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**The European Union: An Effective Actor in Multilateral
Arms Negotiations?**

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CFSP	Common Foreign and
COARM	Council Working Group on Conventional Arms
CODUN	Council Working Group on Global Disarmament and Arms Control
CONOP	Council Working Group on Non-Proliferation
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EC	European Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FMCT	Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
HINW	Humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IR	International relations
MEPs	Members of the European Parliament
MoCV	Method of concomitant variation
MoD	Method of difference
NAC	New Agenda Coalition
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
NNWS	Non-nuclear weapon states
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group

NWS	Nuclear weapon states
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PrepCom	Preparatory Committee
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
RevCon	Review Conference
RIO	Regional integration organization
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction

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- “Explaining EU Effectiveness in Multilateral Institutions: the Case of the Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2015, pp. 875-892.
- “Breaking the ice. The European Union and the Arctic”, in K. Battarbee and J. E. Fossum (eds), *The Arctic Contested*, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2014, pp. 121-132 (with S. Weber).
- “The European Parliament’s Administration: Between Neutral and Politicised Competence,” in C. Neuhold, S. Vanhoonacker, L. Verhey (eds), *Civil Servants and Politics: A Delicate Balance*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 205-228 (with C. Neuhold).
- “Breaking the ice: the European Union and the Arctic,” *International Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 4, 2011, pp. 849-860 (with S. Weber).

ABSTRACT

The EU's participation in multilateral negotiations became an object of study by EU scholars fairly recently. Although EU member states had already started to coordinate their positions within the UN in the 1970s, the academic literature in the field is neither coherent nor systematic. With intent to contribute to a growing research agenda on the EU's impact in world affairs, this project examines the EU's effectiveness in what is arguably a 'least likely' case for the EU's successful participation: multilateral arms negotiations. The international security field of arms and weapons is often viewed as an area of 'high' politics, where states' considerations of sovereignty, integrity and survival are at the center stage, complicating the role of non-traditional post-modern actors like the EU. This study thus postulates the following research questions: *to what extent is the EU an effective actor in multilateral arms negotiations, and what explains EU effectiveness?* The thesis applies a small-n comparative research design, assessing the explanatory power of agency and structure-related factors alike, borrowed from the European integration and international relations theories and merged in a single analytical framework. The empirical evidence is drawn from the area of global arms affairs by way of triangulating between semi-structured interviews, document analysis and direct observation. More specifically, the project examines the EU's involvement in the multilateral negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty and the latest (2010 and 2015) Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences.

In brief, the main claim of the thesis is that the EU is an effective actor in multilateral arms negotiations, the level of its effectiveness differs across negotiation cases, and the account of this variance cannot be reduced to a mono-causal explanation. The EU showed three distinct patterns of effectiveness – outcome, process and damage limitation effectiveness – each of which is defined through a particular mix of goal achievement, relevance and external cohesion as the main conceptual components of EU effectiveness. Agent-based explanations related to power (internal policy) and interests (member states' interest convergence) appeared to be responsible for this diverse picture, as their explanatory power was found to be the most instrumental in accounting for various instances of EU effectiveness. Far from being irrelevant, the structural factors acted as accelerators and breaks on the influence of the internal factors (global distribution of power) or even as determinants of the latter (international constellation of interests), but by itself the external context did not shape EU effectiveness directly.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context of the inquiry and the research puzzle

On 14 September 2010, Belgian diplomat Jan Grauls took the floor at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to present, on behalf of the European Union (EU), a resolution on the EU's enhanced participation in the UN. The introduced draft resolution A/64/L.67 aimed at granting the EU with wide participatory rights, only short of voting privileges, effectively transforming the Union's status of observer into a full non-state participant. The need for these changes, as explained by the Belgian representative, followed from the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a set of institutional innovations in the conduct of the Union's foreign policy and external representation, directly affecting the EU's participation in international organizations. To the surprise of many in Europe, the draft resolution invoked significant resistance from many UN member states, and was converted into a failed motion and a serious fiasco for the post-Lisbon European diplomacy (Wouters *et al.*, 2011). During the debate of the draft resolution, critical voices highlighted the 'unprecedented' character of the EU's initiative due to its alleged potential to compromise the work of the UN by granting the Union with powers similar to those of UN member states. The representative of Nauru, speaking on behalf of small island states, has been outspoken in her skepticism: 'This is a significant proposal that may have profound implications for the very nature of this august body. The United Nations Charter is based on the membership and equality of sovereign States and we must ensure that this draft resolution upholds those fundamental principles' (United Nations, 2010, p. 4). What Europeans regarded as a procedural and rather self-explanatory matter came out as a critical ontological choice for many outside.

Although the EU's status at the UN was ultimately upgraded the following year, the initial unexpected diplomatic backlash is symptomatic of greater challenges that the EU currently faces in international politics. There is little doubt that the EU is a new and promising actor on the international stage (Hill and Smith, 2005; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Having emerged as a powerful trading bloc and the biggest market in the world (Damro, 2012), it gradually developed multiple foreign policy instruments under the umbrella of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), externalized a range of internal policies and standards – environmental, energy, migration, competition – linked to the functioning of its common market (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008), established contractual relationships with key states (Grevi, 2012), regions (Telò, 2007),

international organizations (Jørgensen, 2009) and transformed a large part of the continent through the power of enlargement (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Yet, despite this solid track record, the EU is still perceived as a *sui generis* international actor, a supranational organization that remains an exception to the norm of the state-centric international system. As Jönsson and Hall (2005) have argued, ‘the European Union has yet to make an impact on the reproduction of international society. The diplomatic world is still, by and large, populated by territorial states, which have been granted diplomatic recognition by other states’ (p. 161). The EU does challenge a variety of common norms and existing wisdoms – sovereignty and diplomacy, to name a few – in the practice of international relations (Bruter, 1999; Bátora, 2005), but unless it manages to transform a state-centric Westphalian order or, on the contrary, becomes a fully-fledged state, the legitimacy concerns regarding its international participation are likely to persist.

Nowhere else the issues of legitimacy and recognition are more sensitive than in the EU’s participation in multilateral institutions. At the center of the wide web of multilateral institutions is the UN, which is based on the universal principle of ‘the sovereign equality’ of its member states (Article 2 of the UN Charter). Betsill and Corell (2008) acknowledge the constraints that non-state actors face in global governance, noting that ‘international negotiations [...] are largely the domain of states. As UN members, only states have formal decision-making power during international negotiations’ (p. 6). Given this lack of formal authority, the reasoning behind the EU’s participation in multilateral institutions is not straightforward: ‘for many it will come as a major surprise to learn that the EU is actually engaged in multilateral institutions. They tend to consider the EU itself to be an international organization [...] and international organisations are not supposed to engage in or develop policies towards other organisations’ (Jørgensen, 2013, p. 86). In this thread, international organizations are created by states to serve state interests, and therefore the presence of the EU alongside its member states in the process of inter-state collective deliberation can indeed be confusing. In practical terms, ‘the *sui generis* nature of the EU means that international organisations and fora vary in their willingness to recognize it as an actor in its own right as opposed to its constituent member states’ (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005, p. 56).

What strengthens the EU’s misfit in the current state-centric international order is that, contrary to what skeptics may have expected, the EU has indeed developed specific policy objectives towards other multilateral institutions. Since the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU argues that strengthening a rule-based

international society, reinforcing existing international organizations and building new multilateral institutions is key to ensuring global security and more generally a ‘better world’ (European Council, 2013; see also European Union, 2016). These objectives, embraced by the overarching headline of effective multilateralism, are based on the premise that the EU itself represents the strongest up-to-date example of a successful multilateral cooperation project between states that ‘helped to transform most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace’ (Nobel Committee, 2012). Multilateralism is said to constitute part of the EU’s DNA (Barroso, 2010); it has been described as ‘the way of life in Europe’ (Groom, 2006), which triggers policy-makers and academic scholars to claim that the EU’s primary role in international affairs is replicating Europe’s experience on a global scale (European Commission, 2001; Bailes, 2009). While projection of the EU’s multilateral model can serve as a stepping stone for establishing its legitimacy in the international system, a more fundamental question is whether this task is actually realistic given the predominance of states, rather than regional actors, in international affairs. As Laatikainen and Smith (2006) argue, in the intergovernmental context of the UN, ‘such ambitious multilateralism is highly unusual’ (p. 4). This line of reasoning can be further reinforced considering the field of global arms affairs – the policy domain selected for this study – which is directly linked to the issues of national sovereignty, security and even survival, rendering the achievement of collective goods particularly difficult (Hoffmann, 1966). The puzzle that this research addresses is therefore the following: there is a clear will of the EU to actively participate in multilateral (security) institutions, but it is unclear whether the EU as a multilateral entity and a form of ‘negotiated order’ (Smith, 1996) itself, which practices a distinct supranational multilateralism, can perform in a meaningful way within another multilateral system of negotiations that is largely based on intergovernmental principles.

1.2 Research question, aims and relevance of the study

The EU’s participation in multilateral negotiations became a research target of EU scholars fairly recently. Although EU member states started to coordinate their positions within the UN in the 1970s under the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the academic literature in the field is assessed to be neither ‘consistent, coherent nor systematic’ (Jørgensen, 2007, p. 509). A significant part of the research was shaped by the discussion of the EU’s ‘capacity to behave actively and deliberately’ (Sjöstedt, 1977, p. 16) in the international system. Considerable effort followed to define the criteria of EU actorness, with an evaluation of the EU’s participation in global politics (Caporaso and Jupille,

1998; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Subsequent research on the EU in multilateral institutions predominantly focused on the EU's role (Laatikainen, 2010; Van Vooren *et al.*, 2013), coherence (Mahncke and Gstöhl, 2012), representation (Gstöhl, 2009; Rasch, 2008), membership (Govaere *et al.*, 2004), presence (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011a) and position (Wouters *et al.*, 2012) in various multilateral settings.

From an empirical point of view, there has been a distinct trend in the literature to prioritize those policy forums and fields that are linked to the nature and origin of the EU (trade and economy), or where EU policy-makers invest a considerable amount of diplomatic resources (environment and human rights). 'In these domains, the Union regularly strives to claim a leadership role, whereas it makes its voice arguably less heard in areas such as global security governance' (Wouters *et al.*, 2012, p. 4). The issues of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation are cases in point: they 'rarely drew attention above or beyond the CFSP working groups' (Balfour *et al.*, 2012, p. 19), are less likely to generate external demands or high expectations for EU action (Hill, 1998), and have been frequently omitted in the major handbooks on the EU's role in global governance (Wunderlich and Bailey, 2011; Van Vooren *et al.*, 2013; Lucarelli *et al.*, 2013). For one thing, since the end of the Cold War, these policy concepts have lost their previous salience and currency, which also has been reinforced by continuing stagnation of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the UN's main specialized multilateral negotiation forum (Zanders, 2010). For another reason, arms affairs have been traditionally regarded by EU member states as a defining element of their essential security interests, which are exempted from the integration process (Art. 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU]). It is not unusual to observe how the states' preponderance in the domain of international security takes scholars to a swift conclusion that the EU, almost inexorably, 'lacks the skills and the will to act effectively in the sphere of 'high diplomacy'' (Whitman, 2010, p. 28).

The current research challenges this view along with the dominant conceptual and empirical approaches to examining the EU's participation in multilateral negotiations. First, even though initially it might be counterintuitive to think about the EU being involved in the 'arms business', the fact is that the EU regularly prepares common positions for multilateral conferences or UNGA plenaries dealing with arms issues (Bailes, 2007). Second, unlike most of the previous studies on the EU in multilateral negotiations, this research is focused on scrutinizing EU effectiveness as a conceptual expression of the EU's negotiation success or failure. Third, the study departs from the premise that EU effectiveness, even in the area of 'high diplomacy', is not a one-size-fits-

all straitjacket, which renders the explanation of a potential variation another important aim of the study. Hence, the research questions that this project pursues are the following: (1) *To what extent is the EU an effective actor in multilateral arms negotiations?* (2) *What explains EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations?*

The rationale behind studying EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations stems from a broader debate among scholars of EU foreign policy, which calls for increasing attention to the impact that the EU has on world affairs. Proponents of this impact-oriented approach to the study of the EU as an international actor argue that scholars inordinately contemplated conceptualizing the nature and novelty of the EU's rise to the international stage. As K. Smith (2010) argues, 'we should [...] engage in a debate of what the EU does, why it does it, and with what effect, rather than about what it is' (p. 343). In a similar vein, Schunz (2010) claims that: '[t]he absence of sound conceptual and methodological reasoning about the Union's impact in international affairs stands in stark contrast to the plentiful scholarly attempts at identifying what kind of power the EU can be or already is in the global arena' (p. 23). The *academic* relevance of the research question put forward in this study thus lies in its focus on the notion of EU effectiveness, of which no clear and systematic definition and operationalization currently exists in the literature. An examination of the EU's distinctiveness as an international actor would not be complete without considering effects that the EU produces on the international level.

Analyzing EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations also brings this study in close proximity to a diplomat's world. Some researchers have noticed that both scholars and practitioners of EU foreign policy have been quite inward-looking, focusing on institutions, legal competences and processes of internal decision-making (Ginsberg, 2001; Mahncke, 2014). The benefits of an alternative approach from the policy-oriented perspective are all too difficult to ignore: '[Assessing effects] will show what the ambitions of the EU are, what results the EU is actually achieving, and, last but not least, what the Union needs to do if it wants to make a difference' (Mahncke, 2014, p. 174). The *policy* relevance of the research question examined in this project stems from its ability to inform policy-makers and diplomats whether the EU is fit for purpose in global security affairs and how it can perform better in multilateral arms negotiations. Studying EU 'high diplomacy' in arms negotiations, which for many observers would be an *a priori* failed exercise or a 'least-likely' case for the EU's success, can reveal useful insights for diplomats in other, less formidable, areas of the EU's multilateral action.

1.3 Research design and methods

1.3.1 Qualitative comparative design

The study is rooted in an empiricist epistemological tradition that supports empirically grounded explanatory research, whereby ‘knowledge can be accumulated through experience and observation’ (Lamont, 2015, p. 19). As it can be inferred from the research question, the study constitutes the Y-centered research, since it aims to explain a particular outcome of the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. In other words, it follows a typical for qualitative researchers ‘causes-of-effects’ approach in the explanation of social phenomena, when a researcher identifies the outcome of interest and engages in a retrospective accounting for the particular outcome (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). The Y-centered explanatory design differs from an ‘effects-of-causes’ approach, which estimates average causal effects of particular variables, and traditionally dominates in quantitative studies.¹ The choice of the small-n observational research design in this study rests upon the need for in-depth knowledge of selected cases, a greater conceptual validity and the necessity to address complex causal relations (Bennett, 2004). These are the particular challenges that experimental designs or large-n observational studies are ill-suited to address.

The project builds upon an integrative comparative case study design combining cross-case comparisons and within-case analysis at the theoretical end (Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 12–15). On a cross-case level, I will contrast three episodes of the EU’s participation in multilateral arms negotiations following the procedure of structured and focused comparisons (George and Bennett, 2005). The cross-case inferences will help to determine the extent to which EU effectiveness varies across the cases, juxtapose cases against the key explanatory factors identified in the analytical framework of the study and, most importantly, illustrate a pattern of covariation between varying degrees of EU effectiveness and the causal factors. Due to its aggregated character and a high level of analysis, a cross-case comparison offers a researcher a possibility to project, under specified conditions, its inferences beyond the original context onto a broader number of cases (Della Porta, 2008).

A within-case analysis is another important source of explanatory leverage in this study. Scholars of social science methodology stress that a cross-case comparison (just as a large-n statistical analysis) is rather weak in distinguishing association or correlation

¹ The distinction between ‘causes-of-effects’ and ‘effects-of-causes’ mirrors a broader scholarly debate between advocates of case-oriented and variable-oriented approaches to social science research (Della Porta, 2008; Ragin, 2014).

from causation (Gerring, 2008). In this light, a within case analysis is presented as a tool ‘specifically designed to compensate for limitations associated with cross-case methods’ (Mahoney, 2000, p. 409). The main currency of the within-case analysis is the ability to uncover causal mechanisms that link the outcome with a key explanatory factor. As Toshkov (2016) argues, ‘such evidence can extend and complement the covariational patterns between variables that cross-case evidence provides’ (p. 261). Through a careful examination of within-case observations, I will elaborate upon causal sequences that account for different outcomes of EU effectiveness in selected cases. An in-depth examination of a single case is also a valuable tool for identifying alternative explanations or interaction effects among causal factors (George and Bennett, 2005). Addressing these challenges makes a within-case analysis particularly suitable in the context of studying multilateral negotiations that commonly feature a high level of complexity in terms of actors, activities and processes (Crump and Zartman, 2003). All in all, a within-case analysis is a valuable complementary tool for a cross-case comparison; mixing both strategies thus holds significant promise of strengthening general explanatory utility of a small-n observational research design (Rohlfing, 2012; Toshkov, 2016).

1.3.2 Specification of the population

A logic of a small-n research design entails a purposeful selection of cases to study out of a broader pool of cases at which the research is targeted. Prior to this act, however, a researcher needs to engage in a ‘casing’ exercise – to answer the question ‘what is the case an instance of?’ via scrutinizing the relationship between the case at hand and the empirical boundaries of a set of cases relevant for the study, i.e. its population (Della Porta, 2008). A clear and explicit definition of the population is important for two inter-related reasons. First, the specification of the population plays an important role in generating causal inferences. It helps to establish a degree of comparability between the cases or, in other words, their causal homogeneity, which implies that ‘a cause-effect relationship is, on average, expected to hold true for the cases within the population’ (Rohlfing, 2012, p. 24). Second, the definition of the population relevant for investigation indicates the extent to which the findings of the research can potentially be generalized beyond the examined cases. Generation of knowledge about a larger class of units through an intensive study of its small sample is widely believed to be the main purpose of the case study method (Bennett and Elman, 2007; Rohlfing, 2012; Lamont, 2015). It is important to note that, as the boundaries of cases and populations are not pre-given and need to be constructed by a researcher, the shape of the population is amendable to change

throughout the research process, depending on how a researcher frames results of the study in light of the problem of causal heterogeneity (Della Porta, 2008; Ragin, 2014).

Charles Ragin (2000) argues that ‘the way in which populations are defined and delimited has a substantial impact on findings’ (p. 49). At the core of the interplay between the population definition and causal inference is a role of scope conditions – statements beyond which the relevant causal factors of a case do not operate as causes (Walker and Cohen, 1985). In practical terms, the definition of the population implies an imposition of a set of boundaries on the entire pool of cases along the dimensions of substance, space and time. In terms of *substance*, the potential pool of cases for this research project is limited to a subset of multilateral negotiations in the international security policy field, which deals with arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament issues, or simply ‘arms affairs’. For example, the negotiations leading to the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime falls out of the scope of the population, although this is a security-related instrument, and the EU participated in the negotiations. With regard to *space*, the research investigates the multilateral arms agreements negotiated or concluded under the auspices of the UN principal bodies. In other words, the multilateral agreements negotiated outside of the UN umbrella, such as the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, also fall outside the scope of the study. Moreover, since the study limits itself only to UN-related cases, it also excludes the instances of informal arms related regimes (e.g. Nuclear Suppliers Group or Wassenaar Arrangement), as patterns of the EU’s diplomatic participation here differ significantly from membership in formal multilateral institutions, thereby increasing the risk of causal heterogeneity (Kienzle and Vestergaard, 2013).

Finally, the research also has explicit *temporal* boundaries. On one hand, member states of the European Community (EC) – the EU’s predecessor - acknowledged ‘the need to seek common positions wherever possible in international organizations’ (Brückner, 1990, p. 177) in the 1970s, following the inception of the EPC. Yet, since the EC at that time was a very much nascent diplomatic entity and due to the reason of constraints on access to the relevant sources of data, the 1970s are not seen as a starting point for the investigation. On the other hand, researchers single out the year 2003 as the latest tipping point for the study of the EU in multilateral institutions owing to the adoption of the ESS, with its headline goal of supporting effective multilateralism (Gowan, 2008; Kissack, 2010). While recognizing the strength of the argument, the study does not rely on 2003 as a departure point, as it suggests a very narrow definition of the population, thus compromising the maximization of causal inference and the empirical relevance of the

study. Hence, acknowledging the need to address a balance between specificity and generalizability in the case study research (Bennett, 2004), the project rests upon 1993 – the year when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force bringing about the CFSP – as the lower temporal bound of the study.

1.3.3 Case selection

This study is based on the premise that the outcome of EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations is qualitatively different across cases. A variance-on-Y design is argued to have a number of strong advantages in comparison to no-variance-on-Y approach. First, it allows to identify causal factors that covary with the outcome on a cross-case level, thus, contributing to its explanation. As Collier and Mahoney (1996) argue, social scientists are predisposed to a variation seeking instinct in their studies, as the analysis of the variance promises to ‘produce a more adequate assessment of the underlying causal structure’ (p. 67). Second, from the perspective of set-relational logic, the variance-on-Y design helps to isolate sufficient conditions that are causal factors, presence of which brings about the outcome of interest (Ragin, 2014).

Given the choice in favor of the variance-on-Y design, the case selection in this research follows the distribution-based strategy. The latter implies a selection of cases with respect to their location in a distribution of cases based on values taken by the causal factors or outcome (Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 61–62). As the current research aims at discerning the causes of the outcome and the size of the relevant population is rather limited, an intuitive strategy is to choose the cases in a way that will allow to encompass the full range of variation of the *explanandum*. Selecting diverse cases with maximum variance on Y fits the goal of maximizing generalization to the rest of the limited population. Seawright and Gerring (2008) even admit that ‘the diverse case method probably has stronger claims to representativeness than any other small-*N* sample’ (p. 302).

While the merit of the diverse case selection is evident, this approach bears substantial shortcomings. First, it requires a researcher to have a perfect knowledge of the population to be able to identify extreme values of two cases that encompass the entire range of other possible scores. Unless a researcher performs a specific study for that purpose or enjoys the benefit of being a practitioner-insider, acquiring complete information about the population of cases prior to the investigation is usually unrealistic. Second, a selection of diverse cases is suitable when the outcome is measured continuously or in terms of differences in degree. If, instead, the outcome is assessed in multi-categorical terms – as it is done in this project – performing a diverse case study

effectively means ‘a comparative case study on typical cases’, because ‘each selected case is typical for all other cases from the same category’ (Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 223–224). A case can be regarded as typical when it is representative of a larger group of similar cases with shared patterns of causal relationships (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Selecting typical cases also implies a more cautious approach to generating insights beyond studied cases: instead of making a ‘sweeping’ generalization about the entire population, it suggests a ‘contingent’ or ‘possibilistic’ generalization about similar cases in the population (George and Bennett, 2005; Blatter and Haverland, 2012). A typical case study design thus fits more accurately in the approach taken in this project.²

The first typical case to be included in the research is the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It concluded in April 2013 after seven years of negotiations in the UN First Committee. The ATT became the first global instrument to regulate international trade in conventional arms. The size of the global conventional arms market and the impact of uncontrolled and illicit arms flows on the spread of international conflicts and violence lent the ATT a high level of importance among the international community. Interestingly, the agreement was initiated by two EU member states – the United Kingdom (UK) and Finland – and eventually became a priority for the EU’s multilateral diplomacy. The conclusion and signature of the agreement was presented on a number of occasions – by both EU policy makers and external observers – as the EU’s success story.

The second typical case that contrasts with the ATT is a Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was signed in 1968, and is followed by regular review conferences held every five years. The case of interest is the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT I) and the five-year period of time that preceded its preparation. The EU, as a traditionally strong supporter of the NPT collective security regime, has been visible and outspoken during the negotiations. The Union, however, has not been equally strong on all three pillars of the NPT – disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy – with EU member states attaching different, sometimes irreconcilable, priorities to these aspects of negotiations. The 2010 NPT Review Conference is thus considered a less successful case of the EU’s multilateral arms diplomacy. This case is further contrasted with the 2015 NPT Review Conference (NPT II), where the EU’s performance seemed to hit the rock bottom. As one observer admitted,

² It is important to note that the types of cases are not necessarily exclusive (Flyvbjerg, 2006). A comparative study of typical cases is also a study of diverse cases, unless the cases demonstrate an identical value on the outcome.

the Conference ‘showed the Union most divided ever since it developed a common foreign and security policy in the non-proliferation area’ (Müller, 2015).

A final remark must be made about the issue of selection bias. The literature on social science methodology stipulates that it is not recommended to choose cases on the dependent variable – cases with the outcome of interest – due to a risk of little or undermined inferential leverage (King *et al.*, 1994). On the other hand, Della Porta (2008) argues that, unlike in the large-n studies, examining positive cases is quite common and legitimate in the case study research. Furthermore, Van Evera (1997) makes a point that the most important criterion for the selection of cases is their fit for purpose of the inquiry. In this respect, the study of EU effectiveness (rather than non-effectiveness) and its complexity in multilateral arms negotiations requires an intensive investigation of positive cases, which enables a researcher to make strong choices about conceptualization and measurement even against a potential risk of bias in a case selection (Collier and Mahoney, 1996).

1.3.4 Strategy of causal inference

The strategy for case comparison in this study rests upon the logic of Mill’s methods of comparison. First, all the cases are compared simultaneously based on the method of concomitant variation (MoCV). The method represents a correlation test between potential causal factors and an outcome measured in terms of multiple differences in degree (DeFelice, 1986; Mahoney, 2000). In a subsequent step, two pairwise comparisons are performed in line with the method of difference (MoD). The main purpose of the MoD is to identify causal factors that are associated with different outcomes based on the idea that ‘differences must be explained with differences’ (Rohlfing, 2012, p. 110). In other words, ‘a condition present in both cases cannot account for the differences in case outcomes’ (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 156). The ideal MoD seeks to isolate one causal factor of a phenomenon by choosing cases that share invariant scores on all other potential causes. Therefore, the MoD is closely associated with the most similar system design of comparisons when a researcher ‘picks cases that are as similar as possible but differ in the outcome of interest’ (Toshkov, 2016, p. 266). A great advantage of Mill’s methods of comparison is that they allow to control and exclude contesting causal factors through careful matching of cases (Anckar, 2008). This explains the idea behind including the NPT II case, as its coupling with NPT I maximizes similarities between the two, and thus enhances a control of non-causal factors.

Despite recognition and wide application in social sciences, the MoD is susceptible to several weaknesses that limit its inferential capacity. First, there is a problem of causal complexity, when the phenomenon under study is determined by multiple causes, thus turning the MoD into a suboptimal comparison. Second, the MoD is ill-suited for identifying and accounting for interaction effects between several causal factors (Liebersohn, 1991). Interaction effects increase the number of causal inferences drawn from the MoD, transforming it into an indeterminate comparison. The bottom line is that considering the general complexity of social phenomena, it is difficult to approximate selected cases with an ideal typical MoD. As Della Porta (2008) put it, ‘the contexts of the compared situations are never similar enough to permit considering as null the influence of the environment’ (p. 215).

As it was argued earlier, the shortcomings pertaining to the cross-case level of comparison is compensated by the application of a within-case analysis. At the within-case level, a researcher can rely on three types of analysis: pattern matching (congruence), causal narrative and process tracing (Mahoney, 2000). The first two instruments are less suitable for the parameters of this research, as pattern matching relies on strong theory predictions and causal narrative is better applicable to historical research. Process tracing is considered among the best suited social science instruments for dealing with problems of causal complexity via identifying and analyzing causal chains and causal mechanisms (George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett and Checkel, 2015). ‘The core idea of process tracing is concatenation. Concatenation is the state of being linked together, as a chain or linked series’ (Waldner, 2012, p. 68). Process tracing provides a stepwise test for each element of the mechanism, which can be conceived as ‘the underlying entities that generate observed processes and outcomes’ (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 10). For this purpose, the researcher collects specific types of data – causal process observations – that help to infer the existence of observable manifestations of each step in the causal pathway. The most important goal is to find a sufficient amount of evidence that would demonstrate with high certainty an uninterrupted sequence of steps or, in other words, that each element would make a relevant difference for the next part of the mechanism (Rohlfing, 2012, p. 152).

1.3.5 Data collection and analysis

In order to investigate the EU’s effectiveness in the ATT and NPT negotiations, the study relies on different data sources. First, a large number of official documents are consulted and analyzed. They can be clustered into three groups. The first group includes

policy documents, instruments and strategies related to the EU's policies on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), arms export control and control of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The second collection of documents is comprised of files (common positions, position papers, recommendations, press releases) of EU institutions, EU member states and other relevant actors adopted in the run-up to or in the aftermath of the ATT and NPT negotiations. The third group of documents relates to the ATT and NPT draft texts, official statements and interventions, press releases, non-governmental organization (NGOs) reports, and transcript records of debates during the preparatory meetings and UN conferences – in other words, documents produced during the negotiations. Most of the documents have been accessed through the relevant web-pages, while a few have been shared or, in rare cases, merely 'introduced' on the spot by the relevant interlocutors during the interview conversations. It is important to add that some of the documents are kept away from public eye, such as the EU working documents on ATT negotiation positions or internal deliberations on negotiation priorities in NPT cases, hence rendering confidentiality as a main obstacle in the document-based research (Bowen, 2009).

Second, the study relies on 43 semi-structured interviews with EU diplomats and officials, EU member states diplomats, third countries diplomats, researchers and NGOs representatives. The interview data was collected between 2013 and 2016, with most of the interviews performed during field research in Brussels, Geneva, New York and The Hague, with a handful of interviews conducted by means of telephone. The inclusion of the interview data adds great value to the research in terms of accurate interpretation of documents, enhanced understanding of the negotiation context and, most importantly, with regard to bringing new information and insights that otherwise would not have been available through the document analysis (Richards, 1996; Rubin and Rubin, 2012). Two sampling strategies facilitated the collection of interview data. The first one, which was especially useful during the early stages of learning about the cases, is that of snowball sampling. It implies a reliance on the first set of interviewed individuals to introduce a researcher to new potential interviewees, who in turn, exploring their network of professional contacts, can introduce a researcher to other officials. The snowball sampling was complemented by targeted sampling, when the interviewees were recruited selectively amongst the complete lists of negotiation participants and observers published on the relevant UN web-pages.

Third, in order to increase internal validity of the study, I conducted a direct non-participant observation of one of the empirical cases. For this purpose, I attended two

weeks worth of negotiations of the 2015 NPT Review Conference that took place in New York between 27 April and 22 May. Since access to the negotiation site could not be granted to individuals, I observed the conference as an affiliated member of an UN-accredited think tank (after interviewing its director). The observation method is considered to be the key research technique in anthropology and sociology, but tends to be somewhat neglected by political scientists and international relations scholars, despite its comparative advantages as both a data collection technique and an analytical tool (Burnham *et al.*, 2004, pp. 221–236; Lamont, 2015, pp. 140–154; DeWalt and DeWalt, 2011). Direct observation enables a researcher to collect a ‘raw’ data free of subjective perception or interpretation of individuals. Similar to the interview method, observation is well-suited for inductively generating new knowledge and information that is otherwise unavailable when a researcher stays ‘off-site’.

It goes without saying that despite the outlined advantages, all three research methods are inherently susceptible to weaknesses and limitations. Obtaining access to relevant documents is the main challenge to the document analysis technique (Yin, 2003); reliability is arguably the most serious concern regarding the interviewing method, especially when interviewees are inclined to misrepresent motives for their actions (Berry, 2002); and direct observation is quite costly in terms of time, energy and financial inputs (Prinz and Groen, 2016). It can be argued that in the context of researching multilateral arms negotiations that these challenges are even greater, given the culture of secrecy inherent to these negotiations and the sensitive nature of the subject matter (Matz, 2006).

Relying on each of these techniques separately in a single study might certainly be problematic, but combining data gathered from documents, interviews and direct observation creates a potentially powerful research package. Using different methods to cross-check and compensate each other’s weaknesses is at the core of the idea of methodological triangulation (Read and Marsh, 2002; Lamont, 2015). Such triangulation is also important for creating synergies between the three. For example, while talking to the interviewees, I ‘discovered’ some valuable documents related to negotiation proceedings and positions of its participants. In a similar vein, directly attending the four-week negotiation conference at the UN headquarters enabled me to conduct a new round of interviews with diplomats who happened to be physically present at the negotiations. In sum, methodological pluralism, including the triangulation of data sources, is essential for minimizing bias and increasing the validity of the research.

1.4 Outline of the study

The study is organized as follows. It starts with a literature review that is presented in chapter 2. The chapter outlines the evolution of the research agenda on the EU in world affairs, identifies and discusses several clusters of academic literature relevant to the topic and maps the current study within the existing web of scholarship. By way of conclusion, the chapter presents the research gaps that the given study subsequently addresses. Chapter 3 outlines the conceptual and analytical framework for analyzing EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. At the heart of the chapter is a comprehensive conceptualization of EU effectiveness that involves multiple steps of the concept-building process related to the definition, decomposition and measurement of the main concept. Drawing on the European integration and international relations (IR) theories, the chapter also presents a number of internal and external factors that likely shape EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are dedicated to the empirical analysis of the EU's participation in ATT and NPT negotiations. Chapter 4 starts with the investigation of the internal factors of EU effectiveness. In each of the selected cases, it evaluates the strength of domestic policy, the level of institutional coordination and the degree of member states' interest convergence. Chapter 5 brings forward the external factors of EU effectiveness. It examines the distribution of power resources among negotiators, explores the rules and procedures of the diplomatic forums under which the EU negotiates and assesses the international constellation of interests across the three negotiation cases. Finally, chapter 6 is of crucial importance, as it prepares the ground for answering the first research question of this study. In short, the chapter evaluates the *explanandum* of the study – EU effectiveness in ATT and NPT negotiations – breaking down the analysis along its three dimensions of goal achievement, relevance and external cohesion.

Chapter 7 builds upon the results of the empirical analysis presented in the previous three chapters in order to address the second research question of the study, and discerns the explanation of EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. The chapter first begins with the comparative cross-case investigation, with an intention to single out factors that associate with EU effectiveness. Afterwards, the chapter proceeds with the within-case analysis of selected cases in order to explore causal pathways that link potential causal factors with the outcome. Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the study in light of the research questions put forward in this introduction. In addition, it also outlines broader reflections on the study's findings

from the perspective of external validity and relevance for academic researchers and policy practitioners.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews the existing literature related to the study of EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. In particular, it puts forward and discusses three ways to map the current project in the existing web of scholarship – chronological, substantive and thematic – that form the backbone of the chapter. The three types of the literature review are instrumental in exploring the evolution of the research agenda and the current state of the art. As a way of conclusion, the chapter summarizes the research gap that the current study subsequently addresses.

2.1 Evolution of the research agenda on the EU in world affairs

From a Darwinist perspective, the focus of the current research on EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations is a result of a long-term evolution of the research trajectory on the EU in world affairs. Since the establishment of the CFSP predecessor – the European Political Cooperation – in 1970, the literature on the European Community's (and later the EU's) external relations and foreign policy has experienced a significant growth in number of volumes and authors. The academic interest in the EU in world affairs has been further reinforced by the Treaty reforms in Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon that consolidated an emergence of the united Europe as a new pole in world politics.

2.1.1 *What is the EU?*

Generally speaking, the evolution of the academic literature on the EU in world affairs has gone through three generations of intellectual inquiry. The first generation of scholarship, which surged between the 1970s and 1990s, placed a predominant focus on the question of *what the EU is*. The fundamental leitmotif of this nascent body of literature was to understand the EC/EU's 'raison d'être' in international relations (Goodwin, 1977) or, in other words, its 'international identity' (Whitman, 1997). This research purpose has been motivated by the difficulty of conceptualizing the nature of the EC's external relations and its apparent misfit into the traditional categories of international actors, given that the Community proved to be more than an international organization, but less than a state (Wallace, 1983). This ontological debate was inherently linked to earlier discussions among theorists of the European integration as to the various end results of the integration process in form of supranational polity, confederal state or federal union (Caporaso, 1996).

One of the central categories of the first generation of literature on the EU in world affairs is the concept of *power*. François Duchêne (1973) pioneered conceptualization of the EC's place in the world in terms of power. Duchêne introduced the notion of Europe as a 'civilian power', an identity that sharply contrasted with the dominant realist accounts of power in international relations. At the core of the civilian power idea is Europe's ability to pursue its objectives by non-military, predominantly economic means. Juxtaposing the EC to the United States (US) and Soviet super-powers, Duchêne argued that 'the European Community must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards or it will itself be more or less the victim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself' (pp. 20-21). Galtung (1973) characterized Europe as a 'capitalist superpower', referring to the growing patterns of the EC's economic dominance and asymmetry in relations with developing countries and members of Eastern European socialist block. Similarly to Galtung's emphasis on common market and expanding trade, Feld (1976) referred to the EC as an emergent 'economic power', and explored implications for the Community's political importance.

Other scholars investigated whether the EC is or can become an *actor* in international affairs. In their comparative study of the UN and the EC, Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970) claimed that both represent a new type of international actor by virtue of autonomous decision-making capacities and shaping foreign policies of their member states. In case of the EC, the qualities of an actor have been perceived to be even stronger, as they were enhanced by 'Community consciousness' (p. 50), something that the UN was arguably short of. In contrast, Taylor (1982) was more skeptical about the EC's capacity to act in international affairs. Without offering a definition of an international actor, Taylor claimed that 'Europe is capable of producing occasional examples of actor-behaviour', but 'there is little evidence to support the view that the Communities [...] might be expected to produce actor-behaviour in the long-term' (p. 41). Sjöstedt (1977) developed an extensive theoretical model of the EC's 'actor capability' that supposed to fulfill both 'diagnostic' and 'predictive' functions. Based on the analysis of the model and criteria for an actor capability, Sjöstedt cautiously concluded that the EC 'seems to be some sort of half-developed international actor' (p. 112). Further, Allen and Smith (1990) made yet another effort to conceptualize the EC's place in international affairs, introducing the notion of *presence*. As they put it, the EC is 'a variable and multi-dimensional presence, which plays an active role in some areas of international interaction and less active in others' (p. 20).

2.1.2 What does the EU do?

The prominence of the concepts of power, actor and presence underpin the general intellectual orientation of the earliest body of scholarship towards understanding the nature, *sui generis* status and place of the EC in world affairs. This *explanandum*, however unambitious it may appear, should not be surprising. In the context in which nation states have been seen as nearly the only actors capable of possessing external policies, and given the uncertainty surrounding the prospects and outcomes of the European integration, the research attempt to map and categorize the EC in the existing system of international affairs is fairly legitimate. Yet, this research tradition faced the criticism of an uneven preoccupation with the EC's institutional arrangements and decision-making procedures, discounting 'the substantive policy that they produced (or failed to produce)' (Allen and Smith, 1998, p. 48) or 'the scope and scale of [the EC's] foreign policy activities' (H. Smith, 2002, p. 9). As the EU's international outreach expanded after the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the CFSP, 'by the 1990s, [...] scholars had become less concerned with characterizing the "nature of the beast" than with analyzing what it does and how it does it' (White, 2001, p. 19). Hence, instead of asking 'what is the EC/EU?', the post-ontological generation of scholarship, which grew between the 1990s and 2000s, focused on the question of *what the EU does* in world affairs.

The central place in the second generation of scholarship on the EU in the world belongs to the body of literature that investigates the EU's *role* in the international domain. Hazel Smith's (2002) point of departure was that the EU has clear foreign policy, which can be analyzed in the same way as that of any sovereign state. In what he labeled as a 'geo-issue-area approach', Smith delved into the EU's policies of security and defense, external trade, development aid, interregional cooperation, and enlargement, systematically comparing them across regional areas in light of participating actors, policy instruments and decision-making procedures. In a similar manner, Karen Smith (2003) focused on the substantive elements of EU foreign policy, motivated by the intent to explore 'what the EU actually does in international relations' (p. 2). Smith analyzed 'why and how the EU pursues five foreign policy objectives' (*ibid.*), namely the encouragement of regional cooperation, promotion of human rights and democracy, prevention of violent conflicts and fight against international crime.

Further, White (2001) claimed that European foreign policy consists of three interacting sub-systems of relations: Community foreign policy, Union foreign policy and member states' foreign policies. Applying the foreign policy analysis framework to each type, White compares the three sub-systems with regards to their context, main actors,

instruments and capabilities, and policy-making processes. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) generally followed the same approach to the analysis of EU foreign policy focusing, as previous authors, on wide issues and geographical coverage. In addition, they also discussed the external aspects of the EU's internal policies, thus linking energy, environment, health and justice issues to the EU's foreign policy conduct. The common threads shared in these monographs, as well as in the separate chapters of the edited volumes published in the same time period (see Peterson and Sjørnsen, 1998; Rhodes, 1998; Knodt and Princen, 2003; Hill and Smith, 2005; Bindi, 2010), were a highly empirical character and a lack of theoretical sophistication, a focus on the content and instruments of EU foreign policy, and a consensual understanding that the scope of the EU's external relations are not limited to the narrow confines of the CFSP pillar.

Elgström and Smith's (2006) edited volume advanced the study of the EU's role in world affairs in terms of conceptual analysis. Unlike previously discussed studies that used the notion of role as an umbrella concept to refer to general patterns of EU behavior in the international domain, Elgström and Smith provided an explicit definition of roles 'as patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour' (p. 5). Hence, they suggested to investigate the EU's role in world affairs as a function of both the EU's self-imposed role conceptions and externally-driven expectations. Similarly, Orbie (2008) underlined the utility of the role theory in investigating the EU as an international actor. Highlighting their descriptive and explanatory potential, Orbie contended that role concepts 'constitute a pragmatic and convenient way to come to grips with the Union's international activities' (p. 2).

Gradually, the literature expanded with specifications of role definitions in which the EU is actually engaged. The variety included familiar civilian (Panebianco, 2006), normative (Manners, 2006), and multilateralist (Jørgensen, 2006) roles joined by more novel conceptions of the EU as a leader (Vogler and Stephan, 2007), norm promoter (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Panebianco, 2006), governance exporter (Freyburg *et al.*, 2009), development donor (Carbone, 2007), crisis manager (Emerson and Gross, 2007), and peacebuilder (Tocci, 2010). Among these role definitions, the concept of EU *leadership* arguably attracted the greatest degree of academic interest (Elgström, 2007; Falkner, 2007; Oberthür and Kelly, 2008), not least because of the EU's own self-perception of the role it plays in international environmental, trade and human rights governance.

Another way scholars approached patterns of the EU's external behavior was through the concept of *actorness*. Although the examination of the EU's capacity to act

in international affairs had been conducted earlier (Sjöstedt, 1977), only since the 1990s has the conceptualization of EU actorness gained a systematic character that has enabled analysts to better grasp the EU's changing role in the world (Hill, 1993). Considerable effort had been undertaken to elaborate criteria for assessing EU actorness. Caporaso and Jupille (1998), for instance, argued that in order to analyze the EU's capacity to act in global politics, a researcher needs to delineate a degree of the EU's recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion. Drawing on the constructivist approach to international relations, Bretherton and Vogler (2006) pointed out that the development of EU actorness encompasses interrelated components of presence, opportunity and capability. Further developing their approach in the context of interregional relations, Doidge (2008) suggested other criteria of actorness: action trigger, policy processes/structures and performance structures. These parameters were widely applied to explore the extent of the EU's actorness over time and across different policy domains and geographical regions suggesting that, as with the concept of role, actorness is a fluid and context-specific notion. Another feature of actorness research that links this tradition with the body of literature on EU roles is a familiar focus on the EU's external instruments and tools. As Toje (2008) put it, 'actorness cannot and should not be viewed separately from actual capabilities' (p. 204). Reflecting upon the popularity of the approach among scholars, the thriving research on EU actorness contributed to a conceptual proliferation in the field, as evidenced by the studies on EU regionness (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002), actorship (Hettne, 2008) or actorhood (Krotz, 2009).

2.1.3 What does the EU achieve?

Even though the second generation of literature took the study of the EU in world affairs to a considerably advanced level, some have argued that by the end of 2000s, the research tradition of studying what the EU does ran out of steam. The argument goes that while the examination of the content of EU foreign policy and the way the Union conducts its external relations did advance our understanding of the EU in the world, it had less of an effect with regards to the extent to which these external policies and instruments reached their intended effects. In this context, (K. Smith, 2010a) alleges that 'too often, we lapse into assertions that the EU has either considerable or little influence, without the backing of clear, substantial evidence for such influence' (p. 343). Proponents of the impact-oriented approach to the study of the EU in world affairs also claim that thus far, the researchers have been too busy with the inputs and processes of the EU foreign policy system without sufficiently considering its outputs. As Schunz (2010) observes, '[t]he

absence of sound conceptual and methodological reasoning about the Union's impact in international affairs stands in stark contrast to the plentiful scholarly attempts at identifying what kind of power the EU can be or already is in the global arena' (p. 23). Following similar line of reasoning, Mahncke (2014) also argues that the study of EU foreign policy to date has been quite inward-looking, focusing on the processes of internal decision-making. He highlights benefits of the alternative approach, calling for 'normalization' of EU foreign policy study: '[Assessing effects] will show what the ambitions of the EU are, what results the EU is actually achieving, and, last but not least, what the Union needs to do if it wants to make a difference' (p. 174). Interestingly, these interventions echo the growing expectations among observers and practitioners related to the Lisbon Treaty's shake-up of EU foreign policy machinery and its diplomatic structures in particular.

While the third generation of intellectual inquiry about the EU in the world – driven by the question of *what does the EU achieve* – started to develop into a systematic effort only in the 2010s, analysts might trace its roots to the seminal study of Roy Ginsberg (2001), published a decade earlier. Ginsberg examined external political *impact* of the EU on the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the Middle East Peace Process and on the US. The relevance of studying political impact rests upon its important function of feeding back foreign policy machinery, and hence informing subsequent external actions of the EU. 'Without external political impact, there is no reinforcing link back to new sources of action, there is no expectation of effective action, foreign policy decision-making would not be sustainable' (p. 2). According to Ginsberg, the legitimacy and effectiveness of the EU as an international actor is strongly dependent upon the EU's impact, or the ability to affect interests or change the direction or substance of third states' policies. Ginsberg also admits that 'the concepts of presence and actorness, which help measure the EU's capacity to act, are not sufficient for us to know if [EU] actions have effects – or outcomes' (p. 48). Therefore, a novel analytical framework for defining and detecting external political impact needed to be constructed, as Ginsberg demonstrated before examining the EU's empirical record in selected areas.

What the EU achieves in world affairs might arguably be best grasped through the concept of *effectiveness*. One of the features of the new research agenda on the EU as an international actor is, as Niemann and Bretherton (2013) put it, 'the shift in focus from notions of actorness to effectiveness' (p. 261). Scholars thus started to explore the links between the EU's capacity to act and its effectiveness in the context of bilateral dialogues Brattberg and Rhinard (2013), inter-regional relations (Carbone, 2013) and international

institutions (Groen and Niemann, 2013). Others investigated the causal impact of certain elements of EU actorness, such as coherence (Thomas, 2012) or cohesiveness (Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014) on effectiveness. Unlike earlier texts of the first and second generation of the research agenda, these studies are more conscious of a necessity to balance the EU-introvert character of the literature with a proper consideration of external context and characteristics, including engagement in comparative research.³

EU effectiveness also has been examined in the broader frame of EU *performance* in world affairs. Inspired by research in the fields of business and organizational studies, some (few) scholars have examined not only what the EU achieves in international affairs, but also the way it does so (Oberthür *et al.*, 2013; Jørgensen and Laatikainen, 2013; Dee, 2013; Baltag and Romanyshyn, 2017). Here, effectiveness is assessed along the other parameters, such as efficiency, relevance, cohesion or resilience, which are aggregated under the overarching label of EU performance. What most studies that address EU effectiveness share in common is a rather parsimonious understanding of effectiveness, as an ability to achieve intended results or goals.⁴ Yet, '[f]ew scholars studying the EU's international conduct have analysed the concept in a comprehensive and structured way' (Van Schaik, 2013, p. 37). Moreover, 'systematic empirical analyses of EU effectiveness are still relatively rare' (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013, p. 263). Given the nascent character of the growing research agenda on what the EU achieves in world affairs, the lack of conceptual and empirical studies of its effectiveness is understandable, but far from rewarding.

The outline of the evolution of the research agenda on the study of the EU in world affairs presented above is intended for mapping and positioning the current study on the EU's effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations within the existing trends in the field. It is also meant to elucidate the reasoning behind the focus of this project and to differentiate it from the studies of previous research dispositions. Surely, the three generations of literature are by no means clear-cut. Likewise, the temporal boundaries of each type of research tradition are not set in stone. Scholars can and do continue to scrutinize EU actorness (Kristensen and Jovanovic, 2015) and deliberate on the character of the EU as an international actor, as the renaissance of the EU-as-a-power debate shows (Manners, 2002; Orbie, 2006; Aggestam, 2008; Damro, 2012). Against this background,

³ The tendency of an inside-out bias while downplaying the role of the external environment in the studies of the EU in world affairs has been well-highlighted by Jørgensen (2007; 2015).

⁴ For a rare exception, see Oberthür and Groen (2015).

it is perhaps safer to assume the development of the research agenda on the EU in the world taking a stretched spiral shape, rather than evolving in a linear form.

Table 1. The evolution of the research agenda on the EU in world affairs.

Timeline	Key theme	Key concepts	Key authors
I generation: 1970s-1990s	What is the EU?	Power, actor, presence	Duchêne (1973), Galtung (1973), Feld (1976), Goodwin (1977), Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970), Sjöstedt (1977), Taylor (1982), Allen and Smith (1990)
II generation: 1990s-2000s	What does the EU do?	Role, leadership, actorness	H. Smith (2002), K. Smith (2003), White (2001), Keukeleire and MacNaughton (2008), Elgström and Smith (2006), Elgström (2007), Jupille and Caporaso (1998), Bretherton and Vogler (2006)
III generation: from 2010s	What does the EU achieve?	Impact, effectiveness, performance	Ginsberg (2001), Niemann and Bretherton (2013), Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014), Van Schaik (2013), Oberthür et al. (2013), Jørgensen and Laatikainen (2013)

2.2 The EU in multilateral negotiations

The study and practice of the EU in multilateral negotiations is inextricably linked to the EU's engagement with the wider world. As one former diplomat asserted, 'the capacity to act internationally includes the capacity to negotiate and contract' (Plantey, 2007, p. 256). If bilateral exchanges and encounters always have been a traditional element of international relations – and for that matter practiced by the EC as early as the 1950s – multilateral diplomacy surged to the center stage of world affairs relatively recently. By the end of the 1970s, David Allen (1978) spotted 'the tendency for bloc negotiations to replace bilateral dealings as the dominant practice in the international system', which ultimately compelled 'the European states to organize themselves in order to act effectively within this new environment' (p. 143). The observer status at the UN,

granted to the EC in 1974, allowed to transform what has been known as the Commission information and communication office in New York into a diplomatic delegation (Drieskens, 2012). Since then, the EC/EU has established eight multilateral delegations to international organizations and developed a varying pattern of participation and membership in multilateral forums, while the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 220 TFEU) called on the EU ‘to establish all appropriate forms of cooperation’ with the UN and other international organizations.

As a reflection of the increasing pattern of the EU’s international diplomatic activities, the literature on the Union in multilateral contexts also has seen some growth and visibility, despite the asserted lack of academic interest (Jørgensen, 2007; Drieskens and Van Schaik, 2014). Owing to fuzzy disciplinary boundaries and a somewhat unprecise character of the subject of interest, the study of the EU in multilateral negotiations does not constitute a clear-cut field of inquiry. In the academic textbooks, it is typically subsumed under the headlines of partially overlapping themes, such as ‘the EU’s relations with international organizations’, ‘the EU and effective multilateralism’ or ‘the EU’s multilateral diplomacy’. For the purpose of mapping the current project within the relevant body of literature, it is important to distinguish between two categories of studies with different interconnecting prepositions: (1) the EU *and* multilateral institutions as opposed to (2) the EU *in* multilateral institutions. Each of these bigger groups can be further sub-divided into smaller clusters depending on the research question and aim of inquiry.

2.2.1 The EU and multilateral institutions

The first cluster of research examines the extent to which the EU shapes multilateral institutions, focusing specifically on the EU’s support and empowerment of international organizations. The studies in this area mushroomed after the EU proclaimed in 2003 ‘effective multilateralism’ as a headline goal of its foreign policy, distinct to the supposedly defective unilateralism of the US (Gowan, 2008). Scholars thus scrutinized the EU’s contribution to the UN’s system of collective security and crisis-management (Biscop and Drieskens, 2006), the EU’s input to the reform process of the UN Security Council (Pirozzi *et al.*, 2014) or the EU’s role in the emerging fiscal multilateralism of G20 (Rommerskirchen, 2014). Falkner and Müller (2014), while exploring the EU’s potential for shaping global policies, shifted the focus from international organizations to international regimes. The way the EU embraces multilateralism also has triggered an active debate among communities of practitioners and think tankers, the resonance of

which has been reflected in numerous policy reports (Ortega, 2007; Jokela, 2011; Van Langenhove and Maes, 2012). Apart from showing the EU's varying record in strengthening multilateral systems, scholars also concluded that in some instances, the EU's policies may well undermine or contribute to dysfunctional activities of international organizations (Laatikainen and Smith, 2006; Kissack, 2010). In terms of theoretical explanation, this body of studies is fundamentally agent-driven, which lends the accounts of the EU's efforts at building multilateral global order to the EU's internal attributes and the quality of its internal multilateralism (Costa, 2013; Drieskens and Van Schaik, 2014; Bouchard *et al.*, 2014).

The second cluster of literature is rooted in a structure-oriented tradition, and focuses on the reverse impact of multilateral institutions on the EU. Although the general literature on transnational influences is not scarce (Risse-Kappen, 1995), its application in the context of the EU and multilateral systems is less common. In contrast to the growing body of scholarship of the former cluster, the literature that explores the causal arrows that flow from international organizations towards the EU is underdeveloped: 'second-image approaches, not second-image-reversed approaches, are all time favourite perspectives' (Jørgensen, 2015, p. 25). Exploratory studies conducted in this area demonstrated how and under what conditions international organizations and multilateral agreements, acting through domestic policy entrepreneurs, can trigger a top-down change in EU policies and policy-making processes (Costa, 2009; Costa and Jørgensen, 2012; Nedergaard and Jensen, 2014). In addition, legal scholars scrutinized the extent to which the EU is dependent on the international law and international processes of norm creation, despite a widespread assumption of the autonomous character of the EU legal order (Wessel and Blockmans, 2013; Young, 2011).

Finally, the third cluster of research does not attempt to merely isolate one direction of influence, but instead approaches the interaction between the EU and multilateral institutions from a two-way-street perspective. The contributions in this cluster are implicitly informed and guided by inter-organizational theories of cooperation that address relations, interactions and links between two or more international organizations (Jönsson, 1993). Two prominent volumes investigated, in a comparative manner, the relations between the EU and major international organizations (e.g. UN, WTO, IMF, ILO), focusing on their temporal evolution and varying internal and external factors that conditioned these relationships (Jørgensen, 2009; Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011a). Other scholars performed single case studies researching inter-organizational relations within individual dyads, but across several issue areas, such as

development, environment, and security in the context of the EU-UN partnership (Wouters *et al.*, 2006), or minority rights, terrorism, and data protection in the framework of the EU-Council of Europe cooperation (Kolb, 2013). While studying the post-Cold War security context, (Biermann, 2008) introduced the concept of inter-organizational networking, highlighting dense, and at times overlapping, institutional links between the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and UN in the European arena. Following suit, scholars discovered that cooperation is just one possible mode of interaction between the EU and other security providers, with inter-institutional rivalry and competition becoming now more common (Van Ham, 2009; Koutrakou, 2011; Græger, 2014; Van Willigen and Koops, 2015).

Two characteristics are shared across the three strands of research that effectively allow them to jointly stand out as a distinct body of literature on the EU *and* multilateral institutions. First, the EU is viewed as a partner (or sometimes a competitor) of multilateral organizations. In other words, a researcher approaches the former and the latter as actors on an equal footing, which makes this body of research particularly suitable for a theoretical import of IR perspectives. Second, the three clusters are predominantly policy – and to a lesser extent politics – oriented. That is, the processes of bottom-up or top-down influences between the EU and multilateral institutions are linked to specific changes in ideas, norms and rules that constitute policy priorities and preferences. The type of studies outlined in this section is not of immediate relevance for the current project, as they refer to multilateral negotiations in an incidental and sporadic manner. What is of interest, however, is the specific understanding of strength and weight of multilateral institutions as components to the EU's effectiveness in multilateral systems (Laatikainen and Smith, 2006), something that will be discussed in a greater detail in the Chapter 3.

2.2.2 The EU in multilateral institutions

The fourth strand of research examines the EU's participation in international organizations, and arguably has the longest record of all research clusters discussed in this section. Focusing mostly on the UN and its agencies, scholars tracked the modalities of the EC and its member states' participation as early as following the introduction of the EPC and the EC's observer status in the 1970s (Lindemann, 1976; De Gara, 1979; Gregory and Stack, 1983; Brückner, 1990). In that respect, Lindemann (1976) recalled an anecdotal situation when the Soviet Ambassador to the UN could not make sense of one

of the first joint declarations of the EC's member states, asking 'who are these Nine?' (p. 262). Over time, studies of this cluster of literature grew in numbers and volumes, reflecting the complexity and multi-faceted nature of the EU's participation in multilateral organizations.

Given the composite nature of the EU as an actor, *coherence* between EU diplomatic actors and its member states, in terms of voting, statements and other means of diplomatic exchange, became an omnipresent concern of scholars (Luif, 2003; Johansson-Nogués, 2004; Mahncke and Gstöhl, 2012). Besides the ability to speak with one voice in multilateral settings, the issues related to extensive patterns of *coordination* among EU actors also prominently featured in this body of research (Farrell, 2006; Taylor, 2006; Luif and Radeva, 2007; Degrand-Guillaud, 2009). Another popular topic, not only among political scientists, but also legal scholars, is *representation* of the EU in multilateral organizations. Whether and how the European Commission, member states, rotating EU Presidency or the European External Action Service (EEAS) sit in the EU's chair and speak on its behalf entails the discussion of the intricate division of competences between national and supranational levels, as well as the rules of participation in international organizations (Rasch, 2008; Gstöhl, 2009; Nedergaard and Jensen, 2014).

Other studies focused on explaining the variation and modalities of the EU's *membership* status, some of them drawing on substantial legal expertise (Govaere *et al.*, 2004; Wessel, 2011; Debaere *et al.*, 2014). Relying on the insights of the role theory and its application in the broader study of EU external affairs, scholars also explored the EU's *role* performance in multilateral forums (Elgström, 2007; Laatikainen, 2010). Wouters *et al.* (2012) went somewhat further by conceptualizing *position* as the intersection of the EU's legal status and role, and subsequently scrutinizing the concept in the context of the UN human rights and environmental bodies. Yet, other scholars drew upon well-established concepts, such as *presence* (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011a) or *actorness* (Reiter, 2005; Gehring *et al.*, 2013), to examine the EU's participation in international organizations. If anything can be inferred from this brief review of the fourth cluster of literature, it is a considerable fragmentation and eclecticism in terms of a research target and approach, which motivates new edited volumes to aim at aggregating findings by way of combining multiple facets of the EU's participation in international organizations (Orsini, 2014; Kaddous, 2015).

The fifth and final cluster of research comprises studies that examine the EU's participation in international regimes. More specifically, they investigate the EU's involvement within a set of multilateral conferences that unfold in the framework of

multilateral treaties, conventions and agreements. Studies of this type are rare in comparison to the previous cluster, not least because of the perceived preponderant importance of the agentic qualities of international organizations and a difficulty of analytically separating ‘sets of rules meant to govern international behavior’ from formal organizations embedded in those rules (Martin and Simmons, 2012, p. 328). This is regrettable, as the examination of the EU in international regimes is closely linked with the study of multilateral negotiations. ‘Regimes are the result of continuous negotiations between actors. They are also major arenas for multilateral negotiation games’ (Smith and Elgström, 2013, p. 303). Smith and Elgström (2013) put forward an examination of EU roles and engagement modes linked to its participation in international regimes. In empirical terms, the existing studies of this cluster predominantly centered on the EU’s participation in multilateral environmental regimes (Delreux, 2011; Schunz, 2012), although, since recently, the focus lies to also cover other issue areas (Hivonnet, 2012; Debaere and Orbie, 2013; Kienzle and Vestergaard, 2013).

Several propositions can be formulated about the two reviewed clusters of research that constitute the literature on the EU *in* multilateral institutions. First, the EU is viewed as a participant in multilateral forums, whereas multilateral institutions are arenas that provide a platform for the EU’s participation. Hence, both clusters bring to the forefront the phenomenon of multilateral negotiations as a continuous process that enables participants of international organizations or regimes to shape behavior and outcomes in collective decision-making. Therefore, this body of literature is the most central for the current project, and it is here where the current study positions itself and contributes to the greatest extent. Second, the literature on the EU in multilateral institutions is predominantly polity-oriented, as can be inferred from the outlined survey of *explanandums*. The overwhelming majority of them concern the EU’s internal arrangements and characteristics, rather than portray the EU’s diplomatic interaction and its outcomes, reflecting a well-established tendency evident from the analysis of general EU external relations literature in the previous section. In this light, Laatikainen's (2015) argument that ‘the dominant scholarly preoccupation in the field has been to establish the EU’s actorness within the UN’ (p. 707), which ‘has obscured the EU’s substantive actions’ (p. 712) can be extended to a broader context of the EU in multilateral institutions.

Given this state of art, it is not surprising that the studies on EU effectiveness that are explicitly linked to the context of multilateral negotiations are in their infancy. The most comprehensive attempt to date to explore the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral

negotiations was undertaken by Louise Van Schaik (2013). She studied the impact of the EU's unity of external representation on its effectiveness across a set of negotiations on food safety, climate change and public health. In turn, the degree of unity as the main causal factor was believed to be determined by the type of EU competence, the level of preference homogeneity among EU member states and the degree of socialization among EU actors. Although Van Schaik developed a meticulous approach to analyzing EU effectiveness, the lack of conceptualization of the external context's causal power stands out as a particular shortcoming.

In similar vein, Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014) examined varying patterns of relations between EU cohesiveness and effectiveness in multilateral institutions. Panke (2014) studied the EU's external effectiveness in negotiating UNGA resolutions, revealing a critical role for a negotiation strategy for the EU's success. Effectiveness also has been examined as one of the dimensions of EU performance in multilateral arenas (Dee 2013; Oberthür *et al.*, 2013; Jørgensen and Laatikainen, 2013). Although the existing studies on EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations made an important contribution, not least due to breaking away from a dominant in the field actorness-oriented perspective, they do lack a comprehensive understanding of effectiveness, reducing the latter to the EU's goal achievement. Furthermore, apart from Dee (2013), none of these studies drew on the international negotiation literature that can shed a great deal of light on the context and its implications for the EU's multilateral diplomacy.

Table 2. Overview of the literature on the EU in multilateral negotiations.

Strand of Literature	Key features	Research cluster	Key authors
The EU and multilateral institutions	The EU as a partner (or competitor)	The EU shaping multilateral institutions	Laatikainen and Smith (2006), Gowan (2008), Kissack (2010), Costa (2013), Falkner and Müller (2014), Drieskens and Van Schaik (2014), Bouchard et al. (2014)
	Policy-oriented	Multilateral institutions shaping the EU	Costa (2009), Young (2011), Costa and Jørgensen (2012), Wessel and Blockmans (2013), Crespy (2014)

The EU in multilateral institutions	Multilateral negotiations at the periphery	Interaction between the EU and multilateral institutions	Wouters et al. (2006), Jørgensen (2009), Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2011), Koutrakou (2011), Kolb (2013), Græger (2014), Van Willigen and Koops (2015)
	The EU as a participant	The EU in international organizations	Lindemann (1976), Bruckner (1990), Luif (2003), Johansson-Nogués (2004), Farrell (2006), Degrand- Guillaud (2009), Rasch (2008), Gstöhl (2009), Govaere <i>et al.</i> (2004), Elgström (2007) Laatikainen (2010), Wouters <i>et al.</i> (2012), Gehring et al. (2013), Orsini (2014), Kaddous (2015)
	Polity-oriented		
	Multilateral negotiations at the core	The EU in international regimes	Delreux (2011), Hivonnet (2012), Schunz (2012), Smith and Elgström (2013), Debaere and Orbie (2013), Kinzle and Vestergaard (2013)

2.3 The EU in multilateral arms negotiations

The policy area of arms affairs – an umbrella term that includes issues of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament – is widely believed to possess a set of special characteristics that enable it to stand out among the various international policy areas. Moreover, it is a set of distinct features that puts the military field of arms affairs somewhat at odds with the collective action logic intrinsic to multilateral negotiations (Rittberger, 1983). According to Avenhaus *et al.* (2002), security ‘issues representing a threat against the integrity or survival of a nation (high politics) are treated differently in international political interaction from other issues’ (p. 5). Weapons-related security challenges are set to be handled in an environment in which states are clearly the key stakeholders. The central position of states is grounded in their dual roles as actors that develop, deploy and diffuse weapons on one hand, but also regulate, control and negotiate over arms on the other (M. E. Smith, 2010). Moreover, multilateral arms agreements often involve core aspects of states’ sovereignty related to monitoring and sanctioning. This increased sensitivity of arms negotiations, coupled with a culture of secrecy, perversity of power and other attributes, reinforces states’ perceived exclusive positions in this

domain, and their resistance to any significant role of non-state actors (Burroughs and Cabasso, 1999; Avenhaus et al., 2002).

The outlined characteristics of multilateral arms negotiations thus constitute a ‘hard’ test case for the EU’s participation and ability to make a difference. Naturally, these circumstances generate no high expectations of the EU’s effectiveness, which may well be a reason why the study of the EU in multilateral arms negotiations is less popular compared to areas in which the EU is (or perceived to be) more visible and active. In addition, even within the international security field, arms affairs seemingly have lost their former weight and prestige in academic and policy-making circles and are now overshadowed by, for instance, issues of military conflict and terrorism. To some extent, the logic of the field is still informed by paradigms and elements of thinking developed during the Cold War period, which is also reflected in the lack of a new generation of researchers and experts other than those who were already active before the fall of the Berlin Wall (Bailes, 2013).

The first diplomatic experience that exposed the then EC and its member states to arms related issues and found its reflection in the literature was the negotiation of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Resulting from the rapprochement of the two superpowers, the Conference spread over the course of four years from 1972 to 1975, touching upon a wide variety of issues ranging from military confidence-building measures to humanitarian issues. Although essential policy proposals and positions were worked out in the context of NATO, for the EC and its member states, the CSCE was nonetheless of high significance ‘as the first major attempt to test their ability to work together’ (Tickell, 1975, p. 115), especially regarding representation and spokesperson rights. Underlined by the EPC process, EC member states’ experiences of consensus-seeking consultations ‘brought them in the front row’ and ‘gained the European Community *de facto* recognition by all participants, including the East’ (Walschap, 1976, p. 41; see also Taylor, 1979).

It was not until the launch of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty that scholars started to engage more systematically with the EU’s involvement in international arms affairs. The body of literature that has grown since then shares several distinct characteristics. First, the existing research is overwhelmingly policy-oriented. A ‘default’ design of such studies rests upon a general survey of the EU’s arms-related policies, discussion of their aims and instruments, shortcomings, and achievements, be it WMD non-proliferation (Anthony, 2009; Rhode, 2010; Quille, 2013), nuclear non-proliferation (Michel and Müller, 1996; Müller and Van Dassen, 1997; Tertrais, 2005; Portela and

Kienzle, 2015), export control of conventional arms (Hansen, 2016) or dual-use items (Micara, 2012). Other studies analyze specific EU policy instruments, such as WMD Strategy (Álvarez-Verdugo, 2006; Kienzle, 2013; Cottey, 2014) or Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (Bauer, 2003; Bromley and Brzoska, 2008), or focus on regional dimensions of EU arms policies (Kile, 2005; Zwolski, 2011; Hassan, 2013). Second, the existing research is largely empirically-driven. Although examples of rigorous application of concepts – such as, actorness (Zwolski, 2011) and performance (Blavoukos *et al.*, 2015) – and theoretical perspectives – for example, institutionalism (Rosa, 2001) and intergovernmentalism (Bauer and Remacle, 2004) – do exist, the lack of conceptual analysis and theorization is a tendency that currently defines the state of the art. Hence, it is not surprising that non-academic reports and papers produced by think tanks and expert communities became dominant sources of knowledge, ideas and information in the field.⁵

The abovementioned studies refer to multilateral arms negotiations in a cursory manner, as a mere element of the EU's external arms policies, providing only a general indication of the EU's assessment in terms of success or failure. Standalone research that specifically addresses the EU's participation in multilateral arms talks is extremely rare. One notable exception is Alcalde and Bouchard's (2008) study of the EU's coherence in the 2006 UN Small Arms Conference. Through the lenses of a multiple-level game approach, Alcalde and Bouchard identified problems in the EU's coherence of representation and negotiation priorities that affected its ability to bring the Conference to the consensual outcome. Further relevant research is that of Dee (2012; 2015), who analyzes the EU's participation in multiple NPT Review Conferences. What is particularly interesting is Dee's shifting conceptualization of performance as consisting of recognition, relevance, followership and effectiveness to a more linear understanding in terms of output, outcome and impact. Several non-academic articles also targeted various episodes of the EU's conduct in multilateral arms forums (Müller, 2005a; Schmitt, 2005; Katsioulis and Mölling, 2010; Delaere and Van Schaik, 2012; Depauw, 2012). These papers can provide useful insights into narrative accounts of the negotiation processes, but are less helpful when it comes to developing analytical arguments for causal explanation.

2.4 Summarizing the research gap

⁵ Of numerous think tanks that work on the EU in international arms affairs, three stand out particularly: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF).

With a purpose of mapping the current project within the established scholarship, this chapter scrutinizes the existing relevant literature in light of several distinct dimensions. First, from the perspective of chronological review, the current study is embedded into a broader evolution of the research agenda on the EU in world affairs. The review shows that the research on the EU's effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations is a reflection of a long-term development of the research trajectory that traversed three generations of intellectual inquiry – ontological ('what is the EU?'), behavioral ('what does the EU do?') and consequential ('what does the EU achieve?'). The underlining thread of this evolution is a shift from an introvert study of the EU – an approach that puts EU-internal factors and characteristics at the center of the inquiry – to a broader outward-oriented focus that assigns equal weight to results of EU foreign policy and external environment to which an EU external action is directed. Although the impact-driven approach facilitates 'widening the horizon of the contemporary research agenda to one "that is profoundly more international than European" (Jørgensen and Laatikainen, 2013a, p. 4)' (Orbie *et al.*, 2015, p. 723), it also opened up space for considerable conceptual proliferation. Such notions as 'influence', 'impact', 'outcome', and 'effectiveness' are used by scholars almost interchangeably and without sufficient attempt to define their conceptual boundaries. Against this background and in a rather simplistic sense, effectiveness is often defined through the lenses of performance as an achievement of goals. The lack of comprehensive conceptualization of EU effectiveness tailored to the context of multilateral negotiations is one important research gap that this project addresses.

Second, the substantive literature review maps the current study within the relevant bodies of scholarship related to the EU in multilateral negotiations. It has been shown that the relevant literature can be divided into two large groups and further subdivided into five research clusters. The first group of studies – the EU *and* multilateral institutions – views the EU as a partner (or competitor) to multilateral institutions, is primarily policy-oriented, and lends itself to the analysis of multilateral negotiation processes only to a minor extent. In contrast, the second category of studies – the EU *in* multilateral institutions – examines the EU as a participant in multilateral settings, is considerably heterogeneous in terms of various dimensions of polity as research targets, and brings multilateral negotiations to the forefront. It is therefore this second body of literature to which the current study talks the most, and to which it contributes to the greatest extent. Yet, the latter group of studies is characterized by a set of lopsided research tendencies. First, there is a strong preoccupation with various elements of EU

actorness in multilateral institutions at the expense of studying the effects of the Union's diplomatic activity and its engagement with external negotiation contexts. Second, there is a lack of research on the EU's participation in international regimes, which stands in contrast to a vast focus on international organizations as multilateral settings for the EU's diplomacy. These are the two particular elements of another research gap that the current study on EU effectiveness in multilateral arms regimes intends to fill.

Finally, the thematic literature review exposed this project to nearly non-existent academic studies on the EU's effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. This infelicitous state of the art draws its origin from the unpopular character of arms affairs, particularly in comparison to other areas of the EU's multilateral conduct, among EU scholars. The adjacent literature on the EU's involvement in international arms affairs is dominated by policy concerns and empirical analyses and, most importantly, it addresses the EU's participation in multilateral arms talks in a rudimentary way. A widespread reliance on the non-academic knowledge produced by expert communities and think tanks is another particular feature that underlies the unsatisfactory state of the art. Hardly any research exists that integrates WMD and conventional arms negotiations in a comparative design, despite the promise of 'multiple case studies potentially [producing] more condensed knowledge' and cumulative results (Jørgensen, 2007, p. 517). Addressing these deficiencies in the literature is yet another aim of this study.

CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter outlines the conceptual and analytical framework for analyzing EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations and, by doing so, sets a foundation for the empirical analysis performed in the subsequent chapters of the study. First, the chapter addresses basic pitfalls in studying the EU in multilateral negotiations. In particular, it sheds light and clarifies meaning of the key conceptual units – the EU, negotiations, multilateral negotiations – used throughout the study. Second, the chapter develops an elaborate conceptualization of EU effectiveness, the outcome that this study seeks to explain. A reader is guided through a multi-step and multi-level concept-building process including the definition, decomposition and measurement of EU effectiveness. Third, the chapter draws upon a number of explanatory factors, which most likely shape EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations, before summarizing main features and characteristics of the chosen analytical framework.

3.1 Studying the EU in multilateral negotiations

Analyzing EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations is hampered by a number of conceptual and empirical bottlenecks, foremost related to the difficulties with defining and measuring effectiveness. An examination of the EU's participation and influence in the area of international affairs that is typically perceived to be a *domain réservé* of nation states is a challenge in itself. The traditional dominance of states in the functioning of various multilateral forums largely explains the lack of analytical and methodological tools available to EU scholars that seek to investigate the role of world's most institutionalized form of regional integration – the EU – in multilateral institutions. Before delving into the core of this study's analytical framework, several conceptual and epistemological clarifications ought to be made with regard to the subject of the investigation. Studying the EU in multilateral negotiations raises basic questions and concerns about how *the EU* as such is conceived, what is the essence of *negotiation* and when it is appropriate to speak of *multilateral* negotiations.

What to analyze as 'the EU' in multilateral negotiations is not always straightforward. The heart of the controversy lies in the non-traditional nature of the EU as a global diplomatic actor that is neither a state nor an international organization. What complicates the analysis is that apart from being an international negotiator, the EU is also a negotiation arena for national state actors when it comes to internal coordination and deliberation of diplomatic standpoints (Elgström and Jönsson, 2005). The practical consequence is a frequent parallel participation of the EU and its member states in

multilateral forums, with an uneasy division of competences and tasks between them. This study follows a broad definition of the EU as a multilateral negotiator, which lends itself not only to the collective actions and diplomatic activities of EU institutional actors (the European Commission, the European Council, the EEAS and the High Representative for Union's Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), but also incorporates member states' diplomatic contributions that are developed (at least to some extent) through a certain interaction with the EU (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 14). This broad understanding of the EU in the context of multilateral negotiations foresees a potential for tension between supranational and intergovernmental elements of the EU's diplomatic conduct, with important implications for its effectiveness.

Negotiation can be conceived as an 'identifiable mode of joint decision-making', where 'the parties [...] combine their conflicting points of view into a single decision' (Jönsson, 2002, p. 217). The classic understanding of negotiation presupposes an existence of both commonalities and differences among participants, who seek to reconcile them 'for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present' (Iklé, 1987, pp. 3–4). Negotiations occur at every corner of public and private life, from bargaining at the market to dispute settlement between employer and employee to coalition-building in a parliament. In the international arena, negotiation is commonly viewed in a conjunction with or through the prism of diplomacy. Berridge (1995), for example, defines diplomacy as 'the conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda, or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means' (p. 1). Contrary to war and coercion, negotiation is a more legitimate means for conducting international affairs or, as some even claim, 'a tool that generates order in international relations' (Meerts, 2006, p. 341). The EU is the most prominent epitome of such an order due to a densely institutionalized character of negotiation processes within the EU (Smith, 1996).

In a strict sense, multilateral negotiations can be most clearly understood through what they are not – bilateral negotiations. Unlike bilateral encounters that occur between two parties, multilateral literally means 'many-sided' (Hampson and Hart, 1995, p. 4). In other words, multilateral negotiations are joint decision-making processes with a purpose of reaching an agreement among three or more actors. Yet, focusing solely upon the numerical criterion of the definition, however helpful in terms of clarity, risks missing an important qualitative dimension that allows to distinguish multilateral negotiations from synonymous labels, such as plurilateral or multiparty negotiations (Crump and Glendon, 2003).

The key to understanding multilateral negotiations is in the term ‘multilateral’. Robert Keohane (1990) defines multilateralism as ‘the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions’ (p. 731). While Keohane underlines the institutional dimension of multilateralism, John Ruggie (1993) defines multilateralism through the role of organizing principles – generalized principles of conduct – that guide the relations among its participants. In particular, Ruggie refers to indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity, as multilateralism generates a wide scope of collective goods that benefit its participants in the long run and across many issues, thus going beyond particularistic interests. In the last two decades, numerous scholars (Newman *et al.*, 2006; Bouchard *et al.*, 2014) have proposed modified definitions of multilateralism based on the need to accommodate the growing role of non-state actors in global governance, yet the component of rules and principles still remains at the core. As a form of multilateralism, multilateral negotiations can be understood as a collective decision-making process with a purpose of reaching an agreement among three or more actors, wherein the process is bound by certain rules and guided by certain principles.

Two essential features of multilateral negotiations are important to consider in the context of studying the EU’s participation. First, multilateral negotiations are inherently complex and uncertain processes. In this sense, multilateral negotiations, especially those conducted under UN auspices, are different from bilateral (e.g. EU-US talks) or minilateral (e.g. EU-US-China talks) encounters that are relatively straightforward in terms of identifying negotiating parties and their preferences. Complexity in multilateral negotiations is displayed through multiple negotiation actors, which discuss multiple issues performing multiple roles that are informed by multiple norms (Raiffa, 1982; Zartman, 1994). In addition to – or owing to – their complex nature, multilateral negotiations are often surrounded by many uncertainties due to the difficulty of acquiring and managing relevant information by their participants (Underdal, 1983). The instances when no single actor has a monopoly on ideas, issues, agendas, bargaining tools and negotiations unfold on multiple levels and in a variety of groups, simultaneously complicating the tasks of a researcher in navigating the negotiation processes. More specifically, conducting research in the context of multilateral negotiations is challenging in terms of identifying causal relationships and singling out the individual effects of the EU’s participation.

Second, multilateral negotiations stand out as a particular form of multilateralism along with multilateral institutions – international organizations and international

regimes. While negotiations represent a procedural form of multilateralism, organizations and regimes embody multilateralism's organizational shape. The functions and meanings of the three are closely intertwined: international organizations and regimes are both products of and arenas for multilateral negotiations (Smith and Elgström, 2013). According to Hampson and Hart (1995), the fact that the hallmark of modern multilateral diplomacy takes place under the aegis of international organizations provides them 'special power and leverage to shape prenegotiation processes and influence the terms of subsequent negotiations' (p. 4). For a researcher of the EU in multilateral negotiations, this implies that a proper consideration needs to be paid to the institutional context – the UN setting in this study – of the EU's multilateral diplomatic conduct.

3.2 Conceptualizing EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations

'Concept formation lies at the heart of all social science endeavor' (Gerring, 1999, p. 359). As it is impossible to conduct research without concepts, the undisputed rule of thumb before commencing any in-depth investigation is to specify and define concepts (Sartori, 1970). Hence, before directly addressing the aim of this study of evaluating EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations, it is important to decide what EU effectiveness is. However, as Goertz (2006) argues, 'to develop a concept is more than providing a definition: it is deciding what is important about an entity' (p. 27). Similarly, Gerring (1999) claims that building a concept includes defining the events or phenomena, their attributes or properties and a label that covers all. To explicate ontology of a concept is thus to deliberate on the nature and structure of a phenomenon, drawing on both theoretical and empirical insights. Given the complex character of most social science concepts, Goertz (2006) suggests breaking down their analysis into three levels. At the basic level, a concept represents a noun or a label of a variable that is used in theoretical propositions. At the secondary level, a researcher analyzes multiple dimensions that constitute a basic-level concept. At the third level, there are indicators that specify the concept with regard to the acquisition of empirical data. This framework forms the structure of the following discussion.

3.2.1 Defining EU effectiveness

Effectiveness is a cross-cutting concept that is widely used in a variety of disciplines, although its meanings and forms vary depending on the context, purpose and field of study. The literature on public policy and policy-making ties the notion of effectiveness to the achievement of specific policy goals that are formulated to solve

social problems (Héritier, 2012). It links effectiveness to policy implementation (outcomes) in the context of a policy cycle, distinguishing it from political decision-making (outputs) and policy evaluation (impact). Similar rationalistic understanding of effectiveness is demonstrated by scholars working in the fields of organizational studies and public management (Lusthaus, 2002; Meyer, 2002). Here, effectiveness is conceived as an ability of an organization to successfully fulfil its objectives. Other scholars refer to effectiveness in the context of evaluating policy success (Marsh and McConnell, 2010). If the notion of success is defined ‘in terms of favourable or desired outcomes’, then effectiveness is understood as a necessary ingredient of success (Baldwin, 2000, p. 171).

The international relations literature also widely discusses the concept of effectiveness (Hasenclever *et al.*, 1997; Young, 1994). Analysing the performance of international environmental regimes, Young (1999) suggests to examine regime effectiveness from the perspective of its problem-solving capacity: an international regime is effective when it alleviates the problem that triggered the regime’s creation. Scholars, for example, discuss the effectiveness of international institutions in dealing with environmental pollution, global epidemics or inter-state conflict (Young, 1994; Harman, 2012; Boehmer *et al.*, 2004). Young (1999) further argues that effectiveness is a multi-faceted concept that may take on different forms: legal effectiveness (compliance with contractual obligations), economic effectiveness (the ratio between meeting the objectives and amount of resources spent), normative effectiveness (achievement of justice, participation and other values), political effectiveness (changes in the behaviour and interests of actors).

Apart from the blurred conceptual foundations of effectiveness, another challenge in studying effectiveness is methodological. Since effectiveness does not appear to be a concept with a commonly agreed and accepted meaning, evaluation of effectiveness is susceptible to what some scholars may call ‘the eye of the beholder problem’ (Gutner and Thompson, 2013, p. 59). It means that definition and assessment of effectiveness frequently depend on who is conducting an evaluation. Finnemore (2014), for example, argues that scholars should necessarily ask the questions ‘effective for whom’ and ‘effective for what’ in their analysis. Similarly, March and McConnell (2010) assert that ideas about success and effectiveness ‘are contested and that such contestations, in part, reflect power relations’ (p. 567). Further, Jørgensen (1998) claims that an evaluation of success or failure in world politics depends on whether an assessment comes from actors involved in the political process or from outside observers. In relation to this, Hegemann *et al.* (2013) point to an apparent gap between think tankers and policy-oriented scholars

who rely on case-specific empirical knowledge in dealing with effectiveness, and those scholars who engage in deductive theory-informed conceptualization of effectiveness. In light of defining and applying a common understanding of effectiveness among scholars, Hegemann *et al.* (2013) cautiously conclude that ‘a certain degree of flexibility and ambiguity is probably inevitable and may also be desirable with a view to the diverse [...] contexts in which [effectiveness] is applied’ (p. 19).

The illustrated conceptual and methodological challenges inherent in defining effectiveness in a systematic way are most certainly echoed in the literature on EU external relations. Van Schaik (2013), for example, highlights the lack of conceptual clarity of EU effectiveness, given that ‘few scholars studying the EU’s international conduct have analysed the concept in a comprehensive and structured way’ (p. 37). The most common definition of effectiveness among EU scholars is related to the achievement of objectives. While studying the EU’s performance in international institutions, Jørgensen *et al.* (2011) define effectiveness along these lines as ‘the extent to which organization is able to fulfill its goals’ (Jørgensen *et al.*, 2011, p. 603). Effectiveness as a goal achievement has also been presented in the two recent special volumes that surveyed the EU’s external relations beyond international institutions (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013; Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014). The central argument of this chapter, however, is that goal achievement is only one possible attribute of EU effectiveness and that the over-reliance on this parsimonious definition, no matter how beneficial in terms of analytical clarity, risks downplaying other parameters of the concept.

That EU effectiveness is a complex and not a unidimensional term is signaled by several case studies. While studying the EU’s role in the Human Rights Council, Karen Smith (2010) puts at the forefront of her definition of effectiveness a leadership element. She maintains that effectiveness is ‘the extent to which the EU can garner support for its position among the wider UN membership’ (K. Smith, 2010, p. 225). Others, like Laatikainen and Smith (2006), avoid providing a specific definition of EU effectiveness, but illustrate several kinds of it: effectiveness in acting collectively, in achieving objectives, in strengthening the UN and in acting through the UN (pp. 9-10). In the study of the EU’s support of the International Criminal Court, Thomas (2012) utilizes the mainstream definition of EU effectiveness as a goal achievement acknowledging, however, that it is necessary to maintain a certain level of flexibility while conceptualizing EU effectiveness, taking into account that its understanding ‘will vary according to the issue and forum in question’ (p. 460).


It seems plausible to argue that the concept of effectiveness – and, by extension, EU effectiveness – possesses the qualities of an ‘essentially contested concept’: it is linked to a normative notion of success (appraisiveness), it is likely to contain multiple dimensions (complexity) and its application is subject to interpretation (openness) (Gallie, 1956; Collier *et al.*, 2006). Other scholars use similar descriptions, such as ‘a background concept’ (Adcock and Collier, 2001) or ‘an umbrella concept’ (Mair, 2008) to discern a term that due to its vague boundaries and disputed meanings resists clear definition and specification. Nonetheless, I do provide a specific definition of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations, which in this study is understood as *an aggregate range of significant (observable) effects (direct or indirect, intended or unintended) that the EU produces while being part of multilateral negotiations*. This definition serves two important purposes. First, it is an empirical definition that aims at mitigating the pitfalls of dealing with essentially contested concepts, and primarily helps to facilitate an empirical analysis. In contrast to a normative definition, the empirical conceptualization aspires to neutrality and tends to minimize contestations over value-loaded meanings of the concept (Skinner, 1973). Second, it is a comprehensive definition that allows for inclusion of multiple dimensions beyond the conventional understanding of effectiveness as goals achievement dominant in the literature on EU external relations.

Part of the concept-building endeavor is to determine the negative concept of the outcome, or the absence of the outcome of interest. According to Goertz (2006), thinking counterfactually about the negative pole helps to sharpen boundaries of the basic level concept. In this regard, Sartori (1970) claims that the best way to define any concept is to think about what the concept is not: ‘[A]ny determination involves a negation’ (p. 1041). The negative concept of EU effectiveness reads as *EU ineffectiveness*. As a negation of the positive concept, EU ineffectiveness means a failure of the EU to produce any effects while participating in multilateral negotiations. In this sense, the EU is ineffective when, although present in negotiations, it does not engage in diplomatic interaction so that any change or stability in the negotiation parameters cannot be attributed to the EU. Clearly, just as there is a long way from failure to success, there is a substantial theoretical and empirical gap between ineffectiveness and effectiveness. Hence, rather than treating EU effectiveness as a dichotomous concept, it is more proper to think about a continuum – or, as Goertz (2006) calls it, ‘a gray zone’ – that underlies the space between the positive pole (EU effectiveness) and the negative pole (EU ineffectiveness). Determining the negative pole of the concept and acknowledging the existence of the continuum between the poles helps to increase the coherence of the basic level concept and to avoid significant

measurement errors with regards to the cases that fall into the gray zone (the cases in which the EU is more or less effective).

According to Gerring (1999), one of the criteria that distinguishes a good concept from a sloppy one is its external differentiation. The latter refers to the extent to which the concept is distinguished from similar concepts in the field. Similar to the utility of analyzing the negative pole, establishing relations with external concepts helps to further determine the boundedness of the given concept. In the context of multilateral negotiations, EU effectiveness can overlap or conflate with terms like output, outcome, impact and performance. Output is most commonly conceived as policy decisions (Easton, 1957), establishment of norms, principles and rules (Underdal, 2002) or specification of goals and tasks (Hegemann, 2013). Outcome refers to actors' behavioral changes (Kahl, 2013), compliance with established rules (Underdal, 2002) or simply implementation of the output (Blavoukos, 2015). Impact is the most ambitious concept, which builds upon the former two, and describes (a contribution to) problem solving (Underdal, 2002). In the context of the EU in multilateral negotiations, output can be understood as a product of the EU's internal deliberation (for example, a common position) with which the EU enters the negotiations; outcomes, in turn, can refer to the attainment of the EU's position through diplomatic engagement; impact can be linked to the long-term effects evident through the implementation of the negotiated agreement and/or follow-up rounds of negotiations. As output stands *prior* to the start of multilateral negotiations and impact refers to the phase *after* the negotiations are finished, EU effectiveness better fits the concept of outcome since the latter is linked to a single time period of negotiations. However, EU effectiveness and EU outcome are identical only to a certain degree, since the definition of EU effectiveness in this study goes beyond the achievement of goals (see Figure 1). Finally, performance also partially overlaps with effectiveness, although performance is a broader concept that in addition to output, outcome and impact also includes input (e.g., actors' costs and resources) (Eckstein, 1971).

Figure 1. Effectiveness in relation to other concepts.



3.2.2 Decomposing EU effectiveness

While the basic level concept essentially lies at the top of the conceptual pyramid, it is at the secondary level where the concept's multidimensional structure appears (Goertz, 2006; Adcock and Collier, 2001). As it follows below, three secondary level attributes of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations are considered. Each attribute presented below is linked to a particular kind of effect that the EU produces while being part of negotiations: effects on the *outcome*, effects on the *process* and effects on *EU member states* (see Figure 2).

Among EU scholars, a dominant way to think about effectiveness is to associate it with the extent to which the EU reaches its objectives in multilateral diplomatic forums (Jørgensen *et al.*, 2011; Van Schaik, 2013; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013). The EU is considered an effective actor if as many points as possible of the EU's position are reflected in the negotiated agreement. Effectiveness as *goal achievement* is based on a rationalist epistemology of an actor with a certain set of interests and norms, which are pursued by means of multilateral diplomacy so as to shape the outcome of the negotiation process. Goal achievement thus shares common foundations with the rational image of the foreign policy implementation described by foreign policy scholars as 'a "scientific" matching of agreed means and instruments with agreed objectives' (Webber and Smith, 2013, p. 82). According to this viewpoint, in order to learn about the degree of EU effectiveness, it is sufficient to compare the EU's declared negotiating aims with an outcome document. Despite its reductionist character, the outcome perspective on effectiveness is important since the results of multilateral negotiations frequently produce binding rules for its participants. Goal achievement enhances understanding of EU


effectiveness, although its analysis can raise some challenges, especially when the goals are not clearly formulated, contradict each other, or enjoy a different level of ambition (Jørgensen *et al.*, 2011; Oberthür and Rabitz, 2014).

An alternative view on effectiveness beyond the attainment of goals shifts the focus from the results of multilateral negotiations to the way the negotiated agreement is achieved. For the EU to be called effective, it needs to comply not only with ‘internal’ standards of effectiveness, such as an achievement of the EU’s own objectives, but also to be seen as such in the eyes of external stakeholders. In this sense, the EU is an effective actor when it creates and enhances value through a multilateral process, which is considered a collective benefit in itself. As multilateral negotiation is a joint decision-making enterprise, an actor’s ‘effort in this arena is meant not only to benefit the actor’s interests, but also the interests of the international community at large’ (Van Willigen and Kleistra, 2013, p. 107). Effectiveness as *relevance* in the negotiation process thus implies building trust, confidence and reciprocity among negotiation participants. As this is much about managing relationships between negotiation participants, relevance can be closely linked to what Walton and McKersie (1965) call ‘attitudinal structuring’, or ‘the system of activities instrumental to the attainment of desired relationship patterns between the parties’ (p. 5). Effectiveness as relevance breaks away from the rational-choice logic and its instrumentalist attitude towards multilateralism: the EU may give up the prospect of some of its individual gains for the sake of the contribution to the collective good of having a strong and persistent multilateral platform for institutionalized dialogue and co-operation (Pouliot, 2011). Relevance therefore diversifies standards against which EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations is assessed from individual and inward-looking to collective and outward-oriented.

The third dimension of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations is related to the effects the EU’s participation produces on its constituent entities. The complex nature of multilateral negotiations is characterized by situations when diplomatic delegations, represented by multiple units and agencies, frequently need to negotiate with themselves (Winham, 1977; Raiffa, 1982). In line with Brighi and Hill (2008), an actor’s participation in multilateral negotiations is as an act of constant balancing and interplay between what goes on inside an actor, and its projection towards the outside world (pp. 124-5). Hence, it is important that negotiators and members of their teams abide by common standpoints and messages to minimize the risk of being divided from within. Effectiveness as *external cohesion* refers to the ability of EU actors to ‘sing the same tune’ in support of a common position and act collectively in multilateral settings. Coordinating and crafting a single

voice among 28 member states is a challenging exercise; therefore, the mere fact of ‘getting consensus within the EU is already a big negotiation achievement by itself’ (Van Willigen and Kleistra, 2013, p. 111). The extent to which such a minimalistic requirement can be considered to be a benchmark for effectiveness is contested, with some even describing it as a ‘delusion of success’ (Macaj and Nicolaïdis, 2014, p. 1072). Yet, since the EU is a not state, there always is a need to discount or adjust effectiveness standards that may work well for state actors – just as goal achievement and relevance do – with EU-tailored attributes that take into account the distinct nature of the EU as an international actor.

Figure 2. Secondary level dimensions of EU effectiveness.



The structure of the EU effectiveness concept is close to a prototypical formula of a family resemblance approach: the concept is present ‘if m of n characteristics are present’ (Goertz, 2006, p. 36). In contrast to necessary and sufficient condition structures, the family resemblance assumes sufficiency among concept attributes, which thus can be linked by a logical OR connector. The latter implies that in order to be assigned under the label of the basic level concept, empirical cases need not share all defining attributes of the concept in question. The consequence of opting for the family resemblance approach to concept-building is that it allows constructing, in Goertz’s words, ‘a substitutability continuum’. The latter implies that ‘the absence of one dimension can be compensated by the presence of other dimensions’ (Ibid., p. 45). The substitutability continuum is an important tool for a researcher since it is linked to the issue of relationship between defining attributes and their comparative significance. According to Goertz (2006), ‘in any concept-building enterprise one must directly address at the theoretical level the question of weighting’ (p. 47). It is assumed that insofar as the concept holds multiple dimensions at the secondary level, one or several attributes can be more important than the others. With regards EU effectiveness, it can be argued that external cohesion stands out in relation to the other two attributes: it is ontologically (not causally) prior to relevance and goal achievement. The ability to sing the same tune and act collectively in

multilateral forums is the bare minimum for the EU to be effective, which may lay the foundation for the EU's effects on the process and outcome. If goal achievement and relevance are sufficient for EU effectiveness, the external cohesion carries greater conceptual (but not necessarily empirical) weight, being a necessary condition of the concept.⁶ Since by definition a necessary element cannot be substituted, it becomes clear that the concept structure does not enjoy complete substitutability. Hence, rather than falling fully under the prototype of family resemblance, the concept of EU effectiveness displays traits of a hybrid structure.⁷


As a last step in analyzing the secondary level concept, it is important to consider how the three different dimensions combine to form the basic level concept of EU effectiveness. As the generic definition of EU effectiveness suggests, the basic level concept is something equal to an ideal type. It contains all possible defining attributes of EU effectiveness in general, even though in reality not all can be found in any empirical case. Goal achievement and relevance are sufficient – and, hence, substitutable – components, the absence of which leads to the emergence of ‘diminished subtypes’ (Collier and Levitsky, 1997) or, in other words, subsets of EU effectiveness. If goal achievement is missing, the combination of relevance and external cohesion is referred to as *EU process effectiveness*. By the same token, in the absence of relevance, the combination of goal achievement and external cohesion is associated with *EU outcome effectiveness*. In the absence of both goal achievement and relevance, the subset will contain only one attribute (external cohesion), and can be entitled *EU damage limitation effectiveness* to describe cases in which the EU's participation in multilateral negotiations has led only to significant effects on its member states, rather than the process or outcome of negotiations.⁸ If all three attributes are missing, EU effectiveness disappears altogether, turning into its negative pole of EU ineffectiveness (see Figure 3).

⁶ It can be argued, however, that the external cohesion is a trivial necessary condition of the concept, as trivial characteristics, according to Goertz (2006), is defined as elements ‘which are easy to obtain or which are almost always present’ (p. 48).

⁷ In this respect, one can argue that the internal structure of EU effectiveness shares similarities with a radial concept, as it is built around a core or anchor attribute of external cohesion (Collier and Mahon, 1993).

⁸ This subtype suggests that at times, EU effectiveness can be understood not as much through the extent to which the EU attempts to tackle an external challenge, but rather as a damage limitation process – preventing outside conflicts from causing internal problems (Jørgensen, 1998; Bickerton, 2007; 2010).

Figure 3. Conceptualizing EU effectiveness across two levels.



Note: Based on Goertz (2006)

3.2.3 Measuring EU effectiveness

The third step in the concept-building process includes a design of indicators, or measures to operationalize attributes of the given concept. According to Goertz (2006), descending to the third level of the concept structure implies converting an abstract conceptual discussion of the previous levels into empirical practice: ‘the indicator/data level is where the concept gets specific enough to guide the acquisition of empirical data’ (p. 62). In other words, concept measurement entails a collection of empirical observations that help to distinguish real-world referents of the concept and of its attributes. Apart from selecting indicators, an important task in the concept measurement procedure is to choose an appropriate measurement level. In this regard, Munck and Verkuilen (2002) warn against ‘the excesses of introducing distinctions that are either too fine-grained, [...] or too coarse-grained’ (p. 17), as the two extremes can lead to a risk of either increasing measurement error or losing valuable case specific features. Hence, in this study, if not stated otherwise, a three-value (high, medium, low) ordinal measurement scale is applied throughout as an acceptable middle ground between interval (fine-grained) and dichotomous (coarse-grained) measures. Finally, any assessment of the concept measurement needs to be conducted against the standards of validity and reliability. If measurement validity refers to the ability of a measure to adequately tap into

the concept we intend to gauge (rather than some other concept or phenomenon), measurement reliability stands for robustness of a measure over multiple replications and by different researchers (Adcock and Collier, 2001; Schmitter, 2008; Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 122).

To measure the first attribute of EU effectiveness – goal achievement – one can rely on a congruence between EU goals and negotiation outcome. The indicator implies a comparison between the EU’s negotiating position (in the form of binding Common Positions or less binding Council Conclusions) and the outcome document of negotiations (an agreed upon text or the latest draft of the negotiated document). Goal achievement is considered to be *high* if more than half of the EU’s key position points are reflected in the outcome document. Consequently, goal achievement is considered to be *medium* if around half of the EU’s objectives ended up in the negotiation outcome. Finally, a *low* score of goal achievement means that only a small fraction – less than half – of EU key position points are reflected in the outcome document.

It can be argued that, as an indicator of goal achievement, congruence between EU goals and negotiated outcomes enjoys a high level of reliability. The measure has been widely applied by scholars studying EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations (Van Schaik, 2013; Delreux, 2014; Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014). In contrast, validity of this indicator is slightly problematic. First, there are some reservations with regard to the nature and quality of an actor’s objectives. If continuity is preferred to change, the EU can be deemed effective by simply sticking to the status quo. The argument goes that in multilateral negotiations, it is normally easier to maintain the status quo rather than to make an attempt to push it through (Oberthür and Rabitz, 2014). Second, the link between an actor’s objectives and a negotiation outcome can also be contested. Van Willigen and Kleistra (2013) criticize goal achievement for its arguably simplistic linear understanding of the connection between the two. In a similar vein, Gutner and Thompson (2013) argue that a mere focus on goal attainment says little about causality, as the given outcome might have been reached due to the behavior of other actors.

This study addresses these challenges in a twofold way. As to the first criticism, a second indicator – ambitiousness of EU objectives – is introduced to complement the goal-outcome congruence. It gauges the overall distance of the EU’s position from the status quo in a given field of negotiations, and can vary from a *progressive* to *conservative* score. Hence, any assessment of a match between EU goals and negotiated agreements needs to be discounted or upgraded in light of the underlying level of EU ambition. With

regard to the second challenge, it is addressed on the level of the methodological and analytical framework of the thesis. As it is mentioned in Chapter 1, this study utilizes process tracing, which is arguably the best placed tool to causally link the EU's participation in multilateral negotiations and negotiation outcomes (George and Bennett, 2005). Moreover, a complex nature of multilateral negotiations with a multiplicity of actors and their interests will be well-reflected in the choice of causal factors presented later in this chapter.

In comparison to goal achievement, indicators of the second attribute of EU effectiveness – relevance – are less straightforward. One reason for this is that scholars rarely include the dimension of relevance in the concept of EU effectiveness; hence, the measures to capture empirical fingerprints of this attribute remain underdeveloped. Jørgensen *et al.* (2011) and Dee (2012) are among few who relied on relevance to study the EU's international performance. However, their operationalization of EU relevance as an ability to gain support of its priority stakeholders, mainly EU member states, is not particularly valid for my definition of relevance, which puts at the forefront the EU's effects on the negotiation process. In order to operationalize EU relevance in multilateral negotiations, it is useful to consider the following questions: did the EU matter in the negotiation process? What kind of benefits, if any, did the EU's participation produce in terms of managing relationships between negotiating parties? How did it contribute to the negotiation process in terms of enhancing collective benefit? In other words, EU relevance might be examined by way of looking at what kind of role definition the EU acquired in the negotiations, and how it was practically applied in the negotiation process (Elgström, 2007).


In the context of assessing EU relevance, two further notes are important. First, following international regime scholars, it can be added that in order to get a better grip on empirical manifestations of EU relevance, a researcher needs to map a hypothetical state of affairs when the EU does not participate in the negotiations (Underdal, 1992). 'No EU participation' as a reference point requires counterfactual reasoning that will allow the identification of observable effects of the EU's presence on the negotiation process. Second, drawing on Arts and Verschuere's (1999) methodology of evaluating an actor's political influence, it is important to distinguish between the EU's own perception of relevance (ego-perception) and other negotiators' perspectives on it (alter-perception). Thus, relevance is considered to be *high* if the EU contributed on multiple occasions to the advancement of the negotiation process, and this was recognized not only by EU negotiators, but also by external parties. Consequently, relevance is considered to be

medium when the EU sporadically acted in terms of collective interests, which has not been uniformly acknowledged by EU and non-EU negotiators. Finally, relevance scores *low* if the EU was not able to generate any perceived collective benefits in the negotiation process.

The third attribute of EU effectiveness – external cohesion – consists of two indicators. The first indicator evaluates the compatibility between the EU and its member states’ interventions on the floor as the proxy of an ability to sing the same tune in support of a common position. It implies a comparison between EU statements as a manifestation of a common line on one hand, and member states’ statements on the other hand. The compatibility is considered to be *high* when member states’ statements on the floor reflect the language of the EU statement with no or just a few meaningful contradictions. The compatibility is considered to be *medium* if member states’ interventions only partially reflect the common line expressed by the EU statement, deviating from it on a number of significant points. Finally, the compatibility is considered to be *low* when the content of member states’ interventions and the key messages of the EU statement by and large go apart.

The second indicator of external cohesion evaluates the ability of member states to act collectively in multilateral settings through the EU channel, rather than alternative means (e.g., opting for other diplomatic groupings and coalitions existing in particular multilateral forums). The range of joint EU diplomatic actions in multilateral forums can range from participating and organizing meetings to undertaking démarches to supporting, sponsoring or initiating proposals, resolutions and papers (Van Willigen and Kleistra, 2013). The aptitude for joint diplomatic actions is considered to be *high* when member states consistently and systematically rely on the EU in pursuing collective initiatives in multilateral negotiations. The aptitude for joint diplomatic actions is considered to be *medium* if member states occasionally utilize the EU platform, preferring at times to pursue their preferences through alternative collective channels. Finally, the aptitude for joint diplomatic actions is considered to be *low* when in the course of multilateral negotiations, member states consistently and systematically rely on diplomatic groupings and coalitions other than the EU. The final score of external cohesion as an attribute of EU effectiveness is calculated by averaging the scores of its two indicators.

Figure 4. Three-level structure of EU effectiveness concept.



Once the disaggregated three-level structure of EU effectiveness becomes clear, it is important to clarify how the reverse aggregation of the concept back to the basic level works in light of its measurement. It is important to emphasize that this study does not assume an equal empirical weight among all three components of EU effectiveness. It can be argued that the external cohesion possesses the least empirical clout of all three (although conceptually-speaking, it is considered to be an essential element of the concept), given that it requires a minimal amount of effort from the EU to be considered present, hence, a relatively high empirical extension – the range of cases covered – of this one attribute alone. In contrast, goal achievement and relevance are more demanding elements of EU effectiveness, but their comparative empirical weight differs. It can be assumed that potentially, all negotiators would prefer to shape outcomes of negotiation (direct effects), rather than a negotiation process (indirect effect). In light of a larger set of potential obstacles and as the component of EU effectiveness, goal achievement

appears to be more ambitious than the relevance. Gutner and Thompson (2013), for example, rank, albeit implicitly, effects on the outcome ahead of effects on the process, arguing that ‘process can be used by IOs [international organizations] to mask substantive outcomes’ (p. 63). Similarly, Betsill and Corell (2008), while determining levels of NGO influence in international environmental negotiations, assume greater importance of shaping the outcome rather than the process.

One can therefore assume a ranking among the three attributes of EU effectiveness with goal achievement on top (3 points on a scale from 1 to 3), external cohesion at the bottom (1 point) and relevance in-between (2 points). The empirical weights assigned to the attributes eventually allow to rate different subtypes of EU effectiveness, with a view on their relative importance. In this regard, EU outcome effectiveness scores the highest (3 [goal achievement] + 0 [relevance] + 1 [external cohesion] = 4), which permits to evaluate it as *high* EU effectiveness on a cross-case level of analysis. Correspondingly, EU process effectiveness receives a medium score (0 [goal achievement] + 2 [relevance] + 1 [external cohesion] = 3), and is regarded as *medium* EU effectiveness on a cross-case level. Lastly, EU damage limitation effectiveness scores the lowest among all subtypes (0 [goal achievement] + 0 [relevance] + 1 [external cohesion] = 1), and is assessed as *low* EU effectiveness on a cross-case level.

3.3 Causal factors shaping EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations.

The choice of explanatory factors of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations is based on two main premises. First, it is assumed that a sufficient account of EU effectiveness cannot be reduced to singular explanations. Given the complex and multifaceted character of the *explanandum*, it is likely to be influenced by multiple causal factors, as demonstrated by the research on various types of agents (states, NGOs and international organizations) acting in multilateral environments (Karns and Mingst, 1990; Betsill and Corell, 2008; Gutner and Thompson, 2013). Second, a comprehensive explanation of EU effectiveness requires an examination of EU-internal factors, as well as explanatory conditions related to the external context. As it has been shown in the previous chapter, the dominant pattern in the literature on the EU’s participation in multilateral institutions is a preoccupation with EU-specific variables and characteristics overlooking the influence of multilateral settings in which specific sets of negotiations take place. Prominent studies in the field either neglect causal powers in the external context (Van Schaik, 2013) or underestimate their role (Jørgensen *et al.*, 2011) or examine external factors in isolation rather than as part of an integrated explanatory framework

(Jørgensen, 2009).⁹ The current study therefore not only seeks to provide a balanced account of EU effectiveness by incorporating both EU-internal and EU-external factors, but also through exploring the links between them. To explain the level of EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations, six causal conditions are suggested: three are EU-specific (internal policy, institutional coordination, member states' interests) and three are related to the multilateral context (global power distribution, legal institutional setting, international constellation of interests) (see Table 3).

The first factor relates to certain types of resources – political strategies or domestic legislation – that the EU has at its disposal (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 29; Oberthür and Rabitz, 2014). In the policy areas of conventional arms and WMD, this boils down to the development of EU common rules, standards and instruments that regulate and control a broad range of activities regarding the safe and secure exploitation of arms. Together, these elements are grouped under the label of EU *internal policy*. With respect to the association between internal policy and EU external effectiveness, Jørgensen *et al.* (2011) have pointed out that in multilateral forums, it is hard for EU member states to argue against the objectives of the policy that they have already endorsed internally. Furthermore, they add that member states 'also have a vital interest in "internationalising" or "uploading" domestic EU regulations in order to create a level playing field internationally' (p. 613). Similarly, Woolcock (2012) argues that 'if there is a well developed *acquis* that establishes an agreed internal policy this will often provide the basis for the EU external policies' (p. 27). Therefore, it can be expected that a high level of internal policy development pushes EU actors to promote similar policy objectives at the international level (goal achievement) and provides a platform for building a single voice and acting collectively at multilateral forums (external cohesion). It also can enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the EU's external position, and thus positively shape perceptions of the EU by outsiders (relevance).

The second factor that shapes EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations is the degree of *institutional coordination* between the major EU actors: the European Commission, the EEAS, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. The variable incorporates political and legal aspects of the division of competences and the patterns of external representation (Jørgensen and Wessel, 2011). A high degree of inter-institutional coordination is a prerequisite for effective EU external action in virtually all areas of EU foreign policy, especially that which concerns multilateral institutions. Gstöhl (2009), for

⁹ For a recent exception, see Debaere (2015), who explores internal and external forces shaping the level of EU coordination in international institutions.

example, argues that there is a direct causal link between EU competences coupled with internal coordination mechanisms and the EU's ability 'to speak with one voice' in international forums. As the issues negotiated at the international level frequently crosscut areas of exclusive and shared competences within the EU legal order, the Union and its member states often find themselves in a series of legal disputes, which can be detrimental to the EU's ability to produce effects in multilateral negotiations. As Wessel (2011) contends, 'the complex division of competences between the EU and its member states often block the EU from fully taking over and thus affect its relevance' (p. 633). A high degree of institutional coordination with regard to a clear division of responsibilities and representation is likely to increase the effectiveness of the EU in multilateral negotiations.

Despite the significant progress in the integration of European foreign policies, EU member states continue to play a gate-keeping role in this field. When it comes to the security and defense domain, of which arms affairs is an essential part, national capitals traditionally are hesitant in relinquishing any of their sovereignty, thus reserving the right to act autonomously in pursuit of national objectives. As major international crises have shown, when there is a strong division between member states, as it was the case with the war in Iraq in 2003 and Kosovo's independence in 2008, EU foreign policy tends to be suboptimal. Examining the EU's record in a multilateral context, Whitman (2010) argues that 'when Member States disagree, or are at cross-purposes, this can be a disaster for EU foreign policy' (p. 28). Thus, *member states' interest homogeneity* appears to be another powerful factor that shapes the effectiveness of the EU in multilateral negotiations. Blavoukos (2015) considers member states' interest congruence as one of the main conditioning parameters of EU effectiveness, arguing that the former 'clearly improves the EU's international performance' (p. 23). Further, Weiss (2013) elaborates on potential risks and dangers of conflicting interests among member states that, among others, can lead to a lack of streamlined and coherent EU representation at the international level or subject the EU to divide-and-rule tactics by third actors. If the EU's preferences in multilateral forums are accepted, shared and upheld by a large majority of member states, primarily by France, Germany and the UK, the EU will have a better chance to deliver on its declared objectives, enhance its relevance in the negotiation process and increase its external cohesion.

Distribution of power among actors is a structure-related factor that traditionally features in international negotiation studies. The impact of power on the behavior of actors and its ability to shape foreign policy outcomes is typically emphasized by the realist school of international relations (Rose, 1998; Waltz, 2000). As Doran (2010) put

it, 'the higher the level of its power, the more foreign-policy roles a state is able to perform and the greater the intensity of its participation in world affairs' (p. 43). The broad assertion that power matters is also shared by international negotiation scholars (Zartman and Rubin, 2002). Sjöstedt (1999), for example, discusses conditions necessary for actors to exercise influence in multilateral negotiations. He distinguishes between three dimensions of power: competences/resources (diplomatic, administrative, informational), issue-specific power (values at stake in negotiation) and structural power (status). Sjöstedt emphasizes the importance of issue-specific power as a source of influence, since an accumulation of the latter can lead to 'a situation in which a country's share of the values at stake is so large that an agreement without the acceptance of this country would have only limited value' (p. 248). It is important to note that a comprehensive understanding of issue-specific power entails not only material resources, such as a number of military personnel, possession of nuclear weapons and arms export shares, but also non-material capabilities including skills, knowledge and norms (Young, 2010, p. 5; Hampson and Hart, 1995, p. 10).

EU scholars also have been vocal about the significance of power distribution for EU effectiveness. Blavoukos (2015) and Oberthür and Rabitz (2014) argue that a high number of structural assets or a high weight in an issue area increase the EU's bargaining power in multilateral negotiations, which is crucial for accomplishing the EU's objectives. Similarly, Elgström and Strömvik (2005) and Conceição-Heldt (2014) discuss the impact of the balance of power in multilateral negotiations, contending that power asymmetry in favor of the EU positively affects its ability to succeed in shaping the negotiation outcomes. Hence, it can be expected that the level of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations can be facilitated or constrained by a relative distribution of power among negotiators.

The fifth factor that is crucial for determining the degree of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations is the *formal rules and procedures* of participation in a given international forum. The fact that the EU is not a nation state often creates obstacles and constrains possibilities for its participation in multilateral institutions. Recently, the EU acquired a legal personality and pushed for an 'enhanced observer' status in the UN. The Union eventually obtained the right to attend informal meetings, the right to speak and to make interventions, as well as the ability to propose amendments (Wessel, 2011). However, the EU still has no voting rights in the UN, and its amendments may be put on vote only at the initiative of an EU member state. Scholars tend to disagree as to whether and to what extent the legal institutional setting of a negotiation forum impacts EU

effectiveness. On one hand, Gehring *et al.* (2013) conclude that the EU is able to shape policy outcomes and have an added value for collective deliberation and decision-making in many multilateral forums, regardless its formal membership status. On the other hand, Reiter (2005), Gstöhl (2009) and Jørgensen *et al.* (2011) argue that rules and procedures that do not grant the EU full rights to participate or privilege certain EU member states are detrimental for EU effectiveness, in particular undermining its relevance in the negotiation process, the level of goal achievement and the ability to act collectively. Nevertheless, as a widely accepted explanation of EU effectiveness and due to its ambiguous explanatory power, it is worthwhile to include the rules and procedures of international forums in the analysis. Hence, it can be expected that EU effectiveness will be higher in the negotiation forums in which the rules and procedures grant the EU full membership rights and do not privilege some EU member states over others.

The final factor that belongs to the cohort of EU external conditions is an *international constellation of interests*. Any set of multilateral negotiations is characterized by a combination of common and conflictual interests that, if put along a continuum, can vary ‘from completely identical interests to totally incompatible interests’ (Hopmann, 1996, p. 25). The distribution of interests among negotiation participants allows to distinguish two situations that underlie the negotiation context. The first is a polarized negotiation environment that is characterized by an increased intensity in the conflictual preferences, with negotiation participants moving towards extreme positions (poles). Formation of homogeneous groups or blocks with opposing interests is one of the features of polarized negotiations (Duro and Padilla, 2008). An alternative situation presupposes a less polarized and more consensual negotiation environment, in which participants share moderate positions and a basic motivation to find and build upon common and complementary interests in an integrative manner (Meunier, 2000). It can be hypothesized that in the context of a polarized multilateral situation, the ability of the EU to achieve its objectives is lower, as high levels of tensions among participants induce a propensity to fall back to their national (or block’s) positions rather than to compromise. This tendency has already been demonstrated by the research on multilateral human rights negotiations in which the EU faces difficulties in exercising its influence in a divided environment of the Human Rights Council (K. Smith, 2010). By the same token, a polarized negotiation context complicates the provision of common goods and benefits (relevance) in the negotiation process, as exemplified by the research on international mediation (Bercovitch, 1991), and puts at risk an effective exercise of the united front by

EU member states (external cohesion). By extension, a consensual multilateral context will be more permissive for a higher level of EU negotiation effectiveness.

Table 3. Operationalization of the explanatory factors of EU effectiveness.

Explanatory factors	Explanatory category	Measurement label	Observable implications
Internal policy	EU internal	Strong	Policy rules and standards are codified into a legally binding document; Policy rules and standards are positively evaluated by EU actors; Policy rules and standards are perceived as ‘best examples’ to be emulated by others.
		Weak	Policy rules and standards are voluntary and lack authority; Policy rules and standards lack consensual endorsement of EU actors; Policy rules and standards are not perceived as ‘best examples’ to be emulated by others.
Institutional coordination	EU internal	High	The coordination process is intense and well-conducted by the responsible EU bodies; EU institutions find a smooth agreement over the division of competences and external representation.
		Low	The coordination process is loose and ill-prepared by the responsible EU bodies; EU institutions do not find an agreement over the division of competences and external representation.
Member states’ interest convergence	EU internal	High	EU member states share a common view with regard to strategic objectives.
		Low	EU member states disagree with regard to strategic objectives.
Global distribution of power	EU external	Symmetrical	The EU’s relative issue-specific power is not higher than those of other major actors.
		Asymmetrical	The EU’s relative issue-specific power is high in comparison to other major actors.
Legal institutional setting	EU external	Inclusive, loose, equal	Rules and procedures of the negotiation forum allow the EU to participate on an equal basis with other actors; Rules and procedures of the negotiation forum do not privilege certain EU member states over others.

		Exclusive, strict, unequal	Rules and procedures of the negotiation forum restrict the EU's participation in comparison to other actors; Rules and procedures of the negotiation forum provide for privileged participation for certain EU member states over others.
International constellation of interests	EU external	Polarized	Negotiators take extreme positions in the negotiation process; The role and presence of moderate actors or groups is diminished; Negotiations are characterized by distributive and confrontational character.
		Consensual	Negotiators occupy moderate positions in the negotiation process; The role and presence of cross-cutting groups of actors is increased; Negotiations are characterized by integrative and cooperative character.

Several propositions inform the explanatory choices in this study. First, the current analytical framework is based on the premise that the complex nature of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations cannot be sufficiently explained by a single factor or theory. Given the environment of multiple causalities, the current choice of factors draws upon several established theories and approaches (multi-level governance, institutionalism, intergovernmentalism, structural realism), crosscutting both EU internal (agent-related) and EU external (structure-related) explanations. Apart from the level of analysis, another principle for ordering selected factors can be related to the key explanatory building blocks in social sciences: power (internal policy, global distribution of power), interests (member states' interests, international interest constellation) and institutions (institutional coordination, legal institutional setting). The bottom line is that a broad and somewhat eclectic choice of causal factors has been made in an attempt to develop a problem-specific composite explanatory framework that can account for different aspects of EU effectiveness (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010; H  ritier, 2008).

Second, while some scholars can characterize the outlined framework as analytical eclecticism, another way of expressing it is through the term *integrative theory*. According to Dessler (1991), the driving force for the development of an integrative theory is the need to resolve the double challenge of working with the heterogeneity of independent variables and differential framing of the dependent variable. These variations can be accommodated by incorporating an analysis of causal effects (cross-case level) and causal mechanisms (within-case level) simultaneously, something that the given study intends to perform. The joint focus on effects and mechanisms enables the

investigation of linkages and connections between EU internal and external causal factors.

Third, the current analytical approach presupposes that the EU is a purposeful actor in multilateral negotiations. In other words, the EU is a negotiator with defined objectives, and their fulfillment depends on some material (member states' interests, global distribution of power) and institutional (EU institutional coordination, rules and procedures of the negotiation forum) constraints and opportunities. In other words, the framework largely follows the rationalist 'logic of position' (Parsons, 2007), where an actor's course of action is conditioned upon its relation to exogenously given obstacles. That being said, the opposite constructivist 'logic of interpretation' that is based on ideational driving forces cannot be ignored, and will likely inform the alternative explanation to be contrasted with the central analytical approach of this study.

CHAPTER 4. INTERNAL FACTORS OF EU EFFECTIVENESS IN MULTILATERAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

This chapter discusses the internal factors that hold a potential explanatory power over EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. More specifically, it evaluates the levels of EU internal policy development, institutional coordination and EU member states' interest convergence across the three case studies of the EU's participation in multilateral ATT and NPT negotiations. The chapter shows that all three factors vary across the case studies, albeit to a different degree (see Table 4). While internal policy and institutional coordination show a limited degree of variation, scoring equally in two out of three cases, member states' interest convergence demonstrates a full scope of variation across all cases, ranging from a low to a medium and to a high score.

4.1 Internal policy

4.1.1 ATT negotiations

Since the inception of the European integration project, arms export policy was largely exempted from EC/EU rules and regulations. Various treaty provisions, from Rome to Lisbon, singled out 'the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material' (Article 346 TFEU: European Union, 2010, p. 194) as a sovereignty-sensitive area at the core of national interests. It is thus not surprising that historically, EU member states used to rely on divergent and uncoordinated national arms export policies (Davis, 2002). This tendency has been reversed since the end of the Cold War, when member states started to experience a growing pressure for greater coordination in their export control policies. Since the end of the 1980s, major arms exporters in Europe were exposed to a number of challenges related to a reduction in military expenditure, an increasing surplus of weapons and shrinking domestic markets (Bauer and Remacle, 2004). In addition, globalization of international markets revealed potential economic benefits to consolidating European defense industries as a part of the single European market. The economic incentives unfolded in parallel with efforts to Europeanize member states' foreign policies, which culminated in the creation of the CFSP in 1993. A direct trigger for a common approach to arms exports, though, emerged in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, during which Western allies found themselves in the ludicrous situation of fighting Iraqi troops equipped with Western weapon systems (Hartung, 2008).

The foundation of the EU's export control policy for conventional weapons was laid down at the start of 1990s, in the aftermath of the Gulf War. At that time, the Council Working Group on Conventional Arms (COARM) was established in Brussels to

deliberate on specific conditions for arms exports. They were later incorporated into the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports, which encouraged member states to assess their export authorizations to third countries against eight criteria: (1) respect for international commitments, especially concerning international sanctions; (2) respect for human rights in the country of destination; (3) the internal situation in the country of destination; (4) the preservation of regional peace and stability; (5) national security of the member states and their allies; (6) behavior of the destination country in the international arena; (7) risk of diversion; (8) sustainable development (Council of the EU, 1998). Thus, the principal objective of the EU Code was to set up ‘high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers’ (Ibid., p. 2). The operative provisions of the EU Code required national capitals to establish a consultation mechanism whereby member states exchange information on denials to provide export licenses. Moreover, member states were also expected to exchange, and later to publish, annual reports on aggregate national arms exports in light of the implementation of the EU Code. It must be noted, however, that an actual decision on whether to grant an export license, as well as the accompanying steps of risk assessment, has been left entirely to the discretion of member states.

Since the rationale behind the adoption of the EU Code was ‘to reinforce cooperation and to promote convergence in the field of conventional arms exports’ (Ibid.), it can bear significant implications for the EU’s posture at the ATT negotiations. An influential study has shown the effectiveness, albeit a subject for improvement, of this instrument in restricting arms sales to the states with a great risk of human rights violations, thus reinforcing the EU’s image of a value-based foreign policy actor (Bromley and Brzoska, 2008). Many experts consider the EU code to be an example of a progressive model of an arms export control regime, which is hardly replicated elsewhere by other regional actors. According to Bailes (2011), ‘it is far from certain that anyone else out in the world subjectively integrates [arms within wider foreign policy] when thinking about the importance or the “values” message of Europe’ (p. 83). The EU is the only regional organization that put in force a legally binding multilateral arms export control regime.

In a similar manner, the European Parliament (EP) praises the EU’s arms export control framework as a model to be emulated by others. Although members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are typically quite critical about member states’ implementation of the EU Code, they do recognize that ‘its principles and criteria have been officially endorsed by various third countries’ (European Parliament, 2012, p. 2; see

also European Parliament, 2013). The relevance of the EU Code was acknowledged by member states when in 2008 they agreed to transform it into the legally binding EU's Common Position. This move was accompanied by the decision to expand the scope of activities covered by the eight criteria beyond mere exports and to include production, brokering, transit and transshipment of defense equipment and technology (Bromley, 2012). Member states also have agreed upon a Common Military List of items covered by the EU Code, the Common Position on Arms Brokering and an EU Code User's Guide to assist its implementation. A report prepared by multiple NGOs asserted that the 'ability and willingness to update the regime is one of its main strengths, and one that bodes well for maintaining relevance in future' (Saferworld, 2008, p. i). This assessment echoes the Council's review of the Common Position claiming that its provisions continue 'to provide a solid basis for the coordination of Member States' arms export policies' (Council of the EU, 2012a, p. 22). Hence, regardless the level of its domestic implementation, it can be concluded that the EU entered the ATT negotiations with a *strong* hand in a form of well-elaborated and undisputed internal policy norms and standards regarding arms transfers.

4.1.2 NPT I and NPT II negotiations

In a broad sense, the origins of EU non-proliferation policy go as far back as to 1957, when the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was established alongside the European Economic Community (EEC). The Euratom Treaty was designed to deal with civil nuclear energy cooperation in Western Europe, of which an important element was the establishment of regional nuclear safeguards. The latter implied a creation of a verification inspection system conducted by the European Commission, with a view to ensuring that nuclear facilities and materials of Community members were not diverted for unintended purposes (Müller, 2007). In a parallel process, member states started to discuss external aspects of non-proliferation issues in an intergovernmental working group created under the auspices of EPC in 1981. Yet, it was not until the early 1990s that the EU emerged as a serious global player, destined to tackle the proliferation of WMD. Similar to the development of EU arms export control, a set of external and internal circumstances contributed to an environment permissive for deliberation of the nascent non-proliferation policy. Externally, the end of the Cold War and the US-Soviet rivalry opened up global arms affairs and provided an opportunity for new actors to step in. Internally, France's accession to the NPT and institutionalization of CFSP provided an additional impetus for joint non-proliferation initiatives (Van Ham, 2011).

The cornerstone of EU non-proliferation policy is the EU Strategy against proliferation of WMD, adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The starting point of the Strategy is the recognition of WMD proliferation as a serious threat to international peace and security. The document thus states that the EU's principal objective in this area is 'to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide' (Council of the EU, 2003, p. 2). The Strategy outlines four main areas of EU activities: (1) rendering multilateralism more effective by acting resolutely against proliferators; (2) promoting stable international and regional environments; (3) cooperating closely with the US and other key partners; (4) developing necessary institutional structures within the EU. The most important of all has been the EU's commitment to uphold multilateral non-proliferation institutions and treaties, as well as declared support of international mechanisms of verification and compliance with the existing non-proliferation norms (Ahlström, 2005). In other words, the EU's WMD Strategy emphasizes the specific 'European way' of fighting proliferation, which prioritizes political and diplomatic measures and focuses on international cooperation and multilateralism and the root causes of international problems (Álvarez-Verdugo, 2006).

To what extent does the WMD Strategy strengthen the development of domestic policy in light of the EU's participation in multilateral NPT negotiations? Sceptics claim that the Strategy does not enjoy a legally binding character and lacks an official status in comparison to traditional CFSP instruments, such as positions or actions, defined by Article 25 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). As Van Ham (2011) put it, the Strategy 'is a misnomer and is, in fact, a hollow instrument with the authority of an informal political declaration' (p. 5). The fact that member states prefer to maximize their room for maneuver when it comes to binding themselves to the Strategy's provisions might signal a lack of trust in the EU or a lack of commitment to pool resources at the European level in fighting proliferation. Moreover, as Katsioulis and Mölling (2010) argue, the document's main function is to serve as 'a political symbol of European unity' (p. 5) rather than a genuine attempt to develop a strong and united non-proliferation policy. The adoption of the Strategy, the argument goes, was just an attempt to remedy the deep divide among Europeans regarding how to respond to the US's use of military force against Iraq, which was triggered by Saddam Hussein's alleged WMD program.

On the contrary, optimists highlight the usefulness of the Strategy and its added value to building up the EU's domestic non-proliferation *acquis*. While acknowledging the shortcomings of the Strategy when it comes to its non-legally binding nature, Portela (2004) highlights 'one peculiarity normally absent from political declarations: it foresees

a constant revision and updating process as well as the regular production of progress reports'. The intense review process, based on the publication of biannual implementation reports by the Council, underscores the significance of the document as a cornerstone of EU non-proliferation policy. While revising and upgrading the Strategy for the first time in five years, member states explicitly endorsed its principles as 'highly relevant' (Council of the EU, 2008a, p. 4). Scholars also emphasize the Strategy's positive streamlining and harmonizing effect on Europe's non-proliferation activities 'to a point that makes it possible to talk about a common non-proliferation policy worthy of its name' (Portela and Kienzle, 2015, p. 63). As far as coherence is concerned, the non-proliferation policy largely lacked this asset prior to 2003.

Nevertheless, in terms of best practices or lessons learned that the EU can promote internationally, the policy, as it stands now, does not seem to offer a wide-ranging menu of choices. The core of the difficulties is related to the fact that, in contrast to the well-elaborated EU non-proliferation *acquis*, the body of existing rules and norms – including the WMD Strategy – is strikingly dormant about the other side of the NPT bargain, nuclear disarmament (Cottey, 2014). The nuclear weapon states (NWS) status of the UK and France, and Europe's general adherence to NATO's doctrine of nuclear deterrence, preclude an EU common position on disarmament. Yet, establishing a WMD free zone in Europe or setting the precedent of withdrawing non-strategic nuclear weapons from EU members' soil could have provided the EU with the strongest ground for leading by example in multilateral NPT negotiations (Interview 5, 2014).

This is not to say that the EU has no rules and standards on non-proliferation matters that are worth being exported externally. For example, the EU set up a detailed and a legally binding system of export controls for dual-use goods with Regulation 428/2009 serving as a centerpiece of this Community-wide regime (Micara, 2012). Similarly, far-reaching legislation exists regarding the transfer of nuclear technology and materials and the safety of nuclear installations, based on the functioning of the Euratom Treaty. However, even in these instances, limitations are obvious. The EU's export control lists for dual-use goods are essentially based on inventories prepared by international control bodies, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the EU's system of regional nuclear safeguards is sometimes overshadowed or subsumed by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) rules and standards, which enjoy a greater outreach and higher legitimacy (Müller, 2014; Glavind, 2014). Hence, given this patchy and mixed record, the level of development of the EU's internal non-proliferation policy is conceived as less than strong, but more than weak – *moderate*. This assessment is

shared by the two analyzed cases of NPT negotiations since there were no groundbreaking developments on the domestic level between 2010 and 2015.

4.2 Institutional coordination

4.2.1 ATT negotiations

The central role in coordinating the EU's negotiating position in the ATT deliberations belonged to the Council's COARM working group. The COARM working party consists of the member states' officials from national capitals and, at the time when the ATT process commenced, it was chaired by the rotating Presidency of the EU, with assistance from the Council Secretariat. The coordination process started in 2008 when the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) was created and EU officials started to engage in its work. Since 2009 a special group, the COARM-CODUN¹⁰, was set up, merging the expertise on conventional arms export control with disarmament processes at the UN level. The COARM-CODUN ATT group was given the task to develop strategic and tactical positions on different ATT provisions, and to elaborate on projects in the form of outreach seminars that were put in force by the Council Decision in 2009 (Interview 1, 2013). Since 2011, the group has been meeting on a monthly basis to prepare for different stages of the negotiation process. In addition to these intense coordination meetings, the COARM-CODUN elaborated an EU non-paper on the ATT. The non-paper is a confidential document that contains the EU's position on different aspects of the ATT. The document formed a basis for exchanges between member states in the run-up to the UN conference in July 2012, and proved to be a useful consensus-building exercise (Ibid.). The outcome of the coordination process was laid down in two Council Conclusions that outlined the EU's position on the main ATT issues to the outside world (Council of the EU, 2010a; Council of the EU, 2012b). It should be noted, however, that both documents were of a very general character, and lacked the authority of a formal common position.

What is important to highlight in this context is the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the process of internal coordination. The role of the rotating Presidency in the area of CFSP was largely replaced by the EEAS, which was formally established in December 2010. Both the COARM and CODUN working parties were integrated into the Security Policy and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) Structures, which now form one part of the EEAS. Thus, both CODUN and COARM are no longer chaired by the

¹⁰ CODUN stands for Global Disarmament and Arms Control working group.

rotating Presidency's representative, but by an EEAS official. A permanent chair helped to ensure not only consistency and better expertise, but also an enhanced sense of impartiality. According to one official, the new status of the working groups reinforced their agenda-setting power and also allowed them to gain a certain level of trust from member states (Ibid.). This, in the end, also positively affected the internal coordination on the ATT.

The European Commission's role in ATT coordination was also significant, albeit overshadowed by its competence dispute with the member states. The Commission's presence was needed to guarantee that the ATT was compatible with the EU *acquis*. In other words, it was important to ensure that new controls imposed by the ATT do not disrupt the functioning of the EU's internal trade in defense related products facilitated by the 2009 Directive on intra-Community trade (Interview 2, 2013). Although the Commission normally participates in the deliberations of the Council working groups, it signaled its wish to be part of multilateral negotiations only months before the 2012 UN conference. Consequently, the Commission fell short of time needed for proper preparations, and exceptionally asked the Council to authorize the member states to negotiate certain parts of the Treaty covered by the Union's exclusive competence. Yet, for the March 2013 UN conference, the Commission sought a different mandate, which authorized it to negotiate the relevant aspects of the ATT itself. This naturally created confusion and caused frustration with some of the Council members. Nevertheless, the inter-institutional debate did not affect the EU's external representation, as the EEAS diplomats continued to speak on behalf of the EU (Interview 3, 2013).

Finally, despite its limited role in the area of arms affairs, the European Parliament also raised its voice concerning the ATT. In its Resolution of 13 June 2012, MEPs reiterated its support for a global, legally binding treaty and backed the Council Conclusions on this topic. Moreover, the EP recognized 'the coherent and consistent role played by the EU and its Member States in support of the international process to establish an arms trade treaty' (European Parliament, 2012, p. 5). However, taking into account the dispute on the legal competences between the Commission and the Council, the level of the EU's internal coordination on the ATT is evaluated as *medium*.

4.2.2 NPT I negotiations

In the run-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), the EU coordination process was almost exclusively governed by the pre-Lisbon Treaty arrangements. It means that the primary responsibility for coordinating the EU's negotiation positions was

in the hands of the EU rotating Presidency, whose representative chaired the specialized working group on non-proliferation (CONOP). Assisted by CODUN, the CONOP working party consists of member states' officials from national capitals that meet once a month in Brussels to discuss WMD-related matters. It is important to note, however, that the coordination process in the context of NPT review cycles is not entirely Brussels-based, as it must be geared towards a set of Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings that take place in each of the three years preceding the RevCon in Vienna, Geneva and New York. In 2007-2009, the EU participated and issued statements in each of the three PrepComs that were crafted and delivered by German, Slovenian and Czech Presidencies, respectively. The EU Presidencies' 'shuttle diplomacy' between the three NPT venues and Brussels required a great amount of time and effort, even though the PrepComs have no decision-making authority, and the NPT parties are not under pressure to agree on anything within these arenas (Interview 6, 2014).

As the actual negotiations usually take place only at the RevCons, the months before the 2010 RevCon commenced in May promised to become a real litmus test for the EU's internal coordination process. The lion's share of the task of preparing and crafting the EU's negotiation position was carried out by Spain, which held the EU Presidency in the first half of 2010. Several issues are important to mention in this context, as they arguably have contributed to the quality of internal coordination. First, to perform the job of the Council rotating Presidency, including the preparation for a major multilateral conference, is a traditionally challenging task for small or new and less experienced member states (Müller, 2005b, p. 11). In contrast, Spain already had held Council Presidencies in the past, and possessed the required level of institutional and administrative capacity to perform the job. Second, in the conversation with their American counterparts, Spanish diplomats signaled their willingness to assume leadership roles and to be 'a bit ambitious' in working out the EU's negotiation stance in the run-up to the Conference (Wikileaks, 2009a). Third, in light of the Lisbon Treaty provisions entering into force, the Spanish Presidency has demonstrated flexibility and agreed to incorporate the EEAS representatives, including the Special Representative on WMD non-proliferation Annalisa Giannella, to jointly co-chair the EU delegation to the RevCon.

As a result of a series of coordination meetings, a legally binding Common Position was produced, which has directly informed the EU's negotiation stance in the RevCon (Council of the EU, 2010b). The document was adopted at the end of March 2010, or, in other words, more than one month before the start of the RevCon. This is

important, as it arguably demonstrates good time-management skills and ownership of the coordination process, with an understanding that early adoption of EU Common Position might increase the chances that the other parties will consult it before negotiations. Moreover, in comparison to the EU's previous positions in 2000 and 2005, the current Common Position stood out as a strong and well-elaborated document, with substantial political content and a less declaratory character (Interview 7, 2014; Cenevska, 2016, p. 269). Several interview sources from EU member states confirmed that despite the traditional time-consuming character, the internal coordination process was well-organized and, for what it matters, has not been overshadowed by major procedural conflicts (Interviews 8 and 9, 2014). Apart from the above-mentioned characteristics of the Spanish Presidency, what also seemed to contribute to a successful coordination process was a certain political and legal path dependency: earlier common positions (2000 and 2005) that provided a good working basis to start with, as well as the established legal procedures and practices of member states exercising their foreign policy competence with the help of the Council Presidency (Interview 6, 2014). The evidence at hand therefore allows to suggest that the level of EU institutional coordination in the run-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon was *high*.

4.2.3 NPT II negotiations

The institutional coordination for the 2015 RevCon started in November 2014 with the meetings in Brussels. As it was the case with the previous RevCon, the preparation work was concentrated around the CONOP working group that now had been integrated into the structures of the EEAS since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. The CONOP coordination meetings were also informed by earlier expert level meetings in Geneva (on disarmament) and Vienna (on non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy) that drafted common language related to various NPT pillars (Interview 10, 2015). If the coordination work on Vienna issues was reportedly conducted in a good spirit, the disarmament part appeared to be the backbone of contention. According to an EEAS diplomat present in the meetings, EU member states spent three months before finding acceptable language just on the one paragraph related to the assessment of humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (Interview 11, 2015). Hence, the coordination process was generally perceived by some participants as 'very cumbersome' and 'extremely difficult' (Interviews 12 and 13, 2015).

One complicating factor in this context turned out to be the upcoming parliamentary elections in the UK, scheduled to take place in May. In line with internal

parliamentary procedures of scrutinizing the CFSP, the British Parliament asked the Council to submit its common position on the upcoming RevCon by the end of February 2015, to be able to review it in time. This deadline proved to be unrealistic for the Council in light of the difficulties with the internal negotiation process. Although the initial aim was to adopt a Council Decision, unable to reach an agreement by the end of February, member states were forced to pursue the common position in the form of Council Conclusions, which were eventually adopted on 20 April 2015, two weeks before the start of the RevCon (Interviews 14 and 15, 2015). This move represented a divergence from the established practice of agreeing on legally binding instruments in the NPT context since the 1990s, and has been viewed as a failure, not least because Council Conclusions is a document that binds EU member states only politically (Meier, 2015, p. 5). Moreover, some member states perceived the agreed outcome of the coordination process as suboptimal, criticizing it for its vague language and a lack of forward-looking elements (Interviews 12 and 16, 2015). As one diplomat put it, the Council Conclusions was something that ‘everyone was equally unhappy with’ (Interview 17, 2015). It should be noted, however, that, given the high risk of a total breakdown of internal negotiations between member states with no EU common position as a result, some interviewees indicated that the agreed upon Council Conclusions, even in a weakened form and with diluted content, represented success in the coordination process (Interviews 13 and 18, 2015).

As the 2015 RevCon was the first instance of high-level multilateral negotiations in the NPT context after the Lisbon Treaty reformed the EU’s foreign policy-making, it is important to briefly outline the implications of this change for EU coordination in the run-up to the RevCon. Just as COARM, the CONOP working group has been moved from the Council structures to the EEAS, and has been chaired by a permanent EU official instead of representatives of the rotating Presidency since then. Further, the EU’s new Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Jacek Bylica, replaced the rotating Presidency in representing and speaking on the EU’s behalf in the NPT PrepComs and the relevant UN bodies. This change has been perceived as a positive development, as it promised to add more coherence and continuity to the EU’s internal deliberations on non-proliferation and disarmament (Ibid.).

On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty, which created the EEAS and significantly reinforced the role of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, also brought an unexpected procedural complication for EU coordination on the eve of the RevCon. In contrast to the 2010 RevCon, when the EU’s general statement was

negotiated among member states (although delivered by then High Representative Catherine Ashton), the new rules stipulated that in 2015 the High Representative Federica Mogherini acts on her own authority, reflecting the EU's view on the subject. In practical terms, this implied drafting the general statement independently which – given the shaky ground of internal consensus – generated tensions with some member states, which refrained from drafting statements for NPT main committees before seeing Mogherini's statement (Interviews 19 and 20, 2015). The delicate situation exhausted itself once the text of the general statement became available, being largely drawn on the consensual language of the Council Conclusions. However, as it was released just days before the RevCon's start, this significantly delayed the preparation of EU statements for the NPT main committees (Interview 14, 2015). Given the mixed record of EU institutional coordination for the second case study of the NPT negotiations, it is coded as *medium*.

4.3 Member states' interest convergence

4.3.1 ATT negotiations

On the level of the 27 EU member states, there was a high degree of convergence of national preferences concerning the ATT. Member states reiterated the EU's view on the need for a strong and universal agreement regulating arms sales. There was also a consensus on how the key parameters of the future Treaty should look. In their response to the UN Secretary-General's call on expressing preliminary views on the ATT, EU member states shared a common vision for the necessity to include strict criteria for export risk assessment (United Nations, 2007). Most of them referred to the norms that were already in place at the European and domestic levels, such as those related to the humanitarian agenda. Furthermore, member states maintained similar views on the scope of the Treaty, implementation mechanisms and transparency provisions.

One reason why the new agreement was relatively uncontroversial among EU member states is the fact that the ATT leaves the implementation and enforcement of the export control policy fully to the member states. As long as the protection of national sovereignty was ensured, governments were ready to compromise on the rest of the issues. Moreover, the ATT could create a level playing field for national defense industries on a global scale. As stated by German officials, 'export control can only achieve maximum effectiveness if as many countries as possible apply similar rules and procedures' (German Government, 2010, p. 16). Since the start of the UN negotiations, the business community indeed closely followed the process and cooperated with governments in order to bring the ATT forward. 'For industry, the unevenness [of regulations] presents

enormous challenges in achieving concurrent compliance in all the jurisdictions in which it operates' (Wood, 2012, p. 25; see also ASD, 2013). Finally, the ATT provisions endorsed the creation of structures and practices, which to a great extent, were already institutionalized at the domestic level in European countries. Apart from export criteria, this concerned the establishment of appropriate national authorization bodies, end-use control and lists of controlled military items.

Certainly, there were some differences among EU member states. One group of states (France, Italy) kept a somewhat conservative attitude towards the ATT, a second group (Germany, the UK, Sweden) pushed for a more progressive position, while the rest (mainly non-producers of arms) showed no active stance (Interview 4, 2014). Italy, for instance, wanted to keep civilian arms out of the scope of the Treaty (Depauw, 2012, p. 5). Germany was targeting more ambitious export control risk assessments than the one suggested by EU diplomats (German Government, 2010). Yet, these differences were of minor significance in comparison to the common objective of a strong and effective global agreement. Member states' consensus around the ATT was further reinforced by a joint declaration of the EU's top arms exporting countries. In their joint statement, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK explained their view on different points of the Treaty, and declared their wish 'to conclude a strong, robust, effective and legally binding Arms Trade Treaty in order to make the world a safer place and reduce the number of innocent victims of armed violence' (Fabius *et al.*, 2012). To sum up in the words of one of the interviewees, arms export control in Europe 'is an issue, where comparing to other areas of non-proliferation and disarmament there has been considerable level of cohesion among member states in terms of policy objectives' (Interview 1, 2013). Hence, the level of member states' interest convergence in the case of ATT negotiations is coded as *high*.

4.3.2 NPT I negotiations

In the context of nuclear security politics, strategic interests of EU member states diverge. One line of division stems directly from the distinction between members that hold of nuclear weapons as opposed to those that renounce them. As NWS, France and the UK are committed to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence that is based on the perception of nuclear weapons as instruments to guarantee global and, primarily, national security. Both states are permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) and, at the same time, belong to a NWS club, which effectively limits their policies to an almost exclusive focus on non-proliferation and, at best, a lukewarm attitude towards nuclear disarmament.

France was the last EC/EU member state to join the NPT regime in 1992, thus removing the last barrier for the EU's participation in this multilateral forum. Prior to the 2010 RevCon, Müller (2007) made an observation that France has become 'the most intransigent member of the nuclear club and has stonewalled during the last [2005] NPT Review Conference on further progress in nuclear disarmament' (p. 193). The UK traditionally shows a more flexible attitude and willingness to negotiate nuclear reductions, although it would prioritize solidarity with other P5 members when it comes to disarmament issues.

The absolute majority of EU member states are non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), but despite this shared status, the group lacks homogeneity. The core of EU NNWS constitute NATO member states that benefit from the Alliance's nuclear umbrella and, by extension, acknowledge, at least to some extent, security benefits generated by nuclear weapons. Four states – Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy – are in a particular ambivalent position as they, while being official NNWS, host US nuclear warheads in the framework of NATO nuclear posture. This has led to a situation, in which, as described by Katsioulis and Mölling (2010), Germany's 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls for a nuclear disarmament, while the Ministry of Defence has to maintain "allied discipline"' (p. 6) due to obligations within NATO. Hence, EU NATO states hold cautious attitudes towards nuclear disarmament, which contrasts with EU non-NATO states, such as Austria, Ireland and Sweden. While sharing the non-proliferation agenda with the rest of the EU, the non-aligned trio has been traditionally more interested in disarmament, emphasizing the need for concrete progress in this field (Meier and Quille, 2005). Finally, another line of division within the EU cuts across economic interests and strength of industry or between proponents and opponents of nuclear energy, with France and Austria finding themselves on far opposite sides of the interest spectrum (Rosa, 2001, p. 43).

Although the general constellation of interests among EU member states on nuclear matters suggests a heterogeneous and diverse picture, the situation in the years preceding the 2010 NPT RevCon had been a bit more nuanced. The willingness to bridge the internal divide among member states in foreign affairs and the transatlantic rift with the US after the Iraqi debacle in 2003, which culminated in the adoption of the WMD Non-Proliferation Strategy, was strong enough to set the dynamics of interest convergence for years ahead. Member states' deliberate and almost exclusive focus on non-proliferation was also reinforced by the international agenda, with growing threats of evolving Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. Observing the increasing

convergence of interests among EU member states on non-proliferation issues, Ahlström (2005) importantly notes that it ‘has come about partly as a result of some member states being prepared to suppress their interest in disarmament – at least when working in an EU context’ (p. 46). In other words, member states’ unity of purpose and determination in dealing with non-proliferation crises came at the price of deliberately sidelining the disarmament agenda (Portela and Kienzle, 2015). Due to this mixed record, the convergence of EU member states’ interests on the eve of the 2010 NPT RevCon is considered as *medium*.

4.3.3 NPT II negotiations

Reinforced by the EU WMD Strategy, the evolving pattern of member states’ interest convergence in the nuclear security field is not meant to be inevitable or irreversible. The unequal balance of strategic interests in favor of non-proliferation matters over disarmament issues that characterized the intra-European consensus in the 2000s has since been increasingly challenged by pro-disarmament EU member states. Driven by a lack of implementation of disarmament measures in the aftermath of the 2010 NPT RevCon, as well as by the long-standing national view that rejects the value and relevance of nuclear weapons in the current security environment, Ireland and Austria started to actively advocate the need to re-prioritize the disarmament agenda in international politics, thereby placing it on an equal footing with the commitment to the non-proliferation norm, including on the level of the EU (Nielsen and Hanson, 2014). The Irish Ambassador to the CD has been clear about shifting accents of the country’s preferences: ‘The continuing lack of progress on [disarmament] pillar of the NPT will [...] undermine the Treaty’s non-proliferation objectives unless action is taken now. For this reason, my delegation will be joining those pressing for a greater focus on disarmament as this review cycle progresses’ (Corr, 2013, p. 3). Austria appeared even more strong-headed in justifying its pro-disarmament pivot, which goes as far as questioning the legitimacy and legality of nuclear weapons: ‘We are convinced of [...] the need to fundamentally change the discourse on nuclear weapons. We need [...] to foster the understanding that any use of nuclear weapons would be morally repugnant, incompatible with [...] fundamental principles of international humanitarian law’ (Kmentt, 2012, p. 1). The EU’s NWS, in turn, vehemently reject any bids to outlaw nuclear weapons, and criticize calls for a rapid reduction of arsenals. In other words, both the UK and France continue to insist on the status quo, and demonstrate little appetite for

disarmament, arguing that the NPT regime is primarily about rules and norms of non-proliferation (Interview 21, 2014).

The informal arrangement among EU member states of setting aside disagreements for the sake of moving forward in the areas of shared interest was effectively undermined by pro-disarmament and anti-disarmament camps clearly pulling the EU in different directions. That the Union has become more polarized on NPT issues was crystallized in the preparatory talks preceding the 2015 RevCon. As one diplomat mentioned, in drafting the statements for the 2014 PrepCom, member states were relying on the language of 2010 – a clear sign of an internal stalemate (Interview 8, 2014). Moreover, not only has the unifying effect of EU consensus on non-proliferation slowly evaporated, but further progress on the NPT's second pillar has been seemingly hijacked by the increasing divisions on pillar one. Some member states appeared to be deliberately reluctant about crafting a stronger EU position on non-proliferation before the RevCon, asking for an equally ambitious stance on disarmament. In particular, Austria reportedly made an agreement on the statements for the Main Committees II and III conditional upon an agreement on the disarmament statement – a move that has been characterized by one interviewee as 'hostage taking' (Interview 19, 2015). On the other hand, the EU's NWS did not win over many friends either. France, in particular, was criticized by moderate EU member states for its intransigent position on disarmament and the refusal to even mention the reference to the humanitarian approach to nuclear politics (Interview 20, 2015). France was also the only EU member state that did not attend the international conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons organized by Austria in December 2014. In sum, and in the words of a non-EU diplomat closely following intra-EU debates on the NPT, since 2010, the EU has witnessed increasingly divergent positions among its member states, 'to the point that it can be called dysfunctional' (Interview 22, 2015). Hence, the level of EU member states' interest convergence in the second case study of the NPT negotiations was indisputably *low*.

Table 4. The overview of internal factors of EU effectiveness.

Factors Cases	ATT	NPT I	NPT II
Internal policy	Strong	Moderate	Moderate
Institutional coordination	Medium	High	Medium
Member states' interest convergence	High	Medium	Low

CHAPTER 5. EXTERNAL FACTORS OF EU EFFECTIVENESS IN MULTILATERAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

This chapter presents and discusses the external factors of EU effectiveness in multilateral ATT and NPT negotiations. First, it examines the distribution of power resources among negotiators, and determines the EU's place in relevant power structures. Second, it explores the rules and procedures of the diplomatic forums under which the EU negotiates. Third, it scrutinizes the international constellation of interests and the spectrum of negotiation items that dominated the ATT and NPT processes. It shows that out of the three external factors, only the rules and procedures of the negotiation forums appear invariant, while the global distribution of power and international constellation of interests display different values in two out of three selected case studies (see Table 6).

5.1 Global distribution of power

5.1.1 ATT negotiations

The EU's weight in the area of arms trade is considerably high. Although the EU does not export arms, EU member states collectively accounted for one third (31 per cent) of global arms exports between 2007 and 2011, the period in which the preparatory process for the ATT negotiations was unfolding (see Table 4). This places the EU ahead of the two biggest arms exporters – the US and Russia – with their market shares of 30 and 24 per cent, respectively (Holtom *et al.*, 2012). Out of the 18 EU member states that were trading arms in the indicated period, three EU member states – Germany, France and the UK – accounted for more than two thirds (68 per cent) of total EU exports, thus joining the US and Russia on the list of the top-five global arms suppliers. Moreover, 42 EU-based companies were listed among the world's top-100 arms-producers in 2007, while in 2012 the number fell marginally to 38 firms (Perlo-Freeman, 2009, p. 288; Perlo-Freeman and Wezeman, 2014).

When it comes to a specific category of conventional arms – SALW¹¹ – the inclusion of which into the scope of the ATT has become a subject of intense debate, the EU also demonstrates high significance in this dimension. Between 2007 and 2011, between five and six EU member states were regularly reported to be in the top ten SALW exporters, with Italy and Germany occupying the second and the third rank, respectively,

¹¹ The UN defines 'small arms' as items designed to be carried and used by one person, such as revolvers and pistols, rifles and carbines, and light machine guns. 'Light weapons' are designed for use by several people, and might be transported by a crew of people, a pack animal or a light vehicle. Examples of light weapons include portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, mounted grenade launchers, etc. (Parker and Wilson, 2016).

just below the US (Herron, *et al.*, 2010; Holtom *et al.*, 2014). Hence, in terms of material powerbase, the EU as a collective actor carried more weight than any other participant of the ATT negotiations with an exception of, perhaps, the US. The strong position of EU member states in the global arms market, manifested through an aggregate size of their exports, promised to put the EU in a particularly favorable position of asymmetrical dependence in the negotiations as ‘the third countries would not have an interest to have the ATT without the EU’ (Interview 2, 2013).

Table 5. Largest arms exporters in 2007-2011, in % of global market share.¹²

Exporter	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2007-2011
United States	29,6	28,3	28,5	31,3	30,2	29,6
Russia	20,9	25,9	20,7	23,9	28,7	24,2
Germany	12,4	9,8	10,4	10,6	4,5	9,4
France	9,0	8,3	7,9	3,5	5,9	6,9
United Kingdom	3,6	4,0	4,3	4,5	3,4	3,9
European Union¹³	37,7	32,5	34,6	26,4	26,5	31,4

Arms producing and exporting capabilities were not the only power resources that mattered in the ATT negotiations. As the idea behind the ATT was to craft binding rules and standards in an area that has not been governed by globally accepted norms and practices before, non-material power resources, such as ideas, beliefs and knowledge, also appeared to be relevant for the purpose of influencing the negotiations. In many respects, the ATT initiative emerged on the verge of the international community’s growing concern with human security – a trend that was set in the 1990s, and fostered by the UN

¹² My own calculations based on the data provided by the SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database. The Database covers major types of conventional weapons (aircraft, artillery, armored vehicles, ships, etc.) with an exception of majority of SALW.

¹³ The numbers are based on a sum of exports by 18 EU member states that were supplying arms in 2007-2011.

leadership's personal commitment and interest in human security activism (Hampson, 2008; Krause, 2007). The notion of human security was meant to change the point of reference in security discourse from an exclusive focus on the territorial security of states to the safety and well-being of individuals and their communities. After the end of the Cold War, several Nobel Peace Prize laureates elaborated the International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers, which called upon the states 'to adhere to their commitments on international human rights and humanitarian law when considering application for export licenses' (Holtom and Wezeman, 2007, p. 433). After this initiative was put on the table at the UN in the late 1990s, international civil society organizations started an intense lobbying campaign pushing for a legally binding treaty on conventional arms transfers based on their successful experience of campaigning against landmines, SALW and cluster munitions (Wisotzki, 2013).

The EU was a well-placed actor to capitalize on the normative discourse of human security underpinning the ATT initiative. First and foremost, the EU has been long practicing the application of humanitarian criteria in the arms export decision-making process since the adoption of the EU Code of Conduct in 1998. Further, the EU's self-perception and identity as a human rights champion and normative power is well-known (Whitman, 2011), not least because of its willingness to act as a norms entrepreneur in various multilateral contexts and bilateral dialogues with its partners. By articulating and exemplifying human security norms and ideas in the ATT context, the EU received an opportunity to match its own ideological agenda with global policy-making. In addition, it became a natural ally of many NGOs from Control Arms coalition and progressive states in Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific that were eager to further extend the human security agenda to multilateral arms control processes against the will of actors like China, Russia and India, whose view on international security is predominantly state-centric (Bromley *et al.*, 2012).

Moreover, since the 1990s, the EU has been developing its own arms export control policy based on the strict criteria for arms transfers, common lists of military equipment and information exchange mechanisms. Given that the international community was searching for solutions in the form of mechanisms, practices and models to be possibly replicated in the emerging ATT regime, the EU's experience of operating multilateral export control system on a regional scale appeared to be a considerable asset. Without a doubt, the EU was not the only actor capable of suggesting ideas and providing best practices. Alternative sources of ideas have included, among others, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and

Technologies, the OSCE's Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, and the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (Kytömäki, 2010). Yet, in contrast to the EU's policy, these instruments lacked either a sufficient scope (ECOWAS), or legally binding nature (OSCE) or an adequate level of diplomatic representation (Wassenaar). In short, across both dimensions of material and non-material power resources, the EU had a strong position in comparison to other players in the ATT negotiations.

5.1.2 NPT I and NPT II negotiations

At first glance, the EU's weight in nuclear arms politics is not insignificant. The two EU NWS, France and the UK, collectively possess 515 nuclear warheads, which places them ahead of China and those NWS – India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – that are not parties to the NPT (Kristensen and Norris, 2017). On the global scale, this number is relatively marginal though, as the two former Cold War foes, the US and Russia, account for 93 percent of the world's total nuclear stockpile, which estimated to be around 14900 nuclear warheads (Ibid.). Nonetheless, having the third biggest nuclear force and being partially linked to the US through NATO's doctrine of nuclear sharing and nuclear deterrence makes the EU – through its member states – a powerful military actor.

However, when it comes to the context of NPT negotiations, the role and significance of material power resources need to be re-examined. Under regular circumstances in the area of international security and international affairs more broadly, nuclear forces are an important element of an actor's military strength that helps to create leverage over others, but in the context of the NPT, the potential benefits of material power are largely offset by the structure of the negotiations. The foundation of the NPT rests upon a 'grand bargain' between NWS and NNWS, wherein the first committed to disarm and not to assist in spreading nuclear weapons, and the second pledged not to manufacture, transfer or receive them (Lewis, 2010; Ruzicka and Wheeler, 2010). In addition to the disarmament promise, two other concessions were offered by the NWS in exchange for the NNWS' commitment not to proliferate. In the framework of NPT, the NWS recognized the right of their counterparts to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and pledged to assist them. In order to close the bargain, the NWS also offered various kinds of security assurances to prevent the threat or use of nuclear weapons against NNWS (Knopf, 2012a). Thus, by entering into the NPT's bargain, all of its parties accepted a significant degree of vulnerability and mutual restraint. As

Avenhaus *et al.* (2002) argued, the NPT negotiations exemplify a ground where the effect of equal and opposite force is likely to occur: ‘attempts by nuclear weapon states to “lean on” nonnuclear weapon states merely increases the desire of nonnuclear weapon states to achieve equal means of pressure’ (p. 25). The means of pressure exercised by the NNWS vary, potentially going as far as a withdrawal from the NPT or the creation of alternative negotiation forums (Kulesa, 2014; Johnson, 2010), although not all scholars are convinced about the willingness of the NNWS to jeopardize the NPT to such extent (Horovitz, 2015). In practical terms, the grand bargain implies that the NPT’s three pillars – disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy – are closely interdependent, and that significant change in each of the pillars will inevitably push for equal measures in one or two others, if a negotiated agreement should be reached. As the underlying interdependent structure of the NPT negotiations diffuses material power of the NWS, it is hard to argue that the EU, through its nuclear armed member states, is in any advantageous or asymmetric power position in relation to other participants.

The EU’s non-material power resources in the NPT negotiations are rather scant. Certainly, the EU appears to be a strong promoter of the non-proliferation norm. In the context of the last NPT review cycles, the EU regularly condemned violation and non-compliance with the non-proliferation obligations, although sceptics can point out that the EU’s criticism of some norm-breakers (Israel, India and Pakistan) has not been as equally forceful as towards others (Iran, North Korea) (Müller *et al.*, 2013; Quille, 2013). The EU’s commitment to the non-proliferation norm is also manifested through the practice of inclusion of non-proliferation clauses into its agreements with third countries and the extensive financial contributions to international non-proliferation organizations, such as the IAEA (Grip, 2009; Kienzle and Vestergaard, 2013). However, in the context of the NPT negotiations, the non-proliferation norm has a somewhat muted resonance, as in the eyes of the majority of its members, particularly NAM countries, it is widely associated with injustice to the NPT’s grand bargain.

In contrast, the disarmament norm reverberates greatly with the majority of NPT participants. During the last ten years, this also has been an almost exclusive focus by most grass-roots and advocacy NGOs that joined forces to form the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and the Global Zero coalition, both created in the run-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon (Knopf, 2012b). Yet, it is disarmament, where the EU as a norm entrepreneur, scores quite poorly. To play this role, it would require the EU’s NWS to renounce their nuclear weapons, accompanied with the establishment of a WMD-free zone in Europe. However unrealistic, this scenario would

allow the EU to lead by example and claim the moral high ground in the NPT process, similarly to how Brazil and South Africa capitalize on their past decisions to stop nuclear programs to build leverage in various disarmament forums. As far as knowledge counts as an important power resource, one can argue that nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes developed by many EU member states can contribute to the EU's powerbase in the NPT negotiations. The problem here is that the rules and decisions on the nuclear technology transfer are elaborated in a different international setting – the NSG – which is independent from the NPT (Joyner, 2006). In sum, the evidence at hand does not allow to conclude that the distribution of power in the last two NPT review cycles placed the EU in any advantageous position in comparison to other players.

5.2 Legal institutional setting

5.2.1 ATT negotiations

The ATT was elaborated under the premises of the First Committee of the UNGA, which deals with the issues of disarmament and international security, and subsequently adopted by vote in the General Assembly. At the moment the ATT initiative was put on the table in the middle of the 2000s, the EU enjoyed a formal observer status at the UN. Due to a lack of legal personality, it was recognized in the UN as the European Community represented by the European Commission in cases of exclusive competence, and by the rotating Presidency in events of shared competences and CFSP (Farrell, 2006, p. 31). The observer status allowed the EU representatives to participate only in formal meetings without the right to propose amendments, chair meetings or, most importantly, to vote (Hoffmeister and Kuijper, 2006, p. 14). Rights and privileges of an observer therefore fall significantly short of those of members of the UN. The EU's membership at the UN is, however, unlikely, as it is only open to states, and any modification of this rule would require a change to the UN Charter by large qualified majorities of votes.

By the time the ATT preparatory process was over and the actual negotiations on the content of the Treaty began, the situation with the EU's official status in the UN changed. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the EU acquired a legal personality and pushed to upgrade its formal status in the UNGA and related multilateral forums. As a result, UN Resolution 65/276 of 3 May 2011 granted the EU an 'enhanced observer' status. According to the latter, the EU received the right to attend informal meetings, the right to speak and to make interventions, as well as the ability to propose amendments and to distribute its documents (Wessel, 2011). In the words of an EU diplomat attending the ATT negotiations, the EU relied on 'basically the

same instruments as UN member states with the exception that we don't vote' (Interview 1, 2013). This, however, is a slight overstatement. In addition to no voting rights, UN Resolution 65/276 also stipulates that the EU 'shall not have the right [...] to co-sponsor draft resolutions or decisions, or to put forward candidates' (United Nations, 2011, p. 3). Moreover, its amendments may be put to a vote only at the initiative of an EU member state. Some scholars thus claim that even though the EU's status and visibility in the UN has been upgraded, it will most likely remain 'procedurally handicapped', as it 'still has to rely on its member states to promote its agenda in the UN GA' (Wouters *et al.*, 2011, p. 4).

In the UN Security Council (UNSC), in which informal exchanges on the ATT took place, the EU is virtually absent, and the primary actors in this forum are EU member states. The Lisbon Treaty, however, has made an attempt to enhance the EU's presence in the UNSC. Article 34 TEU calls upon those EU member states that hold a seat in the UNSC to 'concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully informed [and] defend the positions and the interests of the Union' (European Union, 2010, p. 35). Member states can even request the UNSC to give permission to the EU High Representative to speak at the forum on behalf of the EU, once the Union has defined its position on the subject that is on the UN SC agenda. In practice, however, member states, in particular France and the UK, show little willingness to act as 'agents of Europe' in the SC, prioritizing their national positions over collective EU action (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011b). The sort of solidarity stipulated by the Lisbon Treaty turned into an irony given that one of the permanent members of the SC – the UK – regularly questioned the competence and legitimacy of the EEAS to speak on behalf of the EU in international forums.

5.2.2 NPT I and NPT II negotiations

Formally, the NPT is not a UN treaty, as it was negotiated by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, a predecessor to the Geneva-based Conference of Disarmament. Yet, the NPT is connected to the UN system, as it was put to a vote and adopted by the UNGA in 1968, and each of its Review Conferences are convened under the premises of the UNGA. This implies that the EU's status in the NPT negotiations is closely linked to its formal standing in the UNGA. As a non-state actor, the EU is not a party, but an observer to the NPT. Despite its observer status, the EU enjoys a wide range of participatory rights as a result of an informal arrangement with NPT parties (Interview 25, 2013; Interview 43, 2014). In the context of the 2010 and 2015 RevCons, the EU was

able to deliver statements in the plenary debates and during the meetings of the three Main Committees. In addition, the EU could submit proposals, make amendments, intervene and participate in NPT formal and informal meetings.

It thus appears that the EU enjoyed enhanced participatory rights in the NPT process even before UN Resolution 65/276, which officially granted it with enhanced observer status in the UN. However, it would be incorrect to claim that the Resolution has not had any impact on the EU's participation in NPT negotiations. For example, the EU is now allowed to speak early in the debates, which contributes to the better EU visibility among the NPT crowd. Yet, other than this aspect, the Resolution has brought few other concrete changes regarding the NPT participation (Interview 26, 2017). The EU's observer status in the NPT also implies a range of limitations, similar to those it encountered in the ATT negotiations. Clearly, the EU cannot vote during the NPT proceedings. Further, it cannot attend the meetings of Subsidiary Bodies, which are created by the NPT Main Committees to advance the discussion on specific topics and the forward-looking elements of the RevCons outcome. For instance, during the 2015 NPT RevCon, the EU prepared a statement on the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, discussed by the Subsidiary Body II, but it had to ask Latvia to deliver its contribution in its capacity of EU rotating Presidency (Interview 10, 2015). The proceedings of Subsidiary Bodies are only open to NPT members and are closed to the public. In sum, the overview of the institutional rules and procedures in the three cases of multilateral arms negotiations reveals that the EU has enjoyed an equally wide range of participatory rights across all three cases, which nevertheless falls short of all opportunities and possibilities exercised by UN members and full parties to the treaties.

5.3 International constellation of interests

5.3.1 ATT negotiations

Until recently, conventional arms have been the only type of arms not covered by global multilateral treaties, as has been the case with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons for quite some time. Several international mechanisms, among which the most renowned are the 1995 Wassenaar Arrangement and the 2001 UN Program of Action on SALW, have already been in place to address the issue of arms export control. Yet, in contrast to the ATT, these regimes lack a legally binding nature and are not universal in their membership or scope of application. As then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon argued in the opening of the UN negotiating conference in March 2013, 'there are common standards for the global trade in armchairs but not the global

trade in arms' (Ki-moon, 2013). A growing understanding that an agreement on rules regarding the global arms trade is long overdue and that the international community, spearheaded by the UN, is expected to close the major regulatory loophole, has contributed to a growing sense of urgency and a common purpose behind the ATT initiative.

Several pieces of evidence speak in favor of a consensual nature of the ATT negotiations. First, there has been a high level of support for the ATT process just in the initial stage. Transnational pressure to adopt an ATT dates back to as early as the 1990s, but the process reached its momentum when one of the permanent members of the UNSC, the United Kingdom, declared its support for the new initiative. In summer 2006, a cross-regional group of states, consisting of Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and the UK, circulated the draft resolution 'Towards an Arms Trade Treaty', which called for 'a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms' (United Nations, 2006, p. 2). The draft later was co-sponsored by a total of 77 states and adopted by the UNGA in December 2006 as Resolution 61/89, with 153 votes in favor.

Second, apart from declaring its support of the initiative in principle, many states also considered the emerging Treaty as feasible in light of its prospective effectiveness. In response to the Secretary-General's call to share their views on the future of the ATT, around 100 states and the EU formally handed in written replies, which 'was the highest number ever submitted on a disarmament-related issue' (Kytömäki, 2010, p. 39). An overwhelming majority of actors – more than 90 – confirmed that a global legally-binding instrument regulating arms transfers is indeed desirable and achievable. This consensus on the ATT's feasibility was later confirmed in the findings of the Group of Governmental Experts and Open-Ended Working Group established by the UNGA to advance the consultation process (United Nations, 2008; United Nations, 2009). As one researcher commented on the views of participating actors, 'there is a distinct lack of international regulation of arms transfers, and many states feel that international standards are becoming imperative in light of the globalization of the arms trade' (Parker, 2008, p. 2).

Finally, one of the particular features of the ATT process was the absence of block negotiations, which is the fragmentation of participants into a set of informal issue-based coalitions or groupings of actors. Disaggregation of the negotiation space into coalitions of interests is not a problem in itself, and is typical for many multilateral talks (Crump and Glendon, 2003). However, in the field of arms affairs, in which negotiators are usually exposed to high security stakes and zero-sum logic of bargaining, an extensive

number of coalitions is a function of a diverse collection of views that sometimes can propel polarization of interests, paving the way to a negotiation stalemate. As one diplomat stressed about the context of the ATT talks, ‘normally in the field of disarmament you have deep cleavages, but in the ATT case – a strong coalition of European, American and some Asian countries’ prepared to drive the negotiations forward (Interview 23, 2014). Broad acceptance of the need of a treaty to regulate the conventional arms trade and thereby reduce risks to international security posed by illicit arms flows manifested itself in an integrative and cooperative character of the ATT negotiations.

A wide-ranging consensus on the future of the emerging ATT certainly did not imply that there was nothing left to negotiate about or to compromise on. Although negotiating parties largely shared the view on the feasibility of the Treaty, their positions on its parameters and scope – the two most contentious issues during the ATT negotiations – appeared to be quite divergent (United Nations, 2007). Broadly speaking, two camps of opinions can be identified. The group of progressive states – maximalists – consisted of European, Caribbean, Pacific, and African and Latin American countries that insisted on strict criteria for authorizing arms transfer (considerations on possible violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, on the risk of diversion, impact on existing conflict or sustainable development), as well as the broadest possible scope of activities (export, import, transit, brokering, loan, lease, etc.) and types of weapons (all types of conventional weapons including ammunition, SALW, dual-use and technology) to be covered.

These demands were resisted by sceptics, or minimalists, such as China, India and Russia, who were concerned about the impact of the ATT on their arms manufacturing capabilities and the right of self-defense. The trio appeared to be at the helm of a wider group of mostly non-democratic countries in Asia, the Middle East and the Americas, interested in pushing back the human security agenda and overall watering down ambitious regulatory provisions (Parker, 2007; Bromley *et al.*, 2012). Interestingly, the US belonged to this second group of actors until 2009, when the new President, Barack Obama, reversed the American attitude towards the ATT and declared his administration’s support for the initiative. The disagreements between maximalists and minimalists were addressed and reconciled for the most part during the two multilateral conferences in July 2012 and March 2013.

5.3.2 NPT I negotiations

As a rationale behind convening NPT RevCons is to assess the progress in the implementation of the Treaty's main objectives, the subject of each quinquennial talk is, in a way, pre-determined by the Treaty's content and the grand bargain between NWS and NNWS that it manifests. This implies that the broad constellation of interests is quite similar from one RevCon to another, and it revolves around a fundamental concern about means and ways to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons and to further strengthen the non-proliferation norm. In other words, all NPT RevCons are essentially the negotiations between NWS and NNWS, whereby the first focus on the topics of international safeguards and regional nuclear proliferation, whereas the second prioritize the issues related to their access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, security assurances from NWS and nuclear disarmament measures. While these substantive areas have been at the center of nearly all NPT talks, their particular mix and relative salience – frequently determined by the international agenda and the previous NPT decisions – is distinct in every new RevCon.

The 2010 NPT RevCon was convened in the shadow of a decade-long impasse of the NPT process, of which a lack of progress on disarmament was the most critical. The previous 2005 RevCon failed to agree on the final outcome document, mainly due to the resistance of the NWS to recognize their commitment to the previously agreed upon disarmament measures in the form of the so-called '13 steps' (Müller, 2005c). Moreover, the NPT regime has been challenged by the unresolved problem of North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty and its subsequent nuclear missile tests in 2006 and 2009, by Iran's continuous non-compliance with its safeguard obligations and the alleged pursuit of a military nuclear program and by the 2008 US deal on the transfer of nuclear technology to India, a non-party to the NPT. Against this background, a widespread understanding among participants emerged that the upcoming RevCon almost certainly needed to produce a substantial agreement in order to prevent the NPT regime from falling into irrelevance (Interviews 7 and 9, 2014; Rees, 2011, p. 139). As Bourantonis (2015) observed, 'in that context, fears of a full NPT collapse inspired most of the NPT parties to show moderation to restore confidence in the Treaty' (p. 43).

The positive tone of the negotiations was set by several events in the lead-up to the RevCon, primarily by Obama's Prague speech in April 2009, where the US President outlined his vision and commitment to a world without nuclear weapons, and the new US-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), concluded in April 2010. The key to the improved climate of the negotiations was the position of the US delegation, which foremost sought to repair the damage to its posture in the NPT regime inherited from the

Bush administration, and to avoid another failed outcome of the RevCon (Miller, 2010). Political will and commitment to improve the NPT, shown by the majority of its membership, including the NWS, materialized in ‘the unique constructive exchange that developed between the governments and diplomats before and during the conference’ (Aboul-Enein, 2010). As another failed NPT RevCon would risk undermining the NPT regime and the provision of security benefits that it entails, leaving both sides of the grand bargain worse-off, the parties showed a willingness to adopt compromising strategies and seek common ground, which is rather unusual in the NPT context. As one participating observer commented, ‘the international environment in 2010 was more conducive to addressing nuclear issues than ever before’ (Johnson, 2010, p. 8).

One of the driving forces in the 2010 NPT RevCon negotiations was the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a grouping that comprises 116 non-Western NNWS (excluding India and Pakistan, which are not NPT parties) and constitutes more than 60 percent of NPT membership. Traditionally more committed to the disarmament pillar than the non-proliferation norm, the NAM suggested an ambitious disarmament action plan with a timeline of complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 2025, accompanied by a convention banning nuclear weapons (Aboul-Enein, 2010; Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 2012). The timeframe and nuclear weapons convention were proposed as new disarmament measures in addition to the 13 steps action plan agreed upon by NPT parties in 2010. To reaffirm the importance of the 13 practical steps, including the NWS’ ‘unequivocal undertaking’ to eliminate nuclear weapons, an agreed disarmament benchmark for the NWS was also the main priority of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) – Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden – that effectively lobbied them in the 2000 NPT RevCon (Rauf, 2000).

In contrast, the P5 or NWS set their priorities around strengthening the non-proliferation pillar, in particular in the parts related to non-compliance with the NPT obligations and the response to withdrawal from the Treaty, torpedoing Iran and North Korea, respectively. The NWS were also eager to promote the Additional Protocol to the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards agreements as a compulsory verification standard for the NPT parties (Dhanapala, 2010). In this respect, their views closely aligned with the position of the ‘Vienna Group of Ten’, another NPT grouping that is comprised of some EU member states (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden) in addition to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Norway, and is pre-occupied with issues of safety and security of nuclear supplies. The elephant in the room, though, during the 2010 RevCon negotiations was a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, a goal that has

been pursued by the NPT community since 1995, yet with little outcome to date. Progress on this issue appeared to be of top priority for Egypt, the chair of the NAM in 2010, and required an active engagement on behalf of the NWS, especially Russia, the US and the UK as NPT depository states (Kelly, 2010). As many insiders indicated, success of the whole outcome of the 2010 RevCon depended on the progress on the Middle East issue (Interview 24, 2016; Dhanapala, 2010).

5.3.3 NPT II negotiations

If the 2010 NPT RevCon was regarded as a forward-looking conference with its consensual 64-point Action Plan outcome spanning across all three NPT pillars, the following RevCon was predictably perceived as an implementation conference. Indeed, the ninth NPT review cycle featured intense discussions within the NPT community over what has been or should be achieved before the 2015 RevCon is convened. One source of contention among NPT parties stemmed from the fact that the Action Plan did not actually set concrete deadlines or provide specific indication for the necessary pace of its implementation. This tension was especially acute in the area of disarmament, where, as Mukhatzhanova (2014) observed, the NWS and NNWS hold ‘divergent views on the acceptable pace of implementing [relevant] action items, and the gap has only been growing’. While the P5 view the Action Plan as a long-term roadmap that can be ‘rolled out’ for the next review cycles, their counterparts insisted on its implementation in the short-run and without delays. Naturally, this discrepancy in interpretation resulted in what many in the non-nuclear camp viewed as unsatisfactory progress on disarmament measures. According to a study that monitored the implementation of the Action Plan, 50 percent of the disarmament action points showed no or minimal progress, mainly due to the ongoing modernization plans, continuing role of nuclear weapons in states’ security doctrines and a lack of major reductions of nuclear stockpiles (Evans *et al.*, 2015). These findings stood in contrast to the monitoring results of the non-proliferation pillar, where around 90 percent of the action points reportedly were met with some or significant progress (Ibid.).

Apart from disarmament, another issue that promised to be highly contentious during the 2015 RevCon was the issue of the WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The crucial outcome of the 2010 RevCon was a decision to convene a conference in 2012 with all regional players, which would serve as a starting point for the creation of the WMD-free zone. Although the first incremental steps were successfully taken, including the appointment of the Finnish diplomat, Jaakko Laajava, as a facilitator, designation of

Finland as a host country and organization of a seminar on the topic by the EU in 2011, the conference itself did not take place. One reason for the debacle is the position of Israel, that seeks to expand the agenda of the conference and link it to the broader security situation in the region (Dhanapala, 2015). As the key promise of the 2010 RevCon remained unfulfilled and a new date for the conference was not proposed, many Arab states expressed frustration with the inability of the NPT to deliver, with Egypt walking away from the 2013 PrepCom meeting (Mukhatzhanova, 2014). Hence, the two issues of disarmament and the Middle East appeared to be central for the 2015 RevCon, generating tension and increasing rifts among NPT members.

Failure to implement previous commitments on disarmament or other pillars is not an unusual situation in the NPT process, and its practitioners have been exposed to the problem in the past. In themselves, unfulfilled promises are not necessarily a guarantee of dysfunctional or disruptive negotiation dynamics, especially when they could be counterbalanced by positive achievements, as the interim agreement on the Iranian nuclear program reached in 2013 (Meier, 2014). What, however, did make a difference at the 2015 RevCon was the increased focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW). The reference to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon detonation has already been included in the final outcome of the 2010 NPT RevCon. Yet, in 2010, the idea of the HINW was at the margins, whereas in the ninth NPT review cycle, the humanitarian discourse moved to the forefront, with potential to reframe the entire debate on nuclear disarmament. If the 2012 NPT PrepCom statement stressing the humanitarian dimension was backed by 16 states, during the 2015 RevCon the number of states supporting the humanitarian focus on nuclear weapons grew to 159, as exemplified by the statement delivered by Austria during the RevCon (Laggner, 2012; Kurz, 2015). According to Nielsen and Hanson (2014), there have been several reasons for the rise of the humanitarian focus in nuclear debates, the most important of which are the growing importance of human security in international politics more generally, as well as new scientific evidence about the likely environmental, agricultural and health impacts of nuclear weapon detonation.

The rise of the HINW had a significant impact on the NPT negotiation process, not only because it shifted the focus of the debate, but also in terms of altering the fundamental constellation of interests at the RevCon. By highlighting the HINW, its supporters aimed at re-energizing the disarmament process and channeling it towards more effective measures on the way to 'the global zero'. As the Austrian ambassador stated, 'the more the world understands about the global humanitarian consequences of

nuclear weapons, the stronger the case against them becomes' (Kmentt, 2013). Many NNWS, particularly those frustrated with the slow path of disarmament and the perceived injustice of the grand bargain, took it even further, linking the humanitarian dimension with the need to establish a legal ban on nuclear weapons. They argued that in light of the humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapon use, the abolition of nuclear weapons is a political and moral imperative (Fihn, 2015). In contrast, the P5 rejected any such radical moves, arguing that disarmament needs to be pursued in a step-by-step, incremental manner with a proper consideration of the existing global security environment (P5, 2015). Moreover, the NWS also criticized the humanitarian initiative as counter-productive and one that distracts the NPT community from realistic nuclear reductions. France, for example, asked to delete altogether the reference to the HINW in the RevCon draft documents on the grounds of its perceived little added value (Acheson, 2015). The unwillingness of both camps to compromise and to engage with each other's views contributed to 'a particularly difficult atmosphere, which [was] very prone to erratic behavior [...] There [were] clear fears that raising the temperature of the regime in this way will only highlight divisions and force states to pick sides' (Sliwon, 2015). This polarization of the negotiation process became symptomatic of a growing mistrust between the NWS and the NNWS with regards to their intentions behind promoting or rejecting the humanitarian debate. As Meier (2015) concluded, 'most nuclear weapon states and many states supporting the humanitarian initiative appear to have moved so far apart that both camps dispute the legitimacy of the other's perspective' (p. 5). The humanitarian initiative has therefore spotlighted a disagreement over the value and utility of nuclear weapons, a divide that due to its fundamentally normative nature is difficult, if not impossible, to bridge.

Table 6. The overview of external factors of EU effectiveness.

Factors Cases	ATT	NPT I	NPT II
Global distribution of power	Asymmetrical	Symmetrical	Symmetrical
Legal institutional setting	Exclusive, strict, unequal	Exclusive, strict, unequal	Exclusive, strict, unequal
International constellation of interests	Consensual	Consensual	Polarized

CHAPTER 6. ASSESSING EU EFFECTIVENESS IN MULTILATERAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

The main purpose of this chapter is an empirical analysis of the EU's effectiveness in multilateral ATT and NPT negotiations. The chapter will evaluate the EU's diplomatic performance in line with the three main attributes of EU effectiveness conceptualized in chapter 3: goal achievement, relevance and external cohesion. An empirical analysis along these three dimensions provides for a richer and more nuanced understanding of EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. It is shown that the different combination of values attached to goal achievement, relevance and external cohesion define a particular degree of EU effectiveness, which varies across the three case studies (see Table 10). An in-depth explanation with regards to why a particular level of EU effectiveness occurred in the selected cases is discussed in the following chapter.

6.1 ATT negotiations

6.1.1 Goal achievement

The EU was convinced that in order to have added value for and a positive impact on global security, the ATT had to be 'as strong as possible' (Interview 1, 2013). By adopting a maximalist approach to the emerging arms trade regime, the EU took a progressive stance on each of the contentious negotiation items. For example, with regard to the export control *criteria*, the EU wanted to make sure that decisions on arms transfers would be weighed against the risk of human rights abuses, gender-based violence and violation of international humanitarian law in the country of destination. Mirroring its own criteria in the EU Code of Conduct, the EU further maintained that the criteria for arms transfer authorization should reflect the risk to regional security and stability, the risk of diversion to unintended users, and the impact on sustainable development. Moreover, the EU has also suggested to include a reference to the risk of corruption in the ATT (Zimonyi, 2011).

Concerning the *scope* of the Treaty, the EU maintained that, in addition to existing types of arms enlisted in the UN Register of Conventional Arms¹⁴, it should incorporate small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and technology transfers. According to Brussels, in terms of activities the Treaty should not be limited to exports and imports only, but needed to include a broader set of matters, such as transit, transshipment and

¹⁴ The UN Register of Conventional Arms contains seven categories of weapons: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers.

brokering (Bauwens, 2010). Further, the EU suggested an *implementation* mechanism with the creation of an international secretariat and regular review conferences and a *transparency* scheme with public reporting on arms sales and information exchange between states (Giannella, 2011). Finally, the EU pledged to pursue the inclusion of a *regional integration organization* (RIO) clause, which would allow the EU and other regional organizations to become formal parties to the Treaty. The EU insisted on the clause due to its legal competences in the areas related to arms trade, and an eagerness to raise its profile within multilateral institutions.

With these goals in mind, the EU clearly belonged to the maximalists' camp – a group of negotiators that advocated ambitious criteria, scope and other parameters to ensure a meaningful ATT and its highest possible contribution to reducing global armed conflicts and violence. As one non-EU diplomat revealed, 'the EU as a whole was on a very progressive side, strongly defending the ATT with a complete scope and strong provisions' (Interview 27, 2014). However, one can claim that against a background of non-existing rules, it is relatively easy to appear on a progressive or ambitious side given such a low departure point. Yet there were states, such as China, India, Israel and Russia, that defended the status quo, questioning the rationale and feasibility of the ATT in the first place (Parker, 2007, p. 4). Moreover, initially many actors argued that the scope of the ATT should be restricted to the UN Register of Conventional Arms only, while the EU advocated for a broader scope, including SALW and ammunition (Interview 23, 2014). In terms of criteria for export, a majority of states, just as the EU, also shared the need to include human security parameters, but other EU suggestions – diversion, respect for UNSC Resolutions, gender-based violence – appeared to be much less popular (Parker, 2007, pp. 10–11). Thus, the EU clearly put forward ambitious negotiation goals in the ATT process.

The EU was largely successful in pursuing its negotiation objectives (see Table 7). First and foremost, it has managed to push for full incorporation of the principles related to the human security agenda. Article 7 of the ATT maintains that states should weigh their decisions on authorizing arms export to a certain country against the risks of human rights abuses, gender-based violence and violation of international humanitarian law. Moreover, Article 6 prohibits any arms sales if there is a risk of their being used for committing genocide or crimes against humanity. Other criteria, such as respect for international obligations, regional peace, stability and the fight against corruption, were also included in the Treaty text. The only export criterion that did not find a place in Article 6 or 7, but that is reflected in the Preamble of the document, is the principle of

sustainable development (United Nations, 2013a). The EU has thus managed to successfully ‘upload’ virtually all normative principles of its Code of Conduct to the ATT.

Table 7. The EU’s goal achievement on the key dimensions of the ATT.

Objective	Outcome	Reference in the ATT text
Export criteria	Achieved	Articles 6 and 7
Scope (weapons)	Partially achieved	Articles 2, 3 and 4
Scope (activities)	Achieved	Articles 7, 8, 9 and 10
Implementation	Achieved	Article 5
Transparency	Achieved	Article 13
RIO clause	Not achieved	-

The EU also has accomplished its objective regarding the scope of the Treaty, albeit less successfully. Small arms, ammunition and weapon components, apart from technology, were included in the ATT. Yet ammunition was not considered with regard to import, transit and brokering activities, something that the US strongly opposed (Interview 1, 2013). Further, provisions on implementation and transparency reflect EU demands. The ATT obliges states to put in force appropriate national control systems and report annually to the ATT Secretariat. States are also obliged to publish reports on the application of the Treaty and maintain an information exchange among themselves. To a great extent, these provisions also reflect the EU’s domestic export control mechanisms. The only point that was not achieved during the negotiations was the possibility for regional integration organizations (RIO) to become official parties to the Treaty. The RIO clause became ‘the biggest disappointment for the EU’, as it was blocked by China on the grounds of the EU’s active arms embargo against it (Interview 27, 2014). Chinese diplomats were not against the clause as such; they seemed to pick it up as a pretext for diplomatic bargaining in an attempt to pressure the EU to remove the 24-years-old ban (Interview 1, 2013). Nevertheless, as one diplomat claimed, ‘the ATT was a case where the EU got the most compared to other UN treaties [...] It is not that the glass is half full, half empty – its 90 percent full’ (Interview 21, 2014). Given the outcomes outlined above and the progressive character of EU objectives, the level of the EU’s goal attainment is assessed as *high*.

6.1.2 Relevance

Apart from successfully shaping the outcome of the ATT negotiations, the EU also had an effect on the way the negotiated agreement was achieved. The EU's relevance in the ATT negotiation process has been demonstrated through the implementation of the two Council Decisions adopted in support of the emerging ATT. In the run-up to the UN conferences in 2012 and 2013, the EU dispatched 2.3 million euros of financial assistance to organize a series of outreach activities to promote and foster the ongoing debate on the ATT (Council of the EU, 2009; Council of the EU, 2010c). In a partnership with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the EU organized 13 regional seminars in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and Europe, inviting local policy makers, civil society, industry and the public. The seminars aimed at raising awareness about ongoing ATT negotiations, promoting the exchange of views among the interested actors and sharing expertise on arms export control mechanisms. During the project launching event in Geneva, the EU's Special Representative for WMD non-proliferation, Annalisa Giannella, explained the EU's motivation to promote the idea of an ATT among a wide set of stakeholders, with a conviction that it was necessary for the ATT process to be as inclusive as possible (UNIDIR, 2009a).

Aimed at advancing the intensity and inclusiveness of the negotiation process, the EU's initiative appeared to hit fertile ground. There has been a degree of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge about the changing nature of arms trade in times of globalization and the (in)adequacy of existing instruments of arms transfer control (Cooper, 2006; Parker, 2008, p. 9). The need for continuous awareness-raising and information-sharing about the Treaty and its implications also has been acknowledged as an important outcome of the first regional seminar, which took place in Dakar (UNIDIR, 2009b). In the end, the seminars helped to raise the level of participation in the negotiations, especially among the vast majority of countries that are neither major exporters, nor major importers, and which 'otherwise would have felt that [the ATT] is not about them' (Interview 1, 2013). The seminars also occasionally offered a forum for pre-negotiation that, coupled with their awareness-raising function, helped to drive the ATT process forward (Interview 28, 2014). One diplomat claimed that the EU's initiative was useful in terms of focusing and streamlining the negotiation process, arguing that 'without the EU it would have been difficult to prepare [its] agenda' (Interview 23, 2014). By supporting the ATT process through a series of outreach activities, the EU acted to advance the collective interest in moving the negotiation process forward.

While the EU's initiative has been welcomed by many and even praised by Roberto García Moritán, the chairperson of the diplomatic forum (UNIDIR, 2010, p. 1), some questioned the EU's altruism and motives behind the outreach project. Depauw (2012), for example, assumed that the EU was attempting to purposefully impose its individual agenda on participants: '[T]he EU Common Position on arms exports was often used in seminars, which may feed the idea that the EU is promoting its own Common Position rather than an ATT' (p. 10). This assumption is linked to a bigger concern raised by some parties that the ATT negotiations have been excessively dominated by the interests, concerns and practices promoted by arms exporters, allegedly transforming the emerging ATT into an agreement of the exporters' club. Holtom and Bromley (2011), for instance, warned about 'a danger that the Southern states that have played a key role in pushing the ATT forward could lose interest in the drafting process as well as in implementing any treaty that is eventually adopted'. Indeed, countries like India, Pakistan and Indonesia have repeatedly complained about the discriminatory nature of the negotiations, criticizing the ATT as a Western product that primarily favors arms exporters (United Nations, 2013b). As one NGO interviewee commented, 'the weakest point of the Treaty – and probably of the negotiations – has been that it hasn't really made it clear what are the advantages for importers to enter it' (Interview 4, 2014). From this perspective, the EU and its member states have not made enough efforts to accommodate the voices of dissent and bring the major importers on board, opting instead for sidelining their concerns. Given this mixed record of both promoting the common interest in establishing the ATT and hindering the collective ownership of the Treaty by alienating specific groups of actors, the EU's relevance in the negotiation process is conceived as *medium*.

6.1.3 External cohesion

There was a considerable level of external cohesion among EU actors during the final UN conferences in July 2012 and March 2013. Seven EU member states took the floor during the opening session of the ATT conference on 18 March 2013 (United Nations, 2013c). In their statements, all seven countries mentioned as their priority the inclusion of provisions related to humanitarian parameters, SALW, ammunition, implementation and transparency mechanisms, and the RIO clause. The content of the member states' messages largely resembled the one delivered by the EU (Mayr-Harting, 2012). Similarly, on the first plenary day of the 2012 UN conference, nine EU member states practically 'sang the same tune' while delivering their statements (United Nations,

2012a). Even earlier, responding to the Secretary-General's call to participants to share views in the lead-up to the July conference, twelve member states sent their contributions, and all but three explicitly endorsed the EU's submission (United Nations, 2012b). Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom did not refer to the EU directly, but content-wise pushed for the same language and messages as expressed in the EU's contribution. One diplomat from a non-EU country thus pointed out that 'as a group, the EU was the most influential with a common position and one voice' (Interview 27, 2014).

In terms of diplomatic activities, the EU relied extensively on delivering statements, reacting to proposals and suggesting amendments. During the 2012 UN conference, the EU delivered statements during the plenary debate and the committee discussions and proposed amendments to the Chair's draft Treaty, intervening on average almost every second day. The EU also has been very active and extremely vocal during the 2013 conference (Interview 21, 2014). As a matter of fact, this pattern of high visibility was inherited from the EU's earlier participation in the four sessions of the PrepComs in 2010-2012, in which at least 18 interventions in total were made on behalf of the EU. Hence, the EU appeared as the primary collective channel of influence for its member states, in addition to their national means. What is more, some EU member states' delegations deliberately refrained from 'taking a national stance for the sake of investing into European one' (Interview 1, 2013). Especially for small EU member states with limited diplomatic resources, endorsing the EU's collective action in multilateral institutions can bring added value for their national foreign policies.

Yet several reservations about the degree of external cohesion shall be revealed. First, despite widespread backing of the EU-oriented RIO clause in the text of the ATT, there was one country – the UK – which in March 2013, neither endorsed the RIO clause, nor aligned its statement with that of the EU.¹⁵ The UK holds a particular view on the CFSP, questioning the legitimacy of EEAS diplomats to represent the EU externally. Second, one specific difference in the positions of the member states was found in the statements of Germany and France. While the former explicitly rejected introducing exceptions to the Treaty's scope, like the one related to bilateral defense cooperation agreements acutely promoted by India, the latter backed this provision on the basis of the right to self-defense. Paris' support of the major loophole in the ATT was perceived as a surprising about-face in light of the agreed collective position on the Treaty's scope and

¹⁵ An overview of the EU member states' statements, as well as positions of other negotiators, can be found at the web-page of the UN, www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/att/2013-conference/2013-att-statements/; or, alternatively, at the web-page of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/att>.

implementation (Interview 23, 2014). The UK's and France's deviations, however, did not spoil the overall picture of the EU's moderately *high* external cohesion, as both states remained consistent with other EU actors on the remaining issues.

6.2 NPT I negotiations

6.2.1 Goal achievement

The EU revealed its negotiation objectives for the 2010 NPT Review Conference in its detailed and comprehensive common position adopted one month before the start of the RevCon in the form of Council Decision (Council of the EU, 2010b). While outlining its general interest in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime along with the commitment to promote a successful outcome of the RevCon, the EU singled out seven priority areas for its diplomatic conduct:

- (1) a reaffirmation by all States Parties of their commitment to the NPT;
- (2) strengthening the implementation of the NPT through the adoption of concrete, pragmatic and consensual measures on all three pillars;
- (3) reaffirming the commitment to nuclear arms control and disarmament, particularly through an overall reduction of nuclear arms, ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and starting negotiations on a treaty banning fissile material for nuclear weapons (FMCT);
- (4) strengthening the IAEA's comprehensive safeguard arrangements with the Additional Protocol as a verification standard;
- (5) strengthening the NPT through a common understanding of how to respond to withdrawal;
- (6) upholding the NPT with a common understanding of how to respond resolutely and effectively to cases of non-compliance, such as those of Iran and North Korea;
- (7) broadening acceptance and support for responsible and peaceful use of nuclear energy through the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle.

These priorities were embedded into a broader set of 56 specific aims covering all three NPT pillars, the WMD-free zone in the Middle East and other issues related to the functioning of the NPT. On disarmament, in addition to the abovementioned proposals on the CTBT and FMCT, the EU sought to include non-strategic nuclear weapons into the disarmament action plan, and suggested to close the facilities that produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. On non-proliferation, proposals on withdrawal, non-compliance and the Additional Protocol were characterized as the EU's most important preferences in the RevCon (Interview 25, 2013). Furthermore, the EU also put forward

specific ideas on measures to prevent nuclear terrorism, to strengthen export controls and to enforce compliance with the NPT obligations. Regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy and elaborating further its central idea of promoting multilateral nuclear fuel cycle, the EU highlighted the initiative of a Low Enriched Uranium Bank under the control of the IAEA. Finally, the EU called for concrete practical steps in establishing the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, acknowledging special responsibility of the NWS in this task.

Taken as a whole, the EU's negotiation objectives hardly share a high level of ambition. Within the disarmament basket, many of the action points were either backward-looking (e.g., 'reaffirming' existing security assurances, the commitment to the Conference on Disarmament, seeking conditions for a world without nuclear weapons) or uncontroversial (e.g., CTBT). With the exception of the proposal to ban production facilities of fissile material, the EU did not put forward any bold steps for disarmament that would allow to speak of a significant departure from the status quo. As Müller (2010) put it, 'with its minimalist stance on disarmament, the EU had difficulty in impressing anyone' (p. 11). Regarding peaceful uses, only the part related to the multilateral fuel arrangements contained ambitious language, while the rest of the section merely reiterated the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. By the same token, the EU's Middle East objectives were condensed to just two action points, without any specific details beyond a general commitment to the WMD-free zone. The only part of the EU's common position that did include more far-reaching elements than others was the non-proliferation pillar. In this area, the EU provided the most visible, elaborated and concrete input that promised to considerably strengthen the international non-proliferation toolbox (Interview 29, 2014). Overall, however, the EU's negotiation objectives were characterized by a conservative flavor.

Table 8. The EU's goal achievement in the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

NPT pillar	Outcome	Reference in the outcome document	Goal achievement
Disarmament (19 action points)	11 achieved 2 partially achieved 6 not achieved	Actions 1-22	Medium
Non-proliferation (21 action points)	6 achieved 1 partially achieved 14 not achieved	Actions 23-46	Low

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy (8 action points)	3 achieved 2 partially achieved 3 not achieved	Actions 47-64	Medium
The Middle East (2 action points)	2 achieved	Part IV of the Conclusions and Recommendations	High

A comparison between the EU's Council Decision and the final outcome document reveals a moderate level of congruence between them. On one hand, the EU has clearly achieved the first three priorities of its common position: first, state parties reaffirmed their commitments to the NPT through reaching consensus on the RevCon's outcome; second, the NPT was strengthened by a consensus Action Plan consisting of 64 points that covered all NPT pillars and the issue of the WMD-free zone in the Middle East; third, the CTBT and FMCT were covered by sections D and E of the Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions (Final Document, 2010, pp. 22–23). On the other hand, the other four priorities, much more ambitious in character, largely fell by the wayside. The Additional Protocol to the IAEA's comprehensive safeguard agreements was recognized as a voluntary instrument only. Moreover, the RevCon's Action Plan has no reference to the problem of withdrawal from the NPT, not even mentioning any concrete follow-on actions with this regard (Ibid., pp. 25-27). The EU's proposals to strengthen compliance with the NPT obligations by empowering the IAEA's oversight and to endorse the multilateral fuel cycle arrangements also did not find their way to the consensus final document.

This mixed picture of the EU's goal attainment does not change significantly when one looks into the approximation between the EU's detailed action points and the RevCon's Action Plan. As Table 8 demonstrates, the EU appeared to be moderately successful in promoting its disarmament language and proposals regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy: 13 and 5 action points from the respective sections of the EU's common position partially or fully landed in the outcome document. In contrast, the EU was less successful on the non-proliferation side, with only 7 out of 21 specific aims somehow reflected in the RevCon's Action Plan. It is important to point out that most of the EU's achievements related to disarmament, peaceful uses and the WMD-free zone in the Middle East were drawn on the lowest common denominator language, and the respective sections of outcome document have advanced beyond them (Interview 7, 2014). In the non-proliferation area, on the contrary, the EU did not manage to push through its more ambitious proposals and initiatives. Therefore, the medium congruence

between the EU's negotiation goals and the outcome agreement is discounted against the overall conservative character of its goals, resulting in a *low* score of the EU's goal achievement.

6.2.2 *Relevance*

The EU's effectiveness in the 2010 NPT RevCon was arguably more evident when it comes to the way it affected the negotiation process. At the core of the EU's relevance in the NPT review negotiations is the Union's long-standing concern with maintaining balance between the three pillars in all NPT proceedings as an ultimate guarantee of the Treaty's strength and viability as a collective security instrument. This conviction is deeply rooted in the EU's multilateralist identity, or its belief in the inherent advantages of multilateral cooperation over power politics or unilateral methods when it comes to the provision of international security (Dee, 2015a, p. 83). Ensuring the balance between the three NPT pillars in the RevCon outcome document was viewed by EU diplomats as a concern 'overriding' individual ambitions and a necessary measure to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime in the context of deep fissures between its participants (Interviews 7 and 29, 2014). In practical terms, this standing implied the EU's willingness to guide and assist other participants throughout the negotiation process in reaching a point of consensual agreement.

Successfully navigating the process and managing relationships between negotiators required the EU to play one or several meaningful roles capable of producing collective benefits. The EU therefore attempted to play a moderator role in the discussions on the Middle East WMD-free zone, building bridges between the US and the Arab states. Because the EU is regarded as a neutral party in the Middle East peace process, it proposed – together with Ireland as a designated chair of the debate – compromise language formulations that could satisfy both the NAM and P5 (Interviews 9 and 30, 2014). Moreover, the EU offered its diplomatic machinery to host a first meeting of parties on the way to the 2012 Middle East conference. Although the idea to host an EU seminar on the Middle East WMD-free zone was originally not included in the EU's common position, it was welcomed by the main stakeholders and included in the final text (Final Document, 2010, p. 30; Interview 42, 2014). As a key EU diplomat summarized the rationale behind the EU's involvement, 'our aim was to achieve compromises that would guarantee success to the [Review] Conference' (Interview 7, 2014). Without the agreement on the Middle East, there likely would have been no consensus found on the entire outcome of the RevCon (Dhanapala, 2010).

Apart from bridge building and consensus seeking, the EU also acted as an information transmission belt (Dee, 2012). EU representatives, along with the UK, France and Germany, were invited to attend a group of core negotiators during the final week of the RevCon to finalize the agreement on the forward-looking Action Plan. Also, here ‘the EU showed its mettle as negotiator and bridge-builder, [even though] only 14 other delegations [...] witnessed that performance’ (Müller, 2010, p. 12). More interestingly, another responsibility of the EU lay in keeping the rest of its members informed about the closed-door negotiations, and in ensuring their willingness to support the outcome of the talks (Interview 6, 2014). If the EU had not been involved, some vocal member states excluded from the informal gathering, such as Austria and Ireland, might not have found it comfortable to depend on information released by individual EU member states that participated in the group in their national capacity.

The EU effectively contributed to navigating the negotiation process towards a balanced outcome and, by doing so, demonstrated the feasibility of a multilateral approach to the NPT as a collective security mechanism. Both EU and non-EU diplomats acknowledged the ‘constructive’ and ‘stabilizing’ role played by the EU emphasizing that, without the EU’s participation, the negotiation process would have likely featured stronger divisions between the NWS and NNWS, as well as amongst the EU’s own member states (Interviews 25; 29; 30; 31, 2014). In the NPT context, trust and broad ownership, as the principal collective goods needed for an effective non-proliferation regime, are in regular short supply (Ruzicka and Wheeler, 2010), hence the EU’s diplomatic investment in these areas was *highly* relevant for the negotiation process during the 2010 RevCon.

6.2.3 *External cohesion*

EU actors demonstrated a considerable level of discipline in following the common line during the 2010 NPT RevCon. The comparison of statements delivered by the EU representatives and the diplomats of EU member states demonstrates a high level of compatibility between them. Those EU member states that spoke during the general debate endorsed the message delivered for the first time in the NPT context by the EU High Representative.¹⁶ Further, they pursued the EU’s main priorities as agreed upon in the common position: CTBT and FMCT in the disarmament pillar, the IAEA’s Additional

¹⁶ An overview of the EU member states’ statements, as well as positions of other negotiators, can be found at the web-page of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/>; or, alternatively, at the web-page of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, <http://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2010>.

Protocol in the non-proliferation field and the multilateral fuel cycle arrangements in the area of peaceful uses. A similar pattern of cohesion also was visible in the Main Committees' discussions in which EU statements were delivered by the Spanish Presidency. 'Delegations waited for the Presidency to speak and briefly supported what the Spanish delegate said. National positions were rarely uttered' (Müller, 2010, p. 12).

The absence of meaningful contradictions on the floor between the EU and its member states can be interpreted through two interrelated perspectives. First, as the EU's common position was largely based on the least common denominator, there naturally were issues that due to a lack of consensus between member states did not enter the document. It was a prerogative of member states then building upon the common position to go beyond it and cover more far-reaching elements in their national statements (Interview 6, 2014). For example, Austria proposed a Nuclear Weapons Convention with a verification mechanism in line with the EU's general call for effective disarmament measures. It also suggested strong and more concrete proposals for the support of civil society that went beyond the EU common position's minimalistic language (Spindelegger, 2010). Further, Belgium, in line with the EU's vocal bid for the universalization of the NPT, explicitly asked India, Pakistan and Israel to join the Treaty, although the EU's common position and its general statement avoided naming-and-shaming practices regarding these non-signatories (Bauwens, 2010). Also, Hungary provided an extensive input on the NSG and Zangger Committee in the committee debates, which went beyond what the EU was prepared to say on export controls (Zanathy, 2010). As one diplomat commented on this aspect of EU external cohesion, 'it is a fact of life that [member] states have their own views which go beyond which was possibly to agree' (Interview 6, 2014).

Second, the EU's common position covered a broad range of issues as a reflection of the complex agenda of the NPT review negotiations and a compromise between its members. Individual member states, obviously, did not weigh all issues equally, prioritizing some more than the others in line with their specific national interests. For instance, ending the manufacturing of fissile material and dismantling the production sites was one of the EU's aims that was clearly picked up by France during the negotiations (Danon, 2010). Germany was the main driving force behind inserting into the EU's common position the language on the need for withdrawal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe and pursued it, alongside the Netherlands, in the negotiations (Hoyer, 2010; Verhagen, 2010). Italy, in contrast, despite hosting this type of weapon on their territory, did not push for their inclusion in the disarmament process, mentioning

instead the necessity to prevent a nuclear weapon race in space (Manfredi, 2010). Although such cherry-picking tendencies among member states made the EU common position seem as a ‘Christmas tree’ or a *la carte* menu, it did not necessarily jeopardize the EU’s collective stance (Interviews 32 and 33, 2014). On the contrary, this differentiated specialization or division of labor among member states multiplied the EU’s messages in different negotiation committees.

In terms of an ability to act collectively during the RevCon, the EU’s record is somewhat mixed. On one hand, the EU was quite a visible actor by way of delivering statements in all the Main Committees and reacting to the Chairman’s draft proposals (Interview 6, 2014). The EU also submitted four working papers including on the CTBT, strengthening the IAEA, nuclear safety cooperation and organized a side event to promote its common position among NGOs.¹⁷ As one influential observer put it, ‘there was more written EU input into the conference proceedings than ever before’ (Müller, 2010, p. 11). Many member states were willing to channel themselves through the EU, as the EU’s voice was an amplifier through which they could punch above their weight in the high-level security negotiations (Interview 8, 2014). On the other hand, EU member states’ participation in different informal political groupings, such as the NAC, P5 and Vienna Group, demonstrated limitations of the EU’s collective action. This has been a problem in the past (Müller and Van Dassen, 1997, p. 66) and remained a source of concern also in the 2010 RevCon. According to several diplomats, member states’ participation in various NPT coalitions prompts them to develop a commitment to positions and texts oftentimes incompatible with the EU’s collective stance, and therefore contributes to divisions within the EU (Interviews 34 and 21, 2014). In particular, the NAC, of which Sweden and Ireland were members, submitted a working paper pushing for immediate disarmament measures that appeared to be at odds with the gradual disarmament process advocated by the EU’s common position (NPT, 2010). It must be noted, however, that some interviewees also highlighted a positive role played by the informal groupings as a source of information and knowledge for the EU and its member states (Interviews 6 and 35, 2014). Taking into account the scores of the two indicators – single voice and joint diplomatic acts – the EU’s external cohesion in the 2010 NPT RevCon is assessed as moderately *high*.

¹⁷ Working papers of the EU and other participants can be found at the web-page of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/>.

6.3 NPT II negotiations

6.3.1 Goal achievement

The EU laid down its objectives for the 2015 NPT Review Conference in the Council Conclusions adopted by member states in April 2015 (Council of the EU, 2015). In comparison to the 2010 Council Decision, which outlined the EU's priorities and aims for the previous NPT RevCon, the Council Conclusions were shorter and less elaborate, arguably driven by the need to focus only on the core NPT issues (Interview 10, 2015). Apart from declaring 'unwavering' support for the NPT as a key international security instrument and upholding the plea for its universalization, the EU traditionally elaborated its stance on the three NPT pillars. On the first pillar, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament, welcomed the weapons' reductions undertaken so far and called upon the NWS to further cut their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. The other EU priorities in this area contained familiar suggestions on the need for the CTBT, FMCT and revitalization of the Conference of Disarmament. On the most contentious part of the NPT agenda related to the impact of nuclear weapons, the EU barely noted 'the severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use' acknowledging that 'different views are being expressed' among its member states (Council of the EU, 2015, p. 4). On non-proliferation, the EU foremost praised the central role of the IAEA's safeguards system as a fundamental component of the effective non-proliferation regime, and highlighted the primary responsibility of the UNSC in dealing with non-compliance situations. The Council Conclusions also contained specific language on North Korea, Syria and Iran, condemning the non-compliance with the NPT obligations of the first two and welcoming the progress on the Iranian nuclear case. On peaceful uses, the EU raised its concerns about nuclear security and safety, highlighting the important contributions of the IAEA and multilateral Nuclear Security Summits. Finally, on the informal fourth pillar, the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to the prospective zone, and urged the relevant parties to get back on track with organizing the Conference, envisaged by the outcome of the 2010 NPT RevCon (Council of the EU, 2015).

The EU's objectives at the 2015 NPT RevCon appeared to be considerably unambitious, even against the benchmark of the EU's common position at the previous RevCon. The EU's position on nuclear disarmament represented much of the same way the disarmament process has been pursued so far: a gradual, step-by-step process, at the core of which is a reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles. The EU essentially rolled over its stance on the CTBT, FMCT and CD, without adding new input. On the issue that

proved to be detrimental to the process and outcome of the negotiations – the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons – the EU was unable to formulate a clear position with its member states, basically agreeing to disagree. Regarding peaceful uses and the Middle East, the majority of the EU’s proposals were either backward-looking or uncontroversial, with the exception of the reference to high-level Nuclear Security Summits, one of which was hosted by the Netherlands in 2014. Most of the EU’s far-reaching proposals, including many in the area of non-proliferation, for which the EU advocated in 2010 – the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, the issue of withdrawal and multilateral fuel cycle arrangements – did not find their way to the Council Conclusions. Devoid of forward-looking elements and weak on substance, the EU’s common position thus represented the lowest common denominator, which did not depart far from the existing state of NPT affairs (Interviews 12 and 16, 2015).

Table 9. The EU’s goal achievement in the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

NPT pillar	Outcome	Reference in the draft outcome document	Goal achievement
Disarmament (6 items)	3 achieved 2 partially achieved 1 not achieved	Para. 123-154	Medium
Non-proliferation (4 items)	1 achieved 1 partially achieved 2 not achieved	Para. 10-55	Low
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy (5 items)	2 achieved 1 partially achieved 2 not achieved	Para. 56-122	Medium
The Middle East (1 item)	N/A	Para. 164-172	N/A

The 2015 NPT RevCon did not reach an agreement on the final document, and this complicated the measurement of the EU’s goal achievement in this negotiation set. Given the absence of an agreed outcome against which the EU’s objectives can be compared and contrasted, it is obviously difficult to determine the magnitude of the EU’s effect on the negotiated text. What offers a solution is a focus on the latest version of the provisional final document (NPT, 2015) released by the RevCon chair just a day before the US, the UK and Canada broke the consensus over the proposal on the WMD-free zone in the Middle East (Rauf, 2015). It is plausible to assume that, with the exception of the

Middle East provisions, the rest of the text at this stage represented a mutually acceptable compromise, and this provides a good illustration of how the potential final agreement could have been had it not been rejected on the last day of the RevCon.¹⁸

A comparison between the EU's Council Conclusions and the RevCon's draft final document reveals a low-to-moderate level of congruence, generally akin to the pattern observed in 2010. As Table 9 demonstrates, the EU again was moderately successful in deploying its disarmament and nuclear safety language in the negotiated text. In contrast, only one of the four items on the EU's wish-list for the non-proliferation pillar ended up fully in the draft final document. Although the EU's Council Conclusions also contained a point regarding the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, it is left out of the analysis, as RevCon participants did not reach a consensus over the respective part in the draft final document. Similar to the assessment of the EU's goal attainment in the 2010 NPT RevCon, the low-to-medium congruence level between the EU's negotiation goals and the draft outcome agreement is discounted against the largely status quo-oriented character of its goals, resulting in a *low* score for the EU's goal achievement.

6.3.2 *Relevance*

The EU's effect on the negotiation process that unfolded during the 2015 NPT RevCon appears to be insignificant. In contrast to the 2010 NPT RevCon, in which the EU successfully contributed to navigating negotiations to a consensus point and helped to preserve a delicate balance of interests, the EU's relevance in the following NPT review cycle was considerably limited. This is not to say that the EU has shifted away from its long-standing position as a champion of the NPT and, by extension, belief in multilateral diplomacy and international institutions. On the contrary, days before the RevCon, EU policy makers reasserted their 'unwavering support for all three pillars of the Treaty and reminded that the EU is 'one of the most important contributors to the strengthening of the Treaty' (Council of the EU, 2015, pp. 2 and 7). However, there is little evidence to suggest that in the given set of negotiations, the EU indeed managed to invest a sufficient amount of diplomatic capital and resources convertible into collective goods that benefit international community.

¹⁸ Some observers, such as Mukhatzhanova (2015) and Potter (2016), argue that if it had not been for the Middle East, the RevCon outcome document would have been blocked by a group of NNWS due to their discontent with the disarmament sections of the draft. As these concerns were not raised during the concluding session of the RevCon as a sufficient ground for blocking consensus, it is assumed here that the RevCon did not reach an agreement because of the contested text on the Middle East WMD-free zone.

First, unlike in 2010, the EU did not decide to submit its common position as a working paper to the RevCon proceedings. By not articulating its common position in this way among negotiators, the EU arguably has missed a convenient opportunity to demonstrate to the outside world how the balance between different NPT pillars can be preserved and, consequently, what shape the compromise between the NWS and NNWS can take. Importantly, some EU member states' diplomats still maintained that once the EU reached an agreement internally, this could have a positive spillover effect for NPT negotiations at large, hence reiterating the vision of the EU as a source for good for the non-proliferation regime in principle (Interviews 15 and 17, 2015). At the same time, however, the interviewees accepted that in the context of the 2015 NPT RevCon, the EU's bridge-building role was limited. Even though the EU reached an internal agreement in the form of the Council Conclusions, the fact that the document had no elaborate language on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons' use – the most contentious issue during the RevCon negotiations – fed the conviction that the EU had nothing to offer to ensure the success of the negotiation process (Interview 19, 2015).

Second, the EU was not invited to the final week's 'friends of the chair' negotiation group, convened by the RevCon's President Taous Ferroukhi (Rauf, 2015). In 2010, this kind of informal negotiation appeared to be critical for finding a compromise on controversial parts of the text, as well as a crucial venue for the EU's bridge-building activities. Five years later, however, the EU was deprived of the possibility to supply the discussions with its middle ground, compromise language, and therefore to influence the negotiation process at the point when the RevCon reached its momentum. The EU's inability to ease tension and restore trust between the P5 and NNWS on how to proceed with disarmament and the Middle East WMD-free zone – 'constructive' and 'stabilizing' role, for which the EU is usually praised in the NPT context (Interviews 25 and 29, 2014), – was also recognized by external observers (Berger, 2015).

Third, the EU appeared to be less forthcoming during the 2015 NPT negotiations in comparison to the previous RevCon. The EU's top diplomat in the field, Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Jacek Bylica, was present only during the first and the final week of the RevCon, delegating the task of representing the EU in-between to lower ranked or less knowledgeable EEAS diplomats. This has likely contributed to the situation, as described by a non-EU interviewee, that third countries diplomats had difficulty in identifying and reaching out to their EU counterparts during the negotiations (Interview 22, 2015). In sum, if the 2015 NPT RevCon had gone off and proceeded in the

absence of the EU, it would have likely had little impact on the process of negotiations, highlighting the EU's *low* score in relevance to this negotiation case.

6.3.3 External cohesion

With a clear underperformance in terms of goal achievement and relevance, the EU's effectiveness in the 2015 NPT Review Conference appeared to be scaled down to the basic dimension related to EU external cohesion. Yet even here, the EU's record was not particularly remarkable. When it came to the ability to act collectively, the mixed pattern observed in the previous RevCon held. On one hand, the EU submitted three agreed upon working papers on nuclear safety, non-proliferation safeguards and the application of the CTBT, in addition to the three statements delivered in the NPT Main Committees. Apart from written input, the EU also organized two side-events at the margins of the RevCon, promoting The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and its own global role in nuclear safety and security.¹⁹ These are the best examples of the EU's diplomatic initiatives and activities endorsed by member states. On the other hand, the EU was less active in reacting to the draft proposals circulated within the RevCon bodies. One notable exception was Latvia's intervention in the Subsidiary Body II on the Middle East WMD-free zone, carried out on behalf of the EU, in its capacity of the rotating Council Presidency (Interview 10, 2015). Moreover, EU member states continued to actively participate in the issue-based groupings and coalitions, with some negative implications for EU external cohesion. The ninth NPT review cycle featured the rise of a new cross-regional grouping, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), of which Germany, the Netherlands and Poland became members. Co-founded by Australia and Japan, the grouping aimed at working across all NPT pillars and building bridges between the NWS and NNWS, a middle-ground niche that has been claimed by the EU on multiple occasions (Mukhatzhanova and Potter, 2015; Koenders, 2015). The Vienna Group, the majority of which are EU member states, submitted a working paper on withdrawal from the NPT, although this topic had been considered to be the EU's hobbyhorse in the past (Mathews, 2015). EU member states' participation in NPT groupings and coalitions showed the limitations of EU collective action and willingness to focus on priorities other than the EU agenda (Smetana, 2016). As one member state diplomat commented, there was 'less appetite for joint actions' at the 2015 RevCon than before (Interview 20, 2015).

¹⁹ Working papers of the EU and other participants can be found at the web-page of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/>.

The mixed record of the EU's joint diplomatic activities during the NPT negotiations is a continuation of a pattern that also was observed in the previous case study. However, how the 2015 RevCon differs from its previous counterpart in the context of EU external cohesion is the Union's weaker single voice. To a great extent, EU actors did follow a common line in their statements, especially when it came to the second and third pillars of the NPT.²⁰ All 26 EU member states, except for the Netherlands and the UK, which took the floor during the general debate, explicitly endorsed the EU's statement delivered by High Representative Federica Mogherini. Further comparison between the statements of EU actors at the plenary and committee debates reveals a significant degree of match and complementarity. Again, the logic was familiar: member states were either building upon agreed EU language in an attempt to take it further, as the UK did on the importance of P5 meetings (Pollard, 2015) or Germany on negative security assurances (Biontino, 2015) during the exchanges in the Main Committee I; or they were cherry-picking from EU common position specific issues without necessarily promoting others – Italy's stance on non-proliferation education (Della Vedova, 2015), France's endorsement of non-proliferation research and training (Journès, 2015), or Belgium's promotion of civilian nuclear energy, are cases in point (Frankinet, 2015).

This positive dynamic notwithstanding, EU member states have displayed serious discord over the debates on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in the disarmament fora of the RevCon. The disagreement on the subject already has been admitted in the EU Council Conclusions, and the member states' disputing positions did not appear to be reconciled during the EU coordination meetings at the RevCon. There were two lines of contestation regarding the HINW in the member states' statements on the floor. First, member states disagreed whether the humanitarian discourse, which grew rapidly during the last NPT review cycle, highlighted previously unknown evidence regarding the devastating consequences of nuclear weapon detonation. While the UK Minister did not admit any novelty about these concerns (Anelay, 2015), the Irish counterpart highlighted the three international conferences on the HINW held in Norway, Mexico and Austria, which arguably showed 'that the risks of a nuclear detonation are greater than we realised' (Flanagan, 2015, p. 3). Furthermore, Austria and France engaged in public wrestling on the issue of nuclear risks during the second week RevCon debates

²⁰ An overview of the EU member states' statements, as well as the positions of other negotiators, can be found at the web-page of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/>; or, alternatively, at the web-page of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, <http://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2015>.

held in the disarmament committee, further exposing the EU's disunity on the topic (Observation Notes 1, 2015).

Second, EU actors stopped short of developing a common line regarding the link between the humanitarian dimension and the pace and scale of the disarmament process. Austria delivered a statement on behalf of 159 NPT members, outlining in detail the HINW, and signaling readiness to engage into negotiations to ban nuclear weapons (Kurz, 2015). An alternative approach was outlined by Australia, with 25 other states that did recognize the humanitarian dimension, but nevertheless stressed the importance of a gradual disarmament process and dialogue with the P5 (Bird, 2015). Importantly, the two initiatives manifested a division within the majority of EU member states that are neither NWS, nor active pro-disarmament advocates: Sweden and Denmark (in addition to Ireland) joined the Austria-led statement, while the rest followed Australia with Finland, signing up for both positions. The mixed record with which the EU spoke with a single voice in addition to a mediocre level of joint diplomatic activities allows to estimate the EU's external cohesion at the 2015 NPT RevCon as *medium*, at best.

Table 10. EU effectiveness and its dimensions across the three case studies.

Cases EU effectiveness	Goal achievement	Relevance	External cohesion	Assessment
ATT	+	+/-	+	High
NPT I	-	+	+	Medium
NPT II	-	-	+/-	Low

6.4 Summarizing the findings

The EU's effectiveness in the three selected cases of multilateral arms negotiations varied considerably (see Table 10). In the ATT negotiations, the EU was very successful in shaping the parameters and provisions of the outcome document in line with its ambitious negotiation objectives. By the same token, the EU managed to maintain a high level of external cohesion among its member states. The Union, however, was less effective when it came to its relevance in the negotiation process. Judged by the standard of enhancing collective benefits, the EU's relevance was mixed: it contributed to the

overall inclusiveness of the ATT negotiations, simultaneously silencing a group of significant arms-importing states. Given the particular combination of values across different dimensions of effectiveness, the EU's performance in the ATT negotiations represents an imperfect type of *outcome effectiveness*, falling just short of full or maximum effectiveness by a margin of its unfulfilled relevance. On a cross-case level, this record can be assessed as *high* effectiveness, taking into account the differential weights of the main concept's attributes, explained in the Chapter 3 (3 [goal achievement] + 1 [relevance] + 1 [external cohesion] = 5).

In the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the EU showed a different pattern of effectiveness. In this negotiation, setting the EU was highly relevant in terms of building bridges and seeking consensus among negotiation participants, and therefore shaping the way the negotiated agreement was achieved. In contrast, the EU's record in attaining the declared negotiation goals crumbled, especially given that the objectives the EU put forward were largely unambitious. Overall, EU actors maintained a high level of external cohesion, even though the degree to which the member states channeled themselves through the EU in these negotiations appeared to be weaker than in the case of the ATT. This combination of values across different attributes of EU effectiveness allows to place the EU's performance in the 2010 NPT RevCon into the category of *process effectiveness*. Because of the low goal achievement score, the empirical weight of which is considered higher than that of relevance, the EU's record in this set of the NPT negotiations is conceived as *medium* effectiveness on a cross-case dimension (0 [goal achievement] + 2 [relevance] + 1 [external cohesion] = 3).

The case of 2015 NPT Review Conference differs from the previous two. In this set of multilateral negotiations, the EU was neither successful in shaping the draft outcome document, nor was it able to significantly influence the negotiation process. Unlike the previous NPT RevCon, the EU's low record in achieving its declared objectives was coupled with its low relevance, as the EU did not appear to be in a position to invest in common goods and benefits necessary for strengthening the NPT regime. What is more, the EU's diplomatic performance in the 2015 NPT RevCon uncovered problems with its own external cohesion, thus even challenging the basic dimension of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations. EU member states were half-heartedly joining the ranks under the EU banner to launch diplomatic initiatives during the RevCon. And even though EU actors managed to follow a common line on non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, there were serious problems with projecting the united stance on the disarmament pillar of the NPT.

The EU's multilateral diplomatic conduct at the 2015 NPT RevCon can be characterized as an imperfect type of *damage limitation effectiveness*. Beyond influencing outcome or process of negotiations, this type of effectiveness sheds light on another layer of the concept – often overlooked by researchers and practitioners, and possibly even viewed as ‘side-effects’ (Iklé, 1987, p. 43) of the EU's participation in multilateral negotiations – which is an effect on EU member states themselves (Interview 36, 2014). In other words, the EU engages in external negotiations and uses them as an arena to harmonize positions among its constituent members, thereby shielding itself from imminent internal conflicts. From this perspective, the EU's effectiveness in the NPT negotiations boils down to the EU ‘negotiating with itself’ and trying ‘to get its act together’ (Interview 37, 2014; Interview 22, 2015). This significantly lowers the level of ambition for the EU's participation in multilateral negotiations, but, at the same time, does not allow to dismiss effectiveness altogether. As one EU diplomat reckoned, it was already an achievement that the EU agreed to enter the 2015 NPT RevCon with some sort of common position, rather than completely empty-handed (Interview 11, 2015). From a comparative perspective, though, the EU's effectiveness in the 2015 NPT RevCon was undoubtedly *low*: (0 [goal achievement] + 0 [relevance] + 0,5 [external cohesion] = 0,5).

CHAPTER 7. EXPLAINING EU EFFECTIVENESS IN MULTILATERAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

Building upon the findings of the three previous chapters, the current chapter brings together the scores and values of causal factors and the outcome with the intention to explain the varying degree of EU effectiveness in the selected cases of multilateral arms negotiations. The analysis is conducted in two steps. First, a comparative cross-case investigation is performed, with an intent to single out casual factors that covariate with EU effectiveness. Second, based on the results of the paired comparisons, two cases are selected for a within-case investigation in order to explore causal pathways that link the identified factors with the outcome. It is demonstrated that the factor of EU member states' interest convergence appears to fully covariate with varying degrees of EU effectiveness, but its explanatory power is not as strong as the cross-case comparison might indicate. Other factors, such as EU internal policy and global power distribution, also account for various aspects of EU effectiveness, while some factors – international constellation of interests and EU internal policy – are causally relevant for member states' interest convergence, through the factor of which they shape EU effectiveness indirectly.

7.1 Comparative cross-case analysis

Table 11 illustrates the results of the empirical assessment of the internal and external causal factors and the outcome of interest – EU effectiveness – across the three cases of multilateral arms negotiations. As it is shown, the highest level of EU effectiveness – defined as an imperfect type of outcome effectiveness – was found in the case of the ATT negotiations. Here, the EU's exemplary performance is accompanied by the developed internal policy built around well-elaborated norms and rules of arms export control; the high level of member states' interest convergence at the core of which was a shared intent to build an ambitious global arms trade regime; and the medium level of institutional coordination when it comes to the division of competences and responsibilities between the European Commission, Council of Ministers and the EEAS. On the external side, the ATT negotiations featured the asymmetrical distribution of power in the EU's favor; the legal institutional setting in which the EU enjoyed a status short of full membership rights, and where some EU member states (France and the UK) appeared in a privileged position as members of the UN Security Council; and the broad consensus around the need of global rules to regulate conventional arms sales.

Table 11. Comparative overview of the causal factors and outcome.

Cases Factors	Internal policy	Institutional coordination	Member states' interest convergence	Global distribution of power	Legal institutional setting	International constellation of interests	EU effectiveness
ATT	Strong	Medium	High	Asymmetrical	Exclusive, strict, unequal	Consensual	High
NPT I	Moderate	High	Medium	Symmetrical	Exclusive, strict, unequal	Consensual	Medium
NPT II	Moderate	Medium	Low	Symmetrical	Exclusive, strict, unequal	Polarized	Low

In the eighth NPT review cycle, which ended with the 2010 Review Conference, the EU score record was more modest. What has been characterized as EU process effectiveness was matched with rather moderate domestic disarmament and non-proliferation *acquis*, the similarly mixed level of member states' interest homogeneity, marked by a strong convergence on non-proliferation issues in the shadows of a disagreement over disarmament, and the smooth institutional coordination in the run-up to the RevCon, led by the rotating Council Presidency. When it came to external factors, the EU's medium effectiveness in the 2010 NPT RevCon was juxtaposed with the interdependent structure of the multilateral negotiations, which denied the EU a favorable position in terms of power distribution, the EU's handicapped legal status within the negotiations, as it is not an official party to the NPT, and the consensual international constellation of interests, largely driven by the shared motivation to rescue the Treaty from fading into oblivion.

Finally, the third case study – the ninth NPT review cycle and the 2015 Review Conference – evidenced the EU's low effectiveness level, whereby its performance essentially came down to preserving external cohesion and limiting damage emanating from the broken ranks among member states. The EU's poor effectiveness record is accompanied by a medium level of institutional coordination, marked with several complications related to the new Lisbon Treaty provisions and the non-legally binding character of the outcome document, a low level of interest convergence at the core of which was the member states' discord regarding the strategic balance between disarmament and non-proliferation pillars and a polarized international environment in which both nuclear and non-nuclear camps adopted inflexible negotiation positions. With regards to internal policy, global distribution of power and legal institutional setting, these factors took on the same values as in the previous case study.

As most of the causes and the outcome vary, the multi-case comparison of all three instances of multilateral arms negotiations in which the EU participated allows to test for co-variation between EU effectiveness, which ranges from high to medium and low, and the six internal and external causal factors measured accordingly through a multi-categorical scale. As the cross-case comparison informed by the MoCV shows, the only causal factor that fully correlates with EU effectiveness is member states' interest convergence. As the degree of EU effectiveness decreases from high to medium and low in the ATT, NPT I and NPT II cases accordingly, so does the level of EU member states' interest convergence. The values of both variables match in all three analyzed cases, which can be expressed through 1.0 Spearman rank-order coefficient. Hence, EU

effectiveness and member states' interest convergence are positively correlated, which is in line with the expectation assumed in the study's explanatory framework (Chapter 3).

However, member states' interests alone do not account for variation in EU effectiveness. Another EU-internal (domestic policy) and two EU-external (global distribution of power and international constellation of interests) factors co-varyate with EU effectiveness in line with their hypothesized causal effect, albeit not to a full extent. As EU effectiveness drops from high in the ATT case to medium in the NPT I case, the strength of domestic policy also declines from strong to medium. Yet, when EU effectiveness further decreases in the NPT II case, the value of internal policy remains unchanged. A similar pattern of co-variation is demonstrated by the global distribution of power, suggesting that the two factors might also be related to each other. In contrast, international constellation of interests remains consensual in both ATT and NPT I cases, even though EU effectiveness declines, but switches to a polarized character once EU effectiveness drops to low in the third negotiation case. Hence, all three causal factors match the outcome's value in two out of three case studies (the Spearman rank-order coefficient is 0.875), signaling a significant explanatory potential.

As it appears in Table 11, the institutional coordination and legal institutional setting do not co-vary with EU effectiveness, demonstrating the weakest explanatory power among all six causal factors. Although the assumed causal link between institutional coordination and EU effectiveness suggests that the high value of the cause will likely contribute to enhanced effectiveness, no such positive relationship can be inferred from the cross-case comparison. While the institutional coordination varies between medium and high in the three negotiation cases, the level of EU effectiveness decreases from high to medium and low. Similarly, the legal institutional setting seems to be unrelated to the outcome, as it remains constant throughout the case studies, while EU effectiveness varies. What follows from the analysis is that the institutional coordination and legal institutional setting can be discarded as independent causal factors in this study. It is important to note, however, that more cases are needed in order to rule out the potential contingent effect that the two factors can exercise upon the outcome. For example, a researcher can add three other cases of multilateral negotiations in which the EU participated under inclusive, loose and equal institutional rules, and observe whether the same cross-case pattern holds throughout the new cases. Unless the contingent effect of the two institutional factors is not ruled out with the help of additional cases – something that goes beyond the scope of the current study – a researcher cannot claim with full confidence the complete elimination of these factors from the study.

As a next step in the cross-case analysis, a pairwise case comparison is utilized in order to further elucidate the reasons behind the varying degrees of EU effectiveness in the analyzed cases of multilateral arms negotiations. A comparison of the ATT and NPT I points to the logic of the MoD. The difference in the level of EU effectiveness is associated with the differences in the levels of domestic policy development, member states' interest convergence and global distribution of power, while the international constellation of interests remains constant. Hence, the ATT and NPT I comparison indicates a highly indeterminate MoD, wherein the causal effect can potentially be attributed to the three factors, simultaneously rendering a complex explanation.

A second comparison of the NPT I and NPT II is more fruitful in light of the MoD logic. As this pair of cases has more characteristics in common than the former, it is easier to isolate a causal factor of interest that covariates with the outcome. Indeed, a comparison of the NPT I and NPT II reveals a decline of EU effectiveness from medium to low, alongside a decrease of EU member states' interest convergence from medium to low, while the values of internal policy and global power distribution remain unchanged. Hence, comparing the second pair of cases allows to control the two factors that co-varied along the level of member states' interest convergence in the first comparison, which is an added value of a multi-case comparative design. Yet, as it is evident from the Table 11, the second comparison is still not an ideal MoD, as a causal effect can be attributed not only to the role of member states' interests, but also to the international constellation of interests, which changes from consensual in the NPT I to polarized in the NPT II.

The cross-case comparison of the EU's participation in three different episodes of multilateral arms negotiations allows to formulate the following conclusions. First, the cross-case pattern shows that EU effectiveness in the selected negotiation cases is overdetermined, and its variation requires a complex explanation. Of the six causal factors assumed to be instrumental in explaining effectiveness, four co-vary either fully or partially with the outcome. Hence, the initial empirical analysis indicates that an account of EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations involves multiple factors (both agency and structure-related), and is unlikely to be reduced to a mono-causal explanation. Second, member states' interest convergence appears to have the strongest explanatory power in relation to EU effectiveness, but member states' interests alone do not account for variation in EU effectiveness. The positive correlation of this factor with the outcome can be related to the influence of internal policy and global power variables (ATT and NPT I comparison) and the international interests (NPT I and NPT II comparison) on EU effectiveness. Third, the institutional coordination and legal institutional setting appear to

be the least important in explaining EU effectiveness. As the two factors do not seem to be related to the outcome in the way their causal effect has been hypothesized, both can be discarded as independent causal variables in this study.

Even though the comparison on a cross-case level helped to generate important findings, there is a set of questions that remains unanswered and which are, in fact, pertinent to the weaknesses of the small-N comparative design based on the logic of Mill's methods of comparison. First, it is unclear how exactly the member states' interest convergence and the other three causal factors, singled out after the comparative analysis, bring about the particular instance of EU effectiveness. In other words, how can one be certain that the variation in the four identified factors indeed makes a difference to EU effectiveness, and that the correlation is not spurious or a mere coincidence? Apart from the missing link between the outcome and potential causes, the cross-case comparison is not particularly helpful in differentiating causal effects among different factors, which is crucial for disentangling complex causal explanations. For instance, do the factors of internal policy, global power, and international interests, which demonstrate the identical pattern of covariation, enjoy an equal explanatory power regarding EU effectiveness? Finally, it is not clear at this point of analysis how the four causal factors singled out after the comparison are related to each other - or whether they demonstrate an independent causal effect. A similar manner in which the internal policy and global power covariate, for example, can suggest the presence of a causal conjunction – a combination of factors that exercises a causal effect jointly. A within-case analysis based on process tracing can help to address these shortcomings and inconsistencies inherent to a small-N cross-case comparison. The following section therefore focuses on the within-case analysis of the ATT and NPT I negotiations, the two cases that revealed a positive value of the outcome of interest in the paired comparisons.²¹

7.2 Within-case analysis of the selected cases

Accounting for EU effectiveness in the ATT and NPT I negotiations lends itself well to a search for causal processes and mechanisms at the within-case level, since the cross-case analysis is not particularly useful in discriminating between the potential causal factors of the overdetermined outcome. In the first case, the EU's high (outcome) effectiveness, a crucial component of which was the level of its goal attainment, is associated with the EU's strong internal policy, the high level of member states' interest

²¹ Within-case analysis is typically conducted in a single case study in which an outcome of interest occurs (George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett and Checkel, 2015).

convergence and the asymmetrical power position in relation to other negotiators. In the second case, the EU's medium (process) effectiveness, a key element of which is the EU's high relevance in the negotiation process, is attributed to the medium level of member states' interest convergence and the consensual constellation of international interests. In order to disentangle the causal complexity in the two cases and to uphold confidence in causal claims as to whether and how these factors make a difference in the outcome, a researcher is confronted with several causal scenarios. First, only one or two of the identified factors explains the outcome, while the causal power of the rest is spurious. Second, several factors, working either independently or jointly, make a difference to the outcome. Third, all or some factors are causally related to each other and produce the outcome of interest through a causal sequence. A process-tracing of the EU's participation in the ATT and NPT I negotiations helps to probe these causal scenarios in a way that is based on abductive reasoning, when a researcher travels back and forth between data and expectations, upholding and discarding hypothesized explanations, until the best possible explanation is refined that can fully account for the outcome (Toshkov, 2016, pp. 288–290; Beach and Pedersen, 2016, pp. 311–312).

7.2.1 Tracing EU effectiveness in the ATT negotiations

Given the high potential explanatory power of the role played by EU member states' interest homogeneity in the ATT negotiations as revealed by the cross-case comparison, an examination of this factor promises to be a valid starting point for the within-case investigation. Member states' preference convergence can be related to EU effectiveness in the ATT case in several ways. With regard to goal achievement, for instance, it can be argued that the complementarity of interests allowed member states to develop ambitious targets before entering the negotiations, given the high common denominator among them and a lack of a need to compromise on the major parameters of the emerging ATT. Had France or Italy, driven by their national economic or security considerations, insisted on excluding ammunition or SALW from the scope of the Treaty or vetoed the inclusion of peace and security as a criterion for risk assessment, it would likely have resulted in lowering the overall ambition of the block, thus eventually preventing the EU from claiming the position of an advocate of a strong ATT. Moreover, it can also be argued that the unity of purpose among member states improved the collective standing of the EU as a negotiator, decreasing the likelihood of it being divided by external parties, such as China, India or Egypt – major arms importers with a clear interest in diluting the ATT. This is not insignificant in the context of UN multilateralism,

which is driven by sovereign nation states, and where the EU consisted of 28 members and deprived of a single representation, can become a target of predatory divisive tactics by powerful third states.

The plausibility of these mechanisms and, by extension, the importance of member states' interest convergence for the EU's goal achievement, can be demonstrated through the developments around the ATT's article 26. The article describes the relationship between the ATT and other international agreements, stipulating that the Treaty's provisions do not take prevalence over defense cooperation agreements concluded between state parties (United Nations, 2013a, p. 13). This clause, cited in the implementation section of the previous ATT draft as article 5.2 (United Nations, 2012c), reportedly has been introduced by India, and was widely criticized by negotiation participants and observers as a major loophole to the Treaty, undermining its main purpose (Greene, 2012). Until the second UN ATT Conference in March 2013, the EU and its member states held a consistent view that the defense cooperation clause is problematic and requires revision or deletion. However, during the final round of negotiations, France declared its support for the clause on the basis of the right to self-defense, a U-turn move that caught other EU member states off guard (Interview 23, 2014). France's about-face had a significant impact on the EU's ability to promote a strong and robust ATT text in line with its objectives. As one EU negotiator unequivocally admitted, 'it was very difficult to convince Indians to give up on the defense cooperation clause, because there was an interest of a member state at stake. That is why we did not take a direct stance on this debate' (Interview 1, 2013). Although it has not been acknowledged publicly, it appeared that France decided to endorse the Indian clause in order to secure a sizeable bilateral commercial agreement on the sale of Rafale combat aircraft to India (Interview 28, 2013; Kumar, 2015, p. 100).

Even though member states' preference convergence facilitated the EU's goal achievement, it does not seem to account for it. At best, homogeneity in EU member states' preferences explains the maximalist nature of EU negotiation goals, but not the actual congruence between those goals and the outcome document. While it is true that when EU member states are united in their views on the most important negotiation items it increases the EU's collective standing and opens the door for bargaining, it does not guarantee successful goal attainment. All EU member states shared the view that the EU should be a full member of the ATT, and a vast majority of them actively pushed for the RIO clause during the negotiations, including through diplomatic *démarches* at the

highest political level, but this collective determination did not appear to be sufficient enough to overcome China's resistance (Interview 21, 2014).

The evidence appears in even shorter supply when it comes to suggesting strong causal links between member states' interest homogeneity and the second attribute of EU effectiveness – the EU's relevance in the negotiation process. It can be argued that the considerable convergence between EU member states preferences in the area of global arms trade spared EU actors time and resources, which otherwise would have been used to harmonize positions and bridge differences in coordination meetings during the UN ATT conferences. This is a recurrent problem for the EU's multilateral diplomacy, including at the NPT fora, when the EU was viewed as being too busy negotiating with itself (K. Smith, 2010b, p. 235; Macaj and Nicolaïdis, 2014, p. 1072). In the ATT context, in contrast, member states' like-mindedness allowed to focus more on diplomatic outreach and other activities helpful to shape the negotiation process. However, this does not shed much light on why the specific format of regional seminars was chosen for this purpose and why the EU's efforts to promote broad ownership of the ATT were not fully consistent.

Where the explanatory power of member states' interest convergence appears to be the strongest is in relation to the third component of EU effectiveness – external cohesion. Indeed, when member states are generally like-minded, it is only logical to expect them not to contradict or compete with each other on the negotiation floor. Member states largely 'sang the same tune' in their diplomatic interventions during the ATT negotiations because they share complementary interests on the rationale and the purpose of establishing global rules regulating arms transfers. Further, the fact that the EU was extremely vocal during the negotiations can also be attributed to this factor. Had the member states entered the negotiations with conflicting interests, it would have been more difficult for the EU to speak, as each such intervention would have required an often time-consuming and extensive search for common ground in the coordination meetings. Sharing similar preferences, member states were prepared to channel themselves through the EU, as in this way they could get more out of the negotiations, rather than if they acted only in their national capacity (Interview 1, 2013).

As member states' interest convergence only partially explains EU effectiveness in the ATT negotiations, it implies that the remaining two factors – internal policy and global power distribution – cannot be instantly discounted and must be scrutinized on the matter of working in parallel, in conjunction or in sequence with the factor of member states' interests. There is an ample body of evidence suggesting that the factor of internal

policy is crucial for explaining the EU's goal achievement in the ATT negotiations. Following UN Resolution 61/89's request for governments to submit their views on the main points of the future Treaty, the EU drew attention to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and the EU Common Military List as best examples for the parameters and scope of the ATT (United Nations, 2007, p. 92). The EU advocated for a detailed criteria for arms transfer authorizations, illustrating them with the eight CoC criteria, and argued in favor of a comprehensive scope of the Treaty similar to its Common Military List that contains firearms, ammunition, weapons' parts and components, software, and technology. Also, in their submissions, many EU member states acknowledged the benefits of the EU's arms export control policy in identifying best practices for the future ATT. Spain, for example, openly stated that the EU's CoC is an example 'of the regional commitments on which the treaty should be based' (Ibid., p. 201), while Poland, commenting on the ATT's weapons scope, noted that 'the specification of categories should be more comprehensive and precise, as in the European Union Munitions List' (Ibid., p. 168). Jack Straw, the former Foreign Minister of the UK – the first UN Security Council member that backed the ATT and co-sponsored UN Resolution 61/89 – argued that 'a new arms trade treaty will need to build on the good work done elsewhere. [...] It should obviously draw on our experience of the EU code of conduct' (Straw, 2005). Multiple interview evidence drawn from the conversations with the EU and member states' diplomats also confirms that the EU considered its export control system to be a model worth emulating at the global level (Interview 1, 2013; Interviews 21 and 23, 2014).

Although this evidence upholds the causal significance of the domestic policy factor, it is not decisive in the explanation of EU effectiveness in the ATT process. Indeed, it might appear rather unsurprising that the EU and its member states praised their own domestic policy and practices during the negotiations. It is also not yet clear through which causal mechanisms and processes the internal policy factor is linked to the EU's goal achievement. What strengthens the causal relevance of the internal policy factor is that EU arms export control rules and standards were taken on board by a significant number of third parties during the negotiations. Countries as diverse as Australia, Bosnia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Kenya, Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Jamaica, Serbia, South Africa and Turkey all referred to the EU's CoC and endorsed it to a different degree in their national submissions (United Nations, 2007). As one non-EU diplomat claimed, 'EU standards were widely recognized by the civil society and the countries of the Global South' (Interview 39, 2014). By articulating its domestic policy, the EU placed itself into

a maximalist camp together with other negotiators from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean who, just as the EU and its member states, called for establishing the highest possible international standards for conventional arms transfers.

Certainly, the EU's CoC and the Common Military List were not the only reference points during the negotiations. In the context of uncertainty, when the international community was confronted with the need to elaborate on globally-accepted rules of conventional arms trade for the first time, many UN member states were eager to cast their net widely while considering the (in)adequacy of existing instruments of arms transfer control. Hence, regional initiatives, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Code of Conduct of Central American States on the Transfer of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material, or the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers surfaced, among others, during the negotiations (Parker, 2008, p. 21). However, these and other regional instruments possessed several shortcomings in comparison to the EU's policy framework. The Wassenaar Arrangement lacked adequate diplomatic representation in the ATT process, the ECOWAS Convention's focus was limited to just one category of weapons, and the OSCE Principles were binding only politically, while the Central American CoC lacked a rigorous implementation mechanism. All these comparative advantages lent confidence to the EU policy-makers to claim that the EU's 'experience with its own export control system demonstrates the feasibility of agreeing on [a global treaty], and confirms the effectiveness and efficiency of multilateral export control' (Council of the EU, 2007, p. 1).

These observations provide strong support for the assertion that internal policy is crucial for explaining the EU's goal achievement in the ATT negotiations. As many EU negotiation objectives were derived from or built upon its export control system, the best way for the EU to maximize its goal achievement was to approximate the negotiation outcome with its domestic regulations. In other words, for the EU to reach its objectives in the ATT process, it implied extending or 'uploading' existing EU rules and standards to the global level. As one negotiation observer pointed out, 'the EU has been a very proactive actor, also because basically it already has an ATT in place. [...] So, the whole goal for the EU was to get everybody else to follow the same rules' (Interview 4, 2014). Another interviewee concurred: 'What we achieved in the end is something similar to what we have in the EU. It was an extension of EU framework' (Interview 41, 2013). Which negotiation instruments were supposed to ensure a successful 'uploading' process of the EU's model? The evidence at hand allows the inference of traces of the three

complementary mechanisms that link the EU's domestic rules and standards with its goal achievement in the ATT negotiations.

First, the EU shaped the negotiation outcome document through agenda-setting. The EU was the only regional organization to respond to the UN Secretary General's call in 2007 for a general exchange of views on a treaty, even before the official negotiation process was launched. The EU's rather unusually high level of activism during the Preparatory Committee meetings in 2010-2011 is also consistent with the agenda-setting mechanism. By highlighting the necessary building blocks of multilateral export control – scope, criteria, implementation, transparency – the EU shaped the architecture of the future ATT (Interview 21, 2014). Similarly, the 13 regional seminars organized by the EU around the same time period were instrumental, not only for awareness-raising, but also for streamlining the ATT process and preparing the agenda for the UN conferences (Interview 23, 2014). A third country diplomat who attended one of the seminars characterized them as 'very influential', making the EU one of the driving forces in the ATT process (Interview 28, 2014).

Second, the EU engaged in diplomatic bargaining as much as its observer status in the UN allowed it to during the negotiations. Two episodes related to one of the EU's main priorities – inclusion of SALW and ammunition in the treaty's scope – are particularly illustrative. On the issue of SALW, the EU found itself in a dispute with China, which resisted the inclusion of SALW into the ATT's scope, as this is a kind of weapons it produces (Interview 1, 2014). Eventually, China dropped its opposition to SALW in exchange for keeping gifts and loans out, something that the EU initially wished to be within the ATT's remit (Bauwens, 2010). On the issue of ammunition, the EU confronted the US, the biggest world producer of ammunition, in an effort to change its stance on the issue. In particular, the high-level joint communique of the six EU arms-exporting member states was reportedly addressed to the US industry skeptical of the ATT (Fabius et al., 2012; Interview 38, 2013). The end compromise was reached with including ammunition in the treaty, but restricting its scope to export activities only. Certainly, the EU was not alone in pushing for comprehensive scope provisions; many in Africa and the Americas pursued the same ambitious ends to the negotiations. Yet, the EU and its member states were the only big arms producers in the maximalist camp, which added to their diplomatic leverage over the skeptical countries.

Third, a crucial role in managing complex multilateral negotiations belongs to the chairs of the diplomatic forums, who keep track of rolling drafts and act as their gatekeepers (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011c). Since the EU is not a UN member, its

representatives were not entitled to chair any of the official ATT meetings, but the EU's member states did. During the 2012 UN conference, the Netherlands chaired one of the two committees designated to draft a compromise text on the ATT's scope and implementation (United Nations, 2012d). The following year, during the next UN conference, three EU member states – Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland – led the working groups on the issues of scope, transparency and other considerations, respectively (Interview 39, 2014). These observations offer the fingerprints of the third mechanism – drafting – through which the EU shaped the negotiation outcome, although more evidence is needed to determine the extent of the chairs' freedom of maneuver in drafting the compromise texts.

The factor of internal policy also appears causally significant for the second component of EU effectiveness – its relevance in the negotiation process. The EU's initiative of organizing regional seminars for a broad set of state and non-state stakeholders was brought forth by a lack of understanding of the issues at stake in the ATT process, and the need to increase mutual learning and expertise-sharing on export control mechanisms. Hence, in the meetings the EU could not really help avoiding reference to its own experience of arms export control, based on the rules and regulations that happen to match the UN's call for establishing high common standards for global arms transfers. However, as one EU member state diplomat admitted, 'it would have been unwise to say publicly that the EU was a model' (Interview 21, 2014). It is here where the external factor of global power distribution comes into play. Although the dividing line between importers and exporters becomes ever more unclear under the globalization of the arms trade, the ATT negotiations did feature a stand-off among arms-supplying and arms-demanding states, resembling the North-South divide in the global economy. That the pattern of the relationship between the two groups was not one of equality and parity should not come as a surprise. For any multilateral effort to regulate international arms transfers to be meaningful and effective, above all it needs to secure the willingness and commitment of arms suppliers (Bromley *et al.*, 2012). Given the power asymmetries between negotiators, 'the EU being so strong in favor of the Treaty may make this look like it was an "exporters club" [pushing] the imposition of the Western model to everybody else (Interview 4, 2014). This sheds light on the criticism of many arms-importing states about the discriminatory nature of the ATT process, a perception that was not entirely unjustified, given the dominating 'exporter's perspective' in the Treaty provisions (Prizeman, 2012). Both factors of internal policy and global power distribution

are jointly instrumental in understanding the mixed picture of the EU's relevance in the negotiation process.

The EU-internal factors of member states' interest convergence and domestic policy (in conjunction with the global power distribution) appear to fully account for the different facets of EU effectiveness in the ATT negotiations. So far, the explanatory power of the two factors has been examined independently of each other, as if both worked in parallel to contribute to the EU's high (outcome) effectiveness. However, it is also important to probe into the relationship between the factors, not least because both internal policy and member states' interests seem to overlap in explaining the high level of ambition inherent to the EU's negotiation objectives. The idea that the two EU-internal factors are not unrelated is backed by several decisive observations. First, the operational provisions of the EU's Code of Conduct on Arms Exports stipulate that 'Member States will work within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of conventional arms exports' (Council of the EU, 1998, p. 9). The same provision was later transposed to the EU's Common Position (Article 7), which made this and other provisions of the CoC legally binding (Council of the EU, 2008b). Second, a number of studies contended that the establishment of the Council's COARM working group and the elaboration of the CoC in the 1990s set an upward pattern for increased convergence of national export control policies (Davies, 2002; Bauer and Remacle, 2004; Holm, 2006; Bromley, 2012). While a full harmonization is a distant target and the implementation of the EU's Common Position lacks consistency, it is undeniable that national export control frameworks are more Europeanized now than they were decades ago. Third, the interview evidence also points to the causal link between the factor of internal policy and member states' interest convergence. A member state diplomat held that the EU's unity in the ATT negotiations was an effect of years of CoC experience, in particular its evolution from a political to a legal instrument (Interview 21, 2014). It appears that without the existence of EU domestic rules and standards on arms exports, member states' views on criteria, scope and operational provisions of the ATT would have been as different, as their national export control regulatory frameworks prior to the development of EU *acquis*. The within-case evidence therefore allows the inference of the existence of a causal sequence in which member states' interest convergence regarding the ATT is actually a function of the EU's domestic arms export control policy.

In sum, the factor of internal policy appears to bear the most explanatory power in the ATT case, shaping EU effectiveness both directly and indirectly. The EU's elaborate domestic rules and standards in the export control domain account for the EU's

successful goal achievement and ambiguous relevance in the ATT negotiations. The external factor of global power distribution does not exercise a standalone effect on EU effectiveness, but needs to be viewed in combination with the factor of internal policy, where it both adds to (goal achievement) and subtracts from (relevance) its causal impact. Even though member states' interest convergence was found causally relevant for EU effectiveness (external cohesion), this relationship appeared to be dependent upon the causal effect of the internal policy factor.

7.2.2 Tracing EU effectiveness in the NPT I negotiations

As in the previous case, the starting point in the within-case analysis of the 2010 NPT RevCon rests upon the examination of how and to what extent member states' interest convergence made a difference to EU effectiveness, the distinguishing element of which was the EU's relevance in the negotiation process. The link between the factor of member states' interests and the EU's effect on the negotiation process in the 2010 NPT RevCon is not straightforward, but it becomes clearer when one looks into the process of the EU's preference formation for this negotiation setting. As explained in Chapter 4, member states' interest homogeneity in the run-up to the 2010 RevCon was somewhat mixed: their interests converged greatly in the non-proliferation area, but not to the extent that it was sufficient to fully offset the long-standing differences in the views on disarmament and civilian nuclear energy. The wide array of member states' interests, from supporters of nuclear weapons to nuclear umbrella states and nuclear abolitionists, created a burden for setting a high threshold for EU objectives, as two extreme sides risked cancelling each other out and, therefore, diluting the EU's collective position. As one diplomat put it bluntly, 'the EU is kind of nowhere in [the NPT] debate' (Interview 6, 2014). This explains why the greatest part of the EU's common position in the 2010 NPT RevCon, except for the detailed and ambitious non-proliferation goals, was status quo-oriented, and reflected the lowest common denominator.

The EU thus entered the final phase of the eighth NPT review cycle with a largely conservative negotiation position that reflected an internal EU compromise. A middle ground negotiation position that fell not too far from the status quo did not require much diplomatic bargaining to be achieved. The logic was the following: given the composition of EU membership and the nature of the debates in the NPT regime, the internal EU compromise was a good predictor for where common ground lays at the international level (Interview 25, 2013). In line with its image as 'a laboratory of consensus' (Grand, 2010, p. 25) and 'a microcosm of the NPT parties' (Interviews 34 and 36, 2014), the EU

submitted its entire common position as a working paper to the NPT proceedings in order to feed the final outcome document with its domestically-crafted compromise language. As one EU member state diplomat mentioned, ‘already because of our composition that we were able to agree among 27 member states was a good prediction of what could be possibly agreed among the whole membership of the NPT’ (Interview 6, 2014). At this point, considering its ‘homework’ completed, the core of EU tasks at the RevCon came down to guiding and assisting other participants throughout the negotiation process in reaching a point of consensus. The need to balance internal interests therefore has become the driving force of the EU’s external RevCon activities, which largely consisted of efforts at bridge-building and consensus-seeking among NPT negotiators. Ensuring the balance between the three NPT pillars in the RevCon outcome document was viewed by the EU diplomats as an ‘overriding priority’, a necessary measure to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime in the wider context of deep fissures among its participants (Interviews 7 and 29, 2014).

Due to its diverse membership and a middle ground position, the EU appeared to be particularly well-suited for bridge-building efforts at the 2010 NPT RevCon. Because the EU is regarded as a neutral party with substantive diplomatic clout, its added value in negotiating a WMD free zone in the Middle East and mediating between the US and Arab states is acknowledged by both EU and non-EU diplomats (Interviews 30; 34; 40, 2014). Certainly, there was a number of other political groupings and coalitions, such as the NAC, NAM, P5 and Vienna Group of Ten, traditionally active in the NPT negotiations. However, most of them are issue-based groupings and none of them comprised both nuclear weapon states and nuclear abolitionists under a shared roof. The only coalition of states that did attempt to work across all the three NPT pillars was the Norwegian-led Seven Nation Initiative, which also included Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Romania, South Africa and the UK (Gahr Støre, 2008). Established in 2005, the group’s engagement was, however, short-lived, and the 2010 RevCon did not even witness any working papers or common statements issued by the group (Mukhatzhanova and Potter, 2015). These observations strengthen the confidence in the causal link between the delicate internal balance of member states’ interests and the EU’s external relevance in the eighth NPT review cycle.

Member states’ interest convergence is also instrumental in understanding the EU’s external cohesion in the 2010 NPT RevCon. When it comes to the non-proliferation pillar, the logic of causal argument is similar to the one explained in the ATT case. Member states ‘sang the same tune’ alongside EU representatives, because they share the

same views on the risks and challenges to the non-proliferation norm, as well as how to strengthen it. The two other NPT pillars, disarmament and peaceful nuclear energy, are more puzzling though. In those two areas, member states' interests diverge, but this did not result in major contradictions on the floor. The reason why member states stuck to the discipline, even though they do not share the same interests on these matters, might still be related to the factor of member states' interest convergence. Any public clash on the RevCon floor would have born high costs for the overall balance of interests within the EU, which has not been as homogenous as in the ATT case, but also not as divergent as in the NPT II case.²² Even though the EU's common position on disarmament and civilian nuclear energy was based on the lowest common denominator, there still were issues upon which member states could agree, and on which basis they could develop more ambitious elements in their national statements. Furthermore, because of the low level of consensus on disarmament, member states had the freedom to participate in other groupings. As one EU diplomat admitted, 'you have to allow to member states to nationally also play a role to be able to respect the common position' (Interview 7, 2014).

As member states' interest convergence appears to comprehensively account for EU effectiveness in the NPT I case, a question regarding the role of the international constellation of interests – another important factor in the negotiations as revealed by the cross-case comparison – emerges. At this point in the analysis, three potential scenarios can be put forward: the international constellation of interests is either unrelated to EU effectiveness, or it shapes EU effectiveness independently from the factor of member states' interests through an alternative causal pathway, or it influences EU effectiveness through member states' interest convergence in a causal sequence.

The first scenario is the least plausible among the three. The design of the grand bargain implies that the NPT negotiations are mainly about an exchange between NWS and NNWS. It is difficult not to expect that the dynamics between these two forces will not affect the EU's performance in the negotiations, especially given that the EU, through its member states, has a foot in both camps. The second scenario, in which EU process effectiveness is directly affected by the constellation of international interests independently from the role played by member states' interest convergence, receives

²² One additional explanation as to why there has not been an open clash between EU actors on the negotiation floor can be related to the EU's institutional coordination. In the 2015 NPT RevCon, Austria and France held a public fight about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, an aspect that practically had no agreed upon language in the EU's Council Conclusions. In contrast, the EU's Council Decision adopted before the 2010 NPT RevCon was a much more elaborate document, covering all important aspects of the NPT's agenda.

slightly more support. It can be argued that the consensual atmosphere surrounding the 2010 NPT RevCon, in which major players were willing to compromise and work together on a meaningful outcome, created a demand for bridge-builders to lock in an increased level of trust and cooperation among the parties. Had the international interests' constellation been polarized, just as it appeared to be in the 2015 NPT RevCon, it would have been more difficult for such actors to play a meaningful role. As one Polish diplomat commented about the 2015 RevCon, 'the discrepancies of views among the countries and the key players were so tangible that any honest broker could not deliver at that time' (Mogherini, 2015). However, this mechanism seems to explain how the factor of international interests facilitates the EU's relevance in the negotiation process rather than how the former causes the latter. Moreover, it is difficult to argue convincingly that the constellation of international interests shapes EU effectiveness with no relation to EU-internal factors, especially given that the disposition of EU member states' interests is an integral part of this broader constellation of interests in the NPT regime.

What therefore appears as the most plausible scenario is a causal pathway in which the factor of international constellation of interests influenced the level of EU member states' interest convergence which, in turn, shaped EU effectiveness in the 2010 NPT RevCon. That the constellation of international interests is causally related to its counterpart factor at the EU level is supported by a number of important observations. As stated above, EU member states are not isolated from broader interest dynamics in the field of nuclear politics. On the contrary, member states on both sides of the NPT's grand bargain – France and the UK on one hand, and Austria, Ireland and Sweden on the other hand – participate and occasionally coordinate in political groupings, such as P5 and NAC, that are active in various international forums (the CD, the UN First Committee, etc.) beyond the NPT review process. More specifically, the consensual constellation of international interests in the run-up to the 2010 RevCon spilled over into the EU's internal discussions on NPT matters, shaping the attitudes of its member states. As one diplomat observed, 'when we were meeting, all EU member states around the table, preparing, there was a desire to achieve success in 2010, because of the failure in 2005, the new expectations from the Obama administration' (Interview 7, 2014). The preoccupation with the health of the non-proliferation regime and with the need to achieve a result in 2010 became a unifying force among EU member states. Despite their long-standing differences, member states were not eager to expose them, instead adopting a rather flexible attitude towards each other, as well as externally: 'We were quite prepared to do compromises on all fronts' (Interview 9, 2014).

The evidence of a causal link between the international constellation of interests and EU member states' interest convergence is also supported by observations derived from alternative sources of data. A declassified document, for example, revealed Spain's commitment 'to "take advantage of the momentum" that President Obama has created on nonproliferation and disarmament issues' and to be more proactive and ambitious in its role of EU Presidency in forging internal consensus than otherwise would have been possible under ordinary circumstances (Wikileaks, 2009a). Another document showed that France, the most conservative EU member state with regard to disarmament, found itself at odds with and under pressure from other EU partners fueled by growing international expectations to revive the stalled disarmament agenda on the eve of the RevCon (Wikileaks, 2009b). However, as one diplomat put it, 'even if France was sometimes more reluctant to follow, they could not be negative, particularly if they have another nuclear weapon states, like the US with Russia' prepared to make concessions necessary to ensure the success of the 2010 RevCon (Interview 7, 2014).

A number of secondary sources also concur that similarities or differences between EU member states on NPT matters mirror patterns of relations between NWS and NNWS at the global stage (Katsioulis and Mölling, 2010; Müller *et al.*, 2013; Dee, 2015b). Katsioulis and Molling (2010), for instance, make a reverse, but unambiguous, claim that 'if the general framework [of negotiations] is confrontational, [...] the EU cannot contribute to a positive outcome of the Review Conference because any confrontations will also be reflected inside the EU' (p. 12). There is no need to construct a meticulous counterfactual case to briefly consider the validity of this causal mechanism, since the third case of this study – the 2015 NPT RevCon – illustrates it to the greatest possible extent. Without diving into a detailed within-case investigation, it is highly plausible to argue that the increased discourse about and activities around the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, which emerged outside the EU shortly after the 2010 RevCon, drove serious internal rifts among its member states that not only prevented the EU from playing any meaningful role in the negotiations, but also jeopardized its external cohesion.

In sum, the factor of member states' interest convergence comprehensively accounts for EU effectiveness in the 2010 NPT RevCon. Because of the diverse composition of EU membership, covering the entire interest spectrum and driven by the need to preserve internal consensus, the EU engaged into balancing various interests externally among three NPT pillars as the only way to ensure the sustainability of the regime. The hard-won internal compromise also explains why member states largely kept

their ranks, even though some of them also participated in other political groupings. However, member states' interest convergence did not exercise an independent causal effect, but was instead shaped by the factor of international interests' constellation. By forging the degree of member states' interest convergence, the consensual constellation of international interests indirectly shaped EU effectiveness in the 2010 NPT RevCon.

CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS

The final chapter summarizes the main findings of the study in light of the research questions put forward in the introduction. Additionally, it outlines broader reflections on the study's results from the viewpoint of their external validity and relevance for academic researchers and policy practitioners.

8.1 Main findings of the study

This study examined the European Union's involvement in multilateral arms negotiations. Proliferation of arms and weapons fuels conflicts, violence and terrorism worldwide, and presents a serious threat to national and international security and stability. Ironically, arms affairs is an area in which the need for collective action and multilateral cooperation is arguably the most difficult to be reconciled with the dominant role of states in international society. Because the issues of state sovereignty, integrity and survival are at stake, weapons-related security challenges are set to be handled under circumstances in which states are clearly the key actors and in which resistance to any significant role of non-state players, such as the EU, is almost inevitable. Against the odds, the EU is a regular participant in multilateral arms negotiations, be it in the area of conventional arms or weapons of mass destruction. Just as states, the Union formulates negotiation objectives, presents its position to other negotiators, engages in diplomatic bargaining and exchange, and coordinates members of its negotiation team – essentially, it carries out all the main elements of modern diplomatic conduct, short of voting. Being a successful role model for multilateralism itself, the EU is an active and committed player in promoting a rules-based global order through multilateral cooperation and, as this study demonstrates, is able to shape policy outcomes and have an added value for collective deliberation and decision-making in multilateral arms forums.

8.1.1 To what extent is the EU an effective actor in multilateral arms negotiations?

The EU demonstrated various degrees of impact in the three selected cases of multilateral arms negotiations. This allowed to distinguish three different patterns of EU effectiveness, which constitute the first major finding of this study. In the ATT negotiations, the EU was very successful in shaping the parameters and provisions of the outcome document in line with its ambitious negotiation objectives. Driven by the conviction that only a strong and comprehensive treaty can have a meaningful impact on the global arms trade, the EU influenced the most important sections of the draft ATT related to scope, criteria, implementation and transparency. By the same token, the EU

managed to maintain a high level of external cohesion among its member states. With the exception of several instances, such as when France and the UK deviated from the common line, member states and EU institutions by and large sang the same tune and acted in unison at the UN-sponsored negotiations on the ATT. The EU, however, was less effective when it came to its relevance in the negotiation process. Judged by the standard of common goods and collective benefits, the EU's relevance was mixed: it contributed to the overall inclusiveness of the ATT negotiations, but, at the same time, pushed to the sidelines a group of significant arms-importing states.

Given the particular combination of values across different dimensions of effectiveness, the EU's performance in the ATT negotiations was described as an imperfect kind of *outcome effectiveness*, just falling short of full or maximum effectiveness by a margin of its unfulfilled relevance. Outcome effectiveness is a subtype of EU effectiveness, at the core of which is a conceptual attribute of goal achievement or, speaking empirically, a set of effects on the negotiation outcome. From the perspective of goal achievement, which is the dominant view on effectiveness among scholars, the EU is considered to be an effective actor if as many points as possible of the EU's objectives are reflected in the negotiated agreement. As goal achievement reflects an inherently internal standard for understanding EU effectiveness, an examination of the quality of the EU's negotiation objectives is a part and parcel of this approach to EU effectiveness. On the comparative level, the EU's performance in the ATT negotiations has been assessed as *high* effectiveness, taking into account the greater weight of goal achievement in comparison to the other components of EU effectiveness.

In the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the EU showed a different pattern of effectiveness. In this negotiation setting, the EU emerged highly relevant in terms of building bridges between the US and Arab states, seeking consensus among all negotiation participants, and thus in shaping the way the negotiated agreement was achieved. By navigating the negotiation process towards an outcome that is balanced in relation to the three NPT pillars, the EU demonstrated the feasibility of a multilateral approach to the NPT as a collective security mechanism. In contrast, the EU's record in attaining a long list of declared negotiation goals crumbled, especially given that the objectives that the EU put forward, with the exception of the non-proliferation part, lacked ambition and were too close to the existing status quo. Overall, EU actors maintained a high level of external cohesion, even though the degree to which member states channeled themselves through the EU during these negotiations appeared to be weaker than in the

ATT case. Nonetheless, EU member states showed a significant level of discipline and restraint, sticking to a common line in their interventions on the negotiation floor.

This combination of values across different attributes of EU effectiveness allowed to place the EU's performance in the 2010 NPT RevCon into the category of *process effectiveness*. This subtype of EU effectiveness is based on the conceptual attribute of relevance or, in other words, effects that the EU produces on the negotiation process. As an alternative component of EU effectiveness, relevance shifts the focus from the results of multilateral negotiations to the way the negotiated agreement is achieved. From this perspective, the EU is an effective actor when it creates and enhances value through a multilateral process, which is considered a collective benefit in itself. In comparison to goal achievement, relevance diversifies standards against which EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations is assessed – from individual and inward-looking to collective and outward-oriented. The EU's record in the 2010 NPT RevCon, however, has been conceived as *medium* effectiveness on a cross-case level, because of the low goal achievement score, the empirical weight of which is considered higher than that of relevance.

The case of the EU's performance in the 2015 NPT Review Conference differs from the previous two. In this set of multilateral negotiations, the EU was neither successful in shaping the draft outcome document, nor was it able to significantly influence the negotiation process. Unlike the previous NPT RevCon, the EU's low record in achieving its declared objectives was coupled with its low relevance, as the EU did not appear in to be in a position to invest in the common goods and collective benefits necessary for strengthening the NPT regime. What is more, the EU's diplomatic performance in the 2015 NPT RevCon uncovered problems with its own external cohesion, thus challenging even the basic dimension of EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations. EU member states were half-heartedly joining the ranks under the EU banner to launch diplomatic initiatives during the RevCon. And even though EU actors managed to follow a common line on non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, there have been serious problems with projecting a united stance on the disarmament pillar of the NPT.

The EU's multilateral diplomatic conduct at the 2015 NPT RevCon can be characterized as an imperfect type of *damage limitation effectiveness*. Beyond influencing outcome or process of negotiations, this type of effectiveness sheds light on another layer of the concept – often overlooked by researchers and practitioners – which relates to the effects on EU member states themselves. In other words, the EU engages in external

negotiations and uses them as an arena to harmonize positions among its constituent members, thereby shielding itself from imminent internal conflicts. From this inward-looking perspective, the EU's effectiveness in the arms negotiations boils down to the degree of cohesion among EU actors in terms of their messages and acts during the negotiations. This significantly lowers the level of ambition for the EU's participation in multilateral negotiations, but, at the same time, does not allow to dismiss effectiveness altogether. Coordinating and crafting a common approach among 28 constituent entities is a challenging exercise, therefore the mere fact of getting member states on same page is a negotiation achievement by itself. From a comparative perspective, though, the EU's effectiveness in the 2015 NPT RevCon was undoubtedly *low*, given the little weight of external cohesion in comparison to the other attributes of EU effectiveness.

8.1.2 What explains EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations?

To address the research questions of the study, this project relied on an integrative comparative case study design combining cross-case comparison and within-case analysis. This choice proved to be a fruitful strategy for drawing causal inferences in the Y-centered study preoccupied with the 'causes-of-effects', as the two elements of the research design are more powerful when sequentially combined, rather than when used in isolation. Drawn on Mill's methods of comparison, the cross-case analysis of the EU's participation in three different episodes of multilateral arms negotiations allowed to put forward the following conclusions. First, the cross-case pattern showed that EU effectiveness in the selected negotiation cases is overdetermined, and its variation requires a complex or eclectic explanation. Of the six causal factors assumed to be instrumental in explaining EU effectiveness, four – internal policy, member states' interest convergence, global power distribution and international constellation of interests – either fully or partially co-varied with the outcome. This stage of empirical analysis therefore indicated that the account of EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations involves multiple causal factors (both internal and external to the EU), and is unlikely to be reduced to a mono-causal explanation.

Second, the institutional coordination and legal institutional setting appeared to be least important in explaining EU effectiveness. While the legal institutional setting remained invariant, the score of institutional coordination did differ to a certain extent across the cases, but not in the way that allowed the inference of an association with EU effectiveness. As the two factors did not appear to be related to the outcome in the manner in which their causal effect has been hypothesized, both have been discarded as

independent causal factors in this study. At the same time, it is important to note that the cross-case analysis implied little about the presence of a potential interaction effect between the two institutional factors and the other variables. Unless this possibility is not ruled out with the help of additional cases – something that goes beyond the scope of the current project – a researcher is not in a position to claim with full confidence the complete elimination of these factors from the study.

Third and most importantly, the cross-case comparison provided significant hints as to which factors can explain the variation of EU effectiveness. Member states' interest convergence appeared to have the strongest explanatory potential, as it perfectly matched the pattern of covariation with the outcome. The factor of member states' interests, however, was not the only candidate for an association with EU effectiveness. As a result of the paired comparisons, it came out that the positive correlation of this factor with the outcome could potentially be related to the influence of internal policy and global power variables (ATT and NPT I comparison) and international interests (NPT I and NPT II comparison) on EU effectiveness. As important as these findings are, the cross-case comparison, however, has left too much room for indeterminacy over EU effectiveness beyond the level that can allow to adequately answer the research question. It is here where the second stage of the empirical analysis on the within-case level started, with the intent to reduce the causal complexity, to differentiate between powers of the four casual factors and, most importantly, to uncover causal processes and mechanisms that link the identified factors with the outcome.

The within-case analysis of the ATT and NPT I negotiations – the two cases in which the instances of EU effectiveness were the most pronounced – helped to collect casual process observations that strengthened, but also modified, the findings generated by the cross-case level of analysis. The factor of member states' interest convergence indeed took central stage, but its explanatory power turned out to be weaker than the cross-case comparison might have indicated. First, the homogeneity of member states preferences accounted for EU relevance and external cohesion in the NPT I negotiations, but it was much less instrumental in understanding different dimensions of EU effectiveness in the ATT case. While the factor did explain the level of the EU's external cohesion and provided useful analytical insights with regards to the quality of the EU's negotiation objectives, the evidence appeared to be in short supply when it came to suggesting strong causal links between the role played by member states' interests on one hand, and the EU's goal achievement and relevance in the ATT negotiations on the other hand. Second, the factor of member states' interest convergence was not independent in

shaping EU effectiveness. On the contrary, the within-case evidence allowed the inference of the existence of causal sequences in which different degrees of member states' interest convergence were actually found to be a function of the EU's domestic arms export control policy (the ATT case) and the particular constellation of interests on the international arena (the NPT I case).

With regard to the other three factors, the internal policy in particular stood out as one carrying the most explanatory power over the high level of EU effectiveness in the ATT case. The EU's elaborated domestic rules and standards in the export control domain persuasively accounted for the EU's successful goal achievement and ambiguous relevance in the ATT negotiations. Moreover, because the factor of internal policy also conditioned EU member states' interest convergence, one can argue that it shaped EU effectiveness both directly and indirectly. The internal policy factor thus appeared to be the force that made the difference in the level of EU effectiveness in the ATT negotiations. In the NPT I case, the factor of the international constellation of interest was also found causally relevant, determining the level of member states' interest convergence. However, in contrast to the causal power of internal policy in the ATT negotiations, the factor of international interests did not appear to be a common cause in relation to the member states' preferences and the outcome. In other words, its causal impact on EU effectiveness can only be understood indirectly through the effect it exercised on the balance of member states' interests. Finally, the global distribution of power had seemingly the weakest explanatory potential in comparison to the other two factors. Its role in the ATT case can be best conceived as a complementary factor that did not exercise a standalone effect on EU effectiveness, but needs to be viewed in combination with the factor of internal policy, where it both adds to (goal achievement) and subtracts from (relevance) its causal impact.

On a more aggregate level, these findings can be interpreted through the two foundational perspectives. Of the three major building blocks of social science explanation – power, interests and institutions – in which all six causal factors of this study were anchored, those related to power (internal policy and global power distribution) and interests (member states' interest convergence and international constellation of interests) appeared to be causally relevant for EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations. It can be further noted that interests-based explanations accounted for lower levels of EU effectiveness (NPT negotiations), while power-related causes were pivotal for higher levels of EU effectiveness (ATT negotiations). From this point of view, the results of the study challenge those intergovernmental accounts of the

EU's impact on the international stage, which maintain that if the member states' interests are not in line, the EU is destined for failure. The findings of this study showed that the member states' interests are not the only game in town, and that the causal recipe for the EU's success in the 'high politics' arena is actually more nuanced. The EU can be effective in multilateral arms negotiations even if the unity of member states is suboptimal (the 2010 NPT RevCon example). Moreover, what made the EU even more successful in this kind of negotiation was the EU's own experience of multilateral policy development rather than the commonalities between member states' standpoints, although the latter certainly facilitated EU effectiveness (the ATT example).

The combination of power and interests-based reasoning at the center of the study's explanatory framework highlights the utility of the realist-rationalist theoretical angle on the explanation of EU effectiveness. This might appear to be non-news given the domain of international security, from which the negotiation cases were drawn, and the even greater sensitivities attached to arms matters. What is more surprising, however, is the poor explanatory value of the institutions-based factors. The EU was found effective, even though the legal institutional setting, in which the multilateral arms negotiations unfolded, did not provide the EU with equal opportunities similar to those enjoyed by states. That the EU achieved results and influenced the process during the negotiations while not being a full member of the UN implies that the EU's legal status in multilateral institutions is not *sine qua non* for it to be able to make a difference in a multilateral context. In the same vein, the EU showed higher effectiveness, even with the competence dispute between the European Commission and member states, and lower effectiveness when the institutional coordination was smooth and unproblematic. This suggests – perhaps also in line with the previously mentioned criticism about the preoccupation of the relevant literature with the EU's internal arrangements for multilateral institutions – that the EU can achieve results and have an impact in multilateral arms negotiations, irrespective of the strength of its actorness.

Another dimension through which the findings of the study can be scrutinized is from the level of the analysis perspective. The fact that the explanation of EU effectiveness in multilateral arms negotiations incorporates both structural (global power distribution and international constellation of interests) and agent-based (internal policy and member states' interest convergence) factors increases the confidence in the strength of the explanatory framework. Moreover, rather than exposing causal effect of these variables in isolation, it suggests a compelling picture of the nexus between EU-external and EU-internal factors. It can be argued that the overall explanation of EU effectiveness

is slightly tilted towards agent-based reasoning, given the discovered direct causal links between the factors of internal policy and member states' interests and the outcome, as well as their ability to comprehensively account for various dimensions of EU effectiveness. The role of the external context, nonetheless, is not insignificant. The structural factors appeared to exercise their causal impact on EU effectiveness either through or in conjunction with the internal variables, but not separately from them.

8.2 Reflections on contributions and challenges

8.2.1 Potential for generalization

One important question is related to the extent to which the findings of this study can be applied to other contexts beyond the examined cases. The issue of generalization or external validity of causal inferences is problematic in small-n observational studies, given the lack of possibility to examine the entire population of cases of interest (Rohlfing, 2012, pp. 200-211; Ruzzene, 2012). The problem, nevertheless, can be alleviated by the choices made behind the selection of cases. The three cases of multilateral arms negotiations – the ATT and the NPT Review Conferences – were selected for this project on the outcome or, in other words, based on the premise of, presumable variation in the EU's effectiveness among them. Because it was decided to measure EU effectiveness in terms of differences in kind, the three cases of negotiations, in which the EU demonstrated three different patterns of effectiveness, represent typical, rather than diverse cases. This implies that causal insights derived from these cases can travel to similar cases that belong to the same category. For example, the ATT negotiations is a typical or representative case of other potential instances of multilateral arms negotiations in which the EU also demonstrated high (outcome) effectiveness. These cases would be the target group for generalization of the causal relationship, according to which internal and external power-based factors led to the EU's high effectiveness, as shown by the ATT case. The similar logic of generalization to delimited groups of cases applies to the other two typical cases with the EU's medium (process) and low (damage limitation) effectiveness.

This logic, however, assumes that the external projection of causal inferences takes place within the universe of cases specified by the boundary statements or scope conditions. In this study, the scope conditions defined the population of relevant cases of multilateral negotiations along the dimensions of substance (the domain of international arms affairs), space (the UN principal bodies) and time (after the introduction of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993). This pool of cases therefore includes the Review

Conferences of the Biological Weapons Convention, Review Conferences of the Chemical Weapons Convention, negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Small Arms and Light Weapons instruments, the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and other instances of multilateral arms diplomacy in which the EU participated.

It is possible to argue, however, that the insights generated by this study can also be relevant for cases that fall outside the boundaries of the specified population. As it has been mentioned in the introduction, the empirical field of multilateral arms negotiations as a subset of the international security diplomacy can be conceived as a somewhat ‘hard case’ for the EU’s meaningful role, given that the EU is a relative newcomer to this area of world affairs and the dominant role of states (including the EU’s own member states) in this field. Contrary to these expectations, the EU proved to be capable of achieving results in situations in which the Union’s effectiveness seemed least-likely. This outcome thus increases the confidence in the assumption that the EU can demonstrate comparable patterns of effectiveness in the areas of multilateral negotiations, such as environment, trade, human rights and food security, which are more susceptible to the EU’s influence.

The same reasoning extends to the setting of multilateral negotiations. The EU can be expected to perform equally well, if not better, in non-UN contexts in which the rules of participation are less strict and more inclusive in relation to the EU. Further, given that the explanatory framework of this study cast the net as wide as to include both structural and agent-based reasoning along the explanatory categories of power, interests and institutions, it is likely that the structure of causal argument applied in this study can also travel outside the specified population of cases. The shape of the population therefore can be broadened by relaxing the substantive (beyond the field of arms affairs) and spatial (beyond the UN) boundaries, although this needs to be exercised with a degree of caution. Enhancing external validity of causal insights in this way can be marked by increased uncertainty related to the risk of causal heterogeneity due to the presence of new, unaccountable factors in the new layers of the population. Hence, a rigorous empirical testing of new cases will be required in order to lend stronger support to the generalization claims.

8.2.2 Implications for research

The main academic contribution of this study rests upon the further advancement of the latest generation of intellectual inquiry on the EU in world affairs that puts the EU’s results and effects at the forefront. Informed by the research gaps identified in the

literature review, this contribution can be structured along the following dimensions. First, the study pioneers a comprehensive conceptualization of EU effectiveness in the context of multilateral negotiations that goes beyond a simple understanding of effectiveness as goal attainment. By adding the second component of relevance, the study exposed a dimension of collectivity in the understanding of the effectiveness concept that could not be captured by individualistic and internal-oriented standards of goal achievement. The incorporation of the third component of EU effectiveness – external cohesion – was dictated by the need to accommodate a distinct character of the EU as an international negotiator different to that of state actors. The three conceptual attributes on the empirical level can be expressed through effects that the EU produces on the outcome, process and its member states during multilateral negotiations. The specification of the conceptual attributes and delineation of EU effectiveness from other adjacent concepts appeared to be an important stepping stone for its systematic empirical investigation across the case studies. The empirical definition of EU effectiveness, the specification of its three components and their different combinations into several sub-types of EU effectiveness can spur academic interest beyond a circle of EU scholars.

Second, the study adds value to the body of literature on the EU in multilateral institutions that was identified as the most relevant for the current project. More specifically, studying the EU's effects in multilateral negotiations ought to be viewed in light of a need to remedy a strong preoccupation in the literature with various elements of EU actorness in multilateral institutions at the expense of understanding the impact of the EU's diplomatic activities. Moreover, in order to address another popular tendency in the literature – the lack of attention to the external negotiation context and the EU's engagement with it – the study integrated agent-based explanations with an equal number of structural factors into a balanced explanatory framework. On the empirical level, this research examined one of the most neglected areas in the study of EU foreign policy. By focusing on the instances of multilateral arms negotiations and the EU's participation in them, the study generated academic knowledge in the area that is otherwise dominated by the input of think tanks and expert communities. Combining the negotiations on both conventional arms (the ATT) and weapons of mass destruction (the NPT) in a comparative design, the study appears to be the first attempt at cumulative knowledge production in this given empirical domain.

What are the potential avenues for future research in light of the findings and conclusions generated by this study? Taking into account the infancy of the research field, the study of the EU's participation and impact in multilateral negotiations should continue

in order to transform it into a coherent and systematic body of scholarship. One obvious way to proceed is to extend the investigation of EU effectiveness to more cases of multilateral negotiations beyond the area of arms affairs. Such research can take on a design of small-n observational studies similar to the current project or medium-n comparative studies based on a specific method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Studying the shape and magnitude of the EU's effects in multilateral environmental, economic, health or transport negotiations will strengthen the comparative agenda of the research field and will ultimately allow to land at more systematic and generalized knowledge of the EU as an international negotiator. Even more in line with a plea to bolster comparative research, scholars can also study effectiveness of other state or non-state actors in specific multilateral institutions, and juxtapose them against the patterns of the EU's outcome, process and damage limitation effectiveness. Relevant steps in this direction already have been undertaken by some scholars (Müller *et al.*, 2013; Vrailas, 2017).

Another avenue for future research is related to further theorization in the field. This study demonstrates the utility of analytical eclecticism and problem-specific explanatory frameworks in accounting for complex and multi-faceted phenomena, such as EU effectiveness. The inferential leverage of eclectic explanations depends not only upon incorporating a reasonable number of complimentary factors in a single framework, but also from the ability to withstand empirical tests against seemingly contradictory theories. For example, one way to take this project further is to contrast the realist-rationalist explanatory framework developed in this study with ideational explanations rooted in the social constructivist tradition. This step can first include an elaboration of possible EU-external (global norms diffusion) and EU-internal (socialization) factors, with subsequent empirical testing in the same three cases of multilateral arms negotiations. The explanatory weight of the study's framework will be significantly strengthened if it appears that the empirical evidence does not fit the contending explanations.

8.2.3 Implications for policy

Another important issue to consider is the implications of the obtained insights about the EU's participation and performance in multilateral arms negotiations in the broader role of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor. There are two dimensions of such policy implications. On an optimistic side, through the effective support and promotion of the ATT and NPT, the EU strengthened its role as an international security

provider. The major intention behind the ATT was to improve human security by means of stepping up international arms transfer controls. While it is still too early to assess the ATT's practical impact, experts and activists concur that the Treaty, if properly implemented, can have a major impact on preventing human rights abuses and armed violence (Amnesty International and IANSA, 2011; Kytömäki, 2015). It is quite telling that at the time the ATT entered into force in late 2014, half of the required number of ratifications came from the EU. Benefits of the NPT as a collective security mechanism are well-acknowledged and highly acclaimed, despite widespread complaints about the inequalities and injustice enshrined in the grand bargain (Horowitz, 2015). Without the NPT regime in place, the world would have likely witnessed major nuclear weapons proliferation, with up to several dozens of states possessing such weapons by now. The EU's vast financial support of the IAEA and CTBT Organization is especially important in light of fulfilling the NPT's *raison d'être*.

Moreover, by way of contributing to the ATT and NPT negotiations, the EU reiterated its commitment to multilateralism and rules-based global governance. The promotion of multilateral cooperation and support of international institutions always has been and, according to the recently adopted EU Global Strategy, still remains at the core of the EU's international identity. It also became apparent that, even in times of being consumed by internal crises, the EU still can play a role of an example or model that is acknowledged and commended by the international community. As the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini unequivocally claimed, 'whenever multilateralism works, Europe is in the frontline' (Mogherini, 2015). While the statement seems exaggerated, it hints at the EU's principled and almost uncompromising support of multilateral global order. This is not insignificant, because the reluctance (China) or haphazardness (the US) of other big players towards multilateralism makes the EU the only one of its kind in this effort.

On a more pessimistic note, the pattern of causal relations in the NPT cases questions popular wisdom among EU diplomats and policy-makers about the EU as a microcosm of the NPT regime. While the idea itself is not inaccurate – the EU's membership does include all sides of the NPT's interest spectrum – it is the overreliance on it and the resulting consequences for policy choices that are problematic. The notion implies that the key for solving NPT problems lays within the EU. In contrast, this study shows that rather than being a cause of trouble, the frictions, if they appear, within the EU are symptomatic of broader divisions between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. As one national diplomat put it, 'in theory, "microcosm" works, but you

need to consider the context. [For example], Austria is in minority in the EU, but [in the NPT setting] it is in majority' (Interview 12, 2015). This implies that EU officials, instead of focusing excessively on the search for internal consensus, might want to put more efforts towards learning about and addressing the external context and, in particular, its impact on the balance of commonalities and differences among EU member states. That this is a difficult task for the EU to handle in the context of nuclear politics is demonstrated by the recent UN-sponsored negotiations on the treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, which neither the EU, nor the large majority of its member states, were able or willing to attend (United Nations, 2017).

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ANNEX 1 – LIST OF INTERVIEWS

- Interview 1 – EU diplomat, 4 April 2013, Brussels
- Interview 2 – European Commission official, 25 April 2013, Brussels
- Interview 3 – EU diplomat, 8 April 2013, telephone
- Interview 4 – NGO representative, 18 June 2014, Geneva
- Interview 5 – Think tank researcher, 27 May 2014, Brussels
- Interview 6 – EU member state diplomat, 17 June 2014, Geneva
- Interview 7 – EU member state diplomat, 26 May 2014, Brussels
- Interview 8 – EU member state diplomat, 16 June 2014, Geneva
- Interview 9 – EU member state diplomat, 18 December 2014, Brussels
- Interview 10 – EU diplomat, 25 June 2015, telephone
- Interview 11 – EU diplomat, 7 May 2015, New York
- Interview 12 – EU member state diplomat, 5 May 2015, New York
- Interview 13 – EU member state diplomat, 8 May 2015, New York
- Interview 14 – EU diplomat, 15 May 2015, New York
- Interview 15 – EU member state diplomat, 15 May 2015, New York
- Interview 16 – EU member state diplomat, 12 May 2015, New York
- Interview 17 – EU member state diplomat, 6 May 2015, New York
- Interview 18 – EU member state diplomat, 13 May 2015, New York
- Interview 19 – EU member state diplomat, 6 May 2015, New York
- Interview 20 – EU member state diplomat, 7 May 2015, New York
- Interview 21 – EU member state diplomat, 16 June 2014, Geneva
- Interview 22 – non-EU diplomat, 14 May 2015, New York
- Interview 23 – EU member state diplomat, 8 July 2014, telephone
- Interview 24 – EU member state diplomat, 11 May 2016, telephone
- Interview 25 – EU diplomat, 22 November 2013/24 February 2014, Brussels
- Interview 26 – EU diplomat, 7-9 March 2017, email correspondence
- Interview 27 – non-EU diplomat, 26 June 2014, telephone
- Interview 28 – non-EU diplomat, 11 July 2014, telephone
- Interview 29 – EU member state diplomat, 25 February 2014, Brussels
- Interview 30 – EU member state diplomat, 19 June 2014, Geneva
- Interview 31 – non-EU diplomat, 6 July 2014, email correspondence

Interview 32 – EU member state diplomat, 17 June 2014, Geneva
Interview 33 – EU member state diplomat, 17 June 2014, Geneva
Interview 34 – EU diplomat, 28 October 2014, Brussels
Interview 35 – EU member state diplomat, 18 June 2014, Geneva
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Interview 37 – EU member state diplomat, 6 June 2014, The Hague
Interview 38 – EU member state diplomat, 3 April 2013, telephone
Interview 39 – non-EU diplomat, 8 July 2014, telephone
Interview 40 – non-EU diplomat, 6 June 2014, The Hague
Interview 41 – EU diplomat, 26 April 2013, telephone
Interview 42 – NGO representative, 26 November 2014, telephone
Interview 43 – non-EU diplomat, 19 June 2014, Geneva

ANNEX 2 – PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION NOTES

Observation Notes 1 – participant observation notes prepared during the afternoon meeting of the Main Committee I of the NPT Review Conference on 11 May 2015.

Observation Notes 2 – participant observation notes prepared during the afternoon meeting of the Main Committee I of the NPT Review Conference on 14 May 2015.