ability of Italy to obtain key positions gives it an effective return from its membership in NATO and the EU.
5.1 The long and winding road of the Berlin Plus

5.1.1 From the ESDI to ESDP

The NAC summit in Brussels in 1994 decided to establish a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO, which became an integral part of the adaptation of NATO's political and security structures. The ESDI would build on the relations established since 1991 between the WEU and NATO. At the NAC summit in Berlin in June 1996, the so-called Berlin arrangements agreed to develop ESDI by allowing the WEU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for planning and performing Petersberg tasks. This was maybe the greatest achievement in the development of European Defence complementary to NATO. The NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers’ summit in Brussels in June 1996 affirmed the availability of NATO assets for the WEU, including appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO for WEU-led operations, and the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) to provide flexible and deployable European forces “separable but not separate” from NATO deployable HQs for WEU-led operations.398

The Kosovo intervention in 1999 boosted a new role for NATO in non-Article 5 operations, and acted as a catalyst in the development of ESDP, as it revealed that there was a huge capability gap between the US and Europeans. Admiral Guido Venturoni, NATO Military Committee (NMC) Chairman, endorsed the development of European military capabilities in the ESDI framework:

‘Gli Usa hanno fornito il settanta per cento dei mezzi aerei. Senza gli Stati Uniti, la Nato non avrebbe mai potuto condurre la campagna di bombardamenti che ha condotto. Molto semplicemente, gli altri paesi non hanno i mezzi necessari. Occorre che gli alleati europei si

398 See NATO summit final communiqué, June 2006 and see also NATO Handbook (Brussels : NATO Public diplomacy division 2006) p. 245
mobilitino in questo senso, altrimenti l’ identità di difesa europea e’ destinata a restare nel campo delle buone intenzioni.’

The Kosovo intervention led to three lessons being learned: i) European military capabilities were inadequate, and military spending was not enough to bridge the technology gap with the US; ii) although the military technology gap was a priority, NATO decision-making structures, in particular military commands and HQs, needed to be strengthened in order to deal with multiple crisis; iii) NATO intelligence sharing needed to be improved, in particular in non-military intelligence gathering. In conformity with Italian tradition, Venturoni revealed being a supporter of European capabilities, in accordance with NATO:

‘l’ ipotesi di un’ identità europea riguardo alla Sicurezza e alla Difesa si fondava sul presupposto che l’ Europa avrebbe utilizzato le capacità della Nato. Si tratta di una rete di collegamenti per la distribuzione delle informazioni, codici segreti, procedure che regolano la diramazione degli ordini, il modo di condurre le operazioni, tutte cose che non si improvvisano. La Nato ha sviluppato nel corso di oltre 50 anni questa capacità di integrare le forze dei singoli Paesi. L’ Europa no (…) Un collegamento strategico forte fra Europa e America è indispensabile, da sola l’ Europa non è in grado per il momento di svolgere il ruolo al quale aspira.’

From the Italian military point of view, the simultaneous establishment of a stronger European dimension in NATO and EU military capabilities underpins the reform of Italian armed services. The simultaneous reference to NATO and EU is a constant in all the official documents and speeches of the Italian Chiefs of Defence. A single set of national forces should be able to contribute to both initiatives, by facilitiang planning and force generation processes. For this reason, it is

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399 Andrea Bonanni ‘L’ Europa deve armarsi per i suoi nuovi compiti’ in Corriere della Sera, 1 July 1999
400 Marco Nese ‘La fine dell’ Alleanza sarebbe un disastro per l’ Europa’ in Corriere della Sera, 13 February 2003
particularly important to guarantee the compatibility and interoperability of NATO and the EU forces. 402 In 1999-2002, the European defence capabilities were further developed through decisions taken by NATO and the EU.

**Berlin Plus:** The Berlin Plus arrangements were reaffirmed at the Washington Atlantic summit in April 1999 to support the EU crisis management capabilities for operations where the Alliance as a whole was not engaged. This built on NATO-WEU arrangements that were already in place by 1999. 403 The logic behind these arrangements was that NATO possessed a number of collective assets and capabilities which, for financial, military and political reasons, would not make sense to replicate in the WEU or EU. The Berlin Plus arrangements included four elements for use in EU-led operations:

1. assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities;
2. presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets;
3. identification of a range of European command options, further developing the role of the Deputy Saceur to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;
4. the further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations. 404

The ESDP was born at the Cologne and Helsinki Councils in June and December 1999. In particular, the Cologne conclusions abolished the ESDI and replaced it with the ESDP within CFSP framework. 405

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402 Giovanni Gasparini ‘Italy and ESDP’ in Klaus Brummer (ed.) *The South and ESDP: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain* (Gütersloh : Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007) p. 23
403 NATO Washington Communiqué, 4 April 1999, para 10
404 NATO press release ‘NATO-EU cooperation taken to a new level’ 17 March 2003
405 See Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, Conclusions 3-4 June 1999, para.56.
5.1.2 A short-lived honeymoon

The short-lived honeymoon between NATO and the ESDP was inaugurated at the Washington Summit, which endorsed the ESDI and launched a NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to help boost European capabilities by strengthening military capabilities. The British-Italian Summit endorsed the DCI to underpin the European capabilities. However, many of the needs identified under the DCI (such as air lift capabilities) overlapped with those of the RRF. Moreover, in June 1999, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana was appointed High Representative for CFSP in order to establish continuity between NATO and the EU.

The Berlin Plus was put to the test during a joint crisis management exercise in February 2000 (CMX/CRISEX 2000). In July 2000, NATO agreed to a EU proposal to set up EU-NATO ad hoc working groups to define new forms of cooperation building on the NATO-WEU existing mechanisms in four specific areas: arrangements to allow EU access to NATO collective assets, developing permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation and cooperation, defining practical arrangements for EU access to NATO assets according to the Berlin Plus, and EU capability goals and NATO defence planning system adaptation for EU-led forces availability. The NATO-EU Interim security arrangements on exchange of classified information entered into force in July 2000, and the EU-NATO working group on security arrangements worked towards a permanent arrangement. However, the question of how non-EU NATO countries and non-NATO EU Member States should participate in NATO consultations, deliberations and in the decision process was particularly relevant to the work of these groups. As a matter of fact, NATO-ESDP relations encountered opposition in Turkey, who wanted to blackmail the EU to obtain a ticket to join it. In the NAC in December 2000, Turkey vetoed

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407 NATO Fact sheet “Strengthening European Security and Defence Capabilities” 15 Dicembre 2000
EU access to NATO assets, and asked to be associated to the ESDP, resulting in a stalemate in NATO-EU relations.

**NATO-EU summits:** The exchange of letters on 21 January 2001 between NATO secretary General, Lord Robertson, and the EU presidency provided arrangements for consultations and cooperation including joint meetings at different levels, such as two joint NATO-EU foreign ministers meeting every year, and at least three NAC-COPS meetings at the ambassadorial level.\(^{408}\) Under Venturoni’s Chairmanship, for the first time the NMC met the EUMC on 12 June 2001 to exchange information on issues directly related to the coordination of NATO-EU security cooperations (including assets and capabilities), NATO’s command and force structure, and the development of the ESDP.\(^{409}\) The meeting was convened following guidance provided by the NAC and the European Council, and it was decided that at least one such meeting should occur during each EU presidency.\(^{410}\) Officially NATO-EU relations were based on an equal footing, and the autonomy of respective NATO and EU decision-making would be fully respected. In truth, the ESDP had not sufficient enough assets to develop military capability without help from NATO.

### 5.1.3 The Berlin Plus implementation and Concordia

Turkey’s veto was overcome at the NAC on 13 December 2002, by reaching an agreement on excluding Cyprus from NATO assets. On the same day, the Copenhagen Council acknowledged this decision. The joint NATO-EU Declaration on the ESDP issued on 13 December 2002 and the exchange of letters on 16 December 2002 between NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and the High Representative Solana, implemented the Berlin Plus arrangements for NATO support in EU-

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\(^{408}\) NATO press release “NATO-EU cooperation taken to a new level” 17 March 2003

\(^{409}\) First meeting of NATO and EU Military Committees 12 Jun 2001

\(^{410}\) NATO International Military Staff press release ‘First meeting of the NATO Military Committee and the EU Military Committee’ 12 June 2001
led operations, thus allowing the EU to detach NATO C2 and deployable HQ assets for its own use. The Berlin Plus and other NATO-EU agreements were implemented to launch the EU first military operation “Concordia” in FYROM by utilising NATO assets and planning capabilities to replace NATO operation “Allied Harmony”. Moreover, the “Concordia” staff of EUMS was detached to SHAPE to facilitate mission planning and Deputy Saceur was appointed Operation Commander. NATO Secretary General and the Greek presidency signed the permanent NATO-EU Agreement on Security of Information on 14 March 2003 to allow NATO and the EU to share classified information based on common security standards. The NAC decided to end the NATO operation on 17 March 2003 in order to allow the hand over by the 380-strength operation “Concordia” in FYROM on 31 March 2003.

**A disputed ‘Concordia’:** While Italy agreed on strengthening NATO-EU relations, it thought that a military mission was not what the existing situation of FYROM required. Given public security concerns, a police mission was more suitable according to Italy, so starting an EU military mission was mainly a political statement by a few Member States. To this end, at the GAERC on 29 September 2003, the Italian presidency decided to follow Concordia with the 200-strength EU civilian police assistance mission “Proxima” by 15 December 2003. In the Declaration on Security and Defence of the Anglo-Italian summit of 21 February 2003, Italy and the UK welcomed the EU in replacing NATO in FYROM and possibly in Bosnia. Both EU operations should have built on NATO-EU cooperation in the Western Balkans, so that the two organisations worked together on regional stabilisation in a

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412 Interview with Senior Diplomat, Italian representation to the EU, Brussels, May 2003.
413 See C/03/252, 2527th Council meeting - External relations - Brussels, 29 September 2003, p.9; Council of the European Union Doc. 15814/03, ESDP Presidency Report, Brussels, 9 December 2003, para I.3, See also “Priorities for the Western Balkans” Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 2003
comprehensive strategy. In fact, the British and the Atlanticist states opposed the French and Belgian proposal to launch operation “Concordia” without NATO consent and support. France assumed the framework nation role for Concordia by contributing the operational command and a French General was appointed commander, while France deployed the largest contingent of 175 personnel. However, France proclaimed its unwillingness to act as a framework nation when the mission mandate was extended for another three months, and the Eurofor provided Concordia with HQ capabilities from 30 September 2003 until Concordia termination on 15 December 2003. Nonetheless, France saw Concordia as a step to build an autonomous defence that would complicate relations with NATO. Notwithstanding the original meaning of its name, Concordia was a precursor of the disputes to come.

5.2 The dispute over the autonomous EU HQ

5.2.1 Two schools of thought and the Tervuren HQ proposal

The divisions of the Iraqi crisis were transferred to NATO and the ESDP dimension. Being absorbed by the war on terrorism, the Bush administration started to withdraw US troops from the Western Balkans, leaving the responsibility of peacekeeping to the Europeans. The ESDP didn’t have resources comparable to NATO assets:

‘In Europa c’è chi sta manifestando ambizioni per le quali non siamo ancora all’altezza. Se mettiamo in crisi la Nato, la capacità difensiva europea è poca cosa. I singoli Paesi europei non riescono a operare insieme al di fuori dell’organizzazione militare della Nato. Non hanno la capacità di integrarsi fra loro (..) servono capacità di operare lontano dai propri confini, ci vuole la capacità di mobilitare uomini e mezzi, di creare strutture di comando in zone sperdute del Globo (..) Questi requisiti operativi ce l’hanno solo gli Stati Uniti (..) Mettere

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414 see Claudio Catalano “L’operazione “Concordia”: L’Unione Europea in Macedonia (fYROM)” in Analisi Difesa
Two opposite schools of thought can be identified in the discussion about the short-term ESDP evolution: a core group of four states (Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg) and the Atlanticists (Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK). This division was first reflected by the “old” and the “new” Europe.\footnote{See Chapter 2 para ‘The European rifts in the Iraq Crisis’}

The four states emerged as a core group leading EU autonomous capabilities. This core could have two types of impact on the evolution of the ESDP. It could contribute to strengthening the emergence of a stronger ESDP and a UN role in international security or it could undermine further the fragmented nature of the European and international security system.

The Atlanticists did not want the ESDP to compete in duplicating NATO. Therefore, the ESDP-NATO relationship was about allowing ad-hoc coalitions to undertake military engagements in NATO framework as in Afghanistan, and by relying, whenever possible, on the ESDP to provide civilian capabilities for such operations.\footnote{Giovanna Bono ‘Operation Concordia: the first step towards a new strategic EU-NATO relationship?’ WeltPolitik.net, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 26 June 2003}

**The Tervuren HQ proposal:** At the Franco-German summit in January 2003, French President Chirac stated that France and Germany would consider a EU joint staff at the operational level to better utilise the assets and capabilities available.\footnote{Discours du Président Chirac, Déclaration du conseil franco-allemand de Défense et de sécurité au palais de l'Elysée, Paris, le 22 janvier 2003} Gathering at the ‘mini’ summit on European Defence held in Brussels on 29 April 2003, Belgium, France and Germany proposed the creation of a “core of collective planning and operational capabilities” for the EU without utilising NATO assets and capabilities. By summer 2004, an independent EU military HQ was

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\footnote{Admiral Venturoni quoted in Marco Nese ‘La fine dell' Alleanza sarebbe un disastro per l' Europa’ in Corriere della Sera, 13 February 2003}

\footnote{Gathering at the ‘mini’ summit on European Defence held in Brussels on 29 April 2003, Belgium, France and Germany proposed the creation of a “core of collective planning and operational capabilities” for the EU without utilising NATO assets and capabilities. By summer 2004, an independent EU military HQ was established}
established in Tervuren, a Bruxelles suburb only a few miles away from NATO HQ in Bruxelles-Evere. Luxembourg soon supported this proposal. The proposal would have contributed to developing an ESDP autonomous from NATO, regardless of duplication or competition between the two organisations, although liaison agreements with SHAPE were suggested. In any case, the four were not in full agreement on many aspects of the ESDP. Their differences ranged from the role of the Commission in the ESDP to military tasks in conflict prevention. France preferred a traditional approach through national or multilateral arrangements for EU-led military operations. Belgium and Germany would support diplomatic solutions relying on economic and humanitarian aid. Because of these differences, they did not agree on ‘counter-balancing’ the US, as suggested by France, or emphasizing conflict prevention and limiting military operations, as suggested by Belgium and Germany. In any case, the initiative called for other Member States to go ahead and “deepen” their level of cooperation in the ESDP, in a way similar to the strengthened cooperations that led to the “Eurozone”. These ambitions were reflected in two proposals made to the European Convention. The first: “the Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to maintain the Union’s values and serve its interests.” The second regarded “structured cooperation”. In this case, it is argued that the Council may ask the Member States participating in such cooperation to carry out tasks as envisaged under the ESDP.

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419 ‘Déclaration commune des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement d'Allemagne, de France, du Luxembourg et de Belgique sur la défense européenne’ Bruxelles, le 29 avril 2003
420 Article 1-40, paragraph 5 in European Convention. (26 May 2003). Draft constitution, Volume 1 - Revised text of part one
5.2.2 The Atlanticists reaction

Italy and the UK disagreed with the Tervuren proposal, and developed alternative plans on European Defence.422 The Italian presidency’s ESDP priorities presented to the COPS on 1 July, and to the European Parliament on 2 July 2003 included among others: the creation of synergies between NATO and the EU for the ESDP missions, the augmentation of operational readiness of ESDP military capabilities, and the strengthening of the ESDP institutional structures.423

The British plan “Food for Thought”, submitted at the request of the Italian presidency, was drafted on 23 August 2003, and presented to the EU political and military directors on 29 August, and at the Foreign Ministries and MoD meeting at Riva del Garda on 5 September 2003. The proposal aimed to establish a European “planning cell” composed of 40-50 staff officers, to be placed within SHAPE to facilitate EU military operations planning when needed. The idea, which had already emerged from the ongoing discussions on capabilities, was that the EU cell in SHAPE would provide continuity in planning, enabling a build-up and the exchange of experience while ensuring that planning was done firmly within a NATO context.424 The proposal received support from Italy, Ireland and Spain, and also the Netherlands, Denmark and the 10 accessing countries seemed to like this approach.425 At the Berlin Summit on 20 September 2003, Blair, Chirac and Schroeder met to settle their disputes on defence. The ‘structured cooperation’ concept was not accepted by the UK, which considered it a competitor for NATO, but Blair eventually accepted that a small

422 See Interview to Franco Frattini ‘Il Patto frena la difesa Ue’ in Il Sole 24 Ore, 5 December 2003; and Michele Comelli “Cfsp Watch 2003, National Report Italy” Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, Italy, 2003, p.3
423 Giovanni Gasparini “Osservatorio sulla Difesa Europea” IAI, July 2003
424 Simon Taylor ‘Deadlock over operational planning but some movement on IGC’ in European Security Review Number 19 October 2003, ISIS Europe
425 Ian Black ‘UK tries to head off plan for EU rival to Nato’ in The Guardian 29 August 2003; Marit Ruuda ‘London reveals new alternative to EU army plans’ in EUobserver, 25 August 2003; Thomas Fuller ‘Summit talk of close European military ties upsets U.S.’ in International Herald Tribune, 17 October 2003
group of countries could cooperate on defence, provided that there were additional safeguards built-in. Before this, the Franco-German Council on 18 September 2003 had dropped plans to set up the Tervuren HQ.

The Tervuren HQ was seen by the British as an unacceptable independence from the US, although Blair agreed on the necessity of the EU being able to plan and execute ESDP operations independently of NATO. An internal document affirmed that the EU "should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities. Our goal remains to achieve such a planning and implementation capacity either in consensus with the 25 [member states] but also in a circle of interested partners".426 Furthermore, France, Germany and the UK agreed to work on a common paper on EU military issues, that would include the establishment of EU planning capabilities, not colliding with NATO, able to intervene in high intensity situations also by means of ‘structured cooperation’. For its part, Italy recognised that, as the largest military player in Europe, any agreement on defence needed the UK on its side, while the UK welcomed an Italian proposal that suggested forcing the Member States to raise defence spending. Therefore, the Italian presidency seemed to endorse the British position by proposing the establishment of a planning cell at SHAPE composed of 40 ‘mobile’ staffers who would rotate around a system of operational HQs pledged by the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Greece for the planning and conduct of EU-led military autonomous operations. The choice of the operational HQ depended on the ‘framework nation’. This system would not require setting up an alternative to NATO, and so would be more acceptable to London, which recognised that the proposal was a "step in the right direction".427

426 Reported by the Financial Times, 20 September 2003; quoted in Honor Mahony ‘UK comes nearer to Franco-German position on defence’ in EUobserver, 20 September 2003; Id. ‘NATO to discuss EU defence plans’ in EUobserver, 20 October 2003
427 Stephen Castle ‘Italy brokers deal to end EU defence rift’ in The Independent, 3 October 2003; and Blake Evans-Pritchard ‘Italy tables new defence proposal’ in EUobserver, 3 October 2003
According to this vision, at the Defence Ministers’ EU Council on 3 and 4 October 2003, Defence Minister Antonio Martino reaffirmed that the EU should not develop a single autonomous HQ, but it should rely on the Member States’ Operational HQs, as the Italian Joint Operational High Command (COI) in Rome, and similar structures in France (Mont-Valérien, Paris), Germany (Potsdam), Greece (Larissa) and the UK (Northwood). However, the US ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, judged the development of autonomous EU planning and command capabilities a threat to NATO, in direct competition with NATO structures, and he asked for an extraordinary NATO Ambassadorial summit. The US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld held the same position during the Colorado Springs NATO summit. The US position had particularly hardened after the British removed their opposition to ‘structured cooperations’ at the Berlin summit.

5.2.3 Looking for a solution

At the Bruxelles Council on 16 and 17 October 2003, the Europeans reassured the US that the EU initiatives in defence would not compete with NATO, but were just designed to complement it. Prime Minister Berlusconi stated that European Defence would be “complementary” not “alternative” to NATO. French Defence Minister Michelle Alliot-Marie stated that:

"Three projects are going to be studied within Europe: the proposals of the four - France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg; a proposition from the Italian presidency of the EU and a British proposal. The essential is to approach the issue raised with pragmatism in the light of the EU’s real needs." The extraordinary NATO-EU Ambassadorial meeting in Bruxelles on 20 October 2003 started with a tour of the table, and the COPS

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428 See Gabriele Altana, Stefano Baldi Vademecum della PESD in ‘Manuali diplomatici’ (Roma : Ministero Affari Esteri, 2009) p. 26
429 AGR press agency, ‘Vertice Ue: Berlusconi, "L’Unione non conta nel mondo senza supporto militare’ 17 October 2003
430 Robert Graham ‘France seeks to reassure US over Nato commitment’ in Financial Times, 18 October 2003
chairman, Ambassador Maurizio Melani of Italy, reassured the United States that the Europeans were in favour of ‘transparency’ and ‘clarification’ in NATO-EU relations.\footnote{Press Point with NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, the PSC Chairman, Ambassador Maurizio Melani and the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana following the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting with the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the European Union, 21 October 2003.} France, Germany, Italy and the UK made common efforts to develop EU planning and command structures within a joint school of thought. The dispute was eventually overcome when, in November 2003, Germany accepted the idea of a small EU planning unit in SHAPE and a system of national HQs, Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister said:

"You have a national capability in the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Greece. I don’t believe you will have another big operational headquarters."\footnote{Stephen Castle ‘Germany retreats on EU strategic defence plans’ in \textit{The Independent}, 14 November 2003}

The Italian presidency concluded at GAERC on 17 November 2003 the SOFA for EUMS personnel that raised the level of security of De Cortenbergs premises to NATO standards.\footnote{AGREEMENT between the Member States of the European Union concerning the status of military and civilian staff seconded to the institutions of the European Union, of the headquarters and forces which may be made available to the European Union in the context of the preparation and execution of the tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, including exercises, and of the military and civilian staff of the Member States put at the disposal of the European Union to act in this context (2003/C 321/02) EU SOFA signed on 17 November 2003 in Official Journal of the European Union, C 321/6, 31 December 2003.}

The real challenge for the ESDP was not the autonomous HQs, but to create full interoperability with NATO and between Member States’ armed forces when performing the ESDP missions. To this purpose, according to a NATO statement of 12 June 2003, the ECAP groups started to cooperate with the NATO Prague Capabilities Commitment groups in relevant areas under the auspices of the
NATO-EU Capability Group. Moreover, the results of the Berlin Plus became evident, as they were successfully validated in a joint NATO/EU crisis management exercise CME/CMX 03 overseen by the Italian presidency and conducted from 19 to 25 November. The London Anglo-French summit recognised the importance of the NATO-EU arrangements for European crisis management:

“In 2003 the European Union has concluded the full set of NATO/EU agreements laying the groundwork for the strategic partnership in crisis management between the two organisations. We intend to make full use of these arrangements, so furthering the relationship established in this framework. (...) The EU has launched its first military mission with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, Operation Concordia (...) In this context, our two countries reaffirm our support for the EU organising and leading a co-ordinated mission in Bosnia, following the termination of SFOR. It is understood that a military component would be established under Berlin Plus. We look forward to discussions on this in the coming weeks.”

Therefore, the diplomatic advisors of France, Germany and the UK met in Berlin on 27 November 2003 to solve the pending defence issues before the Naples Conclave. The three countries found compromise solutions for the “structured cooperations” and HQ options. The temporary Concordia cell was to be transformed into a permanent SHAPE cell for EU-led operations under the Berlin Plus. De Cortenber building, home of the 130-staffed EUMS, would become the strategic HQ for ESDP autonomous missions and civilian crisis management. The UK asked Washington for approval.

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435 EU Council, ESDP Presidency Report, Doc.15814/03, 9 December 2003 para VI. 16
436 Franco-British Summit London, Strengthening European Cooperation In Security and Defence Declaration, 24 November 2003, p.1
437 Laurent Zecchini ‘Paris, Londres et Berlin sont parvenus à un compromis sur la défense européenne’ in Le Monde 28 November 2003; Maarti Ruuda
5.2.4 NATO-EU joint planning

NATO-EU ministerial meeting in Brussels on 4 December 2003 built on the Berlin Plus and NATO-EU cooperation in Bosnia. Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini stated:

“Siamo stati per 50 anni consumatori di sicurezza americana. Ora vogliamo diventarne produttori. Abbiamo sperimentato le missioni a guida europea nell’ex-Macedonia e in Congo. Dimostrando di essere in grado di assumerci delle responsabilità. Siamo pronti a farlo in Bosnia. Però ci rendiamo conto che non abbiamo le capacità militari. Creare quindi una struttura che cerchi di duplicare quella Nato, avendo a disposizione capacità risibili rispetto a quelle Usa, sarebbe velletario (...) la nuova iniziativa è inclusiva e aperta a chiunque ne avrà prima o poi i requisiti, secondo il nuovo modello costituzionale delle cooperazioni strutturate, inevitabile in un’Europa a 25. Dove l’importante è che le regole di partenza siano stabilite insieme: così la differenza di velocità non diventa un fattore di marginalizzazione.”

Ultimately, the Italian Presidency presented a document entitled “European Defence; NATO/EU consultation, planning and operations” (this will be further referred as “NATO-EU joint planning”). The document, which was welcomed by the European Council on 12 December 2003, formally established a permanent EU cell at SHAPE (SHAPE cell) and a permanent NATO liaison cell at the EUMS in order to facilitate EU military operations under the Berlin Plus, and established a EU civil/military cell and a system of national Operational HQs to be available for EU autonomous operations. Foreign Minister Frattini stated that:

“la presidenza italiana ha realizzato una mediazione importantissima: ha trasformato l’accordo a quattro sulla difesa europea in un accordo a venticinque. Sfido chiunque a ribaltare una posizione tanto divisiva com’era quella di un micro-quartier generale europeo, in una vera e

‘France, Germany and UK hold talks on military issues’ in EUobserver, 28 November 2003

438 Interview with Franco Frattini ‘Il Patto frena la difesa Ue’ in Il Sole 24 Ore, 5 December 2003
Moreover, the “European Council Declaration on Transatlantic Relations” welcomed by the European Council on 12 December was meant to overcome the division between European countries. The “NATO/EU joint planning” document was implemented by an exchange of letters between the EU and NATO. Three scenarios for military crisis management operations emerged as a result of the entry into force of NATO/EU arrangements:

1. NATO operation
2. EU operation with recourse to NATO assets according to the Berlin Plus, if NATO is not willing or able to intervene
3. EU autonomous operation without recourse to the Berlin Plus.

NATO played a leading role because, given the EU’s limited capabilities, it would exercise its right to choose whether or not to intervene or to leave it to the EU. The SHAPE cell and the EU civil/military cell were due to improve NATO-EU relations.

The creation of the planning cells started in early 2004. The Anglo-Italian declaration of March 2004 endorsed the Italian presidency’s document and pledged contributions to create the EU civil/military cell. The High Representative, Solana, also presented proposals to implement the “NATO-EU joint planning” at the informal meeting of on 5 and 6 April 2004, while the informal Defence Ministers’ meeting of 17 May 2004 wanted the cells to be operational by 2004, and speed was required to carry it forward. The SHAPE cell and the NATO liaison cell at EUMS were operational from April 2004 to help in

439 Ibidem; see also Comunicazioni del ministro degli Affari esteri Franco Frattini al Senato della Repubblica, 22 gennaio 2004
441 ‘L’UE et l’OTAN veulent renforcer leur coopération’ in Le Monde, 21 January 2004
442 Laurent Zecchini interview with NATO Secretary General Jaap Hoop de Schaffer ‘L’OTAN a vocation à exporter la sécurité tous azimuts’ in Le Monde, 17 January 2004
443 L’UE et l’OTAN veulent renforcer leur coopération cit.
444 Dichiarazione Congiunta Italo-Britannica 4 March 2004 cit.
planning the EU operation in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{445} The establishment of the EU civil/military cell was more complex- it should “balance” the military and civilian elements, as recent experience clearly demonstrated the need for a comprehensive approach to crisis management. Credible Operation Centre facilities should also be established.\textsuperscript{446} The EU Civil/military cell was formally adopted by the EU Foreign Ministers in June, to be endorsed by the European Council in December 2004. By the end of 2005, it was established in Brussels and involved the preparation of the EU mission to Aceh and EU BAM Rafah. The Operations Centre, standard operating procedures and staff were activated in mid-2006.\textsuperscript{447}

An Italian \textit{Alpini} General has been appointed until 2010 Director of the Civil/Military cell, perhaps as a recognition to the contribution to ESDP missions, or better to solve the joint planning dispute.

5.2.5 Eufor in Bosnia Herzegovina

The Berlin Plus and the “NATO/EU joint planning” arrangements were essential in launching the EU military operation that would replace SFOR in Bosnia. This would be the ESDP’s first heavy military commitment. Operation Concordia was a small mission involving 350 observers, while the EU generated a European Force (Eufor) of 7,000 troops to replace SFOR. However, the take-over was considered feasible as the Member States’ troops already constituted the bulk of SFOR.

\textsuperscript{446} Summary of the remarks made by Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP at the Meeting of EU Defence Ministers, Brussels, 17 May 2004 S0133/04
\textsuperscript{447} Presidency Report on ESDP, Doc.15891/05, 19 December 2005, para VIII. 56
In 2002, NATO started to consider a transfer of responsibility of SFOR, and the Copenhagen Council in December 2002 indicated the EU’s willingness to replace it with a EU-led military operation.\textsuperscript{448} NATO and the EU agreed on a concerted approach to security and stability in the Western Balkans on 29 July 2003.\textsuperscript{449} To facilitate the EU hand over, the NAC decided on 1 December 2003 to reduce SFOR from 13,000 to 7,000 troops by June 2004 while, on a US request, NATO should maintain a presence at the NATO HQ in Sarajevo, after SFOR’s termination.\textsuperscript{450} The Italian presidency welcomed the British willingness to lead the Eufor at the Defence Ministers’ meeting in October 2003. At the Anglo-Italian summit in March 2004, they committed to working closely with significant means for an EU operation conforming to the Berlin Plus.\textsuperscript{451} The Instanbul NATO summit in June 2004 agreed to terminate SFOR and welcomed EU readiness to assume responsibility for a military mission in conformity with the Berlin Plus. To facilitate NATO-EU planning and the seamless transfer of authority, the Deputy Saceur was appointed Eufor commander. The Eufor structure could not prescind NATO HQ structures since the operational commander was under the authority of Deputy Saceur, and the Eufor HQ was put under AFsouth HQ authority.\textsuperscript{452} The UNSC approved resolution 1551(2004) on 9 July 2004, thus extending SFOR’s mandate for six months, and welcoming the EU’s intention to follow SFOR with Eufor “Althea”. The Concept for Althea was published on 29 September 2004, and the EU

\textsuperscript{448} Presidency Conclusions, European Council Copenhagen, 12 and 13 December 2002, Para 29
\textsuperscript{451} Dichiarazione Congiunta Italo-Britannica 4 March 2004 cit.
\textsuperscript{452} Forza Militare Ue (Eufor) Sostituirà Nato/Sfor in Bosnia a Fine 2004 cit.
approved its operational planning on 11 October 2004.\footnote{EU Council ‘Concept for the European Union (EU) Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Operation ALTHEA’ Doc.12576/04, 29 September 2004} It was not too complicated for the EU to replace SFOR, and the troops just “changed the flag”, as it happened in the case of “Concordia”, and EUPM. The UNSC adopted Resolution 1575 (2004) on 22 November 2004, authorising the EU the power to establish Eufor as a legal successor to SFOR. Eufor was launched on 2 December 2004. Recently, High Representative Solana stated that the Althea operation is an excellent example of NATO-EU cooperation.\footnote{Brooks Tigner ‘Greater co-operation between EU and NATO imperative’ in \textit{Jane’s International Defence Review}, 11 July 2009}

**Althea and Italy:*** The ESDP military missions are considered a successful “model of operation that will never cause headaches to any Italian government.” Althea enjoyed bipartisan support in Parliament.\footnote{See Julien Tonon ‘Les Missions Militaires Italiennes à l’étranger’ in \textit{Notes Défense et Sécurité} no. 13, IRIS, July 2007, p.6-7.} The discussion on Althea financing took place on 20 July 2004 in connection with the debate on the authorisation of Italy’s participation in military operations. The debate focused on the need to clarify the financial implications of SFOR transformation. The adoption of law 39 on 21 March 2005 on Italian peacekeeping financing authorised a 1000-strong contingent for Althea. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies was informed on 12 October 2004 about the ESDP issues which had been discussed at the Conference of Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the EU Parliaments on 30 September 2004 in The Hague. Althea’s objective was to stabilise the Western Balkans. On 16 December 2004, after a visit to Bosnia, the Committee’s president, Gustavo Selva, reasoned that although Althea had attracted considerable attention within the region, it had been almost totally ignored by the European press and public opinion. Defence Minister Martino briefed the joint Defence Committees of Parliament on the status of Italy’s participation in international missions on 20 January 2005. Althea was just briefly...
mentioned as the first ESDP operation in cooperation with NATO.\textsuperscript{456} Foreign Minister Fini stated:

“\textit{La coesistenza, l’una accanto all’altra nel teatro balcanico, di missioni Nato e Ue a guida italiana non è frutto del caso. E’ la dimostrazione pratica di quanto i rapporti tra Alleanza Atlantica ed Unione Europea vadano sempre più orientandosi verso un partenariato armonioso, fatto non di duplicazioni bensì di una razionale divisione dei compiti, e di quanto fattivamente e concretamente il governo italiano si adoperi in questa direzione. Per l’Italia, infatti, sia l’europaismo che l’atlantismo, in un quadro di multilateralismo efficace, sono elementi costitutivi del patrimonio genetico della nostra politica estera.”}\textsuperscript{457}

Beyond the Euro-Atlanticism of the political class, Italy has been strongly committed to both military (Althea) and Police (EUPM) ESDP missions in Bosnia. Italian administrative interests have been satisfied as Army and \textit{Carabinieri} Generals have commanded both missions.\textsuperscript{458}


\textsuperscript{457} Remarks of Foreign Minister, Fini at the NATO Defence Ministers summit in Taormina on 9 and 10 February 2006 in Gianfranco Fini ‘Il ruolo della Nato nella nuova Europa’ in \textit{La Repubblica} 21 February 2006.

\textsuperscript{458} See also Chapter VI ‘the civilian capabilities’ para ‘Carabinieri in ESDP’
5.3 The Italian attitude to NATO membership

5.3.1 The issue of NATO military bases

“The glue that has held the allies more or less together is a large, complex and dynamic bargain – partly an understanding among the Europeans, but mostly a deal between them and the United States of America.”

The “transatlantic bargain” concept is a helpful prism through which it is possible to analyse NATO today. NATO would be nothing more than a deal struck between business partners. In its origins, the deal was that the US would contribute to the defence of Europe by means of NATO, and to Europe’s economic recovery by means of the Marshall plan, and the Europeans would organise themselves to help against the Soviet threat and to use the economic aid efficiently. During the Cold War, Italian interest in NATO lay mainly in the security umbrella provided by the US military bases that allowed it to strengthen its position within European allies and to save money on defence.

The NATO military bases in Italy had been a political issue. In the 1970s, the Italian government conceded to US Armed Forces the unlimited use of bases in national territory. The US-Italy SOFA was classified and the Parliament had not been informed of its terms. Farnesina legal advisors justified the bases by means of Art.9 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which allowed the NAC to take further action in implementing common defence. On the contrary, legal experts insist that this practice was not in conformity with Art.80 of the Constitution of Italy that requires political agreements and those that reduce territorial sovereignty to be approved by Parliament. Moreover, Art.9 of the North Atlantic Treaty did not imply powers to conclude agreements in this sense, nor to supersede NATO countries’ sovereignty on their territory. In the mid-1980s, the US retained their

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bases in strategic hubs like the UK and Italy, while closing spokes, such as the Torrejon airbases in Spain. The British commentator suggested that the US pay a cost to maintain its bases in the UK, such as the revision of the classified SOFAs under which US forces enjoyed largely extra-territorial rights. The revision of the classified SOFAs has been proposed in the Italian Parliament too, without any success, and the end of the Cold War did not imply the dismantlement of US bases. This happened because the freedom of the Sea Lines of Communications is crucial for the Italy’s survivability even in the short run, and the only credible guarantee remains the US Sixth Fleet within the US-Italy and NATO frameworks. Moreover, Public opinion is more concerned about the launching of air campaigns and the anti-American disturbances than of renegotiating the agreement.

The Cermis accident and Kosovo: In 1998, in the Italian Eastern Alps, a US Navy Ea-6B Prowler, based in Aviano for the NATO operation in Bosnia, flew low in a valley during an exercise and accidentally cut off the rope of a cableway, thus killing 20 people. It seemed that the crew did not inform Aviano of what had happened and they destroyed the flight videotape. The US claimed exclusive jurisdiction on its servicemen, who were exempted from Italian jurisdiction and trialled by the Navy’s Judge Advocate General and eventually discharged. As a general rule, the US considers its servicemen to be exempt from host state jurisdiction. This principle also causes US opposition to the International Criminal Court. The situation was also complicated by the launching of the Kosovo air campaign from NATO bases in Italy, which caused an appeal of Serbia against Italy and other allies at the International Court of Justice. These events reinforced the anti-

461 Ludovico Incisa di Camerana La vittoria dell’Italia nella terza guerra mondiale (Bari : Laterza, 1996),p. 84-86.
462 Gasparini Italy and ESDP cit, p. 25
463 Cermis episode is similar to the Calipari affair in 2005: see Tracy Wilkinson ‘US-Italy feud at center of trial’ in Los Angeles Times, 17 April 2007, and Giovanni Bianconi ‘Calipari e il processo che non c’è’ in Corriere della Sera, 4 March 2008
American lobby demonstrations. For instance, after 2003, fierce protests of anti-globalization and pacifists demonstrators were directed against the enlargement of “Camp Ederle” in Vicenza, home of the 327th Airborne Brigade that took part in the war in Iraq. On the other hand, nobody noticed the dismantling of the US Nuclear Submarine base in La Maddalena, Sardinia, in the summer of 2007.

At the end of the day, NATO’s actual role in Italy resides both in “path dependency” of the organisation and in the administrative interests of the military that may take advantage of the presence of NATO bases.

As a matter of fact, ‘the richest and farthest master is always best’ stated Ambassador Roberto Ducci when commenting the signature of the Elysée Treaty: by ‘aligning with the US inside the Atlantic Alliance was singled out by Ducci as the best possible option for Italy if European relations were to revert to the traditional patterns of national power politics’.464

### 5.3.2 AFsouth, NATO southern HQ command

In early 1997, taking chance of the restructuring of Allied commands, French President Jacques Chirac claimed that AFsouth HQ in Naples should be rotated among European commanders. France, of course, meant that it should be given a key position in the Mediterranean in a role held since the Second World War by the US Sixth Fleet that inherited it from the Royal Navy. The issue turned into a stalemate, with the US opposed to it, while Italy initially did not take a position. French insistence failed to win Italy’s support because of the security umbrella of the Sixth Fleet. Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini sharply rebuffed the French request as inappropriate and untimely, and Rome was happy when it was eventually dropped, leaving AFsouth staff positions unchanged. Needless to say, French failure to develop a

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common European position prodded Italy to rely on its US connection.\textsuperscript{465}

However, it should also be remarked that the US Admiral of the Sixth fleet is automatically appointed as AFsouth Commander, and the Allied Deputy Commander is always an Italian Admiral.\textsuperscript{466} Italian Armed Forces concluded that it is better to be under a US Admiral’s orders than those of a European, or worse, of a French Admiral. A European commander in AFsouth would challenge the permanent deputy position for an Italian top brass to the big disappointment of Italian Navy. Therefore, the Italian armed services preferred a reduced military sovereignty, rather than sharing key positions with the French. In 2001, President Chirac decided that France, in any case, should access a few NATO committees and integrated commands, without any administrative compensation.

5.3.3 Reaction to Sarkozy and French accession to NATO

President Nicolas Sarkozy stated on 27 August 2007 that France was willing to fall back into line by taking part again in NMC, by resuming full commitment to NATO and aligning his foreign policy to that of the US. France would do so, if the US conceded to the two prerequisites:

i) an independent European defence capability, with a greater European presence in the integrated command;

ii) key positions for France in NATO’s structure. \textsuperscript{467}

The Joint British-French summit on 27 March 2008 and the French White Paper on Defence also confirmed the intention of establishing closer relations with the UK (as linked to the French return to NATO)

\textsuperscript{465} See for this explanation Marta Dassù, Roberto Menotti “The Ratification of NATO Enlargement The Case of Italy” proceedings of the Conference: NATO Enlargement: The National Debates over Ratification 7 October 1997

\textsuperscript{466} As an exception to the rule, an Italian Admiral acted in this position for four months, from March to July 77 before the US Admiral was appointed.

and modernising the armed forces in conformity with British capabilities.\textsuperscript{468}

The French National Assembly approved on 17 March 2009 the accession to NATO that was officially announced at the Strasbourg/Kehl Atlantic Summit on 3-4 April 2009. As a result of \textit{rapprochement} in 2001, about 110 French military were part of 36 military committees out of 38 and of SHAPE, ACT, and the three joint HQ in Brunssum, the Netherlands, Lisbon, Portugal, and Naples, Italy.\textsuperscript{469} French ambitions for European Defence could include the establishment of a French-led European autonomous HQ. Moreover, by 2012, more than 800 French staff should join NATO to reach equality with Italy, at 950 personnel.\textsuperscript{470} As a consequence, Italian military officers feared that their key positions in the Alliance may be getting tough competition from their neighbours. At the end of the day, this did not spoil Italian interests as France obtained leadership of the ACT and the Joint Command Lisbon.\textsuperscript{471} This was already agreed in advance and in February 2009, a Franco-Italian Foreign and Defence ministers’ summit even launched the proposal of a Franco-Italian Battalion for PSOs modelled on the Franco-German Brigade. They also signed agreements on maritime security, naval groups and air defence training.\textsuperscript{472} Franco-Italian relations in military matters were then reassured.


\textsuperscript{469} As regarding military committees, France was out of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group.

\textsuperscript{470} See Laurent Zecchini ‘Ce qui change avec le "retour" de la France” in \textit{Le Monde}, 18 March 2009

\textsuperscript{471} NATO press release ‘France moves on re-integrating NATO’s military structure’ 27 July 2009

5.3.4 Administrative Interests in the Mediterranean security: the 5+5 forum

Italy has also challenged France’s dominant position as security provider in the Mediterranean since the early 1980s. It had developed an active action in the security dimension of north-south relations, as symbolised by sending military advisors to Gaddafi’s Lybia, giving helicopter support to Morocco and above all by the will to guarantee Malta’s neutrality. Malta had declared its neutrality in 1980, following the closure of British military bases and NATO Regional Headquarters, Italy guaranteed Malta’s neutrality by means of the Malta-Italy Neutrality agreement of 1980. Unfortunately, Maltese accession to the EU in May 2004 has complicated defence cooperation between the two countries and their relations with ESDP.

In fact, Italy prefers a comprehensive approach strategy instead of bilateral relations, because the latter could favour the French dominance while a comprehensive cooperative strategy would put Italy in the exclusive club. This is why Italy prefers to concentrate Mediterranean security in the EU framework, rather than in NATO, and Italy and France cooperate to develop a federalist approach to ESDP decision-making, with the aim of making the EU the main security institution in the Mediterranean, while Spain favours a more intergovernmental approach.

After the Gulf War Italy put forward, together with Spain, the notion of CSCE-like Mediterranean security arrangement by means of a comprehensive security forum on political, economic and military matters, which remained just an aspiration. In contrast, the French-inspired 5+5 Western Mediterranean forum had been launched in 1990 as an informal collaboration between 5 European countries (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) and 5 Northern Africans (Algeria,

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Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), shortly to be joined by Egypt. Since January 2001, after its re-launching by the Portuguese government, the 5+5 has become a forum to address in a concerted manner trans-national security issues between the participating countries.475

A “5+5” regional defence partnership was first proposed at an informal meeting of the steering committee in Rome on 19 November 2004. In Paris on 21 December 2004, a Declaration of Intent, signed by the 5+5 Defence Ministries officially set up defence cooperation and officially established rotational annual presidency and the steering committee that will implement an action plan, that shall be approved every year at the Defence Ministries’ summit. Initially there were three areas of cooperation: maritime surveillance, collaboration for civil protection and air space security. During 2007, 20 cooperation activities were started up, while in 2008, chaired by Libya, the number of activities increased to 24.

The 5+5 initiative took an increasing role in naval military cooperation between the participating states, also thanks to the administrative interests of the participating Navies, above all the Italian Navy. On 9-10 December 2007, the 5+5 Initiative Defence Ministers’ meeting took place in Cagliari, chaired by Italy. For the maritime surveillance the meeting agreed to the extension of the Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Centre (V-Rmtc) developed by the Italian Navy, to the “5+5” format (V-Rmtc 5+5 NET) through an Operational Arrangement, signed by all the members, except for Libya which joined in 2008. The V-Rmtc is a system for exchanging non-classified information, shared and updated, for monitoring commercial maritime traffic in the Mediterranean. The V-Rmtc was employed operationally by the Maritime Task Force operating under UNIFIL mandate, and it has been a major achievement for the Italian Navy for its interesting development opportunities both technologically, domestically and internationally.

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475 Calleya op. cit. p. 124
5.4 Senior military positions in NATO and ESDP structures

5.4.1 National allocation of top positions in NATO

As in other international organisations, appointments to the highest civilian and military authorities in NATO are allocated under unwritten rules according to nationality.

Since the 1950s, the top military positions have been reserved for US Generals, such as Saceur, who also decides on Nuclear weapons, and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (formerly SACLANT), whose role is crucial for military technology. The US keeps executive powers in its hands, while top politico-military positions such as NATO Secretary General and the Chairman of the NMC were reserved for the Europeans. The latter is the highest military authority in NATO, a four-star General who served preferably as Chief of Defence or in an equivalent capacity in his country. He chairs a body composed of NATO countries’ Chief of Defence that provides the NAC with direction and advice on military policy and strategy.

A trade-off regards the top military positions of Saceur and NMC: the US hold the Deputy Chairman of the NMC, with specific responsibilities on NRBC matters, and the Europeans hold the Deputy Saceur, a position that until 1978 was reserved for the UK, when it alternated with Germany. The UK and Germany concentrate the main power in NATO military positions, although, in the last few years, Germany has gained position. Germany has replaced the US in SHAPE chief of staff since 1993, the UK in the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces North since 2000, and France, when it opted out of Military commands, in the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Centre since 1966, a position which is now cancelled.

5.4.2 Second best: Italian Deputy positions

As a loyal Atlanticist, Italy has obtained key civilian positions for diplomats, while military positions are still the domain of the UK, US, and increasingly Germany. Italy obtained only one NATO Secretary
General mandate with Manlio Brosio, from 1964 to 1971. To remain an ‘honest broker’ in difficult times, Brosio limited his powers by delegating the NAC chairmanship to the Belgian Ambassador to NATO as regarding negotiations over NATO’s relocation to Brussels.\textsuperscript{476} Since 1971, the Deputy Secretary General position was reserved for a Senior Italian diplomat (see Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jonkheer van Vredenburch</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1952-1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baron Adolph Bentinck</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1956-1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberico Casari</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1958-1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guido Colonna di Paliano</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1962-1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James A. Roberto</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1964-1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osman Olcay</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1969-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo Pansa Cedronio</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1971-1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rinaldo Petignani</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1978-1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric da Rin</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1981-1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcello Guidi</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1985-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amedeo de Franchis</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergio Balanzino</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1994–2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessandro Minuto Rizzo</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2001–2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudio Bisogniero</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2007–present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source NATO website (http://www.nato.int/cv/depsecgen.htm)

This was part of an unwritten rule that Italian diplomacy had drafted since the early seventies by renouncing Italian ambitions to the NATO Secretary General position and by recognition of loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance.

\textsuperscript{476} See Ryan C. Hendrickson ‘Manlio Brosio: Cold War consensus-builder’ in NATO Review, June 2005
In February 2003, US President George W. Bush endorsed the nomination of Defence Minister Martino to replace Lord Robertson as the NATO Secretary General.\textsuperscript{477} Martino dropped this proposal, stating that he wanted to conclude his national mandate and he pointed out that the NATO Secretary General is an individual, not a national representative.\textsuperscript{478} In NATO circles, French representatives circulated the clear message that Italy already held the Deputy Secretary General and he should resign in order to allow Martino to be appointed. On the other hand, the appointment was not automatic and Italy risked losing both positions.\textsuperscript{479} At the end of the day, Martino’s candidature was just a rumor, as his nomination would be a breach of an unwritten rule and it would put the golden end of career appointment for an Italian Ambassador in danger.

5.4.3 The First Italian NATO military Committee Chairman

The top position for a European military officer (NMC Chairman), has been the domain of the UK, Germany, and Belgium. Although he represents all nations, it is good for a country’s administrative interests to obtain this position.

The oligopoly was broken on 5 May 1998, when Admiral Guido Venturoni, Italian Chief of Defence, was elected Chairman by NMC. The other candidates were General Arne Solli of Norway, and Admiral Willy Herteler of Belgium. Solli dropped out, but Herteler did not withdraw his candidature. So, Venturoni was elected with a large majority in the final vote.

For the first time an Italian General officer obtained such a top military position in NATO. In the former NMC Chiefs-of-Staff Session, when Chairmanship was not a full-time position, General Giuseppe

\textsuperscript{477} Francesco Verderami ‘Bush ha chiesto la disponibilità di Martino per la guida della Nato’ in \textit{Corriere della Sera}, 1 February 2003; Claudio Lindner ‘Europa, corsa alle sedie che contano’ in \textit{Corriere della Sera}, 16 May 2003

\textsuperscript{478} Interview with Defence Minister, Antonio Martino, ‘Ecco perché ho detto no alla Nato’ in \textit{Corriere della Sera}, 5 June 2003

\textsuperscript{479} Marco Nese ‘Martino rinuncia alla candidatura Nato’ in \textit{Corriere della Sera}, 4 June 2003
Mancinelli had been the only Italian general to hold this position in 1956-1957. In 1989, Admiral Mario Porta of Italy lost to General Vigleik Eide of Norway, and Venturoni had already been a candidate in 1995. As a Chairman, Venturoni was supposed to lead the military integration of the new countries by taking charge on 1 April 1999, soon before the Washington summit, which marked the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO.

However, rumors in the Italian press suggested that a few NATO countries would recommend postponing Venturoni’s Chairmanship in the event of a NATO ground attack in Kosovo. The official reason was that the Chairman, General Klaus Naumann of Germany, was coordinating and planning NATO countries’ troop contribution to a possible ground attack. One week after the start of NATO bombings, on 1 April 1999, Naumann’s mandate was extended to early May, in order to allow the continuity of command during the air campaign. In mid-April, the NAC was supposed to make a decision to further extend Naumann’s mandate until the end of the Kosovo intervention, thus without a foreseeable deadline. This required a unanimous decision. Italy did not feel at ease in vetoing the extension in case of a ground attack, but on the other hand Venturoni’s postponement could have been interpreted as a reproof of Italy for being too soft on Serbia and for posing too many caveats on Italian Air Force deployments.

The Italian representation to NAC denied these rumors, by stating that the NMC meeting of 15 April 1999 had confirmed the hand over to take place on 6 May 1999. In fact, Italy opposed the decision to postpone the hand over against all the other 18 NATO countries, including the three new members. These stated that it was not convenient to change the Chairman on the fly, and for the sake of the

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480 Bonanni Andrea ‘Nato, un italiano al vertice’ in Corriere della Sera, 6 May 1998.
481 Andrea Bonanni ‘La nomina di Venturoni a Bruxelles potrebbe slittare’ in Corriere della Sera, 15 April 1999; Id. ‘E il comandante tedesco lascia il timone all' Italia’ in Corriere della Sera, 25 April 1999
482 ‘Nomina di Venturoni al Comitato militare L’ Alleanza chiarisce: la data non cambia data non cambia’ in Corriere della Sera, 16 April 1999
continuity in the chain of command, Venturoni had to wait. Italy reasoned that nobody could forecast the end of the Kosovo crisis and it gained the support of NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, who stated that Naumann’s mandate had expired, that Venturoni could do a great job, and that the continuity of the chain of command would be granted by the Saceur. Italian determination on the subject made all the other countries drop the subject. Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini stated that the issue was never brought to the NAC level, so Italy never officially vetoed the decision.

Moreover, another obstacle was overcome when British Foreign Minister Cook, French President Chirac, and German Chancellor Schröder opposed the launch of a ground attack, thus joining the isolated position of the Italian Prime Minister D’Alema. Therefore, there was no need to extend Neumann’s mandate, who stated that it was not easy for him to abandon ship during the storm, although he hoped that the ship in Italian hands could reach a safe port. 483

5.4.4 The first EUMC Chairmanship: a troubled election

The election of the first EUMC Chairman was a heavy blow for Italy. The Nice Council ruled out that the EUMC Chairman was to be elected by the Member States’ Chief of Defence, and then appointed by the EU Council. The candidates were General Mario Arpino of Italy, General Gabriel Espirito Santo of Portugal, and General Johan Edvin Birger Gustav Hägglund of Finland. There were two representatives of an Atlanticist country and one of a neutral country, and the Portuguese general was said to be favoured. General Arpino was the second best, because Italy already held in 2002 the NMC Chairmanship with Admiral Venturoni. Neither France nor Germany had proposed candidates, and the likely British candidate, Sir Charles Guthrie, was

appointed in a national position, thus giving the Italian candidate a chance.

On 26 March 2001, the interim military body, composed of the EU national Chief of Defence, voted on simple majority. In the first round, no clear majority was found: 7 votes went to Hägglund, 5 to Arpino and 3 to Espirito Santo, who dropped out. In the final vote, Hägglund defeated Arpino by one vote, with a majority of 8 to 7. The first EUMC Chairmanship was given to a neutral country. The ballot is secret, but according to internal sources the Italian candidate won the support of NATO countries (France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the UK) and met the opposition of the “Nordic” countries (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, who held the EU presidency), the “neutral” countries (Austria and Ireland) and the “small” NATO countries (Belgium and the Netherlands). It has been suggested that the eighth decisive vote came from Germany. The mastermind of Hägglund’s election has been identified as German General Harald Kujat, NMC Chairman, who hoped to make Germany weigh on the establishment of European forces. By electing a neutral countries’ Chairman, Germany wanted to keep European military ambitions low, to assure that future ESDP missions deal with peacekeeping rather than with combat tasks. Otherwise, it could be just a trade off as German Lieutenant General Rainer Schuwirth was appointed General Director of the EU Military Staff and his chief of staff was British Major General Graham Messervy-Whiting. The Military Staff was declared operational on 11 June 2001, with a strength of around 140.

The EUMC Chairman election underlined some weaknesses arising in the organisation of the ESDP: the risk that the ESDP could be linked to “low spectrum” Petersberg Tasks only, a substantial veto power by the “small” countries, and the rise of further complications in

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485 See Franco Papitto ‘Le manovre tedesche dietro il no ad Arpino’ in *La Repubblica*, 10 April 2004.
the dialogue with NATO. Furthermore, the Danish Chief of Staff took part in the vote, although Denmark opted out of ESDP structures and it even resulted decisive. Moreover, some commentator saw the episode as Member States criticisms of NATO and transatlantic ties:

“Hanno rotto la solidarietà fra i paesi della NATO (..) è un fatto di rilevanza politica di cui l'Italia deve ricordarsi. Noi siamo un paese molto generoso verso l'Alleanza Atlantica, investiamo mezzi e uomini senza risparmio.”

The Italian ruling class and public opinion did not give attention to this episode, because they were in the run for general elections in April 2001. This may also explain why the Italian candidate lacked diplomatic support, although this is a very usual shortcoming for Italian diplomacy. The Finnish government commented that Hägglund's appointment to the EUMC was a tribute to the recognition of Finnish efforts in developing the ESDP during its Presidency in 1999. The Finnish insisted that non-NATO countries should be on equal footing with NATO countries in ESDP structures. NATO membership is always a sensitive issue, and the Swedish presidency replied that the choice of the Chairman was made purely on professional grounds, and without consideration for whether the individual's country was in NATO or not.

The Sweden presidency put forward Hägglund's name to GAERC on 9 April 2001, which ratified the decision. Italy stated that it had no intention of questioning Hägglund’s appointment, but provided a statement on the selection procedure. Defence under-secretary Umberto Ranieri sent a request for clarification to the EU council to interpret the Treaties on the subject of Danish voting rights in the

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486 Giovanni Gasparini ‘EU Military Organism – Appointment’ in *Observatory on European Defence*, IAI, March 2001
487 Napoleone Colajanni ‘La bocciatura di Arpino non è contro l'Italia, è una critica alla NATO’ in *Il Messaggero*, 8 April 2004
ESDP. Denmark shared this request. The request also concerned decision-making and participation in the RRF.\(^{490}\) The EUMC started its work in July 2001, by joining the COPS and EUMS. In any case, fears about the NATO issue became real, as Hägglund appeared to be a supporter of autonomus European defence, thus causing the Finnish government to deny his statements.\(^{491}\)

5.4.5 General Mosca Moschini appointed EUMC Chairman

On 7 May 2003, General Rolando Mosca Moschini - who had replaced General Arpino as Italian Chief of Defence on 2 April 2001 - was elected by the EUMC as a replacement for Hägglund, and his appointment was confirmed by the GAERC on 19 May 2003. EUMC Chairman handing over took place on 7 April 2004. The vote on Mosca Moschini was unanimous, and this can be interpreted as compensation by common consent to Italy because no EU Member States proposed any other credible candidate.\(^{492}\) Moreover, Mosca Moschini enjoyed Bipartisan and strong government diplomatic support this time. Mosca Moschini stated that:

"Il nostro apporto è fra i maggiori e riguarda tutti e quattro i rami delle Forze armate. Devo dire che la mia nomina si deve anche alla generosità con cui l’ Italia fornisce le sue truppe per le missioni estere..."

\(^{490}\) Press Releases, 4/6/2001 ‘Hägglund’s appointment will be confirmed at the EU’s General Affairs Council in Luxembourg’; Singer Enrico ‘Risolta la polemica su Hagglund ma l’italia chiede nuove norme’ in La Stampa, 10 April 2001


\(^{492}\) See also Marco Nese ‘Mosca Moschini a un passo dal comando dell’ esercito europeo’ in Corriere della Sera, 29 April 2003
In conformity with multilateralism, Mosca Moschini reasoned that the ESDP capabilities should be developed in order to be at the disposal of UN-mandated peacekeeping. He had served as Italian military attaché to the UN. This was a strong statement, considering that during his three year mandate, he had to supervise the implementation of the RRF and lead the first military operations such as the hand over of the SFOR in Bosnia, and finally the coordination of military contributions from newly accessed Member States with EU enlargement in May 2004.

5.4.6 Admiral Di Paola at the NATO Military Committee

After an interlude with German and Canadian Generals, an Italian Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, who had replaced Mosca Moschini as the Italian Chief of Defence in 10 March 2004, was elected to the NMC on 14 November 2007, and he took charge on 27 June 2008. His competitors were General Franciszek Gagor of Poland, General Felix Sanz Roldan of Spain, for the first time an officer from a former Warsaw Pact nation, and a candidate put forward by Spain. Admiral di Paola’s election went through without any particular trouble and he was elected on the second vote.

In an interview, the current Italian Chief of Defence, General Vincenzo Camporini, answered a question on Italian irrelevance in European and NATO structures:

“Mi pare che una risposta sia arrivata proprio dalla Nato che ha scelto l’ammiraglio di squadra Giampaolo Di Paola per la presidenza del Comitato militare. In passato non si consideravano i nostri soldati, oggi cercano i nostri generali.”

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493 Marco Nese ‘Un italiano alla guida dell' esercito europeo’ in Corriere della Sera, 8 May 2003
494 NATO International Military Staff, Military Committee Executive Brief “Election of the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC)” 1 October 2007
495 Interview with Chief of Defence, General Vincenzo Camporini ‘Spendiamo quasi tutto per gli stipendi’ in Corriere della Sera, 18 July 2008

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Since 1963, when NMC was transformed into a full-time position, it has been held by 15 officers from: Germany (5 times), the UK (three times), Canada (twice), Norway (twice), Italy (twice), Belgium and the Netherlands (one time each). Moreover, Italy held two NMC Chairmanships in the last ten years. Furthermore, one out of three EUMC Chairmans is Italian. At first glance, Italian generals have a good score in NATO and EU structures. If we look more attentively, we can see that in the last 15 years, three out of four Italian Chiefs of Defence have been promoted to international appointments (see Table 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>duration</th>
<th>Following appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adm. Guido Venturoni (Navy)</td>
<td>1994-1999</td>
<td>Chairman NATO Military Committee, on 6 May 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Mario Arpino (Air Force)</td>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>Candidature to Chairman EUMC, then Retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Rolando Moschini (Army)</td>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td>Chairman EUMC, Chairman, on 7 April 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm. Giampaolo di Paola (Navy)</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>Chairman NATO Military Committee, on 27 June 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, we can see in the table: i) the Navy is well positioned in NATO, thanks to its reputation of efficiency demonstrated by its participation in international operations since the late 1970s, for its integration in NATO, and above all, in the US Sixth fleet. ii) The Army is increasingly earning positions in the ESDP structure, by enjoying the priority the EU is giving to land forces, as exemplified by the Battlegroups. iii) The Air Force had just been reincluded in the service rotation for Chief of Defence, after it had lost this opportunity as a consequence of the Ustica affair, when the Air Force was suspected of being involved in the Itavia DC-9 crash in 1980. General Arpino had been the first Air Force General to take charge of Defence after 13 years.

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496 NATO International Military Staff, Military Committee Executive Brief ‘Election of the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC)’ 1 October 2007 200
Conclusion

For Italy, the European Defence should not be in competition or duplication with NATO, but it should just fill the gap when NATO is not willing or able to intervene. In this sense, Italy’s stress was on ESDP’s unique capabilities such as police missions, as shown by the ‘Concordia’ episode. The mutual support of the ESDP and NATO has a rationale in this approach, because NATO is regarded the most successful military alliance, and the establishment of the ESDP should build on NATO’s procedure, standards and integrated structure. This approach helped to solve the dispute on NATO-ESDP planning during the Italian Presidency. In this event, Italy and the UK cooperated in drafting a concept for the use of NATO-ESDP joint planning, by means of bilateral planning cells and a system of an operational HQ in order to help EU-led operations with or without recourse to NATO assets. Italy helped to tone down the disputes started by the Tervuren proposals, and attempts to create a British-Franco-German directoire. France and Germany on one side, and the UK on the other, still had different visions on European Defence, while Italy and the UK shared a common view in defence.

Regarding military administrative issues, the NATO bases are a price to pay in order to meet Italy’s administrative interests. The administrative interests could be defined as regarding the ruling class, which by enjoying the US security umbrella can devote themselves to domestic politics and more profitable issues rather than security policy. Above all, administrative ointerests are defined in terms of the bureaucratic elite exemplified by the officer class: the options of command for Admirals justify AFSouth in Naples, which also provides a security umbrella by means of the US Sixth Fleet. In the same sense, the security umbrella also justifies the Air Base in Aviano. Regarding the NATO and ESDP bodies, Italy has obtained key positions in the civilian structure: the NATO Deputy Secretary General position is reserved to a senior Italian diplomat. This could satisfy the administrative interests of the Diplomats, but it did not comply with the military interests. Key positions in international organisations mean money, and international prestige for the officers who are appointed,
and recognition for the Italian armed services. This is again a military version of the political Chair policy aiming at an increased international status both for the armed service and for the country.

In recent years, the military have gained positions in the two organisations. After a failed attempt, an Army General has obtained the EUMC chairmanship as recognition of its ESDP commitment, which is emerging as more land-oriented, while the Navy obtained two NMC chairmans and kept its position in AFsouth, as a recognition of its integration in NATO with the US and Royal Navy. Moreover, some fears of the officer class stemming from the professionalisation of the armed services such as the reduction of General staff’s status and of personnel structure have so far been calmed by actual duplication at the NATO and EU level of command appointments and structures.

In conclusion, the ability of Italy to obtain key positions in NATO and ESDP structures repays in part the commitment of its armed forces to NATO and the EU. So far, as the EU and NATO both provide new prominent positions and appointments, the Italian military elite would not raise any objection to the reduced sovereignty in Italian Defence Policy as caused by the NATO bases or as a result of the development of the ESDP.
CHAPTER VI
THE CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES

This chapter will particularly focus on the role of Italian institutions in EU civilian crisis management. This includes police missions and institution building missions, in particular in the field of rule of law, and civil protection that includes police missions and institution. We will identify the key actors in relation to crisis management. After a short introduction on the civilian crisis management concept, the police mission issues will be treated extensively due to their importance in the current EU civilian crisis management, while rule of law and civil protection will be examined at the end.

First we will start with the police missions by analysing the leading role of the Carabinieri (above all their commitment to police missions) and in particular the MSU experience in the Western Balkans, along with the role of the Carabinieri within the ESDP framework.

Secondly, we will analyse the interactions between the Police Forces with Military Status (PFMS) of Europe and the promotion of the role of PFMS in the EU within the FIEP framework. In this sense we will assess the FIEP role in EU development progress towards the definition of the concept of Integrated Police Units (IPU) and in the promotion of a rapid police response capability by means of the European Gendarmerie Force (Eurogendfor).

In conclusion, we will deal with rule of law, the magistrates and the development of EU civil protection, in which the main actor is the Protezione Civile, with the similar member states’ forces. Attention will be given to its interventions during the Asian tsunami events; here we will analyse the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the “internal” competitor, and the disputes between it and the Protezione Civile in international disaster relief. The role of the Protezione Civile in the Mediterranean cooperation in this field will also be examined.
6.1 The Carabinieri as an actor in ESDP

6.1.1 European PFMS: Cooperation versus Competition

In the 1990s, the Western Balkans’ Crisis spurred the EU to develop appropriate structures, concepts and principles for non-military crisis management. In the past this rested only with emergency relief and humanitarian aid, and in recent times, as the limits of use of military force have become more evident, the need to transform war-torn countries into well-sustained democratic states by means of good governance and social and economic development became more and more crucial for the EU as an international actor.\footnote{Renata Dwan, “EU policing for peace operations: what does it mean?” in: EIRU discussion paper 023, July 2002, p.1.} Therefore, the EU civilian crisis management is conceived as an “exit strategy”, marking a further step in the transition phase for the re-establishment of rule of law and political and economical stability after a crisis situation undermined the pre-existing state framework.\footnote{Interview with a First Counsellor, Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 2003} At the Cologne Council in June 1999, the EU decided to focus on both military and civilian crisis management.\footnote{Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999.} At the Helsinki Council in December 1999, the areas of expertise of the EU and of the individual Member States for non-military crisis management were identified\footnote{Resources available listed in Doc.11044/99 REV 1 for EU and Doc.12323/99 for the Member States.}. The EU civilian crisis management included: ‘civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring’.\footnote{Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the EU ANNEX 2 to ANNEX IV} The police missions were to become the key area in EU crisis management thanks to the administrative interest of the police forces of Member States.
The PFMS: The EU Member States possess a variety of different and specialised police forces.\textsuperscript{502} The PFMS are the most ancient and widespread type.\textsuperscript{503} They include: Arma dei Carabinieri of Italy, Gendarmerie Nationale of France, Guardia Civil of Spain, Koninklijke Marechaussee of the Netherlands and Guarda Nacional Republicana of Portugal. A distinctive national esprit de corps is deeply rooted in their traditions and the need to keep their own reputations high tends to boost the competition between them. Given their unique civilian-military nature, these forces have established a strong cooperation that balances their competition. The cooperation is even stronger than the countries’ bilateral diplomatic relations, as is shown by the FIEP cooperation.\textsuperscript{504} These corps have some common characteristics inherited from their military status and from traditional tasks. On the other hand, some PFMSs have undertaken a certain degree of demilitarisation.

Gendarmerie and Carabinieri models: It is possible to identify two models: the Gendarmerie-model, and the Carabinieri-model. In the Gendarmerie-model adopted by France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, the force has been demilitarised, meaning it maintains formal military membership but comes under the operational direction of the Ministry of the Interior. In the Carabinieri model, adopted by Italy, Romania and Turkey, the force maintains a military-minded organisation, it has a full armed forces membership, and a dual affiliation with the MoD and the Ministry of the Interior: it is under the authority of the Chief of Defence for military tasks, and under the functional authority of the Ministry of the Interior for public security tasks. In the Gendarmerie-model, the head of organisation is the Director General, a position usually filled by a senior civilian official while in the Carabinieri-model there is a Commanding General. In both cases,

\textsuperscript{502} For a survey of European Police forces see: Erbès Jean-Marie et al., Polices d’Europe, Editions L’Harmattan, Paris 1992

\textsuperscript{503} The term Gendarmerie derives from French Gens d’armes, translatable into English Men-at-arms.

\textsuperscript{504} See Further para. “The FIEP Association and its European Affairs Commission”
the members of the PFMS are subject to the military condition, organisation and training: the personnel is composed of officers, warrant officers, NCOs and troops. Concerning the training, in the Gendarmerie-model, officers are university graduate admitted to military training at the officers school, while the Carabinieri officers receive basic training in military officers school before receiving specialised police training and obtain a degree in law at the corps’ Officer school in Rome, although there are also AUCs selected from university graduates. Warrant officers, NCOs and troops attend regular military training and police technique training at specialised corps’ schools.

Traditionally the PFMS were territorially deployed in small detachments in rural areas, performing general surveillance tasks. Therefore the force usually has a territorial organisation and a mobile organisation with pre-constituted units for specialised tasks such as the Gendarmerie Mobile and the Carabinieri Mobile and Specialist Organisation.

The PFMS units are already experienced in CIVILPOL missions, starting from their first major deployment in Haiti and El Salvador where the Argentinian Gendarmeria Nacional, the Gendarmerie, the Carabinieri and the Guardia Civil contingents were deployed in the ONUSAL mission from 1992 to 1995. In any case, a CIVPOL mission raises an issue, because however large the force may be - for 112,000-strong Carabinieri or 102,000-strong Gendarmes – it is still too small for both domestic and international needs.

505 For further discussion see: François Dieu; Paul Mignon Sécurité et proximité: la mission de surveillance générale de la gendarmerie (Paris: l’Harmattan, 2002) p.7
6.1.2 The Arma dei Carabinieri

The Arma dei Carabinieri traces its origins back to 1814. Until recently the Carabinieri were a corps of the regular Army under the authority of an Army General. Their recent reorganisation has provided them with the status of fourth service. The Carabinieri are a PFMS with general competence and duties over the maintenance of law and order and public security. Their military tasks include military police, territorial defence, and international peacekeeping. The history of Carabinieri’s international missions dates back to 1855. From 1950 the Carabinieri have operated directly for the UN, WEU, and OSCE and within NATO or national and multilateral framework. The reorganisation in 2000 has defined by law the participation in PSOs. The Carabinieri should create public security and enhance a peaceful coexistence of people in the intervention areas by means of police missions in order to train, advise, assist and monitor the local police forces.

The Carabinieri are deployed as national police throughout the country and especially in small detachments in rural areas; they are organised on territorial units, and on a Mobile and Specialist Organisation. The ‘Mobile’ is composed of pre-constituted units for robust intervention that include two brigades and the Special Operative Unit fighting

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506 Alessandro Politi; (ed) Vincenzo Pezzolet, Massimo Tosti, La storia dei Carabinieri: 1. le Origini supplemento il Carabiniere (Rome : Ente Editoriale per l’Arma dei Carabinieri, 1992)
508 For further see Maria Gabriella Pasqualini Missioni all’estero dall’intervento in Crimea nel 1855 ad oggi, Volume 2 (Roma : Ente Editoriale per l’Arma dei Carabinieri, 2001)
509 Art.1.a.3 Legge 31 Marzo 2000, n. 78
510 Art. 5 Decreto legislativo 5 ottobre 2000, n. 297
against organised crime, and terrorism in Italy and abroad. The ‘Mobile’ account for 10% of the whole force and it has been recently reorganised for peacekeeping activities.

Accordingly to the Western Balkans experience, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Mobile Brigade was created in 2002 as the Carabinieri specific unit for military police and CIVILPOL in international missions. This Brigade is composed of the 7\textsuperscript{th} Regiment “Trentino - Alto Adige”, the 13\textsuperscript{th} Regiment “Friuli Venezia Giulia”, the 1\textsuperscript{st} Parachute Regiment “Tuscania” including the counter-terrorism Special Intervention Group (GIS). These units have been particularly active in the Western Balkans, even before they were attached to the Brigade. The “Tuscania” paratroopers have been deployed as police or military forces in every Italian international mission since 1982. (see Table 7)

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{CARABINIERI’S INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS SINCE 1995}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
Mission & Period & Tasks & Personnel  \\
\hline
UNPROFOR (Croatia) & 1995 & CIVPOL & A Company of 13\textsuperscript{th} Rgt “Friuli Venezia Giulia”  \\
\hline
IFOR (Bosnia) & 1995-1996 & Military Police and Parachute Special forces & 36 Military Police & 78 paratroopers  \\
\hline
EU administration of Mostar WEUPOL & 1995-1996 & CIVPOL & 24 personnel  \\
\hline
SFOR (Bosnia) & 1996-2004 & Military Police & 102 personnel  \\
\hline
Multinational Protection Force Operation Alba (Albania) & 1997 & Executive policing & 1\textsuperscript{st} Rgt “Tuscania” (270 personnel)  \\
\hline
IPTF (Bosnia) & 1997-2002 & CIVPOL & 23 personnel  \\
\hline
MSU / SFOR (Bosnia) & 1998-2004 & Integrated police unit and training of constabulary forces & 13\textsuperscript{th} Rgt “Friuli Venezia Giulia”; a platoon of 1\textsuperscript{st} Rgt “Tuscania”, a GIS unit (400 personnel)  \\
\hline
KFOR (Kosovo) & 1999-present & Military Police & 70 personnel  \\
\hline
UNMIK (Kosovo) & 1999-present & Criminal Intelligence Unit & 3 personnel  \\
\hline
MSU/AFOR (Albania) & 1999 & Integrated police unit & 181 personnel  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation / Mission</th>
<th>Start / End</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Staff / Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSU/KFOR (Kosovo)</td>
<td>1999- present</td>
<td>Integrated police unit and training of constabulary forces</td>
<td>269 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Amber Fox and Allied Harmony (FYROM)</td>
<td>2001-2003</td>
<td>Military Police and Military Observers</td>
<td>5 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>2002-present</td>
<td>Military Police and Parachute Special forces</td>
<td>A platoon of 1st Rgt “tuscania”: 35 personnel; Carabinieri provide ISAF with the Provost Marshal; a GIS Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM (Bosnia)</td>
<td>2002-present</td>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>22 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eufor “Operation Concordia” (FYROM)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Military Police extraction team</td>
<td>5 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSU (Iraq)</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>Integrated Police Unit and humanitarian tasks</td>
<td>Two companies from the Tuscania Para. Rgt and 7 and 13 Rgt of 2nd Mobile brigade (365 personnel) and foreign units totalling 570 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPU-style capability (Bosnia)</td>
<td>2004-present</td>
<td>Integrated Police Unit</td>
<td>Same as MSU of SFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU BAM (Rafah)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>CIVPOL and Border control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Arma dei Carabinieri)

The *Carabinieri* employed in PSOs are mainly taken from the ranks of the 2nd Mobile Brigade, but due to the huge demand, other personnel who meet the professional requirements of foreign language knowledge and career status and being willing to do so, are also deployed. The training for the peacekeeping personnel includes a first phase for learning the TTPs and a second phase for the specific mission requirements.\(^5\)\(^{11}\)

The main objective of *Carabinieri* in international missions is the training of local police forces. This role started in the early nine-teeth century by modelling the Turkish *Jandarma* on their own organisation.

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In this sense, the *Carabinieri* promote their reputation and expand their influence by training in their TTPs and building similar forces that maintain strong ties with the parent organisation.

**6.1.3 The Multinational Specialised Units**

Recently, in addition to the traditional employment as military police and CIVPOL, the *Carabinieri* have developed doctrines for PSOs such as the MSU concept. The MSUs are regiment-size units composed of PFMS and military police: these have been deployed in the Western Balkans and other theatres to perform public security tasks within the NATO framework. The MSU were first deployed in Bosnia in 1998 to fill the “public security gap”. This consists in the grey area in security between the competence of military and police, as military security is traditionally associated with an external threat, while police competence is maintaining law and order. Nor the SFOR nor the IPTF had mandate to maintain public order that according to the Dayton Agreement was a competence of the local police, which was not willing nor able to perform this task.\(^{512}\) Furthermore, the violent accent on breaking of law in a war-torn country, lacking the authority of a state framework and complicated by situations such as civil disturbances and extended organised crime, raised the problem of public security for local citizens. The NAC in February 1998 entrusted the *Carabinieri* to raise a Regiment-sized police unit with appropriately armed and specially trained police.\(^{513}\) The MSU started to develop specific TTPs to integrate into SFOR structure and to perform general police tasks and crowd control. The MSU was commanded by a *Carabinieri* Colonel and organised on a military-like structure with mobile component and support. It was included in the military chain of command under the direct authority of the force commander to operate at Theatre level. The

\(^{512}\) General Agreement for Peace, 1995, annex 11

\(^{513}\) General Guido Bellini, Commanding General of *Arma dei Carabinieri* at the Seminar on the MSU in Rome, Scuola Ufficiali *Carabinieri* 30 and 31 March 2004; Interview with Mrs Cristina Gallach, Spokesperson for the High Representative for the CFSP; Interview with *Carabinieri* General Officer. Pasqualini *op.cit*, p.235
MSU had the capability to maintain public order and negotiate crowd control, to conduct general surveillance and criminal intelligence. The MSU/SFOR mandate allowed to perform basic judicial police tasks, which did not include the arrest of indicted criminals of war, investigation, or law enforcement. The Carabinieri trained local police and MSU’s military police in specialised techniques.514 A MSU was attached to AFOR in Albania with the task to protect refugees and IDPs in NATO operation "Allied Harbour" from April to July 1999, before its deployment to Kosovo. A MSU has been active in KFOR since August 1999 with a robust mandate of executive policing to fight organised crime and terrorism, and to protect refugees and IDPs. The Gendarmerie also after an initial scepticism towards the MSU/SFOR, then took part in MSU/KFOR. In the Western Balkans, the MSU was positive because it quickly fulfilled its intended aims in public security and it was especially good from the political point of view, because police forces are more politically acceptable than military to the host state and to the local population.515 MSU had its faults too, and it sometimes broke the rules by arresting individuals, even though this executive policing was not covered by its mandate. In Iraq, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid had considered in spring 2003, the deployment of an Italian-led Carabinieri brigade-size MSU.516 This proposal was eventually dropped as the huge deployment of Carabinieri units abroad meant that it was impossible to raise a Brigade. In summer 2003, the Italian Joint Task Force raised a MSU Regiment in its area of responsibility in Southern Iraq. It also performed specialised tasks such

514 A special unit of certifying Carabinieri, had the task to certify the capabilities of other contingents in MSU regarding organisation, training and equipment. They helped in training in paramilitary-Police techniques units of Hungarian and Slovenian soldiers, see: Kelly Whittingaker “Escort Training At The MSU” in: SFOR Informer 140, 6 June 2002; Vance White “MSU crowd control and hostage rescue demonstration” in: SFOR Informer 127, 28 November 2001
515 Interview with Mrs Cristina Gallach, Spokesperson for the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union.
as the protection of cultural and archaeological heritage, and humanitarian assistance according to the “Italian way of peacekeeping”. Unfortunately, the MSU support and logistic command suffered heavy casualties in the terrorist attack in Nassiriya in November 2003. The MSU experience in Iraq, although it paid the price in human life, was very appreciated by the US, which decided to support the Carabinieri initiatives in peacekeeping such as the International Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Vicenza. The COESPU would train and equip by 2010 a 75,000-strength MSU-like constabulary force for African peacekeeping in cooperation with the UN, AU, EU. The State Department inspired the Sea Island G8 document establishing the COESPU:

“Increasingly, carabinieri/gendarme-like forces have demonstrated their unique skills in recent peace support operations. These units can fill the security gap between military forces and civilian police, relieving some of the military units’ heavy burden and establishing an environment in which civilian police can operate effectively within the rule of law. More interoperable and a greater number of these units are needed to participate in international peace support operations and their related activities.”

On 4 November 2009, US President Barack Obama sent a letter to Prime Minister Berlusconi particularly ppaising the role of COESPU in peacekeeping and in supporting the local population. The MSU has proved to be a consolidated and effective structure, and it represents a valid model in robust executive policing. The MSU was designed so as to be able to operate in close cooperation with the military force in the phase of transition to civilian administration. Therefore, the Carabinieri have drafted a national MSU doctrine for peacekeeping.

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517 Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Oliveira of Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana at the Rome Seminar on MSUs, cit.
519 Letter of US President Barack Obama to Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, 4 November 2009.
6.1.4 The EU integration of Italian police forces

A range of different specialised police forces is to be found across the spectrum of Italian public security agencies. Most of them were established with military status. The National Police was civilianised in 1981, when it was placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, keeping some defence assistance tasks in wartime; the Guardia di Finanza is a PFMS that maintains military ranking and discipline, but it is under the authority of the Minister of Finance: it performs border and financial police tasks, including the EC economic and budgetary policing. The Commissioner of the National Police is a senior Prefect, while the Guardia di Finanza is commanded by an Army General. The coordination of all police forces in national territory is under the responsibility of the local Prefect, and the criminal investigations are conducted under the authority of a magistrate.

The Italian police forces felt compelled to harmonise with the EU, conforming to work in progress of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. They took part in the newly established JHA bodies, and took advantage of the Italian Presidency in 2003. Therefore, they tried to maximise their resources by means of a division of labour, while specialising in the fields in which they have built a reputation of efficiency at the European level.

The National Police: The National Police assumed its jurisdiction mainly in police cooperation of the JHA, by sending the National Police Commissioner as a permanent representative to the European Police Chiefs operational Task Force proposed at the Tampere Council, and by seconding 40 officers (including Carabinieri and Finanzieri) to Europol for criminal intelligence, fighting organised crime, and drug dealing, and.\(^{520}\) The National Police gave special attention to the “joint

\(^{520}\) Presidency Conclusion, Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, point. 44; Intervento del Capo della Polizia, ‘La Cooperazione di Polizia nel Quadro della Nuova Architettura Europea’ Roma, 11 June 2003. The speech illustrated the guidelines for the development of police cooperation during the Italian Presidency. The Convention based on Article K.3 TEU, on the
investigative teams” mentioned by point 43 of the Tampere Council conclusions. They were in charge of creating the Europol National Unit in which Carabinieri and Finanzieri senior officers may also take part: the Unit’s command is rotated between the National Police and Carabinieri. The participation of National Police to police missions started with UNMIK in 1999, and National Police personnel was seconded to EUPM. From 1999 to 2009, a total of 318 National Police personnel took part in UN and EU police missions (32 were deployed in 2009). The Central Directorates of the National Police decide on the deployment of personnel, including the call of personnel and mission training. The personnel is detached to the 1st Mobile Department based in Rome. The personnel usually has two to three years tour of duty, and tend to constitute a permanent pool of officers to be deployed in these missions. According to the ‘Rank’ system, official ranking is not respected but personal requirements make the difference, so that detectives can be appointed as Chief of Police Departments, while superintendents may perform investigations as detectives. National Police strategy is to fill any rank positions rather than aim at top positions, so that junior police officers are deemed as important as Police Commissioner positions.

The Guardia di Finanza: The Guardia di Finanza has created an EC anti-fraud task force at the EC Policies Department of the government secretariat. The head of this task force is double-hatting as a permanent member of the Advisory Committee for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF) of the Commission. The Finanzieri are seconded establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) in: Official Journal C 316, 27/11/1995, pp. 2-32; ratified by Italy with the Legge 23 marzo 1998, n. 93, published on Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 86 del 14 aprile 1998 - Supplemento ordinario n. 69

521 Art.4 of “Europol convention”, see: Comitato parlamentare Schengen-Europol, Decreto Istitutivo dell’Unità Nazionale Eurogol.
523 National Police representative speech at the workshop ‘L’Italia nelle missioni civili dell’UE’ at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Roma, on 4 and 5 November 2009.
to OLAF in which they specialise in the fight against EC and structural fund fraud, and forged bank guarantees. The OLAF Director of the investigations and Operations is a magistrate, not a Finanziere.\footnote{Olaf was established by: Commission Decision of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), SEC(1999) 802; (1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom) According to the Decreto Legislativo n. 68 del 19 marzo 2001, Finanza personnel may be seconded, as attachés or liaison officers, to permanent representations abroad for financial police tasks in State or EU budgetary frauds; See Comando Generale della Guardia Di Finanza “Relazione dell’OLAF sulle attività operative: dichiarazioni del Direttore Generale Franz-Hermann Brüner sulla cooperazione con la Guardia di Finanza” Roma, 9 luglio 2007; and Report of the European Anti-Fraud Office for the period 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2006.}

### 6.1.5 Carabinieri and the ESDP

The Carabinieri succeeded in boosting the role of ESDP police missions according to their own criteria in three ways:

- by secondment to EU institutions
- by participation in international missions
- by building cooperation with the other European PFMS

The best way to lobby a European institution is by seconding senior officers in key decision-making positions. Although Italy is not well represented in EU institutions, Carabinieri are. In 2002-2005, in the first composition of the DG IX Police Unit (DGIXPU) of the EU Council secretariat, two out of seven people were Carabinieri senior officers, including the Head of unit. The DGIXPU is a key position, responsible for drafting doctrines, and planning and conducting the ESDP police missions. In this strategy, the Carabinieri were more successful than the National Police, and they had the chance to assume a more influential role in drafting police concepts. This may have happened because the responsibility for civilian police investigations is usually put under the authority of the magistrates or prefects, who were candidates for EU senior positions. On the other hand, due to their particular status, the Carabinieri may assume both police and military positions in JHA or ESDP bodies. For instance, it seems that Italy is not very supportive of...
Europol: in 1999 Italy fought together with France to reduce Europol’s budget for 2000, from the proposed €30 M to €27.5, with a national quota of €3.5 M. Officially, Italy opposed raising the budget because the growth rate was not in conformity with the Europol work programme for 2000, but considering the alliance with France it is possible that the fact that the PFMS are not well represented in Europol may have influenced the national position.525

The Carabinieri earned a good reputation in peacekeeping thanks to their extensive commitment to it. Therefore they won laurels in ESDP missions. Brigadier Vincenzo Coppola was appointed EUPM Commissioner on 25 November 2005.526 Major General Pietro Pistolese was appointed head of EU Border Assistance Mission (BAM) at Rafah crossing point in November 2005 that is mainly composed of PFMS personnel.527 Moreover, the Carabinieri felt that the MSU model was so successful that it should be promoted at the international level. This led to the IPU concept of ESDP that was originally developed by the Carabinieri seconded to the DGIXPU.528 Furthermore, if the MSU’s main tasks are to share knowledge and train other countries’ military police or PFMS in specific Carabinieri and MSU doctrines, this is the reason why the MSU includes units from other countries.529 This a role that the

528 Interview with a Carabinieri General officer.
529 MSU/SFOR included units from Argentina (76 personnel), Romania (23 personnel) Slovenia (47 personnel) and Hungary (150 personnel), in the HQ staff there were 2 US and 2 Dutch officers. MSU KFOR included Gendarmerie (37 personnel) since June 1999 and Estonian police (21 personnel) since 10 November 1999. MSU Iraq included a company of Romenian MPs (101 personnel) and a Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana company (135 personnel). The IPU-style capability includes Austrian, Hungarian, Slovenian and Turkish military police companies.
Carabinieri played very efficiently with the Hungarian, Rumanian and Turkish military police, and with Guarda Nacional Republicana.

Nonetheless, the MSU model was also promoted in other international fora by means of cooperation with the other European PFMS in lobbying bodies that have just been created to promote PFMS role, such as the FIEP.

6.2 The FIEP contribution to the EU Police Concepts

6.2.1 The FIEP Association and its European Affairs Commission

The European PFMS have established partnerships such as the FIEP, which is an association open to all PFMS of the Council of Europe (CoE) countries and the Mediterranean countries designed to further cooperation and foster the exchange of information and best practices in the fields of human resources, organisation management, new technologies, logistics, and European affairs. The association was established after the meeting of the Carabinieri Commanding General with the General Directors of the Gendarmerie Nationale and Guardia Civil on 18 February 1993, aimed at identifying possible domains of cooperation between the three institutions. In a meeting in Madrid in May 1994, a Common Declaration established the Tripartite Commission of FIE co-operation. The Guarda Nacional Republicana was granted an observer status in the Tripartite Commission in June 1995 at the meeting in Rome and in May 1996 entered the Tripartite Commission, which was then transformed into a Four Parties’ Commission. The Common Declaration signed in Lisbon on 28 October 1997 officially designated the Four Parties’ Commission as the FIEP (from the initials of the participating states in their original language: France, Italia, España, Portugal). The official status of the FIEP was approved in the Rome Declaration and the FIEP Agreement on 20 October 1999. The FIEP currently includes the PFMS of France, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Turkey.

530 FIEP Statute, art.2 see: www.fiep-asso.com
**European Affairs Commission:** According to signed in Rome, its The FIEP is organised in a Senior Council, a rotational Presidency with secretariat, and the relevant Commissions of the representatives of the member institutions who meet once a year. The Commissions include the European Affairs Commission (EAC) composed only by the EU Member States of the FIEP (France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and more recently Romania) The EAC is supposed to select projects of common interest to be submitted to the relevant EU institutions for approval and financing. The EAC also identifies which members (at least two), will introduce the project to the competent EU Institutions. The non-EU FIEP participating institutions may only participate as observers in the EAC activities.\(^{531}\)

One of the FIEP cooperation’s tasks is to facilitate the participation of PFMS in police missions. In this sense the FIEP drafted a common doctrine to use at international fora and particularly as a platform for ESDP. Moreover, the FIEP common doctrine stresses the recognition of the added value of FIEP and PFMS in police missions and police cooperation and technical assistance. Moreover, the FIEP’s participating institutions should coordinate their initiatives to consolidate common positions within ESDP framework.\(^{532}\) The key EAC common position in the ESDP was: “the definition and establishment of an European police force to operate in a context of regional crisis in Europe.”\(^{533}\)

The EAC had the task to implement these common initiatives within ESDP framework. This was pursued by means of exchange of information between the FIEP members, by promoting their participation in EU committees by consolidating common positions, and by promoting the PFMS at the European Parliament and the CoE.\(^{534}\)

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\(^{531}\) See FIEP statute, art.4-11  
\(^{532}\) See FIEP common declaration 2005  
\(^{533}\) FIEP aims and stakes: [www.fiep-asso.com](http://www.fiep-asso.com)  
\(^{534}\) FIEP “European Affairs”, Commission meeting 2004, Strasbourg, France, 12 and 13 January 2005; p.4-5
In any case, the EAC has been very important in drafting ESDP police doctrines and providing the EU with the appropriate police capabilities.

6.2.2 A rapid deployment PFMS

The Cologne Council in June 1999 stated that for the EU-led operations, which do not have recourse to NATO assets, the EU could use national or multinational European means pre-identified by Member States.\textsuperscript{535} In a meeting in Paris on 25-26 January 2000, the EAC agreed on the need for a ‘European Security and Investigation Force’ (FESI is the French Acronym).\textsuperscript{536} The High Representative for CFSP Solana was presumed to have encouraged this project. The FESI could be a tool at the disposal of both the EU and NATO, because it was intended to be deployed under military command to facilitate the civilian-military transition by taking over the military mission and eventually being handed over to a police mission.

The transfer of authority was designed to take place in three phases:

1) a phase of Intervention, in a military environment;
2) a Transitional phase, or the civilian-military transition;
3) a Stabilisation phase, with the handing over to the ‘reconstituted local police forces’.

The FESI concepts and doctrines were modelled on the MSU experience: the FESI, made up of PFMS, would be particularly qualified for the restoration of public security in crisis scenarios as part of a military mission.\textsuperscript{537} For this reason, the FESI should have representation in the military planning and operational structures. The FESI concepts have inspired the subsequent ESDP works on police units.

\textsuperscript{535} Presidency conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3-4 June ‘Declaration of the European council on strengthening the Common European policy on security and defence’ in Chaillot Paper 47, p.44
\textsuperscript{537} “Global "policing" role for EU”, in Statewatch News online, July-August 2000; see also Richard Norton-Taylor “New European secrecy controls come into law”, in The Guardian, 31 August 2000.
Feira Council: The EU capabilities for civil crisis management were defined at the Feira Council in June 2000. A study recognised the police as a first priority in all present and past crises in Europe.538 The EU Member States:

“recognising the central role of police in international crisis management operations, and the increasing need for police officers for such operations (...) to strengthen their capability to provide police officers for international police operations” 539

A police capability was set as a final objective to be met by 2003 to contribute to the RRF. Considering that, at the time of the Feira Council, the total deployment of EU Member States’ personnel to international police missions amounted to 3,300 personnel. As a final objective in the strengthening of police capabilities, the EU Member States should be able to deploy up to 5,000 personnel for international missions at the request of the UN or OSCE, or which could constitute an autonomous EU police mission, especially in the context of a larger EU-led crisis management operation. Moreover, a rapid deployment capability for the most demanding crisis scenarios was proposed. As a matter of fact, rapid deployment is the most important factor for the success of a crisis management mission. The “deployment gap”- that is the amount of time before the force may be deployed on the ground- may escalate the crisis situation if it is too long. The Kosovo experience had also shown that the public security gap could be worsened by the time gap between the deployment of military force and the achievement of a full operational capability of the CIVPOL. To face the “deployment gap” and according to lessons learned in past police missions, the Feira Council fixed the deployment time at within 30 days for a 1,000-strength rapid deployment police force asking the EU Council to develop the proper measures to implement this commitment.

Furthermore, in order to recognise the EAC contribution to the future role of the PFMS in the ESDP:

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538 Study on Concrete Targets on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, annex I appendix III, point B
539 Concrete Targets for Police, annex I appendix 4, point A.1
“Member States’ contributions will take account of their own particular arrangements for national policing and the type of police expertise which they can provide”. 540

The similarities between the RRF police component and the FESI are striking, but the FESI is just the original name for the IPU concept outlined in the Concrete Targets for Police set out in the Council Report, with the proposal for the development of ‘robust, rapidly deployable, flexible and interoperable’ EU IPUs designed to perform executive tasks in non-stabilised situations and in particular during the civilian-military transition. To this end the Member States should pre-identify integrated police forces for rapid deployment. 541

The definition of an EU concept for police operations should draw up rules of engagement (in particular defining the categories of police officers most appropriate for the different phases of operation) and develop a general concept of executive policing, including police-military cooperation in post-conflict deployment situations.

The PFMS offered themselves as candidates and the main supporters of these specialised tasks. The Feira Council was heavily influenced by ideas emanating from the EAC that decided to provide police rapid deployment capabilities to the RRF. This development led to the IPU proposal that was strongly supported by the EU Member States of the FIEP states including the Portuguese Presidency. The FIEP played an important role in promoting the debate on specialised police capabilities at the Nice Council.

6.2.3 The generic concepts of police

The Nice Council in December 2000 identified the guiding principles of EU police mission.542 The police missions, thanks to the different types of Member States’ police, would be able to carry out a full range of

540 Concrete Targets for Police, point A.1
541 Ibidem, point A.2
542 ‘Method through which Phased Targets can be met and maintained through Voluntary Contributions’ in: Definition and implementation of EU capabilities in the civilian aspects of crisis management: concrete targets for police, methodology, EU Council 14882/1/00 REV 1 of 12 January 2001, annex p.7.
assignments. Taking the recent scenarios of police missions into account, two concepts for EU police missions were formulated:

- Strengthening of local police forces
- Substituting for local police forces

The first concept mainly dealt with traditional CIVPOL tasks in a low-intensity scenarios and led to the EU concept of police assistance missions. The second concept involved a more complex crisis situation, with war-torn societies and failed institutions in a non-stabilised situation that required robust intervention with an executive mandate to restore law and order. This led to the police substitution mission concept. These concepts were developed bearing in mind that in the EU operational concept, civilian crisis management was conceived as an ‘exit strategy’ at the end of the transition phase and the restoring of the host state sovereignty. The police assistance mission would work towards the prevention and mitigation of internal crises by Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA) local police so as to raise local police standards according to basic human rights criteria and codes of conduct. The assistance role may also include the reform or restructuring of the local police forces in response to a request from local authorities.

The concept of the police substitution mission is more innovative and deals with situations where local institutions and respect for rule of law are failing. The police substitution missions’ concepts are closely related to the public security gap. There could be a public security gap, because the local police are non-existent or unable to act, further complicated by serious civil disturbances. In this case, an international police force, which will initially consist mainly of IPUs, would be

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544 The Method through which Phased Targets cit. named for first concept the experience of police missions in Guatemala, Croatia, Albania, Mostar, El Salvador and for second concept Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor and Kosovo.
545 Strengthening of EU Capabilities cit., Annex II to Annex VI, Point II.2
temporarily substituted for the local police and would perform executive policing to restore public security.\textsuperscript{546}

The complex crisis framework for police substitution missions in a Kosovo-Style situation should be developed in three stages:

- initial stage involving the gain of military control over the territory;
- transition stage involving the restoration of law and order through direct law enforcement and transition from a military to a civilian environment;
- post-crisis stage for the gradual devolution of sovereignty to the reconstituted local institutions.\textsuperscript{547}

The police substitution missions will require a full range of police forces. Every kind of police capable of these assignments was considered, although, in particular cases, these need to be carried out by an integrated military and police force, composed of PFMS as the MSU experience suggested. The substitution scenario may evolve into a ‘strengthening scenario’ with an improvement in the security situation, along with a shift to a police assistance mission at a later stage, or, if the situation allows, the local authorities can be strengthened through the training of local police performed by the police force in addition to the executive police. However, the two scenarios are only for the purposes of classification, as any real crisis situation requiring the deployment of a police mission would require a combination of the mission’s tasks.

During the Nice Council the FIEP agreed to examine and analyse in detail the contribution of the PFMS to a multinational police force, whether involved in assistance missions or acting in an advisory, monitoring, or substitution role to the local police, in the context of crisis prevention and management as outlined in the conclusions reached by the commissions under the French FIEP Presidency, and taking into account the orientations of the Feira Council with regard to the EAC. As a consequence, the Nice Council recognised the role played by PFMS and, therefore, the police substitution mission concept.

\textsuperscript{546} Method through which Phased Targets cit, annex ,II.1, p.8

\textsuperscript{547} Strengthening of EU Capabilities cit. Point II.2 & 3
was based on PFMS in particular, by taking the FESI concept as a reference for drafting its tasks, and underlining the need to make the IPU s operate temporarily under military command like the MSU.\textsuperscript{548} The three-stage crisis management operation was modelled on that developed for the FESI.

It was also acknowledged that military and police components of a crisis management operation should be part of an integrated planning process and should coordinate closely.\textsuperscript{549} Often the EAC pointed out the need of an PFMS force for the EU by stressing that this may be effectively employed in international crisis.\textsuperscript{550}

The interoperability of police forces and the military options for command were particularly put forward by the EAC and included in the Police Action Plan presented at the Göteborg Council in June 2001. The Plan give the EU the necessary capabilities for planning and conducting operations, whether in contribution to missions led by the UN, OSCE or CoE, or as autonomous EU police missions.\textsuperscript{551}

At a Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels in November 2001, the EU member states declared and defined their national capabilities commitment for EU civilian crisis management. Together with the Gendarmes, the Carabinieri constituted the bulk of EU police capabilities.

### 6.2.4 The IPU concept of the EU

PFMS, due to their military structure and pre-constituted units, are able to operate in formed police units with a military-type structure like

\textsuperscript{548} Interview with Ms Helene Holm-Pedersen, Directorate for Politico-Military Affairs, DGE VI, General Secretariat of the Council, 2003; and Carabinieri Senior Officers. See \textit{Strengthening Of EU Capabilities} cit., II. Policing Capabilities; see also ‘Concept for rapid deployment of police elements in an EU-led substitution mission’ Doc. 8508/2/05 REV 2 EXT 1 original document 25 May 2005

\textsuperscript{549} \textit{Strengthening Of EU Capabilities} cit II Policing Capabilities

\textsuperscript{550} FIEP common statement 2001

\textsuperscript{551} Göteborg European Council, Presidency Report on ESDP, Annex I to the Annex point I.1
the MSU or the SPU of the UN. The EU developed its own IPU concept by taking the best from these two experiences. For this reason, the IPUs may intervene in non-stabilised situations so as to fill the public security gap by integrating themselves into the military environment of a PSO to perform executive policing tasks in a post-crisis situation. The IPUs, depending on their national rules and legislation, could be deployed in the initial stage of a crisis as a rapid deployment police element of a larger military operation, and be placed temporarily under military command and included in the military chain of command. In the event of a substitution mission involving the IPUs, a strong synergy between the military and civilian component should be created by means of an integrated planning process and coordination on the ground. Furthermore, the police components of an EU-led mission must be placed under EU chain of command, to be determined according to EU Council decisions. During missions, the IPU would be deployed as part of a larger EU police force (Eupol). The IPU would be structured within a military-type territorial organisation and it would have its own internal chain of command including a multinational HQ organised under the military structure model like the MSU. The structure of the police substitution mission shall be adapted to the changing situation in a process based on the three-stages for police substitution mission agreed on at the Nice Council. The IPUs tasks may include general surveillance and restoring public order. When appropriate, the IPUs may conduct investigations and criminal intelligence. It may also provide assistance to refugees and internally

552 The special police units are company-like units composed of pre-constituted units of uniformed police or PFMS who are deployable for executive policing under the civilian command of the Police Commissioner in UN substitution missions.
553 Strengthening Of EU Capabilities cit II Policing Capabilities; see also Concept for rapid deployment of police cit.
554 Concept of rapid deployment of police cit., see ‘Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management’ Doc. 11127/03 and ‘Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Police Operations in Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management’ Doc 6922/02
555 See Strengthening Of EU Capabilities cit. II Policing Capabilities 2. Concepts of police forces
displaced persons or perform other special security tasks according to mission requirements.556

The EU organised an exercise policy to verify the validity of the IPU concept and to draft ‘lessons learned’. Just to reassert the Gendarmerie and Carabinieri role in the IPU development: the first exercise, the “Lucerna 03,” was held at the Carabinieri Officer School in Rome in November 2003 with Italy as a lead nation and the second exercise, the “Periland 04,” took place in June 2004 with France as a lead nation.557 These exercises raised the issue that the IPUs are deployed as national units, so only the achievement of a standardised structure and Common TTPs may enable planners at all levels to make better use of the IPUs, while the Member States should consider this proposal in the IPUs’ deployment.558

The IPU should also contribute, together with the CRT, integrated packages to further development of the civilian-military coordination and interoperability within the EU civilian crisis management.559

The candidate forces for the IPU: The IPU would have special requirements, because of the specialised nature of the units and the very demanding executive tasks of the police substitution mission. To respect the time deployment gap limit of 30 days, it is necessary to use pre-constituted units such as mobile units of uniformed police or PFMS. The personnel should have extensive training in civilian-military cooperation to be able to operate in a military-type structure.

Nonetheless, the IPU requirement to operate temporarily under military authority became a sensitive issue for admission to the IPUs. To meet this requirement, IPU candidate police forces should not have

556 Carabinieri Brigadier Vincenzo Coppola’s paper for the Rome Seminar on MSUs, 30-31 March 2004
557 Interview with Senior Carabinieri officer, DG IX police Unit
558 Brigadier Coppola’s paper cit.
any legal obstacle to prevent them from being deployed under military authority. In light of the MSU experience, the Carabinieri of the DGIXPU were particularly keen on this subject, in order to identify PFMS forces as the best candidate for the IPUs. They argued that PFMS do not need to integrate into the military chain of command and control, because they are already military. They are able to perform all required tasks, have no obstacle in deployment under military command, and have sound experience in robust intervention in peacekeeping by means of the MSUs. The ability to operate under military or civilian authority assure a seamless military-civilian transition and continuity in the operational experience and share knowledge and information. On the other hand, the Gendarmerie has always questioned the inclusion of the MSU or IPU in the military chain of command. In any case, the IPU takes the MSU concept one step further because it may perform a broader range of police tasks but could also be deployed under civilian authority, just as the SPU s. In any case, the uniformed police corps may form the IPUs, provided that they have no legal or social obstacles in being deployed under military command.560

Some Member States, having legal or other restrictions on putting police forces under military authority, or simply not having pre-constituted police units, are seeking other means of contributing to the ESDP police missions. For this reason Germany is developing a separate Formed Police Unit (FPU) for rapid deployment and specialised tasks. This concept would be very similar to the IPU concept, but the FPUs may operate only under civilian authority. This implies a problem, because the FPU can not operate under military command, making it unsuitable for first rapid intervention along with a military mission, unless it can be deployed under a relevant civilian authority. The FPU should have a force of around 100 uniformed police officers with a rapid deployment structure. It is unclear whether the units will be pre-constituted or the officers will be selected from “on-call” lists. Another German project, which focused on a Eupol able to conduct crowd control to provide security to international summits in

560 Interview with Senior Carabinieri officer, DG IX police Unit
the EU Member States, was rejected. Because a police concept for internal use would interfere with the Member States’ sovereignty.  

6.2.5 IPU-style capability of the EUFOR

A Carabinieri senior officer once said that in Bosnia, ‘the MSU will switch off the light and close the door’, meaning that it would be the last international unit to be disbanded at the end of the stabilisation process. He was, to some extent, right. When the SFOR mission ended, to assure a seamless transition, the MSU was followed up by a similar IPU-style capability of the Eufor. The main problem for the Eufor was whether the IPU-style could operate under civilian or military authority. To be deployed under military command, a police unit needs an appropriate legal basis; this means a UNSC resolution, in order to have an executive mandate. The MSU/SFOR had an executive mandate. To be deployed under civilian authority, the police unit should have been placed under the responsibility of the EUSR or should have included in the EUPM structure under the responsibility of the Police Commissioner. This solution was not applicable, as it would have substantially changed the responsibilities of the two civilian authorities. Furthermore, the EUPM was mandated as an assistance police mission. The EU Council on 17 May 2004 started to consider both a military option and a police option that included the role of the MSUs and the liason between the Eufor and EUPM. A few EU Member States, in particular France and Greece, supported the civilian command option, which meant that a unanimous decision could not be reached. Eventually, the IPU-style was established to follow the MSU as a final compromise agreement. The unit was named IPU-style as it did not fulfil all the requirements for the IPU concept. It is also sometimes referred to as ‘IPU Regiment’ to underline its military

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561 ‘Accordo a cinque per la polizia militare europea’ in: Il manifesto, 19 September 2004. A police co-operation was decided on the matter; see Doc.6930/05 and doc. 6931/05

562 Interview with Carabinieri Brigadier
command and its mixed composition of PFMS and military police personnel.\textsuperscript{563}

The UNSC Resolution 1575 (2004) establishing Eufor provided a sufficient legal basis and the IPU-style followed on from the MSU of SFOR and to be put under the military authority of the Eufor Commander. The executive powers of the IPU-style derived from the Eufor mandate, and being it included in the Eufor chain of command the IPU-style was also subject to the Berlin Plus, although those arrangements do not contemplate a police dimension.\textsuperscript{564} The Italian-led IPU-style is modelled on the relevant IPU concept and it inherited the MSU structure and tasks in addition to other police tasks by cooperating with the NATO HQ Sarajevo. A special planning procedure involving the EUMS, the DGIXPU, the COPS, and a Eufor commander has been developed by Carabinieri of the DGIXPU, for the joint planning and generation process of the IPU-style.\textsuperscript{565} The IPU-style is subject to a review process every six months by the EUSR, the EUPM Police Commissioner and the Eufor commander, who make decisions regarding changes in the chain of command and transfer to civilian authority. After the civil disturbances that occurred in March 2004 in Kosovo, IPU-style units were also utilised as a tactical reserve force to reinforce the MSU/KFOR in case of necessity. In March 2005 a Carabinieri company of IPU-style reinforced the MSU/KFOR to prevent civil disturbances.

The Carabinieri exerted a strong influence over IPU-style activities. On 15 December 2007, the Eurogendfor assumed command of IPU-style by offering its Permanent HQ capabilities, and starting Eurogendfor’s first operational deployment.\textsuperscript{566} Currently the IPU is composed of PFMS of Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, Hungarian and Romanian Military Police. A Portuguese Colonel is now the Eurogendfor Force commander, thus showing that the IPU process is now expanding from the original MSU.

\textsuperscript{563} Interview with Senior Carabinieri officer, DG IX police Unit
\textsuperscript{564} Interview with Senior Italian diplomat, Italian Representation to the EU, 2003
\textsuperscript{565} Interview with Senior Carabinieri officer, DG IX police Unit
\textsuperscript{566} Ceremony of Full Operational Capability in Sarajevo.
6.3  The Eurogendfor

6.3.1  The birth of Eurogendfor

In the Concrete Targets for Police document, special attention was paid ‘to the possibility of a smaller number of Member States cooperating to build capabilities in this specific field.’\(^{567}\) Therefore, a small group of EU Member States cooperated to build capabilities for robust intervention in the IPUs, composed of PFMS, to create a Eurogendfor to be available to the EU. The initiative was supported by EU Member States of the FIEP and within the EAC. It must be remembered that the important phases of Eurogendfor were drawn up during the EU Presidencies of the FIEP states. The idea had been circulating at the EAC since early 2000. Under the French FIEP Presidency, the EAC agreed on the necessity of examining more fully the participation of the PFMS in a European multinational force, considering their expertise in managing regional crises, specifically in non-stabilised situations.\(^{568}\) Therefore, at the informal EU Defence Ministers meeting in Rome on 4 October 2003, the French Defence Minister, Alliot-Marie, first launched a proposal for the creation of a force composed of PFMS. Alliot-Marie asked the interested Member States to begin a feasibility study. On 8 October 2003, the proposal was formally endorsed by the Defence Minister, Martino. France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, who are members of the FIEP and the Eurofor (but the Netherlands do not participate in the Eurofor) agreed to start technical and political consultation, by means of a working group to prepare a feasibility study and declared their contribution to the force.

**The French concept:** According to the original idea, the Eurogendfor was conceived out of the need of a non-military force for multinational missions and it was supposed to be something different from a military rapid intervention force. The original French concept did not specifically take the experience of the current EU missions into

\(^{567}\) Concrete Targets for Police, annex I appendix 4, point A.2

\(^{568}\) FIEP Common Statement 2000 Conclusions European Affairs Commission
consideration. Alliot-Marie had seen the Eurogendfor project as having great potential and had mapped out the project in advance.\footnote{Interview with Cristina Gallach, Spokesperson of the High Representative for CFSP} She considered the existence of crisis situations where the stability situation is not secure enough for a humanitarian mission, but where the security situation does not require a military mission. In such cases it was felt that a non-military security tool would be very useful. PFMS would be perfect for this scenario: from the professional point of view, they were used to work in military-like units, and received specialised training. The objective was to establish a force of about 900 or 1,000-strength. The Eurogendfor would intervene in crisis prevention, crisis situations and post-crisis situations. In this regard, the Eurogendfor concept was broader than the EU police mission concept. According to Alliot-Marie, the main idea is to be a force of ‘transition between the purely military situation and the civilian situation’.\footnote{La France pousse ses partenaires à créer un corps de gendarmerie européen’ in \textit{Le Monde}, 4 October 2003} Regarding the status of the force, the Eurogendfor was supposed to be a multinational force, like Eurofor or Euromarfor that could be used at the request of the EU, the Member States, or NATO. The analysis of Alliot-Marie was that after ten years the current situation in the Western Balkans did not require a huge military presence, because the security threats in the region concerned mainly public security.\footnote{Interview with a senior official, French Ministry of Defence} However, there weren’t supposed to be geographical limits and a potential deployment area could be, for instance, in Africa. The important thing was to underline the need for a force that would be ‘neither blue, nor green’. For this reason, only member states having PFMSs could contribute to the force.\footnote{In security jargon, Green means a military force, while Blue stands for civilian uniformed police}

**Member States’ reaction:** The Member States displayed a mixture of interest and curiosity towards the project. There was a common interest in an EU police force able to perform executive tasks in police missions. The High Representative for CFSP, Solana, expressed support for the
Eurogendfor project, recognising that participation in it was more generous than with other similar structures, especially in view of the fact that police forces in general are a scarce resource.\footnote{Interview with Cristina Gallach, Spokesperson of the SG/HR for CFSP} Some Member States may have difficulties in deploying police forces outside the country, as they are already heavily employed for internal use. Austria and Belgium, which formerly had PFMSs, did not take part in the project. Luxembourg had a very small Gendarmerie territorial force which was not able to be deployed outside the country. Other countries not having PFMS declared their intention to take part in the initiative. Some Member States had border police corps under the authority of a relevant civilian ministry, but with a special structure and training. These forces were not eligible for the Eurogendfor, since they lacked some of the requirements for admission (such as the possibility to operate under military command.) For instance, under German law, the Bundesgrenzschutz cannot operate under military command and has never been employed for peacekeeping activities. Germany and Poland supported the French proposal. Although Germany was not eligible for admission, it decided to cooperate in domains which are still to be determined.\footnote{‘La France pousse ses partenaires à créer un corps de gendarmerie européen’ cit.} Poland, which has a PFMS-like military police, even circulated the idea that it could raise PFMS units specifically to contribute to Eurogendfor. The UK declared that it was ready to take part. The British army has developed crowd control techniques for light infantry in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the light infantry battalions serving in Northern Ireland and Iraq received special training in counterinsurgency, and in civilian-military coordination with the police forces. But because these are military units, they may not be eligible for full membership in Eurogendfor. Some years ago the UK commissioned a study on the need to raise PFMS. Although the study showed the advantages of such a civilian-military police force, the proposals were shelved due to organisational problems as the UK does not possess a national federal police. Anyway, the participation of military units in Eurogendfor, even of military police, is highly questionable, because PFMS are civilian-military forces
having military structure and training, but are able to perform civilian police tasks.

6.3.2 The declaration of intent

The process of the Eurogendfor definition included a technical table to draft a feasibility study and determine a declaration of intent. The technical table included officers of the participating institutions and the original direction was assured by the Carabinieri. Considering the proposals pushed in particular by the Carabinieri, the technical table resolved to create a multinational force available for use by interested international organisations to perform the whole spectrum of police tasks. In any case, Eurogendfor should not be mistaken as an EU force.575

The official Declaration of Intent was signed by France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain at the informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers in Nordwijk, the Netherlands on 17 September 2004. It was modelled on the Eurofor’s Lisbon declaration. According to the provisions determined by the technical table, the Eurogendfor should be ‘pre-organised, robust and rapidly deployable’ and be able to carry out all types of police missions in accordance with the Generic Concepts of Police, and in particular police substitution missions and capabilities responding to the ESDP requirements for IPUs. The Eurogendfor was to be self-sufficient and deployable in an autonomous operation, or able to operate as an element of a military mission. It should be made available not only to the EU, but also to the UN, NATO and OSCE or even to a coalition of states. The Eurogendfor only standing structure is the Permanent HQ which is responsible for the operational planning and operation command, while the CIMIN assures the intergovernmental decision-making at the politico-military strategic

level.\textsuperscript{576} Eurogendfor disposable forces are composed of the forces listed in the HFC and the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference of November 2001. The Eurogendfor will possess an 800-strength initial rapid-reaction capability to be deployable within 30 days, and a 2,300-strength total force. The force remains multinational and intergovernmental, according to French requests, as each participating state will retain its full freedom to decide whether its units will participate in a Eurogendfor operation.\textsuperscript{577}

On deployment the Eurogendfor should ensure an effective presence, cooperating with the military component and the local police. In the transitional phase of transfer of authority from a military to a civilian environment, the Permanent HQ can be placed either under military or civilian command. Under military authority, the Eurogendfor chain of command would be very similar to a military structure. For this reason, the Eurogendfor will be able to deploy the IPUs if required by the mission’s decision process. The training in the police mission tasks of the individual national units made available for Eurogendfor will be the responsibility of the national authorities.\textsuperscript{578} Admission to Eurogendfor is open only to EU Member State’s PFMS (in some ways the Eurogendfor is a PFMS club). For both admission to and cooperation with the Eurogendfor, the main requirement is that the candidate force has a military status, or is able to be deployed under military command as required by the \textit{Carabinieri}.\textsuperscript{579} The Eurogendfor operations can be integrated by forces with appropriate police skills, offered by other states in order to strengthen public security and operational capabilities.\textsuperscript{580} The participation of EU Member States military police units in a Eurogendfor mission is questionable, although the Austrian, Hungarian, Romanian and Slovenian military police took part in MSU operations, and could only be possibly allowed in the

\textsuperscript{576} Declaration of intent, command structure 4, See Annex A for the composition of this Committee
\textsuperscript{577} See Declaration of Intent, force structure, 5 for description of activities
\textsuperscript{578} Interview with the Eurogendfor Commander, Brigadier General Deanaz; see also Declaration of intent, training 6
\textsuperscript{579} Interview with a \textit{Carabinieri} Brigadier
\textsuperscript{580} Declaration of Intent, 1 scope
early stages under military command. The third states in relation to the EU having PFMS may participate in an operation led by or including the Eurogendfor.

The five participating states showed their common determination by supporting and establishing the force in a very quick process. The personnel selection was planned to start during the summer of 2004 and the Permanent HQ staff took service in March 2005, ahead of schedule. The basic concepts and doctrines have been drafted by the Permanent HQ throughout 2005. The Permanent HQ officially reached full operational readiness on 23 February 2006. To establish the force and to define its legal status, the participating states signed the Eurogendfor Treaty on 18 October 2008. The Treaty identifies Eurogendfor competences and structures and as announced by the Declaration of Intent, it defines the Permanent HQ status and SOFA, being modelled on the Eurofor Treaty.581

The Eurofor and FIEP legacy: The participating states agreed to take the Eurofor as a model for Eurogendfor structures and procedures, while the FIEP provided a very useful and valid ‘meeting point’ for testing and evaluating the early cooperation between PFMS, exchanging best practices and developing common doctrines, training and technical cooperation.582 There was a political will not to include Eurogendfor in the ESDP but to model it on Eurofor’s multinational military cooperation initiative, given that four out of the five Eurogendfor countries took part in it. The Eurogendfor structure is modelled even in their wording on the relevant Eurofor bodies. Furthermore, the FIEP facilitated the negotiation process for establishing the Eurogendfor, as the participating states were all part of the FIEP. The EAC also played a role in the thinking-process and promoting of the force by developing new ideas for the deployment of PFMS in ESDP missions since the Feira Council decisions, such as the IPU concept that led to establishment of the Eurogendfor. This also explains the quick agreement on the issue and of the establishment of

581 Declaration of intent, legal aspects 10
582 Interview with Carabinieri Brigadier
the force within about a year of the official initial proposal. Furthermore, the FIEP experience could be useful for drafting the Eurogendfor doctrines and concepts for training, logistics and new technologies relying in particular on the information and best practices. The FIEP also organise joint training courses for officers and the experience will strongly influence the Eurogendfor training standards. But on the other hand, it is important to remember that FIEP best practices are specifically conceived for domestic security. In any event, the PFMS have proved very efficient and flexible in their deployment in peacekeeping operations. Even if the conditions of deployment are more onerous in non-stabilised environments, the tasks they are performing are very similar to domestic security police tasks.583

6.3.3 The Franco-Italian debate

The Eurogendfor is primarily a Franco-Italian initiative, with the support of the FIEP states. From a political point of view, the concept was originated by the French MoD, while from a technical point of view it was developed by the Carabinieri. In any case disputes arose:

- on the very nature of Eurogendfor
- on the MSU as a basis for the Eurogendfor
- on the choice of HQ site and on the designation of the first commander of the force

The Eurogendfor nature: Italians stress the Eurogendfor role as Eupol force for ESDP missions, while the French prefer the original idea of a multinational force that can be made available to the EU and other organisations.

In the French view, the Eurogendfor cooperation was supposed to remain just an intergovernmental cooperation in its status and structure, and to remain subject to national authorisation for mission deployment and force disposal even upon request of the EU. The Eurogendfor was considered a useful tool for the ESDP. It was conceived to remain an intergovernmental cooperation, developing

583 Interview with Eurogendfor commander, Brigadier Deanaz
police capabilities modelled after Eurofor and Euromarfor, but not as an EU standing force. For this reason, the Permanent HQ is supposed to be the only standing structure.\textsuperscript{584}

The Carabinieri wanted to make the Eurogendfor available to the EU mainly in order to integrate it in the ESDP as an EU police force. The Permanent HQ staff had the task of preparing the force and developing doctrine, training, interoperability, and the command and control structures for police missions. For this reason, the Eurogendfor concepts and doctrines should be developed according to the relevant ESDP civilian crisis management concepts but also according to MSU experience, which was considered a successful example of PFMS intervention in peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{585} Moreover, the Battlegroup concept was very close to the intent and objectives of the Eurogendfor.\textsuperscript{586}
The two points of view agreed on many issues and in particular on contributing with the Eurogendfor to the development of the ESDP capabilities.

**The MSU dispute:** The dispute over the role of the MSUs divided the FIEP states into two opposing parties:

- Italy and Portugal (which took part in the MSU in Iraq) supporting the MSU model
- France, Spain and the Netherlands, asking for a totally new concept of operations.

The main question is the kind of tasks the Eurogendfor shall perform.

According to the Carabinieri, the Eurogendfor developed out of the MSU model. Starting from the MSU, the PFMS have developed a model concept for robust intervention using pre-constituted police units. The MSU model is perfect for specialised police intervention under military command in the initial stage of the crisis management operation which presumes a military environment. For this reason, the

\textsuperscript{584} Interview with a senior official, French ministry of defence
\textsuperscript{585} It is to remark that in the EU circles, the MSU experience, of which Italy have developed the original concept and has been leading nation, is regarded as a very successful precedent to be considered for the lessons learned, but that it is now to evolve to new concept and experiences. Coppola, \textit{op.cit.} p.2
\textsuperscript{586} See Chapter IV, para ‘the ongoing process: the Battlegrops’
Eurogendfor should be deployed during a military operation or in the transitional phase from a military to a civilian environment, in order to maintain public order when local police forces are not deployable. In this sense the Eurogendfor may take advantage of the MSU experience.  

However, the French-led group argues that the MSU is a different concept from the Eurogendfor. The MSU is a NATO concept for a regiment-sized unit that can operate only under military command and, at the request of the NATO mission commander, as a quick reaction force to enforce public order. In contrast, Eurogendfor may act in an autonomous operation under the authority of the Eurogendfor commander either under military or civilian command, such as a UN High Representative or EUSR, depending on the international mission environment. The Eurogendfor will perform all the executive police tasks, including public order tasks assumed by the MSUs plus judicial police. In the end, the French also agreed that it does not mean the Eurogendfor will not take into account the MSU ‘lessons learned’- in particular those for the interoperability solution, such as detaching participating State officers both in the logistical component and in the staff cells in order to ensure better co-ordination of the company-level national units. The French stress that Eurogendfor will be a broader concept, designed to be deployed for larger missions and more demanding tasks. 

Both parties agreed that the Eurogendfor operative deployment concept makes extensive reference to ESDP concepts. By means of the Eurogendfor and its Permanent HQ, the ESDP will have the capabilities to organise Eupol IPU operations for police substitution missions.

The rotations and the Permanent HQ choice: A final Franco-Italian dispute involved the conflicting administrative interests of the Gendarmerie and the Carabinieri on the site of the Permanent HQ and on the nationality of the first commander.

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587 Gen Gottardo, hearing of Senate Defense Commission cit.
588 Interview with Eurogendfor commander, Brigadier Deanaz
For the Permanent HQ, the *Carabinieri* proposed their “Chinotto” barracks in Vicenza that also hosted the COESPU.\(^{589}\) On the other side, the *Gendarmerie* supported its training centre in Saint Astier. Concluding its work, the technical table decided to set the Permanent HQ in Vicenza, the official reason being that the *Carabinieri* could establish an international centre there for the development of the PFMS in peacekeeping. On the other hand, the *Gendarmerie* got the first commander, who was also given the responsibility of leading the definition of the first doctrines. However, given the rotation of the post, the *Carabinieri* were assigned the next round. In conformity with multinational criteria, at the first meeting of CIMIN, on 21 January 2005, a *Gendarmerie* Brigadier was appointed Eurogendfor Commander, a *Maurechausée* Colonel was appointed deputy commander and an *Carabinieri* Colonel was appointed Chief of Staff.\(^{590}\) At the same time, the CIMIN formally decided to establish the Permanent HQ in Vicenza. As planned, on 26 June 2007, a *Carabinieri* Colonel was appointed commander until 2009. In 2007-2009, the *Carabinieri* had in their hands both key Eurogendfor benefits: the Permanent HQ premises and the Commander position. Moreover, the *Carabinieri* Colonel had the opportunity to command the first operational deployment, when Eurogendfor took responsibility of the IPU-style.

To meet the administrative interests of all participating countries an official schedule of rotation in the key position was agreed on. (see Table 9)

The rotational basis is quite balanced between the two opposing groups (Italy and Portugal, and France, the Netherlands and Spain). The key positions were balanced in the first slot of the schedule with a French commander and an Italian Chief of Staff. In 2007-2011, Italy and Portugal reach their peak of influence: the Commander position pass from Italy to Portugal. However they reach the bottom in 2011-2015 when they rely only on the Deputy Commander and Head of

\(^{589}\) see ‘G-8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capability For Peace Support Operations’ *cit.*

\(^{590}\) Brigadier Deanaz was designated according to French law by the Council of ministries on 1 December 2004, see press release of the French MoD ‘Un général français, chef de la gendarmerie européenne’
a sector. The first four years are crucial to shape the participating institution own the establishment of the force, the development of the doctrines, and the first deployment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>FRANCE</th>
<th>ITALY</th>
<th>PORTUGAL</th>
<th>The NETHERLANDS</th>
<th>SPAIN</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td>CDR/ACOS LOG</td>
<td>COS</td>
<td>ACOS PL&amp;POL</td>
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<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>ACOS OPS</td>
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<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>D-CDR</td>
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<td>2011-2013</td>
<td>ACOS PL&amp;POL</td>
<td>D-CDR</td>
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<td>CDR/ACOS LOG</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013-2015</td>
<td>COS</td>
<td>ACOS PL&amp;POL</td>
<td>D-CDR</td>
<td>ACOS OPS</td>
<td>CDR/ACOS LOG</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Eurogendfor)

The first deployment gave Italy and Portugal an opportunity to maximize their results. A UN-mandated Eurogendfor intervention in the DRC, planned under the French commander, never happened. Under the Italian Commander, Eurogendfor assumed command of the IPU-style and as a consequence the concepts and scenarios of Eurogendfor employment were shaped on the MSU/IPU-style operational experience. In this way, the Carabinieri also won their dispute with the Gendarmerie on the MSU model.

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Acronyms: CDR (Commander); COS (Chief of Staff); D-CDR (Deputy Commander) ACOS LOG (head of Logistics); ACOS PL&POL (head of Political and Legal affairs); ACOS OPS (head of operations)
6.4 The other components: Rule of Law and Civil Protection

6.4.1 Judicial cooperation in rule of law

The rule of law missions are a recent evolution of the EU civilian crisis management missions. The rule of law’s main issue is the reconstruction of public security institutions (including local police, judges, and the jail system) also including the drafting of legal codes. The reconstruction of local tribunals and jail systems is essential also for a police mission with an executive mandate that should be able to legally enforce the applicable law in the territory, to have warrant for arrests by a legal entity and to assure that indicted criminals are prosecuted by tribunals. Failing to do so, the executive mandate is seriously endangered if the local public security apparatus is non-existent. The deficiency of judicial and penal systems may in some crises have a significant impact on the credibility and effectiveness of an international police presence.\footnote{Concrete Targets for Police, annexe I appendix 4, point A.1 Overall EU capabilities} The Brahimi Report encouraged the creation of a common UN justice package to fill the rule of law gap. The Feira Council in June 2000 identified the strengthening of the rule of law as one of the four priority areas.\footnote{Presidency conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, annexe I, Appendix 3 ‘Study On Concrete Targets On Civilian Aspects Of Crisis Management’} The Civilian Headline Goal 2008, included magistrates in CRT integrated packages, and identified potential shortfalls in judges, prosecutors and also prison personnel.\footnote{‘Civilian Headline Goal 2008’ Doc. 15863/04 cit.} About 400 personnel were needed for the ambitious substitution missions, such as the EU mission in Kosovo.

Italian magistrates started just recently to take part in the assistance and training of local judges. Traditionally, the magistrates enjoy a very influential role in Italian administration, but on the other hand their international standing has been poor. Until recently, international law professors were chosen for positions in international
courts. This occurred because national magistrates are experts in the domestic law and have a poor knowledge of International law. For instance, the training of Afghan magistrates was carried on by the International Development Law Organisation in Rome.\textsuperscript{595} Italian magistrates are nowadays seconded to EU institutions and rule of law missions abroad and they took part in the training of Iraqi judges, in the EUJUST mission for Iraq, and a breakthrough in magistrate participation is expected for the EU mission in Kosovo. Their influence in the development of ESDP cannot be assessed, because no documents are available at present for consultation. On the other hand, their main attention has been diverted to the JHA institutions and in particular judicial cooperation such as the framework for the exchange of liaison magistrates especially with France and the UK, in the European Judicial Network.\textsuperscript{596} The magistrates are also well represented in Europol, OLAF, and since 2002 in Eurojust, by seconding a national member, who is assisted by up to three other magistrates.\textsuperscript{597}


The real breakthrough in Italian magistrates participation in international missions started with the EULEX Kosovo. The mission was launched in February 2008, but it reached the full operational capability only in April 2009. Italian magistrates are represented at any Court and Prosecutor office with executive powers and to perform MMA for local magistrates. Italian magistrate Alberto Perduca has been appointed Head of Judicial Component of EULEX Kosovo, while a National Police Deputy Chief of Police (Vice Questore) is Head of International Police Cooperation.598

6.4.2 The Civil Protection cooperation

The Feira Council identified civil protection, including search and rescue in disaster relief operations, as a priority of civilian crisis management. However, there is a distinction between civil protection operations within the framework of crisis management and other types of disaster relief operations that may have specific characteristics. The ESDP civil protection operations should resort to Member States’ tools and capabilities, and may be based on the lead-nation concept, while the national civil protection should undertake an effort in the compatibility of equipment.599

The period between December 2004 and October 2005 witnessed a series of major natural disasters that have boosted the European cooperation in civil protection.600 After the Tsunami on 26 December 2004, the External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, proposed a 5,000-strength crisis management corps – a civilian version of the Battlegroups – drawn from experts trained and identified by Member States, and placed under a central co-ordination, to set up teams of EU experts for disaster relief and emergency reconstruction. The earlier proposals did not encounter enthusiasm

598 Workshop Italia nelle missioni civili dell’UE cit.
599 Study On Concrete Targets On Civilian Aspects Of Crisis Management, point 4
600 See Annex of Civil protection: EU Commission proposes strengthening EU Civil Protection Mechanism (27 January 2006: Brussels)
within Member States. An Instrument for Stability was established in DG RELEX with an annual budget of € 200 M for the period 2007 – 2013.

Nonetheless, a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) under the responsibility of Environment Commissioner, Stavros Dimaras, had already been established in 2001 by the EU Council. It coordinates 30 countries’ specialised services assistance to disaster-stricken countries (the 27 EU Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) to support civil protection assistance in the initial phase of major disaster crisis (search and rescue equipment, medical services, temporary shelter, sanitation equipment, etc). The CCPM was quickly activated in the aftermath of the Tsunami in December 2004. Immediately following the earthquake in Indonesia, the CCPM was activated on 26 December, and a few hours later, the first European expert left for Thailand. In the initial phase of intervention the CCPM considerably facilitated the coordination of the Member States. Medical teams, medicine, temporary shelters and water supply equipment were provided by the Member States’ civil protection, and the Commission’s evaluation teams worked closely

601 Daniel Dombey ‘Tsunamis prompt EU review of crisis management’ in the Financial Times, 3 January 2005
602 Council Decision of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions (2001/792/EC, Euratom) in Official Journal of the European Communities L 297/7, 15 November 2001; For further see: Questions and Answers on the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism, MEMO/06/50, Brussels, 27 January 2006,
604 Commission Press release ‘Commission's Civil Protection Mechanism takes effective measures to co-ordinate technical assistance in South Asia’, 5 January 2005,
with the UN. About 12 European civil protections were coordinated by the Commission, and this cooperation proved itself quite successful. The Monitoring and Information Centre was made available for the European consular cooperation in order to support EU citizen victims of disasters in third countries.

In September 2005, during the Hurricane Katrina crisis, all Member States offered assistance for civil protection coordination under the Commission's supervision. Furthermore, the Kashmir earthquake, in October 2005, showed the need for an appropriate use of military assets in humanitarian response for rapid assistance in distressed areas, while reconciling military intervention with the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence.

In January 2006, the Commission adopted proposals aimed at strengthening the existing legislative framework governing civil protection cooperation at the EU level and contributing to a more effective and well-coordinated response to major disasters occurring inside or outside the EU. The measures will allow the Commission to better address any shortage of transport and equipment needed at the site of a disaster. Moreover, additional measures will contribute to the development of early warning systems, improve coordination and provide logistical support.

In July 2006, upon request of the Lebanese and Cyprus authorities, the CCPM was activated together with ECHO, for the support and assistance in Lebanese relief and evacuation efforts. Italy has provided 420,900 tons of humanitarian supplies, mainly medicine.

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605 Speech by Stavros Dimas, European Commissioner in charge of Environment, on 'The Civil Protection Intervention in South Asia', at the GAERC, 7 January 2005,
606 interview with a DGE official, EU Council secretariat.
607 Council of the European Union, GAERC, July 18, 2005,
608 Speech by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood policy ‘Building a Transatlantic Alliance for the 21st Century’ Institute for Human Sciences, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, 12 September 2005
610 EU response to the conflict in Lebanon , Brussels, 8 August 2006.
In March 2007, the legal basis of the European civil protection response was upgraded with the adoption of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument by the Council, and a recast of the legislation establishing a CCPM adopted at the EU Council on 8 November 2007. The new legislative framework significantly strengthens European civil protection cooperation by financing transport for the provision of assistance, setting up specialised units known as "modules", and developing early warning systems and cooperation with third countries. In 2008, self-sufficient and interoperable civil protection modules in 13 areas shall be established in areas such as fire fighting, CBRN detection and sampling, search and rescue. Furthermore, a stronger cooperation with EU military capabilities and NATO will be worked out.

6.4.3 Italian civil protection and the internal disputes

The Protezione Civile is organised on a regional basis and tasked with intervention in natural and man-made disasters. It gained experience in the relief of earthquakes or extensive fires. The Protezione Civile is made up of a part-time volunteer force, mainly drawn from military officers and conscripts in discharge to the reserve, and headed by a Commissioner. During the second Berlusconi government the Protezione Civile enjoyed a significant growth of competencies. Under Commissioner Guido Bertolaso, it assumed the management of international disaster relief and international events, such as the G8, the European Constitution summits, and the funeral of John Paul II.

The growing international role of the Protezione Civile tends to erode the influence of the Farnesina Directorate General for Cooperation

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612 SDA Roundtable Report “What Future For A European Disaster Relief Force?”
613 Interview with a Diplomat, office of International protocol, Ministry of foreign affairs, 2005
in this domain was causing some friction between the civil protection and the diplomats.

The Protezione Civile volunteers were the “first in” during the Tsunami crisis of December 2004. An EU assessment expert from Italy was contracted by the Commission for Thailand, where Italy also sent medical equipment and supplies, while Italian evaluation teams, medical teams and supplies were also deployed in Sri Lanka. However the Italian Ambassador in Sri Lanka accused the Protezione Civile of ‘improvising’ a role in foreign policy, a domain that should be dealt with by professional diplomats. The Farnesina, however, disavowed its Ambassador, and proclaimed a total synergy between it and the Protezione Civile according to governmental instructions.

Speaking in Sri Lanka at the 1 anniversary of the Tsunami, in his capacity as the chairman of the Comitato dei garanti of the Protezione Civile, Professor Giuliano Amato, lauded it as “il migliore ramo della pubblica amministrazione italiana, i risultati sono sotto gli occhi di tutti” He stated that the Protezione Civile is far better than the Cooperazione italiana of the Farnesina in fund-raising. This caused an immediate reaction by the new Italian ambassador to Sri Lanka, who lamented the lack of personnel and funding, accusing the Farnesina top brass; also issuing a tactless statement on the Protezione Civile propaganda and paramilitary nature. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ union even sent a letter of complaint to Amato, saying that his statement had been misinterpreted by journalists, and that the Ambassador had fallen into a “political trap”.

This is just an example of the frustration of the Farnesina towards the growing international role of the Protezione Civile. However, the real issue at stake was the reform of the law on international cooperation,

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614 Commission's Civil Protection Mechanism takes effective measures to co-ordinate technical assistance in South Asia (Brussels), 5 January 2005,
616 Gerardo Pelosi ‘La Protezione Civile batte la Farnesina’ in Il Sole 24 Ore, 29 December 2005
617 ‘Tsunami, scontro tra Amato e L'ambasciatore in Sri Lanka’ cit.
618 Letter by Mr Granara to Prof. Amato, protocol 05/253, Rome, 30 December 2005; Reply of Prof. Amato to Mr. Granara, Rome, 3 January 2006.
and the management of private and public funds, that the Protezione Civile fairly administrated during the Tsunami Crisis.\textsuperscript{619} Italy is willing to spend more for the role of the Protezione Civile in EDSP civilian crisis management.\textsuperscript{620} The fact that Italy has reached excellence in this field, would mean that if the Protezione Civile do not receive full backing, the government would at least try to downgrade the internal disputes, and give the Protezione Civile a free hand in promoting their role in the ESDP.

6.4.4 Italian civil protection and the Euro-Med

The main contribution of the Protezione Civile is to be found in the Euro-Med framework, according to the Barcellona declaration. Italy, together with Egypt, established, in 1996, the Partnership Building Measures of the cooperation in Civil Protection and Disaster Management. Italy and Jordan coordinated the civil protection pilot project that started in 1998 and terminated in 2003.\textsuperscript{621} At the steering committee in Rome, in January 2004, a decision was made to start a bridge programme to be implemented in the framework of a long term project. The bridge programme of civil protection “Disaster Management - Development of a Euro-Mediterranean reduction, prevention and management of natural disasters system” which started in December 2004 and extended until March 2008, is led by France, Italy, Algeria and Egypt. The programme is financed by the Commission and includes the 25 civil protection services of the EU Member States, the 10 Mediterranean participating States (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco,

\textsuperscript{619}Legge 26 febbraio 1987. N. 49 “Nuova Disciplina della Cooperazione dell'Italia con i Paesi in via di Sviluppo”; A Draft reform was presented by the Ministry of Foreign affairs to the Cabinet meeting on 5 April 2007 ‘Disegno Di Legge: Delega al Governo per la riforma della disciplina della cooperazione dell'Italia con i Paesi in via di sviluppo’. La Protezione Civile batte la Farnesina cit.

\textsuperscript{620}Ministry of Foreign Affairs Rapporto 2020 Le scelte di politica estera, Chapt.1, Allegato n. 2, L’Italia e la Difesa europea.

\textsuperscript{621} Presidency Conclusions For The Euro-Mediterranean Meeting Of Ministers Of Foreign Affairs, Doc.14869/04, Brussels, 30 November 2004.
Palestinian authorities, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey), the European Commission, and the Council secretariat.

The main objective of the programme is to improve the close cooperation between the participating civil protection authorities in consolidating the Euro-Mediterranean Network of civil protection services and experts created in the pilot project. The main fields of the project are: training and information, exchange of experts, reinforcement of regional cooperation, networking of civil protection schools, and technical and operational assistance in cases of necessity.

The main fields of the project are: training and information, exchange of experts, reinforcement of regional cooperation, networking of civil protection schools, and technical and operational assistance in cases of necessity.

The French Ministry of the Interior has the responsibility of executive management of the programme.

The Commissioner, Guido Bertolaso, takes part in the operational committee composed respectively of the Directors of Civil Protection of the four leader countries and the participating countries and the commission. He co-chairs the Steering Committee with an Egyptian general (composed of national delegates and representatives from the Commission and the Council) that validates and/or modifies the Steering Committee’s proposals for actions.

In the first Steering Committee in Rome, on 5 and 6 July 2005, an Action Plan was approved by identifying the main project activities, and starting the preparations of a long-term plan.622

In the second Steering Committee in Rome, on 7 and 8 February 2006, a progress report was presented together with alternatives to develop a permanent Euro-Mediterranean civil protection system. These meetings are intended to share strategies in disaster relief, by sharing knowledge, drafting common contingency plans, and creating a permanent Euro-Mediterranean civil protection cooperation network.623

Eventually the Protezione civile, due to its integrated structure, is expected to give a significant contribution to the creation of the CRT integrated packages for crisis intervention scenarios.624

624 See Civilian Headline Goal 2008 cit, Civilian Response Teams cit.
Conclusion

In the civilian crisis management Italy has played a leading role thanks to the influence of its national institutions. The development of police missions and their capabilities are becoming more and more an exclusive competence of the *Arma dei Carabinieri*, who are promoting their role for external action in the EU institutions. The *Carabinieri* acted as a catalyst for police missions and utilised their connections with other European police forces to promote the PFMS and their role in EU police missions. Italy allied with other Member States having PFMS, such as France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain within FIEP framework. The ties between the PFMS were even stronger than the cooperation between the other institutions of these member states. The FIEP, through EAC, had its main objective in lobbying the EU institutions to promote PFMS’ role in police missions. Therefore, the EU police substitution mission concepts for executive policing have been based on the MSU experience in the Western Balkans that gave birth to the IPU. A dispute arose, however, for the civilian-military coordination and chain of command of the IPU: the *Carabinieri*, being a full military corps with police tasks, admit the military command for the police component in the first phase of intervention of police missions; France and other Member States, including Germany, insist on the necessity of a civilian chain of command for the police component.

The FIEP cooperation also gave birth to Eurogendfor as a multinational force at the disposal of the ESDP and other organisations. Again, the *Gendarmes* and the *Carabinieri* quarrelled in Eurogendfor over the MSU legacy, over the need to operate under military command, and in particular over administrative interests of establishing the location and appointing the commander of Eurogendfor. In the end, police capabilities are an added value to ESDP missions, and notwithstanding the unresolved issues of cooperation between the FIEP countries, proved it to be quite successful.

Notwithstanding their status in Italy, Magistrates are just starting to show themselves in rule of law missions and in EU
institutions. The civil protection and disaster relief is another field where Italian institutions have helped in developing capabilities. Again, the Italian Protezione Civile is very keen on civilian-military cooperation. The influence of the Protezione Civile in the ESDP has been, until now, limited because the development of an EU civil protection is still in its early stages. In any case, the Protezione Civile has found international standing by participating in Tsunami disaster relief in 2004, and by assuming a leading role in boosting civil protection within Euro-Med. Unfortunately, the Protezione Civile still needs to win its final battle with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the sole protagonist for this kind of intervention abroad.

In conclusion, the civilian crisis management is maybe the ESDP domain in which Italy is the most influential. This is thanks to the initiatives of two of the most efficient Italian institutions: the Carabinieri and the Protezione Civile, which are assuming a leading role in exclusive clubs (such as the FIEP, Eurogendfor, and Euro-Med) to boost cooperation in their relevant fields.
CHAPTER VII
TRANSNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

This chapter investigates the Italian defence industry’s contribution to building the necessary capabilities for the ESDP, while the next chapter will deal with Italy’s participation in European Institutional cooperation on military capabilities. Therefore, the main actor is industry, although military bodies and political parties could play a role in deciding the participation in multilateral collaborative industrial programmes.

First, we will define the true nature of European defence companies, bearing in mind their shareholding structure. Defence companies may be private companies or state-owned or state-controlled, and they may be classified according to their ownership. In any case, given the national security implications it is assumed that the state could play a role in private companies too. Defence companies try to react to the globalization process by means of new strategies; in particular we will describe the multi-domestic market strategy adopted by some companies in their pursuit of transnational consolidation.

Secondly, the European consolidation process will be described, including the emerging of national champions.

Third, we will introduce the Italian defence industry market and its main actor: the Finmeccanica A&D group. Finmeccanica’s initiatives in the consolidation scenario and its participation in multilateral programmes will then be explored.

Fourthly, we will deal with the A400M programme, which is the most ambitious, complex and ‘unfortunate’ European armament programme. We will see in particular the reasons that led to the Italian decision not to take part in the programme, and the consequences for Italy of the A400M decision.

In conclusion, we will examine the Finmeccanica’s new multi-domestic strategy for US and the UK, as a new way to react to the globalization of markets and the inefficiency of single European programmes.
7.1 The demand side (state) and the supply side (industry): who does what

7.1.1 Shareholding structures of European defence companies

The relation between the demand (Government and MoD) and the supply side (industry) in defence Policy decision-making is a crucial issue for the scope of this research. Is it the Government, or better the military, who decide, or do they may be influenced by companies? To answer this question it is necessary to define the shareholding structure of defence companies, and the relationship between government and defence industry.

Defence companies’ ownership is an added complexity. Given their particular nature defence companies could be state-owned or state-controlled; they could also be private companies with a “golden share”, or sometimes family-owned. Unlike other industrial sectors, defence companies are closely interconnected to their governments. The political influence is determined by the government shareholding. This may help also to reduce the risk of commercial insolvency, if the customer is not able or willing to respect contracts.

In Europe there are two fairly typical models of shareholding structures: the ‘Anglo-Saxon’, or British corporate model, and the French model. The British model involves the participation of private investors in the groups’ capital and corporate governance aiming at profits and return on shareholders’ investment. It is based on three principles: firstly, according to Free market principles, the state has no ownership in the company except for its “golden share”; secondly, the collaboration between companies is based on common objectives – rather than political assumptions - such as developing and manufacturing competitive defence systems; and thirdly, foreign ownership of UK-based defence companies is relatively unimportant.

provided that strategic capabilities are retained onshore and the security, jobs and R&D requirements are respected.\textsuperscript{626}

The French model is based on a network of defence company shareholder structures to ensure strong state shareholding and control of the companies and at the same time to prevent them being taken over. Mergers are conceived as a chance to gain control of foreign assets, while exclusive sovereignty is granted by state shareholding, and the shareholder structure prevents foreign investors from holding a significant stake in these companies. This model is dominant in continental Europe, and it is the main obstacle to any restructuring or consolidation of European industry.\textsuperscript{627}

The consolidation might trigger a process of closer integration of national procurement procedures that would require considerable political will. The consolidation of the A&D sector is a common goal of both national governments and defence industries. This consensus is essential to achieve the internationalisation of industry: governments, because of their role of customer, sponsor and regulator, have considerable influence over the alliance policy of national industry, but their influence varies considerably from one country to another.\textsuperscript{628} This influence is stronger in the French model rather than in the British model.

7.1.2 The MoD-industry relationship

The defence market is monopsonist, because MoDs are the major component of demand side in the market.\textsuperscript{629} Competition and transparency are usually the main principle of any market; the fact that

\textsuperscript{626} MoD Defence Industrial Policy, Policy Paper no.5, October 2002, para 11, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{627} Alessandro Pansa ‘La difesa europea: l’industria delle armi. Tecnologia, concorrenza e cooperazione’ in Antonio Missiroli, Alessandro Pansa La Difesa Europea (Genova : il Melangolo, 2007) p. 148-150

\textsuperscript{628} Schmidt op.cit, p. 28

\textsuperscript{629} A monopsonist is a firm, institution or government department that is the only source of demand in a given market. It is the demand-side equivalent of a monopolist (the unique supplier).
the MoD is the only customer implies that it would be able to wield substantial power on the demand side of the market: defence equipment has to comply with the requirements set by it, and based on the assessment of future threats and operational needs.

In a sense defence firms products are custom-oriented. By contrast the assumption that the governments are key in determining the shape of national defence industry is questionable if only based on the ground that they are the main customers. In fact defence companies may export equipment in foreign markets, so they may adapt to various MoD’s requirements. On the other hand, only a few national MoDs have the theoretical resources to devise grand strategies, and invest its resources in this direction, such as the UK or the US, while a middle power, such as Italy, just imitates US or NATO-related doctrines.

It is more effective for MoDs to pay for the major investment in R&D directly and at the start of the prime defence contracts, to dictate in considerable detail its specific programme requirements: upfront payment allows the research to be directed into the most appropriate areas, so that the most appropriate technology is developed in the medium term to meet the longer-term requirements of MoD. There is an increasing partnership between MoDs and industry that we will discuss in the following paragraph, and there is a process of globalization of defence industries, looking for markets abroad, a topic to be discussed next.

The shrinking trend for European defence budgets and the spiralling costs of advanced technology equipment forces MoDs to reform procurement policies with an extensive use of commercial components in weapons systems to reduce the costs of military programs. The new role of the state was reflected in the British ‘smart

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procurement’ and the reorganisation in France NAD (DGA), which shifted MoD approach from a ‘regulatory’ one to a more ‘industry-oriented’.632 The British MoD decided to go further into the procurement reform process by sharing costs with the industry, thus enhancing ‘better value for money’ for the taxpayers. These assumptions led to the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) published in December 2005 under the auspices of the Minister of defence procurement, Lord Drayson.633 The principles established by the DIS led to a revolution in the MoD-industry relationship such as the through-life capability management concept (TLCM) that redefines the concept of procurement and maintenance of in-service platforms and the appropriate sovereignty and operational sovereignty, that redefine sovereignty of the national defence industry on the basis of the place where the technology is developed, the site of the intellectual property, the location of new jobs and the destination of investment.634 The latter has showed that it is possible to reshape companies’ ownership structure to reduce the government’s share, or being dependent on foreign-owned companies based on the national territory without any consequence for national security and security of supply. The structure of the industry does not require a government’s shareholding to control national security. The methods of assigning contracts (favouring companies that maintain or plough investment into the country), their financial structure, the availability of public funds for the development of technology are also incentives to maintain and expand the DTIB.

633 MoD Defence Industrial Strategy, Defence White paper CM 6697 December 2005
So, in the ongoing process of consolidation in the European defence industry, defence companies seem to have a more relevant role than national governments. This is due to the structural developments that are rapidly changing the role of the government and industry in Europe. The governments are consensually reducing their control on national defence industries. The main reasons for this are fourfold: the informational asymmetry stemming from increasingly complex technology and the risk of making decisions on the basis of an inadequate information set; the cost of advanced technology and the budgetary difficulties in European countries; the internationalisation and the increasing influence of foreign markets on companies’ decision-making as a result; and the trend towards consolidation.  
Furthermore, governments are delegating for strategic and economic responsibility defence industry to the companies themselves, and companies give absolute priority to economic and financial criteria, and increasingly consider the domestic market as just one among others. The consolidation of a European defence industry is only an event in the globalization of the defence industry.

7.1.3 The globalization of the defence industry and “multi-domestic market” strategies

The end of the Cold War caused a transformation in the DTIB. In the US and in Europe, defence budgets were drastically reduced and major armaments programmes were slowed down or cancelled. NATO was no longer confronted with a presumably advanced technological power, and NATO countries no longer needed state-of-the-art aircraft, missiles or nuclear ballistic submarines.

Looking for new markets, the defence industry started a process of globalization, with the emergence of transnational companies (TNCs), with an extensive use of subcontractors in Europe.

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635 Pansa *op.cit*, p. 149, 161, 171
636 Schmidt *op.cit*, p.10
and in the US.\textsuperscript{637} TNCs need to attract and retain investors in international markets, by promoting efficiency, restructuring and rationalisation.

From the point of view of sovereignty, the defence industry – and the armed forces – is traditionally an exclusive domain of nation states, and the shift to TNCs, challenged the very nature of national sovereignty in defence, in particular because the defence industry of one country is expected to ensure the security of supply to the national armed forces. It is also true, that smaller countries have limited sovereignty because of their small armaments production, producing their own foreign licensed armaments or importing equipment from abroad, and thus being dependent upon foreign sources.\textsuperscript{638} But major European countries tried to maintain national sovereignty where the defence industry is concerned, although the British started the DIS revolution.

If armaments production becomes globalized, by means of TNCs and the extensive use of subcontractors, US and European companies will perhaps try to expand their defence market, by selling defence goods worldwide. On the other hand, given the sensitiveness of its products and technology, the defence industry would never be global in terms of product standardisation or the structure. But US and European companies has evolved towards a “multi-domestic” market strategy, in which although there are still significant restrictions on the circulation of technology and other limits on production standardisation, companies derive an increasingly large share of orders from foreign customers and as a result tend to localise some operations in commercially attractive economies.\textsuperscript{639}

According to the “multi-domestic” market strategy, considering shrinking domestic demand and budgets, these companies would maintain a monopoly in their domestic market and set a stable

\textsuperscript{638} On State options in arms production such as: “autarky”, “collaboration” and “Foreign Dependence” see Jones \textit{op.cit}, p.140-148
\textsuperscript{639} Pansa \textit{op.cit},

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foothold, by means of foreign direct investments, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, in huge and high-growth foreign markets, with no strong obstacles to foreign investors such as in the US or UK defence markets, trying to win a second domestic market.

In the near future, European defence industries may consider their MoD to be a less important customer than foreign markets, because their exports are higher than domestic sales, and the military complain that the requirements of foreign customers are driving the national production.640

In Italy, an ever shrinking Defence Budget (average percentage of the real Defence Budget is 1,3% of national GDP) and above all, a very poor spending in military procurement and R&T (see Table 10) if compared to major European countries, forced Finmeccanica to create a second domestic market for its advanced Defence equipments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Procurement and R&amp;T spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>10.353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data 2005 in € millions, source EDA

640 Neuman, *op.cit*, p.5
7.2 The consolidation of the European Defence Industry

7.2.1 The US and European consolidation scenario

As a result of post-Cold War conditions, the US undertook in 1993-1997 a process of mergers and acquisitions in order to consolidate and rationalise its defence industry. In 1993, Secretary of Defence Les Aspen and Deputy Secretary, William Perry, invited all the CEOs of US companies to a “last supper” at the Pentagon, announcing that US Budget was due to decrease significantly in the following five years, so half of the companies sitting at the table would not be needed by the Pentagon.641 This consolidation process led the number of independent prime contractors in the US defence sector to fall from 20 to four.642 US defence contractors emerged as the dominant players in the world of A&D industry. Lockheed Martin - the world's largest defence contractor by revenue – was created in 1995 upon the merger of Lockheed Corporation with Martin Marietta; Boeing in 1997 merged with McDonnell Douglas; and Northrop Grumman resulted from the 1994 purchase of Grumman by Northrop; General Dynamics, ranked as the fourth biggest Defence firm, since it sold its Forth Worth Division to Lockheed Martin in 1993.643 In Europe, national defence companies inevitably followed US consolidation.

1970s European consolidation: The first restructuring of the European A&D industry took place between 1970-1975. European Member States promoted joint R&D between national companies, and encouraged

mergers and restructuring, in particular in the high-tech sector, under the control of national holdings – such as the IRI of Italy - to create companies heavily dependent on state assistance, termed ‘national champions’.

After the oil crisis, national champions allowed the Europeans to maintain a firm grip on the allocation of resources better than international cooperation. State aid was given directly to national industry to finance a special projects or upgrades of existing products. This system was defined as “primary aid” as “secondary aid” was offered by the US system, where by the defence industry could enjoy R&D development funds and spin-offs for the civilian market indirectly from the Pentagon.

There are a few examples of European consortia heavily subsidized by state aid, to create some sort of European aircraft industry able to compete with the US.

The Airbus Consortium was established in 1974, by coordinating the resources and marketing abilities in airline manufacturing of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK; it emerged as a global competitor to US companies only in the 1980s, when at the Tokyo Round, the EC succeeded in limiting US restrictions with respect to sales of civilian aircraft products.

In military aircraft, the joint Anglo-German-Italian Panavia Tornado consortium was created in March 1969, by BAe of UK, MBB of Germany (42.5% each) and Aeritalia of Italy (15%). Aeritalia was established in 1969 as an equal partnership between FIAT and Finmeccanica. It was the first Italian military aircraft company since Second World War, which built US-licensed aircraft such as the Lockheed F-104S, and autonomously developed aircraft such as G-91 R/Y. The Tornado project was created to the replace Lockheed F-104S in NATO European air forces for multi-role combat tasks, and it was a

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644 Joseph C. Rallo *Defending Europe in the 1990s, the new divide of High technology* (London : Frances Pinter) p.48
645 In 1960s the G-91 R “Gina” was the first military aircraft to be autonomously designed, developed and manufactured in Italy, in origin by the FIAT aircraft division. It was also exported to Germany, Portugal, and other countries.
success although its defence orientation prevented spin-offs, and sales were limited to consortium members with the exception of a later and highly disputed sale to Saudi Arabia in 1985. The Panavia Tornado together with the French Mirage was an exception and no other national or European collaborative venture was able to compete with US products, prior to the 1980s.

In the consortium national control over production, R&T and sales remained strict – in the military consortium control was exercised by MoDs - and primary aid was secured by the principle of *juste retour* ensuring that product innovation remained property of the national team responsible for developing the specific project share. Even the profits were distributed to consortium members on a pro rata basis. These factors limited the success of consortia.

In 1975 Commissioner Altiero Spinelli, already the author of the 1970 industry policy, presented a proposal for an Aerospace programme.646 The programme aimed to consolidate civil programmes by including all national industries in a single Community system capable of maintaining an independent global commercial capability, and of shifting from primary to a secondary aid, by taking assistance from national control to the Community. This should have channelled joint R&D programmes and created a common financing system, in order to overcome the practice of intergovernmental cooperation between national firms, as practiced in the Airbus consortia. A joint procurement agency was to be established in military aircraft to consolidate projects and purchases. The 1975 aerospace programme was never implemented.

The economic efficiencies attainable through pooling the aerospace industry are not sufficient to overcome the need of national sovereignty over industrial assets, because occupation and foreign policy leverage are at stake; in particular in the defence industry, military and security implications add to the risk. As a result wastage of resources and programme duplications are quite common.

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In 1984, the ambitious European military programme was halted when the original EFA consortium of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK was disbanded because of inability to agree on the purpose, design and the division of labour involved, also because France demanded a leading role. Therefore, France embarked on the Dassault Rafale autonomous project, and Spain procured 72 Northrop F-18s in November 1985. In Turin meeting on 2 August 1985, Germany, Italy and UK decided to continue with the consortium, and they were soon rejoined by Spain. The EFA consortium was renamed in 1986 as holding company Eurofighter GmbH with spiralling development costs and huge delays. The workshare was divided in proportion to national procurement: BAe (33%), DASA (33%), Aeritalia (21%), and CASA (13%), and later re-allotted after the signature of production contract on 30 January 1998: BAe (37%), DASA (29%), Aeritalia (19.5%), and CASA (14%).

National approaches to aerospace manufacturing differed and France tried to maintain national her sovereignty with the Mirage project, and later Rafale; Germany, Italy and the UK made a shared effort with the Tornado, and later the EFA, while smaller countries like Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands had a total dependence on US military aircraft. For instance a 1975 agreement made a trade-off with the US buying Belgian machine guns, if Belgium would join Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway in choosing General Dynamics F-16 over the French Mirage. In the mid-1970s several European NATO states assumed a subcontractor role on F-16 project.

In European aerospace productivity stood at about one-third to two thirds that of US companies, and in 1974 in Western Europe 99% of planes were US built, with European manufacturers supplying 1% of the European market. Furthermore, the stress on aerospace national sovereignty as in France, did not help operational efficiency as the national prestige often force to maintain an independent capability in producing outdated equipment.647

In 1985, French President Mitterand proposed the “Eureka” plan for industrial and R&D cooperation in the high-technology sector in

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647 Rallo *op.cit*, p.57-58, 62, 66, 89-90.
response to the US President Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The Milan Council in June 1985 endorsed the “Eureka” project and the Commission Report on the strengthening of technological cooperation in Europe to give the EC a new technological dimension. Italy accepted the pro-active ‘spirit’ of Mitterand’s proposal without questioning the US-European technology gap. Eventually, in July 1985, Mitterand had to establish “Eureka” outside the EC framework and limit it to civilian applications. UK and Germany voiced fears that France was trying to drag them into another expensive, bureaucratic programme for subsidizing private industrial research. France promised $ 130 M to finance “Eureka”. European companies were looking at shares of the SDI project worth $ 26 Bn. Therefore, Europeans were trying not to give the US the impression they were decoupling or trying to loosen the Atlantic Alliance.

1990s consolidation: The European consolidation in the late 1990s closely followed on the US process of consolidation, stemming from both high-level policy-making and industrial bottom-up integration. These two trends have been pursued independently by governments and industry, respectively by intergovernmental approach and transnational integration. Up until 1997, major defence programmes have been performed by ‘national champions’. The principle of juste retour, however, strongly limited the work share in collaborative programmes. From 1997, joint ventures between partner companies and the creation of TNC by means of mergers of national champions and acquisitions of smaller foreign companies was retained as the best solution to fight US competition.

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649 Cfr. ‘A battesimo da Mitterrand l' Europa della Tecnologia’ in Repubblica, 18 July 1985
650 Paul Lewis ‘High Technology; Europe's Eureka Project aims to narrow U.S. Lead’ in New York Times, 23 March 1986
651 Schmitt op.cit, p.V
BAe of the UK and DASA of Germany started in 1995 to speculate on the creation of a TNC. After its privatisation the French company Aérospatiale was supposed to take part in it.\textsuperscript{652} Airbus Industrie – by then a consortium of BAe, DASA, and CASA - was supposed to change its nature from consortium to an integrated company. In January 1997 BAe and DASA signed a MoU for the general restructuring and rationalisation of their civil and military aerospace divisions. The announcement of the merger between Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas had convinced the European partners to consider the establishment of a military division.

The separation of Aérospatiale and DASA from Airbus would have weakened the two companies that would not have the necessary size to stay in the market. The military activity, which are often out of phase with the civil sector, could help Airbus to sustain the fluctuations that characterise the commercial aircraft business. Hence the necessity to combine military and civil activities and to have a broader industrial organisation that oversees both. Airbus will therefore obtain legal autonomy but not the financial independence that would have resulted from its flotation on the stock market.

BAe and DASA, who were already partners in the Panavia Tornado and Eurofighter projects, shared the same business philosophy in the face of the various objections of Aérospatiale: “shareholder value as the absolute priority, and no state participation in the firm’s capital”\textsuperscript{653}

As a general principle, in transnational mergers, BAe, DASA and Saab favoured a “come as you are” option. Aérospatiale and Matra had to accept this kind of solution, thus insisting in the first phase on a core partnership of the three companies; Finmeccanica and CASA were not willing to accept “come as you are” options. On the other hand, this option could solve in one step difficult questions in transnational

\textsuperscript{652} Sparaco, Pierre; Morrocco, John D. ‘French Government Grapples With Aerospace Strategy’ in \textit{Aviation Week and Space Technology}, 30 June 1997
\textsuperscript{653} Schmitt \textit{op.cit}, p. 22, 29, 35, see also Gray, Bernard; Skapinker, Michael “Giant waiting in the wings: Bernard Gray and Michael Skapinker ask if Europe’s defence industry can consolidate in time to challenge US dominance” in \textit{Financial Times}, 24 June 1997.
mergers (due diligence, distribution of shares and responsibilities, government relations), and particularly in negotiations involving six parties. Moreover, BAe and DASA had their own hidden agendas.\textsuperscript{654} The transnational merger was thus doomed to failure because of divergent industrial objectives notwithstanding political good will.

\subsection*{7.2.2 From EADC to EADS}

On 9 December 1997, France, Germany and the UK issued a trilateral declaration calling for their defence industries to present, by 31 March 1998, a clear plan and detailed time schedule for industrial restructuring and transnational integration. On 27 March 1998, by replying to the declaration the companies of Airbus consortium responded, submitting to the governments concerned a report on the founding principles for a European Aerospace and Defence Company (EADC). The report was also submitted to Saab and Finmeccanica, so the intergovernmental consultation included the countries of the companies involved.\textsuperscript{655}

In July 1998, the industry ministers from the six LoI/FA countries (France, UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and UK) called upon their defence manufacturers to come up with a blueprint to create a single integrated TNC by October 1998.\textsuperscript{656} Merger discussions began between BAe and DASA, while Aérospatiale was to merge with Matra and be privatised by reducing the French government’s shareholding in the new company that was quoted on the stock exchange in June 1999.\textsuperscript{657} The second report was negotiated starting from September 1998, between the Airbus consortium companies, Saab, Finmeccanica and Dassault Aviation were associated. The final report was presented

\textsuperscript{654} Schmitt \textit{op.cit}, p. 31-32
\textsuperscript{655} Schmidt \textit{op.cit}, p. 29
\textsuperscript{656} ‘Defence merger on the radar’ in \textit{BBC news online}, 10 July 1998
\textsuperscript{657} ‘BAe and Dasa discuss proposals for merger: Aerospace groups still have important issues to resolve’ in \textit{Financial Times}, 24 July 1998

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in mid-November 1998, but it consisted in an exchange of ideas, because the discussions never reached the stage of real negotiations. BAE and DASA agreed on a merger project in December 1998, from the onset of the bilateral negotiation, Aérospatiale and other European companies were excluded on the basis of their government’s share; BAe and DASA did not want to negotiate with national governments.

The extensive use of private capital in the consolidation process became a key subject, given the transnational nature of the group, and the shareholding structure. According to the LoI/FA ministers the EADC should have a single management commercial structure, access to private capital markets, and be listed on the stock exchange. Notwithstanding, this expression of political will, the transnational restructuring took place before the establishment of an appropriate political and regulatory framework.

The merger process was further complicated by the fact that many of the interested companies were state-owned or state-controlled, such as Aérospatiale and CASA, and this was perceived by BAe as a major obstacle to the success of the merger; the “British” model favoured private companies, which were considered to be less dependent on the political will of their governments. The privatisation of Aérospatiale-Matra, CASA and Finmeccanica had been announced or was ongoing. The privatisation was a prerequisite for consolidation, because DASA and BAe refused to merge with public companies.

7.2.3 The British national champion: BAE Systems

In the UK, the General Electric Company (GEC)-Marconi had a defence division, Marconi Electronic Systems (MES), that provided many of the Eurofighter electronic system, for which BAe was a prime contractor. A merger of the two companies would create a vertically integrated

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658 Schmidt *op.cit.*, p. 30; The text also make a summary of the report main principles.
659 Schmitt *op.cit.*, p. 34-35
660 *Defence merger on the radar* cit.
661 Schmidt *op.cit.*, p. 2, 29
British company able to build complete systems and platforms and would consolidate British DTIB making it able to compete with US companies. So, when GEC decided to sell its MES division on 22 December 1998, BAE abandoned the merger project with DASA and purchased its British subcontractor, because it was tempted by absorbing its traditional rival for the high-technology networked systems that were popular in British defence, but because it feared that an American company - Lockheed Martin was circling – would but it, thus obtaining an enormous toehold in Europe.

The merger of BAE and MES was announced on 19 January 1999. BAE Systems plc was established on 30 November 1999 as a vertically integrated company merging the BAE platform manufacturing businesses with MES’ electronics systems capabilities. The choice for a national champion instead of cooperating with DASA in a TNC seems to conflict with the principle of the “British” model, which opposed a strong states’ shareholding. BAE had rather to establish a private company able to build complete defence systems.

In any case, BAE Systems shareholding system was a compromise inherited from that established for BAE privatisation. The British government held a shareholding of a nominal value of £1, preventing amendments to certain parts of the company’s Articles of Association without the permission of the government. The interested Articles require that no foreign person or persons acting together may hold more than 15% of the company’s shares or control the majority of the board and that BAE Systems CEO and Chairman must be British subjects. The British government did not have, however, a strong influence over BAE Systems management, for an example, it would have favoured a merger between Marconi and Thomson-CSF.

The transnational activities were pursued by means of a “multi-domestic” markets strategy with six markets: Australia, Saudi Arabia, 

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663 Schmitt op. cit, p. 35; Peter Spiegel ‘The largest aerospace companies gather next week for the Farnborough air show but the event will be without its long-time unofficial host’ in Financial Times, 17 July 2004
South Africa, Sweden, UK, and the US. It also has a US subsidiary: the penetration into the US defence market started by means of Tracor, a Marconi US subsidiary, and went on with United Technologies’ acquisition in 2005 and Armour Holdings in 2007. BAE Systems thus became larger than the other European defence companies, ending any possibility of a transnational merger and hopes of an Anglo-French-German industry.665

7.2.4 Franco-Germans industrial core: EADS

DASA management was caught by surprise by the breakdown of the merger discussion and the creation of BAE Systems. DASA reaction was the creation of the horizontally integrated TNC, called European Aeronautic Defence and Space company (EADS). The political decisions and psychological reactions were crucial in the establishment of EADS: German bitterness at BAe’s ‘treachery’, and French government’s pragmatism regarding privatisation, made the merger of DASA with Aérospatiale-Matra possible. At the Paris Air Show in June 1999, DaimlerChrysler, Lagardère group and French government began secret negotiations for the merger.666 Simultaneously DASA announced the acquisition of the 87% of formerly state-owned CASA of Spain incorporated as EADS CASA. The Spanish state holding company SEPI’s decision to sell CASA to DASA was the ignition spark for EADS’ transnational merger.667

The EADS was based in the Netherlands and to reassure private investors, a mixed structure with the inclusion of private capital and the moderate participation of state holdings was chosen. On 10 July 2000, on its launch on the stock markets, EADS was established with 34.5% of its capital floated, with the remaining 65.5% held on a parity basis by DaimlerChrysler AG (45.8%), a French Pooling

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665 Schmitt op.cit, p. 36-37
666 Schmitt op.cit, p. 3, 38
667 EADS chairman Manfred Bischoff quoted in ‘EUROPE, EADS Marches Onwards’ in Jane's Defence Industry, 1 February 2000

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Company (45.8%) and SEPI (8.5%). The French State holds directly 0.06% of public shares subject to certain specific provisions.

EADS, with combined revenues of approximately €21 Bn, climbed to fifth in the world. EADS was originally the outcome of a period of gestation that began with the transatlantic merger that created DaimlerChrysler and DASA, and continued with the Aérospatiale-Matra merger that was at the heart of the restructuring of France's aerospace industry. The DASA legacy provided EADS with a significant extra mass. EADS CASA gave a considerable strategic weight to EADS considering its participation in the Eurofighter programme. As a trade off, a Spanish board member was named for both the holding company and EADS, and a Spaniard would head the EADS’ Transport Aircraft Division. EADS also inherited from DASA the technology co-operation agreement with Northrop Grumman, and an eye for US acquisitions in order to penetrate the US market. EADS also had a 43% ownership of Dassault Aviation.

**The management in tandem:** EADS could be seen as the industrial version of the Franco-German core. This is particularly true, if we consider that to reconcile the interests of the French and German partners and national governments, EADS adopted a ‘management in tandem’ model consisting of two CEOs, French and German nationals, two chairmen; HQs in both countries and joint heads of other businesses. This resulted in a top-heavy management structure designed to meet the national sensitivities of the merged companies, but it is not the best performing business model for management. Although this model succeeded in improving the Franco-German relations, it is the stockholders who have to be satisfied. In A&D sector the government interests may overcome those of the business community. EADS “management in tandem” is modelled after

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668 The French pooling company shareholding was composed of: the French government (50%), Lagardère group (37%) and private financial institutions (13%).

669 EADS: Testing time for a new corporate model’ in *Jane's Defence Industry*, 1 July 2000
DaimlerChrysler itself, although the US-German partnership of equals is German-dominated, so as EADS ended to be dominated by France. EADS should balance between the political reasons and national sovereignty in industrial capabilities and the shareholder return: two needs that are often not compatible. Moreover EADS should deal with the other European companies, in particular BAE Systems. BAE Systems had inherited BAe’s share of Airbus Industrie. So EADS had to please its main competitor and partner BAE Systems in the transformation of the civilian aircraft manufacturer Airbus Industrie into an integrated company. The industrial cooperation between EADS and BAE Systems in Airbus transformation was not an easy one, given the different approaches of the two companies. Since 2000, BAE Systems also wanted to sell its 20% share of Airbus, thus reinforcing its position in the defence systems and in the US market. In 2001 Airbus was incorporated as Airbus SAS, a joint stock company, with a EADS 80% ownership, while BAE Systems controlling 20% of shares, for which BAE Systems transferred ownership of its Airbus UK plants to the new company. However, BAE Systems had a better performance in stock markets with higher profit margins at 10.6% in 1998, compared to EADS at 5.6%.

7.2.5 The Anglo-Italian vs the Franco-German industrial conglomerate

The creation of EADS set off shock waves that reverberated throughout the second and third tiers of the European industry. The consolidation of European A&D industries, by creating economies of scale, gave an opportunity to reduce the price of components and compete with US companies. In any case the competition between EADS and BAE Systems was in acquiring primacy over defence market.

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670 EADS: Testing time for a new corporate model cit
671 Damian Kemp ‘EADS walks a political tightrope’ in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 February 2000
672 EADS: Testing time for a new corporate model cit
BAE Systems was redefining its position in the world taking advantage of its shareholder structure, that made it less dependent on British government, thus allowing the company to pursue its “multi-domestic” market strategy breaking into the US Defence Market.

BAE Systems sold most of its divisions to Finmeccanica in order to finance its US operations and acquisitions. Finmeccanica remained the key element in the European consolidation scenario, being courted by both EADS and BAE Systems. These BAE Systems initiatives eventually led to the creation of two industrial conglomerates: the Anglo-Italian, formed by BAE Systems and Finmeccanica including its operating companies, and the Franco-German cooperation that is mainly represented by EADS.

The process leading to the creation of the Franco-German conglomerate is clear, while the Anglo-Italian conglomerate is a result of a series of political and industrial decisions, the latter seeming to be the most influential, which we will describe throughout the chapter.

The restructuring of defence industry was one of the topics of the British-Italian summit on 20 July 1999. Defence and Industry Ministers discussed the ongoing integration of British companies BAe and GEC–Marconi, on one side, and the DASA’s acquisition of CASA on the other. This did not leave much room for the Italian industry. At the same time, British and Italian companies were having talks on the matter. A series of negotiations were underway between Finmeccanica’s operating companies and BAE Systems on one side and the nascent EADS company on the other. Before describing these events it is necessary to define the Italian defence industry.

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673 *EADS walks a political tightrope* cit.
7.3 The Italian Defence Market

7.3.1 The Defence Industry

In Italy, the defence industry is state-owned or state-controlled; the shipbuilding Fincantieri is 100% state-owned: the Department of Treasury’s control is exercised by means of the Fintecna holding company; as a result of the privatisation process led by IRI in 2000, Finmeccanica is a public limited company with Treasury’s stakes accounting to one-third, the rest being owned by private investors. Family-controlled firms are the military transport company Iveco of FIAT; the defence electronics company Elettronica Spa (Finmeccanica, Thales and private investors own one-third each); the light weapons manufacturer Fabbrica d’Armi Pietro Beretta SpA and many other small and medium-sized enterprises that form the Italian DTIB.

For the scope of this research, only Finmeccanica will be reviewed, because it is the main Italian A&D group, accounting for 85% of national defence industry. Therefore it is the most politically influential Italian defence company having an international standing, and by investing around 10% of revenues in R&D it is able to compete with US and European companies. Furthermore, in the Italian case the national industry’s defence goods and products are, very often, more sophisticated than the military requirements originally required. The Italian armed forces’ demand, due to their shrinking budget, cannot absorb the supply from national industry. This forced the national industry to look abroad for new markets.

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For Finmeccanica’s history see Vera Zamagni *Finmeccanica. Competenze che vengono da lontano* (Bologna : Il Mulino, 2009)
7.3.2 Finmeccanica in the European consolidation scenario

Finmeccanica’s strategy was to position itself in a strong negotiating position for consolidation of the European industry, being effectively the only counterpart in Italy.\(^{676}\) After 2000, Finmeccanica increasingly became the Italian defence conglomerate by concluding strategic alliances with British, French and German companies and by starting cooperation with US companies. Those companies were often bigger than Finmeccanica in terms of dimensions, revenues, personnel or even political influence worldwide. Finmeccanica started to build strategic alliances with British companies to establish TNCs.

**Alenia Marconi Systems:** The radar, land and naval-system company Alenia Marconi Systems (AMS) was an equal share joint venture company registered in the Netherlands in 1998, resulting from the merger of Alenia Difesa of Finmeccanica and the Radar and Defence Systems Division of GEC-Marconi - later renamed MES. AMS joint venture represented a significant step in the restructuring of the European defence electronics industry.\(^{677}\) In 1999 BAE Systems replaced GEC-Marconi in the British shareholding of AMS. However, Alenia was not in good shape. As a result of the agreement between Alenia and Marconi, the former announced six hundred redundancies at the Rome and Naples sites.\(^{678}\) On 18 December 2000, Finmeccanica signed with BAE Systems an equal partnership agreement for AMS, and BAE Systems Combat and Radar Systems Limited activities were incorporated in AMS. For equal partnering it was important that Foinmeccanica and BAE Systems had shared objectives.\(^{679}\)

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\(^{676}\) Interview with Alberto de Benedictis, Finmeccanica Senior Vice-President for Strategic Finance *Finmeccanica finds JV solution to survive Euro climate* cit.

\(^{677}\) Quotation from GEC Managing Director Lord Simpson in *Defence merger on the radar* cit.

\(^{678}\) Senato della Repubblica, Resoconto 258a Seduta della Commissione Industria, Commercio, Turismo, 22 Luglio 1999.

\(^{679}\) *Finmeccanica finds JV solution to survive Euro climate* cit.
AMS became a major defence electronics company that reached number two in Europe and number four in the world, with sales proceeds of €1.1 Bn, and orders for €3.3 Bn.

**MBDA:** As planned, in 2001 the missile business of AMS merged with Aérospatiale-Matra Missiles and Matra BAe Dynamics (MBD) to form a 'New MBD'.\(^{680}\) MBDA was the number two company in missile production, with sales revenues of €2.3 Bn, a book order of €2.3 Bn, 45 missile systems (and another 30 in the development phase) and 35 platforms in 70 countries. MBDA’s stakes became for Finmeccanica an indirect holding of 25%, and EADS and BAE Systems 37.5%. MBDA had good potential for growth through projects such as the Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile: MBDA’s backlog would be nearly five times its sales."\(^{681}\)

**AgustaWestland:** On 26 July 2000, Finmeccanica signed an agreement with GKN for an equal partnership joint venture to merge Agusta and GKN-Westland Helicopters. AgustaWestland became the second helicopter manufacturer worldwide with total sales proceedings of €2.4 Bn and orders for €2.9 Bn, and an order book of €7.8 Bn. The deal was difficult to negotiate, because GKN came to the negotiating table looking for a larger say because its business was bigger. Finmeccanica insisted for an equal partnership with no special rights, and GKN had to convince itself that an equal joint venture was a fair deal. The deal worked well because the two companies turned out to be quite complementary.\(^{682}\) AgustaWestland was supposed to be a strong team, and although traditionally the helicopter market has not afforded a high growth rate, the partnership had good potential.

On 12 February 2001, the partnership has been completed, thus establishing a firm grip on UK DTIB. A joint venture with Eurocopter for NH Industries (the NH90 programme) completed the helicopter scenario.\(^{683}\)

**Unfinished businesses:** a Strategic alliance in avionics was also underway. In Space activities Finmeccanica did not succeed in

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\(^{680}\) See: Jane's Defence Weekly 25 October 2000
\(^{681}\) *Finmeccanica finds JV solution to survive Euro climate* cit.
\(^{682}\) *Ibidem*
\(^{683}\) *EADS walks a political tightrope* cit.
partnering with Astrium group. Alenia Spazio had been established as a limited company in order to facilitate the partnership with the group. Cooperation was aimed at three strategic sectors: satellite navigation (Galileo System) satellite communications (Euro Sky Way, Cosmo-Sky Med e Sicral) and orbital infrastructures (ISS). Cooperation with Boeing and Alcatel continued while a merger in Space activities with the French company was on its way.684

To conclude the strategic agreement and Joint Ventures, it was necessary to “get the house in order” free financial resources and consolidate the group’s core business. The structure of the Joint Ventures and the fact they were dedicated to one business area - helicopters, for example - should make for their success. Finmeccanica was in a good position for the future. The company overall was not in slow growth, for example MBDA offered good opportunities: if Finmeccanica played its cards right it could be able to grow its A&D business better than the sector average.685 On the other hand the security clearance to French and British nuclear-related missiles programmes, reduced the room of manoeuvre of MBDA Italia. All these joint ventures resulting in TNCs, such as AMS, MBDA and AgustaWestland, and the strategic alliances in defence electronics with BAE Systems; with BAE Systems and EADS on missile production; and with EADS in NH90 helicopters and maybe aeronautics could help Finmeccanica in finding a role in the European consolidation. 686

684 Andrea Tani, “La internazionalizzazione dell'industria della difesa italiana: luci e ombre” in Pagine di Difesa, 12 November 2001
685 de Benedictis in Finmeccanica finds JV solution to survive Euro climate cit.
686 EADS walks a political tightrope cit.
7.3.3 The European Military Aircraft Company (EMAC) project

Finmeccanica was not integrated into EADS, but there was a project to create an equal joint venture in military aircraft between EADS and Alenia Aerospazio of Finmeccanica. In 1999 talk of BAe’s interest in forming an alliance with Alenia Aerospazio was quietening to a whisper. EADS made a formal offer to Finmeccanica to create a joint venture in civil aircraft, avionics and sub-aqua systems. Having received positive political support from D’Alema’s government, DASA detailed the offer to Finmeccanica.

Making big plans for military aircraft, in April 1999, Finmeccanica started negotiation with the companies of the nascent EADS to form an equal partnership joint venture company called European Military Aircraft Company (EMAC) that would include Alenia Aerospazio and Aermacchi (of which Finmeccanica held 25%, but was ready to take over the 100%) and on the other side, Aérospatiale-Matra, DASA and CASA of EADS. EMAC should be active in military aircraft and aeronautics, including aerostructures (28%), other combat aircraft (23%), special mission and transport (16%), trainers (8%), and other services such as maintenance and conversion of large aircraft. If established, EMAC would be the fifth-largest military aircraft producer in the world and the third largest in Europe, after BAE Systems and Dassault Aviation.

The EMAC preliminary agreement was signed on 14 April 2000. Finmeccanica increased its share in the Eurofighter programme from around 19% to 30%, because it wanted to have an "equal say" in the joint venture and an "equitable share".

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687 See MoD DIS cit. para 4.6; and EADS: Testing time for a new corporate model cit.
688 EADS Marches Onwards, in Jane's Defence Industry, 1 February 2000
690 Finmeccanica finds JV solution to survive Euro climate cit.
Alenia Aerospazio, after the creation of EADS, became one of the smallest participants in the Eurofighter. The merger with CASA increased EADS' total share capital in Eurofighter to 44%, compared to BAE Systems’ 37% and Alenia’s 19%. However, Alenia held the balance of power because it would provide the partner company with a majority shareholding in the programme. EMAC would reach a 62.5% stake in the Eurofighter programme that would alone represent 25% of EMAC activities also giving EADS a leading role in the programme. On the other side, Alenia could make the British prevail.

Alenia also had a 20% stake in the Tornado Panavia Consortium and 80% in the group which produced the AMX fighter. So, EMAC would have stakes in most major European military aerospace programmes, including Tornado (57.5%), the A400M (71%), and be in prime position for trainer aircraft Mako, Mb 346, and AMX and a majority stake in the C-27J Spartan developed by Alenia with Lockheed Martin. There was also interest in a collaboration on the ATR regional turboprop aircraft. EMAC would assure an economical return and 17,000 jobs every year. Furthermore, Finmeccanica’s objective for civil aviation was to take a 5% stake in the Airbus SAS, and a 10% stake in the A 380 programme. Therefore, Alenia Aerospazio and Airbus signed on 19 December 2001 an agreement for industrial participation of the Italian company in the A380 programme. The biggest decision, however, was over participation in the A400M consortium.

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691 EUROPE, EADS Marches Onwards cit
692 internazionalizzazione dell’industria della difesa italiana cit.
7.4 The Airbus A400M affair

7.4.1 A project to boost European capabilities

The A400M was a multi-role military airlifter made to replace the Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules and the C-160 Transall in European air forces. The Strategic Airlift was the major capability gap in ESDP, and a business opportunity for some 300 aircraft. The feasibility study was drafted between October 1993 and June 1995 and the European Staff Requirement was finally signed by the seven nations during the second half of 1996, followed by a first collaborative Request for Proposals (RfP) in September 1997. In July 1998 the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of the UK made a strong case for improving air transport capability to support the proposed Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. Complicating factors like the Lockheed Martin offer of the C-130J-30 to Belgium, France, Spain and the UK, and the German interest in the Antonov An-70 delayed progress for the A400M. Early in 1999 even the French Air Force was considering a range of options for transport aircraft, including the A400M, the An-70 or a C-17s and C-130Js fleet.

The A400M prime, Airbus Military Company SAS was the consortium specifically established in 1999 by risk-sharing partners Airbus SAS - EADS and BAE System joint venture - (64%)693, EADS - Aérospatiale-Matra, DASA and CASA - (25.5%), Tai of Turkey (5%), and Flabel of Belgium (4%). At the beginning it included a small participation of Alenia Aerospazio (1.5%) in charge for developing aft fuselage, together with Airbus Germany, and the cargo handling system.694 FiatAvio of Italy (8%) was involved in Aero Propulsion Alliance (APA) a joint venture established in June 2001 to develop, manufacture and support the TP400 turboprop engine.

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693 The Airbus SAS integrated company was formed in July 2001, with EADS holding 80% of shares and BAE Systems 20%. In 2006, BAE Systems sold its stake in Airbus back to EADS.

The A400M programme was regarded as the biggest European defence programme and a significant step towards a common European defence. Germany and France declared their intention to support A400M programme during a summit at Mainz, on 9 June 2000. The RfP of 1997 totalled 288 aircraft, but in the commitment declaration signed by Defence Ministers at the Farnborough Air Show on 27 July 2000 the number shrank to 225.695

Italy, took part in RfP, with a preliminary option of 44 aircraft, but in 1999 reduced it to only 16 aircraft at an estimated cost of €1.5 Bn. On 19 June 2001 at the Paris Air Show an MoU was signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, and the UK.696 Germany signed on the understanding of parliamentary approval as in November 2000, when the Bundestag authorised only DM 10 M for the programme. Turkey, because of a serious economic crisis, reduced the number of aircraft from 20 to 10. Italy and Portugal did not sign.697 Portugal was re-entering the programme but reduced the number of aircraft to three because its Parliament had not yet approved this investment in the defence Budget, and in Italy a change of government prevented a definitive decision on the subject being taken.

The preference for A400M was a political commitment to the development of a European defence industry and in this “European vision” EADS participating countries would enjoy most of the technological return. France had secured the assembly of cabin and control systems. Even Spain had a huge return: it obtained the final assembly in San Pablo Facility in Seville and the CEO of EADS CASA, was appointed as President of Airbus Military that later in 2003 became a company registered in Spain. This was due to the fact that the Spanish had a significant trade-off at the EADS creation: EADS transferred a significant portion of the Airbus programmes’ workload

695 Germany made an option for 73 aircraft, France ordered 50 aircraft, Spain ordered 25 aircraft; UK ordered 25 aircraft, Turkey ordered 20 aircraft, Belgium ordered 7 aircraft; Portugal 4, Luxembourg one.
696 Press release Airbus Military ‘European nations formally commit to A400M programme’ 19 June 2001
697 ‘MoU on A400M signed’ in Flug Revue, Week ending 24 June 2001, Motor-Presse Stuttgart www.flug-revue.rotor.com
to CASA while, in return, CASA would contribute its range of military transport aircraft to EADS. Therefore, CASA would lead combined activities in the Airbus expansion into military applications, such as the A400M. 698

Therefore, the Italian aerospace industry would receive only the spoils with no significant technological investment.699 The *juste retour* provides that national industry’s work share in international programmes is proportional to the country’s financial effort: the more you pay or you procure, the more industrial return you should get. If one country decides to pay less, its industrial participation would be transferred to other foreign industries thus triggering intergovernmental negotiations for trade-offs.700

In Brussels on 18 December 2001 Airbus Military and OCCAR, as the contracting body acting collectively for the European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and UK), signed up to the launch contract to purchase 196 aircraft – a total value of € 16 Bn - the first aircraft was due to fly in 2006 and the first customer deliveries were planned for 2008.701

In the morning meeting of the Defence Ministers of the eight European countries at NATO HQ, Defence Minister, Martino, declared that the Italian government had to think it over, thus postponing a definitive decision on the A400M. 702

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698 *EUROPE, EADS Marches Onwards* cit
700 Audizione del capo di stato maggiore della difesa gen. Vincenzo Camporini, Commissione IV Difesa, Resoconto stenografico dell'Assemblea, Seduta 22 novembre 2008 (Roma : Camera dei deputati) p. 5
701 Airbus Military press release ‘Eight Nations sign up for 18 Billion Euro A400M Airlifter contract’ 18 December 2001
702 Ivo Caizzi ‘Parte l' Airbus, l' Italia sceglie di restare fuori’ in *Corriere della Sera*, 19 December 2001
7.4.2 The uneasy decision to leave the programme

On 11 June 2001 Italian Chief of Defence’s operational-technical evaluation of the A400M gave the programme a “low priority”. Therefore, Martino opposed A400M participation on the ground that the MoD had rejected it, and A400M was not in national priorities.

After the entry into line of C-130J, the Italian Air Force did not need the A400M anymore, and the MoD lacked the funds for other programmes. To tell the truth, the Italian option for 16 A400Ms had already taken into consideration the C-130J fleet, but the scarcity of funds was real. After 9/11, the airborne early warning capabilities (Awacs, fighter and reconnaissance aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft) rather than the airlifter were a priority in air defence. For Italy, the A400M costs per unit were €114.4 M, and the R&D and production starting costs were to be funded by the MAP, while the Defence Budget was to finance the medium-long term procurement of 16 aircraft. The actual law allowed MAP direct finance only for national companies and not for multinational consortia, so the MoD budget had to bear by itself the financing of the A400M.703

Furthermore, the A400M was also considered an expensive programme by Germany and the UK too. Difficulties also arose in Germany where the Christian Democrat opposition party claimed that there were not enough financial resources to participate, while the contract was subject to Bundestag approval. The German government evaluated the total cost for 60 aircraft at €8,517 Bn and MoD reports identified the Antonov An-7X as a superior and cheaper solution for airlift.704

The British government reasoned it was essential that full financial approval from Germany was in place if the programme was to continue to move ahead successfully. A review was to take place by 31 January 2002, and if funding had not been granted, the contract would

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704 See Airbus Military A400M profile in Flug Revue
not take effect. France and Germany hoped that Italy would change its mind and take part in the consortium. Somebody also proposed not only the signing of the contract but also a second document in order to leave the door open for Italy.

The decision to scrap Italian participation in the consortium was clear when Finmeccanica - unlike the other companies of the consortium - did not send representatives to the signing of the MoU. After the Italian withdrawal from the consortium, Alenia’s shares were taken up by Ogma of Portugal which became responsible for developing the wing/fuselage fairing. Portugal signed the launch contract confirming the option for 3 aircraft. Eventually, on 20 February 2003, the Portuguese MoD announced an initiative similar to the Italian by planning to procure 6 C-130Js to replace the Portuguese Air Force’s ageing C-130H/H-30s and withdrawing from the A400M programme. The order did not materialise in the end. The Portuguese government has since indicated that it may procure some A400Ms in the future.

**EMAC resumed:** the strategic partnership with EADS and participation in the A400M were strongly supported by the Centre-Left. It presented an interrogation of the Defence Minister, quoting the *Financial Times*, which reasoned that the withdrawal from the A400M had discarded the Finmeccanica-EADS strategic alliance for EMAC. It also opposed a government’s strategy in favour of other possible alliances. In Centre-Left view, sinking the EMAC had undermined the integration of Europe’s A&D industries.

Unlike BAe, Finmeccanica was not a main negotiator in the establishment of EADS in 2000, and it did not enter into Airbus consortium in 1979, instead wanting Alenia to become an aeronautic

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705 Paola di Caro ‘Airbus europeo, oggi la firma senza l’ Italia’ in *Corriere della Sera*, 18 December 2001
706 See Airbus Military A400M profile in *Flug Revue*
components supplier for Boeing, a role that it is still carrying on. The EMAC could challenge the Italian A&D industry choice for 20 years.

Nevertheless, Finmeccanica’s talks with EADS have been held back because of disagreements over financial issues, differences over worksharing, and an overlap of military transport programmes. As a result, the EMAC launch was delayed from March to June 2001, the agreement was supposed to be signed at the Paris Air Show in July, and then delayed indefinitely.708

It seems that the 9/11 events played an important role in delaying the conclusion of the joint venture, by damaging the aeronautics market, and forecasting a slowdown in civilian aircraft sales that constituted the bulk of sales, thus weakening the aerospace industry as a whole.709

The 9/11, the negotiation slowdowns, the change of government, and the A400M withdrawal, eventually resulted in the dropping of the idea to create the EMAC, which ended any chance of agreement with EADS on enlarging the European consortium by including Italy. On 24 January 2002 EADS released a communiqué that they would further cooperation with Finmeccanica in the EMAC and in the Eurofighter programme; the fact that Finmeccanica kept silent on these issues was confirmation of the Financial Times’ speculation that the EMAC project would eventually be dropped for external reasons.710

709 Bagnoli Roberto ‘Finmeccanica, movimenti al vertice’ in Corriere della Sera, 21 settembre 2001
710 Tani, “La internazionalizzazione dell'industria della difesa italiana”cit. and ‘Polo aeronautico europeo, sfuma l'asse tra Finmeccanica ed Eads’ in Corriere della Sera, 25 January 2002
7.4.3 The preferences for US equipment

The choice not to take part to the A400M consortium is usually regarded as the most striking example of Italian pro-Americanism versus European cooperation.\(^\text{711}\)

In late 2001 Italy decided to scrap the A400M programme and to take part in the JSF, the most advanced multi-role fighter programme developed by Lockheed Martin (prime contractor), Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems. Italy signed a bilateral MoU with the DoD becoming a second-tier partner, like the Netherlands; while the US and the UK are first-tier partners, and the UK is a “collaborative partner”.

The decision to procure JSF at the expense of A400M seems to have been independent, although the fact that it was simultaneous seemed to link the two decisions in some way. Furthermore, the Italian Air Force staff requisite for a tanker was set in July 2000, choosing the Boeing KC 767, instead of its Airbus competitor, and in July 2001 Boeing signed with Alenia Aeronavali of Finmeccanica a MoU for the conversion kit to comply with Italian Air Force requirements.\(^\text{712}\) This led in October 2002 to the award to Boeing for four of its KC 767 airborne tankers.\(^\text{713}\)

In 2002, Italy procured an integrated fleet of 22 medium transport aircraft, Lockheed Martin C-130J/J-30s – a decision taken by D’Alema’s government in November 1997, together with the decision to buy F 16s - and 15 light transport aircraft, Alenia Aeronautica’s C-27J Spartan.

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\(^{711}\) See On. Elettra Deiana intervention in “Informativa Airbus A400M” cit. p. 65.


\(^{713}\) Direzione Generale degli Armamenti Aeronautici (ARMAEREO), Boeing 767 Tanker factsheet.
The Italian Air Force and industry respectively benefited from the adoption of the C-130J and the C-27J by means of offsets and *juste retour* for the adoption of JSF. 714

An interesting question is who have been more influential in A400M affair: the military or the defence industry? The Italian Air Force has been traditionally more inclined towards US-designed aircraft, and its unofficial comments mirrored those of the government: the A400M was not needed and the industrial return was low. 715 The C-130J and C-27J integrated fleet solution was cheaper and gave a superior operative capability than developing the A400M. The A400M was supposed to be a competitor to the C-17, but it had similar performance to the C-130J. The Air Force preferred the C-130J because pilots were already trained and operated the C-130H Hercules. The C-130J could soon be delivered and ready to operate strategic airlift in support of the PSOs when the A400M agreement was being negotiated. The Air Force view was that perhaps in ten years, when the first A400M would enter into the line and the C-130J would be obsolete, Italy could procure some A400Ms. 716

In the meantime, France was forced to operate the old C-160 Transall for its PSOs, while the UK, for instance, had budget for a diversified fleet of airlifters buying the C-130J as an interim solution sufficient to spending money and time on the A400M. Italy had scarce financial resources and could not procure three different types of airlifters, the A400M solution would increase maintenance and training costs, and disrupt operational standardisation. The C-130J and C-27J are complementary and interoperable aircraft that operate the same engine system and avionics, and share a common logistical chain, thus reducing maintenance and training costs.

The main technical arguments against the A400M were: 717

714 See Andrea Tani ‘A400M e Joint Strike Fighter: l'impatto strategico per l'Italia’ in Pagine di Difesa 29 October 2001
715 Sergio Rizzo ‘All’Alenia il 4% Ma l’Italia resta alla finestra’ in Corriere della Sera, 18 January 2005
716 Intervento On. Pietro Armani “Informativa A400M” cit. p.69
717 See Tani “A400M e Joint Strike Fighter” cit.
Scarce financial resources forced to choose between procuring the C-130J and developing the C-27J; or supporting the higher multinational R&D costs for the A400M programme.

The industrial return for the A400M was small, because only 16 aircraft were to be procured for Italy.

The A400M could have been a competitor for the C-27J – it is a two-engine plane but its performances for tactical and sub-strategic transports are similar.

Lockheed Martin could sponsor C-27J foreign sales, according to “Juliet+”’s agreement with Alenia on the Italian Air force C-130Js adaptation, if Italy bought the C-130J first.

On a strategic-operational level, the choice to have a fleet of C-130Js and C-27Js – added to the B767 MRTT and the C-17 Globemaster of NATO for strategic transport and special services - could solve both the time gap in airlift and the support of the national industry, because the C-27J is built by Alenia Aeronautica which has industrial participation in C-130J and together with Avio performs C-27J logistic support. The Lockheed Martin and Alenia cooperation for the Italian version of the C-130J had positive effects on the C-27J’s common development. The C-27J is an updated version of the Fiat G-222, a small licensed copy of the Lockheed C-130H, that served for about 30 years in the Italian Air Force and was continuously upgraded by the industry under Air Force request. The G-222 enjoyed good export sales to Africa and Latin America, and with the C-27J the industry hoped to repeat this success story, while Lockheed Martin could help with entering the US market. So regarding the questions on military and industrial interests we may conclude that both of them agreed in principle on a pro-American choice.

French-Italian dispute: the Italian pro-American choice of course enraged the French.\textsuperscript{719} However, conventional wisdom on Berlusconi’s pro-Americanism for buying equipment can be challenged:

“Some decisions in crucial sectors of defence and the economy (aeronautics for example) went more frequently in the direction of the United States than Europe. Italy generally preferred relations with Lockheed and Boeing to those with Dassault o Eads (...). But when decisions that were disagreeable to Washington were required (space policy, Galileo, the many trade disputes of the last decade) Italy was impeccably European.”\textsuperscript{720}

Considering the limited Italian workshare and the MoD’s opposition, the A400M was a good deal only for French industry that enjoyed a major industrial return. For Italy investing in the A400M would only waste resources, it was not a way to promote national industry.\textsuperscript{721}

Therefore, the A400M unspent resources were redirected by the MoD to naval programmes mainly financed by MAP, such as FREMM and Horizon Frigates, the Cavour-class carrier, and aircraft programmes like the JSF and Eurofighter. These programmes enjoyed the support of the armed forces that needed them for operational reason, and offered a strong return for national industry.\textsuperscript{722} Moreover, naval programmes are more difficult to cancel as they focus on complex platforms and “systems of systems”. While aircraft programmes are complex systems, avionics and armaments can be reduced, and equally land vehicles programme dealing with individual vehicles are the easiest of all to cancel.\textsuperscript{723}

The cooperation with France was redirected to Naval (FREMM and Horizon Frigates), Missile (FSAF) and Satellite programmes, although Italy and France competed on Aeronautics and Helicopters.

\textsuperscript{719} Nava Massimo ‘Michèle Alliot-Marie: Le nostre spese militari? Servono a dare credibilità all'Europa’ in Corriere della Sera, 28 September 2002
\textsuperscript{721} Defence Minister, Martino “Informativa A400M” \textit{cit.} p. 70-71
\textsuperscript{722} See On. Pietro Armani intervention in “Informativa A400M” \textit{cit.} p.68-69
\textsuperscript{723} Audizione Gen. Camporini \textit{cit.} p. 10

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This was a strategy to diversify alliances and optimising results by exploiting Finmeccanica’s niche positions.\footnote{Antonio Missiroli ‘Italy’s security and defence policy – between EU and US, or just Prodi and Berlusconi?’ paper presented at the Colloquium on Italy’s approach to international issues, at the Centre of International Studies of the University of Cambridge, 16 March 2007 and published in \textit{Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans}, Volume 9, Issue 2 August 2007, pp 156}{\textsuperscript{724}}

At the Franco-Italian summit in Rome on 8 November 2002 Chirac urged on the FREMM programme, considering Berlusconi to be too close to US companies.\footnote{Paola di Caro ‘Berlusconi: «Italia-Francia, malintesi cancellati»’ in \textit{Corriere della Sera}, 8 November 2002}{\textsuperscript{725}} The Franco-Italian agreement for 27 ships (17 for France, 10 for Italian Navy) worth € 11 Bn was finalised at the bilateral summit in on 4 October 2005.\footnote{‘Accord franco-italien sur les frégates signé dans les prochains jours’ in \textit{Le Monde}, 5 October 2005.}{\textsuperscript{726}} FREMM were developed as an export version of Horizon Frigates which were too expensive. In the end, the French shipbuilding (DCNS) was exporting more than the Italian participants (Fincantieri and Finmeccanica).\footnote{Audizione di rappresentati AIAD, Resoconto stenografico, seduta del 27 gennaio 2009, Commissione IV Difesa (Roma : Camera dei Deputati, 2009) p.18}{\textsuperscript{727}} In any case, the French and Italian industries both courted the UK, (see Anglo-French programme CVF) Europe’s biggest spender in defence and a bridge to the US.\footnote{Michèle Alliot-Marie: \textit{Le nostre spese militari} cit.}{\textsuperscript{728}}

### 7.4.4 The A400M follow up

In 2009, 13 years after the approval of the European Staff Requirement, and ten years after the establishment of Airbus Military Consortium, the A400M was not yet operational. Notwithstanding the huge delays, the sanctions to the EADS, and the suspension of the assembly line, the European Airlift needs were to be met.\footnote{Alain Ruello ‘EADS suspend la production de l’A400M’ in \textit{Les Echos}, 4 November 2008 ; Thierry Vigoreux ‘L'A400M accuse un nouveau retard’ in \textit{Le Figaro}, 12 January 2009}{\textsuperscript{729}} So, taking into consideration...
the UK’s Strategic Airlift Initiative, the EDA Steering Board asked the willing pMS to explore possibilities to pool acquisitions of additional aircraft, to partner in contracting transport services, and to pool maintenance and training in case of additional A400M procurement.

In 2001 Defence Minister, Martino, had endorsed a proposal to the CFSP High Representative, Solana, to establish a Military Air Lift Agency, similar to the NATO Awacs body, to manage an A400M fleet with a common budget and European crews. This was at that time regarded as too challenging to be achieved. However, in November 2008, the Defence Ministers of Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain all signed a declaration of intent for a European Air Transport Fleet (EATF). In the EDA framework, the EATF was intended to reduce air transport shortfalls by pooling aircraft such as the A400M and the C130J by the next decade.

The Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg also signed a declaration of intent for the establishment of a Multinational A400m Unit. France and Germany would offer pilot training to countries willing to procure the A400M. However, there could be problems of industrial return for the whole project.

EADS admitted in January 2009 that it underestimated the “military nature” of the A400M: it was not a “flying truck”, but a very complex programme and its schedule was far too optimistic. Furthermore, given the unavailability of the A400M, Member States lacking the necessary capabilities could consider leasing the Russian Antonov aircraft as first proposed by the German MoD ten years before.

730 “Informativa A400M” cit. p. 60
731 EDA press release “European Air Transport Fleet Launched” 10 November 2008
732 Declaration of Intent between Defence ministers of Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg regarding “the Establishment Of Multinational A400m Unit”
733 interview with Hervé Morin ‘Les 27 ne peuvent pas avoir la même ambition’ in Euractiv.fr, 9 November 2008
734 EADS CEO, Louis Gallois quoted in ‘EADS chief admits viewing A400M as 'flying truck' was mistake’ in Jane's Defence Industry, 14 January 2009
7.5 The Finmeccanica’s US-UK multi-domestic strategy

7.5.1 The Battle of Britain

Analysts agreed that the end of a possible cooperation with EADS, paved the way for strategic alliances with the US and above all with British companies. In industrial relations, Finmeccanica’s cooperation with US companies, including Boeing, started before the second Berlusconi government. Although state-controlled, the Group retained a certain freedom of movement in choosing partnerships. Strategic alliances with French companies, such as Alcatel and Thales, dominated the Space Department, while Finmeccanica has always remained open for a merger with Defence Electronics division of Thales.735

In February 2002, the government started to discuss the composition of Finmeccanica’s top management. On 12 March 2002, Roberto Testore, former CEO of FIAT, was appointed as Finmeccanica President and Pier Francesco Guarguaglini, then Fincantieri CEO, as the CEO.736 Mr Guarguaglini was chairman of AMS from 1998 to 2000 and this experience convinced him that equal joint ventures do not work well; joint ventures need a “leader” and a “follower”, and Italian companies should become “leaders” in their sectors of excellence. Therefore, Guarguaglini ended all equal joint ventures and gained a majority in selected companies while selling shares in others.

In the UK, BAE Systems seemed to be an ideal partner for Finmeccanica and this prospect even raised the Italian company’s shares in the stockmarket.737 Defence Electronics and Avionics Systems, considering that BAE Systems had an equal partnership in AMS, were a

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735 Answer by P.F Guarguaglini, in the Press Conference of the Board of (shareholders assembly) 6 June 2008. see MF-Dow Jones News ‘Finmeccanica: Guarguaglini; ok alleanza con Thales, ma ora noi piu' forti’
736 ‘Finmeccanica, vertice sulle nomine’ in Repubblica, 27 February 2002; ‘Finmeccanica alla svolta Testore verso la presidenza’ in Repubblica, 13 March 2002
737 Polo aeronautico europeo, sfuma l’asse tra Finmeccanica ed Eads cit.
good point of departure. BAE Systems was going to jump over the Atlantic and Finmeccanica was ready to fill BAE’s gap in the UK.

To this end government’s support and an intergovernmental understanding were needed. Therefore, the British-Italian declaration on Security and Defence of 21 February 2003 encouraged an ever closer defence industrial relationship between British and Italian companies in the fields of Defence Electronics, Communications and Aeronautics. The field of helicopter capabilities was the best opportunity for long-term industrial cooperation. Therefore BAE Systems and Finmeccanica decided to consolidate their avionics, C4ISR and communications businesses in three joint ventures companies, by signing on 3 July 2003 the “Eurosystem” MoU. The “Eurosystems Transaction” was signed on 27 January 2005, and Finmeccanica and BAE Systems announced the termination of AMS according to the vast reorganisation plan. The Eurosystmes Transaction was finalised on 3 May 2005. The Eurosystem Transaction was the first defence industry’s agreement to have been notified to the EC Commission.

**Selex SI and Selex Communications:** AMS was closed on 3 May 2005 by splitting its activities: the British operations – except for the air traffic control and communications systems – were integrated into the C4ISR division of BAE Systems. The Italian activities were absorbed into Alenia Marconi Systems Spa (100% of Finmeccanica) later renamed as Selex Sistemi Integrati (Selex SI) Spa. At completion BAE Systems paid Finmeccanica an equalising amount of £50.5 M to account for the difference in value between AMS’s UK and Italian operations. Finmeccanica acquired AMS’s UK Air Traffic Management business for £6.5 M and the assumption of its debt. The communications systems portions of AMS and BAE Systems were sold

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738 Vlachos-Dengler *op. cit*
739 ‘Dichiarazione sulla difesa e sicurezza’ Vertice italo-britannico, Villa Madama, 21 febbraio 2003
741 “BAE ties up £2.6bn Italian deal” in *BBC news*, 3 July 2003; see also Finmeccanica press release ‘BAE Systems and Finmeccanica achieve an important milestone in the Eurosystmes transaction’, 22 March 2004
for £25.4 M to Selenia Communications - a Finmeccanica operating company - subsequently renamed Selex Communications.

**Selex S&AS:** BAE Systems Avionics Ltd. merged with Galileo Avionica SpA to form Selex Sensors and Airborne Systems (S&AS) owned 75% by Finmeccanica and 25% by BAE Systems. Galileo Avionica supported British avionics with design, development and production activities, including the system integration. At completion BAE Systems received the adjusted amount of £374 M.\(^\text{742}\) The EC commission gave the green light to the Eurosystem transaction.\(^\text{743}\) Moreover, BAE Systems could sell its 25% stake of Selex S&AS to Finmeccanica after May 2007, or Finmeccanica could exercise at any time a call option on its 25% stake. Finmeccanica acquired it on 30 March 2007. Selex S&AS became Europe’s second largest defence electronics business, and its operating companies Galileo Avionica of Italy and Selex S&AS of the UK had in 2006 total revenues for €1.750 M, and orders for over €4 bn. Selex S&AS developed 13 of the main electronics systems of EFA or 70% of avionics.

**AgustaWestland:** AgustaWestland’s total ownership was acquired by Finmeccanica on 28 July 2004 as a result of the Head of Agreement with GKN of 26 May 2004. GKN needed financial resources and focused on the automotive industry. For Finmeccanica, this operation was a step towards concentrating its core business on aerospace to become a global player in this sector, having an operating company with leadership in Helicopters. Moreover, the UK is the second largest defence market after the US. The British government obtained Rolls Royce to provide Italian Navy with engines at the annual UK-Italy Summit on 13 July 2004.\(^\text{744}\) The report of the Office of Fair Trading, published on 29 September 2004, gave a green light to the

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\(^\text{743}\) EC Commission ‘Mergers: Commission approves the EuroSystems transaction between BAE Systems and Finmeccanica in the defence sector’ IP/05/294, 15 March 2005

acquisition. The British government approved the sale only on the assurance that Finmeccanica would maintain strategic production of helicopters onshore. Meeting in Porto Rotondo on 17 Agust 2004, Prime Ministers Blair and Berlusconi decided that AugustaWestland should have a leading role in the development of British helicopter capabilities. With the total ownership of AgustaWestland, Finmeccanica started to become a truly internationalised group and its shares started to float in global financial markets.

In 2005, the new holding company Finmeccanica UK Ltd. had become British MoD’s second supplier. However, the integration of Anglo-Italian management was not easy. The “UK National Security Regulations” states that British nationals with a security clearance shall have operational control on military capabilities. The Selex S&AS integration process of the management included the appointment of a British subject as CEO, in a position usually held by Italian nationals, as a clear sign of Finmeccanica’s international commitment. From January 2008 Selex S&AS and Galileo Avionica were integrated into a single company “Selex Galileo”. The Anglo-Italian conglomerate was taking shape by means of the operating companies’ actions. To give a formal recognition, at Farnborough Air Show, on 16 June 2008, the DMA of UK and its Italian counterpart AIAD signed a MoU. This mutual understanding as national Defence industrial association was reaching common goals by exchange of information and trade missions to create an Anglo-Italian network. According to the US/UK “multi-domestic” strategy, the UK foothold was seen as a bridge for accessing the US market.

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745 Mark Odell, Tony Barber, ‘GKN close to helicopter sale’ in Financial Times, 21 May 2004
746 Interview with Steve Mogford ‘Selex S&As, Impegnata nella Difesa su scala internazionale’ in Specchio Economico, July 2007.
747 Gregory Alegi ‘Italia e UK: intesa tra associazioni industrie difesa’ in Dedalonews 25 July 2008
7.5.2 The access to US market

Already in 2000, the US market was at the top of Finmeccanica’s agenda because for the defence industry a strong US presence is essential for a global market approach. The UK strategy was a preemptive strike to access the US market, however, this did not mean buying US assets, as happened in the UK. Finmeccanica already had a good working relationship with all the US companies in particular with Boeing in civilian aircraft and with Lockheed Martin in military aircraft. In any case, joint ventures, like the European one, were the best options for transatlantic links, given the US security issues that prevented European companies from breaking into the market: “There is an overall security issue, but over time it will become less of an obstacle.”

Soon after being appointed as CEO of Finmeccanica, Guarguaglini, in one of his first board meetings in 2002, announced that the company should try to penetrate the biggest defence market: the US market. Nobody believed that it could be a realistic objective.

The US-Italy industrial cooperation also received government’s support. At the Italian Defence Industry Roadshow at the US Congress in March 2004: Italian industry had state-of-the-art sectors which offered good opportunities for cooperation with the US industry, and in international programmes, also in view of an increasing European industrial collaboration. The collaboration of Finmeccanica with Boeing and Lockheed Martin and with BAE Systems were cited as success stories, particularly making reference to the US101 Helicopter and the C-27J Airlifter.

**Finmeccanica and Boeing:** After the cancellation of the A400M, Berlusconi government decided to strengthen Finmeccanica’s strategic alliances with US companies, in particular with Boeing. Boeing had

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748 Interview with Alberto de Benedictis *Finmeccanica finds JV solution to survive Euro climate* cit.
749 *Finmeccanica finds JV solution to survive Euro climate* cit.
750 Speech by the Italian Under Secretary of the Foreign Ministry at the “Giornata di presentazione dell'industria italiana della difesa” Washington, 30 March 2004.
been working in Italy since the 1950s, closely collaborating with the Italian armed forces, industry and airlines. Italy is the second supplier for Boeing in Europe after the UK (excluding propulsion systems) and its supply chain involves 25,000 jobs. Finmeccanica’s cooperation with Boeing started in the civilian aeronautics. On 12 February 2002 Alenia Aeronautica reached an R&T cooperation agreement with Boeing Commercial Airplanes for the “Sonic Cruiser” commercial cargo aircraft. Finmeccanica signed a MoU with Boeing on 23 January 2003, to strengthen their commercial and industrial collaboration in the aerospace and defence sector. The MoU was renewed in 2005. The cooperation reached its climax with a framework agreement to co-develop R&D on advanced materials and aerostructures in November 2007, leading to Alenia’s major participation in the Boeing 787 Dreamliner programme.

7.5.3 The Presidential Helicopter and the C-27J

VH-71: The year 2005 was a watershed for US-UK strategy. On 28 January 2005, AgustaWestland EH-101 (or US101) won the “VXX competition” for the US presidential Helicopter “Marine One” renamed VH-71. The “US101 Team” was composed of Lockheed Martin, AgustaWestland and Bell Helicopter. According to Buy American Act, the 64% work share was shared between Lockheed Martin (31%) and Bell (27%). On 15 May 2003, AgustaWestland signed with Bell an agreement for the final assembly in the US. This removed the main argument against the “European” Helicopter. We may find three main reasons for the US101 choice:

1) the EH-101 was superior to its competitor Sikorsky VH-92 and it has been adopted by the British and Italian Navies and other countries’ forces. This draws up a golden rule: equipment shall be tested and adopted by a home country’s armed forces, before becoming competitive worldwide.

751 Ufficio Stampa Aeronautica Militare, Boeing profile.
2) the British and Italian governments, and in particular diplomats in Washington, lobbied for the US101. It is said that even Prime Minister Blair played a role.

3) the US101 Team showed that US-Italian industrial collaboration could prove to be successful, paving the way for further collaboration. Moreover, an industrial return for the US was secured.

Go tell the Spartans: The VH-71 opened the door for Finmeccanica in the US, in cooperation of course with US companies. This had consequences the announcement on 13 June 2007 of the US Army’s and USAF preference for C-27J in the “JCA competition”, a contract for 78 aircraft by 2012, worth $ 2 Bn, and up to a total of 145, worth $ 6 Bn. Lockheed Martin and Alenia had cooperated for the common development of the C-27J, by means of Lockheed Martin Alenia Tactical Transport Systems. Lockheed Martin was supposed to support the C-27J, but it became a competitor by proposing a short version of the C-130J for the JCA, and Alenia built a partnership with L3 - then joined by Boeing - named Global Military Aircraft Systems and based in Mississipi. The other competitor was C-295 of Raytheon and EADS.

The C-27J surpassed all JCA requirements above its competitors. Furthermore, the C-27J will be built in Italy and assembled at a facility in Florida by Alenia North America subsidiary and Boeing. L3 will then buy the aircraft from Alenia and Boeing and provide additional services to the US Army and the USAF. Future aircraft would be built more and more in the US thus assuring the US an industrial return.\(^{752}\) On the other hand, Boeing and Alenia did not reach an agreement on the assembly line, because Boeing wanted the production line, but Alenia North America alone is supposed to assemble the aircraft built by Alenia.\(^{753}\) Furthermore, Raytheon formally protested against the award of the JCA, but the GAO rejected it. Considering the logistic support the JCA contract is estimated at $ 12 B,

\(^{752}\) Guy Dinmore ‘L3 team beats Raytheon for $2,04Bn contract’ in Financial Times, 14 June 2007

\(^{753}\) Andrea Nativi ‘Alenia farà volare da sola gli aerei del Pentagono’ in Il Giornale, 13 June 2008
moreover the USAF requirement is expected to increase and the Special Operations Command ordered another aircraft in the gunship variant.\textsuperscript{754}

\textbf{Follow the money:} Winning a US competition paves the way for export opportunities in other countries. Romania too preferred the C-27J against the C-295 of CASA and Canada and Australia are considering it. New Europe countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia are evaluating their needs for such an aircraft: \textsuperscript{755} The C-27J success opened a second phase in the US-UK strategy. Building alliances with US companies was not enough, Finmeccanica should enter the US DTIB. In spring 2008, Finmeccanica acquired DRS Technologies, a US company focusing on Defence electronics and a major supplier of DoD.\textsuperscript{756} So Finmeccanica’s US strategy is threefold: AgustaWestland Helicopters based in Philadelphia; Aeronautics by means of the Alenia North America subsidiary and defence electronics through the DRS acquisition.

However, the Obama administration’s reductions in the Defence Budget 2010 strongly hit Finmeccanica’s programmes. On 6 April 2009, Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, announced the termination of the VH-71 programme, on the grounds that the procurement costs had spiralled from $ 6,5 Bn to $ 13 Bn, and he suggested to open a new tender.\textsuperscript{757} The JCA programme was also reduced from 78 to 38 aircraft.

In conclusion, the DRS acquisition gave Finmeccanica a foothold in the US DTIB, owning a US company is a crucial element in removing legal obstacles political constraints and that prevent from entering the US market.

\textsuperscript{754} See Andrea Nativi, Amy Butler ‘Spartan Foothold’ in \textit{Aviation Week}, 6 October 2008.
\textsuperscript{755} Morgan Stanley Research Europe \textit{Finmeccanica JCA Contract Win – Another Step on the Roadmap for Upside}, 14 June 2007,
\textsuperscript{756} Paul Betts ‘Finmeccanica outwits EADS with Tuscan tactics’ in \textit{Financial Times}, 13 May 2008
\textsuperscript{757} Transcript of the DoD News Briefing With Secretary Gates From The Pentagon, 6 April 2009.
Conclusion

The consolidation of the European defence industry has changed the nature of European companies from national champions to TNCs. Ownership does not influence defence companies’ strategies, because all companies have some government control, including the golden share rule. However, the role of government depends on top management decision-making in defining market strategies, although it could decide whether the company should pursue a British or French approach.

For Finmeccanica although the shareholding structure is similar to the continental model, the analysis of its market strategy, by means of its multi-domestic market strategy, makes it more closely connected to the “Anglosphere” than to the Franco-German conglomerate. Finmeccanica could choose to consolidate Europe first or to move to a more open and global competitive market place, where access to the US technologies base and to the US market represents a priority. The company chose the latter. By pursuing its multi-domestic US-UK strategy, and by obtaining a foothold in UK DTIB and the acquisition of DRS, Finmeccanica has completed its consolidation process. The group is now one of the more internationalised TNCs of the A&D industry, having not only market access but also production plants on a global level including in the US, the UK, Russia, United Arab Emirates and so on.

Political will and a favourable political climate are the determinants of a fruitful transatlantic cooperation. At the end of the day the Italian decision not to take part in the A400M programme proved to be successful because the A400M has been repeatedly postponed; it is now (2009) in the testing phase, while the production line has been suspended. The focus on developing the C27J gave a huge return to the national industry, in particular with the JCA tender, and allowed the shift from a traditional European national champion nature to a truly TNC.

As a matter of fact, events in the defence global marketplace are moving faster than high-level policy, and the integration of foreign
commercial practices has strengthened the company’s competitive performance. In the UK, the most advanced national companies tend to build on MoD-Industry partnership not only to better perform programme development but to reduce costs. The through-life capability management concept has been perfectly learnt by the Finmeccanica’s operating companies, and AgustaWestland was awarded the first strategic partnership with the British MoD. This is a model that the group has unsuccessfully tried to replicate in Italy, facing huge opposition from the politico-military establishment in the MoD. In any case, Finmeccanica is becoming more and more autonomous of the national market and increasingly transatlantic.
CHAPTER VIII
BUILDING THE CAPABILITIES:
THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION

Having extensively discussed industrial transnational issues in the previous chapter this chapter is devoted to European institutional and intergovernmental cooperation. The main actors will be military bodies and international cooperative bodies, although national defence industries and political decision-makers do play a role.

First we will deal with European intergovernmental R&T and industrial collaboration, and the reasons for involvement in collaborative programmes, with a special focus on Italy’s armament policy and its participation in collaborative programmes. This will provide an opportunity to describe the European multilateral cooperative groupings (NATO RTO, WEAG/WEAO, OCCAR, LoI/FA) and the nascent EDA.

Secondly we will recount the previous projects and in particular the success story of the Anglo-French project leading to the EDA. The role of the administrative interests of EDA participating Member States (pMS) is crucial to the objectives of this study. Moreover, the pMS’ interests in EDA development and in its programmes will be dealt with. Particular attention will be devoted to the intergovernmental debate and above all to British interests that seemed to collide with French and Italian aims for the EDA. Furthermore, the creation of the EDEM seems to be a common end state for all major pMS.

In conclusion we will deal with EDA relations with such European groupings as OCCAR and LoI/FA and the need to find a collaborative European framework, not least one which would not duplicate the EDA and NATO projects.
8.1 European Intergovernmental R&T and Industrial Collaboration

8.1.1 The main reasons for collaborative programmes

States may choose to cooperate in defence R&T and industrial programmes because they can no longer afford to sustain on their own the necessary level of R&T effort in all areas given the increased cost of high-technology defence equipment:

“we do not seek to restrict the scope for international cooperation and competition where this is appropriate, and we cannot afford to maintain a complete cradle-to-grave industrial base in all areas.” 758

Moreover, cooperation may help in standardising some interoperable equipment and systems, and encouraging cross-fertilisation of innovations. Intergovernmentalism remains in any case the ruling principle because projects are chosen and managed on a case-by-case basis by the governments concerned to meet their own national defence needs and not as part of a coordinated European defence R&T strategy.

Up until now, there has still been no direct link between the research activities carried out by multinational cooperation via NATO or ESDP, other than the fact that national governments may choose to use these groupings to mount cooperative projects allowing them to develop their national contributions to those goals.

Moreover, on average, only a very small proportion of spending on cooperative Defence R&T is channelled through these groupings. In the case of WEAG/WEAO, the most active multinational European forum, the 19 participating states allocated on average less than 5% of their annual budget to cooperative projects. The discrepancy is particularly acute among the higher-spending nations. 759 There are, of course, exceptions and Italy is one of them.

8.1.2 Italy in the context of European institutional collaboration

Italy takes part in almost all European Defence R&T and Industrial programmes. According to De Coubertin’s olympism, for Italy “the important thing is… to take part” in any programme, however, a better selection according to specific interests and available resources is needed. An interest-related selection could assure better performance of results and industrial return.\(^{760}\) Italian R&T budget is financed by a system comprising the MoD, for in-service military R&T, the MAP and Ministry of University and Research, financing industrial and scientific R&T. International programmes have budget priorities instead of national programmes because Italy decided to utilise international programmes as a showcase for scientific and technological know how.\(^{761}\) Industrial and R&T cooperation is just another aspect of the Chair Policy meaning to take part in any multilateral initiative just to “show the flag”.

**Italian armament policy:** In Italy, the SGD/DNA is responsible for the MoD technical-administrative area and in particular for a defence procurement, military R&D, and Italian participation in collaborative R&T programmes.\(^{762}\) The SGD/DNA assess the feasibility of bilateral and multinational programmes; it assures Italian representation in international cooperation structures, including NATO, NAD, EDA, OCCAR, LoI/FA, and it works closely with these organisations to define the National Military Research Plan. Deputy SGD/DNA and Department 3 (Armaments policy), 4 (R&D programmes), and 5 (R&T) are responsible for armament collaboration and representation in European organisations, collaborative R&T programmes in the frameworks of EDA, LoI/FA and NATO RTO.

\(^{760}\) Interview with an Italian Senior military officer, SG/DNA, May 2007


\(^{762}\) Task are identified by Legge n. 25/1997 and its MoD enactment decrees; see also SGD/DNA *Defence procurement in Italy* (Rome : MoD, 2007)
Italian Defence community was aware of the need to reorganise European collaboration including the WEAG, OCCAR, LoI/FA and even the ESDP framework. The reorganisation of military instruments in the European framework raised the issue of available resources; a joint effort of the MoD and defence industry was required.\textsuperscript{763} The Italian military had been keen on promoting Italy’s role even in industrial cooperation. Military elites have stronger administrative interests, national pride, and \textit{éspirt de corps} than other actors, such as the defence industry. The SGD/DNA aims at “improving technological quality, production capabilities, competitiveness and worldwide defence market share for Italian industry in a field that – due to developing multinational alliances – can be no longer considered as “national”; and, finally, reinforcing the international security system by enhancing the role of Italy within political and industrial alliances”.\textsuperscript{764}

In any case because of its “internationalist mantra”, the Italian MoD considers the CNAD of the NATO as the main body in defence cooperation because the Atlantic Alliance is the main pillar in national and European security.\textsuperscript{765} CNAD reasserts the importance of maintaining relations between the major national armaments authorities. So, even more important is that CNAD’s exclusive club created in the mid-1980s, by NADs of France, Germany, the UK and US, known as the "Four Power NADs", which Italy joined in April 2000, transforming it into the "Five Power NADs". Therefore, the “Five powers NADs” became for Italy the most influential decision-making body in defence industrial cooperation, and the main organisation for the political-strategic direction of international armaments programmes. This reasserted transatlantic and national sovereignty versus European cooperation.\textsuperscript{766} If CNAD is the main decision-making body, to implement its collaborative defence policy, Italy can rely on a

\textsuperscript{763} Italian MoD \textit{Defence White Book} 2002 (Rome : MoD, 2001) Chapter 4 conclusions
\textsuperscript{764} Lt. Gen. Gianni Botondi foreword \textit{Defence procurement in Italy} cit. p.2
\textsuperscript{765} Italian Defence White Paper cit., para 4.5.4
\textsuperscript{766} Italian Defence White Paper cit., para 4.5.4; \textit{Defence procurement in Italy} cit. p. 22-42
multitude of different international groupings in addition to a number of "private" bilateral or multilateral defence research groupings.

8.1.3 NATO Research & Technology Organisation (RTO)

The NATO RTO is a body that promotes and coordinates scientific and research activities for NATO. NATO RTO is managed by the “NATO Research & Technology Board” (RT Board) established under the Military Committee and CNAD authority. For daily management of research activities, the RT Board has an agency (Research & Technology Agency - RTA) organised into panels, and working groups composed of national representatives. Italy is part of more than 60 working groups and finances them all on a voluntary basis. National experts decide which projects should be financed by the participating state. The network of experts and information sharing are the added value of the NATO RTO that publishes scientific works and organises workshops.  

8.1.4 GARTEUR

The GARTEUR was founded in 1973 and it has currently seven members (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and UK). It concentrates on aerospace R&T and unlike the other cooperation bodies, it includes in its activities also civil R&T.

8.1.5 WEAG/WEAO

The WEAG was originally established in 1976 by NATO European countries as the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), and was renamed in 1993, when transferred into WEU framework. The WEAG has no legal personality, but was established as the European body for armaments cooperation by the Maastricht and Amsterdam

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767 Italian Defence White Paper cit., para. 4.9.5.1
768 Davies op. cit, p. 270-271
Treaties, and according to the 1997 WEU Statement annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.\textsuperscript{769}

WEAG constituted the first and largest pan-European framework for armament cooperation. Starting with the 13 IEPG countries, WEAG was enlarged by the Defence Minister of 13 November 2000 to include another six new members including all the European NATO countries (except Iceland) and EU Member States (except Ireland). Italy is a founding member, and it held the presidency in 2000-2002.\textsuperscript{770} The WEAG provides a forum in which members can carry out the full range of R&T activities, including tests and trials. WEAG’s principal objectives are:

- More efficient use of resources through increased harmonisation of requirements, interoperability and normalisation of defence policy;
- The opening up of national defence markets to cross-border competition;
- supporting and strengthening the EDTIB
- R&D cooperation;

The WEAG organises its work into three Panels, dealing with harmonisation or requirements (Panel I), R&T (Panel II) and Defence economics (Panel III).

**WEAG R&T:** Panel II is aimed at information sharing and support of the R&T programmes financed by Member Countries. Italy held its presidency in 2000. The WEAG organised its R&T activities around so-called Common European Priority Areas (CEPAs) managed by a Steering Committee representing the WEAG countries wishing to

\textsuperscript{769} Yves Fromion, *Rapport d'information « sur la recherche de défense et de sécurité »* No. 2150, Commission de La Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, Assemblée Nationale, 12ème Législature, 9 March 2005, Chapter II A.3

\textsuperscript{770} IEPG members were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and UK) the six new members were Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Poland, and Sweden.
participate in cooperative research projects. In 2002, Italy took part in 59 WEAG projects, worth £90.6 Bn per year.\textsuperscript{771}

European cooperation for the long term in Defence (EUCLID) was a “top down” procedure established in 1990 by a MoU between the IEPG countries, considered as a military equivalent to the EC Commission’s “Eureka”. Eurofinder was a "bottom up" procedure that considered unsolicited proposals from defence industry consortia - including SMEs and research centres - covering one of the existing technology priority areas (CEPA). Eurofinder rounds were launched by annual conferences in which the defence industries from WEAG countries were invited to bid. During Eurofinder’s lifetime (1996-2006) 234 proposals were received and the success rate of acceptance was about 50%.\textsuperscript{772} By analysing trends in Eurofinder, as industry’s interests are stronger in some fields than others, proposals tended to concentrate on the technology areas of radar & RF electronic combat systems (CEPA 1), micro-electronics (CEPA 2) and information processing and communication (CEPA 6).

However, initiatives in this framework were complex, as national MoDs had to identify R&T projects from a list of common priorities, and interested MoDs had to sign an agreement, leading to a call for tenders with industrial consortia. A MoU “European Understandings for Research Organisation, Programmes and Activities” (EUROPA) was signed on 15 May 2001 by 18 of the 19 WEAG countries to supersede MoU EUCLID and Eurofinder. By 1 September 2004, all previous WEAG activities were placed under MoU EUROPA.

Another interesting WEAG activity was the use of models and simulations, or the "virtual demonstrators" capable of dealing with large and complex systems, in order to predict how components will inter-react within a system and how a vehicle will perform in certain environments.\textsuperscript{773}

\textsuperscript{771} Italian Defence White Paper \textit{cit.}, para 4.5.1
\textsuperscript{772} See WEAG website
\textsuperscript{773} Davies \textit{op. cit.}, p. 273-274
**WEAO:** The lack of legal personality for WEAG, forced the MoDs to have a proxy for WEAG. Recognising the difficulty of setting up a European Armaments Agency stemming from the WEU Maastricht Declaration and responsible for the full range of procurement activities on behalf of WEAG countries, the WEAG Ad Hoc Study Group (created in March 1993 for setting up the agency) proposed the creation of the WEAO. WEAO was established in November 1996 as a WEU subsidiary entity, so WEAO shares the international legal personality of the WEU, and the WEAO Charter provides for a broad range of potential activities. This gives WEAO legal capacity to let research contracts with industry on behalf of WEAG thus becoming WEAG’s arm. Anyway, WEAO has operated only as a Research Cell supporting WEAG in the R&T and providing Member States with administrative and contractual assistance for co-operative R&T projects. By 2005, more than 120 R&T projects had been approved and 64 of them were already on course, while total budget reached € 100 M per year.

The WEAG was the oldest and most active European body especially in cooperative R&T and information sharing. However the WEAG was not very flexible because of the high number of participating States, and it was thus not able to turn into a procurement body. With the creation of the EDA, according to paragraph 8 of the Preamble of the Joint Action establishing the EDA, both WEAG and the WEAO research cell tasks were transferred to the new agency.

### 8.1.6 OCCAR

France, Germany, Italy, and the UK were the major European states having a sizeable defence industry, accounting for the three quarters European military spending and 80% of total European procurement.

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774 Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency

They tried to rationalise the demand side by establishing a cooperative procurement body; one that would be more efficient than WEAG cooperation.

In July 1996 Italy and the UK joined the Franco-German precursor team, established under the bilateral Baden-Baden Agreement of 1995, and signed an Administrative Arrangement on 12 November 1996. The OCCAR Convention was signed on 9 September 1998, and entered into force in January 2001, thus giving OCCAR a legal personality and allowing it to place and manage contracts (art.38 OCCAR Convention). Italy ratified the OCCAR convention in 2000.776 Belgium joined the OCCAR in 2003 and Spain in 2005. The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Turkey take part in collaborative programmes.

OCCAR-Executive Administration is the operational branch with its central office in Bonn and seven programme division based in Germany and France. In Rome there is a satellite office of FREMM division since 2006. Italy has a good representation in the heads of programme divisions (France, Germany and Italy have two heads of division each, Belgium one) and in the central office of the 230-staffed OCCAR-Executive Administration.777 Between 2004 and 2008 the Italian Air Force General, Nazzareno Cardinali, was the OCCAR-Executive Administration Director in a timeline characterised by the rise of the EDA. High level policy issues are dealt with by the OCCAR Board of Supervisors, comprising the participating states’ NADs supported by a Future Tasks and Policy Committee and a Finance Committee. A programme board is established for each programme to be composed of participants states only.

776 Legge n. 348, del 15 novembre 2000
777 In 2009 Italy held the heads of FREMM and FSASF programme divisions, and in Bonn the legal advisor and the head of programme management support division; Audizione del comandante Michele Cosentino, capo della divisione di supporto alla gestione dei programmi dell'Osservatorio centrale dell'OCCAR-EA, Commissione IV Difesa, Resoconto stenografico, Seduta 15 luglio 2009 (Roma : Camera dei deputati).
**OCCAR principles:** OCCAR’s original five principles were to promote best “value for money” of collaborative armaments programmes, to renounce to *juste retour*, to harmonise the requirements and technologies of participating states, to strengthen the competitiveness of the EDTIB, and to open participation to other states. Acting as a catalyst between states and industries, OCCAR selects its programmes on the principle of best “value for money” in a “controlled competition” framework for prime contractors and Free competition for SMEs sub-contractors. 778 According to the Baden-Baden principles, the subscribing states renounce the analytical calculation of industrial *juste retour* on a programme-by-programme basis (according to *juste retour* in a collaborative programme the “cost share” of a state should be equalled by a “work share” for its national industry) and replace it by the pursuit of return on an overall multi-programme/multi-year balance (global balance). In any case every participant state has a minimum standard of return on financial contributions assured by OCCAR Convention.779 To tell the truth, for reasons of national industry policy, the Baden-Baden principles are not fully adopted by OCCAR that still applies *juste retour* to most of its programmes, and the OCCAR’s role in harmonising European requirements and strengthening EDTIB has been transferred to EDA after its creation.780

Nowadays, OCCAR’s main role is to act as a more effective and efficient manager of selected existing and future armament acquisition programmes by means of through-life capability management and demonstrators, and it aims at maximising the global effectiveness of defence spending. OCCAR has inherited the management of a few bilateral or multilateral programmes, including the management of the A400M programme.781 Italy is interested in the FREMM, the FSAF, the

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780 Audizione com. Cosentino cit.
781 OCCAR programmes, worth € 43 Bn, include the A400M airlift, the FREMM - Fregate Europee Multi-Mission program, the Tiger helicopter, the
SAAM/IT to be fitted to Cavour-class Carrier and its SAMP/T ground segment, and the new programme ESSOR. On the other hand, PAAMS which is the ammunition programme for FSAF, is a multilateral cooperation between France, Italy and the UK with no relation to OCCAR.

In contrast with the WEAG/WEAO broad and pan-European approach, the OCCAR reflects the interests of a group of countries seeking progress through smaller multilateral initiatives. Like the WEAO, the OCCAR has the legal potential to become a fully-fledged armaments agency. According to Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention, the OCCAR could cover a whole range of activities, including providing participating states with effective and efficient management of existing and future collaborative armament programmes. The value added of the OCCAR lies in its flexibility regarding other countries’ participation in programmes; innovation in procurement principles, such as global balance, and the coherence of OCCAR programmes with the capabilities needed for the ESDP.\(^{782}\) The OCCAR is nowadays the only existing and efficient multinational procurement body, its role having not been put into question by the creation of the EDA:

“Appare, pertanto, indispensabile per l’Italia curare e seguire con particolare attenzione le attività dell’OCCAR, alla stregua degli altri Paesi membri, che peraltro coinvolgono tutto il comparto industriale nazionale per la difesa”\(^{783}\)

However, its weaknesses are in its intergovernmental status. The OCCAR lacks autonomy by focusing on programmes identified by participating states; its future planning is limited, and although the OCCAR charter permits R&T development and some demonstrators are being delegated to it, OCCAR has not engaged in any research

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Boxer multi role armoured vehicle, the Cobra weapon locating system, Future Surface-to-Air missile family, and munitions for the PAAMS and the short-range optical/radar guided surface-to-air missile Roland, and in collaboration with the EDA the European Secure Software Defined Radio (ESSOR).

\(^{782}\) See Michele Nones, Stefania Di Paola, Sandro Ruggeri Il Processo di Integrazione del Mercato e dell’industria della Difesa in Europa, Quaderni IAI no.17, May 2003, p. 17

\(^{783}\) Italian Defence White Paper cit., para 4.5.2
activities up to the present. The OCCAR has been purely a management agency, aiming at greater efficiency in the management of collaborative defence equipment programmes.\textsuperscript{784}

8.1.7 LoI/FA

In the context of the US consolidation of the 1990s France, Germany and the UK signed a statement on European defence restructuring in December 1997 and they were soon joined by Italy and Spain.\textsuperscript{785} In July 1998, Defence Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) with respect of “Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Organisation of the European defence industry”. LoI gathers the six major arms-producing countries in Europe, which have a common solid defence industry and constant investments for military procurement and R&D. LoI countries reach a certain homogeneity resulting into common interests on defence policy. Hence, on 27 July 2000, LoI countries signed a Framework Agreement (FA) which created a political and legal framework for cross-border restructuring of the defence industry through an upgraded level of harmonisation. Italy ratified the LoI/FA by Law 148/2003). The LoI/FA is active in six fields relating to the government-industry defence relationship as identified by the FA: (1) security of supply; (2) transfer and export procedures; (3) security and classified information; (4) defence related research and technology; (5) treatment of technical information; (6) harmonisation of military requirements.

The FA intends to establish an intergovernmental consultative mechanism rather than a single defence market, and to put in place specific implementing arrangements. An Executive Committee composed of one member representing each country, is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the agreement and proposing

\textsuperscript{784} Fromion, Rapport recherche de défense et de sécurité cit. Chap.II, A.1; House of Lords, cit. BOX 2

\textsuperscript{785} France, Germany, UK, Joint Statement on the restructuring of the European defence aerospace and electronics industry 9 December 1997 and France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK Joint draft Statement on restructuring of the defence industry 20 April 1998
additional international instruments pursuant to this agreement. The Executive Committee takes its decisions by consensus. Therefore LoI/FA is above all a forum for discussion to enhance the coordination in R&T and for information sharing for defence industry. The LoI/FA countries share information on their participation in multinational and national equipment programmes, and on their military R&T priorities in a database. This should bring about the identification of a list of common R&T priorities. Industrial participation is encouraged by LoI/FA by means of the Eurofinder procedure.

The LoI/FA does not call for a common strategy report as LoI/FA remains a debating society on R&T and defence market for six countries, who have no ambition to establish a European defence policy by means of LoI/FA. In any case, the harmonisation of military requirement committee works contribute to R&T strategies by drafting and by identifying initiatives for requirements-harmonisation with a view to future collaborative armaments programmes. Furthermore, LoI has drafted measures to improve cross-border equipment transfer, although these are severely limited by art.296 TEU. Ultimately, although there was no permanent strategic relationship the LoI/FA countries could call on WEAG/WEAO instruments and processes to run individual projects, a possibility that is now lacking after the termination of WEAG. Italy, although heavily involved in LoI/FA’s sectors of interests, undertook a very slow ratification process, thus weakening its negotiating power in LoI and slowing the whole LoI/FA process.

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786 Fromion *Rapport la recherche de défense et de sécurité* cit. Chap.II, A.2; House of Lords *cit.*
787 Nones et alii *op. cit*, p. 26
8.2  The European Defence Agency

8.2.1  A European agency for developing R&T, capabilities and consolidating demand

European countries are aiming at consolidating the European market both at intergovernmental (OCCAR, LoI/FA) and EU level (EDA). They hop to focus on streamlining the added value of a better-regulated Single Market. But the European Defence sector is fragmented at national level, with as many different regulatory frameworks as Member States: these create extra costs and hamper the competitiveness of the defence industry. The development of an EDTIB as well as the equipment of national armed forces suffers from these rifts. In 1978 the Report by the member of the European Parliament, Egon Klepsch, had suggested the creation of a European Armament Procurement Agency under Community control. This would have coordinated the creation of a single market in military equipment and the pursuit of a civilian-military industrial policy (and its relation to NATO two-way’s street, which stand at an 8:1 disadvantage in military sales for Europe). Atlanticist countries were reluctant to set up such a body. Unfortunately, neither the follow up to Klepsch Report nor the Ferguson Report on “European arms sales and procurement” were implemented. 788 In 1991, a declaration referring to the creation of a European Armaments Agency was attached to the Maastricht Treaty, but the UK in particular feared that such an agency would exclude US companies from European defence contracts.

The Anglo-French Joint Declaration on European Defence in Saint-Malo in December 1998, and the Helsinki Council Conclusions in December 1999 ratified the ongoing process of the integration of

military capabilities and their influence on industry. The British-Italian declaration of 20 July 1999 proposed:

“A road map for more effective European defence procurement; this will include harmonisation of military requirements and collaborative arms procurement.”  

The restructuring of defence industry, or more particularly of the supply side, anticipated a reorganisation of the demand side, in particular in military procurement. Ploughing huge investments into EDTIB would strengthen capabilities and give credible military tools to the EU. The plans, however, did not lead to the creation of a European model, or to a single defence policy. An Agency was established whose added value is based on the principle that promoting coherence in place of fragmentation is the only way to improve European Defence. It is expected that the EDA armaments partnerships will provide opportunities for EDTIB restructuring and, ultimately, progress towards a competitive continental-scale market.

8.2.2 EDA: an Anglo-French project

Italy had been active in promoting the creation of a European Armaments Agency (EAA) within the WEAG framework, but the actual EDA project is the result of an Anglo-French project. At the WEAG meeting in Rome on 17 November 1998 Ministers agreed to take the "Masterplan for the EAA" as the basis for further development and established a Group of National Experts. The “Masterplan” would develop the necessary rules and regulations as well as the structure and working procedures for the EAA in order to allow Ministers in 2001 to decide on EAA implementation.

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790 Alessandro Pansa ‘La difesa europea: l’industria delle armi. Tecnologia, concorrenza e cooperazione’ in Antonio Missiroli, Alessandro Pansa La Difesa Europea (Genova : il Melangolo, 2007) p. 159
791 See the WEU Declaration no.30 annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht
In fact, the concept of an evolutionary process for the EAA was agreed at the WEAG meeting in Rome on 16 May 2002. EAA should be established as soon as all appropriate conditions were met and political consensus reached. Moreover, the WEAG took into consideration the identification of possible options for European armament structures taking into account ESDP developments. In early 2002, the Spanish presidency also tried to revive a 1997 Commission’s Action Plan on Aerospace and Defence to establish a European Armament Policy, encountering huge opposition in particular from neutral Member States. Eventually, the appropriate conditions for an Agency were found in the ongoing works of the Convention for the future of Europe regarding the ESDP framework.

**French proposal and British approach:** In Autumn of 2002, French Commissioner, Michel Barnier, chairing the Convention’s Defence Working Group raised the issue of the establishment of an EU armaments and research agency. The UK proposal for an agency focusing on defence capabilities rather than armaments collaboration gained support and was included in the final text as a proposal for a ‘European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency’. The actual EDA stemmed from Anglo-French interests in a European armaments and capabilities agency. Moreover, the British government considered the Agency should be considered outside the Constitutional Treaty framework. At the Franco-British defence summit at Le Touquet on 4 February 2003, they agreed on an EU capabilities agency to coordinate arms procurement, and to improve the European DTIB. The Anglo-Italian summit in Rome on 21 February 2003 also endorsed the establishment of the agency to incorporate the WEAG/WEAO, the OCCAR, and LoI/FA roles and ruling principles (like the Baden Baden

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793 “Rome Declaration” Meeting of the WEAG Defence Ministers, Rome, 16 May 2002, Para.4 and 3.
794 Spanish presidency of EU non paper Basis for a European Armament Policy February 2002; see Nones et alii op.cit, p.7
principles of the OCCAR) and procedures in order to gradually open the European defence market.\textsuperscript{796}

In the view of the incoming Italian Presidency a key role of this Agency would be to integrate the closer cooperation initiatives that already exist in the armaments sector with regard to some Member States (WEAG/WEAO, the OCCAR, LOI/FA).\textsuperscript{797}

In the meantime the Greek presidency took notice of the issues raised by the POLARM.\textsuperscript{798} The POLARM had focused its discussions:

- on the cooperative R&T programmes in order to replace the WEAG/WEAO role;
- on the supply security by suggesting to replicate a structure similar to the LoI/FA initiative;
- on cooperative industrial programmes, and in particular on the need to replace \textit{juste retour} principle with OCCAR’s \textit{global balance}.

POLARM proposals just tried to take on initiatives already existing in the European intergovernmental framework. This was the reason for its unsuccessful outcome.\textsuperscript{799}

**EDA and the Italian Presidency:** At Thessaloniki Council in June 2003 EU Member States welcomed the Anglo-French project and decided to establish an ‘intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments within the EU’.

Italian Presidency had included the creation of the Agency in its ESDP priorities.\textsuperscript{800} Therefore, it had initiated the work of the Informal Advisory Group of with MoDs representatives from the EU Member

\textsuperscript{796} Dichiarazione sulla difesa e sicurezza, Vertice italo-britannico, Villa Madama, 21 febbraio 2003
\textsuperscript{797} Italian MoD \textit{Future Developments of the European Defence} (Rome : MoD, 2003)
\textsuperscript{798} POLARM is a EU working group on armaments policy under the authority of COREPER. It was established in 1995.
\textsuperscript{799} Nones et alii \textit{op.cit.} p.10
\textsuperscript{800} The Italian presidency ESDP programme was presented to the COPS on 1 July 2003.
States. On 4 September 2003, the COREPER established an Ad Hoc Group for the Agency, which was chaired by the Italian Army Lieutenant General, Gianni Botondi. The NADs held a meeting on 16 September 2003 to discuss the progress of the Agency and Ad Hoc Group reported to COPS on 9 October 2003. \(^{801}\) Moreover, an informal high level Defence-Industry Seminar was held in Brussels on the 5 November 2003 in order to raise the awareness of the industrial actors on the importance of continuing Defence-Industry dialogue in developing the European DTIB. The GAERC of 17 November 2003 took the formal decision to establish the agency renamed as the EDA in Brussels in the Summer of 2004. Therefore, the Ad hoc Group was replaced in January 2004 by the Agency Establishment Team (AET) which was to prepare a comprehensive plan and elements for the EDA draft joint Action to be submitted to the European Council of June 2004. \(^{802}\)

The GAERC discussed the following EDA tasks:

- the development of military capabilities by means of the identification of the operational needs and common requirements and to identify financial priorities;
- the promotion of armaments cooperation by means of multinational programmes in collaboration with the OCCAR initiatives;
- the harmonisation of the European defence market building on LoI/FA experience;
- the promotion of European DTIB;
- the promotion of defence research activities including the space-related activities.

Furthermore, Italy tried to strengthen the role of the Agency in the Constitutional framework. At the Naples Conclave in November 2003

\(^{801}\) Daniela Manca ‘Italian Presidency plans for ESDP’ in *European Security Review* Number 19 October 2003, ISIS Europe

\(^{802}\) Council of the European Union “ESDP Presidency Report” Doc.15814/03, Brussels, 9 December 2003, para IV.12; Honor Mahony ‘EU defence agency gets the go ahead’ in *EUobserver*, 17 November 2003
the Italian Presidency included the EDA in the protocol for permanent structured cooperation of the draft Constitutional Treaty. However, Italy had to face the truth when in December 2003, the Treaty was not approved. By adopting the British approach on the EDA’s autonomy from the Constitutional framework, the Italian presidency could start already in December 2003 the work of the AET. The British MoD Director for International Security Policy, Nick Witney, was appointed to chair the AET and later the EDA. France, Germany and Spain presented other candidates, Witney was chosen mainly to reassert the British influence on the EDA. The EDA was formally established by a Joint Action in July 2004.

8.2.3 Participating Member States administrative interests

Although formally it is an EU agency, the EDA remains an intergovernmental agency specialising in industrial defence cooperation. The pMSs are EDA main shareholders, so intergovernmental principles are respected and decisions are taken by the Steering Board composed of one delegate from each pMS, and a Commission representative. Therefore, Member States remain the main actors in the market while EDA staff and the EU Commission continue to play a small role in the decision-making process.

The Steering Board meets twice a year at ministerial level, and more frequently at the level of NADs, National Research Directors, and National Capability Planners and Policy Directors. The decision-making process is analogous to that of the EU Council; decisions made by qualified majority according to art 23(2) TEU. The power of veto allows a representative of pMS may declare to oppose a decision for important and stated reasons of national policy. In this case, the matter

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805 Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency

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is referred to the Council asking for guidelines, or alternatively, the Steering Board, acting by qualified majority, may decide to refer the matter to the Council for decision, that shall act by unanimity. In any case, the EDA’s intergovernmentalism allows a “big tent” approach, or enhanced cooperation, as groups of pMS may collaborate on specific projects in which they have industrial interests. Political will of pMS in taking action and starting projects is crucial for building capabilities. The Steering Board provides the EDA with a certain “power of persuasion” that allows it to facilitate cooperation between pMS by suggesting workable solutions and identifying problems; above all it would name and shame non-collaborative pMS.806

The EDA management team includes the Head, a position held by the High Representative for CFSP, and the Chief Executive, who is responsible for EDA staff and management. According to its mission objectives the EDA is organised into five directorates: Capabilities Development; Armaments Cooperation; Industry and Market; R&T; and Corporate Services. The Chief Executive is supported by the Planning and Policy Unit and the Media and Communication Unit. A strict balance of pMS’ interests was reflected in the Management Board appointments. In 2004 Nick Witney was appointed Chief Executive mainly to reassure the British on keeping the EDA consistent with British practice.

On the other hand, the appointment of directors followed a Franco-German criteria: given its economic strength, Germany obtained the Deputy Chief Executive position for Hilmar Linnenkamp; France gained an important position for industrial policy, with Bertrand de Cordoue as R&T Director and later Jacques Bayet as Corporate Service Director. Thanks to its Franco-German loyalty Belgium punched above its weight with Pierre Hougardy as Capabilities Director. So did Sweden with Ulf Hammarström appointed as Industry and Market Director. Ultimately the Italian armed forces defended their administrative interests well and obtained a good position with Brigadier Carlo Magrassi as Armaments Director. Unfortunately Italian diplomats were

806 House of Lords cit. Chapter 3, para 51, and Conclusions, para 84.
not as good at defending their civilian interests: notwithstanding the high qualifications of the Italian candidate, the Media and Communication Head went to Poland, which claimed a position for the new accession countries. The Netherlands obtained the Head of Planning and Policy Unit with Dick Zandee.807

Less important for defence industry, such as R&T or Industry and Market Directorates, the Armaments Directorate provided a good opportunity in particular for the military, being responsible for promoting multilateral cooperative projects, coordinating existing national programmes and promoting effective military procurement. Magrassi could coordinate with his fellow countryman General Cardinali, Occar Director. The LoI/FA countries were well represented on the EDA Management Board; Belgium owed the position to Occar participation rather than to European orthodoxy. Spain’s part in LoI/FA and Occar was less well represented, maybe because it had already Solana as the Head of EDA, and it did not participate in all the EDA activities, such as EDEM (see Table 11)

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**TABLE 11**

EDA ORGANISATION CHART 2004-2007

![EDA Organisation Chart 2004-2007](source: EDA)

The second management board appointments reflected a different balance. Germany, Italy and Poland gained positions, while the UK, France and Belgium lost out. In May 2007, the German Deputy NAD, Alexander Weis, was appointed as Chief Executive to replace Witney by October 2007. Germany could not claim full victory as Linnekamp was replaced by two deputy directors. General Magrassi of Italy was promoted to Deputy Chief Executive for Strategy and Polish Deputy NAD, Adam Sowa, was appointed as the other Deputy Chief Executive responsible for operations. Franco Baldi of Italy was to replace Bayet as Corporate Service Director. Italy and Poland had now two positions each. However Italy has no staff positions in the Industry and Market Directorate, a very important Directorate from the industrial point of view. In October 2007 Jonathan Mullin of the UK was appointed to replace Hougardy of Belgium as Capabilities Director, and Jukka Juusti of Finland, replaced Magrassi of Italy as Armaments Directorate.  

So Finland was rewarded for its active role in EDA programmes and the R&T directorate became French property when de Cordoue was replaced by Bréant (see Table 12).  

### TABLE 12

EDA ORGANISATION CHART SINCE 2008

(Source: EDA)

808 EDA press release ‘New EDA Directors For Capabilies, Armaments Appointed’ 5 November 2007

809 EDA press release ‘EDA Research & Technology Director Appointed’ 21 May 2008
Spain claimed a management position, when in July 2007 it decided to join the EDEM. So, in December 2008, Arturo Alfonso-Meiriño was appointed as the Industry and Market Director to replace Hammarström of Sweden in early January 2009, thus giving Spain a good position; this is not considering Solana’s role as EDA Head.\textsuperscript{810} For the purpose of this study, we will not keep record of the EDA’s many initiatives for equipment programmes and strengthening the European DTIB but we will look into the pMS’ interests.

\textbf{8.3 Current Intergovernmental debate on EDA development}

\textbf{8.3.1 The debate on EDA financing}

A more efficient spending and a competitive more European industry are the two main objectives of EDA. Defence spending is a crucial issue in the development of European Armaments programme. One of the main constraints in the development of EDA projects is the limited amount of national defence budgets. The pMS combined defence Budgets of pMS are estimated to be worth about € 160 Bn per year, but and above all within them there is resistance to raise supranational or national budgets for defence. Nevertheless, the total European spending is ‘\textit{still a huge amount of money}’ and is less worrying than its fragmentation across pMS: too much is spent on a national basis, while a European effort would be more effective, both on the demand and on the supply side.\textsuperscript{811}

To partially overcome this problem the EU Council approved a Force Catalogue in November 2006 and the following month a Capability Development Plan (CDP) to set out a structured approach to

\textsuperscript{810} EDA press release ‘EDA Industry and Market Director Appointed’ 4 December 2008

\textsuperscript{811} Nick Witney statement in: House of Lords \textit{cit.}, Chapt.3.
building capabilities beyond the Headline Goal 2010. The CDP would assist pMS in developing their national plans and programmes, but would not be over-arching or supranational; national defence planning and investment decision-taking would remain subject to the sovereign processes of each pMS. The CDP, however, would help in coordinating national efforts and looking for better value for money for constrained defence budgets. This gave birth to a CDP plan endorsed by EDA in July 2008, which should be implemented in concert with EDTIB strategy of May 2007, the “European Defence Research & Technology Strategy” of November 2008, and the “European Armament Cooperation Strategy” of October 2008.

Moreover, the EDA is entitled to manage both a general budget and single budgets for specific programmes. In November 2006 the EU Council agreed to postpone the setting out of the EDA three-year financial framework, because the UK opposed the French proposal for a strong increase in the operational budget over three years (see Table 13, and it asked for more clarity about EDA spending plans. The EU Council unanimously adopted the EDA budget of €22 M for 2007.\(^{812}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Functioning</th>
<th>Operational</th>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>10</td>
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</tbody>
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(Data are in € M)

On 10 November 2008 the Relex Council approved a 2009 budget of €30 M, including an €8 M operational budget for research, which allowed the recruitment of new staff. An EDA three-year financial framework, however, had not yet been approved.

Back in 2006 French Defence Minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, had claimed that the British position was a sign that the UK was no longer serious about bolstering European capabilities. On the other hand, France tried to save money on ESDP. In 2002 France and Italy had

\(^{812}\) Mark John ‘UK stays out as EU launches defence research fund’ Reuters, 13 November 2006.
agreed in principle that the Stability Pact criteria should be flexible on defence investment as declared by Alliot-Marie.\footnote{Nava Massimo ‘Michèle Alliot-Marie: Le nostre spese militari? Servono a dare credibilità all'Europa’ in Corriere della Sera, 28 September 2002}

On the other hand, the UK have been clear on EDA financing:

“The Council has set the EDA highly ambitious tasks. We are concerned that the EDA should not be burdened with expectations which it has not been given the resources to fulfil. We urge the EDA to be very transparent in reporting on its activities and spending. (...) We will return to the issue of the EDA’s funding at the time the Council is due to determine the three year budgetary framework for the Agency.”\footnote{House of Lords cit., Chapt. 2., para 27, 28; and Conclusions, para. 81, 82.}

The British were not keen on contributing to EU Budgets, and EDA budget is paid on a standard percentage of pMS’ GNI. Therefore, the UK contributed € 250,000 to EDA in 2004 and the following year, by adding the set-up costs, its contribution reached € 2.5 M. From 2006 onwards UK was expected to contribute €1.5 M per year, and the annual contribution could grow if French plans were approved. However, the British government stated that EDA “needs to prove its worth”.\footnote{House of Lords cit.} Ultimately, Germany and Italy seem not to pay great attention to the EDA that they would maintain at minimum standard with small budget and just a coordination role.\footnote{Le Britannique Nick Witney prend la direction de l'Agence européenne de l'armement cit.}

These diverging approaches show how difficult it could be for countries to accept the effective launch of the EDA. Thus there is a risk that the EDA, far from becoming a driver of European technological development could join the list of useless and expensive EU bodies.\footnote{Pansa, op. cit.}
8.3.2 The participation to R&T programmes

The diverging British and French attitudes towards the EDA do not apply to European defence *tout court*, and the Anglo-French summits in St.Malo and Le Touquet bear witness to this. British presidency, following the Hampton Court informal meeting on 27 October 2005, set an ambitious “Hampton Court Agenda” aimed at improving EU defence capabilities, increasing spending on defence R&T, enhancing European collaboration on R&T projects, and last but not least the increasing CFSP funding. Unfortunately, the follow-up to the Hampton Court summit soon lost momentum.

Nevertheless, the UK and France disagreed on the approach to the EDA and the UK has traditionally opposed:

“an armaments agency on the grounds that it could all too easily have become ‘a sort of benefit to industry without regard to proper defence needs’.”  

France, Germany, and Italy stress the role of the EDA in the promotion of the European DTIB, while the UK does not consider it as a priority. The French industry, in particular the EADS, was disappointed by the small EDA staff and budget because it had hoped to benefit from supranational R&T investments. In short, France sees the EDA as a European body which should lead the defence industry, dispose of a consistent budget and promote huge programmes in support to national defence industry, while the UK considers the EDA as a coordinating tool for pMS rather than a spending entity controlling budgets for large scale research projects. A British MoD spokesman stated that the UK would look to find a compromise, but the EDA did not need a central budget, and he went on to define the EDA as a “dating agency” bringing together Member States, when it is needed, and supporting research programmes to secure good value for money.

The fact is that the money is paid out of the MoD’s budget and the MoD initiated the British revolution in defence matters, basing it on

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819 House of Lords *cit.*, Chapt. 2, para.1
efficiency and “better value for money”. The DIS in 2005 and the DTS in 2006 identified huge investment in national programmes. The British MoD is not willing to participate in the EDA projects because of the high degree of duplication of MoD programmes. Furthermore, British conservatives say the EDA projects could harm defence ties with the US and are covert moves by nations such as France to weaken NATO. Hence in December 2006, the British decision not to take part in the three year Defence R&T Joint Investment Programme (JIP) on Force Protection nor to be involved in the advanced wireless technology known as Software-Defined Radio Programme angered some Member States.

On the other hand, France is the main contributor to JIP, (€ 12 M) Germany and Poland follow (with € 10 M each) and France will be the leading nation for Software-Defined Radio (€ 40 M), with Thales as lead company in co-operation with Raytheon of US. Finland, France, Italy, Sweden, and Spain are participating in the SDR study to enhance the interoperability of medium-term national SDR projects which may also increase the interoperability of European and US systems. This is to reassure the British critics who see it as a threat to transatlantic relations by narrowing the technology lead of the US. The JIP involved 19 pMS and established a mechanism for collaborative action with the definition of a common budget to fund the whole programme, managed by a pMS committee with powers to oversee the selection of individual projects. In any case, France is aware that EDA projects can only succeed with British participation.

**Anglo-French rapprochement:** The French “White Paper on Defence and National Security” published on 17 June 2008, during its European Presidency, confirms the French intention of establishing closer relations with the UK. To do so, France needed to return to NATO as soon as possible and to modernise its armed forces, creating capabilities similar to those of the UK, participating in CVF and nuclear submarines programmes. But first and foremost, as French President, Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister Gordon Brown agreed at the

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820 *UK stays out as EU launches defence research fund* cit.
France-UK summit in March 2008, more resources must be allocated to R&D and cooperation shall be increased in particular by means of cross-investments and a joint industrial strategy for complex weapons.\textsuperscript{821}

As stated by French Defence Minister, Hervé Morin, France and the UK together account for 70\% of R&D expenditure in the EU, spending 35\% each to support their DTIB. However, French expenditure on military R&D has dropped by 40\% since 1990. The reorganisation of the armed forces and the identification of areas of sovereign authority, in the French White Paper are similar to British DIS. Morin also stated that the strengthening of the European defence industry depends on the intra-community transfers. The creation of the EDEM is a priority shared by the UK and France.\textsuperscript{822} Having the “most open defence procurement market in Europe”, the UK considers EDEM as a priority and “an area in which the EDA may come to play a prominent part” by means of the voluntary Code of Conduct. This would not mean that the EDA would became the sole customer for the EDEM, but that EDA would have a role in monitoring the application of Code of Conduct.

\textbf{8.3.3 The Code of Conduct for a competitive EDEM}

Competition and transparency are still an issue in the defence market since states are the only customers and often grant state aid to national industries to meet the high cost of defence investments. The security requirements for supplies to the armed forces and the continuous updating of technologies makes competition difficult in the sector.

The EDA “Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement” is a voluntary and non-binding agreement aimed at increasing transparency and competition; its efficiency raises concerns because of its non-binding nature and the small budget allocated to the EDA. In

\textsuperscript{821} “Joint UK-France Summit Declaration”, 27 March 2008, p.10;
\textsuperscript{822} Déclaration de M. Hervé Morin, ministre de la défense, sur les réformes engagées au sein du ministère de la Défense, à Paris le 1er avril 2008, release 7 April 2008
fact, political will is pivotal for the development of a working European market. Nevertheless, pMS responded enthusiastically to the initiative and 22 out of 24 pMS had joined by 1 July 2006 when the EDEM intergovernmental regime was launched.823 According to the Code of Conduct clauses, subscribing pMS are called to publicise procurement opportunities through an Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) managed by the EDA that through a punctual reporting and monitoring system will ensure transparency and mutual accountability. The EDEM regime should streamline fairness and assure equal opportunities for all suppliers based on other subscribing pMS, by publicizing objective criteria for selecting bidders and awarding contracts. Whenever subscribing pMS decide not to apply it, explanation from the other national authorities will be requested. The House of Lords warned on the need for transparency because: “this approach has disadvantages as there is a great deal of uncertainty whether other Member States will open their defence markets”.824

**Italy**: Italy signed the Code of Conduct on 30 April 2006, but together with Greece, it has been very slow in opening its defence Market. The fact is that Italian perception of the EDA role is to consider it as a catalyst and developer of capabilities, rather than a customer for an autonomous Defence European market. Moreover, speed as well as transparency have become crucial issues for pMS in opening their markets. An off-hand change in rules established by general practice could have the effect of throwing off balance long-term investments, and defence industry and market actors would oppose it supported by pMS in doing so.825

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823 At EDEM launch these were: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and UK. Only Hungary and Spain decided not to join the Code of Conduct regime
824 House of Lords, *cit.* Chapter 3, para. 67-68 ; Conclusions, para. 88
For Italy, the development of a defence procurement single market would be positive, if the time schedule fitted the needs and time schedule of Italian industry and did not leave national industry behind. This could happen if the process were too rapid or Italian industry were excluded from an exclusive European industrial club. Hence, the industrial sector replicates the fears of the political sector.

**Review:** A Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain was also established, with the objective of extending the benefits of greater competition to SMEs that may not be able to bid for contracts directly but could act as sub-contractors.826 In October 2008 the EDA Steering Board reviewed the application of the Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain and EBB. From July 2006 to September 2008 only 18 of the 26 subscribing pMS published 308 calls for tender on the EBB, of which only 127 were awarded, and only 28 - less than 25% - involved cross-border transfers (a value of € 2.3 Bn). The EDA blames industry for the limited cross-border bidding: companies only responded to one third of the contract notices posted by other pMS. Nevertheless a cross-border contract was awarded in 70% of these cases. Only 60 of the 260 contract opportunities posted up to 2007 were awarded for a total value of € 616 M; of these, 44 were assigned by pMS to national industries and only 16 were cross-border contracts. Furthermore, pMS had classified 222 contracts, for a total of € 2.5 Bn under Art.296 exceptions to the Code of Conduct.

8.3.4 **Opening the Market: the Interpretative Communication on Art.296 and the Defence Package**

Defence procurement law is an important element of the fragmentation of the European Defence Procurement Market that is estimated to account more than € 80 Bn. EU law provides that defence contracts fall under the EU Internal Market rules.827 Nevertheless, according to

826 Market opportunities for SMEs will be made public in the national public contract bulletin of the relevant subscribing Member State.

827 Directive 2004/18/EC.
Art.296 TEU, national authorities can make an exception to this principle evoking “essential security interests”, and since, the interpretation of the article is mainly left to Member States; they tend to interpret it in a non-restrictive way.

The Art.296 includes several exemptions to the common EU trade schemes and this has discouraging results when left to the interpretation of national authorities.

As a result the majority of defence contracts in Europe are exempted from Internal Market rules and are awarded on the basis of national procurement rules; Member States can privilege their national industries versus foreign companies. Italy is, however, less efficient than France or the UK in taking advantage of not only Art.296 exemptions but also of state aid.828

In order to open the EDEM, and to develop it in line with single market rules, the Commission deemed it necessary to narrow down the application of Art.296 in order to develop cross-border transfers. The EC Commission Green Paper (COM(2004)608 final) and the Communication (COM(2005) 626) on defence procurement led to the publication of:

- the Interpretative Communication on the application on Art.296 in the field of defence procurement, adopted by EC Commission in December 2006, to clarify the existing legal framework.

The Commission’s Interpretative Communication on Art.296: The Interpretative Communication on Art.296 aimed at boosting the EDEM by reducing Member States’ broad interpretation and exemptions by clarifying the dividing line between defence acquisitions which comply with “essential interests of security” and those that do not. The Commission tells pMS to open up non-sensitive sections of their defence markets to competition from foreign countries by stating that

the Art.296 clause should not be used “in a restrictive way” and only “procurements which are of the highest importance for the security of the Member States” should be exempt, hence only the most sensitive goods and services used by the military would be exempted; all other goods such as clothing, catering, vehicles and non-military goods and services, would be subject to competitive, cross-border bidding.

The Interpretative Communication on Art.296 also represents a stage in the fight between the Commission and Member States on supranational powers. However, Member States may find other ways to support their national defence industries, most of which - against the EU principles - are state-owned or receive state aid. Officially all pMS welcomed the Interpretative Communication, although off-the-record, except for the UK, most pMS were concerned about losing their privileges.

**The Defence Package:** On 5 December 2007 the EC Commission released the long-awaited, so-called, Defence Package which included:

- a communication with recommendations for fostering the competitiveness in the sector;
- a directive on defence procurement for intra-European competition on domestic markets and
- a directive on intra-EU transfers of defence products.

Security of supply, confidentiality, urgency, transfers and transit, harmonisation of export policies, state aid these are the main issues that are tackled in the ‘Directive’ coordinating national procedures for the procurement of defence goods.

The views of consultative committees from Internal Market Directorate General are taken into account in the drafting of the directive, together with the inputs gathered from public and private industry sectors in the framework of the Public Consultation launched by the Commission in 2005. The Defence package has been welcomed by European industry, by means of ASD, as a measure that makes the market more open and transparent. For the ASD, it is important to keep stringent control over the export of sensitive equipment and technologies, but, as the Commission proposes with the Intra-Community Transfers, national procedures within the EU can be
harmonised while maintaining government responsibility on exporting licenses.

The directive on defence procurement for intra-European competition on domestic markets was approved by the European Parliament on 14 January 2009 with only slight differences from the original draft. The French Presidency had been repeatedly trying to put forward its agenda, but only a few of its proposals were adopted, in particular the principle of reciprocity in transfers with the US was not finally adopted. The directive also applies to sensitive non-military security equipment contracts published by police forces. Furthermore, in the normal practice, MoDs award to the prime contractor both an R&T contract and a manufacturing contract; under the directive the manufacturing contract, which is the most lucrative item, is put out to tender. The ASD stated that the directive did not meet their intended objectives and called it a “mixed blessing”. The directive overlooks the fundamental principle in defence procurement that products are designed at national taxpayers’ expense for national armed forces:

“To apply the logic of EU internal market rules which rigidly divide R&D and production phases is to reduce the incentives for defence capability investment by both the public and private sectors. Under these rules, will governments invest in R&D if the resultant production for their Armed Forces may be conducted anywhere? Will companies invest in R&D if they cannot be confident of winning the resultant production? Such a philosophy has never been applied in defence markets. Furthermore, it does not provide a satisfactory business model for industry.”

In any case, collaborative R&T programmes and multilateral programmes managed by NATO agencies, or EDA or other groupings are exempted from the Defence Package’s application. Member States will have 18 months to convert the Directive into national law, after the directive’s final approval by the EU Council, and then another 18 months to get the Defence Package implemented.

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830 François Gayet ASD Secretary General in ASD Press Release, 14 January 2009
8.4 EDA cooperation with other organizations

8.4.1 EDA relations with OCCAR and LoI/FA

Italy considers the EDA an important element of the European Defence community along with other organisations such as NATO, OCCAR and LoI/FA. The collaboration between the EDA and the WEAO, LoI/FA and the OCCAR is encouraged by EDA Joint Action. According to the EU decision to merge the WEU with EU structures, and according to WEAG NAD decisions, EDA took over the tasks of WEAG in March 2005 (in May for Panel II only) and the WEAO Research Cell in August 2006. However, the EDA will co-exist with the OCCAR and LoI/FA, thus making the Institutional framework more puzzling. LoI/FA is mainly a multinational cooperation to drive European Defence research: “Defence research was regarded in Europe as a game only six people played”. While the OCCAR is essentially a multinational agency: “to manage co-operative programmes once they have gone beyond the R&T arena”, this means that where EDA stops “is roughly where OCCAR starts in terms of procurement”. However, EDA and OCCAR initiatives on addressing the state of European military capabilities and of the European DTIB are overlapping. The British considered that if the EDA were successful, a rationalisation could include the merging of the two bodies. According to Witney, EDA Chief executive, it would not be possible to merge EDA and OCCAR, for the following reasons:

- it would take time, and the EDA has to focus on concrete targets

833 Nick Witney quoted in UK stays out as EU launches defence research fund cit.
834 Mr Fraser of the MoD, and Nick Witney, House of Lords cit. Chapter 3, para. 34.
835 House of Lords cit., Chapter 3, para. 34-36, and Conclusions, para. 83.
- they have a different nature, the EDA is an Agency of the EU Council, the OCCAR is a means of cooperation between six countries, who are also EU Member States
- their role is different, the EDA has a role in developing the ESDP, whereas the OCCAR simply manages multinational projects.

The OCCAR could be an ideal partner for the EDA to manage specific projects. This position is also shared by the OCCAR Director, General Cardinali.836

For French Minister, Morin, EDA-OCCAR cooperation could help in more efficient spending the European Defence Budgets, by coordinating common projects and avoiding duplication. The EDA should become a catalyst for European thinking and investment being able to generate equipment programmes and thus becoming a breeding ground for European armaments cooperation. The OCCAR should be integrated in the rationalization. French Defence Minister, Morin, acting EU president suggested OCCAR to become EDA’s strongarm: a programme conceived at EDA could be easily transferred under OCCAR management.837 Morin also added that the British had agreed on that project and he had entrusted the MP Yves Fromion to draft a policy paper.

**Fromion Report:** On 17 July 2008 Fromion delivered a report to Morin suggesting ideas to consolidate the European Defence Industry.838 The report advises consolidation of supply by means of TNC’s integration (BAE Systems, EADS, Finmeccanica, and Thales) and the consolidation of demand with the launch of cooperative EDA armaments programmes on the basis of CDP, because Member States have no longer resources to maintain an efficient DTIB just for domestic demand.839

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836 Cardinali *cit.*
837 Morin *cit.*
838 Yves Fromion *Les moyens de développer et de structurer une industrie européenne de défense*, 30 June 2008
839 Morin *cit.*
To solve the interinstitutional dispute, and to develop a European Defence Policy, Fromion suggests an ambitious division of labor between LoI/FA, Occar and EDA according to three circles. In the first circle, LoI/FA is to become a forum on strengthening the EDTIB, and the 6 members would lobby EDA for common projects. LoI/FA shall boost the creation of a “espace européen d’échange des équipements de défense” (E4D) to support the EDTIB, while it would progressively delegate to EDA its unfinished business. In the second and main circle, the EDA would become the pivot for European equipment cooperation by generating and financing common programmes. In the third circle, the Occar would become a natural receiver for projects conceived by the EDA Armaments Directorate, as stated by Morin.840

Therefore an EDA-Occar agreement should be signed. Hence, to ensure the EDA works in a complementary way with Occar, and LoI, and in compliance with EDA Joint Action, the French Presidency finalised an EDA-Occar Statement on cooperation endorsed by the EU Council on 10 November 2008. This resolves EDA-Occar relations.841

The OCCAR became a favoured partner of the EDA, which implementing a pMS’ proposal could transfer to OCCAR the management of programmes resulting from EDA’s own preparatory work, in compliance with the European Armaments Cooperation Strategy and the EDTIB Strategy. To assure consistency and continuity, the EDA would be involved in following up programmes which have been transferred to OCCAR management and may make recommendations on those programmes to OCCAR.842

Therefore, the EDA strategies (CDP plan, EDTIB strategy, EDRT Strategy and European Armaments Cooperation Strategy) should become the cornerstone for the rationalisation of European capabilities building. The ERDT strategy is also proposed as “an ambitious guide” for the different Defence R&T stakeholders, including pMS, Occar, and

840 Fromion *industrie européenne de défense* cit., recommendation 2 and p. 30
841 Council of the EU Press Release, 2903rd meeting of the Council General Affairs and External Relations, 15396/08 (Presse 319) 10-11 November 2008
842 “Statement of the Council of the European Union on cooperation between the EDA and Occar” Annex I to Council conclusions on the ESDP, 15465/08, 10 November 2008.
NATO in their investment.\textsuperscript{843} To be honest, the EDA seems not to have gained sufficient authority to tell NATO – or the US - what to do or where to invest its money.

\subsection*{8.4.2 EDA or NATO: duplication and overlap}

NATO still maintains its pivotal role for European defence and in most European countries NATO standards and requirements are the benchmarks for evaluating the quality of the equipment. European capabilities on the tactical, and at least partially on the operational level, will closely resemble those of the US Armed Forces, simply because they are designed to fulfil the same requirements and originate from the same political demands (low casualties, low collateral damage). European politicians would be expected to put these forward too.\textsuperscript{844} So, European countries, which are part of NATO, base their requirements on US requirements, but with a technological gap of 5 or 6 years. In the 1990s the US Army started the Revolution in Military Affairs that involved an extensive use of state-of-the-art technologies including the digitalization process and the development of the NCW concept.\textsuperscript{845} In the early 2000s, US Defence Secretary developed a transformational doctrine for the US Armed Forces that was later abandoned for the NCW.

In the UK, and to a lesser extent in Sweden, an NEC concept was developed making large use of legacy systems (in-service systems to be integrated into the NEC). Therefore France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain started to develop the NEC concept, driven by the interests of their National Industries.\textsuperscript{846} More recently, after the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{843} EDA \textit{A European Defence Research & Technology Strategy}, 10 November 2008, para 4.
\item \textsuperscript{844} Joachim Rohde, Andrew James, ‘The future of transatlantic armaments cooperation’ SWP working paper, Berlin, July 2004, p.2
\item \textsuperscript{845} See Burkard Schmitt \textit{From cooperation to integration: defence and aerospace industries in Europe, Chaillot Paper 40} (Paris : Institute for Security Studies –WEU, 2000) p. 8
\item \textsuperscript{846} For Italy see: \textit{La Trasformazione Net-Centrica, Il Futuro dell’interoperabilità Multinazionale e Interdisciplinare} (Roma : Stato
Prague summit, NATO started to develop a NATO NEC concept; the Steering Board directed the EDA to take forward the work on NEC for the ESDP working closely with all relevant Council actors, and stakeholders.\textsuperscript{847} NATO and the non-EU states are often associated with decision making process and the implementation of specific projects of EDA. The real gap, however, is one of doctrines on the use of the NEC in NATO or ESDP.\textsuperscript{848}

From a technological perspective, the NEC needs a horizontal integration that can only be performed by the defence industry, because the Military are accustomed to top-down integration, and ‘system of systems’ integration has a depersonalizing effect on operative networks that cannot be dealt with without a change of mentality on the part of the military.\textsuperscript{849} Therefore, at least in Italy, Industry plays a major role in NEC development than MoD, but defence industry is still national-based and without Foreign Ministry support could not rationalise the management of international programmes on its own. Furthermore, the harmonisation of doctrines can be performed only by MoDs.

The NEC example raises the issue of duplication and overlap as the same programmes, force protection or airlift capabilities for instance, are replicated at NATO, EDA, and at national level in particular in LoI/FA countries. In Italy, there are NEC programmes at NATO, EDA and national level; the national level was developed as a military-industrial partnership. It seems to be the most advanced as it is a newcomer and has been able to benefit from the lessons learned by the other programmes.\textsuperscript{850} Information sharing between the entities is limited, thus resulting in a waste of money and time. British Government admits that ‘it would be wrong to say that there is no

\textsuperscript{847} EDA work plan 2006.
\textsuperscript{848} See Guy Ben-Ari “European Commitment To Network-Based Operations and the Transatlantic Doctrine Gap” CSIS Paper, August 2005
\textsuperscript{849} Interview with Italian Military Representative, SHAPE, 4 December 2007.
\textsuperscript{850} Audizione di rappresentati AIAD, Resoconto stenografico, seduta del 27 gennaio 2009, Commissione IV Difesa, Camera dei Deputati, p.21
duplication between the agency and work that is done in NATO’ but maintains that the EDA ‘will have a different focus.’

Division of labour: the specific role of the EDA is to build capabilities for ESDP, while NATO has a broader mandate. In so far as the EDA respect this smaller role, the “different focus” is a valid point. According to NATO sources overlapping could be avoided by insisting on core competencies; the two organisations would then have different but converging tasks. However, as we have seen, national, NATO and ESDP requirements are similar, although different on scale and in geographical context, thus resulting in overlapping programmes. Furthermore, the decision-making of programmes is top-down, so, given the limited resources available, every Member State has a preference for specific programmes. Thus, the reorganisation of these programmes should be tackled in a rational way. By transferring the European subsidiarity principle (Art.5.2 TEU) to industrial cooperation, the programmes could be developed at the most appropriate level, and in conformity with the leading principle of international R&T cooperation. Since national programmes may have limited resources, international cooperation could be better. In any case the most appropriate framework should be chosen either NATO or EDA, of course leaving aside Occar.

“In any event NATO has not made significant progress in the areas of the EDA’s tasks”. The unsaid reason is the technological gap between the US and European allies, and the lack of interest of the US in developing common capabilities. Therefore, in the EDA “different membership can be an advantage”, and neutral states, Sweden in particular, may bring something to the table. Furthermore, unlike NATO where “European countries cannot hide behind or blame lack of progress on the US, ’a very predominant partner in NATO’”, in EDA the Steering Board may exert its “power of persuasion”. Increasing pressure, by “naming and shaming” recalcitrant pMS. The building up of the EDA and the need to meet

851 House of Lords cit., Chap. 3.1., para 46
852 Ibidem
853 Interview with NATO official, Bruxelles, 4 December 2007
854 British government in House of Lords cit., Chap. 3.1., para 46, 47 and 84
the headline goal created considerable pressure in many Europhile countries and gave them the advantage of the momentum. Therefore, even the British accepted that the EDA could “have some advantages over the NATO framework” and “The EU framework may prove more effective in mobilizing political commitment and providing impetus for action” provided that “Communication and co-operation with NATO will still be paramount to avoid duplication of effort.”

In NATO-EDA relations it is “nice to be ambitious but is better to be realistic”. The NATO-EDA cooperation never did take off, giving room to further duplication and to a fight for supremacy between the organisations. According to an Italian General NATO-EDA relations are “good in surface, but ice cold in depth”. Italy did not take sides and continues to sponsor both organisations, and to take note of disputes. Interoperability is a crucial factor, but while the Italian defence industry tends to develop equipment autonomously without taking into account interoperability, the Italian military is very keen on interoperability. Interoperability, however, is subject to other technological and organisational constraints.

The potential of the EDA, in particular the “power of persuasion”, never materialised as British opposition to the budget and EDA programmes showed. The great expectations of the EDA are being frustrated by the lack of political will and coordination between pMS. As a sign of good will, EDA and NATO, in particular the ACT, are cooperating on measures to improve the availability of helicopters for operations. The results of the relevant NATO study are to be made available to the EDA, which is trying to improve the availability of crews by means of a Helicopter Tactics Training Programme. But this is only one example.

855 House of Lords cit., Chap.3, para 51, 52, and 85
856 Interview with NATO official, NATO HQ, Brussels, 4 December 2007
857 Speaker at the SDA conference ‘NATO & ESDP: Forging New Links’ Brussels, 8 June 2007
858 Interview with Italian military representative, SHAPE, 4 December 2007.
Conclusions

The European grouping of cooperation in R&T and armaments seems not to be the answer to the need to cooperate in these matters. The OCCAR is an efficient managing body for the European collaborative programmes, however, its objectives and aims are limited in scope: OCCAR is just a programme manager for project that have been conceived outside of its framework.

EDA seems to be the only institutional answer available to cope with the fragmentation of the European defence marketplace. This is easier said than done, the EDA does not solve the problem, on the contrary, it has enhanced the Franco-British dispute that then had to be resolved on a bilateral basis.

EDA R&T programmes are just a drop in the ocean. Although EDEM is an end state for the major pMS, it is still in an early phase, and it is experiencing many bureaucratic obstacles because industrial lobbies seem to be scared by EDEM. The fear of losing their national market share is stronger than the expectations of new business opportunities in a transnational European market.

On the other hand, the EDA was good for fulfilling the administrative interests of some pMS. There have been winners and losers, and for Italy, the war chest is satisfactory for the administrative interests of the military, while the defence industry is quite weak within EDA. Further development of the EDA lies in its ability to become the hub of a collaborative framework of European groupings, like OCCAR and LoI/FA. The Fromion Report and the initiatives of the French Presidency lead in that direction.

It is too early to say whether the EDA would help in the development of credible military capabilities for the ESDP. This would depend also on the goodwill and the consensus among the pMS. Unfortunately, the EDA has not yet found its place within the ESDP, not it was able to interconnect with the European groupings such as LoI/FA and OCCAR. Unlike the OCCAR, the EDA has no competence in the procurement or management of multinational collaborative programmes. This lack of effective power reduces its bargaining power.
as respect to the pMS, which still retain their sovereignty in EDA through the Steering Board that is largely an intergovernmental body.

NATO-EDA relations and the overlap and duplication between the two bodies’ projects are the greatest threat to European cooperation. The current situation does not provide much hope for future improvements and we do not see no light at the end of the tunnel. The EDA has no role in the EU-US relations as the industrial cooperation is pursued by means of bilateral industrial cooperation, as we have already examined it in the previous chapter. The US may just fear a “Buy European” through EDEM, but in this case they would be able to respond with massive retaliation.

Eventually, the defence industry is getting more and more globalized, and the A&D companies from emerging countries, like SAIC I & II of China, Oboronprom and Rosoboronexport of Russia, Embraer of Brasil and the Shipbuilding of India are increasingly becoming big players in the global defence market. The EDA with its reduced powers and its internal disputes would not help in coping with the emerging competition. The EDEM would maybe crucial as a European model in removing transnational barriers to defence market. The fate of the European defence sector lies in the traditional actors like the governments, military and defence industry representatives who still make the actual decision-making powers in these issues.
CONCLUSION

The Italy’s role in the development of a European Defence turned out to be a subject much broader than was initially envisaged. Italy seems to have contributed to the development of ESDP at a level that proved to be above expectation. It reached the same level of France in troop contributions and support to military and civilian capability development. Italy also helped the UK in promoting a European Defence in conformity with NATO commitments, so the UK supported Italy in boosting its military and industrial capabilities, and to stand out in defence matters.

The fear of exclusion from a ESDP directoire dominated by France, Germany and the UK, made Italy to support the UK in the defense sector fearing that otherwise – with the UK in an ancillary position of observer and keeper of the NATO tradition, and Germany being a follower in the Franco-German couple – ESDP initiatives may serve French interests, that are not necessarily compatible with the two-track fidelity to EU and NATO and are somehow competitive on specific procurement and defense industrial issues.

In relation to security the Chair Policy and a willingness to envisage military interventionism has been sustained in order to to avoid marginalisation in European Defence. Thanks to its post-Cold War interventionism, Italy has obtained a place in the ‘core’ of European Defence, unlike what it happens in economic or financial European cooperation. Moreover, thanks to the Carabinieri, Italy is even leading in the development of EU police concepts and capabilities.

A key factor is its loyalty and commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, that helped Italy to be on the winning side and to maintain an efficient military tool, at least in the aero-naval domain. Therefore, the golden rule is that NATO is the main pillar of security policy and any European Defence advancement should conform to it. The ESDP, however, is an end in itself for Italy, which does not pay much attention to any duplication with NATO, but does try to avoid any decoupling of the Member States from it.

So, the answer to our first research question is that Italy had allied with the UK, while competing with the Franco-German couple in
European Defence matters. While the Atlanticism supported by the UK, is balanced – in the Italian approach – by European federalism, that put the same emphasis in the support to the convergence in European Defence. Just to answer to our second research question, while the Atlanticism and Europeanism are merged by the Italian approach in an indissoluble Euro-Atlantic Pillar, the Mediterranean policy has been sometimes neglected especially in recent times.

As we know, all this started with De Gasperi, who established the post-war Italian foreign policy and decided to subordinate to national interest to two main “external ties” that could also constitute surrogate ideals: Atlanticism and European Federalism. De Gasperi’s Western choice and his support for Federalism were, at least at the beginning, resulting more from a political plan than from an idealistic support. Consequently, joining the NATO was a rational choice for the ruling classes, allowing them to follow domestic politics while enjoying the US security umbrella. It was also a rational choice to stay on the Euro-Atlantic path and choose not to choose, even after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the Neo-Atlanticism – by looking for a national role as honest broker in international crises and trying to pursue a Mediterranean policy - has always been a typical feature of Centre-Left governments.

Notwithstanding the changes of governments, the military had kept on doing joint exercises and deployment in operations within the NATO or even the WEU framework. The recent crises had boosted the need for military capabilities, and Italy had been at the front-line with its troops in every Western Balkan theatre, although the political results were not always satisfactory. In some sense the national government was at the mercy of events, and the Chair Policy exaggerated its participation in crisis management, without identifying a clear end state. For example, despite the fact that the public had a good opinion of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo its outcomes were not worth the Italian military commitment, particularly because Italy had no clear objective for Kosovo, except to fulfil its NATO commitments. The post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq had a negative effect on public opinion, while they helped in building a military and industrial cooperation with the US and the UK. It is true that the Berlusconi
government had stressed on Atlanticism and downplayed the Mediterranean policy. However, he did support the European integration, although in a different way from the Franco-German couple and the Centre-Left governments.

As a result Italy boosted the military and defence collaboration with the UK, which helped to develop new ideas, such as the Headline Goal, and exchanged commands with each other in NATO and ESDP operations. The cooperation was exemplified by the recurrent British-Italian meetings that occurred between 2003-2005. The most effective British–Italian cooperation was in defence industry and Finmeccanica of Italy has become a permanent actor in the British DTIB, and the second supplier to the British MoD, thus cooperating with the British operating companies seeking to enter the US market.

While France has the same level as Italy in troop contributions to the HFC, cooperation between the two states is low. There are exceptions of course: Gendarmerie and Carabinieri have a strong cooperation, together with Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese PFMS in the FIEP to boost the European police capabilities. On the other hand, the Gendarmerie and Carabinieri have the same level of cooperation and competition in deciding the direction of relevant police concepts, such as the MSU role and the options of military command for IPUs.

Germany and Spain seemed not to enjoy the level of military interventionism that made the Italian military emerge from the shadows. Germany did not cooperate much with Italy, while Spain is partnering in a few multinational structures (Eurofor, Euromarfor, Eurogendfor, Spanish-Italian Amphibious Battlegroup).

Italy has also cooperated more than other Member States with the newly accessed Member States and the candidate countries in security affairs. The military cooperation with Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey is exemplified by the Italian-Hungarian-Slovenian Battlegroup and the Italian-Romanian-Turkish Battlegroup in military matters, and by the participation of Hungarian, Romanian, Slovenian and Turkish units in the MSUs in the Western Balkans and in Iraq. In this sense, the military are reviving De Michelis’ ICE project that failed in the early 1990s. This collaboration with newly accessed Member

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States would maybe give a new role to Italy, distinct from the usual Franco-German or Atlanticist confrontation.

As we have already speculated, the inactivity of the ruling class and the lack of a clear national interest boosted the interests of the bureaucratic elites. These pressured a bottom-up decision-making process that have acted as a motor in foreign and security policy-making. However, the bureaucratic elites had limited objectives and lacked the wide and long-time vision of a political leader. Therefore they just followed the three Pillars line, as in the case of the military, or fought to obtain high-paid senior appointments in international organisations, as in the case of the military in NATO or ESDP bodies.

The top bureaucratic positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence are respectively held by career diplomats and officer class. This allowed the creation of powerful élites, in particular for the diplomatic élite that, unlike the officer class, had survived the “shame” of losing a world war. The military, especially the Army, always suffered from the social gap with the civil society in particular between the 1970s and 1990s, until the new military interventionism, the PSOs and its casualties succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of public opinion. According to the Transatlantic Trends, 2004, published by the German Marshall Fund and Compagnia di San Paolo, the percentage of Italians who believe that the ESDP should be increased to act as a global player is 71%. On the other hand, the Carabinieri, thanks to their contribution in fighting organised crime and the mafia, are the most reputed institution of the Italian State.

The bureaucratic élites had been challenged by a changing international scenario. The military and the diplomats were looking for a new international role after the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of Soviet threat. The military also had to deal with the quest for a “new model army”, with the transformation of the armed forces from a conscription force for territorial defence to a professional and projectable force for peacekeeping tasks. The military have succeeded in evolving their status, while the diplomats have entrenched themselves into their traditions. On the other hand the existence of a career diplomats’ caste has contributed to maintain the three pillars and in keeping a certain
degree of consistency in Italy’s foreign and security policy. Therefore both the military and the diplomats have actively shaped the policy-making.

The Carabinieri are perhaps the most successful actors in shaping the European policy-making, although only in a very small area of European integration: police capabilities. Nonetheless in this area of expertise, the Carabinieri are really leading Europe. The Civilian capabilities are also interested by the emergence of new actors: the Protezione Civile, and the magistrates. The Protezione Civile is building on the reputation obtained at the domestic level, and it is conducting its own Mediterranean policy. The magistrates are just taking their first steps in international cooperation, but due to their key role in the national administration are already obtaining top positions as exemplified by EULEX Kosovo.

This leads us to the last category of elites: the national defence industry. The top managers were just trying to find a place in the consolidations of the European defence industry market that took place in the late 1990s. These resulted in the formation of the main European groups that started to look for new markets outside the European mainland. The Finmeccanica Group emerged as the Italian Aerospace and Defence conglomerate. Conventional wisdom regards Finmeccanica as fiercely Atlanticist in its partnering with US companies Lockheed and Boeing, and sharing the British defence market with BAE systems. The watershed was the decision not to take part to the Airbus A400M European transport aircraft programme that led to the sacrifice of the EMAC, the aircraft company in partnership with EADS.

The decision to renounce to the A400M programme was disputed. Defence Minister Martino assumed the responsibility of it, but his negative view was originated in Air Force studies on airlift capabilities. Therefore, the military and defence industry had been influencing the ruling class. The military have been fiercely pro-American in selecting their equipment. However, the national industry could have agreed to participate in A400M if the consortium had offered a more tempting work share for Alenia Aeronautica. In fact, Finmeccanica was fiercely pro-European in the Space sector by forming two joint ventures with Alcatel - recently replaced by Thales - and in
supporting the Galileo programme. At the end of the day since the military are the client and the ‘client is always right’, the military may have more influence in national armaments policy. Yet, the Italian military are a regular client for the national industry, and the need for national industry to expand in the foreign markets exerts a strong influence on the government and on diplomats who try to help in boosting exports.

Military and defence industry interests agree on general principles such as enabling the “country system” to develop, manufacture and procure state-of-the-art equipment, but diverge on specific interests. While the military are interested in international cooperation for administrative interests, such as high-paid positions on international bodies, industry looks to increase the R&T and procurement budget and market expansion. The military and industry disagree on budgetary issues and on public support for tenders abroad. Industry would like to increase the limited resources for R&T and procurement. In contrast, the military would maintain higher spending on operations and salaries. Industry would like stronger support for international tenders, while the military argue that high quality equipment sells by itself. In fact, the rationale in military circles is that equipment in-service in the national armed forces is the best showcase for testing national industry quality and boosting exports.

For sure in European cooperation the military are more influential than the national industry. Indeed, agencies and cooperative bodies are mainly staffed by seconded national officials and military officers, who have obtained key positions in European groupings, such as the EDA. In contrast, the defence industry is almost non-represented in these bodies, and industrial executives play a minor role, except for industrial associations which are usually consulted by these bodies. However, generally speaking the representation in European institutions is quite unfavourable to Italy (with the exception of Carabinieri in their area of expertise) and this does not help in pursuing its own national or administrative interests.

Conventional wisdom maintains that so far Italy has punched below its weight in European Defence: this is the impression until you penetrate
below the surface. In contrast, the finding of this thesis is that Italy has performed above expectation. We could argue that expectations were low, but the overall EU Member States’ resources invested in the ESDP are low. However, as we have remarked Italy invests in the ESDP more than all the other Member States, except for France, which on the other hand has high expectations and ambitions for European Defence.

The present doctoral thesis has tried to fill a gap and has gone deeply into the description of the Italian conceptual and material contribution to the ESDP. In doing so, we have made a distinction between military, civilian and industrial capabilities, and assessing the administrative interests of the domestic actors in the respective areas of expertise. However, a doctoral thesis has the distinctive limits of space, time and resources. Hopefully this could just be a starting point toanalyse the national contributions of the Member States to ESDP (other than those of France, the UK, or Germany) and not just a drop in the ocean of the many International Relations and European Studies works now emerging on European Defence.
APPENDIX: ABBREVIATIONS

A&D: Aerospace and Defence
AET: Agency Establishment Team of EDA
AFOR: NATO force in Albania (Allied Harbour)
AFsouth: Allied Forces Southern Europe
AFV: Armored fighting vehicle
AIAD: Associazione Industrie per l’Aerospazio, i sistemi e la Difesa (Italian Aerospace and Defence Manufacturers Association)
AIS: Automatic Identification Systems
AMF: Allied Military Force
AMS: Alenia Marconi Systems
APA: Aero Propulsion Alliance
ARRC: Allied Rapid Response Corps
ASD: Europe’s Aerospace and Defence Industries Association
AU: African Union
AUC: Allievo Ufficiale di Complemento (junior reserve officer)
AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System
BAe: British Aerospace
BAM: Border Assistance Mission
BGCC: Battlegroup Coordination Conferences
C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance.
CASA: Aérospatiale and Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA
CCPM: Community Civil Protection Mechanism
CDP: Capability Development Plan
CEO: Chief Executive Officer
CEPA: Common European Priority Areas of WEAG
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIN: High-Level Interdepartmental Committee
CINCNAV: Comando in capo della squadra navale (Commander-in-Chief Fleet)
CIVPOL: Civilian Police international missions
CJTF: Combined Joint Task Forces
CNAD: Conference of National Armaments Directors
CoE: Council of Europe
COMMZ-W: Communication Zone West
COPS: Political Security Committee
CRT: Civilian Response Teams
CSAR-X: competition for Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter
CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CVF: Anglo-French Carrier programme
DASA: DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG
DC: Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic)
DCI: Defence Capabilities Initiative
DCNS: French Shipbuilding company
DGA: French National Armaments Directorate
DGIXPU: DG IX Police Unit
DIS: Defence Industrial Strategy
DMA: Defence Manufacturers Association
DoD: Department of Defence of the US
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo
DRS: US-based defence electronics company
DS: Democratici di Sinistra, the Italian Centre-Left party successor to PCI
DTIB: Defence Technology and Industrial Base
DTS: Defence Technology Strategy
EAA: European Armaments Agency project of WEAG
EAC: European Affairs Commission
EADS: European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
EATF: European Air Transport Fleet
EBB: Electronic Bulletin Board
ECAP: European Capabilities Action Plan
ECB: European Central Bank
ECHO: European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community
EDA: European Defence Agency
EDC: European Defence Community
EDEM: European Defence Equipment Market
EDTIB: European Defence Technology and Industrial Base
EFA: European Fighter Aircraft
EMAC: European Military Aircraft Company
EMU: Economic and Monetary Union
EPC: European Political Community
EPU: European political union
ESDI: European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EUCLID: European cooperation for the long term in Defence
Eufor: European (military) Force
EUMC: Military Committee of the European Union
EUMM: EU Monitoring Mission
EUMS: Military Staff of the European Union
Eurogendfor: European Gendarmerie Force
EUPM: EU Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina
Eupol: EU police force
EUSR: EU Special Representative
FIEP: Association of the European and Mediterranean Police Forces and Gendarmeries with Military Status
FOC: Full Operational Capability
FPU: Formed Police Unit
FREMM: Franco-Italian programme for multirole frigates
FSAF: Famille des systèmes Surface-Air Futurs (Next Generation of Surface-to-Air Anti-Missile Systems)
GAERC : General Affairs and External Relations Council
GAO : Government Accountability Office of US Congress
GARTEUR: Group for Aeronautical Research and Technology in Europe
GEC: General Electric Company
GIS: Gruppo d’Intervento Speciale (Carabinieri counter-terrorism unit)
GNI: Gross National Income
GNP: Gross National Product
HFC : Helsinki Force Catalogue
HG2010: Headline Goal 2010
HHG: Helsinki Headline Goal
HQ: Headquarters
ICE: Iniziativa Centro-Europea
IDP: Internally Displaced Person
IEPG : Independent European Programme Group
IFOR: Implementation Force
IOC: Initial Operational Capability
IPTF: International Police Task Force of UNMIBH
IPU: Integrated Police Unit
IPU-style: IPU-style capability of Eufor in Bosnia
IRI: Istituto Ricostruzione Industriale (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction) the state holding of Italy
ITAR: International Traffic in Arms Regulations of the US
JCA: Joint Cargo Aircraft competition
JHA: Justice and Home Affairs
JIP: Joint Investment Programme
JSF: Joint Strike Fighter
LoI/FA: Letter of Intent/Framework Agreement
MAP: Ministero delle attività produttive (Ministry of Industry)
MBDA: European missile company resulting from the merger of AMS missiles, Aérospatiale-Matra Missiles and Matra BAe Dynamics
MEP: Member European Parliament
MES: Marconi Electronic Systems
MMA: Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising
MNB-W: Multinational Brigade West
MoD: Ministry of Defence
MONUC: UN mission in the RDC
MoU: Memorandum of Understanding
MP: Member of Parliament
MRBM: Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles
MSU: Multinational Specialised Unit of Carabinieri
NAC: North Atlantic Council
NAD: National Armaments Directors
NATO RTO : NATO Research and Technology Organisation
NCW : Network Centric Warfare
NEC : Network-enabled capabilities
NIAG : NATO Industrial Advisory Group
NMC: NATO Military Committee
NRDC: NATO Rapid Deployable Corps
NRDC-T: NATO Rapid Deployable Corps based in Turkey
NRDC-IT: NATO Rapid Deployable Corps based in Italy
NSC: National Security Council
OCCAR: Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armement
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Ogma: Indústria Aeronáutica de Portugal (Aerospace Industry of Portugal)
OLAF: European Anti-Fraud Office
OTHF: Over The Horizon Forces
PAAMS: Principal Anti Air Missile System
PCI: Communist party of Italy
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFMS: Police Force With Military Status
pMS : participating Member State
POLARM: working group on armaments policy of COREPER
PSI : Socialist party of Italy
PSO: Peace Support Operation
QMV: Qualified Majority Voting
RfP: Request for Proposals
R&T : Research and Technology

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R&D: Research and Development
Rgt: Regiment
RRF: Rapid Reaction Force
SAAM: Surface-to-Air Anti-Missile
Saceur: Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SDR: Strategic Defence Review of the UK
SEAL: SEa-Air-Land, US Navy special operations units
S&AS: Sensors and Airborne Systems a Selex UK-based company of Finmeccanica
SEPI: Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (the state holding of Spain)
SFOR: Stabilisation Force
SGD/DNA: Secretary General of Defence, National Armaments Directorate of Italy
SHAPE: Supreme Head Quarters Allied Powers in Europe
SOFA: Status Of Force Agreement
Spa: Società per azioni or public limited company (Ltd.)
TEU: Treaty of the European Union
TLC: Telecommunications
TLCM: Through-life capability management
TNC: Transnational Company
TTPs: Techniques Tactiques and Procedures
Uçk: the military branch of the Kosovar Albanians
UNSC: UN Security Council
USAF: US Air Force
V-RMTC: Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre
VTS: Vessel Traffic Service
WEAG: Western European Armaments Group
WEAO: Western European Armament Organisation
WO: Warrant Officer (Maresciallo)
WTO: World Trade Organisation
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