A MAIN GERMAN QUESTION
The Evolution of the FRG’s Multilateral Policy of Détente in a Decade of Major Crises and Changes, 1975-1985

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# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Auswärtiges Amt</td>
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<td>AAPD</td>
<td>Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDE</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>ČSSR</td>
<td>Československá Socialistická Republika</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich-Soziale Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>ECE</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Europe</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Freie Demokratische Partei</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRTNF</td>
<td>Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBFR</td>
<td>Mutual Balanced Force Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiS</td>
<td>Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (STASI)</td>
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NNAs Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries
PA AA Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes
RAF Rote Armee Fraktion
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TNFs Theatre Nuclear Forces
U.K. United Kingdom
UN United Nations
U.S. United States
USSR Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Abstract

This thesis investigates the evolution of the FRG’s multilateral policy of détente between 1975 and 1985. During this decade Cold War relations went through major crises and changes which affected directly political balances in Europe. This work investigates how Bonn’s federal government – and the Auswärtiges Amt in particular – rethought its détente strategy after the conclusion of the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in order to adapt it to changing international conditions. It highlights the increasing importance of the CSCE process within the West German broader international strategy towards the Western allies and the Eastern partners.

The FRG’s CSCE policy during the first half of the Seventies has commonly been described as a completion or multilateral guarantee of Bonn’s bilateral Eastern policy (Ostpolitik). Its development after the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act has been largely overlooked by historical research. This thesis aims at offering a new interpretation of its later evolution. It argues that the CSCE process affirmed itself after 1975 as a FRG’s priority foreign political domain. Undoubtedly, Bonn’s efforts to rescue multilateral détente in the late Seventies-early Eighties were directed to shelter the prosecution of its bilateral cooperation with the East from escalating Cold War tensions. However, pursuing a proactive CSCE policy became increasingly important per se. Indeed, the series of conferences on security and cooperation in Europe offered the adequate diplomatic framework wherein Bonn could chase its national interests and foreign political ambitions, in years in which the FRG was called to greater international responsibilities and was trying to emerge as a more influent political actor on the global stage.

Based on a foreign policy-centred approach, this thesis is the result of the careful investigation of a wide range of primary sources from the Political Archive of the German Federal Foreign Office, as well as of newspapers articles from the Seventies and Eighties. The work offers a contribution to the study of West German foreign policy and Cold War history during the decade which paved the way to the important transformations of the late Eighties.
“It is therefore once again a duty of responsible observers at this moment in history to focus their minds on the Germans. What are they, really (eternal question)?

Luigi Barzini, *The Europeans*, 1983

Introduction

In 1983 Italian journalist Luigi Barzini observed: “The future of Europe appears largely to depend today once again, for good or evil, whether we like it or not, as it did for many centuries, on the future of Germany. It is still, as Madame de Staël wrote, ‘le cœur de l’Europe’.¹ [...] It is therefore once again a duty of responsible observers at this moment in history to focus their minds on the Germans. What are they, really (eternal question)? What do they fancy they are? Where are they going, wittingly or unwittingly? Where do they think they are going?”.² As Barzini’s interrogatives suggest, a German question continued to exist and affect European affairs in the early Eighties. What historians of the Cold War traditionally refer to by using the formula “German question”, represented the cornerstone of the postwar settlement of Europe. It was, first, about the postwar division of the German nation and the management of peace in Europe; second, about the creation of two separate German states – the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) – belonging to different and competing systems in the centre of Europe, where the dividing line

² Ibid., p. 107.
between the opposite Cold War blocs run. As a tight bipolar system came into being in world affairs, Germany’s division became strictly dependent on East-West dynamics: i.e. any transformation of the Cold War status quo in Europe implied a redefinition of the German question and vice versa. A number of other aspects contributed, moreover, to shape the German question: constraints to the German power, material and psychological limits to the sovereignty of both German states, security needs, questions of uncertain borders, enduring memories of the recent past and enemy images evoking deep-seated fears (Feindbilder).

For the Federal Republic of Germany dealing with the German question meant foremost, in the course of the Cold War decades, coping with its peculiarity within the Western front. This implied, in the specific, finding a way of living in direct contact with the cumbersome presence of occupying forces, the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall; handling the peculiar needs and worries deriving from its geopolitical position in the middle of the continent (Mittellage) and on the East-West border (Randlage); striking a balance between the presumption of being the only legitimate representative of a (temporary) divided nation and the need of finding concrete ways of living together with the other German state; finding a solution to the dilemma of whether giving up maintaining contacts with the Germans living in the East or pursuing dialogue with the authorities of a not recognised country, the GDR, and of the enemy bloc; dealing with the

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5 The recognition of the GDR as international sovereign state on the same level as the FRG was prohibited by West German postwar constitution, the Basic Law.
burdens and the legacies of the German power’s past aggressiveness. Last but not least, it meant learning to develop a new foreign political identity and finding a more certain collocation in international politics.

Object and arguments of the thesis

This thesis investigates the evolution of the West German multilateral policy of détente (Entspannungspolitik) – as it was implemented within the framework of the Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) between 1975 and 1985 – by contextualizing its pursuit in the broader changing international scenario. Indeed, during this decade Cold War relations went through major crises and transformations which affected directly the political balances in the European continent. With regard to East-West relations, the new era of bipolar dialogue inaugurated at the end of the Sixties reached its peak in 1975, as thirty-five heads of state and government from Europe, the U.S. and Canada gathered in Helsinki to sign the final accords from the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. During the first half of the Seventies relations between the two Cold War blocs had profited from the convergence between the different projects of superpower détente and European détente.6 As the relationship between Washington and Moscow deteriorated dramatically after 1975, Western Europeans were confronted with the question of how to continue East-West dialogue in a context of renewed Cold War confrontation (i.e. the so-called “Second Cold War”). Defending the achievements of détente was particularly

important to the FRG: given its special geopolitical position, it was the European country which benefited the most from improved relations with its Eastern neighbours and suffered the most under the consequences of a new international confrontational course.

The general assumption of this thesis is that the years under study represented a fundamental formative period for West German foreign policy. The evolution of the West German multilateral policy of détente is studied as an important part of a broader process of definition and implementation of a more assertive foreign policy which could better fit the FRG’s undisputed economic strength without otherwise fuelling perennial fears of rising German power. During the decade of the Seventies, indeed, the West German economic stability against a background of diffuse crisis enhanced the country’s relative weight within an international system growingly dominated by economic issues and interdependence. Moreover, the successes of the new policy of dialogue with the East (Ostpolitik) implemented by the social-liberal coalition government of charismatic and popular Chancellor Willy Brandt encouraged the West German ambition to take more effective foreign political initiatives. Boosted by these developments, foreign policy returned to be a federal government’s top priority, after domestic politics had been in the foreground for years. As it has traditionally been stressed, the “economic giant” aimed at overcoming its position of a “political dwarf” on the international stage. Truly, in the course of the Seventies West German diplomacy went through an important learning process as the FRG was called upon to take greater international responsibilities.

The present work argues, first, that the CSCE framework represented – for a series of reasons which will be analysed in the course of this dissertation – the foreign political domain where this evolution of Bonn’s international action was more evident,

notwithstanding some hindrances and setbacks; second, that the West German federal government – especially the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) – invested a great deal of efforts into the CSCE process, as it offered an adequate field to implement a proactive and comprehensive détente policy which allowed fostering the country’s own vital interests. The mechanism of follow-up conferences set out in the Helsinki Final Agreement provided a permanent multilateral diplomatic forum where Bonn could best chase its national and international interests and foreign political ambitions, in years in which the FRG was expected to shoulder greater international responsibilities and was trying to emerge as a more influential political actor on the global stage.

This research focuses in particular on the diplomatic strategy deployed by Bonn’s Foreign Office to chase, reinforce and safeguard the multilateral policy of dialogue with the East within the framework of the CSCE follow-up meetings. It analyses how the Auswärtiges Amt rethought and revised its détente strategy after the 1975 conclusion of the first CSCE in Helsinki in order to adapt it to changing international conditions. This dissertation advances the argument that the FRG’s multilateral détente policy underwent a major qualitative change during the years between 1975 and 1985, by taking increasingly the shape of a realistic, flexible and countercyclical policy. The major episodes of East-West crises of the decade – i.e. the renewed superpower nuclear competition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the exacerbation of the Polish crisis – challenged seriously the prosecution of the process of détente; however, they turned into important occasions of foreign political refection and stimulated the transformation of the West German multilateral détente strategy. The analysis of this evolution shows, moreover, the increasing importance the CSCE process gained within the FRG’s overall spectrum of international action. The pursuit of multilateral détente affirmed itself, in the course of the years 1975-1985, as a well-established issue in the West German political agenda: it became largely accepted by those domestic political forces which had originally firmly opposed it and survived nearly unchanged the major
political turn of the early Eighties, i.e. the return to power of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU).

The present work confirms the existence of a strict intertwining between Bonn’s bilateral Eastern policy and multilateral détente policy. They were undoubtedly linked by a relationship of functional interdependence. As it emerges with evidence from the analysis of this dissertation, the continuation of the CSCE process contributed importantly to safeguarding at the multilateral level both the achievements and the working conditions of Bonn’s bilateral dialogue with East Berlin and the other Eastern capitals. However, the view according to which the West German CSCE policy would represent a mere multilateral completion of Ostpolitik is challenged: indeed, its pursuit gained growing value per se, as well, within the Auswärtiges Amt’s comprehensive international strategy.

Defining the time period: years of crises, years of changes

The first aim of this dissertation is to contextualize the evolution of the West German policy of multilateral détente in the broader transforming Cold War scenario of the late Seventies-early Eighties. As the FRG’s foreign political decisions were profoundly affected by international circumstances, it is useful to review briefly the main developments marking the decade under study.

The years between the mid-Seventies and the mid-Eighties were marked by serious crises, several returns and a number of major transformations. After the postwar economic boom and revolutionary spirit of the late Sixties, the Seventies represented a decade of “diminished expectations”, according to the definition used by Tony Judt.9 These years were characterised by diffuse sentiments of crisis, pessimism and preoccupation. Western democracies were faced with the return of monetary inflation and economic recession; declining

growth rates were flanked by raising unemployment; social discontent grew in parallel with mounting social problems and protests against the establishment turned to violent confrontation in some countries – particularly Italy and West Germany – where terrorist groups intensified their open challenge to the stability of the democratic system in the late Seventies. The overall impression that the West had entered an age of crisis it was incapable to handle with led, as Judt analyses, “to much nervous talk of the ‘ungovernable’ condition of Western societies. Such anxieties proved overwrought: under stress, the institutions of Western Europe showed more resilience than many observers had feared. But there was no return to the optimism – or the illusions – of the first postwar decade.” Economic downfall and social discontent undermined the broad consensus which had embraced the Keynesian model and traditional political parties throughout the postwar decades. As a consequence, political landscapes underwent a process of fragmentation and the free-market ideology fostered by neoclassical economics gained a foothold almost everywhere in Western Europe.

With regard to international relations, the time period which spans between the second half of the Seventies and the first half of the Eighties has been traditionally depicted by historians as an age marked by multiple crises. Commenting on these years, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt talked about a “double crisis” which the world (and the FRG) entered between the late 1970s and the early 1980s. This “double crisis” involved, first, the strong escalation of

10 For a comparative historical analysis of West German Rote Arme Fraktion and Italian Brigate Rosse, see: R. Lucchesi, RAF und Rote Brigaden – Deutschland und Italien von 1970 bis 1985 (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2013).
tensions between the two blocs, which raised citizens’ fears and worries over the chance to preserve peace and the possible explosion of a nuclear conflict; second, the economic stagnation regarding the whole industrialised world, which led to recession and the rise of unemployment in many countries and raised worries about the return of a possible second, big global depression.

In the course of these years of international crises superpower détente collapsed, causing the stalemate of bilateral arm talks and undermining seriously the conditions for the prosecution of European détente. The worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations was boosted by the return of military confrontation outside Europe (so-called “proxy wars” between the superpowers in Africa), growing Soviet military interventionism (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), and renewed military competition in Europe (dispute over missiles). It was aggravated by the rigidity of the last years of Brezhnev’s leadership, by Carter’s dogmatic human rights campaign and by Reagan’s assertive policy of strength. Security issues returned to be at the centre of Western European – and especially West German – worries, as the deployment of Soviet new-generation missiles in Eastern Europe and Moscow’s military intervention in Afghanistan were interpreted as threatening signals of the USSR’s willingness to return to a renewed aggressive international course. The transatlantic relationship, as well, was confronted with major difficulties and tensions in the course of the decade under study: the lacking transatlantic entente over a number of international issues significantly contributed to reinforce the impression of a steady state of crisis in the Alliance. The outburst of the second oil crisis, which was

mainly caused by the wave of panic that the 1979 overthrow of the Shah in Iran produced in the oil markets, had tremendous large-scale consequences for international economies. Whereas during the Seventies there had been many talks about the “crisis of the West”, it was the traditional reputation of the Soviet strength that began to crumple at the end of the decade. The East bloc was increasingly confronted with internal ideological challenges coming from the euro-communist movement, dissident groups and supporters of a liberalisation of Eastern socio-political systems; with economic hardship and stagnation; with its own incapability to cope adequately with the renewed East-West rivalry in the field of arms race. The outburst of the Polish crisis in the early 1980s became the emblem of the poor health conditions of the whole Soviet bloc.

The “years of crises” entailed, however, significant transformative aspects, whose importance has been often overshadowed by their negative denotation. All these episodes of crisis were mainly late consequences of older scleroses and unsolved problems inherited from the previous years. They urged and boosted processes of transformations, redefinitions and pursuit of innovative solutions. Hence, the time span under study in this work was also a time of radical redefinition of the postwar order and of major transition to a new social-cultural age. The “conservative revolution” promoted by the tandem Reagan-Thatcher in the early Eighties – paralleled by its West German version, namely the “spiritual-moral turn” (geistig-moralische Wende) announced by Christian Democratic leader Helmut Kohl – spread across the Western bloc. Political landscapes in Western Europe underwent similar processes of fragmentation and new political groupings started to challenged the monopoly of traditional political parties. The list of large-scale transformations marking this process of renovation includes also: the advent of postmodernism in many fields.


of human activities, a concept which insisted on the idea of breaking with the past and whose vagueness was paralleled by immediate widespread popularity;\(^ {17}\) and the onset of globalization and of the technologic revolution which prompted a dramatic acceleration of interdependence. With regard to the novelties in the realm of international politics, the growing economic interdependence urged the start of a new season of regular summits amongst the leaders of the most industrialised nations, which began in November 1975 in Rambouillet;\(^ {18}\) a process of radical economic reforms started in China in 1978, prompting growing economic growth and opening to the world; dictatorships came to an end in Portugal, Spain and Greece and were followed by parallel processes of transitions in all three countries and by the ensuing EC’s enlargement to the South;\(^ {19}\) the development of new energetic sources received significant impulse on the wave of the second oil shock and ecological issues became crucial items of political and public debate, involving the active commitments of governments\(^ {20}\); peace movements burgeoned in Western societies and their demands directly questioned the validity and the sustainability of the bipolar international order, urging an overall rethinking of the whole Cold War system.\(^ {21}\)

All these episodes of crisis and change compose the broad background against which this study unfolds. A large part of them will be addressed in the ensuing chapters: they will be analysed through the lenses of their impact on and interaction with the main research

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\(^ {17}\) Philosophical manifesto of post-modernism was the work of French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard *La conditione postmoderne*, published in 1979.


\(^ {19}\) For an historical account of the EC’s role in Southern Europe after the end of the dictatorships, see: M. Del Pero, V. Gavin, F. Guirao, A. Varsori, eds., *Democrazie. L’Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature* (Milano: Le Monnier, 2010).

\(^ {20}\) An example for this trend is represented by U.S. President Carter’s project for the development of solar energy.

\(^ {21}\) The requests of the West German peace movements in the FRG alimented renewed fears of pan-Germanism and neutralization, raising a large public debate in the FRG.
question of this work. By coping with major crises and transformations, Western national states were urged to make sense of themselves, both with regard to their domestic transformations and their changing international tasks. This process of rethinking was particularly evident in the case of the FRG, which went through a process of profound revision of its national and international identity.

**Defining the context: West German foreign policy between continuity and change**

The second aim of this dissertation is to place the analysis of the evolution of the West German CSCE policy in the years 1975-1985 within the broader process of transformation of West German foreign policy. Détente policies provided an important field where the Auswärtiges Amt could carry out its attempts to play a more dynamic and assertive role in the international arena. It is therefore important to introduce briefly the foreign political context underpinning the implementation of Bonn’s CSCE policy after 1975, i.e. to highlight the main characteristics marking West German foreign policy in the mid-Seventies.

**Elements of continuity**

As Helga Haftendorn has claimed, West German foreign policy was a curious construction, subject to a “double containment”, i.e. affected by the burden of past horrors as well as by the East-West confrontation. Structural and psychological limits continued to restrict the room of manoeuvre of West German foreign policy in the years wherein the FRG committed itself to playing a more assertive international role.

The country’s geopolitical position steadily affected its national interests and needs, amongst those security issues remained in the

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foreground. The FRG continued to depend on the Western Alliance – especially on the U.S. – for the tutelage of its security needs. The coordination with the Western partners remained essential even though sometimes difficult. In particular the special relationship with the bigger ally, i.e. the U.S. administration, was carefully cultivated by Bonn’s federal government notwithstanding frequent divergences and mutual incomprehension. Dealing with the East continued to be a delicate affair even after the major shift introduced by the launch of Brand’s new Ostpolitik: the FRG’s Eastern initiatives remained under scrutiny by the Western allies. Questions concerning the state of the inner-German dialogue and the situation of Berlin continued to be object of regular discussion between Bonn and its allies. With the cumbersome presence of its wall and the Four Powers’ enduring duties regarding its destiny, the former capital of the German Reich

23 As U.S. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Hartmann explained to the head of the political department of the Auswärtiges Amt, van Well, in December 1975, the three powers “strongly recommended” to the West German federal government to inform them “more extensively and more regularly” about its talks and negotiations with the GDR. It was, indeed, important that they could gain knowledge in due time of questions affecting them closely. See: Ministerialdirektor van Well, z.Z. Brüssel, an das Auswärtige Amt, 12.12.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II, doc. 382, p. 1801. The request of more exhaustive and regular consultations had been already directed to the FRG by the three powers in June 1975, as they had complained about the reticence of the new Schmidt/Genscher government in providing information about its moves towards East Berlin: see Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Gehlhoff, 2.06.1975, in, vol. I, Doc. 144, p. 661.

24 One important permanent forum of discussion on German-German and Berlin questions was provided by the routine of regular meetings of the foreign ministers of the FRG, the U.S., the U.K. and France, which traditionally took place in conjunction with the gatherings of NATO Council of Ministers. The coordination between the Bundesrepublik and the three Western partners was two-way: on the one hand, Bonn was offered the possibility to be involved and have voice in the decisions regarding Berlin – for whose status the three powers shared the responsibility with the Soviet Union; on the other hand, Bonn was asked to involve the Western partners in the pursuit of its bilateral relations with the GDR.

25 The rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers – France, the U.K., the U.S. and the USSR – over the future of the former German capital and of Germany as a whole were reconfirmed in the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. For the text of the agreement, see: J. Nawrocki, ed., Die Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Staaten in Deutschland: Entwicklungen, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen (Berlin: Holzapfel 1986).
embodied that persistent interweaving of two world wars’ legacies, Cold War dynamics, and symbolic and everyday repercussions of the East-West division, which continued to shape the complexity of the German question. The Four Powers’ responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole represented the counterweight to Bonn’s economic predominance in Europe. Fears of a return of the “German power”, worries about the re-emergence of the neutrality-option for the FRG and suspicion about inner-German rapprochement continued to influence the European partners’ hearts and minds.

All these factors represented elements of continuity marking the unfolding of West German foreign policy – even though with different nuances – throughout the whole duration of the Cold War. As it will emerge from the analysis in the course of the next chapters of the present work, these restrictions affected the conduction of the West German CSCE policy and were consciously taken into account by the Auswärtiges Amt when formulating and implementing its détente strategy.

28 Worries about the return of the “neutrality option” for Germany’s settlement were alimented by the growing popularity of protests against the NATO double-track decision of West German pacifist and anti-nuclear movements in the early Eighties: their requests challenged indeed the validity of the bipolar order. Bonn’s attempts to safeguard the dialogue with the East in times of renewed bipolar confrontation were target of the Western partners’ suspicions as well. As stressed in a cablegram sent from Brussels to the Foreign Office in Bonn, there was some fear in the Western Alliance that the FRG’s efforts to continue its Ostpolitik would make the federal government hostage of the Eastern requests. See: Botschafter Wieck, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtiges Amt, 16.02.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. I, doc. 42, p. 237.
29 Emblematic of those suspicions was the statement of Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, who in 1984 claimed that: “Everybody agrees that the two Germanys should have good relations. It should be clear, however, that pan-Germanism is something that must be overcome. There are two German states and two German states must remain”. See: J.M. Markham, “For both East and West two Germanys is better”, in The New York Times, 23.09.1984.
The constitutional moment of Bonn’s Eastern policy

Besides the existing elements of continuity, West German foreign policy had undergone a major transformation during the first half of the Seventies, which paved the way to its following developments. The real turning point had been marked by the return to power of the Social Democrats of the SPD in 1969 – in coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) – for the first time since the era of the Weimar Republic. New Chancellor Willy Brandt brought along the experience he had collected by serving three years as foreign minister in Kiesinger’s coalition government (1966-1969) and devised together with his collaborator Egon Bahr a new approach to relations with the GDR, the Soviet Union and the other Eastern countries.

Bonn’s new Eastern policy was inspired by the idea of “change through rapprochement” – Wandel durch Annährung – which overturned Adenauer’s traditional conception of relationship with the Soviet bloc: the solution to the German question was no more the precondition for a normalisation of relations with the Eastern countries, but rather a policy of dialogue and multiple contacts with the East would lay the favourable grounds for the overcoming of Germany’s and Europe’s division.30 Within few years since its start, West German Ostpolitik reached a series of important diplomatic achievements: a complex of agreements – the so-called Eastern Treaties – were signed with Moscow and Warsaw (1970), East Berlin (1972) and Prague (1973); the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was attained in 1971; the ratification of the Basic Treaty with the GDR by the Bundestag in 1973 paved the way to the de facto normalisation of relations with East Berlin, to the exchange of “Permanent Representatives” between the two German states, to the participation of both countries in the CSCE in Helsinki and to a new season of regular inner-German contacts. The “age of Treaties” marked the constitutional moment of the FRG’s relations with the Eastern bloc: it set the ground for their ensuing developments and provided the irreversible foreign political

30 T. Judt, Postwar, p. 497.
legacy inherited by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt after the resignation of his predecessor in 1974.

The conduction of bilateral relations with the Eastern countries was flanked by the pursuit of negotiations for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at a multilateral level. They were both constituents of the same détente project directed to the future aim of building a new order of peace and overcoming bipolar division on the European continent through the steady multiplication of East-West diplomatic, economic and human contacts. Hence, Eastern policy, inner-German dialogue and multilateral détente were integral part of the same foreign political project which established progressively itself as a deep-seated West German foreign political paradigm; their mutual interactions are object of analysis of the following chapters.

In the name of responsibility

According to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, it was only in the Seventies that the FRG discovered its interest for world politics.\(^\text{31}\) In the course of the decade the country was called upon to take on greater international responsibilities. This was a consequence, in part, of the success of the German model (\textit{Modell Deutschland}): the FRG affirmed itself as an example of relative economic, social and political stability against a background of diffuse crisis.\(^\text{32}\) It was a consequence, too, of the successful achievements of Bonn’s \textit{Ostpolitik} and of the age of Treaties. The 1972 Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR opened the door to the full participation of both German states in international organisations and diplomatic forums. On 18 September 1973 the FRG and the GDR became full members of the United Nations (UN): after many years of participation as an observer country,\(^\text{33}\) the achievement

\(^\text{32}\) W. Jäger, W. Link and J. Fest, \textit{Republik im Wandel, 1974-1982: Die Ära Schmidt. Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland}.
\(^\text{33}\) The FRG had obtained the status of observer country in 1955: not defined in legal terms, the observer status represented a fundamental informal device to overcome the formal obstacles to the West German full membership and permitted to the FRG to enjoy a meaningful relationship to the UN’s work. See: A.G. Mower, “Observer countries:
of the aim of the full membership marked for the FRG the symbolic completion of its long process of postwar international emancipation. The West German first experience as non-permanent rotating member of the UN Security Council in the years 1977-1978 enhanced drastically Bonn’s possibilities to play a role of responsibility in world affairs and faced West German diplomacy with new important tasks.\(^{34}\)

In 1977 West German Foreign Minister Genscher claimed in front of the federal Parliament – the Bundestag – that: “quoting Max Weber: foreign policy requires ethics of responsibility and not ethics of conviction. [...] We [the West Germans] share the responsibility towards what happens in the world”.\(^{35}\) The term “responsibility” became the keyword of West German foreign policy during the second half of the Seventies.\(^{36}\) References to the concept recurred frequently in public speeches, interviews and analyses in these years. Its repetition served a double purpose: first, to support the FRG’s ambitions to play a more influential role on the international stage; second, to make a clean break with Germany’s past irresponsible Machtpolitik which had dragged Europe into two world wars. The assumption of greater responsibilities in foreign policy was oriented both towards the present/future (by Bonn’s engagement in the fields of détente, UN policies, human rights, North-South relations, development policies towards the Third World, in the stabilisation of the processes of democratisation in Southern Europe, in the creation of an European Political Community) and towards the past (by dealing with the international repercussions of Germany’s recent history, particularly

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35 *Vorbereitung der Bundestagsdebatte zur Regierungserklärung (außenpolitischer Teil)*, 17.01.1977, in PAAA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.

36 To the popularity of the term contributed the publication in 1979 of the renown essay “The imperative of responsibility” (*Das Prinzip Verantwortung*) by West German philosopher Hans Jonas.
with the emergence of public discussions about Nazi crimes and Holocaust\textsuperscript{37}).

Given the peculiar characteristics of West German foreign policy, multilateral cooperation provided the adequate framework wherein the FRG could pursue greater international responsibilities and expand its room of manoeuvre. In the course of the Seventies West German learnt, indeed, to make a more conscious and effective use of the possibilities offered by multilateralism.\textsuperscript{38} Bonn tried to take proactive initiatives within the major forums of international cooperation at its disposal – the G7 summits, the EEC, the UN, and the CSCE. Hence, multilateral détente represented an important field where West German diplomacy could take more assertive international initiatives within the framework of a vaster policy of growing international responsibility.

**Literature review and contribution of the work**

The prosecution and development of the FRG’s multilateral policy of détente after the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act have been largely ignored by historical research on the Cold War. A number of reasons have contributed to the lack of publications addressing this subject.


\textsuperscript{38} “The rapid West German learning process in the use of multilateralism” is a central theme of Hakkarainen’s book on the formative years of the West German CSCE policy; see: P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe. West Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975 (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011).
First, the investigation of the West German multilateral policy of détente has suffered from the same destiny of the study of the CSCE process. The historical significance of the European détente endeavour was neglected for years by historiography on the Cold War and International Relations. With the exception of Wilfried Loth’s work “Helsinki, 1. August 1975. Entspannung und Abrüstung” published in 1998, the years between 2005 and 2010 saw a relative revival of the CSCE process. All these works focus on the origins of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, on the diplomatic preparation of the first conference in Helsinki and on the significance of the Helsinki Accords. Only in recent times, the international developments marking the era of crisis of détente have attracted a considerable amount of historical interest: within the blooming of publications on the so-called Second Cold War, few studies on the later developments of the CSCE process have got a little space as well. A very limited


number of works have been devoted to the analysis of the CSCE review meetings in Belgrade (1977-1978) and Madrid (1980-1983): they are collective volumes, whose case studies offered a detailed view on the diplomatic unfolding of both follow-up conferences.42 By providing separate analyses of single aspects of the CSCE review conferences they lack, notwithstanding their accuracy, a comprehensive historical account of the vaster evolution of the process as a whole.

Second, the historical analysis of West German diplomatic efforts within the process of multilateral détente in the years 1975-1985 has been affected by the general trends regarding the study of Germany’s Cold War history. Scholars have predominantly focused their attention on two periods/topics: i.e. on the developments of the postwar time which brought to the formation of two separate German states in 1949;43 and on the major turning point marked by the return to power of Social Democrats and the launch of Brandt’s new Ostpolitik.44

43 Noteworthy works on post-war Germany and the German question during the first Cold War period are: W.G. Gray, Germany’s Cold War. The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); N. Lewkowicz, The German question and the origins of the Cold War (Milano: IPOC, 2008); W. Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German Question and the founding of the GDR (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).
Moreover, a large part of works on Cold War Germany has been affected by the cumbersome presence of the revolutionary events of the years 1989/1990 which led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. With particular regard to Bonn’s policy of dialogue with the East, there has been an overwhelming flood of historical studies on the formative Brandt years, which have insightfully gone through a variety of different aspects and implications – domestic, bilateral, international – of Ostpolitik. This burgeoning has been paralleled by a relative scarcity of works on the ensuing developments during the years of the Schmidt administration and the first years of the Kohl administration. Analyses addressing this subject tend to concentrate on mere bilateral aspects – mostly at the level of German-German, West German-Soviet, West German-American relations –, neglecting the significance of their large-scale interactions with the broader international dynamics and Cold War developments. This lack of studies can probably be explained, first, by the widespread idea that Ostpolitik was characterised by lesser ideal inspiration and smaller realisations after Brandt’s resignation; second, by the pronounced technical character marking inner-German bilateral negotiations after 1973; and third, by the common impression that the West German Chancellery’s attention was devoted in these years to other foreign political domains (management of international economy, security issues, transatlantic relations, crisis management). Studies on the realisations of West German foreign policy during the decade have been mostly written by contemporary commentators and policy analysts; they have been subject of diplomats’ and politicians’ memoirs; they have been included into general handbooks addressing West


45 Bonn’s policy of dialogue with the East is meant here in a broad sense by referring both to its bilateral dimension (Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik) and multilateral dimension (Entspannungspolitik).
German foreign policy on its whole. They undoubtedly provide a large amount of interesting information and standpoints; they are however deficient in historical approach.

Third, the idea that West German initiatives in the field of the CSCE represented merely a multilateral coverage of Bonn’s bilateral Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik has contributed to overlook their original aspects. The most notable and comprehensive analysis of the evolution of a West German distinct CSCE policy has been offered by Petri Hakkarainen in his valuable work “A State of Peace in Europe. West Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975”. The Finnish historian focuses on the idea that the Brandt/Scheel government made of the CSCE during its first years of negotiations in order to achieve the priority goals of the Eastern Treaties and of Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. In his analysis he put a particular stress on the process of “Europeanization” that Bonn’s Ostpolitik went through in Helsinki. Another important contribution to the formative years of Bonn’s CSCE policy is provided by Senoo Tetsuji in his work devoted to Bahr’s conception of the CSCE as intermediate step for a construction of new European order and for the overcoming of Europe’s and Germany’s division. The

46 One of the most comprehensive account of the FRG’s political history is provided by the six volumes of the collection Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, edited by Karl Dietrich Bracher; an important section of each volume is dedicated to the analysis of West German foreign policy during the respective period under study. With regard to the years of the Schmidt and Adenauer administration, see respectively: W. Jäger, W. Link and J. Fest, Republik im Wandel, 1974-1982: Die Ära Schmidt. Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; A. Wirsching, Abschied vom Provisorium: 1982-1990 (München: DVA, 2006); Creuzberger, Westintegration und Neue Ostpolitik. Die Außenpolitik der Bonner Republik (Berlin: be.bra Verlag, 2009); Lappenküper, Ulrich, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1990 (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2008); H. Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung.


investigation of the later evolution of the West German CSCE strategy is limited to two contributions by German historians Matthias Peter (focus on the FRG)\(^49\) and Oliver Bange (focus on the parallel strategies of the FRG and the GDR)\(^50\) published within two collective volumes dedicated to continuation of the process of multilateral détente after Helsinki.

Building upon the existing literature, the present dissertation intends to offer a vaster picture of the evolution of Bonn’s CSCE policy over the decade 1975-1985 as a West German priority foreign political domain. By challenging the view according to which the West German initiatives in the field of multilateral détente should be interpreted as a mere multilateral completion or protection of the achievements and possibilities of the bilateral dialogue with the East, the investigation aims at highlighting their original significance, too, against the background of the changing Cold War dynamics. Undoubtedly, Bonn’s efforts to rescue multilateral détente in the late Seventies and early Eighties were directed to preserve the prosecution of its bilateral cooperation with the East – and the concrete achievements of the inner-German dialogue in particular – in face of the escalating Cold War tensions. However, pursuing a proactive CSCE policy became increasingly important *per se*. Quite significantly, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who leaded the West German Foreign Office from 1974 until 1992, when looking back at the long years of his office has defined the CSCE process as “the heart of Bonn’s foreign policy strategy in the last


fifteen years of Cold War’s East-West relations”. Hence, the findings of this research suggest looking with greater attention at the interaction between the complex of Deutschlandpolitik-Ostpolitik-Entspannungspolitik and at the attempts of pursuing an overall more autonomous foreign policy by the FRG.

By investigating the process of transformation, adjustment and implementation of a West German realistic policy of détente in the specific field of the CSCE, the present work aims at highlighting its peculiar significance within the broader process of assertion of a more influential West German foreign policy. Second, it intends to enrich the understanding of these transitional years in the history of the Bundesrepublik. Third, it wishes to contribute to a more accurate interpretation of the late Cold War developments which paved the way to the end of Germany’s and Europe’s division.

Furthermore, this dissertation adds to the slowly increasing number of studies by Italian scholars on German postwar history, which has been relatively overlooked in Italy for years: the author hopes to contribute to the consolidation of this growing trend and to the deepening of the understanding of Germany’s recent history in her country of origin.

Finally, considering that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act has celebrated this year its round anniversary, namely the fortieth; that primary sources on the development of the CSCE process after Helsinki have been becoming increasingly accessible to scholars in the last few years under the thirty-year rule; and that recent international developments in Europe urge to rediscover the historical roots of the policy of dialogue with the Soviet Union and the past experience of détente in times of serious East-West tensions, new publications on the

52 This point has been made by historian Antonio Varsori in his introduction to Bernardini’s work Nuova Germania, antichi timori. Stati Uniti, Ostpolitik e sicurezza europea.
topic of the CSCE are to expect – which the present work aims at adding to.

**Approach and Sources**

This dissertation treats of the West German policy of détente as it was devised, adjusted and implemented at the multilateral level by the *Auswärtiges Amt*. Therefore, it adopts an historical approach mainly centred on the investigation of national foreign policy, which however takes a careful look at the domestic implications of foreign political decisions and their interweaving with broader international developments. Investigating such interconnections is particular important in the case of the FRG’s détente policy due to some peculiarities which characterised it. First, the policy of East-West dialogue strongly affected West German vital national interests. Second, West Germans were particularly mindful of the process of détente and sensitive to its development, as a large part of its achievements touched directly their everyday lives: hence, public expectations represented a factor that the West German Foreign Office had to take into due account when conducting its CSCE policy. Third, the enduring limitations to the country’s sovereignty and the openness of the German question made Bonn’s pursuit of East-West dialogue more exposed to international instabilities and uncertainties.

Whereas the conduction of inner-German relations and of bilateral relations with the Eastern countries was marked by the political imprint of the Chancellery, decisions in the field of the CSCE were predominantly made by the *Auswärtiges Amt* under the stable and long-lasting guidance of Foreign Minister Genscher. This was partly due to the nature of the CSCE process: as a broad, semi-permanent multilateral framework, it involved the expertise of diplomats used to long and strenuous negotiations. Moreover, Genscher’s special interest in the CSCE and the multilateral policy of détente contributed to the great efforts invested by West German diplomacy into this foreign policy field. Hence, the investigation of the evolution of Bonn’s CSCE
policy in the years 1975-1985 offers a glance not only at the process of international emancipation of the FRG within the international arena, but at the process of relative emancipation of the Auswärtiges Amt from the Chancellery within the realm of East-West policies.

For these reasons, the thesis is based on the investigation of a wide range of primary sources – namely strategic papers, internal analyses, diplomatic papers, reports of ambassadors, speeches and interviews – from the Political Archive of the German Federal Foreign Office – Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA AA). During the long months of research, it has been possible to analyse a large amount of archival materials, many of those have been disclosed only in recent times. The research is focused on the investigation of the following records:

- the records of the Office of the Minister (B1), of the Office of the State Secretaries (B2) and of the Planning Staff (B9), which provide a vast load of information about the planning of Bonn’s détente strategies, the internal and diplomatic preparation of the CSCE meetings, the evaluation of their unfolding and results, as well as about the continuous work of analysis of international developments carried out by the officers of the Foreign Office;
- the records devoted to the relations with the U.S. (B32; NEWYGK), France, Belgium, Netherlands and Austria (B24), which offer a detailed picture of the “Western dimension” of Bonn’s foreign policy;
- the records dedicated to the relations with the Eastern countries (B42) and to the discussion of foreign political issues with the GDR (B38), whose materials have consented the investigation of the diplomatic initiatives undertaken towards the East in the field of multilateral détente, as well as of Bonn’s assessments of ongoing developments within the Soviet bloc;
- the record of the Press Office (B7), which collect speeches, interviews, articles, public appearances of the foreign minister and his collaborators.
On their whole, this variety of archival documents provides a comprehensive picture of the development of the FRG’s multilateral détente policy during the decade between 1975 and 1985, by disclosing useful details about the load of conceptual and diplomatic work accomplished by West German officers and diplomats. The parallel analysis of bilateral talks and negotiations with both the Western allies and the Eastern countries highlights the coherence underpinning the arguments and ideas put forward by Bonn when discussing about détente with its different partners. The frequent references to the process of European détente in the course of bilateral talks and public speeches confirm the crucial importance the CSCE process had for West German foreign policy in these years. Moreover, public contributions, speeches and interviews contribute to the understanding of the public and domestic side of the international pursuit of détente.

Research in the archive of the German Foreign Office has been supported by the examination of published sources, in particular of the West German diplomatic documents included in the collection "Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland". In addition, research activities conducted at the Newspaper Archive in Berlin Westhafen – Zeitungsabteilung der Staatsbibliothek – have provided a vast amount of newspaper and magazine articles from the Seventies and Eighties (from Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, the F.A.Z., Welt am Sonntag). They represent a valuable insight into the mood and the perception trends of the West German public opinion, by enriching the understanding of Zeitgeist.

**Structure of the work**

With regard to the structure, the dissertation is divided into five main chapters, organised chronologically.

In Chapter 1 the analysis moves from the seminal moment marked by the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, whose legacies influenced significantly the following developments of the FRG’s CSCE policy. The problems linked to the Helsinki Agreement’s implementation
process began to depict the landscape wherein the first review conference of Belgrade would unfold.

Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical definition of the concept of “realistic détente” by the West German Foreign Office and its tempted implementation at the first CSCE follow-up meeting of Belgrade. The Belgrade CSCE represented a severe test and an important learning-step for West German multilateral diplomacy, which was confronted with disappointing results and urged to reflect on its miscalculations. Both the lessons learnt at Belgrade and the changing climate of East-West relations urged the Auswärtiges Amt to start an internal reflection aimed at rethinking its détente policy for the following years.

Chapter 3 marks the ideal centre of the dissertation: it shows how issues of military security played a pivotal role in diplomatic and public debates in the time interval between Belgrade and Madrid. These debates interacted with the preparation of the second CSCE follow-up meeting, by influencing importantly the formation of the conference agenda and the partial revision of the West German CSCE strategy.

To the long unfolding of the Madrid CSCE is dedicated Chapter 4. The conference works were beset by two major international crises: the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 and the open challenge launched by oppositional groups to the governing elite in Poland, which unfolded in the course of 1980-1981 and pivoted in December 1981 as martial law was imposed by General Jaruzelski. West German diplomatic efforts at the turn of the decade were directed to protect the process of détente from the return of East-West confrontation: Bonn’s CSCE policy in times of crisis gained flexibility and pragmatism and asserted itself as an anti-cyclical policy.

In Chapter 5, after investigating the West German contributions to the first phase of the Stockholm’s Conference on Disarmament, the analysis turns to assess the state of the CSCE process ten years after Helsinki: 1985 was a year of important anniversaries, whose celebrations revealed the persistence of past legacies affecting the conduction of West German foreign policy. As European détente
celebrated the tenth anniversary in 1985, a new major shift was taking place on the international stage, marked by Gorbachev’s seizure of power in the Soviet Union and the ensuing restart of the superpower dialogue.
“Entspannungspolitik bedarf des langen Atems”

Per Fischer, Head of the West German delegation at the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade

Chapter 1


Introduction

The first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe reached its final stage at the end of July 1975, after two years and a half of intense negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki. On 1 August the heads of state and government of the thirty-five participant states gathered in the Finnish capital to sign the conference final document, i.e. the so-called Helsinki Final Act, fruit of laborious compromise. The CSCE was the first and most resounding achievement of the multilateral process of European détente. Its convening had been the result of a long formation process. After the first embryonic proposal for a Pan-European Conference on Security issued by Soviet Foreign Minister

53 “The policy of détente requires a long breath” [transl.]
Molotov in 1954, the idea of creating an East-West forum to discuss security issues in Europe had been relaunched by the Warsaw Pact through in its 1969 Budapest Appeal. A series of new conditions had encouraged the Western Alliance’s decision to accept, this time, the Eastern invitation to cooperation. First, unlike older proposals, the Budapest Appeal did not preclude the participation of the U.S. and Canada, allowing Western Europeans to open to cooperation with the Eastern bloc by preserving the unity of the Alliance. Second, a new interest for a policy of East-West dialogue had begun to spread across Western Europe in the course of the Sixties: the promotion of political détente had been included amongst the future tasks of the Western Alliance in the 1967 Harmel Report. Third, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam on the one hand and the Soviet crackdown on Czechoslovakia paralleled by the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations on the other hand prompted the superpowers to turn to mutual cooperation and dialogue. Last but not least, the FRG’s unprecedented drive to intensify diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe fostered by Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt’s through his new Ostpolitik project urged the Western allies not to stand aside watching.

Notwithstanding these new favourable conditions and the widespread cooperative spirit informing East-West relations in the

early Seventies, the achievement of a diplomatic agreement in Helsinki was not taken for granted. During the long months of CSCE negotiations the participants’ divergent interests and views clashed and risked many times to compromise a fruitful conclusion of the conference. It is not surprising, hence, that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act was welcomed as a success – even though for respectively different reasons – by political elites both in the East and the West. More varied were public reactions towards the conference’s outcome. While some looked with preoccupation at the possible repercussions of the dialogue with the traditional enemy or were simply sceptical about what had been achieved in Helsinki, for others Helsinki represented the first realisation of that “spirit of détente” which would usher in a new era of East-West peaceful cooperation.

The Helsinki CSCE represents a divisive matter of historical analysis as well. Historians have disagreed about the significance of the conference, especially with regard to the late developments of the Cold War and to its conclusion. Amongst others, Jussi Hanhimäki has defined the signing of the Helsinki Accords as a seminal moment in Europe’s Cold War. Similarly, the creation of the CSCE has been assessed as a major landmark in the Cold War era by Akira Iriye in his work dedicated to the rise of the global community in the postwar decades. However, a large part of historical research in the field of Cold War and International Relations overlooked the Helsinki endeavour for years. The 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act was traditionally considered as the peak and the end of the détente era; the significance of its following developments was clouded by the cumbersome presence of the returning bipolar confrontational course.

59 For an overview of Western public reactions towards the results of the CSCE in Helsinki, see: A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, pp. 32-37.
marking the advent of the so-called “second Cold War”. One possible reason for this common disinterest has been identified by Angela Romano in the “disproportion between efforts and achievements” marking the CSCE negotiations, which lasted for many months, involved large delegations from a great number of countries and ended with the signature of solemn but not legally binding documents. The negative accounts of the Helsinki endeavour by some outstanding contemporary commentators did probably contributed to influence the trends of the following historical research, too. The pronounced compromise character of the Helsinki Final Act did certainly open the way to ambiguities and misinterpretations which emerged with evidence in the aftermath of the conference. The (dis)proportion pointed out by Romano appears, however, more varied if we look more closely at the specific expectations, efforts and achievements of the individual CSCE participant countries.

The assessment of the historical significance of the Helsinki CSCE assumes a peculiar meaning in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany. The FRG was the engine of European détente and one of the leading actors of the CSCE. Great efforts were invested by Bonn into multilateral negotiations; they were rewarded by the inclusion of specific West German interests in the conference final act. West Germans had greatest interests in a positive conclusion of the conference and most reasons to be satisfied for the compromise achieved in Helsinki. The CSCE was, in a way, as it will be analysed in the course of this work, largely a (West) German question. Even though its role within the overall unfolding of the following Cold War developments had not to be overrated, the Helsinki Final Act did mark

62 A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, p. 17.
63 The FRG’s role in fostering the inclusion of human issues in the CSCE negotiation agenda has been analysed in detail by Sara Lamberti Moneta in her dissertation. See: S. Lamberti Moneta, Helsinki Disentangled (1973-75): West Germany, the Netherlands, the EPC and the Principle of the Protection of Human Rights, PhD thesis (University of Trento: 2012).
64 For an insightful analysis of West German diplomatic work at negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki, see: P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe. West Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975.
a fundamental watershed for West German foreign policy. In the years ensuing the signing of the Helsinki Accords, the CSCE became indeed a foreign policy priority for the Bundesrepublik. CSCE matters were constantly addressed by the diplomatic work of the West German Foreign Office, the Auswärtiges Amt, in the years between 1975 and 1985. During the months of preparation of the follow-up conferences in Belgrade and Madrid, the CSCE was central item of analyses within the West German Foreign Office, of debates within the Western Alliance and negotiations with the Eastern countries. This persistent attention contributed to reinforce the processual nature of the CSCE, whose possibility of continuation had been provided by the Helsinki Final Act through the inclusion of the mechanism of review conferences. Notwithstanding setbacks and moments of disappointment, the CSCE established itself for Bonn as a continuous forum of East-West multilateral dialogue.

In this chapter, the analysis moves from a brief review of the main elements of novelty marking the diplomatic endeavour of the first CSCE, in order to focus on the main achievements reached by West German diplomacy at Helsinki. The successful outcome of the conference contributed to reinforce Bonn’s confidence in its foreign political means. Besides offering the adequate framework to multilateralise the aims and contents of Bonn’s Ostpolitik, the CSCE asserted itself after 1975 as a foreign political priority per se. The perception of a West German victory at Helsinki was puzzled by the uncertainties and setbacks of the ensuing implementation process. The problematic unfolding of the implementation process unveiled, indeed, the existence of conceptual divergences and ambiguities sealed in the Helsinki Accords. As Eastern countries adopted more pronounced ideological and defensive stances on the CSCE in the wake of Helsinki, the West German Foreign Office directed its diplomatic efforts to reinforce coordination within the Western caucus, put pressure for implementation on the Soviet bloc countries and observe carefully the ongoing developments in the Eastern bloc.
The Helsinki CSCE as a “curious diplomatic enterprise”

Looking at the developments of the first three Cold War decades, the CSCE appears as an unprecedented event. The peculiar character of the conference was highlighted by the contemporary analysis published in the West German journal of international politics *Europa-Archiv*, where the CSCE was defined as “the most curious diplomatic enterprise of the century”.65 Several factors contributed to its uniqueness in the postwar international history.

A first element of novelty consisted in the composition of the conference: with its thirty-five participants, the CSCE was the first Pan-European multilateral meeting since World War II.66 Whilst European in its name and in its aims, the CSCE encompassed a vast geographical area, in which the conceptual borders of the Western bloc coincided with the borders of the Western Alliance, including the U.S. and Canada. The involvement of the group of European neutral and non-aligned countries (NNAs) was intended to open European cooperation to the demands of the non-aligned movement and to overcome a strict bipolar logic.67 Both aims remained largely unrealised: the nature and the functioning of the CSCE, as in Helsinki as in the course of the following review meetings, never managed to overcome the predominant East-West logic. Bipolarity informed Helsinki’s conference aims, negotiation issues and alliance schemes. Indeed, the conference was since its origins – and continued to be in its following developments of the Seventies and the Eighties – a product of the Cold War. The CSCE provided evidence for the fact that Cold War was still ongoing in Europe, notwithstanding the temporary cooperative spirit marking East-West relations; and that Europe still remained a main

stage of bipolar confrontation, notwithstanding the trends of globalisation marking the recent Cold War developments.68

Second, peculiar were the meaning and the structure of the Helsinki Accords. Their signing marked a founding moment for East-West relations. Similarly to a constitutional Charta, the conference final agreement addressed, indeed, both the rules of the game and the contents of cooperation in Europe. Werner Link has defined the CSCE as a replacement for a European peace conference and the Helsinki Final Act as the replacement for a European peace treaty.69 The West German Foreign Office ventured to compare the role of the conference to the 1815 Congress of Vienna: Helsinki marked the first attempt in the postwar era to define common rules and principles of interstate behaviour for a modus vivendi on the European continent.70 The opening declaration of principles, which sealed the participants’ commitments to the respect of some shared rules in the conduction of their mutual relations, was followed by a series of substantial recommendations for cooperation. These were grouped in three main areas, also known as the Helsinki’s three Baskets. Basket I contained arrangements of political nature in the field of traditional security, with the main focus on the so-called confidence-building measures (CBMs): the signing states committed themselves to announcing their military manoeuvres and to inviting other participant states to attend as observers. Basket II dealt with issues of cooperation in the economic, scientific and technical fields and in the area of environmental protection. Basket III focused instead on the human dimension of cooperation, encompassing

a series of commitments concerning the facilitation of human contacts, information and cultural cooperation.⁷¹

Third, the Helsinki Final Act contained the grounds to consolidate the CSCE as a process. Basket IV ensured the continuation of the CSCE, by calling for follow-up meetings to verify the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and eventually negotiate its further improvement. The mechanism of review conferences granted a certain degree of continuity without institutionalisation. This had been a Western request: rejecting the Soviet proposal for the creation of a permanent body – which might turn into an instrument to merely freeze what had been achieved in Helsinki⁷² – Western Europeans aimed at shaping East-West cooperation as a continuous but dynamic process. All thirty-five delegations decided to meet again two years later in Belgrade in order to evaluate the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions and discuss new possible ways of East-West cooperation. Hence, the Helsinki Final Act introduced an important element of novelty in East-West relations by opening a new season of conference diplomacy. The Helsinki CSCE was ensued by three follow-up meetings in Belgrade (1977-1978), Madrid (1980-1983) and Vienna (1986-1989); a Conference on Security and Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm (1984-86); and plenty of meetings of experts on issues of peaceful arbitration, economic cooperation, cultural exchange and human rights. The diplomatic work pursued during and in preparation of these meetings took the shape of a thick weave of bilateral and multilateral negotiations which multiplied the occasions for contact and gathering. As the West German Foreign Office observed in the fall of 1975, from the clauses of Basket IV derived a series of new

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⁷¹ The integral text of the Helsinki Final Act is available on the website of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the link http://www.osce.org/mc/395017.

⁷² According to Young, Moscow had used the process of multilateral détente mainly to try to freeze the nuclear parity with Washington, secure technology transfers, and legitimise its sphere of influence over Eastern Europe. See J.W. Young, “Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979-1989”, p. 291.
diplomatic tasks and possibilities which all participants, both in the West and in the East, were faced with.\textsuperscript{73}

Fourth, even though the dispositions of the Helsinki Act lacked legal binding force, they had high political value. The political significance of Helsinki’s commitments was confirmed by the decision of most delegations to be represented by their respective heads of state and government at the signing ceremony. Being the Helsinki Final Act an agreement reached on the basis of free and good will, everything concerning its implementation was left to the willingness of the signing countries. Arguing that the Helsinki Accords restrained the foreign policy choices of its participants in the years to come would be exaggerated. The fulfilment of its commitments posed, however, a question of mutual trust and introduced an additional element of reciprocal control. If political leaders were interested in continuing East-West dialogue in Europe, they should, at least publicly, confront themselves with the commitments made in Helsinki.

Last, to the peculiar character of the Helsinki Final Act contributed also its unusual public relevance compared to other international agreements. All member states committed themselves to publishing and distributing the text of the document. The fulfilment of the Helsinki’s commitments became an issue of public diplomacy. The relationship between the CSCE Final Act and the public opinion developed in the aftermath of Helsinki at three different levels. First, the commitments sealed in the Helsinki Accords became an authoritative reference for European citizens who could appeal to them in order to legitimise their requests to their leaders. This practice took place most of all in Eastern Europe, were dissidents used the Helsinki provisions in the field of human rights and human contacts to challenge directly their governments. In the wake of the conference, Helsinki monitoring groups were founded in the Soviet Union and similar groups were formed in other Eastern European countries.\textsuperscript{74} As

\textsuperscript{73} Stand der Ost-West Beziehungen nach Helsinki, 24.11.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.581.
highlighted by Nye, the Helsinki Final Act legitimized discussions on human rights behind the Iron Curtain and had consequences that were unforeseen by those who signed it.75 Second, the public meaning of the Helsinki Final Act coincided with its instrumental, propagandistic use towards public opinions. Governments in both blocs used the document – or, more correctly, their respective or partial interpretation of the document – to gain public support for their own international strategies and foreign policy decisions. As it will be analysed in the next chapters, this was the case, for instance, of the U.S. administration under President Jimmy Carter, who would appeal to the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement to pursue its public struggle for human rights; or the case of the West German federal government, which at the turn of the decade would need concrete détente improvements to present to the national public opinion in order to counterbalance unpopular decisions in the field of military security. Third, the public resonance of the CSCE was used by the advocates of détente – in particular by Bonn’s diplomacy – as a tactical tool to persuade its allies and Eastern counterparts, when necessary, to continue cooperation.

Assessing the West German victory in Helsinki

In the direct aftermath of Helsinki, sentiments in the Bundesrepublik featured a mix of enthusiasm and prudence towards the outcome of the CSCE. Expectations that Helsinki would open new possibilities and scenarios opened for East-West cooperation were widespread, but, as Chancellor Schmidt warned few days after the conclusion of the conference, excessive enthusiasm should be toned down: big changes were not to be expected in the imminent future. According to Schmidt, the prosecution and improvement of détente rather depended “on the possibility to take concrete steps forward, starting from the common

foundations we have laid together, which can do justice to the hopes of people”.  

However, there were many good reasons for the West German federal government to be satisfied with the outcome of the Helsinki CSCE. The West German delegation had invested great diplomatic efforts in multilateral negotiations, as it has been insightfully analysed by Hakkarainen in his work dedicated to the West German role in the first seminal phases of the process of multilateral détente. Bonn’s efforts were paid off by some important achievements which responded to West German primal interests and were perceived, as a consequence, as important national victories. The perception that the Helsinki CSCE had been a successful endeavour contributed to enhance Bonn’s confidence in its diplomatic possibilities and means. It probably reinforced also the decision of the West German Foreign Office to focus on the pursuit of a proactive multilateral policy of détente in the years to come: after Helsinki the CSCE process asserted itself as a priority field of action of Bonn’s diplomacy.

In May 1972 the Auswärtiges Amt had drafted a document which provided the guidelines for the course the West German delegation would pursue at the CSCE negotiations. The paper identified some core interests which the West German diplomatic action would focus on: first, elaborating some common principles for the reinforcement of the international legal grounds of peaceful coexistence in Europe; second, intensifying human contacts, exchanges of information and economic cooperation between the blocs; third, creating forms of

interaction between political and military security; fourth, protecting the interests of the city of Berlin, which should not become object of negotiations; fifth, preserving the cohesion of the Western Alliance. All those conference aims were the extension of the FRG’s main national and international interests. They all addressed the main dimensions of the German question at the beginning of the Seventies. If we look at the outcome of the conference, we can observe that all West German conference aims were, in principle, achieved. Hence, the experience of Helsinki encouraged Bonn’s idea that the CSCE provided an adequate stage for the FRG to successfully pursue its own foreign policy interests at the multilateral level.

**Fostering human and security aspects of détente**

In the declaration on the CSCE issued in front of the federal Parliament, the Bundestag, on 27 July 1975, the West German federal government confirmed its intention to use the chance offered by the CSCE “for the sake of the peoples living in divided Germany and in divided Europe and for the sake of peace in the continent”. The statement was the answer to the harsh criticisms coming from the opposition of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), which strongly opposed the new policy of dialogue with Eastern Europe and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Beyond rhetoric, the inclusion of a “human chapter” in the Helsinki Final Act was a first important achievement for Bonn. Basket III was considered as the operative extension of the recognition of individual and collective human rights, sealed in the inclusion of Principle VII (“Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief”) and VIII (“Equal rights and self-determination of peoples”) in the preamble of the Final Act. The FRG had been, together with the Netherlands, the first advocate of human contacts within the EPC, struggling to make them

79 Ibid., pp. 886-887.
accepted as a common Western interest.\textsuperscript{82} Human contacts represented indeed a West German vital national interest: as long as millions of Germans still lived beyond the Iron Curtain, in the GDR and in the other Eastern countries, enhancing their possibilities of contacts with the West represented a tangible improvement in their everyday lives. As Hakkarainen highlights, “Basket III was not a symbolic tool to be used for propaganda purposes. [...] It was precisely due to Deutschlandpolitik reasons that improving contacts between people was one of the main ideas of West German CSCE policy.”\textsuperscript{83} Multiplying human contacts amongst European citizens would, moreover, contribute to that progressive rapprochement between the East and the West: this was the ideal aim and theoretical ground of the paradigm of “change through rapprochement” which represented the cornerstone of the Social Democratic new Ostpolitik, as it had been conceived and pursued by Brandt’s coalition government since the end of the Sixties and as it had been inherited and continued under his successor Helmut Schmidt since 1974.

Contributing to the progressive reinforcement of the mutual trust necessary to construct a safer and peaceful atmosphere in Europe was also the ideal purpose of the confidence-building measures included in Basket I. Similarly to human contacts, CBMs were consistent with Bonn’s ideal aims and concrete interests. Indeed, the West German federal government attributed great importance to the provisions of Basket I.\textsuperscript{84} Because of the country’s geopolitical situation and its dependence on the allies for the provision of its own security, the FRG supported any initiatives in the field of security which contributed to make East-West relations more relaxed, transparent, calculable and less subject to the monopoly of the superpowers. The incorporation of


\textsuperscript{83} P. Hakkarainen, \textit{A State of Peace in Europe}, p. 233.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der KSZE-Beschlüsse}, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
military aspects of security within multilateral détente should be completed, according to the West German idea, by favouring the beneficial interaction between the CSCE and its military side, namely the Conference on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), whose preliminary talks had started in 1973 in Vienna. The aim of integrating both frameworks worked only partially: as CSCE and MBFR negotiations were pursued in parallel, the first rapidly overtook the second. Negotiations in Vienna proceeded through the years at a very slow pace, were subject to frequent interruptions and susceptible to the mood swings of the relationship between the superpowers.\(^{85}\) No significant achievement was accomplished on the front of the MBFR and the planned conference in Vienna parallel to Helsinki was never realised.

**Involving the U.S. in European détente**

Preserving the unity of the Western Alliance had been one of West German main goals at the negotiations for the first CSCE. Bonn achieved two important results in Helsinki on this front: first, the involvement of the U.S. in the affairs of European détente; second, the multilateralisation of its own conference aims through the coordination within the Western caucuses.

Washington had never hidden its scarce enthusiasm and a certain degree of annoyance for the European endeavour of the CSCE. The U.S. détente project devised by State Secretary Henry Kissinger was directed to reach a balance of power with the Soviet Union, reduce the costs of superpower competition and freeze the bilateral status quo. By trying to take advantage of some elements of Soviet weakness – namely its problematic relationship with China – the U.S. administration aimed at finding a solution to its own weaknesses after the debacle in

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Vietnam.\textsuperscript{86} Within the U.S. overall international strategy, the CSCE represented a less important “European thing” which Washington desired to conclude quickly, trying to avoid any confrontation with the Soviet Union which could endanger the unfolding of the superpower dialogue.\textsuperscript{87} The American delegation at the CSCE had showed little interest in the negotiations in Geneva and had left the lead of the initiative to the group of the Community’s country, i.e. the EC-Nine.\textsuperscript{88} Not only were the aims and the language of European détente alien to the U.S. administration, but Washington seriously feared that the CSCE would end up with a final imbalanced outcome in favour of the East. Undoubtedly, the Soviet acceptance of the U.S. participation in the CSCE had had the meaning of an implicit recognition of the U.S. role of responsibility over the Western part of Europe. But it was only the Soviet availability to make some concessions on human rights and human contacts which finally convinced the U.S. administration that the final conference outcome was far more favourable to the West than expected during negotiations.\textsuperscript{89} A shift occurred in Washington’s assessment of the CSCE after Helsinki: the U.S. Congress approved the Final Act and the Ford Administration started to engage itself for its implementation.

In the analysis of the state of East-West relations after Helsinki drafted by the West German Foreign Office in September 1975, the changing attitude of the U.S. administration towards the CSCE was identified as one major aspect of novelty. Ford’s speech at the signing ceremony in Helsinki marked indeed, in Bonn’s view, the return of the

U.S. to the role of leader of the Western bloc. Washington’s more convinced involvement in the CSCE was perceived as an important step towards a greater American engagement in the process of European détente. The U.S. possible decoupling from European affairs had traditionally been a main source of worry for federal governments in Bonn. With the launch of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the question of the U.S. involvement had assumed the new meaning of Washington’s necessary backing to West German initiatives of dialogue with the East. As the Helsinki Final Act opened a new front of multilateral détente wherein Bonn’s federal government aimed at playing an active role, the U.S. backing was determinant. From the analysis paper of the Auswärtiges Amt emerged a certain degree of confidence that the American commitment to the CSCE would reinforce the West’s position in East-West cooperation after Helsinki. Bonn’s optimism can appear fallacious and somewhat naïf, particularly if assessed against the background of the following developments the CSCE process, the transatlantic relationship and East-West relations would go through. West German confidence was undoubtedly nourished by the gust of enthusiasm surrounding the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. It has to be observed, however, that a convergence of interests between the projects of U.S. and European détente was in place in the months after Helsinki. Their respective conceptual constructions and ultimate goals remained different. But their interaction was more complex than the traditional view of a pronounced contraposition between superpower détente and European détente seems to suggest: the two processes run in parallel, diverged and found occasions of entente, depending on specific interests and international junctures.

92 The relationship between Brandt’s government and the U.S. administration in the years of formation of the new Ostpolitik had been well analysed by Italian historian Giovanni Bernardini (G. Bernardini, Nuova Germania, antichi timori: Stati Uniti, Ostpolitik e sicurezza europea).
Coordinating with the West and multilateralising national interests

Besides the U.S. involvement in the dynamics of European détente, the coordination with the other Western partners – both within the group of the EC-Nine and NATO – was a matter of satisfaction for Bonn. The CSCE negotiations had been the first test for the new born mechanism of coordination amongst the foreign policies of the EC-Nine, i.e. the European Political Cooperation (EPC), and for the coordination between the EPC and NATO frameworks. Preparing the Helsinki CSCE had been one of the most important operative tasks of the EPC. Cooperation amongst the EC-Nine was pursued at different levels: amongst national delegations in Geneva and Helsinki, within the committee of political directors and at the regular meetings of foreign ministers. A representative of the European Commission participated in negotiations in Geneva and spoke for the Nine when the Community’s common interests were at stake. All Western proposals were first voted within the CSCE ad hoc group and then communicated to the NATO group, where they were rediscussed and adjusted according to the aims of the whole Alliance. During negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki and then after 1975, the FRG managed to obtain the inclusion of its main requests in the fields of human contacts and movements – concerning particularly issues of family reunification.

93 The decision to create a system of cooperation on foreign policy was agreed by the EC’s heads of state and government at the 1969 The Hague Summit within the framework of a broader relaunch of the process of European integration. The so-called “Davignon-Report” of October 1970 established the system of European Political Cooperation (EPC). See: M. Gilbert, European Integration. A Concise History (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).
95 For a description of the functioning of the EPC see D. Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008).
working conditions of journalists and convening of a scientific forum – in the list of Western proposals. To this purpose, the West German diplomacy had skilfully used the mechanism of coordination between the EPC and NATO, obtaining first the EC partners’ support to its proposals in order to achieve joint positions for the ensuing discussion within NATO.98 Thanks to the mechanism of the EPC, Bonn managed to transform primary West German interests into shared Community’s aims. It is not a coincidence that the FRG had been, since the relaunch of the project of European Integration in 1969, one of the most convinced advocates of the idea of coordinating the EC members’ foreign policies by supporting more ambitious federalist stances.99 As the EC partners had discussed how to coordinate their conducts at the CSCE negotiations, the French had initially opposed to use the EPC framework for the pursuit of East-West dialogue. Paris’ resistance reflected the fear that a multilateral Western action would limit and weaken its deep-seated bilateral diplomacy towards the Soviet bloc.100 Whereas France tried to avoid embedding its foreign policy at the multilateral level, multilateralism was instead for the FRG a question of necessity.

It was at the CSCE negotiations that West German international interests with regard to East-West cooperation became fully multilateralised. As highlighted by Hakkarainen, the CSCE provided West German diplomacy with “unprecedented opportunities to utilise multilateral mechanism to pursue its national interests”101. The successful coordination within the Western Alliance displayed at the negotiations in Geneva did mark a watershed for the FRG’s foreign policy. Even though Bonn’s multilateral action was displayed on multiple stages – at the EC, at the UN, at the new-born economic summits of leading advanced economies, whose season was

inaugurated in November 1975 at Rambouillet – the CSCE represented a central stage to pursue multilateralism due to the centrality of East-West dialogue within the West German foreign political complex. For this reason the coordination within the Western caucuses experienced at the Helsinki CSCE was, notwithstanding some problems and flaws, assessed very positively by the West German Foreign Office in the aftermath of the conference. When pointing out that, not only had the CSCE confirmed the unity of the Western Alliance, but it had provided a factor of further Western integration too,\textsuperscript{102} the Auswärtiges Amt was also implicitly addressing the successful integration of its own foreign policy aims into the framework of Western interests.

The West German call for improving cooperation within the Western caucuses is a recurrent theme in the strategic papers of the Auswärtiges Amt. This constitutes one element of continuity in the unfolding of West German CSCE policy. Bonn committed itself to coordinating its CSCE aims with the Western partners both during the preparation of the CSCE follow-up meetings and during negotiations in Belgrade, Madrid and Stockholm. Preserving the West’s unity at the CSCE would remain a West German priority also in times of major drift within the Alliance. In the months ensuing the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, Bonn’s Western political efforts were directed to the task of agreeing a common Western strategy with regard to the process of implementation and review of Helsinki’s commitments.\textsuperscript{103}

\textit{Keeping the German question out, keeping the German question open}

In West German foreign policy the commitment to Western coordination was one face of the coin, the commitment to the dialogue with the East the other. The CSCE provided Bonn with the opportunity to merge its Westpolitik and Ostpolitik into the same multilateral framework. In no other Western European country were the pursuit of

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\textsuperscript{103} Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die Verwirklichung der KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
dialogue with the East and the coordination with the Western Alliance as strictly interwoven as in the West German case. Multilateralising the couple Ostpolitik-Westpolitik served a double purpose. On the one hand, Western partners were reassured, as the CSCE provided them with possibilities to embed and monitor Bonn’s bilateral initiatives; on the other hand, the CSCE widened the FRG’s international room of manoeuvre, by offering West German diplomacy an additional stage to pursue its national interests. The main contents of Bonn’s Ostpolitik – economic cooperation, human contacts, and security issues – were multilaterally sealed in Helsinki.

Besides being one of the propulsive forces of the CSCE, the FRG constituted its geopolitical centre as well. The CSCE was a product of the Cold War and divided Germany was the symbolic epicentre of the conference. Quite significantly, the most famous picture of the signing ceremony in Helsinki portrays the leaders of the two German states, West German Chancellor Schmidt and East German General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) Honecker talking friendly while sitting close to each other at the centre of the conference room. Albeit the German question was symbolically intrinsic to the CSCE – and several provisions of the Helsinki Final Act addressed issues strictly related to the German question – the West German diplomacy worked on keeping the specific aspects concerning inner-German relations out of the CSCE negotiation table. The 1972 signing of the Basic Treaty with the GDR – part of the complex of the so-called Eastern Treaties including also the 1970 agreements with Moscow and Warsaw – opened a new season of inner-German relations. The inner-German relations were characterised by peculiarities which did not allow framing them as normal international relations between sovereign states. Both the peculiar nature and the fragility of the inner-German relationship convinced Bonn of the opportunity to avoid them to become item of multilateral negotiations. This aim was achieved in Helsinki and remained a trademark of Bonn’s following CSCE policy. The state of inner-German relations represented a frequent issue of Bonn’s bilateral informal talks with the Western partners and the Eastern countries. Inner-German issues were discussed by the FRG and
the GDR in the margins of the conference in Helsinki, Belgrade and Madrid. But the specific contents of the inner-German dialogue were not multilateralised. Similarly, after the 1971 signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers over the German capital and Germany as a whole were not item of debate at the CSCE.

If the specific aspects of the inner-German relationship were to be excluded from multilateral negotiations, there was an issue which addressed the heart of the German question and whose inclusion in the conference final act West German diplomacy struggled for: i.e. the recognition of the possibility to change peacefully national borders in Europe. The West German delegation made the successful conclusion of the CSCE dependent on its inclusion in the list of principles of European détente: its mentioning in the Preamble of the Helsinki Final Act represented Bonn’s most important diplomatic victory at the CSCE negotiations.\(^\text{104}\)

The issue of borders had always been a central dimension of the German question.\(^\text{105}\) In the history of Europe, the borders of the German nation had represented an object of dispute with Germany’s neighbouring countries, by alimenting geo-political instability at the centre of the continent. Germany’s division had been the resulted of the defeat of WWII and had been consolidated by the ensuing Cold War developments, asserting itself as the cornerstone of Europe’s bipolar settlement. Any solution to the German question would inevitably pass through the modification of the inner-German border. Consequently, any discourse regarding the possible change of borders in Europe addressed, directly or indirectly, the German question. Issues related to borders in Europe – their inviolability, their securing, the conditions for their modification – could not but be at stake at a conference whose mandate consisted not only in favouring cooperation amongst its participants, but also laying the grounds to safeguard security on the

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105 E. Colotti, Dalle due Germanie alla Germania unita, p. xi.
continent. The Soviet Union had not hidden its main interest in obtaining through the CSCE the definitive recognition of Europe’s territorial order as it had come out from WWII.\textsuperscript{106} To the Soviets and their allies – in particular to East Germans – it was important to attain in Helsinki a sufficient multilateral guarantee over the territorial status quo in Europe. This would neutralise those ambivalent elements regarding the issue of borders contained in the bilateral treaties signed with the FRG. Such ambiguities undermined, indeed, the full and incontestable recognition of the existence of two German states: the possibility for the FRG to issue unilateral declarations on “German unity” conceded by the Moscow Treaty and the Basic Treaty; the reference, contained in the Quadripartite Agreement, to the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers over Germany as a whole; and the inclusion in the Moscow Treaty of a logic connection – the so-called “bridge sentence” – between the recognition of the principle of inviolability of frontiers and the preceding commitment to the principle of renouncing the use of force.\textsuperscript{107}

The same duality of interests sealed in the Eastern treaties was reproduced also in the list of guiding principles for the East-West \textit{modus vivendi} in Europe of the Helsinki Final Act’s Preamble. The West German federal government needed a compensation for the recognition of the inviolability of frontiers in Europe the Eastern countries longed for: namely, inviolability had not to exclude the possibility for their change under certain conditions. Hence, the West German delegation directed its diplomatic efforts to avoid that the Helsinki principles might prejudice the possibility for a future change of the inner-German border, i.e. the possibility for a future solution to the German question.\textsuperscript{108} To this purpose, Bonn’s Foreign Office demanded the fulfilment of a series of requirements which would allow shaping the Helsinki Principles according to its (inter)national interests. First, the...

\textsuperscript{106} The principle of inviolability of frontiers figured amongst the seven principles contained in the Prague Declaration issued by the Warsaw Pact on 25 and 26 January 1972.
\textsuperscript{107} Delegation of the FRG, 26.02.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Ibid.}
principle of inviolability of frontiers had to be tied to the principle of renouncing the use and threat of force. Second, the possibility of their peaceful change should be explicitly mentioned in the Preamble of the Final Act. Third, all principles should have equal rank and their interpretation should take into account the other principles. Fourth, the declaration of principles should not have a legally binding character, i.e. it would not be subject to the principle of “lex posterior derogate lex priori”. The vital importance of all parties’ interests at stake dragged on negotiations on the principle of inviolability of frontiers until the very end of the conference and forced delegations to make hard concessions. The final outcome was a compromise that was satisfactory for the FRG. The principle of inviolability of frontiers was placed where the West German delegation wanted it – i.e. after the principle of renouncing the use and threat of force. Despite the lack of an explicit bridge sentence connecting both principles, an implicit tie between them was secured by their positioning. The equal rank of all principles was implied by declaring that “all principles are of primary significance”.

Most importantly, the West German delegation had managed to obtain the inclusion in the Helsinki Final Act of the following floating formulation: “The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement”. The option of the peaceful change of existing national borders was directly connected with the “state of peace in Europe” that the FRG aimed at creating through the pursuit of its détente policy. Conservative aspects of the Helsinki Final Act had been counterbalanced by the introduction of a dynamic element of change which was consistent with the ideal horizon of West German Ostpolitik and Entspannungspolitik. As the West German federal government declared in front of the Bundestag, inviolability of frontiers meant that changes of borders imposed through coercion were

109 Ibid.
110 A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, p. 38.
forbidden; this not excluded, however, the possibility itself of change under peaceful conditions.\textsuperscript{112} Even though Germany’s division was not explicitly mentioned in the Helsinki Final Act, it represented the first implicit target of the clause on the peaceful change of frontiers. As Hakkarainen has highlighted, the recognition of the possibility of a peaceful change of frontiers in Europe had the meaning to leave a small back door open to the future solution to the German question.\textsuperscript{113}

The West German federal government did not hide the German political relevance of the “peaceful change of frontiers” in the aftermath of Helsinki. The link between the dynamic elements of the CSCE process and the possibility for a future German reunification was repeatedly mentioned in public statements and official speeches since the summer of 1975. It was an answer to those in the FRG who saw in the outcome of the CSCE an additional multilateral recognition of the division of their nation. Hence, the Helsinki Final Act provided the West German federal government with an additional tool to address publicly the issue of the future solution to the German question. The CSCE marked, indeed, a multilateralisation of the public discourse on the German reunification. Whilst references to the future overcoming of Germany’s division almost disappeared from the contents of the bilateral Ostpolitik, the CSCE process offered the fertile ground for reiterating the discourse on German reunification, by framing it within the broader discourse on the long-term goals of European détente.

To sum up, the Ostpolitik of the West German federal government became fully multilateralised at Helsinki. Once set in place, the CSCE provided the main framework which entangled Bonn’s bilateral Eastern policy, completed it, solved its main imminent problems – i.e. coordinating Ostpolitik and Westpolitik and keeping open the public discourse on German reunification – and long-term problems – i.e. providing, at least in principle, for the possible solution to the German question.

\textsuperscript{112} Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
\textsuperscript{113} P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe, p. 232.
Puzzling the West German victory in Helsinki

The dispute over the principle of inviolability of frontiers provided evidence for profoundly divergent interests and aims with which the Eastern and Western countries approached the CSCE. As Garton Ash has highlighted, whilst the Helsinki Accords represented for the East the “sealing of Yalta”, they marked in the Western view the starting of a process aimed at “overcoming Yalta”.114 As multifaceted document, result of laborious mediations and mutual concessions, the Helsinki Final Act had inevitably the character of a compromise. Its provisions contains ambiguities which opened the way to different interpretations in the East and the West. It is not surprising, hence, that initial triumphalism surrounding the successful conclusion of the conference was soon replaced by growing uncertainties when the CSCE participant states moved to the phase of the implementation of the Helsinki Accords.

Internal papers of the Auswärtiges Amt reveal Bonn’s awareness that the implementation path would be long and insidious. An internal analysis drafted in September 1975 highlighted that both the Western and the Eastern countries would be faced with difficulties when compelled to put into practice the commitments made in Helsinki.115 Bonn looked with particular attention to the ongoing developments beyond the Iron Curtain. The first implementation steps undertaken by the Soviet bloc’s countries with regard to the publication of the Helsinki Accords were less coordinated than expected. Few months after its signing, the text of the Helsinki Final Act had been published in the USSR, the GDR, the CSSR and Romania, whilst Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria remained inactive.116 It was evident that the implementation of Helsinki’s substantial provisions, particularly in the

114 T. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name. Germany and the Divided Continent, p. 223.
fields of Basket III, would represent a great challenge for the Eastern European leaders. The *Auswärtiges Amt* suggested, therefore, that the West should necessarily display as much patience during the implementation process as it did during negotiations. Once the “constitution” of European détente had been signed, a double problem of implementation and interpretation arouse. It was easily predictable that the constitutional principles of the East-West *modus vivendi* would be object of divergent interpretations in the two blocs. Despite its compromise character, the declaration of principles reflected to the largest extent Western ideas of détente: it was to expect, hence, that Eastern countries would take on a defensive attitude in the aftermath of the conference. Bonn expected that its main diplomatic achievement, i.e. the clause on the peaceful change of frontiers, would be ignored or challenged by the Soviet bloc by adopting selective interpretations of Helsinki’s principles and focusing on the respect of the participants’ respective “laws, traditions and customs”. Predictably, the appeal to the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs (Principle VI) would be used to hinder any Western imitative directed to the enforcement of the dynamic aspects of the CSCE. As West German State Secretary Gehlhoff discussed with his French colleague De Courcel few days before the signing ceremony in Helsinki, particularly West German détente initiatives would be probably condemned as attempts to pursue the German reunification in violation of Helsinki’s principles.

West German predictions were well-founded. Eastern and Western delegations in Helsinki had limited themselves to sharing a general interest in finding some common rules which would stabilise their mutual relations. A shared vision of the meaning and aims of the project of European détente was never developed: the existence of this core misunderstanding was well shown by the divergent arguments used by the two blocs to claim their respective victory at the CSCE. Political leaders both in the East and in the West presented to their

public opinions different assessments of Helsinki’s achievements that could suit their own international and national interests best. Particularly in the Eastern bloc the Helsinki Final Act was largely used as tool of ideological struggle. The Soviet commitment to the CSCE provided Eastern leaders with additional arguments to reinforce the USSR’s image as a peaceful power. On the other side, any Western criticism directed towards the Eastern countries in the aftermath of the conference was publicly blamed for being contrary to the letter and spirit of Helsinki.\(^{119}\) The West’s decision to make a compromise with the East over rules for the bipolar modus vivendi was used as a tool of Eastern propaganda in support of the argument of the West’s endemic crisis and growing weakness.

Eastern victorious claims levered up some aspects of the Helsinki Final Act which the Soviet bloc had good reasons to believe to be the main beneficiary of. The Helsinki Accords provided indeed the Soviet Union and its allies with the international prestige ad tutelage they had long sought. In particular, Principles I (“The participating States will respect each other’s sovereign equality and individuality as well all the rights inherent in and encompassed by sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity”) and VI (“The participating states agree to refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal and external affairs falling within domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations”) meant for Moscow the confirmation of Potsdam’s settlement of Europe and the definitive guarantee of the inviolability of the Soviet sphere of influence. The parallelism between 1945 Potsdam conference and 1975 CSCE was recurrent in Eastern assessments: both conferences shared the common aim of defining Europe’s clear-cut geopolitical settlement and providing for the tools of its securing.\(^{120}\) The German question could be considered in the Eastern view as definitively closed: as a


\(^{120}\) Stand der Ost-West Beziehungen nach Helsinki, 24.11.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.581.
signing country of the Helsinki Final Act, the GDR had achieved at the CSCE that multilateral acknowledgement of its existence as sovereign country and its equality with the FRG which marked the culmination of the recent process of international recognition started with the signing of the 1972 Basic Treaty with Bonn. On the whole the Helsinki Final Act provided the Soviet Union with a multilateral reassurance against its endemic geopolitical insecurity. As Tony Judt put it: “not only were the political division of post-war Europe now officially and publicly accepted, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the GDR and other satellite regimes officially conceded; the Western powers had for the first time foresworn all ‘armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State’”.\textsuperscript{121}

According to Moscow’s conservative idea of détente, in the aftermath of Helsinki the stress was put predominantly on the static aspects of the Final Act. As West German Ambassador at NATO Krapf reported in September 1975, a restrictive interpretation of the Helsinki Final Act was being propagated by Eastern mass-medias. The Eastern interpretation displayed the following characteristics: a pronounced stress was put on the significance of the Helsinki Accords in recognising the validity of the principle of peaceful coexistence and contributing to the prosecution of international class confrontation; the clause of the “peaceful change of national borders” was not mentioned; hierarchical distinctions were introduced amongst Helsinki’s principles and baskets, by ascribing to them different degrees of importance; the implementation of the multilateral commitments of the CSCE was made independent by the pursuit of bilateral relations between the conference’s participants.\textsuperscript{122}

According to the analysis of the West German Foreign Office, the East’s restrictive approach to the implementation and interpretation of the Helsinki Final Act revealed the emergence, in the aftermath of the

\textsuperscript{121} T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, p. 501.
conference, of a more general defensive attitude towards détente.\textsuperscript{123} Whereas during negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki Brezhnev had shown a less ideological attitude – by renouncing to frame developments on the front of the CSCE into the Soviet ideology and interpreting them rather as the result of all participants’ common efforts for dialogue – a shift towards more pronounced ideological stances occurred in the Soviet CSCE strategy in the months ensuing the signing of the Final Act. This renewed ideological turn unveiled in Bonn’s view a certain degree of unsafeness and weakness of the Eastern bloc.\textsuperscript{124}

Besides anti-Western press campaigns, matters of greater concern for Bonn were some worrisome signals coming from East Berlin. On 7 October 1975 a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Support was signed between the Soviet Union and the GDR.\textsuperscript{125} Its signing confirmed that the principle of “peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems” was valid only for the Eastern countries’ external relations with the West.\textsuperscript{126} With regard to intra-bloc relations, the Brezhnev Doctrine remained in place and overrode the application of the Helsinki’s principles.\textsuperscript{127} Few weeks before the signing of the treaty with Moscow, SED General Secretary Honecker had publicly addressed the question of the implementation of Basket III with words which left little room for West German hopes to improving human contacts with East Germans. As Honecker cleared up while speaking in front of East German soldiers of the National People’s Army (NVA) in September 1975, the GDR would not tolerate any openings representing disguised attempts to introduce espionage, sabotage or

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textit{Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der KSZE-Beschliisse}, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
ideological diversion in the country under the cloak of “freedom of information” and “human contacts”. In December 1975 correspondent of the West German magazine *Der Spiegel* Jörg R. Mettke was expelled by the GDR; his expulsion was followed a year later by a similar measure taken by East German authorities against correspondent of West German television channel ARD Lothar Loewe who had often denounced the shootings of East German citizens at the inner-German border. In both cases, expulsions were justified by East German authorities as necessary measures to contrast defamation of the country’s organs and leaders. In response to the increasing permeability of the East-West border which the signing of the Helsinki Agreements had further encouraged, East Berlin pursued a strategic course which merged the continuation of the policy of ideological demarcation from the FRG (Abgrenzungspolitik) launched by Honecker in 1971 with efforts to impose restrictive interpretations of Helsinki’s provisions. The GDR was the country in the Eastern bloc which was most exposed to the detrimental consequences of a rapprochement with the West which ultimately aimed at changing the European geopolitical settlement. Whilst the Helsinki Accords had provided the East German state with international prestige and a consolidation of profitable economic cooperation with the West, decisions in the field of human contacts contained hidden dangers which might undermine the existence of the socialist model itself in the long-run. Ideological competition flanked diplomatic cooperation within East Berlin’s *Westpolitik*. Quite significantly, East German Minister for State Security (STASI) Mielke spoke of the necessity to pursue a “harsher form of class struggle” after Helsinki.

Notwithstanding existing nuances of standpoints from country to country, the Soviet bloc as a whole adopted a common approach towards the Helsinki Final Act that the Auswärtiges Amt summarised as it follows: discretionary interpretation of the Declaration of Principles, with the purpose of conserving the status quo of Europe’s settlement; and restrictive approach towards the implementation of Basket III, directed to the protection of Eastern European societies from external influences.132 As the GDR’s Ministry for State Security had foreseen, Basket III turned out to be the greatest challenge for Eastern leaders. Some steps to implement Helsinki’s commitments in the human field were made in the East: for instance, transit taxes were lowered, more working visas for Western journalists and more authorisations to the import of films and books from the West were conceded. As Peter has highlighted, concessions of this sort were made by the Eastern leaders with the main purpose of providing the impression that they were committed to fully implementing all parts of the Final Act.133 Western requests for the fulfilment of additional provisions in the field of human contacts were steadily parried by the Eastern leaders by appealing to the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. Principle VI – conceived by the West with the aim of banning external coercive interventions in the domestic jurisdiction of the (Eastern) participant countries, particularly thinking back to the past experiences of 1956 Hungary and 1968 Prague – was indeed largely used in the Soviet bloc to hinder Western demands for greater circulation of persons, ideas and information.134 The weight of Basket III’s clauses had been somewhat underestimated during negotiations by the Eastern

134 This was the essence of the Eastern delegations’ struggle for adopting the terms “interference” instead of “intervention”, “internal affairs” instead of “domestic jurisdiction” and “respect of the respective political, economic, and cultural traditions (list to which they added also the sentence “[respect of the respective] systems of law and regulations”) in the Helsinki Final Act. See Delegation of the FRG, 26.02.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
delegations which had held them to be declarations of intents directed to pleasing Western public opinion rather than enforceable clauses. What they had not fully foreseen was, most importantly, that the commitments made in Helsinki with regard to human rights and human contacts would turn into a significant tool for domestic pressure. In the months after Helsinki, Eastern European leaders were faced with a largely unexpected burgeoning of circles, groups, organisations, initiatives of dissidents and citizens demanding the fulfilment of Helsinki’s obligations in the human field.135 The Helsinki Final Act became the most important weapon at disposal of dissidents and citizens in Eastern Europe – organised as “Helsinki movements” – to legitimise their demands for liberalisation of their societies.

At the beginning of 1976 the West German ambassador in Moscow reported the existence of serious worries in the USSR about the “euphoria for liberalisation” that the Helsinki process might generate.136 Indeed, demands for reforms of socialist societies increased in the first months of 1976 during the preparation of the Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Europe. The unfolding of the conference’s preparation was strictly intertwined with the developments on the front of the CSCE. To Helsinki groups’ requests for liberalisation added the demands for reforms coming from some Western communist parties. The alternative “euro-communist project” had taken a more defined shape in the mid-Seventies. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) had launched, with the support of the French and the Spanish communists, a call for a more modern, efficient and human form of socialism resting upon the acceptance of political pluralism and democratic rules.137 The euro-communist theses challenged the compactness of the socialist movement, by aiming at realising a new form of “socialism with a human face” in Western

137 For an insightful analysis of the origins and unfolding of the euro-communist project of the PCI, see S. Pons, Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 2006).
Europe as an alternative to the model of real socialism governing Eastern European societies.\textsuperscript{138} It became soon clear to the Soviet leadership that the upcoming Conference of European Communist and Workers’ Parties in East Berlin would inevitably turn into a terrain of direct confrontation between the Soviet orthodoxy and the euro-communist alternative.\textsuperscript{139} After the Chinese schism and the uncertain developments of Portugal’s transition, the USSR feared that Euro-communism could create another Mediterranean front within the communist movement, able to endanger the Soviet undisputed leadership.\textsuperscript{140} Moreover, memories of the 1968 Prague Spring were still very vivid: there was some fear that the euro-communist demands might spread to East European parties and societies, particularly amongst the young generations, whose liberalisation requests had been encouraged by the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The conference in East Berlin, which initially scheduled for the immediate aftermath of Helsinki with the mandate of working out a common position of the communist movement on the prosecution of East-West détente, was postponed to the summer of 1976.\textsuperscript{141}

The West German Foreign Office observed with great attention the ongoing developments in the Soviet bloc between the second half of 1975 and the first half of 1976. The preparation of the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in Europe was assessed in Bonn as the main reason of Soviet ideological and defensive attitude towards the CSCE process.\textsuperscript{142} From the papers of the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} emerg the West German awareness of the precariousness marking the achievements reached in Helsinki. Moscow’s difficulties and worries contained indeed an element of potential danger for the prosecution of

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\textsuperscript{138} Westeuropäische KPen – Analyse und Empfehlungen, 12.01.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.581.
\textsuperscript{140} Westeuropäische KPen – Analyse und Empfehlungen, 12.01.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.581.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
East-West cooperation. There were the margins, however, to use such elements of weakness to the Western advantage in order to force the Soviet bloc to implement Helsinki’s commitments and make further concessions. In the aftermath of Helsinki the CSCE process looked open to possible future developments in different directions. The goal of shaping its prosecution according to West German interests faced Bonn’s CSCE policy with some tasks: continuing to analyse carefully political developments beyond the Iron Curtain; pursuing good bilateral relations with the East and using them to foster the full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act; and, most importantly, refining an effective concerted Western strategy.

A concerted Western strategy for the process of implementation

The uncertainties marking the first phases of Helsinki’s implementation track raised questions in Bonn about which direction the CSCE process could and would take after Helsinki’s seminal act. The Eastern bloc’s selective approach towards the interpretation and the implementation of the Final Act’s provisions compelled the Western Alliance to respond with adequate, concerted initiatives.143 West German diplomatic efforts were directed, in the second half of 1975 and throughout 1976, to fostering a comprehensive and balanced implementation of all chapters of the Helsinki Final Act in concert with the Western partners.

As the members of the EC-Nine’s newly-established working group on the CSCE confirmed on 12 September 1975 in Venice: “Cornerstone for a successful implementation of the Helsinki Final Act is the coordination within the frameworks of the EPC and NATO. The West will prepare carefully for Belgrade and advance concrete proposals, in order not to lose the initiative”.144 The traditional EPC’s voting mechanism had been replaced in September 1975 through the

143Ibid., p. 1305.
144 Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe über Fragen im Zusammenhang mit der Durchführung der Schlusskarte der KSZE, 10.10.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.581
establishment of a working group with an extensive mandate in the field of East-West dialogue, with the purpose of reinforcing political coordination amongst the EC-Nine with regard to détente policies. Its tasks mainly focused on the implementation of the Helsinki Accords: the working group was in charge of monitoring the CSCE participants’ respective implementation efforts; it should deal with the multilateral implementation of Helsinki’s provisions within the competent multilateral frameworks (ECE, UNESCO, etc.); and it was intended to favour the exchange of information amongst the Nine with regard to their bilateral Eastern policies. The FRG fostered the idea of establishing an “information pool” on the implementation of the Final Act also within NATO. Similarly to the EC-Nine’s working group, NATO’s “information pool” would be entrusted with the main task of improving coordination through a continuous exchange of information amongst the Western partners, both at the bilateral and multilateral level. In the aftermath of Helsinki, Bonn fostered with conviction any initiative directed to reinforcing and institutionalising the foreign political cooperation within both Western caucuses. The West German commitment to the consolidation of a Western concerted détente policy remained still valid after the FRG had obtained the official multilateral legitimisation of its Eastern policy at the Helsinki CSCE. As the CSCE process gradually asserted itself as a major West German foreign policy priority per se, the multilateral coordination with the Western Alliance took on new significance for Bonn.

The FRG’s insistence on improving Western coordination in the field of East-West dialogue collided with France’s reluctance. The pursuit of the special relationship between Bonn and Paris was one of the cornerstones of the FRG’s international action in the years of the

146 Ibid.
148 As stated in the decision of NATO council on 19 September 1975: see AAPD, 1975, vol. II, doc. 275, pp. 1275-1278.
Schmidt government. Its burgeoning was largely due to the personal bonne entente of the West German Chancellor with French President Giscard d’Estaing. However, it turned out to be more problematic when issues of détente and security policies were at stake. In these areas Paris was willing to preserve its autonomous sphere of action. As West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has highlighted in his memoirs, the contradiction between the French and West German security policy interests could never be solved. With regard to the dialogue with the East, France was jealous of its tradition of good ties with Moscow – the politique à l’Est – started by Charles De Gaulle in early 1964. And after all, Paris had never hidden a certain annoyance towards the conduction of détente as a NATO policy under the U.S. leadership. As West German Ambassador at the NATO headquarters Krapf reported to the Auswärtiges Amt, France’s bilateral Eastern policy had returned to be in the foreground of the country’s overall détente strategy after Helsinki. At the meeting of the NATO Council on 19 September 1975, the French ambassador openly expressed scepticism towards the U.S. proposal of conducting regular consultations on the implementation of the Helsinki Accords within the Atlantic Alliance: being the CSCE concluded, there was no need for further multilateral consultations. With the exclusion of France, the U.S. proposal encountered the favour of all other NATO’s countries. The positive

149 To the “bonne entente” with France, Helmut Schmidt has dedicated a chapter of his memoirs. See: H. Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn. Menschen und Mächte II (Berlin: Siedler, 1990), pp. 153-297.


154 Ibid., p.174.


156 Ibid., p. 1277.
moment of transatlantic convergence over détente continued during the fall of 1975. Consultations within NATO focused on some problematic aspects of the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions in the field of security. Their manifold tasks included: the regular exchange of information about the implementation steps taken by the Soviet bloc, with particular regard to CBMs and the interconnected field of MBFR; the careful analysis of all agreements signed both at the bilateral and multilateral level within the CSCE framework; regular consultations about the conduction of more targeted public policies and public relations, with the aim of reinforcing the image of NATO’s role as main actor of détente, in response to Eastern propagandistic anti-Western campaigns. 157

According to Bonn’s viewpoint, the main political task the Alliance had to cope with in order to enhance its relative weight within the process of implementation of Helsinki’s commitments was twofold: strengthening internal coordination and putting pressures on the Eastern countries. The area of confidence-building measures offered best chances to pursue this dual strategy. 158 Basket I’s CBMs were the quintessence of the trends marking the implementation process in the aftermath of Helsinki: they were subject to divergent interpretations in the West and in the East; they were used for propagandistic purposes; and their implementation featured mixed results. The West German federal government fostered an extensive interpretation and a full implementation of the dispositions of the Helsinki Accords in the field of CBMs. Bonn’s special interest in Helsinki’s Basket I was not surprising, considering that most of NATO’s military manoeuvres took place on its national territory. 159 But it was fuelled also by another reason: namely, focusing on the implementation of Helsinki’s “security chapter” served to support the idea that security and political aspects of détente were closely interwoven within the CSCE. Against the Soviet attempts to impose a clear-cut separation between political détente and

157 Ibid., p. 1276.
159 Ibid.
military détente, the importance of pursuing a balanced implementation of all aspects of the CSCE, was unceasingly repeated in West German strategic analyses, public statements and diplomatic talks.

According to the commitments made in Helsinki, Bonn announced two military manoeuvres taking place on its territory in the summer of 1975 – “Grosse Rochade” in August and “Certain Track” in September of the same year. All CSCE countries were invited to send observers: fifteen governments answered positively to the West German invitation, none of whom belonging to the Eastern bloc.160 No manoeuvres were instead signalised by the Warsaw Pact’s countries. A propagandistic campaign was rather started by the Eastern countries blaming NATO for violating the spirit of détente by conducting military manoeuvres in the direct aftermath of the conference conclusion. In the case of CBMs, similarly as in other fields of the CSCE, the implementation game between the East and the West was played both in the field of concrete realisations and public receptions. As West German Ambassador Krapf analysed in September 1975, Western initiatives should not be limited to putting pressure on the Warsaw Pact’s countries for fully implementing Helsinki’s dispositions on security matters. They should rather be flanked by adequate public answers to Soviet attacks. It was necessary, hence, to collect more information about military manoeuvres in the Eastern countries in order to evaluate them together with the NATO partners and pursue then a targeted press and information policy directed to counteracting Soviet propaganda.161

The USSR gave first notice of a military exercise in Transcaucasia only in January 1976.162 Only five of all CSCE signing countries were invited to observe, namely Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and

Yugoslavia, i.e. the countries confining with the exercise area. A second Warsaw Pact’s military manoeuvre was announced by Hungary in April 1976. It was a poor result, against the seven military manoeuvres notified by NATO in the months between the summer of 1975 and the spring of 1976. Eastern European countries had chosen the way of a “minimal implementation”. As the West German Foreign Office observed, they had decided to give no notice of manoeuvres involving less than 25,000 men; not to respond to invitations to send their observers to manoeuvres held by members of the Western Alliance; and to invite to attend their manoeuvres under the guise of observers only representatives of neighbouring states.

**Time for a first assessment of the CSCE**

Six months after the signing of the constitutional act of the CSCE, West German MPs of the majority fractions of SPD and FDP presented a parliamentary enquiry, in which they asked for elucidations on the state of Helsinki Final Act’s implementation and on the federal government’s expectations for the first follow-up conference in Belgrade. It was time for the federal government to make a first, interim assessment of what had been achieved so far on the front of the CSCE. The answer to the parliamentary enquiry came in May 1976. Hence, according to the federal government, the implementation path displayed mixed results. Unlike in the case of CBMs, Basket II – and particularly economic cooperation – was the field where most concrete improvements ensued the signing of the Helsinki Accords. Facilitations to East-West trade and business had been introduced. Several Western

163 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
164 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
166 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
167 Ibid.
enterprises had obtained the authorization to open foreign representations in the Soviet bloc. In February 1976 COMECON’s countries accepted the invitation to negotiation advanced by the EEC in November 1974: a significant development whose way had been paved, according to the West German federal government, by the signing of the Final Act.\textsuperscript{168} Positive developments were paralleled, however, by Eastern pronounced reluctance to mention explicitly the Helsinki Final Act in negotiations, talks, protocols, and agreements.\textsuperscript{169}

Encouraging steps had been made in some fields of Basket III as well, with particular regard to the matter of family reunification. The number of Eastern citizens visiting their families in the West or obtaining permissions to leave their countries for family reasons increased steadily after the signing of the Helsinki Accords. Some concrete measures, as the decision of decreasing fees for passports and visit permissions, were also welcomed in Bonn as small but positive steps in the direction of favouring the multiplication of East-West human contacts. Small facilitations were also introduced on the front of working conditions of Western accredited correspondents in the Soviet bloc’s countries. A cultural agreement had been signed by the FRG with Bulgaria in November 1975, a similar agreement was under negotiation with Poland and promising conditions existed for opening negotiations on cultural matters also with Hungary and Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{170}

In all fields of the Helsinki Accords, encouraging developments were opposed by uncertainties and reluctant stances. Eastern proofs of

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\item \textsuperscript{168} A beneficial contribution that COMECON’s countries preferred, however, to neglect. See: Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665. For an analysis of the economic relations between the EEC and COMECON, see A. Romano, “Untying Cold War knots: the EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s”, in Cold War History, Volume 14, Issue 2, April 2014, pp. 153-173.
\item \textsuperscript{170} Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
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good will were counterweights by attempts to curb cooperation at minimal levels. By assessing the first results of the implementation process ten months after the signing of the Final Act, the West German federal government was faced with the perennial question about the glass being half full or half empty. Notwithstanding the difficulties and ambiguous trends which emerged during the first months of implementation, Bonn approached Belgrade with a great deal of confidence in the potential for improvement inherent in the CSCE process. As Genscher stated in front of the Bundestag, the CSCE represented a chance: “nothing more, but nothing less too”.\(^{171}\) The West German federal government remained convinced that the Helsinki Final Act represented a forward-looking program: processes of change within Eastern societies and in East-West relations could not but be slow and gradual. No radical and rapid transformations were to expect in the short run, as it was unceasingly repeated by Genscher and his officers in official documents and public statements.

One year after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, former West-German Chancellor and father of Bonn’s new Eastern policy Willy Brandt, interviewed by Bonn’s correspondent of the Soviet newspaper Prawda and asked to assess the role of the CSCE, observed that the influence of the conference on international politics had been more limited than expected. It was however undoubted, continued Brandt, that uncertainties in international affairs would be much more dangerous if not contrasted by the presence in Europe of stabilising factors as the CSCE.\(^{172}\)

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171 „Helsinki nicht unterschätzen, sondern nutzen“, 27.08.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
“Wenn die eine Seite der anderen Seite, die an der Brücke weiterbauen will, keine Antwort auf die Frage gibt, wie es weitergehen soll, dann bleibt die Brücke unvollendet und erreicht das gegenüberliegende Ufer nicht. Wir sind nicht dafür, dass Brücken abgerissen werden – im Gegenteil: wir wollen, dass Mauern durchlässigen werden.”

Dispatch of the West German delegation at the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade, November 3, 1977

“Is not peace in the last analysis a matter of human rights?”

Arthur Goldberg quoting J.F. Kennedy, inaugural address of the U.S. delegation at the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade, November 4, 1977

Chapter 2

Putting the FRG’s Realistic Policy of Détente to the Test: West German Diplomacy at the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade (1977-1978)

Introduction: Domestic and international developments paving the way to the first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade

According to the third article of Helsinki Final Act’s Basket IV dedicated to the “Follow-up to the Conference”, all thirty-five participant states of the CSCE would meet again in 1977 in Belgrade to review and improve the process of European détente. The preparation of the first CSCE follow-up meeting unfolded within an international context.

173 “If the one side gives no answer to the other side’s questions about how to continue to construct the bridge, the bridge will remain uncompleted and will never reach the other shore. We are not for destroying bridges – on the contrary, we want walls to become permeable” [transl.]
context marked by the progressive deterioration of East-West cooperation. Whilst Europeans were celebrating the triumph of détente on their continent, the superpowers continued their confrontation in the Third World, by fighting proxy wars in Angola (1975-76) and Ethiopia (1977-78).\textsuperscript{174} During 1976 the language of détente lost popularity in the United States, where the political debate was dominated by the ongoing presidential election campaign during which the grounds for a major foreign political turn were laid. In the meanwhile, the Soviet Union started stealthily a program of renovation of its nuclear arsenals on the European continent. The beginning in the mid-Seventies of what historians have referred to as the “crisis of détente” unfolded slowly and regarded in the first place and foremost the relationship between the superpowers.

A great hint to the deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet diplomatic ties was given by the unexpected change of power in Washington. Whilst 1976 federal elections in the FRG largely reconfirmed the ruling government of Schmidt/Genscher, testifying to the existence of a broad popular support for West Germany’s successful economic model – the Modell Deutschland – and for the recent achievements of the federal government’s policy of détente, American electors opted for a political change.

The idea underpinning Kissinger’s foreign political project in the Nixon and Ford years was that superpower détente served the purpose of managing reduced bipolar competition in times of perceived American declining hegemony.\textsuperscript{175} According to Zubok, the declining phase of détente in the United States had begun in 1975 independently from specific international developments, when the concept became increasingly target of criticism of politicians both in the Republican and

\textsuperscript{174} For an analysis of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, see O.A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World interventions and the Making of our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

\textsuperscript{175} For an account of the years of the “American crisis”, see: F. Romero, Storia della guerra fredda. L’ultimo conflitto per l’Europa (Torino: Einaudi, 2009), pp. 227-238.
Democratic ranks.\textsuperscript{176} The rejection of Nixon-Kissinger’s overall foreign and domestic political agenda was at the core of the program of moral regeneration launched by Ford’s opponent Jimmy Carter. Carter’s promises of renewal, which originated from the desire to break with the years of disillusionment that had followed the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, brought the former governor of Georgia to win the presidential elections in November 1976.

The promised turn concerned the contents and style of U.S. foreign policy too.\textsuperscript{177} Carter’s inauguration in January 1977 was marked by the announcement of the pursuit of a new international policy course, which aimed at enhancing transparency, morality, commitment to disarmament and centrality of human rights in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{178} It was with regard to the last aspect in particular that Carter showed immediately the seriousness of his intentions. A series of resounding initiatives in support of Soviet dissidents were taken by the new American administration during its first months of activity. Carter’s idea of dealing with Moscow through a more open diplomacy was limited foremost to the practice of denouncing publicly ongoing violations of human rights perpetrated by Soviet authorities. According to Wilfried Loth, three main factors were behind Carter’s human rights struggle: first, the idea of a mission that the U.S. President was entitled to, in order to extend the values of democracy and relaunch the U.S. image in the world; second, the strategic vision of his Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski who aimed at destabilising the Soviet domination

\textsuperscript{176} V.M. Zubok, \textit{A failed empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev} (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), p. 228.


\textsuperscript{178} As President Carter explained to British Prime Minister Callaghan, French President Giscard d’Estaing and West German Chancellor Schmidt on occasion of their talks in the margins of London’s G7 summit in May 1977, his human rights campaign was necessary to restore the moral grounds of American politics after the Watergate scandal. By pursuing this aim, he admitted to have underestimated possible Soviet reactions. See \textit{Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruhfus, Bundeskanzleramt}, 3.06.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. I, doc. 145, p. 756.
over Eastern Europe;\textsuperscript{179} and third, the exploitation of the international human rights campaign for domestic purposes.\textsuperscript{180} Washington’s assertiveness on human rights contributed to push this issue to the top of the international agenda in the course of 1977, as the Western Alliance was busy with the preparation of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade. The cumbersome presence of human rights issues complicated the achievement of a Western agreement over the future direction of the process of détente, boosted mutual mistrust between the superpowers and had important repercussions on the unfolding of the Belgrade CSCE.

The West German federal government looked with concern at the new developments in the U.S. administration’s international strategy. The continuation of East-West détente required a certain degree of international stability that the redefinition of the cornerstones of the superpower dialogue seemed to endanger. The cooling-off of Soviet-U.S. relations added to other factors of instability which complicated the background against which Bonn’s Ostpolitik and Entspannungspolitik moved in the second half of the Seventies. The troubled implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in the Eastern bloc had been paralleled by a renewed stronger ideological turn in Soviet foreign policy. Moscow was providing large support to Communists in Portugal where a difficult process of transition to democracy was ongoing and had got wide-ragingly involved in the Angolan civil war. New initiatives in the field of rearmament were undertaken by the

\textsuperscript{179} As West German Secretary of State van Well reported to Genscher, from his talk with the U.S. National Security Advisor – which occurred in Washington on the eve of the inauguration of follow-up meeting in Belgrade – emerged a pronounced difference with the foreign political conceptions of Brzezinski’s predecessor Henry Kissinger: neither the maintenance of the status quo, nor the balance of power or the strategic parity were priorities for Brzezinski, who rather aimed at peaceful change, historic turn, and disappearance of communism in Western and in Eastern Europe. On this point, see: \textit{Staatssekretär van Well an Bundesminister Genscher, z.Z. New York, 28.09.1977}, in AAPD, 1977, vol. II, doc. 262, pp. 1271-1273.

Warsaw Pact which started the replacement of its old intermediate-range nuclear weapons stationed in Eastern Europe by more modern SS-20 missiles. Inner-German relations were going through difficult moments due to Moscow’s rigid Berlin policy, East Berlin’s repressive, domestic political course and repeated incidents at the inner-German border.\footnote{Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Bundestages am 28.01.1977, 28.01.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.381.}

By assessing which possible scenarios and diplomatic tasks West German foreign policy would be faced with in the course of 1977, the Auswärtiges Amt maintained, however, its confidence in the opportunity of continuing European détente. The validity of the process initiated by the Helsinki CSCE seemed to find confirmation in some encouraging developments taking place on the front of East-West cooperation. The number of permits to leave the country conceded by Soviet authorities within the framework of family reunification had noticeably grown. Bonn’s improved relations with Poland had borne their fruits as well: after the signing of bilateral agreements regulating mutual cooperation in various fields in 1975-1976, a growing number of Germans living in the neighbouring country had got the possibility to leave for the FRG (23,306 in 1976 against 7,041 in 1975). Economic relations with all Eastern countries had improved, notwithstanding the restrictions to trade exchange imposed by the poor solvency of the Eastern partners.\footnote{Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Bundestages am 28.01.1977, 28.01.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.381.} Bonn’s Ostpolitik had benefited from the favourable intertwining of bilateral and multilateral initiatives since the summer of 1975. The good moment of détente marked by the conclusion of the CSCE was utilised by the West German federal government to improve bilateral relations with all Eastern countries. Between November and December 1975 Schmidt and Genscher visited the USSR, Bulgaria and Romania.\footnote{On the meeting between Genscher and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 12 November 1975, see Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem sowjetischen Außenminister Gromyko in Moskau, 12.11.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II, doc. 339, pp. 1582-} CSCE issues continued to be object of discussions and
analysis with the Eastern leaders throughout 1976:184 bilateral talks offered to Schmidt and Genscher the occasion to reiterate the importance of a prompt implementation of Helsinki’s commitments and of a further development of the CSCE process.

Reinforced by the electoral victory in October 1976 and looking to the upcoming appointment with the CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade in October 1977, the West German federal government worked on the continuation of multilateral détente in the course of the year. The tasks deriving from the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions and the preparation of the Belgrade CSCE stimulated a conceptual reflection on the definition of a Western common concept of détente. As it will be analysed at the beginning of this chapter, Genscher’s concept of “realistic détente” contributed significantly to the debate within the Western Alliance. The theoretical and strategic preparation of the first CSCE follow-up meeting was faced with increasing transatlantic divergences over the West’s foreign political

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priorities, with particular regard to the international role of human rights issues. Bonn’s efforts were directed, as the chapter investigates, to fostering its conference aims within the Western Alliance and protecting the transatlantic harmony in front of the eyes of the public opinion. Whereas the CSCE preparatory meeting in the summer of 1977 displayed encouraging results, the main conference in Belgrade turned soon, after its start in autumn, into an occasion for reviewing existing divergences. After analysing West German diplomatic attempts to attain substantial achievements by pursuing a “middle-course” strategy at negotiations in Belgrade, the chapter ends by reviewing the main lessons West German détente policy had to draw from the disappointing outcome of the first CSCE follow-up meeting.

**Fostering a Western common concept of détente**

In the months which followed the conclusion of the CSCE in Helsinki the West German federal government repeatedly argued – in front of the Bundestag, in public statements on the press and on occasion of bilateral meetings with other Western and European leaders – that there was no reasonable alternative to the prosecution of détente. The question of how to improve and shape further the process of European détente was at the centre of the West German Foreign Office’s attention throughout 1976. Once Bonn’s bilateral Ostpolitik had been fully multilateralised at Helsinki, the CSCE policy asserted itself as its inextricable completion. But it represented also the adequate field wherein the Auswärtiges Amt could pursue its ambitions to play a strategic role in the international – and especially European – arena. Not only did the CSCE policy offered to the Foreign Office good chances of diplomatic success – as the experience of negotiations in Helsinki and Geneva had showed. It represented also one important field where Genscher and his servants could chase their aspirations of autonomy with respect to Schmidt’s Chancellery, which held the lead
of international initiative in other crucial fields – as Ostpolitik, inner-German dialogue, economic cooperation.\textsuperscript{185}

The great number of internal analyses and strategic papers of the West German Foreign Office dedicated to issues of Entspannungspolitik reveals Bonn’s interest in attaining a better definition of détente both from the theoretical and the practical point of view. More precisely, West German efforts were directed, first, to work out a Western common concept of détente; and second, to decide which next strategic steps the multilateral policy of détente should focus on, in preparation of the upcoming first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade.

To détente and its continuation was dedicated NATO’s Spring Conference which took place in Oslo in May 1976.\textsuperscript{186} The Western partners’ different definitions of détente were discussed at the meeting of the Alliance’s foreign ministers. Whilst U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger spoke of a strategy of “peace through strength” and French minister of foreign affairs Sauvagnargues of a “sort of containment through dialogue”, Genscher advocated his idea of a “realistic policy of détente” (realistische Entspannungspolitik).\textsuperscript{187} The theoretical conception of a realistic policy of détente served the purpose of contrasting the critical views of those in the FRG who considered the foreign minister of the Schmidt government as a “brakeman” of East-West dialogue.\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{185} The conduction of Bonn’s CSCE policy was marked also by a personal element: indeed, Genscher considered the CSCE as one of his policy domains. In his memoirs, the CSCE policy is analysed as one of the “three columns” of the West German foreign policy of responsibility. See H.D. Genscher, \textit{Erinnerungen}, pp. 299-324.


Realism was, moreover, a trademark of Schmidt-Genscher’s tandem: Realpolitik became in the second half of the Seventies the social-liberal coalition’s keyword and the antidote to multiple international and domestic crises.

During NATO’s Spring Conference the West German foreign minister stressed that a realistic détente policy was the only possible strategy to follow. The potentiality of the CSCE process remained valid, even though setbacks were to expect in the months and years to come. Genscher’s “realistic détente policy” rested upon three cornerstones. First, the existing interaction between the pursuit of security and détente policies: Genscher’s formula originated from the need to find an adequate answer to the Soviet idea that the tasks of political détente had been completed for good at Helsinki and what remained for East-West dialogue to deal with was merely a “policy of military détente”. Second, the unity of an action of the Western Alliance: the coordination with its partners remained for the Bundesrepublik a question of principle – i.e. anchoring its initiatives towards the East to the allies’ approval – and of winning strategy – i.e. preventing The Soviet bloc from distinguishing between countries more and less willing to cooperation within the Western caucus and implementing a consequent divide et impera strategy. Third, the understanding of détente as a continuous and dynamic process: the stress on the processual nature of the CSCE should compensate the West’s rejection of any form of bureaucratisation which would lower its high political value and openness to change. The three pillars of the conceptual construction of Bonn’s “realistic détente policy” were elaborated by the Auswärtiges Amt on the basis of the experience collected during negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki. They all responded to the FRG’s vital foreign policy needs. The concept that Genscher proposed to the Western allies was, hence, the outcome of the process of reflections and conceptualisation carried out in Bonn’s Foreign Office in the aftermath of the Helsinki CSCE.

Genscher’s formulation contributed importantly to the debate on détente within the EPC’s working group on the CSCE. As part of their preparatory work for the first review conference of Belgrade, the EC-Nine agreed upon a rough common concept of détente. This included the three dimensions of the West German realistic policy of détente and completed them by recalling the principle of renouncing the use and threat of force – with the aim of addressing openly the invalidity of Brezhnev’s doctrine in the Soviet bloc – and the principle of the power of individuals – a formulation encompassing both human rights and human contacts. From a pragmatic viewpoint, détente dialogue was conceived as a complex of flexible diplomatic tools which could be used in different forms and at different levels according to circumstances. Amongst the possible tasks that détente dialogue could take, the Nine mentioned: the regulation of practical problems; decisions on armament limitations; forms of partial cooperation; the preservation of the modus vivendi; crisis management.190

The EC Nine’s working group on CSCE continued to work on the refinement of a common concept of détente in the course of 1976. The main ideas produced by the debate were summarised on 27 January 1977 in the strategic paper “Elements for a definition of détente”. In this paper the EC-Nine postulated the principle of “geographic and thematic indivisibility” of détente. Not only were détente commitments in different areas bound together (“thematic indivisibility of détente), but participant states committed themselves to conforming to détente principles when acting in different geographic areas, i.e. outside Europe too (“geographic indivisibility of détente”). The EC-Nine advocated, moreover, the idea that cooperation should be strengthened in those areas where East-West divergences did not impede to realise concrete improvements; instead, some moderation was required when dealing with more divisive issues – as highly ideological or military questions – in order not to endanger the overall prosecution of

cooperation.\textsuperscript{191} Hence, Western European countries developed an operative concept of détente, which entailed clear indications about the strategy they were intended to follow at negotiations in Belgrade. The feasibility of such operational guidelines was put to a hard test at the first CSCE follow-up meeting.

\textbf{Fostering a Western common agenda for Belgrade}

The definition of a common concept of détente was interwoven with the identification of a joint agenda for the prosecution of the CSCE process in Belgrade. Agreeing upon what the process of détente was and what it meant implied to decide what concrete steps had to be taken to shape its continuation. Bonn’s diplomatic efforts throughout 1977 were dedicated to both aims. The working out of the West’s concerted strategy for conference was flanked by an accurate preparation within the West German Foreign Office in coordination with other federal ministries competent on specific aspects of the CSCE. The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} led the activities of the inter-ministerial group in charge of setting up the West German strategy, whose regular meetings paced Belgrade’s preparation works.

Approximate indications for the mandate of the follow-up meetings were contained in the provisions of Helsinki Final Act’s Basket IV. According to its second article, the process initiated by the first CSCE should be continued by proceeding, first, to a thorough exchange of views on the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions; second, to negotiations for deepening multilateral cooperation; and third, to an eventual agreement on the future development of détente.\textsuperscript{192} The first CSCE follow-up conference had a dual mandate: its tasks were directed both “towards the past” and “towards the future” – i.e. reviewing what had been realised so far and negotiating further realisations. The contents of the FRG’s preparatory works for the conference reflected


\textsuperscript{192} The full text of the Helsinki Final Act is available at: http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?.
such duality of tasks as well. During 1976-1977 the West German Foreign Office dealt, on the one hand, with the pursuit and the assessment of the ongoing implementation process (as it had been analysed in conclusion of the preceding chapter); on the other hand, with the elaboration of concrete proposals to raise in Belgrade.\footnote{Protokollnotizen „Sitzung der Interministeriellen Arbeitsgrupp KSZE im Auswärtigen Amt am 23. November 1976“, 30.11.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.} 

Bonn’s approach to the definition of Belgrade’s agenda rested upon some general considerations. The detailed identification of the aims of the conference would be largely dependent on the state of the Helsinki Final Act’s implementation. If participant states would prove to have already put in practice large part of Helsinki’s dispositions, the way would be open for deepening and extending the contents of East-West détente significantly. Otherwise, a serious debate over the reasons of the impediments to the implementation would be inescapable. In Bonn’s view, direct confrontations were however to be avoided in Belgrade, as they would damage particularly the Bundesrepublik and discredit the value of détente in front of the eyes of the public opinion. To give new stimulus to negotiations, it was necessary to find some matters which could attract the interest of all participants. All proposals for deepening multilateral cooperation could not be detached from the contents of the Helsinki Accords: the Final Act provided indeed for the binding grounds for all further improvements.\footnote{Fortführung des multilateralen Entspannungsprozesses in Europa, 15.04.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.389.}

According to West German predictions, the CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade would serve as a first test for the willingness of its participants to continue cooperation.\footnote{Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der KSZE-Beschlüsse), 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.} Bonn’s eyes were fixed on the Eastern countries. After the early developments of the implementation process had unveiled the serious difficulties the Eastern leaders were faced with after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, a question was put to the attention of the West German Foreign Office: on which issues should the West focus, in order to test the Soviet bloc’s commitment to
the continuation of multilateral détente? The field of confidence-building measures seemed to provide, again, the adequate answer to West German diplomatic needs. As initiatives in this field coming from the neutral and non-aligned countries were to expect in Belgrade, the Western Alliance should be prepared to react united and to take a proactive attitude.\textsuperscript{196} According to the instructions provided by the Auswärtiges Amt to the West German representation at the NATO quarters in July 1976, concrete proposals for the improvement and extension of the existing provisions on CBMs stayed at the centre of Bonn’s agenda for Belgrade.\textsuperscript{197} They encompassed the following tasks: improving the criteria for the notification of military manoeuvres, by anticipating the temporal deadline for announcements; extending the obligation of notification to other categories of manoeuvres which had been left out of Helsinki’s Basket II; putting into practice Basket II’s dispositions concerning the announcement of big manoeuvres over 25,000 units; defining clearer rules for regulating manoeuvres’ observation.\textsuperscript{198}

Besides being amongst the FRG’s priorities at the CSCE,\textsuperscript{199} CBMs had benefited in Helsinki from the good cooperation with the delegations of the NNA countries; they had moreover compelled the Soviet bloc to get involved by addressing its traditional interest for security. The Auswärtiges Amt aimed at replicating Helsinki’s experience at the follow-up meeting in Belgrade, by forcing the Eastern


\textsuperscript{197} KSZE-CBM. Hier: Hausbesprechung zur Vorbereitung auf Belgrad am 13.05.1977, 10.05.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.


\textsuperscript{199} In Bonn’s view, the CBMs had high political value and contributed concretely to the improvement of security on the continent. Whilst the CSCE was not the adequate framework to make decisions on limitations of military activities and on strictly military questions, the development of CMBs should be instead a central object of negotiations in Belgrade. See: Militärische Aspekte der Sicherheit auf dem KSE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad. Hier: Zwischenbilanz, 12.01.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
countries to negotiate for the extension of Basket II’s existing provisions. Bonn’s intentions to relaunch the initiative in the fields of CBMs collided, however, with the growing scepticism of the superpowers towards the CSCE. On the occasion of bilateral consultations on CSCE with the USSR in June 1976, Bonn had registered the Soviet contrariety to further negotiations in the fields of CBMs. The distinction in principle made by Moscow between political and military détente had concrete repercussions on the Soviet strategy for the follow-up conference in Belgrade. In the Soviet view, after the topic of CBMs had been completed for good in Helsinki, negotiations on additional aspects of military détente should take place in Vienna. Likewise, on the other side of the Atlantic, Washington expressed reluctance towards Bonn’s proposal of extending the obligations of notification to big military manoeuvres.200

Whereas NATO was the adequate framework to elaborate concerted initiatives on security aspects of détente, Bonn’s diplomacy worked during the months of 1977 to collect the Western partners’ necessary support to its proposals for Belgrade with regard to other issues and within other caucuses as well. The coordination on the Western front was displayed at a large scale. CSCE issues were discussed at all levels at disposal of Bonn’s diplomacy, namely: within the EPC’s Working Group on the CSCE; within the Committee of Permanent Representatives at the EECs in Brussels and in coordination with the Community’s institutions; within NATO’s Political and Economic Committee; within the Group of the EC-Nine at the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in Geneva; at UNESCO in Paris and at its 1977’s annual conference in Nairobi; within the Council of Europe – which had gradually turned into a useful forum of coordination with the non-aligned countries; at the bilateral level through rounds of consultations on the CSCE with Europe’s non-aligned and Eastern countries.201

201 Fortführung des multilateralen Entspannungsprozess in Europa (Vorbereitung des KSZE-Folgekonferenz in Belgrad 1977), 15.04.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.389; and
Preparing the first CSCE follow-up conference continued to be one important operative tasks of the EPC. The Nine’s possible strategies to follow in Belgrade were discussed throughout 1976 and 1977 by the representatives of the Working Group on the CSCE and of the EPC Political Committee, and by the Nine’s heads of stated and governments. On 27 January 1977 Working Group on CSCE transmitted to NATO its report on the state of the preparation of the Belgrade CSCE, according to the established procedure of coordination between the smaller and the larger Western caucuses. The document summed up the Nine’s guidelines for their conduct in Belgrade. They reiterated their commitment to preserving the balanced and harmonic nature of the Helsinki Final Act which remained the irrevocable grounds for all next realisations. The foreign ministers of the Nine charged the EPC Political Committee with the task of elaborating substantial proposals for negotiations in Belgrade. Western initiatives could eventually aim at opening new fronts in the CSCE cooperation, without otherwise diverting the attention from the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions. To the Nine’s January’s report, two additional, important strategic papers followed in the course of 1977. In the first – “Main Themes and Catalogue of Mains Points for Belgrade” – the Nine submitted a list of detailed proposals for the follow-up conference. In the second – “Proposals for improving implementation”
– the proposals of the Nine were reviewed and grouped into different categories: first, the ones deriving directly from the Helsinki’s provisions and therefore considered more likely to be put on the negotiations table; second, the ones to raise as floating ideas during negotiations, with the twofold aim of testing the other participants’ willingness to cooperate and offering narrow openings for the unblocking of negotiations in difficult situations; third, the ones destined for mere tactical uses, i.e. in order to contrast undesirable Eastern requests.207 These two papers – which reflected the Nine’s will to speak with a single voice in Belgrade – were a fruit of compromise between two main opposite views. On the one hand, the British and the Dutch advocated an assertive approach towards the focal issue of the implementation of Helsinki’s dispositions on human rights in the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, the majority of the Nine favoured more pragmatic and balanced approaches to negotiations. A compromise between these two standpoints was found by extending the British/Dutch proposal for in-depth review debates to the whole complex of the Helsinki Final Act.208

**Clashing visions and strategies of détente**

Whilst coordination amongst the EC-Nine was proceeding at a good pace, it was more difficult to find an agreement over a convergent strategy for Belgrade with the U.S. new administration. In 1977 bilateral relations between Bonn and Washington entered a phase of troubles and misunderstandings. Mutual discord marked particularly the personal relationship between U.S. President Jimmy Carter and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.209 The feeling that administrations in Bonn and Washington were speaking different

207 Ibid.
languages concerned also the conduction of détente policy and the diplomatic preparation of the first CSCE follow-up conference.

Transatlantic coordination with regard to the continuation of the process of détente had suffered from the presidential election campaign and the power change in Washington. As the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the West German Bundestag observed, several crucial questions concerning the Western strategy at the Belgrade CSCE were still unanswered at the beginning of 1977.210 No decisions had been made about what concrete initiatives NATO’s delegations would undertake in Belgrade to relaunch East-West cooperation. There was overall agreement only on some general points, limited to the part of the conference’s mandate directed “towards the past”. First, Western delegations should be firm on stressing their disappointment about the incomplete implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the Eastern bloc. Firmness should not degenerate, however, into sterile confrontation.211 Second, it had to be made clear that the process of implementation, though gradual, should be pursued with continuity by all signing countries.

With regard to this aspect, Bonn had recognised encouraging signals coming from the Soviet bloc in Brezhnev’s speech held in Tula on 18 January 1977, two days before Carter’s inauguration. The Tula speech contained innovative passages regarding the Soviet security doctrine which had the meaning of a positive signal of opening towards possible cooperation sent by Brezhnev to the new U.S. administration.212 Bonn hoped that Moscow’s implementation of a more defensive security strategy would be paralleled by a less ideological attitude towards cooperation in the field of security and more generally towards the détente process.213 As Peter has

211 Ibid.
212 W.M. Zubok, A failed empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, p. 255.
highlighted, the Soviet leadership feared – not without good reasons – that relations with the new American administration would be dominated by human rights issues.  

With regard to the Belgrade CSCE, there were good reasons to fear that the upcoming review conference would turn into a stage of public condemnation of Eastern violations of human rights. The development of a growing drift between Bonn’s and Washington’s views of the process of détente, with particular regard to human rights issues, were observed and reported by the correspondents of the West German press in the U.S. The public and political interest for human rights pivoted in the West during 1977. It was not a novelty of the post-Helsinki time: human rights issues had been a crucial item of debate at the Helsinki CSCE as well. But what changed in the months preceding the beginning of the follow-up meeting in Belgrade was the prominent role that human rights issues took on in the international political agenda. The acceleration of this trend was first due to a series of resounding initiatives undertaken by Carter and his entourage in the field of the promotion of human rights. Within the first months of the Carter administration, the State Department protested publicly against the arrests of Soviet dissidents Alexander Ginsburg and Juri Orlow, initiators of the Helsinki-observer-group in Moscow; the President sent personally a letter of support to Soviet dissident Sakharov and welcomed at the White House Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukowski, after his release from the Gulag; and the Congress created a special committee in charge of observing the state of the respect of human rights.

216 On the EEC’s commitment to human rights at the CSCE in Helsinki see A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente. Moreover, during the Seventies also the EEC were increasingly involved with human rights protection outside of Europe, as it has been well analysed in Ferrari’s PhD thesis (L. Ferrari, Speaking with a Single Voice. The Assertion of the EC as a Distinctive International Actor).
rights in the Eastern European countries.\footnote{218} As an additional confirmation of the new salience of human rights issues in international affairs, Amnesty International was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1977.\footnote{219} Throughout the year plenty of initiatives for the promotion of human rights were organised in Helsinki’s name in Europe. Seventy-five MPs of different Western European countries supported Romanian dissident Goma and created the association “HAIG” (Helsinki Agreements Implementation Group), whose main task consisted in monitoring the respect of human rights in the Soviet bloc. Belgium’s President Tindemans proposed the creation of a “pan-European court for human rights”, in front of which the Soviet Union could be indicted.\footnote{220}

Bonn’s possibilities to multilateralise and anchor its conference aims within the Western Alliance – i.e. to shape a Western strategy for Belgrade according to the West German idea of a “realistic détente policy” – were strongly hindered by the U.S. activism on human rights. It was clear to Bonn that the Carter administration would push the human rights item to the top of its agenda for the CSCE. In its internal analyses, the West German Foreign Office unceasingly stressed the importance of taking a cautious approach to human rights issues in Belgrade. Appeals to prudence were repeated both by Bonn’s government and the EC-Nine during the diplomatic preparation of the CSCE follow-up meeting.\footnote{221} According to the Auswärtiges Amt, the focus on moaning about human rights in Belgrade would prove to be a counterproductive strategy. Theoretical discussions should be avoided

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and replaced by a more pragmatic approach to negotiations.\textsuperscript{222} The West German government agreed in principle on the importance of Principle VII; Bonn’s primal interest remained however directed to safeguarding the possibility of obtaining further Eastern concessions in the fields of visa policies, family reunification and human contacts – areas in which the FRG led Western initiatives, by drafting and negotiating proposals.\textsuperscript{223}

Human contacts – conceived as an operative extension of the human rights principle – represented for the Bundesrepublik the concrete essence of the everyday coexistence with its Eastern neighbours. Facilitating flows of visits, contacts, phone calls, letters, newspapers etc. with millions of Germans living behind the Iron Curtain had certainly a less powerful public impact than resounding denounces of human rights violations regarding outstanding dissidents; however, they had undeniably more direct repercussions on the lives of European citizens. Quite significantly, during bilateral talks with Swedish Foreign Minister Söder in April 1975, Genscher highlighted that it was more important to get three people out of the East than to make of a fuss about one single person for propagandistic purposes.\textsuperscript{224} This argument, which had been, was and would be repeatedly brought forward by the Auswärtiges Amt, was used also to try to soften Washington’s intransigency on human rights.

On occasion of London’s G7 summit in May 1977 human rights issues were discussed in relation to the upcoming CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade.\textsuperscript{225} Since the convening of the first economic summit of the most industrialised countries in Rambouillet in

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November 1975, the routine of the meetings of the Group of Seven had turned into a platform of transatlantic coordination and foreign political discussion of utmost importance. For the FRG it represented the ideal multilateral forum to pursue its international interests and have a voice in international affairs by leveraging the strength of its economic preponderance. At the summit in London, the West German Chancellor tried to convince the U.S. President of the opportunity to pursue a moderate and pragmatic approach to human rights questions in Belgrade, with the goal “not to destabilise systems but to improve peoples’ concrete living conditions”. Schmidt provided some numbers in support to his idea of the process of détente: the West German federal government had contributed since Helsinki to achieve the full implementation of human rights for about 65,000 citizens coming from the Soviet Union, Romania, the GDR and other countries; similar results were to expect for further 40,000 citizens in 1977 and 50,000 for 1978. Carter’s reassurances that the U.S. administration aimed at a cooperative and not divisive conference in Belgrade and intended to take constructive actions in order to accomplish the full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, sounded encouraging but somewhat ambiguous. More assertiveness was shown by Carter’s hardliner National Security Advisor Brzezinski, who chased away any illusions about Washington’s second thoughts by explaining to West German Ambassador in Washington von Staden that the U.S. administration saw the question of human rights from a “more global” point of view than Bonn’s federal government. Human rights issues were the focal item of U.S.-West German consultations held on 9 September 1977 in view of the beginning of the Belgrade CSCE one month later. Against Bonn’s hopes, the round of bilateral talks did not shed light on how far the U.S. administration intended to pursue its struggle for the respect of human rights in Belgrade. It gave the West

228 Ibid., p. 582. 
German federal government to understand that the U.S. delegation at the Belgrade CSCE would be likely to take two actions which both displeased Bonn. First, a marked stress would be put on the implementation of Principle VII. Second, the idea of naming single cases of violations, particularly the ones of prominent dissidents, during the review debate on the Helsinki Final Act was an option that Washington did not disregard.\textsuperscript{230}

The discrepancy between the standpoints of the U.S and the FRG – together with the majority of the EC-Nine, which were instead in favour of focusing negotiations on issues of human contacts and review discussions on broader categories of violations and cases – remained profound on the eve of the Belgrade CSCE. On 28 September 1977, few days before the starting of the first follow-up meeting, the heads of NATO’s delegations at the Belgrade CSCE met in Brussels to agree on the guidelines for the West’s behaviour at the conference. The two strategic papers drafted by the EC-Nine – “Main themes for Belgrade” and “Proposals for the implementation of the Final Act” – were approved.\textsuperscript{231} The decision represented a provisional agreement over the main general strategic lines the Alliance intended to pursue in Belgrade. But the details about the following concrete actions the Alliance would take, as well as about the real intentions of the U.S. delegation, remained largely undefined.

\textbf{Pursuing transatlantic harmony in public policy}

Notwithstanding West German-American divergences of views and strategies, for the \textit{Bundesrepublik} it remained vitally important to keep the Americans involved in the CSCE process. The search for a transatlantic entente over a Western common strategy for Belgrade continued to be pursued by West German diplomacy as before as

\begin{flushright}
230 \textit{Stand der Vorbereitungen auf das KSZE-Folgentreffen in Belgrad, 27.09.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.}

231 \textit{Stand der Vorbereitungen auf das KSZE-Folgentreffen in Belgrad, 27.09.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.}
\end{flushright}
during the follow-up meeting. Besides being a West German foreign policy priority, protecting the transatlantic harmony became increasingly a public political need as well. The public side of the West German diplomatic preparation of the first CSCE follow-up meeting consisted in avoiding any public dissent with the U.S. administration. Even though divergences of foreign political views between Bonn and Washington had grown throughout 1977, transatlantic harmony and Western coordination needed to be defended in front of public opinions. Particularly, it was necessary to convince the public opinion that Bonn’s federal government agreed in substance with Washington upon the importance of engaging in the struggle for the respect of human rights in the Soviet bloc.

Handling carefully the public dimension of Belgrade’s preparation responded to the need, first, of washing up perennial concerns that the FRG would undertake a foreign political single-handed course in the pursuit of East-West dialogue. Bonn’s international behaviour remained under scrutiny in the U.S., especially since incomprehension between Carter and Schmidt had become to emerge. Bonn’s critical stances on Carter’s human rights policy, in particular, were object of public discussion on the U.S. press.232 In June 1977 the West German Foreign Office asked its ambassador in Washington to carry out briefings with the German press correspondents in the U.S., in order to take precautions against increasing trends of depicting Bonn and Washington as drifting apart. Divergences of opinions should be softened in the press coverage and German readers should get the impression that Washington and Bonn shared an overall common political line for the management of East-West dialogue.233 A month later, as delegations of the CSCE participant states were in Belgrade to prepare the conference, U.S. chief delegator Sherer blamed the West German radio sender Deutschlandfunk for a reportage which “wrongly” disclosed the existence of a profound disagreement between the U.S.

233 Ibid.
and the West German delegations over human rights issues.\textsuperscript{234} Press releases claiming the “isolation of the U.S. delegation” at the preparatory meeting in Belgrade were paralleled by a report by Reuters pointing the finger at the leanings to unilateralism of the West German delegation, whose “fluctuating position” had been target of criticism of the British newspaper \textit{The Times} too.\textsuperscript{235}

Pursuing an adequate public strategy responded, second, to Bonn’s need to deal with the requests coming from the domestic political opposition and public opinion. A special interest in the CSCE existed in the FRG: the \textit{Bundesrepublik} had been the only country in which the CSCE had been item of parliamentary debate twice.\textsuperscript{236} Public expectations on the contributions the CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade would bring to the human rights cause could not be ignored. The minority fractions of the CDU/CSU put pressure on the federal government for greater commitment to human rights. After having strongly opposed the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the CDU/CSU pretended that Schmidt and Genscher followed Carter’s example of foreign political morality and adopted an offensive stance on human rights towards the Eastern countries as a precondition for the continuation of East-West cooperation.\textsuperscript{237} CDU/CSU’s insistence aimed at putting the federal government in a difficult position by pushing human rights issues to the top of the political agenda. It would not be easy, indeed, to justify in front of the public opinion the reasons of the FRG’s minor commitment to human rights compared to other Western partners. The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} assessed the existence of concrete risks that West German aims and intentions would be misunderstood by the

\textsuperscript{234} Erklärungen des amerikanischen Delegationsleiters beim KSZE-Vorbereitungstreffen in Belgrad, 7.07.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
domestic public opinion and the allies. The Helsinki Final Act had raised great public expectations which played increasingly a focal role in the following developments of European détente. The unprecedented public interest in the CSCE negotiations, which marked the process of European détente since Helsinki onwards, faced all governments with new tasks in the realm of international public policy.

On the basis of the experiences collected during the diplomatic preparation of the first CSCE follow-up meeting, the West German Foreign Office decided, in coordination with the Chancellor’s office, to embark in Belgrade on a strategy of balance which would mediate between different needs and thrusts. First, it was necessary to strike a balance between satisfying public expectations and avoiding excessive confrontations able to endanger the positive outcome of the conference. On the operational side, it meant to show firmness on Eastern responsibilities for the lacking implementation and violations of the Helsinki Final Act, by circumscribing them, however, to the first phase of the conference dedicated to review debates. Second, a middle course had to be undertaken between questions of principle – i.e. the need to preserve the credibility of the CSCE process – and pragmatic interests – i.e. achieving concrete improvements in East-West cooperation – both during review debates and substantial negotiations. Human issues in particular needed to be discussed, after having restated the importance of the principles underlying them, within the framework of concrete actions in the fields of Basket III. Third, intermediation had to be pursued between the divergent positions of the Western allies, particularly between the American and the French. Whereas the first mainly aimed at realising in Belgrade an exhaustive and comprehensive review of the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions, by focusing particularly on the state of human rights in

239 Auszug aus der Aufzeichnung der Abt. 2 des AA, 07.03.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
Eastern Europe, the second firmly opposed the scenario of turning Belgrade into a mere “conference in human rights”. Translated into practice, it meant to support Washington’s call for an in-depth review debate, without otherwise closing the possibility of multilateral cooperation with the Eastern countries.241

The preparatory phase of the first CSCE follow-up meeting started on 15 June 1977 in Belgrade and ended eight weeks later, on 5 August 1977. The thirty-five delegations reached an overall agreement over the conference’s dates, duration, agenda and main procedural questions, in order to permit works in Belgrade to flow without impediments. The relatively long duration of the preparatory meeting was due to the emergence of the first disagreements between the Western and the Eastern fronts. The West German delegation managed to push through its demand for a dual structure of the plenary debate, with a first temporally limited phase oriented “towards the past” – i.e. focused on the review of the process of implementation of the Helsinki Act – and a second phase directed “towards the future” – i.e. negotiations on substantial improvements and developments.242 The Auswärtiges Amt welcomed warmly the proactive mediation role carried out by the group of neutral and non-aligned countries – particularly by the Austrian, Swiss and Spanish delegations – which anticipated the dynamics that would mark the unfolding of the main conference some months later.243

As regards the most divisive question of the conference’s duration and of the schedule of its end date, the Western interests prevailed over

Eastern demands for a short conference limited to a duration of three-four weeks and with a fixed end date. The Western delegations, which aimed instead – with Bonn’s vivid support – at a sufficiently long conference with an open end, managed to get a practicable duration of indicatively sixteen weeks. The end of the first CSCE follow-up meeting was hence scheduled for the spring of 1978; the conclusion was however left open and tied to the adoption of a final document. The organisational agenda of the conference was roughly structured: after two weeks of plenary conference focused on review debates, the following weeks would be dedicated to negotiations within five working organs – respectively on Basket I, II and III, on Mediterranean questions, and on the final document and the terms of the convening of the second follow-up meeting.244

Between the conclusion of the preparatory meeting in August and the beginning of the main conference in October 1977 no consultations with the Warsaw Pact countries took place. Bonn’s impression was that the Soviet Union and its allies – with the single exception of Romania245 – would pursue a low-profile approach in Belgrade and focus their efforts on avoiding in-depth review debates – with particular regard to human rights issues – which would damage their international prestige and fuel dissidents’ demands.246 Still during bilateral CSCE consultations with the USSR in the early months of 1977, Bonn had registered Moscow’s will to avoid any spectacular conference which would compel the Soviet bloc to deal with the large shortcomings of its implementation of Helsinki’s provisions.247 According to West German

245 Romania undertook an independent course from the Soviet bloc, both before and during the follow-up meeting. For an assessment of Romania’s autonomous strategy at the CSCE, see: M. E. Ionescu, “Romania’s Special Position within the Eastern Bloc during the CSCE Follow-Up Conferences of Belgrade and Madrid”, in Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975-1990, eds. M. Peter and H. Wentker, pp. 137-153.
246 Bericht an die Minister über den Stand der Vorbereitung des KSZE-Folgetreffens in Belgrad, 7.04.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
analyses, signals coming from Moscow suggested that the Soviet Union aimed at a short meeting with consultative character. Review debates should consist in a mere exchange of national reports on the state of the implementation process. The West German Foreign Office predicted, furthermore, that Eastern delegations would try to shift soon the focus of negotiations in Belgrade from implementation issues to general discussions over security and to Brezhnev’s proposal for a pan-European conference on cooperation in the fields of energy and environment. Therefore, it was to expect that the Soviet bloc would abstain from taking any proactive initiatives, by rather investing its efforts into a rapid conclusion of the conference.

The upcoming follow-up meeting in Belgrade looked like being an intermediate step in the CSCE process, split between the reconfirmation of Helsinki’s realisation and the possibility of paving new developments for the future follow-up meeting. According to Bonn’s predictions, the Belgrade CSCE would exercise a “preventive function of control” of the future behaviour of Eastern countries, wedging them further into the process of détente. An extraordinary final document was not, however, to be expected in Belgrade: therefore, it was convenient to approach the appointment of the first follow-up conference with pragmatism and not to pitch public expectations too high.

The Belgrade CSCE at its start: reviewing existing divergences

On the eve of the opening of the plenary session at the Belgrade CSCE, positive signals coming from the superpowers alimented West German hopes that the conference would display a fruitful cooperation. Whereas it seemed difficult to replay the success of Helsinki, there was

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248 Bericht an die Minister über den Stand der Vorbereitung des KSZE-Folgetreffens in Belgrad, 7.04.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
250 Ibid.
enough room for confiding in the possible achievement of concrete détente improvements. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit in Washington in September 1977 had given the hint for the resurgence of the talks on strategic arms limitation (SALT II) and for a consequent overall improvement of the superpowers dialogue in all fields, after coolness had marked bipolar relations during the first months of the Carter administration.\textsuperscript{251} As the American magazine \textit{Newsweek} reported, an officer of the State Department close to Cyrus Vance had commented that “If SALT is on, Belgrade will be a lot shorter and sweeter”.\textsuperscript{252} Even the authoritative \textit{Washington Post} welcomed positively the apparent return of “new warmth marking the U.S.-Soviet ties”: “The stage is also set”, so the American newspaper, “for the opening in Belgrade on Tuesday of the review conference on European Security and Cooperation with the expectation that the U.S.-Soviet confrontation over human rights will be either avoided, or much more muted than originally anticipated”.\textsuperscript{253} The beneficial interaction between the unfolding of SALT II and CSCE negotiations – as the dependence of Belgrade’s fortunes on the superpowers’ willingness to cooperate – was not unknown to the West German federal government.

The works of the first CSCE follow-up meeting started in the Yugoslav capital on 4 October 1977. According to the schedule agreed at the preparatory meeting, general plenary debates lasted two weeks.\textsuperscript{254} On 9 October was the turn of the West German delegation to issue its opening address. The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} had sent to Belgrade a high-profile delegation which was headed by Ambassador Per Fischer and included eight high-ranking servants of the Foreign Office, a staff of six collaborators, a press speaker, and some experts for specific items

\begin{footnotes}
\item[252] \textit{KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad}, 03.10.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
\item[253] \textit{Ibid}.
\end{footnotes}
of negotiation.\textsuperscript{255} After the long and careful diplomatic work carried out during 1976-1977 to promote the implementation of the Helsinki Accords and to prepare the first review conference, the moment had come for Bonn to present on a broad stage its plans for the continuation of the CSCE process. Hence, the head of the West German delegation restated in his opening address Bonn’s main views about the aims, the meaning and tasks of the CSCE, offering a small \textit{summa} of the West German idea of the process of multilateral détente.\textsuperscript{256}

As Fischer stressed, détente had to be necessarily continued because there were no other available and pursuable alternatives. As Helsinki Final Act represented the cornerstone of détente in Europe, its correct interpretation and full implementation needed to be safeguarded. The Helsinki CSCE had initiated a long but continuous process whose main aim was making Europe safer and Europeans more human.\textsuperscript{257} A particular stress was put by Fischer on the human dimension of the CSCE, by giving once again clear indications about what West German priorities consisted in. The importance of human rights was evoked with reference to their historical and multilateral significance; their implementation and their respect were put into the hands of the shared responsibility of all member states.\textsuperscript{258}

When moving to the analysis of the state of implementation of Helsinki’s commitments, Fischer adopted the rhetorical strategy of balancing achievements and shortcomings: he started mentioning what had already been realised to proceed then by enlisting what was still to do. Severe and direct criticisms were not spared to the Eastern countries: concrete examples of setbacks and shortcomings of the process of implementation in the Soviet bloc were listed by the head of

\textsuperscript{255} \textit{Stand der Vorbereitungen auf das KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad, 27.09.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.}
\textsuperscript{256} \textit{KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Deutsche Erklärung für Generaldebatte, 09.10.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.}
\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{258} \textit{Ibid.}
the West German delegation. As the *Auswärtiges Amt* had decided when preparing its strategy for Belgrade firmness had to be displayed in the first phase of the conference. On this point there was agreement with the Western partners and the U.S. delegation. Bonn drew, however, a marked line between the “moment for firmness” and the “moment for pragmatism”, i.e. the “moment of (moderate) confrontation” and the “moment of negotiation”: once questions of principles would have been discussed and exhausted in the first phase of the conference dedicated to review debates, delegations had to put aside ideological contrapositions and make room for substantial negotiations in the ensuing phase of the conference. This clear separation proved soon to be difficult to implement: the confrontation over the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions affected in an harmful way the possibilities to build cooperation in the ensuing negotiation phase.

After all delegations had issued their opening statements during the first week of plenary debate, the conference works moved to the tasks of reviewing implementation and presenting new proposals for cooperation at the level of subsidiary working committees. The divergent approaches to the interpretation and implementation of the Helsinki Accords, which had emerged in the aftermath of the first CSCE, continued to mark the East-West’s respective positions and strategies in Belgrade. It was not that surprising, hence, that review debates proceeded – as Fischer reported to Bonn – as a “dialogue of the deaf”.

rights violations, existing obstacles to trade exchange, human contacts and issues in the field of information; on the other hand, Eastern delegations avoided any confrontation on human rights issues by appealing to the principles of non-interference (Principle VI) and social and political self-determination (Principle I) and put the stress on general disarmament issues, obstacles to imports in the West and positive realisations in the fields of culture.  

The moderate tones which had marked the debates until that moment went through a dramatic change as Arthur Goldberg, head of the U.S. delegation, took the floor on 18 October 1977 at the session of the working committee on Basket III to direct a violent attack against the Czech government which had prohibited reporters to cover the ongoing trials against four members of the dissident group Charter 77. Goldberg’s speech was a surprise to the Western allies. The works of the working committee had just started: the U.S. attacks appeared fully inappropriate as they harmed the construction of that favourable climate for substantial negotiations that the West German delegation longed for. Goldberg’s charges seemed to move in the direction of transforming Belgrade into a tribunal on human rights, a spectre often evoked by the Soviet Union and a scenario ruled out by the Western Alliance. A further reason of Western discontent – and of profound Czech irritation – was Goldberg’s decision to break off the diplomatic taboo of “not naming names” of specific guilty parties for human rights violations. The U.S. solo initiative clearly contradicted the Western
overall agreement over the strategic course to pursue in Belgrade. At the NATO meeting on 28 September 1977 the Western partners had expressed their common intention to avoid mentioning single cases of human rights violations in Belgrade, by prefer referring to larger categories of impediments.\(^{266}\) Few days before the inauguration of the conference Goldberg himself had personally reassured West German Foreign Minister Genscher about his intention to refer to human rights violations in the Soviet bloc through allusions and general examples, when addressing the issue in his opening speech.\(^{267}\) As the U.S. chief delegator had changed his mind within a couple of days and had communicated to the Western partners his intention to mention, during the general debate on Basket III the day after, a series of fresh violations of human rights perpetrated in the Soviet Union, a spontaneous “emergency meeting” of the NATO delegations had taken place under the West German direction. The majority of Western delegations had reconfirmed the common position expressed at the NATO meeting few weeks before. They had reaffirmed their shared belief that single cases were to be discussed in bilateral talks in the margins of the conference works; they had committed themselves to avoiding counterproductive confrontations on the human rights issue which would risk endangering the cooperative atmosphere of negotiations. U.S. chief delegator Goldberg had given his assent to the allies’ common position.\(^{268}\) Goldberg’s solo initiative on 18 October was perceived as a reiterated violation of the gentlemen’s agreement concerted with the Western allies.

The West German delegation was in the difficult situation of being the first amongst Western delegations to intervene in the debate of the working committee after Goldberg’s attacks. Preserving the unity of the


Western front was Bonn’s first inevitable priority. The head of the West German delegation carried out its task and took Goldberg’s side. No rule of procedure had been infringed, he explained, as any participant have the legitimate right to address critical matters – as in the case of the ongoing human rights violations in Prague – in the debate of the working group. To the contrary, Belgrade provided the adequate forum to deal with the shortcomings of the implementation of Helsinki’s principles, included Principle VII.\textsuperscript{269}

The West German intervention served as an illustration for the middle-course approach Bonn’s Foreign Office had decided to pursue in Belgrade. Taking the U.S. delegation’s side did not rule out the possibility to keep the door open for negotiating with the East in a cooperative atmosphere. As Fischer reassured Eastern delegators, “frankness and constructiveness” did not contradict each other.\textsuperscript{270} The West German strategy seemed initially to reap some benefits: as Per Fischer reported to Bonn, albeit his delegation had openly stood up against the Prague’s trial and the Eastern deficits in the implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Eastern criticisms had not been directed against West Germans, but rather against the U.S., Canadian and British delegations.\textsuperscript{271} The developments of the first weeks of works in Belgrade unveiled what the preceding diplomatic preparation of the conference had already suggested: i.e. that the game at the Belgrade CSCE would be played not only between the East and the West, but within the Western Alliance as well. The considerations of diplomatic opportunity marking the Nine’s approach to review debates and negotiations appeared, indeed, not to form part of Washington’s strategy for Belgrade.


\textsuperscript{270} Intervention des deutschen Delegationsleiters zu Prinzipien 6 und 7 der Sitzung des Arbeitsorgans am 21.10.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.

Dealing with the German political implications of the Belgrade CSCE

Whilst the West German delegation attempted to circumscribe the detrimental consequences of the U.S. assertiveness on human rights at the Belgrade CSCE, Bonn’s federal government had to deal with the strong engagement for human rights of its parliamentary opposition at home. The CDU/CSU had opposed the signing of the Eastern Treaties in the Brandt era as well as the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The overall validity of Bonn’s détente policy towards East had been harshly questioned by the opposition parties during the national election campaign in 1976. The pursuit of a realistic dialogue with the East, neither at the bilateral or multilateral level, was an item of the minority’s political agenda. Not being interested in concrete improvements of the process of European détente, West German Christian-democrats aimed at putting the Eastern bloc on the defensive at Belgrade. They were, hence, on the same wavelength of hardliners in Washington: they appreciated the moral stances informing Carter’s international struggle for human rights and shared the idea of that part of the U.S. administration which aimed at turning Belgrade into an international trial on human rights.

CDU/CSU’s activism for human rights – which had intensified as the appointment of the first CSCE follow-up meeting was approaching – pivoted in November 1977, as MPs of the minority group announced their intention to hand a white book “on the state of human rights for Germans living in Germany and Eastern Europe” amongst delegations and journalists at the Belgrade CSCE. The initiative undertaken in the Yugoslav capital was flanked by the presentation of a parliamentary enquiry on the same themes, with the goal of opening a broad public debate in the Bundestag and in the country over the violations of human

rights and basic freedoms perpetrated by the Soviet bloc. The 175-page document contained, first, a detailed list of charges directed against the GDR, the Soviet Union, the CSSR and Romania concerning violations of individual and collective human rights committed against German citizens; and second, a series of demands for the federal government and the other CSCE participants. The German political implications of the white book were clear, as an important part of the accusations were directed against the GDR – not accidentally, mentioned in the title by referring to the whole Germany. The initiative was, hence, twice as insidious for Bonn’s federal government: not only were negotiations in Belgrade in the deadlock, but the inner-German dialogue was undergoing difficult times as well.

The affair of the white paper was handled carefully by the Auswärtiges Amt. According the assessment of the Foreign Office, the document offered a quite accurate analysis, but did not bring new evidence or information to the matter. The federal government was indeed familiar with the numbers and facts presented by the CDU/CSU, most of which had already been taken into account by the Foreign Office when formulating its contributions for the debate on human rights in Belgrade – by presenting them, though, in a less detailed and smoother manner. That part of the white paper’s reproaches which had not been included in the list of arguments for review debates and negotiations had been packed into the so-called “big baggage” for Belgrade, i.e. a chapter of the Western agenda containing a list of reserve arguments to use only in the case the exchange of blows with the East would become such violent to impede any positive conclusion of the conference. The West German Foreign Office firmly rejected the attempts of the domestic opposition to exert influence on the position of its delegation in Belgrade and tried to limit as much as possible the public resonance of its initiative. For this purpose, the federal government’s answer to the parliamentary enquiry

274 Weißbuch der CDU/CSU-Fraktion „Über die menschenrechtliche Lage in Deutschland und der Deutschen in Osteuropa“, 09.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
275 Weißbuch der CDU/CSU-Fraktion „Über die menschenrechtliche Lage in Deutschland und der Deutschen in Osteuropa“, 09.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
of the minority was postponed to 9 March 1978, after the scheduled conclusion of the CSCE follow-up meeting.276

The initiative of the CDU/CSU touched a sore point of Bonn’s diplomatic strategy at the Belgrade CSCE – and more generally of its overall Ostpolitik. Prudence and pragmatism marking the West German approach to negotiations required a certain degree of secrecy and discretion. Any resounding initiative likely to incur big public attention had to be cautiously avoided as long as the federal government was dealing with delicate negotiations. Looking constantly after the relations with the press was one priority task of the West German delegation throughout the whole conference. It was important that detailed information about negotiations with the Eastern countries did not leak. Consequently, the public opinion was kept informed about the general unfolding of the conference and was informed in due time about the outcomes of negotiations, once an achievement had been secured.

This general need for secrecy assumed further importance when dealing with inner-German questions: no details about the conduction of parallel talks with the East German delegation in the margins of the official conference works were provided by the West German delegation to the national press. With its evident German political implications, the white book of the CDU/CSU threatened to rouse at the multilateral level a dangerous confrontation over specific inner-German matters – an eventuality that Bonn’s federal government, in accordance with the East German leadership, had tried to escape since the beginning of the conference. As preparing its strategy for Belgrade, the Auswärtiges Amt had dealt with the question of how to address inner-German issues at the CSCE follow-up meeting.277 In conformity with the approach adopted at the Helsinki CSCE, Bonn’s efforts continued to be directed in Belgrade to preventing the follow-up

meeting from turning into a multilateral conference over Germany. The main aspects of the CSCE regarding Bonn’s Deutschland- and Berlinpolitik were confined to some mentions within the general overview presented by the West German delegation in its opening address. General problems related to inner-German human contacts were roused by the Western delegation within the broader framework of review debates and negotiations on Basket III. A particular stress was put on those issues that were clearly important to Bonn for German political reasons – e.g. the questions of Western journalists’ working conditions in the Eastern countries, which had become a very sensitive matter after the reiterated expulsions of West German correspondents from the GDR. Specific bilateral matters, as for instance the issue of German citizenship, were put forward only allusively. Moreover, the practice – which had already been tested at the Helsinki CSCE – of handing confidentially lists of hardship cases concerning German citizens living in the GDR over the East German delegation, within the framework of informal contacts in the margins of the official conference, was continued in Belgrade.

Drafting the conference final document: a West German miscalculation

At the beginning of November 1977 diplomatic works in Belgrade headed slowly towards the next phase of substantial negotiations for the conference final document. Review debates had brought poor results during the weeks of October; especially within the working committee on Basket III, discussions had remained stuck on sterile matters of principles. On the one hand, the EC-Nine had been

278 Drahtbericht Nr. 732 vom 25.10.1977; Drahtbericht Nr. 756 vom 27.10.1977; Drahtbericht Nr. 774 vom 31.10.1977; Drahtbericht Nr. 779 vom 1.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
279 Bericht der Bundesregierung über das KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad, 22.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
compelled to accept the embitterment of the confrontation on human rights issues after Goldberg’s hard intervention against the Czech government; on the other hand, Eastern delegations had refused to give any answers to specific questions posed by the Western counterparts.281

In November 1977 review debates were progressively absorbed into the negotiations on possible concrete improvements of the Helsinki’s commitments. Eastern delegations complaint about the West’s lacking willingness to conclude discussions on implementation issues for good and move to the drafting of the final document. Notwithstanding the U.S. insistence on human rights violations, Eastern delegations had remained at the negotiation table: it was surprising, so Fischer reported to Bonn, how much the Soviet Union and its allies had been willing to tolerate.282 According to the analysis of the West German Foreign Office, negotiations had entered a phase in which any spectacular confrontation was to expect. However, Bonn still hoped to achieve in Belgrade satisfactory results, likely to be presented to the national public opinion as concrete improvements of the process of détente.283

The greatest challenge for the West German delegation consisted in pursuing balanced improvements in all fields in order to hinder that selective improvements would dilute the political significance of the CSCE process. Each group of delegations had presented its own package of proposals for the final document. With the exception of Soviet requests in the field of disarmament and Romania’s proposals in the military field, the Eastern package focused on Basket II. The issue of CBMs, one of Bonn’s main priorities, was deliberately avoided by the Soviet Union: the Warsaw Pact, as reported by West German Ministerial Director Blech, had shown scarce interest in improving

283 Bericht der Bundesregierung über das KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad, 22.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
CBMs from the beginning of the conference, by rather turning its attention to more propagandistic matters of disarmament and armament control which overlapped with the scope of the MBFR negotiations in Geneva. NNAs’ proposals addressed all three Helsinki Baskets with preponderance for military and economic issues. Western proposals aimed at improving the shortcomings of the process of implementation highlighted during review debates, with a pronounced stress on the human field. According to the division of work within the Western caucus, the NATO group presented proposals for the improvement of CBMs and the EC-Nine suggested a series of measures to increase cooperation in the fields of Basket II. Western delegations backed Bonn’s requests in the fields of Basket III, namely on issues of family reunification, facilitation of bureaucratic procedures for the release of visa and permits to leave the country, improvement of exchange of information and working conditions for journalists. The West German delegation extended its invitation to a meeting of experts in charge of organising the international scientific forum to be hold in Bonn in the summer of 1978. Furthermore, it gave notice of its wish to include in the Belgrade final document a passage on the common commitment to the international fight against hostage-taking. Matters of terrorism and its international connections concerned closely the Bundesrepublik which had gone through the fiercest season of terroristic attacks in the summer and autumn of 1977. The extreme-left militant group of the Red Army Fraction (RAF) had launched a violent attack against the state which threatened to endanger the stability of the West German political and social system, by opening scenarios of possible reactionary deviations. During the so-called German Autumn – Deutscher Herbst – tension in the country dramatically escalated, with the kidnapping and assassination of industrialist Martin Schleyer by the RAF and the hijacking of the Lufthansa airplane “Landshut” by the

Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine.\textsuperscript{286} Dealing with the terroristic challenge had become one of the main tasks of Schmidt’s government after the electoral turn in 1976, whose initiatives on the domestic front were flanked by the pursuit of a diplomatic broad consensus over the international fight against terrorism. The West German proposal for an international convention against the taking of hostages, put forward at the UN, received the large approval of the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{287} The West German parallel initiative at the Belgrade CSCE was directed to its support.

Coming back to negotiations in Belgrade, the proposals for a final document presented by all delegations amounted on the whole to eighty at the end of November – a number which would grow further, exceeding the threshold of one hundred by 22 December 1977. They constituted a cumbersome stream, which hindered the pursuit of effective negotiations.\textsuperscript{288} It was clear to all delegations that the working mechanism of approval by consensus would prevent the largest part of them from being included in the final document. As Fischer reported to Bonn in December 1977, Western delegations would be compelled to discard some of their proposals, by fixing their priorities in due time in order to facilitate the advancement of negotiations.\textsuperscript{289} The Eastern bloc’s reticence to discuss any Western factual proposal served as renewed confirmation of its interest in a rapid and unsubstantial conclusion of negotiations. As the conference was heading to the Christmas break


\textsuperscript{287} \textit{KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Stand des KSZE-Folgetreffens. Überblick über die bisher eingereichten Vorschläge für das Schlussdokument}, 11.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689. In the resolution of 15 December 1976 (A/31/103), the UN General Assembly had agreed the West German proposal for an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, whose drafting the ad-hoc committee on International Terrorism was in charge of: see \textit{Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Fleischhauer}, 25.08.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. II, doc. 228, pp. 1128-1132.

\textsuperscript{288} \textit{Bericht der Bundesregierung über das KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad}, 22.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.

without any significant improvement, the question of what results delegations aimed at achieving appeared to be strictly intertwined with the question of the conference duration. A new configuration of interests took shape over this question in December 1977. The West German delegation was the main advocate – on indication of the Foreign Office in Bonn – of the idea of remaining in Belgrade until substantial improvements of the détente process would be attained, i.e. at the inevitable cost of prolonging the conference by some weeks or months over the scheduled end. The West German position gathered a composite support: it received the full support of the Danish and Belgian delegations, whilst it was backed by the U.K., France and Canada only to a certain extent; on the same West German wavelength were also, for different reasons, Austria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland and Sweden; within the Eastern bloc it were Romania and, more timidly, Poland and Hungary to show some interest in substantial decisions.290

As negotiations were temporary suspended on 22 December 1977 and adjourned on 17 January 1978 with the task of drafting a final document, the head of the West German delegation admitted that it was impossible to predict which directions negotiations would take.291

The unfolding of the last phase of the conference revealed to be very difficult once delegations returned to Belgrade after the Christmas break. West German hopes to prolong the duration of negotiations until the achievement of concrete results clashed against the definitive demonstration of the Soviet will to close the affairs of the CSCE follow-up meeting as soon as possible. The Soviet delegation tabled on 18 January 1978 a verbose draft for an unsubstantial final document which swept away all proposals presented until that moment and limited itself to accepting the Western suggestion of the city of Madrid as place for the next follow-up meeting.292 The meaning of the Soviet initiative was clear: there was no time for longer negotiations, no interest in

290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
substantial achievements and no room for concessions on Western proposals. Moscow’s aimed at concluding the conference with a minimal document which would merely ensure the continuation of the CSCE process, without otherwise introducing new commitments for the thirty-five participants. As Fischer reported to Bonn, a shift had occurred in the Soviet approach during the three and a half weeks of break. The Soviet intentions were not surprising: since the preparation of the follow-up meeting it had been clear that the Western and Eastern ideas of the conference were largely divergent. But the Soviet bloc’s decision to remain in Belgrade after the embitterment of debates on human rights issues and to commit itself to presenting a number of proposals for a substantial final document until 22 December 1977 had nourished West German hopes that, besides the respective pursuit of strategic purposes, a East-West compromise on concrete improvements was still possible. The experience at the Helsinki CSCE had taught to West German diplomacy that important results can be attained after troubled negotiations and notwithstanding profound divergences of visions. There was a main difference, however, between the first CSCE and its follow-up meeting: i.e. Eastern delegations had not brought strong interests to Belgrade. Overlooking this factor represented the core of Bonn’s miscalculation.

The “Western struggle” for a final document

In January 1978 it became evident that Eastern delegations would rather forego achievements in their areas of interests – Basket II, non-first use of nuclear weapons, moratorium on joining alliances – than to make any concessions in the area of human rights and human

contacts.\textsuperscript{295} Things had taken too far: even though the whole responsibility of the crisis was not ascribable to the behaviour of the U.S. delegation, it was otherwise undoubted that Goldberg’s persisting insistence on keeping discussions on human rights open had significantly poisoned the constructive atmosphere that pragmatic negations would require.\textsuperscript{296} Although the presentation of the Soviet draft, Western and NNA delegations continued to pursue “business as usual” within the drafting committee, with the conviction that Brezhnev had not had the last word on the Belgrade CSCE yet.\textsuperscript{297} Negotiations continued throughout February without bringing any significant contribution to the reconciliation of the respective irremovable positions. The list of negotiable proposals became shorter and shorter and possibilities for a substantial final document scarcer as weeks went by. The Soviets, backed by the East Germans and the Czech, limited their goals to the inclusion of references to “military détente” and “irreversibility of détente”.\textsuperscript{298} The EC-Nine continued to seek the support and intermediation of the NNA delegations in order to achieve at least some minimal concrete results.

The Western struggle for a final document turned into a struggle within the West. The exacerbation of contrasts within the Western front complicated further the difficult advancement of the works of the drafting committee. As long as negotiations went on, the West German delegation continued to pursue its strategy of intermediation, not so much between Eastern and Western delegations but rather between the divergent interests of its partners. To Goldberg’s accusation that Europeans were too compliant to Soviet demands, Fischer replied that it was not about being “hard” or “weak”, but rather about pursuing the

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right tactic to compel the Soviet Union to make concessions – a position the U.S. public opinion stigmatised as “indulgent”. The French delegation, inclined to sacrifice some Western requests and open to some Eastern proposals, surprised its partners with an unexpected solo initiative. On 15 February 1978 Fischer was informed by his French colleague Richer that a French draft for a final document would be tabled the day after. The French single-handed initiative, which according to Bonn’s assessment hailed from direct instructions of Giscard d’Estaing, violated the most important premise of Western coordinated behaviour at the CSCE that the foreign ministers of the EC-Nine had agreed at the EPC meeting in Copenhagen. Dealing with the French initiative required West German diplomacy a good degree of spirit of compromise: notwithstanding initial irritation, the West German delegation opted for considering the French draft on a par with the other drafts tabled that far and continued to be committed to a Western joint draft. From the past experience at the Helsinki CSCE Bonn’s diplomacy had learnt that the French, after their solo initiatives, ended up falling into line with the Western partners.

Western attempts to pursue a coordinated strategy continued to be beset by the French-American contrast. After a number of votes within the Nine’s and NATO’s groups and repeated consultations with the NNAs, the heads of NATO’s delegations managed to approve a short draft on 22 February 1978, which reproduced the contents of the document agreed by the foreign ministers of the EC-Nine on 14 February in Copenhagen. Tension escalated after Goldberg’s

302 Ibid.
303 In Copenhagen the Nine agreed to keep the short draft aside for the case negotiations on a substantial document would definitively fail.
advanced a last minute request to include a reference to human rights in the short draft and Richer threatened to leave both NATO’s and the Nine’s groups.\textsuperscript{304} The state of negotiations – and of Western coordination – was such harmed to convince Western delegations to take advantage of the Soviet wish for a rapid conclusion of the conference.\textsuperscript{305} According to Fischer, NATO’s short document had good chances to meet the favour of the NNAs and influence the contents of the draft they were working on. Several NNA delegations had expressed indeed their support for the so-called “second option”, i.e. in the adoption of a short document in the form of a communiqué limited to securing the continuation of the CSCE process.\textsuperscript{306} The “second option” offered an exit-strategy from a probable conference failure. Things had gone too far: an intermediation of the NNA group represented the last possibility to break the stalemate and bring the conference to an acceptable conclusion.\textsuperscript{307} An initiative of the NNA delegations was necessary both for strategic and public political reasons: it was indeed important to Bonn that the responsibility for the proposal of a short, unsubstantial document would not be publically ascribable to the West.\textsuperscript{308}

The West German Foreign Office did not want to leave any stone unturned and attempted a last diplomatic initiative with Moscow before yielding to the inevitability of the “second option”.\textsuperscript{309} State Secretary van Well and West German Ambassador in Moscow Wieck undertook a parallel diplomatic mission with the goal of convincing their Soviet partners, Ambassador Falin and Vice-Foreign Minister

\textsuperscript{305} KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Weiteres Verfahren, 22.02.1978, in PA AA, EA, Bd. 223.
\textsuperscript{306} Ibid.; and Stand des Belgrader Folgetreffens, 22.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
\textsuperscript{307} Stand des Belgrader Folgetreffens, 22.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
Firjubin, that the enhancement of the political value of negotiations in Belgrade through the involvement of the participant states’ deputy foreign ministers would possibly to break the stalemate. Van Well made clear to Falin that he was ready to fly to Belgrade at any moment, together with other Western vice-ministers. The same proposal had been directed by Foreign Minister Genscher to his Czech colleague.310 Firijubin’s answer came few days later, on 26 February 1978: the Soviet vice-foreign minister confirmed that time for discussions was over. All positions were well-known and negotiations had shown that there was no adequate basis for a common agreement on substantial matters. A high-rank gathering of the thirty-five deputy ministers, as proposed by Bonn, had no sense at that point of negotiations.311 The failure of the late diplomatic initiative of the Auswärtiges Amt swept away any West German illusions of changing the course of the conference. At the end of February 1978 the West German delegation had to accept the evidence that a rapid conclusion of the conference with the adoption of a short final document was the only option left over.312

During the first week of March there was only room left for the last attempts of some delegations – namely of Romania, Yugoslavia, Malta and Switzerland – to include their proposals in the final document. The West German delegation was the last in the Western caucus to give its approval, by leaving the responsibility to the Soviet Union to take position on the NNA and Romanian requests.313 As the first CSCE follow-up meeting was approaching to its end, the West German Foreign Office was looking to the aftermath of Belgrade by dealing with the problem of how to present the disappointing outcome of the conference in front of the national public opinion.

313 Vermerk zum Stand Belgrad nach dem Plenum vom 3.3, Ende 19 Uhr gemäß Anruf Botschafter Fischer bei RL 212, 03.03.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
Dealing with a big disappointment: the West German assessment of the first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade

The first CSCE follow-up meeting ended with a unanimous agreement sanctioning the irreconcilability of interests that had marked the unfolding of the conference (“Consensus was not reached on a number of proposals submitted to the meeting”). The thirty-five delegations approved on 9 March 1978 a final document which, as Selvage has well summarised, “basically confirmed that the participating states had met to review implementation, had expressed different views and would meet anew in Madrid” on 9 September 1980 for preparing the second follow-up meeting, whose beginning was scheduled on 11 November of the same year. Substantial provisions were limited to convening three meetings of experts which would hold in the aftermath of the conference – i.e. the meeting for arbitration of disputes in Montreux, the scientific forum in Bonn and the meeting of experts on Mediterranean questions in Valletta. The choice of the Spanish capital to host the ensuing follow-up meeting represented the only poor victory of the Western European delegations.

In the direct aftermath of the conference it was time for assessments in Bonn. What emerges from the West German evaluation of the whole Belgrade endeavour is a sort of operation of “diminishing expectations ex-post”. As already mentioned in the course of the chapter, the Auswärtiges Amt had been aware that existing conjectural and structural problems suggested limiting optimistic expectations on the eve of the conference inauguration. During negotiations, however, the West German delegation had hoped to replicate the successful experience of the Helsinki CSCE by pursuing a strategy of patient intermediation between conflicting interests. After the outcome of the conference had belied West German hopes, West German chief delegator Per Fischer

315 For the full text of the concluding document of the Belgrade meeting see at the link: http://www.osce.org/mc/40865?.
tied his final assessment to the consideration of what the conference could and should not have been: “Neither a new ‘Geneva’ or a new ‘Helsinki’” – i.e. a renewed constitutional moment for the CSCE – “nor a new ‘European New York’” – i.e. a sort of general assembly on human rights. But considering the specific mandate of the follow-up meeting – exchanging views on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and deepening mutual relations amongst the participant states – Bonn had sufficient good reasons to be disappointed. To allow negotiations to succeed “the antagonists of the first phase should turn into cooperative partners in the second phase of the conference, and the identification of existing flaws should turn into mutually agreed decisions on how to solve such flaws”. Both circumstances failed, however, to happen. A real, constructive review debate, observed Fischer, had never taken place; and the transition to the second phase of the conference in charge of defining the conditions for the future development of the CSCE process had proved to be even more difficult.

According to Fischer, his delegation had brought to the negotiating table of the working committees a series of reasonable, pragmatic and not destabilising proposals for improvements in all three Baskets. Eastern delegations had refused cooperation on human rights and human contacts, by equating the two fields and rejecting both in toto. West Germans had repeatedly underlined the different nature of debates on Principle VII – which addressed questions of principle – and Basket III – which addressed concrete measures and different categories of people. Bonn’s diplomacy had never hidden, since the preparation of the follow-up meeting, its main interest in the improvement of human contacts and exchange of information with the East. The Soviet refusal to collaborate on Basket III was unacceptable for Bonn for several different reasons which involved matters of principle, foreign political interests and national needs. First, the Eastern selective

317 Ibid.
approach to the improvement of Helsinki’s provisions contrasted with the idea of integrity and balance underlying the CSCE process. Second, the rejection of any form of cooperation on Basket III jeopardised Bonn’s idea of pursuing rapprochement through the multiplication of occasions of contact, travel and exchange amongst European citizens. Third, at stake was the international prestige of the Bundesrepublik, which had invested many diplomatic efforts in the promotion of human contacts since the origins of the CSCE process, by revealing both to its allies and to the Eastern leaders that they represented a West German vital foreign policy interest. Fourth, public expectations of improvements in the human fields were very high in the FRG. Bringing home no significant achievements with respect either to human rights or human contacts would – and did – put the federal government in the difficult position of justifying its debacle at the Belgrade CSCE in front of the domestic opposition and public opinion.

Even though a great deal of responsibility for the poor outcome of the conference was assigned to the intransigency of Soviet bloc, the West German assessment reveals the will to understand objectively, or at least take into account, the reasons of the Soviet behaviour in Belgrade. In Bonn’s view, the hardening of Moscow’s line was due, first, to the difficult state of American-Soviet relations. Second, the East’s resistance to negotiations needed to be analysed against the background of the inherent difficulties of the CSCE process, which had been put to its first test in Belgrade after the signing of the Final Act. It would be a mistake to interpret the poor performance at the Belgrade CSCE as a proof of the Soviet will to bury definitely European détente: the decision to schedule the second follow-up conference for 1980

318 Bonn’s diplomatic work to promote improvements in the fields of Basket III had continued during the conference. For instance, on occasion of a bilateral meeting with Soviet chief delegator Yuri Vorontsov, Fischer had let the Soviets know again that “concrete decisions on all three Baskets, and especially on human contacts, were indispensable to conclude the conference”. Drahtbericht von Fischer, 24.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 115.085.
proved evidence against such hypothesis. Furthermore, the Foreign Office shared the French analysis which identified the reasons of the Soviet change of strategy in the course of conference in the rigidity marking the “end of the Brezhnev era” (sic), and foremost in Goldberg’s behaviour – who spent the months between October and March attacking steadily the Eastern countries.

In the internal analysis of the West German Foreign Office responsibilities for the conference’s failure were equally distributed between the two superpowers. Per Fischer, who had personally dealt with Goldberg’s assertiveness in Belgrade, admitted that the disappointing outcome of negotiations was ascribable, besides to Soviet rigidity, to the U.S. chief delegator’s harsh tones and obsession for human rights. The first CSCE follow-up meeting had developed from an occasion for improving détente into an attempt to savage both the East-West multilateral dialogue and the unity of the Western Alliance. As it had done when preparing the conference, Bonn committed itself to keeping up appearances in front of the public opinion in the aftermath of Belgrade: it was important not to stress the significant role that increasing divergence with Washington had played in the negative unfolding of negotiations and to avoid that Goldberg released public critical remarks against the Western European behaviour in Belgrade.

There were technical elements, too, which had contributed to compromise the good unfolding of negotiations in Belgrade: review debates had been too long, too many proposals had been tabled, cross-bargaining between the Helsinki Baskets had been scarce, coordination between the groups of the Nine and NATO had been problematic,
some cracks had started to show in the coordination amongst the Nine – particularly due to the French deviations from the common line.\textsuperscript{323} 

Even though the FRG had experienced a major disappointment in Belgrade, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} tended to smooth excessively negative assessments, both in internal analyses and public statements. The partial failure of the first follow-up meeting was justified in the name of its exceptional character. Belgrade was depicted as “the first checkpoint down a long road”.\textsuperscript{324} As follow-up conferences would become a regular constituent of the CSCE process, both its participants and public opinions would gradually get used to them and the spirit of cooperation would gradually increase.\textsuperscript{325} West German arguments did not forget to highlight the positive outcome attained in Belgrade: i.e. the Eastern commitment to meeting again two years later for a second follow-up meeting which bound them more tightly to the strengthening of East-West rapprochement. \textsuperscript{326} Finally, the traditional claim according to which détente was a slow process which required a long breath and a far-sighted gaze turned into a central argument for condoning the Belgrade fiasco in front of the public opinion.

\textbf{Conclusions: Some important lessons for the FRG’s realistic policy of détente}

Defending the conference outcome in the aftermath of Belgrade meant for the West German foreign government safeguarding the grounds of its whole foreign political complex and its own international prestige. The recognition of the importance of pursuing dialogue itself in spite of concrete achievements included in the Belgrade final document (“states stressed the importance they attach to détente, which has continued since the adoption of the Final Act in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{323} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{324} \textit{Main themes and catalogue of main points for Belgrade, 14.09.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.}
\item \textsuperscript{325} \textit{Das Ergebnis von Belgrad. Das KSZE-Folgetreffen in seiner Bedeutung für den Entspannungsprozess. Von Per Fischer, 28.03.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.}
\item \textsuperscript{326} \textit{Runderlass 30 von Engels vom 11.04.1978, in AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 113.}
\end{itemize}
spite of difficulties and obstacles encountered”⁴²⁷) was undoubtedly relevant for the prosecution of the European détente process. A large part of the positive historical account of the first CSCE follow-up meeting has rested upon this recognition.⁴²⁸ The circumstance that all delegations remained in Belgrade until the end of the conference and committed themselves to continuing the CSCE process by agreeing upon the date and place of the second follow-up meeting has not to be overlooked. If analysed against the background of the international developments which would occur in the ensuing years, the minimal outcome attained in Belgrade seems retrospectively to have provided an important anti-cyclical antidote against the renewed Cold War confrontation. Moreover, the Belgrade follow-up meeting contributed to shape the CSCE process as a dialectic process, by offering multiple occasions of debate – at the level of plenary session, within the single working committees and the meetings amongst experts, through the complex of bilateral talks in the margins of the main conference and diplomatic initiatives outside the conference – of undeniable diplomatic significance.

However, positive re-examinations had not to prevent from reflecting on some mistakes and miscalculations that the West German approach entailed and the first CSCE follow-up meeting disclosed. Bonn’s federal government – and the Auswärtiges Amt in particular, which had the direct responsibility for the preparation of the diplomatic strategy at the CSCE – learnt some hard lessons in the Yugoslav capital. They would stimulate a partial rethinking of the CSCE strategy in the aftermath of Belgrade.

First, the “realistic détente policy” had proved to be not that realistic once put in place. The West German approach to negotiations remained quite bound to principles, especially with regard to the proportioned

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³²⁷ For the full text of the concluding document of the Belgrade meeting see at the link: http://www.osce.org/mc/408657.
³²⁸ See, for instance, the introduction to the collective volume edited by V. Bilandžić, D. Dahlmann and M. Kosanović, From Helsinki to Belgrade. The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting and the Crisis of Détente.
character of the Helsinki Final Act. The call for balance turned into a
demand for simultaneous improvements in all Baskets. Indirect
consequence of this attitude was the huge stream of Western proposals
which Western delegations, according to the reproach of the NNAs,
limited themselves to informing the other delegations about.\textsuperscript{329} Putting
aside for the moment the problems of coordination with the U.S., the
EC-Nine had been incapable to narrow their priorities and agree upon
the necessary sacrifices – a problem which the West German delegation
was aware of, as analyses drafted during and after the conference
reveal. The cohesion of the Nine showed its hidden flaws in Belgrade
and was harmed repeatedly by the French single-handed initiatives. It
was a serious blow to Bonn: the FRG was the country which most
needed the EC to speak with one voice (preferably with its own voice)
when dealing with the East.

It was especially with regard to the Soviet Union and its Eastern
allies that the FRG’s CSCE strategy displayed lacking realism. The
Western biggest mistake – and the second important lesson Bonn was
taught – was the incapability of involving any Soviet important
interests at any phase of the conference. This represented the
fundamental reason of the poor conference outcome. At the Helsinki
CSCE Soviets had been compelled to significant concessions, as they
had important interests at stake. At the Belgrade CSCE, to the contrary,
Soviet goals were limited to protecting the Eastern bloc from Western
pressures concerning the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions,
defending its international prestige from Western attacks and securing
the irreversibility of détente, i.e. the continuation of the superpower
dialogue on arms control and economic cooperation with Western
Europeans. These were the main explanations for the Soviet decision
not to leave the conference notwithstanding Goldberg’s unceasing
attacks. By focusing on unrealistic proposals which fell outside the
scope of the conference – as the “non-first-use” of nuclear weapons or

\textsuperscript{329} See A. Romano, “The European Community and the Belgrade CSCE”, in \textit{From Helsinki to Belgrade. The First Follow-up Meeting and the Crisis of Détente}, eds. V. Bilandžić, D. Dahlmann and M. Kosanović, p. 22.
the moratorium on the further enlargement of military alliances – Moscow confirmed its favour for an “empty” conference outcome. Hence, the Eastern countries had good reasons to claim their victory at the first CSCE follow-up meeting in the aftermath of Belgrade, apart from traditional propagandistic purposes.

Third, West Germans learnt in Belgrade how detrimental the U.S. engagement in European détente could be. One of the reasons of the success in Helsinki had been the convergent momentum between the U.S. détente and European détente, which had been otherwise paralleled by a certain Washington’s disinterest for the European endeavour. Instead, the new U.S. administration had gone to Belgrade with the intention to play an active role. Carter’s strong interest in the first CSCE follow-up meeting was motivated by interwoven domestic, foreign political and public political reasons. As Goldberg explained to Fischer on occasion of an after-dinner talk in Belgrade at the beginning of February 1978, the U.S. administration had decided to take on a hard stance on human rights at the Belgrade CSCE in order to obtain the endorsement to the SALT II agreement of those reluctant congressmen who considered negotiations with Moscow as a proof of weakness. Whereas the CSCE was a secondary diplomatic stage for Washington – being important security issues discussed elsewhere – it provided an ideal international showcase for Carter’s public foreign policy. Turning the CSCE into the main framework for the pursuit of his struggle for human rights allowed Carter to take a more pragmatic

332 The SALT II agreement played a central role in the problematic relationship between the U.S. administration and the Congress: as U.S. Ambassador in Bonn Stoessel explained to Genscher on 22 March 1978, there were good chances for SALT negotiations to come to a successful conclusion in the course of that year; but the ratification of the agreement would be hardly attainable. See Gespräch zwischen Genscher und Stoessel, 22.03.1978, in AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 84.
approach to SALT-negotiations. The U.S. priorities were clearly set: a gradual relaxation of East-West relations through growing human contacts should be deferred until the SALT II agreement would be achieved by the superpowers. The talk with Goldberg, in which the U.S. chief delegator unveiled openly for the first time Washington’s real goals, disclosed an inconvenient truth: U.S. détente and European détente had never been so divergent, with regard both to their aims and strategies. Bonn’s idea of a beneficial interaction between the CSCE and SALT negotiations was deeply challenged by the disclosing of Washington’s intentions.

Finally, there was a fourth general lesson West German diplomacy had to draw from the Belgrade experience: i.e. it had to learn to deal with the cooling-off of superpower détente. As Chancellor Schmidt had declared in an interview in the summer of 1977, if Moscow and Washington would develop a deep conflict of interests instead of reaching an agreement on curbing their nuclear strategic armaments, this would inevitably limit the room of manoeuvre for Germany’s détente policy”. As international conditions had changed since the times when Bonn’s Entspannungspolitik had been conceived and achieved its first realisations, the prosecution of a realistic policy of détente required to rethink its strategy and adjust it to the new circumstances.

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Chapter 3


Introduction: Dealing with the legacy of Belgrade on the way to Madrid

In the last phase of the troubled negotiations at the Belgrade CSCE, the delegations of the thirty-five participant states could reach an agreement upon the date and place of the CSCE of the second follow-up meeting. They had decided they would meet again in November 1980 in the city of Madrid. The appointment of the Spanish capital was a small victory for the West, which managed to impose its preference over the candidatures of Vienna and Malta. The choice of Madrid had a significant symbolical meaning for the EC-Nine: it sealed Spain’s full integration into the multilateral conference diplomacy after years of diplomatic isolation and was a recognition of the successful democracy transition efforts made by the country after Franco’s death in 1975.336

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335 “The forces of history will prove to be stronger than ideological barriers and forcible separations” [transl.]
336 On Spain’s transition to democracy and the Nine’s role in supporting the process of democratisation, see: M.E. Cavallaro, Los orígenes de la integración de España en Europa. Desde el franquismo a los años de la transición (Madrid: Silex, 2009).
As pointed out by Judt, only in 1970 a visitor crossing the border from France into Franco’s Spain could not but be struck through the abyssal chasm separating the two sides of the Pyrenees.337 Ten years later, the young Spanish parliamentary democracy prepared itself to host the greatest European diplomatic forum. Détente had not been the only major event in the European affairs during the Seventies. The unfolding of the CSCE process was flanked in Southern Europe by the peaceful transition to democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain.338 Greece was the first of the three Mediterranean countries to apply for membership in the EEC in 1975, only one year after the fall of the dictatorship of the colonels, and the first to join on 1 January 1981. As the second phase of the Madrid CSCE started, the group of the Nine had enlarged to Ten.

The West German Foreign Office directed its attention towards the preparation of the second follow-up meeting in Madrid in the direct aftermath of Belgrade. During his speech in front of the European Council in Copenhagen on 8 April 1978, West German Foreign Minister Genscher addressed the steps the Nine should undertake to prepare themselves accurately for Madrid.339 Turning the attention to the following appointment of Madrid was a part of the federal government’s strategy of sweeping away the disappointment for the outcome of Belgrade.340 But it revealed also that Bonn’s interest in

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340 Disappointment was, however, always neglected in public statements. Genscher was the one amongst the Nine’s foreign ministers – together with his Danish and British colleagues – who expressed the less critical position towards the outcome of Belgrade at the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen: West Germans were not disappointed, according to the foreign minister, as they had undoubtedly desired more but had been realistically aware that greater achievements were not possible under the present circumstances. See: *Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Engels*, 11.04.1978, in AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 113, p. 539.
pursuing multilateral détente had remained unvaried notwithstanding the failure of its diplomatic strategy in Belgrade.

The Auswärtiges Amt started an internal reflection aimed at rethinking the West German CSCE policy for the following years. As analysed in the last paragraphs of Chapter 2, the first follow-up meeting had taught some important lessons to Bonn. It had shown that there were several problems which were inherent in the CSCE process and needed to be dealt with. The legacy of Belgrade provided useful indications about how the West German – and Western – strategy for Madrid could be shaped better. As Genscher highlighted at the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen, the second CSCE follow-up meeting had to be prepared more carefully and in due time within the Western Alliance. The coordination between the groups of the Nine and NATO, which had functioned problematically in Belgrade, had to be enhanced. Likewise, cooperation with the Eastern and the NNA countries should be improved. The last had lamented the scarce willingness of Western delegations to pursue real consultation on their proposals, by limiting themselves to informing other delegations about them. Therefore, the Nine had to discuss their positions with the other CSCE participants before the beginning of the conference on occasion of the rounds of bilateral talks which would be pursued in preparation of Madrid.\footnote{Proposals of the Nine for Madrid, 23.01.1980, in PAAA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.} Moreover, the Nine had to define more precisely their common goals in order to recover their ability to speak with one voice. The European partners’ different views and interests needed to be merged into one accepted strategy by avoiding to including them simply into an endless list of proposals – as it had happened in Belgrade, where Western delegations had given a significant contribution to the enormous stream of proposals which had paralysed negotiations. A better definition of Western priorities meant, according to the West German Foreign Office, diminishing the horizon of expectations as well. A clear dividing line needed to be drawn between attainable and unattainable achievements. Bonn committed itself to using the months between the first and the second CSCE follow-up
meetings to pursue consultations with the Western partners, the Eastern counterparts and the NNA countries, in order to understand what respective interests were at stake; to examine the available room for bargaining; and to start discussing concrete proposals in advance. The aim was to arrive in Madrid with a sufficiently clear overview of the whole spectrum of interests and possibilities, which prevent the Belgrade stalemate from happening again at the second CSCE follow-up meeting.\textsuperscript{342}

The experience of the Belgrade conference had convinced the West German Foreign Office that the relaunch of the CSCE process would pass through the enhancement of the political rank of the follow-up meetings, by envisaging the direct involvement of the foreign ministers of the thirty-five participant states at some point of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{343} A similar initiative had been attempted by Bonn’s diplomacy – without success – in the last days of the Belgrade CSCE with the purpose to rescue negotiations from a certain empty outcome. The idea behind the West German proposal levered up considerations of international prestige, by implying that the higher the political involvement of the participant states, the greater their commitment to the success of the conference would be. Moreover, the enhanced political profile of the follow-up meetings would provide an antidote against the East’s traditional attempts to bureaucratise the CSCE process. The main question which Bonn’s diplomacy was faced with was how to convince the Soviets and their allies to get more involved in the development of multilateral détente. The struggle for elevating the political rank of the Madrid CSCE represented a central item of the West German diplomatic preparation of the second follow-up meeting.\textsuperscript{344} As works in


\textsuperscript{344} Außenministerebene für das Madrider Folgetreffen, 13.11.1979, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.804.
Madrid would begin in November 1980, Bonn would succeed to get the support if not of all but of many participant states. Foreign Minister Genscher would hold the inaugural address in the name of the West German delegation, followed by a few colleagues of the Western and NNA countries. The Eastern bloc – with the exception of Romania – would make the eventual participation of their foreign ministers in a second phase of the conference dependent on the outcome of negotiations. As the conference would come to an end in the fall of 1983, after long months of difficult negotiations and repeated adjournments, also the foreign ministers of the Eastern countries would be present in Madrid to celebrate the adoption of the conference final document.

Whilst fostering the reduction of the technocratic character of negotiations at the CSCE, the Auswärtiges Amt recognised otherwise the significance of the “minor” gatherings of experts, whose works flanked the diplomatic preparation of the Madrid CSCE. According to the dispositions of the Belgrade concluding document, three meetings of experts were convened in the months between the first and the second follow-up conferences. As regards the first, delegations of experts of all thirty-five CSCE participant states met in the Swiss city of Montreux between 31 October and 11 December 1978 to discuss matters of peaceful settlement of disputes. The second meeting, which had been strongly fostered by the Maltese delegation and had been accepted with little enthusiasm by the Western countries, dealt with Mediterranean questions and was held in Valletta between 13 February and 26 March 1979. The third, “the scientific forum”, originated from a West German proposal and was held in Hamburg between 18

February and 3 March 1980. According to the West German assessment, the three meetings of experts were more significant for their bridging role than for their actual results. They represented an additional occasion of multilateral encounter which provided some interesting information about the development of the respective participants’ approaches to CSCE process. In the aftermath of the scientific forum in Hamburg, the West German Foreign Office stressed that the meeting had unfolded already in the view of the upcoming follow-up conference in Madrid. In particular, a shift in the overall CSCE strategy of the USSR had been observed; the Soviet behaviour at the scientific forum had reinforced Bonn’s impression that Moscow would take a more open and flexible attitude to negotiations in Madrid in respect to its performance at Belgrade.

As the West German Foreign Office was reflecting on how to relaunch the CSCE process, East-West dialogue was increasingly faced with security matters. As this chapter investigates, issues of military security played a pivotal role in diplomatic and public debates in the time interval between Belgrade and Madrid; they interacted with the preparation of the second follow-up conference by influencing importantly the formation of the conference agenda and a partial rethinking of the West German détente strategy. Moreover, as the analysis of Chapters 3 and 4 illustrates, both the preparation and the unfolding of the Madrid CSCE were deeply marked by two major international crises: the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 and the open challenge launched by oppositional groups to the governing elite in Poland, which unfolded in the course of 1980-1981 and pivoted in December 1981 as martial law was imposed by General Jaruzelski. Both crises boosted a further revision by the Auswärtiges Amt of its concept of realistic détente policy, in order to adjust it to the strained international context. Chapter 4 shows that those episodes of crisis seriously threatened the continuation of

349 Ibid., p. 431.
détente; but, paradoxically, they opened new possibilities of cooperation by compelling CSCE participants to greater efforts to rescue the multilateral dialogue. In order to allow the détente process to continue, the FRG had to adjust its CSCE strategy to changing international conditions and domestic pressures. Flexibility, realism, and separation between principles and realisations characterised the revised détente policy of the Bundesrepublik which in these years went through a major political shift, marked by the gradual end of the governmental experience of the social-liberal coalition and the return to power of the Christian Democrats.

**New challenges for East-West relations in the field of military security**

Security had traditionally been a central matter of concern for the West German federal government. Lying on the Cold War border between antagonist blocs, the FRG had lived since its foundation with the awareness of being the most probable target of an eventual Warsaw Pact’s military attack against the West. Because of the limits imposed to its sovereignty, it was largely dependent on its allies for the provision of its own security. As a result, Bonn was very sensitive to any change of the military balance on the European continent. Hence, the proceeding of the USSR’s program of renovation of its nuclear arsenal in Eastern Europe through the deployment of long range theatre missiles of the newest generation (SS-20s) roused increasing worries in the Bundesrepublik. The holding of the nuclear balance in Europe was at risk due to the growing advantage of the Soviet Union in the so-called “grey area” between the strategic arms covered by SALT II and the effective strategic systems at Moscow’s disposal.350 Helmut Schmidt, who as federal defence minister in the years 1969-1972 had followed personally the unfolding of SALT I negotiations, was preoccupied with

the changing strategic conditions on the continent. Indeed, the exclusion of the SS-20s from the coverage of both SALT I and II provided the Soviets with a new alarming free room of manoeuvre. As Schmidt highlighted in his renowned London speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 28 October 1977, a gap was coming into being between the Eastern capability to attack through nuclear tactical and conventional weapons and the Western capability to answer.

After the inglorious affair of the neutron bomb had embittered U.S.-West German relations between the summer of 1977 and the spring of 1978 — as Carter convinced a reluctant Schmidt to accept the inclusion of the newest enhanced radiation weapon into the NATO arsenal; Schmidt hardly managed to convince his much more reluctant party to deploy the U.S. “inhuman bomb” on the West German territory; and Carter finally changed his mind and took back the proposal — Bonn pressed for a greater U.S. commitment to their security. Traditional fears of an American decoupling and Soviet military supremacy were still present in Bonn notwithstanding the achievements of European détente. A “dual-track” policy was necessary to counteract the military disparity between the East and the West: NATO would modernise its nuclear arsenals in Europe, by meanwhile continuing to pursue negotiations on arms control. The concept was first discussed by U.S. President Carter, British Prime Minister Callaghan, French President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt

at the informal meeting on the island of Guadeloupe in January 1979 and made inroads into the Western Alliance in the course of the year. The adoption of a dual-track strategy was officially sealed through NATO’s famous decision of 12 December 1979: Western foreign and defence ministers agreed on proceeding with the stationing of additional long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNFs) in Western Europe – the “armament track” – if East-West negotiations would not lead to a substantial reduction of the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe by 1983 – “the disarmament track”.  

Alongside the development of NATO’s new strategy and the achievement of the superpower agreement on SALT II, the West German federal government intensified its diplomatic efforts to reanimate negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna, which were proceeding at a slow pace. Whereas the superpowers held the monopoly on the discussion of strategic arms’ limitations, the MBFR talks represented an adequate multilateral framework where Bonn could address directly its vital interests in the field of security. West German proposals for the relaunch of negotiations in Vienna – which had been advanced by Chancellor Schmidt to President Carter in July 1977 and then approved by the NATO partners – became a cornerstone of the whole Alliance’s initiative. As West German détente interests had been fully multilateralised at the CSCE, Bonn similarly longed for securing and multilateralising its security interests at the MBFR talks. As security issues imposed themselves gradually as the central item of international debates in the years 1977-1978, Bonn committed itself to reinforcing the integration between the CSCE and MBFR frameworks. To this purpose, it proposed starting negotiations on the so-called

“associated-measures” which were an integral part of MBFR talks but had not been discussed in Vienna that far.  

Associated measures reinforced, indeed, Helsinki’s provisions on CBMs. The West German initiative was directed to adjust the scheme of the MBFR to the one of the CSCE, by extending the area of jurisdiction of associated measures to the European part of the Soviet territory. The operation was directed to create a beneficial interaction between negotiations in Vienna and Madrid and to enlarge the complex of instruments at disposal of European détente to deal with crisis management and conflict reduction.

As Peter has highlighted, in 1979 Bonn aimed at including at integrating the manifold dimensions of its international engagement in the field of security – namely, the modernisation of LRTNWFs, the prosecution of MBFR talks, the support to the superpower arms talks and the implementation of CBMs – into a single improved strategy, capable to meet at best the new requirements of the security question un Europe. Security was far from being a discovery of the late Seventies: its protection had been strictly intertwined with the pursuit of East-West dialogue since the origins of the détente project. The interweaving of security and détente needs remained valid at the end of the decade: the new predominance of security questions changed the terms of the relationship, requiring the West German federal government to rethink partially its détente strategy.

The decisions made by the West German federal government in the field of security had important political and public repercussions of the domestic front. The affair of the neutron bomb first and the prospect of


359 Ibid., p. 1137.

an upcoming deployment of new U.S. missiles in the FRG then, reinforced the impression of a large part of the West German public opinion that Schmidt’s government was not speaking the language of détente anymore. A public opinion poll conducted in 1981 by the Federal Press Office (Bundespresseamt) revealed that most of people interviewed interpreted NATO’s dual-track resolution as a decision on rearmament.\(^{361}\) West Germans had got used to the achievements of the dialogue with the East. Even its traditional opponents had begun to yield to the changed paradigm of Bonn’s foreign policy. The apparent political reverse of the West German federal government and its NATO partners aroused the formation of a broad oppositional front. At the turn of the decade a wave of protests raged in the FRG, whose immediate target was the deployment of U.S. missiles on the West German territory – similarly to ongoing protests in other Western democracies. The West German protest movement of the early Eighties encompassed, however, a more composite spectrum of identities and requests: peaceful and anti-nuclear stances, anti-American sentiments, requests of rethink the bipolar division of the world, needs to redefine the West German national identity.\(^{362}\)

As protests against the “return of hard security” intensified dramatically in the whole country, the relaunch of the CSCE process at the Madrid meeting became increasingly urgent for the West German federal government. It was necessary to counterbalance the decisions in


the security field with important results on the détente front. The implicit interweaving of security and détente should be pursued more explicitly, both in the relations with the Eastern countries and in front of the national public opinion. Whereas political and military aspects of détente were, according to the West German theoretical conception, inseparable, in the practice Bonn’s CSCE policy took on increasingly the instrumental function of counterweighing the decisions made on the front of military security.363

New opportunities for East-West relations in the field of military security

One of the most important lessons the FRG had learnt at the Belgrade CSCE was that the process of European détente could improve only if Western countries would manage to get the Eastern bloc more involved. Hence, the West German Foreign Office was faced with a crucial question as it was preparing its strategy for the second follow-up meeting of Madrid: where should the relaunch of the CSCE process start from, in times of renewed East-West confrontation over military security? An indication on the path to follow came from a Soviet proposal; it suggested that the solution to the stalemate of the CSCE should be sought within the field of security itself.

As the Western Alliance was discussing the details of the dual-track strategy, the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact gathered in the Polish capital on 14-15 May 1979 replied by advancing the idea of a “Pan-European Conference on Questions of Military Détente.”364 The Eastern initiative recalled the French similar proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) put forward by Giscard d’Estaing in

January 1978. According to the Eastern project, the pan-European conference would constitute a third additional forum of East-West cooperation, whose negotiations should be carried out separately from the MBFR and the CSCE frameworks. Questions of disarmament should be discussed at a different pace from and in parallel with the CSCE. From a strategic point of view, the new Warsaw Pact’s proposal was in line with the Eastern idea of the development of détente after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Indeed, it aimed first at breaking up the unity of the contents of the CSCE by focusing cooperation on selected issues; and second, at lowering gradually the profile of the follow-up meetings, by extracting “important” negotiations from the frame of the Helsinki Final Act. A similar attempt had been already made at the Belgrade CSCE, where Eastern delegations had tabled 1975 Brezhnev’s proposal for a conference on cooperation in the fields of traffic, environment and energy which aimed at deepening cooperation on specific issues of Basket II outside the existing frameworks in charge – i.e. the CSCE and the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). Whereas the new Eastern invitation to cooperation on disarmament shared similar strategic and propagandistic intents with elder initiatives, it contained some aspects of novelty the West German Foreign Office considered worth to be taken into account. During inner-German talks on 24 July 1979, East German Deputy Foreign Minister Moldt introduced the project of the pan-European conference to West German State Secretary van Well as

“the cornerstone of the Warsaw Pact’s package of proposals”. The socialist countries were open, as Moldt declared, to discuss similar initiatives coming from the Western side. As East Berlin was giving clear indications about the direction to follow: the Eastern and French proposals for a CDE offered a possible common ground for negotiations at the Madrid CSCE.

As the armament track of NATO’s new dual strategy was taking shape in the course of 1979, Eastern invitations to cooperation on disarmament intensified. The interweaving between missiles, disarmament and CSCE became stricter and stricter as the appointment of the second follow-up meeting in Madrid was approaching. The adoption of the NATO’s December 1979 decision did not only affect the formulation of the West German détente strategy, but brought important changes in the approach to the CSCE of the Soviet Union and its protégées. Disarmament had been always been a focal item of Soviet propaganda. A large part of the Soviet proposals tabled at the Belgrade CSCE addressed matters of disarmament. However, Eastern initiatives in this field took on a new concrete dimension at the turn of the decade: they became a major foreign political tool intended to hinder the deployment of new U.S. ballistic missiles in Western Europe. The CSCE became again, as in Helsinki, an important framework for the Eastern bloc to pursue its own vital interests.

The proposal for a conference on disarmament – revised and updated by the Warsaw Pact in May 1980 – was promoted by the Soviet diplomacy through a round of talks in several Western capitals in the summer of 1980. During bilateral CSCE consultations in Bonn,
Moscow reconfirmed its strong interest in negotiating a CDE with the West. To this purpose, Eastern countries would consider to make concessions in the fields of Basket II and III, against the Western reassurance to avoid sterile polemics over confrontational issues. The way was paved for the strategic course Eastern delegations would pursue during the whole duration of negotiations at the Madrid CSCE. Besides the CDE project, a series of proposals for enhanced cooperation on security issues were brought forward by the Warsaw Pact in the months of preparation of the second CSCE follow-up meeting. They focused on developing CBMs, reinforcing the security aspects of détente in the Mediterranean region, reducing troops and armaments, renouncing to the first-use of both nuclear and conventional force.

The Eastern bloc had not played such a proactive role since the times of negotiations for the first CSCE. The West German Foreign Office observed with interest the ongoing shift beyond the Iron Curtain. The complex of Eastern proposals indicated clearly what the focal theme of the review conference in Madrid would be. More importantly, it unveiled that the Soviet bloc had regained strong interest, out of necessity, in getting involved in the CSCE process. As the West German Foreign Office observed in the spring of 1980, the East’s renewed interest for cooperation on the security dimension of détente could be turned to the West’s advantage: if handled carefully and kept within the framework provided by the Helsinki Final Act, it could be utilised to revitalise the CSCE process and force the East to

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372 Deutsch-sowjetische KSZE-Konsultationen am 7./8.08.1980 in Bonn, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.

373 This initiative was directed, according to the assessment of the Auswärtiges Amt, to block the deployment of U.S. missiles in Italy: see Tagung des Politischen Beratenden Ausschusses des Warschauer Paktes am 14. / 15. Mai 1980 in Warschau. Hier: Endgültige Analyse, 06.06.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.

374 Ibid.

those substantial concessions the Belgrade conference had failed to achieve. 376

Adjusting the FRG’s CSCE policy to new conditions: the preparation of a balanced agenda for Madrid

The relaunch of the détente process at the Madrid CSCE required the West German Foreign Office to deal with two main tasks, in coordination with its Western partners: first, shaping debates on disarmament according to the Western view; second, safeguarding the balanced nature of the CSCE from the predictable predominance of security questions. To these purposes, the diplomatic efforts of the Auswärtiges Amt were directed, in the months of preparation of the second follow-up meeting, to bring together the Soviet and French drafts for a CDE and to agree a list of attainable proposals for the improvements of détente in its fields of interest.

At the end of 1979 it had become clear that the Soviet bloc would take a proactive approach to negotiations on security in Madrid. 377 The Western Alliance was compelled to define a detailed, coordinated plan in order “not to leave a clear field for Soviet initiatives”. 378 In December 1979 NATO’s foreign and defence ministers had declared themselves in favour of using the 1978 French draft as the basis for negotiations at the Madrid CSCE. Overcoming the initial U.S. opposition and the scepticism of a number of European partners, the CDE had become part of the “negotiation track” of NATO’s twofold strategy. 379 The definition of the Western proposal for a CDE was object of analysis within the Auswärtiges Amt and of debates within the Alliance in the course of 1980. Bonn aimed at not limiting discussions to technical

376 Ibid.
details, but rather at conceiving the Conference on Disarmament as a project of vast “political dimensions and significance”. The West German ambitions to enhance the political value of the CSCE process were invested in the project of the CDE as well. The achievement of a big initiative on disarmament within the framework of the détente process would represent that important counterbalance to NATO’s rearmament decisions the West German federal government longed for in order to appease domestic oppositions.

The Auswärtiges Amt identified the most important aspect of the CDE in its geographic mandate. Indeed, the 1978 French proposal covered the whole European continent “from the Atlantic to the Urals”. Keeping the initiative within the framework of the CSCE would provide, amongst other reasons, the legal basis for the inclusion of the European part of the Soviet territory. The geographic area of the CDE represented the main difference between the French and the Eastern proposal. The West German diplomacy tried to bring the two projects together throughout the spring and the summer of 1980, in order to achieve an agreement in principle before the start of negotiations in Madrid. Bonn’s efforts did not succeed: both a Western initiative for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and an Eastern initiative for a Conference on Military Détente in Europe (CMDE) were brought forward at the negotiation table of the second CSCE follow-up meeting. The question of the geographic mandate of the conference would represent a major bone of East-West contention in the Spanish capital and the conditio sine qua non for the Western final approval.

The preparation of the Western agenda for the Madrid CSCE did not limit itself to the sole CDE. To the contrary, the aim of the CDE should be strategically used, according to Bonn, to obtain those concrete improvements of the Helsinki process the West German

380 Ibid.
382 In the course of the chapter it will be always referred to the “CDE” for reasons of simplicity.
delegation had longed for in Belgrade. The West German traditional interest for human contacts remained unvaried. The reinforcement of the human dimension of détente appeared even more urgent in times of renewed East-West tension, both from a substantial and a symbolic viewpoint. Between the first and the second CSCE follow-up meetings an interesting shift gradually occurred in the West German attitude towards the idea of balance which should necessarily characterise the development of the CSCE process. Safeguarding the harmonic relationship amongst the Helsinki’s baskets had always been a cornerstone of the Western German policy of multilateral détente. In principle nothing changed: indeed, aiming at the balance between security, economic and human matters continued to represent one of the guiding postulates of the Western strategy at the Madrid CSCE. Its importance was reiterated in a number of declarations of the EPC, NATO and European Council during the preparation and the unfolding of the follow-up meeting. In practice the goal of balanced improvements should be pursued less mechanically: the experience in Belgrade had shown that it was quite unrealistic to attain achievements in all fields of the Helsinki Final Act in every contingency. Particularly in the human field, pragmatic distinctions should be made between attainable and unattainable aims against the background of the existing circumstances. The acceptance by the Eastern bloc of three or four of the Western demands concerning the easing of family reunification, exchange of contacts and visits of relatives would represent according to the Auswärtiges Amt a sufficient counterweight to a positive decision on the CDE.

384 The shift to a more pragmatic interpretation of the “principle of balance” was a gradual process: it was triggered, first, by the lessons learnt at the Belgrade CSCE; and reinforced by the adverse international developments which occurred during the unfolding of the Madrid CSCE. A retrospective assessment of the meaning of “balanced character” with regard to the development of the CSCE was provided by Ministerial Director Pfeffer and Ambassador Ruth in 1982: see Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer und des Botschafters Ruth, 12.07.1982, in AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 206, pp. 1084-1085.
The preparation of Western proposals in the fields of Basket II and III was carried out within the EPC frameworks between 1979 and 1980. The legacy of Belgrade affected significantly the formulation of the Nine’s strategy. In a strategic paper of December 1979 the West German Foreign Office addressed the question of how to deal with the numerous Western demands which had remained unanswered at the first follow-up meeting. On the whole, they still remained valid and relevant for the continuation of the process of détente: as West German chief delegator Fischer had stressed in its concluding address in Belgrade, they addressed concrete problems which could be solved only through the common commitment of all CSCE participants.\(^\text{386}\) However, they needed to be revised and updated. The West German Foreign Office indentified the following tasks the Nine had to deal with. First, the number of proposals should be reduced: an important step in this direction was made by the Nine by collecting and summarising their demands in some synthesis papers – as for instance the so-called “Miller-Paper” on human contacts and the “Hoffman-Paper” on information.\(^\text{387}\) Second, possible initiatives should be classified according to criteria of priority and negotiability, by excluding those which had scarce chances of success. For instance, the U.S. proposal for the convening of a meeting of experts on the participation of single individuals in the CSCE presented within the NATO caucus in February 1980 was firmly rejected by the Nine.\(^\text{388}\) Third, Western delegations should take the initiative with more conviction than they had done in Belgrade, where fears of diverting the attention from implementation issues had restraint more proactive attitudes. In January 1981 the Nine openly declared their intention to pursue a different course in Madrid. The reiteration of old demands (addressing the implementation flaws of the Helsinki Final Act), would be flanked by initiatives on those issues of the Helsinki Accords which


\(^{387}\) Ibid.

\(^{388}\) Die Rolle einzelner Bürger bei Implementierung der Schlusskarte, 30.07.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
leave room for further improvements (namely the CBMs) and by more innovative proposals (resting upon the “letter and spirit” of the Helsinki’s provisions but enlarging its contents).\textsuperscript{389}

To sum-up, the preparation of the second CSCE follow-up meeting was pursued by Bonn with increasing pragmatism. The development of a détente policy which did not limit itself to being realistic in words was a gradual process, triggered by the lessons learnt in Belgrade, the changing international environment and the enduring pressures coming from the domestic public opinion. The West German CSCE strategy underwent two important changes between Belgrade and Madrid. First, after the adoption of NATO’s December 1979 decision, the inherent interweaving of security and détente interests had to become more evident: the CSCE policy was pursued instrumentally to counterbalance the decisions of the federal government in the field of security in front of the eyes of public opinion. Second, the necessity to relaunch the CSCE process required greater flexibility: the Auswärtiges Amt developed a more pragmatic interpretation of the “balanced character” of the development of the CSCE process.

As those adjustments were gradually taking shapes, East-West relations were faced with two major crises, which would profoundly affect the unfolding of the second CSCE follow-up conference.

**Adjusting the FRG’s CSCE policy to times of crises: the influence of Afghanistan and Poland**

In the twelve months before the beginning of the Madrid CSCE the East-West relationship went through a significant deterioration, which has led historians to speak of the “return to a second Cold War”. Two major Cold War crises unfolded at the turn of the decade: they triggered a redefinition of the balance of power between the two blocs and challenged directly the continuation of the CSCE process. The first,

\textsuperscript{389} Proposals of the Nine for Madrid, 23.01.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.

145
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve of 1979, occurred outside the European continent but contradicted the commitment made by the CSCE participants to attune their general international conduct to the principles of détente. The second, the Polish crisis, developed in the heart of Europe and escalated between the summer of 1980 and the end of 1981: notwithstanding its domestic nature, it had important international repercussions and addressed open violations of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Both Afghanistan and Poland were comparable, for their public impact and the imaginary they recalled, to the 1968 Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. However, they did affect much more seriously the prosecution of the policy of détente, than the solution to the Prague crisis by armed intervention had done a decade before.

**Afghanistan**

As Zubok has highlighted, Moscow’s decision to invade Afghanistan was a surprise not only to politicians and foreign policy experts in the West, but also to most of the Soviet foreign policy elite. Although it matured from the endemic weakness of the Soviet bloc, it was largely interpreted as a clear proof of Moscow’s return to expansionist drive in foreign policy. The Afghan crisis deepened the strains between the superpowers and the rifts in the transatlantic partnership. The U.S. administration undertook unilaterally a series of punitive sanctions intended to affect economic, security and political vital interests of the Soviet Union. Against Carter’s expectations, Western Europeans were little inclined to follow the American

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392 The complex of U.S. sanctions encompassed the suspension of the already troubled Congressional ratification of SALT II treaty, an embargo on American grain shipments to the USSR, the limitation of economic exchanges with Moscow with special regard to the field of high-technology, the postponement of the opening of new consulates in New York and Kiev, and a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. See D. Selvage, “The Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1977-1983. Human rights, Nuclear Weapons, and Western Europe”, p. 27.
example. Whereas the British declared themselves ready to meet Washington’s demands, the French tried to convince the European allies to undertake an autonomous course from Washington.\footnote{For an appraisal of the French attitude towards the USSR after the invasion of Afghanistan, see the analysis of the West German ambassador in Paris: \textit{Botschafter Herbst, Paris, an das Auswärtige Amt}, 12.01.1980, in AAPD, 1980, vol. I, doc. 11, pp. 68-71.} West Germans opted for a moderate course towards Moscow as well: notwithstanding a firm condemnation of the military intervention in Afghanistan, it was essential “not to break off communication with the Soviet Union during such times of crisis”, as Schmidt explained to the American President in a long call phone on 11 January 1980.\footnote{H. Schmidt, \textit{Men and Powers. A political retrospective}, (New York: Random House, 1990) p. 202.} The U.S. sanctions against the Soviet Union had not been discussed with the Western partners, although they affected some of their important interests. Economic and trade measures would inflict important damages to Western European economics in times of deepening recession.\footnote{M. Howard, “The Conduct of American Foreign Policy: Return to the Cold War?”, in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Volume 59, Number 3, 1980.} The conditions for the continuation of the policy of East-West dialogue were at stake, as concerned Schmidt and Giscard observed few weeks after the invasion of Afghanistan.\footnote{R. Garthoff, \textit{Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan} (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1985), p. 1089.}

The West German federal government had its hands tied. The sanctions affair took on increasingly the meaning of a loyalty test towards the U.S. administration. Possibilities of resisting to the pressure coming from Washington were limited by the awareness that the particular conditions of West German sovereignty made the FRG more heavily dependent on the American public opinion and military protection with respect to its Western allies. The pursuit of Bonn’s Ostpolitik remained still critically dependent on the good health of its Westpolitik. Since the beginning of its bilateral policy of dialogue with the East, the West German federal government had to strike a balance between supporting the foreign political choices of the U.S.
administration and pursuing good relations with the Eastern countries. In times of superpower rivalry, this task required greater efforts and sacrifices. A very reluctant Schmidt decided to make at least some concessions to Washington’s demands. Whilst the FRG managed to forego economic sanctions, it was amongst the few NATO countries – together with Norway and Turkey, similarly exposed to the presence of Soviet fighting forces on their immediate borders – to join the U.S. boycott of the Moscow Olympics. Even though the boycott represented “a victory of impotence over politics”, as former Chancellor Willy Brandt commented in an interview on French television, it was the necessary price to pay not to revise the policy of dialogue with the Soviets. Hence, at the beginning of July 1980 Helmut Schmidt travelled to Moscow to meet Brezhnev, following the example of Giscard’s visit to the Soviet leader in Warsaw in May.

As the Western partners were drifting apart over the sanctions issue, their efforts to coordinate their strategies for the Madrid CSCE continued. The U.S. ambassador in Brussels presented a list of proposals for Madrid at the NATO meeting in February 1980. Washington seemed to wish to give its imprinting to the formulation of the Western conference strategy. Its initiative featured a mixture of good willingness and persisting scepticism about the possibilities of European détente. On the one hand, the U.S. administration committed itself to complying with the needs of the European allies: the declaration that a “balance between a thorough and frank review of

400 Ibid.
implementation and willingness to discuss new proposals in all areas of the Final Act” was the best course to follow in Madrid represented an absolute novelty.\textsuperscript{401} On the other hand, the limits of possible cooperation with the Soviet Union in the wake of Afghanistan were clearly set: the U.S. ambassador warned Europeans that they “should be aware that events of the next several months with regard particularly to Afghanistan will determine whether the United States can agree to participate in any post-Madrid meeting aimed at expanding contacts or cooperation with the Soviets”.\textsuperscript{402} Bonn remained sceptical about the possibility of a significant shift in Washington’s CSCE policy. As West German Ambassador at the NATO quarters Pauls reported in August 1980, it was not to exclude that the U.S. administration – considering the increasing political weight of hard-line positions emerged in the aftermath of Afghanistan and in concomitance with the ongoing presidential election campaign – would reiterate the strategy pursued at the first CSCE follow-up meeting, by putting great emphasis on review debates and human rights issues in Madrid. The West German conference aims, namely improvements of human contacts and the convening of a CDE, were at risk to be pushed, again, to the background.\textsuperscript{403}

Whilst no significant change was to expect on the front of the U.S. approach towards the CSCE, an important shift was ongoing beyond the Iron Curtain. As Zubok has highlighted, the collapse of superpower détente in the wake of Afghanistan changed the Soviet calculus of the CSCE between Belgrade and Madrid.\textsuperscript{404} The international consequences of Afghan crisis accelerated the trends triggered by the adoption of NATO’s dual-track decision. Faced with the pending prospect of a U.S. reinforced military presence in Western Europe, the economic

\textsuperscript{401} Speaking Notes: New Proposals for Madrid, 8.02.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
\textsuperscript{402} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{403} Botschafter Pauls, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 01.08.1980, in AAPD, 1980, vol. II, doc. 224, p. 1185.
\textsuperscript{404} V.M. Zubok, A failed empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, p. 268.
repercussions of punitive sanctions placed by Washington and the widespread international condemnation of its Afghan endeavour, the Soviet leadership needed cooperation with Western Europe more than before. The upcoming CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid opened possibilities for achieving the aim of the CDE, improving the trade with the West and breaking away from diplomatic isolation. Taking on a more cooperative attitude towards the process of European détente imposed itself as a Soviet foreign political necessity in the course of 1980.

Poland

In August 1980, as the beginning of the preparatory works for the second CSCE follow-up meeting of Madrid was getting close, a wave of protests erupted in Poland. Labour strikes in Gdansk guided by the anti-Soviet movement Solidarność (Solidarity) soon escalated into an overall systemic crisis of the Communist rule in Poland. In the second half of 1980 and throughout 1981 workers’ requests took on a broader political meaning, by discrediting the communist thesis of unity of action between the ruling party and the working class and questioning the legitimacy of Warsaw’s regime itself. Three main elements characterised the Polish domestic developments of 1980-1981 as a major international crisis.

First, Poland’s turmoil represented a serious threat for the duration of the Soviet leadership and the existing geopolitical order in the Eastern bloc. The possibility of a Soviet external military intervention casted a long shadow over the development of the Polish crisis, reinforced by the inability of the government in Warsaw to deal with protesters’ demands. The solution by armed intervention to the 1968

405 The Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan roused a widespread weave of disapproval which went far beyond the borders of the Western bloc. At the emergency special session on Afghanistan of the UN General Assembly, an overwhelming majority of 111 countries expressed their firm condemnation of the Soviet military initiative.
406 M. Zubok, A failed empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, p. 265.
Prague Spring had not prevented the embryonic process of détente from progressing at the end of the Sixties. But the overall international background against which the Polish crisis unfolded had profoundly changed since then. Indeed, it was clear to all parties involved in East-West cooperation that détente – already harmed by the deterioration of the superpower relationship, by the strains over securities between the two blocs and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – would not tolerate a military intervention in the heart of Europe. Moreover, whereas détente had still been a clear field at the time of the Prague crisis, a corpus of rules and commitments had been defined by its participants and had consolidated throughout the Seventies: their open violation could hardly be ignored.

Second, as Zubok has observed with force, the Polish revolution spilled over, politically and psychologically, into the borders of the Soviet Union. Fears of contagion were present in Moscow and in the Eastern capitals. The Polish example risked to encourage further dissident groups, whose public demands intensified as the appointment of the Madrid CSCE was getting close. Hence, events in Poland triggered defensive reactions in most of the Eastern countries, which affected also their contacts with the West. Bonn’s federal government observed with particular worry the ongoing developments in the GDR at the beginning of the new decade. Hence, bilateral inner-German relations were going through difficult times due to the renewed restrictive political course pursued by East German authorities. Already since the spring of 1979 the GDR had strengthened its policy of ideological demarcation from the other German counterpart: working conditions for West German journalists

407 Ibid., p. 266.
408 The GDR pursued a two-faced policy at the turn of the decade. A policy of sharp demarcation and propagandistic confrontation with West Germans on the ideological front was paralleled, indeed, by unvaried efforts to continue economic cooperation with the FRG. Massively harmed by the world energy crises and faced with the serious problems of its productive sector, the GDR became growingly dependent on West German aid and trade in the second half of the Seventies. See H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Zweiter Band, pp. 363-365.
had become harder, the criminal law had been reformed by introducing more repressive elements, and the overall control over the lives of East Germans reinforced by the adoption of new legal disciplining tools.\textsuperscript{409} But even more surprising and disappointing for Bonn was East Berlin’s decision – taken on 9 October 1980, few days after the federal elections in the FRG and before the opening of the CSCE works in Madrid – to enhance drastically the so-called \textit{Mindestumtausch}, i.e. the mandatory minimum currency exchange of a specified amount of \textit{Deutsche Mark} for Western citizens visiting the GDR.\textsuperscript{410} This measure, which came into force immediately without any exception and notice, represented, first, a unilateral modification of the agreed inner-German regulation in force since November 1974, considered an integral part of the \textit{acquis} of détente. Second, it contradicted the multilateral commitments made at the Helsinki CSCE with regard to the facilitations of travels and contacts between signatory countries. Hence, Bonn denounced East Berlin’s initiative as an open infringement of the legal and political grounds which inner-German relations and East-West détente rested upon.\textsuperscript{411} A second slap in the Bonn’s face came a week later, on 13 November, as during his speech in the city of Gera SED General Secretary Honecker demanded a list of unacceptable conditions for the normalisation of inner-German relations and directed a series of sharp criticisms against the FRG which recalled the tones of the past, harshest Cold War times.\textsuperscript{412} The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}’s interpretation of the East German repressive turn, which in Bonn’s view had been largely affected by the eruption of the Polish crisis, seemed to be confirmed few months later as East Berlin agreed with Warsaw on a series of restrictions to the flows of visits and contacts between the two countries which aimed at closing \textit{de facto} the Polish border to East

\textsuperscript{411} \textit{Erhöhung des Mindestumtausches für Besuche in der DDR und Berlin (Ost)}, 10.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
German citizens. Whereas economic motivations could be put forward by the East German leadership to explain the rationale of the October 1980 enhancement of the mandatory currency exchange, they could hardly be used to justify the limitations of human contacts with Poland. East Berlin’s restrictive measures were rather to be understood, according to Bonn, as similar attempts to discipline the population and discourage contacts both with the West and with Polish dissidents. The meaning of such trends went far beyond the specificity of the inner-German relationship. They contributed to complicate the negotiation landscape at the Madrid CSCE, especially with regard to the matters of Basket III.

Third, the management of the Polish crisis by the government in Warsaw received high international exposure as the confrontation between protesters and authorities developed in concomitance with the unfolding of the second CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid. Indeed, the Polish crisis, already serious on the eve of Madrid, deteriorated dramatically during the first conference year. The Madrid CSCE became inevitably an international sounding board for the crisis: what was happening in the Eastern country was under the eyes of the delegations gathered in Madrid and of the international public opinion. As a signatory state of the Helsinki Final Act, Poland had committed itself to the respect of all its principles. Eventual massive violations of Polish dissidents’ human rights and basic freedoms by the government in Warsaw would compel delegations in Madrid to take positions. Even though the Polish crisis did not become an official item of debate at the Madrid CSCE during the first conference year, at least until Jaruzelski’s decision to impose martial law in December 1981, it was constantly under the careful scrutiny of the CSCE participants since the start of multilateral negotiations in the Spanish capital. As Chapter 4 analyses, diplomatic works in Madrid could not but be affected by the

415 Ibid.
deterioration of the relations between protesters and authorities in Poland. If, on the one hand, it became more and more difficult to silence massive violations of human rights and punitive measures adopted by Warsaw’s authorities, on the other hand the crisis drastically sank the Eastern countries’ tolerance thresholds and room for manoeuvre.\footnote{Schrifterlass des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Joetze, 17.12.1980, in AAPD, 1980, vol. II, doc. 369, p. 1915.} Hence, dealing with the Polish question became in the course of the conference an inevitable task for all delegations gathered in Madrid.

**Rethinking a realistic policy of détente in the times of the Afghan and Polish crises**

The international developments in Afghanistan and Poland urged the West German Foreign Office to revise further its multilateral détente policy in view of the appointment of Madrid. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan represented a massive violation of the shared principle of geographic indivisibility of détente, according to which each CSCE participant state committed itself to conforming its conduct outside of Europe to the requirements of European détente.\footnote{Erster Entwurf der Einführungserklärung des BMs auf dem Madrider Folgetreffen, 28.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.} Such infringement posed the West German federal government in front of the question of how to conciliate firmness on the respect of the basic principles of the Helsinki Act with its foreign policy interests and needs. Even though Schmidt and Genscher continued to foster the continuation of détente even after the Afghan crisis – and in spite of it – there was awareness in Bonn that indulgence towards the Soviet endeavour would endanger seriously the credibility of the whole détente construction.

A solution to the dilemma was found by distinguishing with pragmatism, once more, between the theoretical and the operational side of the process of multilateral détente. This meant that, even though
the principle of geographic indivisibility of détente remained valid as a theoretical postulate of the CSCE and an imperative for its participants, the West German Foreign Office decided to deal with it with flexibility on the operational level. Developments in Poland of the years 1980-1981 came to Bonn’s aid to motivate this partial rethinking of its realistic policy of détente. The FRG tied the continuation of the process of East-West dialogue to the possibility of fostering stability in Poland both in the internal analyses of the Auswärtiges Amt and in the argumentations of the West German diplomacy. The improvement of multilateral détente – and more specifically the successful outcome of the second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid – would exert, according to Bonn’s view, a positive effect on the ongoing attempts for liberalisation in Poland. In the course of the Madrid CSCE the West German Foreign Office promoted the link between improvement of East-West dialogue and solution to the Polish crisis, shaping increasingly its multilateral détente policy as a policy of stabilisation and, after Jaruzelski’s imposition of martial law in December 1981, as a policy of crisis management towards Poland. According to the indications provided by the Auswärtiges Amt, whilst the West German delegation at the Madrid CSCE should not withdraw from denouncing open violations of the Helsinki Act – as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – in its opening address and during review debates, negotiations on concrete improvements in the field of human contacts, trade and disarmament should be pursued also for Poland’s sake. Moreover, the CSCE’s protective function towards Poland was one of the main arguments adducted by the West German delegation.

419 KSZE-Aspekte der Ereignisse in Polen, 05.09.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.954.
throughout 1981 to contrast the possibility of a premature conclusion of the follow-up conference.\textsuperscript{422}

Tying Poland’s destiny to the advancement of multilateral détente was part of a broader strategy of stabilisation encompassing a series of diplomatic actions pursued at different levels. Bonn’s strategy aimed at improving East-West dialogue through CSCE negotiations in Madrid and INF negotiations in Geneva; at sending positive signals from Brussels to the Eastern bloc through the proposal of negotiations and economic cooperation with the European Community; at offering to Warsaw targeted economic help.\textsuperscript{423} As on the bilateral level, Schmidt and Genscher used their network of good relations with the Eastern countries to avert the risk of an armed intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Poland, the West German diplomacy at Madrid aimed at continuing the CSCE, with the idea that the Eastern neighbour would more easily find a solution to its domestic crisis within an improved international environment.

The strategy of de-escalation was directed also towards the USSR. Given the renewed Soviet interest for achieving concrete results within the process of European détente, CSCE negotiations were considered by the West German Foreign Office an important diplomatic tool to convince Moscow to abstain from an armed intervention in Poland. The West German shifting attitude towards the principle of indivisibility of détente served foremost to the purpose of constraining the Soviet conduct in Poland. If the process of European détente had continued in spite of Afghanistan, an armed invasion on the European territory would not be tolerated, as Genscher made clear in his inaugural address.\textsuperscript{424}

\textsuperscript{424} Zum Entwurf Genschers Madrid-Erklärung, 06.11.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.804.
More than a radical shift in the West German CSCE policy, the formulation of an operative approach to the geographic dimension of the indivisibility of détente represented a realistic adaptation of the theoretical grounds of multilateral détente to the constraints imposed by the tense international context. Bonn’s efforts revealed that the federal government, besides continuing to consider the CSCE a priority foreign policy field, preserved a certain amount of confidence in the possibility of prosecution of East-West dialogue while approaching the appointment in Madrid, against widespread scepticism of large part of the national public opinion towards a process which seemed to be seriously worn out through the difficulties of that year.425

In the last phases of the preparation of the second CSCE follow-up meeting the West German Foreign Office was faced with another, more practical question: i.e. how to address publicly the Afghan and Polish issues at debates in Madrid. According to the political guidelines for the West German delegation at the CSCE, collected in the strategic paper drafted by State Secretary van Well on 5 November 1980, all major setbacks of détente – included Afghanistan – should be discussed in the first review phase of the conference.426 A different treatment was reserved instead for Poland. Although the Polish developments were a central matter of concern for Bonn, it was decided not to mention them in Genscher’s address at the inaugural session of the CSCE follow-up meeting – except for the general but implicit reference, mentioned above, to the circumstance that the process of détente would not tolerate, after Afghanistan, any military enterprise within the European borders.427 The West German Foreign Office decided to abstain as much as possible from public statements on the Polish crisis which risked

aggravating further the precarious international situation. Bonn’s choice was dictated by reasons of diplomatic prudence and convenience: there was awareness that any Western and West German declaration would be easily stigmatized by the Eastern countries as an attempt to interfere into the Polish domestic affairs, burdening in vain the development of works at Madrid. The West German delegation, along with its allies, reserved however the right to take a position, depending on the future development of the situation.\footnote{Basispapier zur Prinzipienerklärung, 29.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.} Hence, both for Poland’s and the CSCE’s sake, the Polish crisis managed to remain an unspoken presence in Madrid at least until events escalated in December 1981.
“In this dynamic world, stability cannot be obtained by trying to turn back the wheel of history”

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, speech at the Second CSCE Follow-up Meeting’s plenary session in Madrid, February 9, 1982

Chapter 4

For the Sake of Poland, For the Sake of Détente: the Implementation of a Realistic Policy of Détente at the Second CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Madrid (1980-1983)

Introduction: Changing political landscapes in the West at the beginning of the new decade

One month before the start of the second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid in November 1980, federal elections took place in the Bundesrepublik. On 5 October West German voters reconfirmed the social-liberal coalition: both the SPD and the FDP performed better than in 1976, increasing their number of seats in the Bundestag, whereas the CDU/CSU – though remaining the country’s strongest party – suffered a consistent loss of 4.1 percent of votes. The October’s federal elections had turned into a referendum over the hard-liner Christian Democratic candidate Strauß, spokesman of those in the CDU who continued to be opposed to the policy of dialogue with the East.429 The young political party of The Greens (Die Grünen) – founded at the beginning of that year – obtained 1.5 percent of votes. It was the start of a parabolic rise at the national level which would bring the ecologist

429 H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 360.
and pacifist party to enter the federal parliament in March 1983: for the first time in the postwar time a new political entity added to the three traditional parties at the federal level.430 This novelty marking the political landscape was the symbol of a broader process of transformation that the West German society – as well as other Western European societies – was going through in the early Eighties.431 The internal fragmentation of the Social Democratic party, the outburst of the peace movement, the emergence of The Greens, the drift of public opinion over security issues represented different aspects of an overall process of polarisation.432

The reconfirmation of Helmut Schmidt as Chancellor – with Hans-Dietrich Genscher continuing to lead the Auswärtiges Amt – represented a countetrend to the developments occurring in the most important Western countries at the turn of the decade. A first major political turn took place on the other side of the Atlantic only one month after the federal elections in the FRG. In the electoral turn-out on 4 November in the U.S., Republican candidate Ronald Reagan reported an uncontested victory over President Carter. Hence, unlike West Germans, Americans showed their favour for a clear political change by turning their back on the weak Carter administration, supporting Reagan’s economic program of deregulation and opting for a harder line in foreign policy. In Reagan’s foreign political program there was no room for any form of dialogue with the East: as Romero has highlighted, the idea itself of détente was undermined at its grounds by rejecting the Soviet Union as


431 On the profound transformations Western European societies and political systems underwent in the early Eighties, see: T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, pp. 535-558.


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a partner on the same level with the American power. As it will be analysed in the course of this chapter, Reagan’s election worried seriously the supporters of détente in the FRG and Western Europe, who started to interrogate themselves on what possible developments would occur in international politics after the inauguration of the new U.S. administration on 20 January 1981.

Other two pillars of the Western Alliance underwent major political changes at the turn of the decade. 1979 Margaret Thatcher’s seizure of power in the UK caused an epochal twist whose political consequences marked the beginning of the new decade. Moreover, in the course of 1980, French politics too was preparing for change: presidential elections in the spring of 1981 marked the victory of Giscard’s opponent, Socialist candidate François Mitterrand. A reconfiguration of political balances and personal relations was ongoing within the Western caucus in the early Eighties. It contributed to complicate further the landscape wherein the Madrid CSCE took place.

The second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid started in November 1980 and lasted, after repeated breaks and adjournments, until the fall of 1983. It represented the main multilateral stage where changing intra-bloc and inter-bloc dynamics were put to test and took shape. Whereas interdependence between the two blocs had increased during the Seventies, conflicts and contentions at the turn of the decade imposed – or tried to impose – new dividing lines. As the wheel of history seemed to turn back under the impulse of the affirmation of the “second Cold War”, the Madrid CSCE offered the stage where supporters of détente attempted to pursue a countercyclical international policy. Amongst those, the FRG aimed at playing a primal role. As the chapter illustrates, West German diplomacy tried to implement in Madrid a realistic détente policy which, with respect to

the past, had gained increased flexibility and pragmatism. Bonn supported firmly the opportunity to continue negotiations even in adverse conditions. But the Madrid CSCE became soon a terrain of indirect confrontation over the major episodes of crises marking the turn of the decade: Afghanistan, Poland, the deployment of new missiles in Europe. Whereas the Polish crisis was not initially an item of multilateral debate, it casted a lengthening shadow over the unfolding of negotiations until the precipitation of events in Poland in December 1982 changed the track of the conference. The chapter shows how the major issues of East-West confrontation entailed some potential for bringing the conference to a good conclusion. Throughout the three years of negotiations in Madrid, West German diplomacy tried to draw from the major episodes of international crisis arguments of persuasion and tactical tools of negotiation that they could used both with the Western partners and the Eastern counterparts in order to attain its own détente goals.

“Looking behind to go ahead”: reviewing the state of multilateral détente in Madrid

The second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid was marked by a difficult start. Delegations had not managed to agree on a common conference agenda during the preparatory meeting which, started on 9 September 1980, was still ongoing at the beginning of November 1980 when the main conference should officially begin.435 West German Foreign Minister Genscher instructed the head of his delegation, Ambassador Kastl, not to cede to easy compromises in this first determinant phase of the conference where the contents and the structure of negotiations were defined: what would be given away at the beginning could no more be improved afterwards.436 The lingering fear of a premature interruption of the Madrid CSCE should not urge Western delegations to excessive compliance. Indeed, the months of

436 Ibid.
diplomatic preparation of the Madrid CSCE had revealed that the Soviet Union and its Eastern allies had substantial interests in bringing the conference to a successful conclusion.\textsuperscript{437} This awareness nourished the West German confidence in the possibility of achieving concrete détente improvements even though East-West dialogue was going through one of its hardest phases. After a few days of uncertainties and tensions, a last minute agreement on the main organisational conference aspects was reached on Friday 14 November 1980, paving the way to the official start of the second CSCE follow-up meeting the week after.

The beginning of the conference was surrounded by troublesome international developments. The hanging consequences of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the escalating crisis in Poland, the growing strains between the superpowers, the East-West confrontation over armaments, the embitterment of inner-German relations, and the overall worsening of Western journalists’ working conditions in the Warsaw Pact’s countries were heavy problems weighing on the diplomatic work in Madrid. Their existence and influence could not be ignored by delegations at the CSCE. The question of how those challenging issues were to deal with at multilateral negotiations had been addresses by the West German Foreign Office – as it had been partly analysed at the end of Chapter 3 – on the eve of the start of the conference. According to the main political guidelines for the West German delegation at the Madrid CSCE, collected in the strategic paper drafted by State Secretary van Well on 5 November 1980, all major setbacks of détente should be discussed in the first review phase of the conference.\textsuperscript{438} Bonn asked its delegations to take a stand against open violations of the Helsinki agreements perpetrated in the Eastern European countries by using, however, objective, moderate and political argumentations. It was not the case to turn Madrid into a tribunal and to repeat the frustrating experience of Belgrade, where the

\textsuperscript{437} Ibid.
Warsaw Pact had used Western attacks to justify their refusal to negotiate.\textsuperscript{439}

In continuity with the strategy pursued in Helsinki and Belgrade, instead, the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} decided to leave off the multilateral negotiation table specific bilateral issues regarding the \textit{querelles allemandes}.\textsuperscript{440} In accordance with the GDR, questions related to the status of the inner-German relationship and of Berlin should not – and would not – become conference themes.\textsuperscript{441} Both Bonn and East Berlin had good additional reasons for rescuing inner-German relations from international debates: at the turn of the decade Schmidt and Honecker tried to shelter the continuation of bilateral cooperation – as much as their room of manoeuvre and upper reasons of dependence on their respective alliances consented it – from the escalation of East-West tensions that threatened to disrupt the achievement of the last years.\textsuperscript{442} Hence, the late restrictive measures imposed by East German authorities were mentioned in the inaugural address of the West German delegation within the framework, however, of a broader analysis of setbacks of the détente process in view of the ensuing review debate. West German demands regarding the improvement of everyday life of German citizens living in the divided country and beyond the Iron Curtain were included in the proposals package on Basket III of the EC-group.\textsuperscript{443} A list of other problematic inner-German issues – concerning the Berlin Wall, the firing at the inner-German border, the situation in East German prisons, the repression of the freedom of expression in the GDR – were packed into the so-called “big luggage” collecting those argumentations to keep in reserve and use as

\textsuperscript{439} Basispapier zur Prinzipienerklärung, 29.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.

\textsuperscript{440} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{442} O. Bange, “‘Keeping détente alive’: Inner German relations under Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker 1974-1982”, pp. 230-243.

reply to direct Eastern attacks only in the case of a serious and irreparable deterioration of cooperation in Madrid.\textsuperscript{444}

In line with the strategy sketched out by the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} on the conference eve, all major setbacks of détente of the years 1979-1978 were addressed directly by Foreign Minister Genscher in his inaugural speech in Madrid. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was mentioned as a massive violation of that principle of indivisibility of détente, according to which each participant’s conduct outside Europe had to be compliant with the requirements of détente in Europe.\textsuperscript{445} After having reminded the core points of West German \textit{Deutschland-} and \textit{Berlinpolitik}, criticisms were directed against the violations of the Helsinki commitments in the fields of human rights, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, and free information perpetrated in the GDR.\textsuperscript{446} A similar stress was put on other violations perpetrated by the Eastern countries. Genscher was aware of the great visibility of his inaugural speech, whose first addressees were the West German and Western public opinions: Bonn’s concept of détente needed to be explained with clarity and no hesitation in denouncing violations needed to be showed to the domestic and international audiences.\textsuperscript{447} According to a consolidated rhetorical strategy, critical stances were concentrated in the first part of the speech, to leave room for positive assessments of what had been reached so far in the second part. Optimism towards possible future achievements of multilateral détente had the meaning of holding out the hand to the Soviet Union and its allies.\textsuperscript{448}

Showing firmness when reviewing the state of détente did not contradict the intention of pursuing pragmatism when negotiating afterwards. A dividing issue as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was

\textsuperscript{444} Basispapier zur Prinzipienerklärung, 29.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
\textsuperscript{446} Basispapier zur Prinzipienerklärung, 29.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
\textsuperscript{447} Zum Entwurf Genschers Madrid-Erklärung, 06.11.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.804.
\textsuperscript{448} Ibid.
considered exhausted by the *Auswärtiges Amt* with its mentioning in the plenary session and it should not dominate ensuing review discussions.\(^449\) This was in line with the West German concept of a realistic policy of détente as it had been revised after the Afghan crisis: pursuing realism at the Madrid CSCE required the West German delegation to display acrobatic abilities to walk on the fine line between the levels of principles and concrete behaviours. Moreover, review debates should remain circumscribed – unlike in Belgrade – to the first conference weeks in order to proceed soon to substantial negotiations.\(^450\) A sense of precariousness – due to the worrisome developments in Poland – loomed over the meeting. It was important to Bonn not to miss time and opportunities: already the first phase of review debates should be used by Western delegations to present their proposals for the continuation of the Helsinki process. As stated in the strategic paper of the West German Foreign Office, it was opportune “to look behind, only when it is necessary to go ahead”.\(^451\)

According to the conference schedule, the first phase of works in Madrid dedicated to review debates lasted six weeks and came to an end on 19 December. The West German delegation drew a quite positive balance: whereas firm criticisms had been directed towards the Eastern countries and East-West respective positions over the main political questions – Afghanistan and human rights – had remained irreconcilable, discussions had been overall marked by a more objective atmosphere than in Belgrade.\(^452\) In compliance with the compromise on the conference rules agreed by all delegations on the last day of the preparatory meeting in November, the Eastern countries had not obstructed the regular unfolding of review debates.\(^453\)

\(^{449}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{450}\) *Basispapier zur Prinzipienerklärung*, 29.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.


Continuing European détente in the advent of the Reagan Era

There was awareness within the Western caucus that the second phase of the conference, whose start was scheduled for 27 January 1981 after the Christmas break, would be more difficult, as its unfolding would depend on the ongoing international developments and the health condition of East-West relations.\textsuperscript{454} To be put to the test was not only the possibility to negotiate material détente improvements with the East, but the solidity of the Western unity front in Madrid as well.

The transition to the ensuing phase of substantial negotiations was indeed welcomed by several Western delegations – and by some delegations of the NNA group – with spread scepticism.\textsuperscript{455} The Dutch and the British were those showing scarcest interest in multilateral negotiations (they lacked, according to the West German assessment, of the necessary \textit{“animus negotiandi”}), as considered the mandate of the follow-up meeting fulfilled with the review debate. The uncertainties of the ongoing presidential election campaign in France further weighed on the pursuit of a Western effective conference strategy. The biggest interrogative regarded the future development of超级powers relations after Ronald Reagan’s inauguration day on 20 January 1981. Indeed, besides the persistent Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and the precarious situation in Poland, the international policy of strength launched by the new U.S. administration threatened to puzzle definitively multilateral détente. An urgent question concerned the West German Foreign Office: what were the intentions of the new administration in Washington for the Madrid CSCE?

The years of the Carter administration had not certainly represented a blossoming time for Washington’s diplomatic relations with Moscow – and either for the relations with the Western European partners. Ideological confrontation, human rights, sanctions, security issues and

\textsuperscript{454} Ibid.
a good dose of personal animosity and incomprehension – marking both Carter’s relationship with his “special partner” Helmut Schmidt and with his rival Leonid Brezhnev – had represented heavy burdens.456 But the change of power in Washington did not appear promising either. During the months of the presidential election campaign, the West German federal government and the Auswärtiges Amt had carefully analysed the contents of the Republican Party’s foreign political program and the possible consequences of Reagan’s victory for East-West dialogue. To emerge from the West German assessment was a bipolar Weltanschauung, highly ideological and characterised by strong anti-Communist stances, marking Reagan’s attitude towards international politics.457 Many in Bonn feared that the new administration in Washington would put under radical examination the whole U.S. foreign policy, included MBFR negotiations in Geneva and CSCE negotiations in Madrid, i.e. the only forums of East-West dialogue which had remained in place after the interruption of the superpowers talks on strategic arms.

With regard to the Madrid CSCE, the West German Foreign Office aimed at profiting from the pending uncertainty to persuade Reagan and his collaborators, as far as it was possible, of the convenience of the West German strategy.458 During a confidential talk with U.S. Secretary of State Haig in the wake of Reagan’s inauguration, Foreign Minister Genscher reminded the vital importance the CSCE process had for the

456 For an historical account of the multiple strains marking the relationship between Schmidt and Carter, see: K. Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis: Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen. On the personal incomprehension which contributed to deteriorate relations between Carter and Brezhnev, see: V.M. Zubok, A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, pp. 257-264.


FRG and highlighted the West’s position of strength in negotiating with the East on CSCE matters.\textsuperscript{459} Even though no spectacular outcome was to expect at Madrid, Bonn stood firmly on its conference aims on the eve of the restart of the follow-up meeting’s works: pursuing with conviction the continuation of the CSCE process in spite of adverse international situations; not releasing the Soviet bloc’s countries from their obligations to the Helsinki Act; and urging them, through an achievement-orientated approach, to make concessions on the main requests of the EC-Ten – i.e. CDE and improvements in the fields of human contacts and information.\textsuperscript{460} On 16 February 1981 positive signals came from the Reagan administration. The head of the U.S. delegation at Madrid, Max Kampelmann, finally broke the silence over the goal of the CDE and announced the U.S. backing of the French project.\textsuperscript{461} In return, he demanded the European allies’ greater support for the U.S. proposals on human rights.\textsuperscript{462} As highlighted by Selvage, Western Europeans were highly relieved that the U.S. decided to remain at Madrid and endorse the Western conference aims, against Reagan’s electoral statements which had let them fear worse scenarios.\textsuperscript{463}

\textbf{Negotiations at the Nullpunkt: the West German dilemma between hypotheses of adjournment and risks of isolation}

Whereas the American proof of goodwill reassured provisionally European worries, it did not help appease contrasting views within the Alliance. Existing differences amongst the Western partners emerged indeed in the spring 1981 with regard to the issue of the duration and conclusion of the follow-up meeting. Before the start of the second

\textsuperscript{460} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{461} "Am Nullpunkt", \textit{Der Spiegel}, Nr. 32, 1981
\textsuperscript{463} Ibid.
conference phase in January ministerial director Blech observed that the high number of proposals presented by all delegations – totally 85, much more than expected – spoke itself against a rapid conclusion of negotiations. As West German chief delegator Kastl confirmed, negotiations in Madrid went on at a snail pace and entered soon a stalemate. It became clear that the foreseen goal of ending the conference at the beginning of March 1981 was quite unrealistic. Hence, shortly before the Easter pause, after the date initially scheduled for concluding negotiations had expired since weeks, delegators’ efforts to agree on a final document had produced scarce results in all Baskets.

Moscow’s new interest in achieving concrete results at the Madrid CSCE turned out to be a factor which slowed down significantly the advancement of negotiations. Unlike in Belgrade, time pressure did not seem to play any decisive role for Moscow in this phase of the conference. In his speech at the CPSU congress on 23 February 1981, Brezhnev had declared to be available to extend the area of CBMs and the CDE to the Soviet territory up to the Urals against the inclusion of the U.S. and Canadian territory and of air and sea manoeuvres. In the following weeks Soviet diplomatic efforts in Madrid were focused on obtaining compensations for Brezhnev’s opening. The Soviet delegation made its decision on a third follow-up conference and on concessions in Basket III dependent on a positive decision on the CDE. No progress was made with regard to the Western core demands: the Eastern delegations opened to concessions limited to those issues which were covered by their own proposals or did not force them to big sacrifices.

469 Ibid.
As in April 1981 it became evident that multilateral negotiations would go inevitably on for very long, a few NNA and Western delegations – namely France, Italy, Denmark, Belgium and the U.S. – got more and more inclined to withdraw experts from Madrid, to agree in short time on a brief concluding document and, in case of failure, to postpone the meeting for one year.\textsuperscript{470} France and the U.S. \textit{in primis} were not ready, for different reasons, to pay dearly for the continuation of détente. The Reagan administration persisted on its anti-communist stances and was not willing to cede on human rights. The French government, fully absorbed by the last moves of the presidential election campaign, \textsuperscript{471} opposed instead any attempt to water down the mandate of the CDE.\textsuperscript{472} The majority of Western delegations supported the idea of raising renewed review criticisms after the Easter break in order to spoil Soviet delaying tactics. Such views were contrasted by the West German delegation, which considered all review discussions definitively exhausted with the conclusion of the first phase of the conference and continued to support the persistent pursuit of open-ended negotiations.\textsuperscript{473} Indeed, West German diplomacy was not impatient to come to a rapid conclusion of the follow-up meeting: as now in Madrid as before in Belgrade, Bonn had always spoken for longer negotiation times in order to achieve positive outcomes.\textsuperscript{474} A worrisome Kastl observed the growing risk that his delegation would remain isolated within the Western caucus: an inconvenient position that Germans could not easily afford.\textsuperscript{475}

However, any proposal for a premature conclusion of the conference was opposed by the West German delegation throughout the spring of stalemate at the Madrid CSCE. During the informal

\textsuperscript{471} Presidential elections in France took place on 26 April and 10 May 1981.
\textsuperscript{475} \textit{Ibid.}. 

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meeting in Venlo on 9 May 1981 the foreign ministers of the EC-Ten decided to continue with negotiations until July of that year, after having assessed that the state of things in Madrid was favourable to Western interests.\textsuperscript{476} During his diplomatic visit to Washington at the end of May, Schmidt explained to Reagan the fundamentals of the West German policy of stabilisation pursued in Madrid: the prosecution of the CSCE process made it more difficult for the Soviet Union to opt for a military solution to the Polish crisis.\textsuperscript{477} West German stubbornness seemed to be rewarded: Western pressures for a rapid (and inconclusive) end of the conference were left out for the moment.

The West German victory turned out to be precarious. Negotiations continued to be, indeed, at the \textit{Nullpunkt}.\textsuperscript{478} In June 1981 the idea of suspending negotiations around the mid of July for a long summer break and adjourning the conference works to October, was growingly catching on within the Western Alliance. Bonn could not oppose to this eventuality: the West German delegation found itself gripped between the impossibility to afford solo positions and the evidence that, given the existing conditions, possibilities to unblock the stalemate were at the moment scarce. West German diplomacy was forced to readjust partially its official line – not without a certain political opportunism – to the circumstances: the adjournment option would savage the most important aim of continuing the conference. As Genscher confirmed to deputy chief delegate Graf zu Rantzau, slow-moving was better than breaking off.\textsuperscript{479} On 24 July 1981 the West German diplomat reported to Bonn that the plenary session in Madrid had voted the adjournment of the conference until 27 October 1981.\textsuperscript{480}

\textsuperscript{478} “Am Nullpunkt”, \textit{Der Spiegel}, Nr. 32, 1981.
\textsuperscript{480} Drahtbericht Nr. 1080, 24.07.1981, in PA AA, Referat 212, Bd. 133.421.
Notwithstanding setbacks and difficulties, negotiations in Madrid had worked that far, according to the West German assessment, better than in Belgrade: Graf zu Rantzau observed with satisfaction that, before the starting of the summer break, already seventy percent of the conference materials had been already discussed.\textsuperscript{481} West German Ambassador in Moscow Meyer-Landrut stressed that the policy of stabilisation pursued by the federal government seemed to work: the international situation remained tense; this would enhance, on the other hand, the importance for the Soviets to commit themselves to the CSCE.\textsuperscript{482} Bonn expected with confidence signals of goodwill coming from the Soviet Union, once delegations would be back to Madrid in October.

The West German Foreign Office continued to work on the CSCE during the summer break. An attempt to improve coordination within the Western Alliance was undertaken with regard to the most dividing matters, i.e. the issues of human rights and dissidents. In view of the restart of negotiations in Madrid, all Western requests in the fields of human rights and basic freedoms, human contacts and information were grouped together under the formulation of the concept of “human dimension”.\textsuperscript{483} From the theoretical point of view, dispositions of Basket III remained a derivation, in the substance, of Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act. From the operative point of view, the collective concept of “human dimension” served to avoid that improvements in the fields of human contacts and information – i.e. the primal conference interest of the Bundesrepublik – would be eclipsed by some other partners’ preference for human rights and dissidents issues.\textsuperscript{484} Hence, the formulation of the “human dimension” was conceived as tool of Western coordination to limit the drifts between the allies’ different interests. In Bonn’s view it had foremost the meaning of an

\textsuperscript{481} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{484} Ibid.
opening towards Washington’s demands, with whom the divergence on principle still persisted after the power change. Similar reasons of solidarity within the Alliance had dictated the FRG’s and Western Europe’s decision to adhere to the U.S. proposal – initially welcomed with some scepticism – of convening a meeting of experts on human rights.\textsuperscript{485} As highlighted in the analysis of the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt}, the “human dimension” package should be instead used externally – i.e. towards the Eastern countries – with caution and flexibility.\textsuperscript{486} Although differences in the Soviet bloc’s commitment to Principle VII and Basket III existed, both issues of human rights and human contacts became increasingly a sensitive matter for Eastern Europe’s communist regimes throughout 1981, as developments in Poland continued to deteriorate.

\textbf{Because of Poland, for Poland’s sake: the impact of the Polish crisis on the further unfolding of the Madrid CSCE}

\textit{Because of Poland...}

In the weeks between the restart of conference works in Madrid after the summer break and the new Christmas break, as delegations were mainly busy with discussions on the geographic jurisdiction of the CDE, the gravity of the Polish crisis escalated.

1981 had been overall a quite positive year for West German foreign policy. Particularly in the fall of the year East-West relations seemed to have significantly improved. Negotiations at the Madrid CSCE had continued in spite of repeated threats of interruption; West German diplomacy had succeeded in convincing the allies of the opportunity to use the Soviet Union’s moment of weakness and defensive stance to persist in handling with the East and attain concessions to the West’s advantage. The superpowers détente seemed to have slowly restarted:

U.S. Foreign Minister Haig had met with the Soviet colleague Gromyko in New York on 23 and 28 November 1981; a couple of days later, on 30 November, bilateral INF talks between the superpowers had been resumed. On the front of Bonn’s Ostpolitik, Brezhnev visited the Bundesrepublik between 22 and 25 November 1981, and Schmidt’s long planned and repeatedly postponed visit to the GDR took finally placed between 11 and 13 December of that year.487 The summit visit, initially scheduled for the end of August 1980, had been cancelled at the last minute by the West German Chancellor because of the recent developments in Poland: the renewed raging of strikes raised fears in Bonn that tensions in the neighbouring country would exacerbate and cause an international escalation.488 Whereas in the summer of 1980 a Soviet armed intervention in Poland appeared indeed as an incumbent threat, the virulence of the crisis appeared diminished in the mid-1981. As observed in an internal analysis of the Auswärtiges Amt, after the compromise achieved between Polish authorities and protesters on 1 April 1981 domestic tensions had been eased.489

Quite ironically, the Polish crisis degenerated again dramatically at the end of the year, during the last day of Schmidt’s long-planned visit. In the morning of 13 December 1981 the West German delegation at Lake Werbellin was taken by surprise by the news that martial law had been imposed in Poland during the night by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the head of the Polish armed forces who had taken over the Party leadership in October. After some weeks of resistance to Soviet pressures, Jaruzelski’s radical decision provided a fragile and

487 The visit was first postponed on Honecker’s decision at the beginning of 1980, as East-West strains drastically reduced the room of manoeuvre of the inner-German dialogue; the second postponement was announced by the West German side in August of the same year under the influence of the Polish crisis and the ongoing federal election campaign in the FRG. See H. Potthoff, Im Schatten der Mauer. Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 1990, pp. 162-172.

488 H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 360.

provisional solution to the crisis in Poland – and in the Eastern bloc.\textsuperscript{490} From a pragmatic point of view, the “internal” solution to the crisis adverted indeed the risk of a Soviet military intervention which would have serious international repercussions – and to which détente would hardly survive. Although Genscher would refer on 9 January 1982 in front of the plenary session of the Madrid CSCE that the imposition of martial law in Poland had been received in Bonn with “bewildermment, bitterness and indignation”\textsuperscript{491}, there was some realistic awareness, as in the Bundesrepublik as in the other Western countries, that Jaruzelski’s decision offered an exit strategy from worse scenarios and savaged the possibility for East-West dialogue to continue. Similar considerations had driven Schmidt’s decision to show some caution in expressing condemnation of what was happening in Poland during the press conference hold in the GDR on 13 December 1981.\textsuperscript{492}

Besides considerations dictated by pragmatism and political opportunism, the news of the declaration of martial law against dissidents in Poland was a shock to the international public opinion. As information about the recrudescence of the repression against the Polish opposition begun to circle, all Western governments were compelled to take on harder stances. The West German Bundestag professed on 18 December 1981 its unanimous solidarity with the Polish people and appealed to the military government in Warsaw to release all detainees, restore the freedoms and the conquests reached by

\textsuperscript{490} As Zubok correctly argues, the Polish crisis was far to be at an end: it had been a symptom of an ongoing and persisting structural crisis not only of the country, but of the entire Eastern bloc; the imposition of the martial law did not solve in the long run endemic problems either in Poland or in the other Eastern countries. See Zubok, \textit{A failed empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev}, p. 270.


\textsuperscript{492} H. Potthoff, \textit{Im Schatten der Mauer. Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 1990}, p. 194. Schmidt’s prudent attitude was motivated by the Chancellor’s wish, as well, not to break off his visit and to preserve the conditions for the continuation of inner-German dialogue in face of the Polish crisis; see: W. Loth, \textit{Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Détente, 1950-1991}, p. 177.
the opposition in the course of the process of liberalisation since the summer of 1980, and resume the dialogue with the opposition.493

The harsh repression ongoing in Poland risked undermining the conditions for the continuation of the CSCE. In the days in which Jaruzelski was going to take his decision to impose martial law, some significant steps had been made in Madrid. On 10-11 December NATO’s foreign ministers had decided to go on with multilateral negotiations after the conference Christmas break.494 As highlighted by Peter, it was a lucky temporal coincidence, that NATO’s decision to resume the conference works in February 1982 had been made few days before the escalation of events in Poland.495 During the meeting of the Four Political Directors in Brussels, Genscher tried to convince his Western allies, sceptical about the possibility to continue the CSCE follow-up meeting under such circumstances, to remain in Madrid and focus discussions on the compromise draft for a final document handed out informally by the NNA delegations: in the West German view, it was a good draft which included a large part of the Western aims.496 And it was a fortunate case as well that the NNA draft for the final document, the so-called “RM-39”, was ready to be tabled on 16 December.497 Both the NATO decision and the NNA initiative undoubtedly contributed to lay the foundations for the continuation of the follow-up conference after the imposition of martial law in Poland.

Since the beginning of the second CSCE follow-up meeting there had been a widespread feeling that its destiny was strictly intertwined with the development of the Polish crisis. As stressed by Mastny,
Jaruzelski’s December 1981 initiative “plunged the CSCE into the worst crisis of its existence”. The continuation of the conference after the Christmas break became very uncertain: the Western delegations were faced with the main questions of whether and how to remain in Madrid.

In the direct aftermath of the imposition of martial law in Poland Western Europeans opted for prudence, considering that radical initiatives would primarily damage the Polish and the Eastern societies. Harder stances were taken instead by the administration in Washington: a series of punitive sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union were imposed by Reagan on 29 December 1981. With regard to the CSCE, during the special NATO session on Poland on 14 December 1981 U.S. assistant secretary of State Eagleburger reassured the European allies about the will of his administration to come back to the negotiation table in Madrid after the Christmas break. Washington’s reassurance did not clarify, however, the fundamental matter of what attitude Western delegations would take towards the Polish question and multilateral negotiations once back in Madrid. How to deal with Warsaw, Moscow and East-West relations after the escalation of the Polish crisis were the main items of debate within the Western caucus at the turn of the year. A question was raised in NATO’s strategic paper on the state of the Alliance: could the West negotiate further with the East, being aware that massive violations of the Helsinki Final Act were being committed in Poland?

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500 Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 76), 01.01.1982, and Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 77), 08.01.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
Similar interrogatives confronted the West German federal government as well, which was urged by the Polish late developments to reflect on its overall complex of Ostpolitik and Entspannungspolitik. A strategic paper of the Auswärtiges Amt drafted at the beginning of 1982 took into consideration the possibility to introduce some corrections to Bonn’s détente policy in case of an aggravation of the situation in Poland.\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^3\) Signals coming from Warsaw suggested that the lift of the state of emergency and the return to normality in the country were not to expect in the short run.\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^4\) However, Bonn remained convinced of the opportunity to continue pursuing a policy of dialogue directed to the stabilisation of its Eastern neighbour. According to the internal analyses of the Auswärtiges Amt, Poland was compelled to remain heavily dependent on Western economic aid if it wished to solve its serious economic difficulties.\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^5\) The main task of the West was to play skilfully the “economic card” in order to force Polish authorities to concessions to its own advantage – and to the own sake of Polish citizens.

The loyalty of the Bundesrepublik to its policy of dialogue with Warsaw and Moscow risked opening a new front of transatlantic strains. West German-American divergences on how to deal with East-West relations in times of “emergency” were addressed with harsh tones in the public debate. At the end of December 1981 the U.S. press attacked repeatedly the West German “reticence” on the Polish question.\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^6\) The Auswärtiges Amt denounced that U.S. media were superficially informed about European stances on Poland; West German positions in particular had been object of rough misinterpretations.\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^7\) Schmidt’s visit to Washington at the beginning of

\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^3\) „Feste Sprache“, Der Spiegel, Nr. 4/1982.
\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^4\) Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 76), 01.01.1982, and Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 77), 08.01.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^5\) Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 76), 01.01.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
January 1982 was surrounded by a new series of public, harsh criticisms against the West German federal chancellor and his December meeting with East German leader Honecker: Schmidt was blamed for being blinded by his attraction to the East and for putting the Western Alliance at risk of finlandisation.\textsuperscript{508} Since the time when Bonn’s Ostpolitik had moved its first steps at the end of the Sixties, suspicions about the FRG’s ultimate aims had continued to surround West German initiatives towards the Eastern countries. Still in the fall of 1980, an article published on the outstanding French newspapers Le Monde defined the FRG as the weakest point in the solidity of the Western Alliance due to its indispensable tie with détente and its benefits.\textsuperscript{509}

The conduct of the FRG’s dialogue with the East remained still strictly interwoven with questions of Deutschlandbild. If divergences with the U.S. administration – with their load of public repercussions – would deepen, it would be hard for Bonn to simply ignore them. Bonn’s federal government still needed the support of the whole Western Alliance to implement its Eastern policies. Détente and Ostpolitik could be pursued in full autonomy, indeed, as long as their ties with the interests of the Western Alliance were secured. Defending the Western anchoring of its foreign political complex remained for Bonn as important as defending the achievements of the dialogue with the East. As long as a common strategy towards Poland would not be agreed, it was important to abstain from any public statements which could reveal disharmony with the allies. As the influential West German magazine Der Spiegel reminded: “As we make public statements on our Eastern policy, we must be aware of the distrust which has always surrounded this policy and has further grown after Afghanistan”.\textsuperscript{510}

\textsuperscript{508} H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 391.
\textsuperscript{510} „Feste Sprache“, Der Spiegel, Nr. 4/1982
The Polish crisis was a matter of central concern for Bonn not only with regard to the conduction of its Ostpolitik and Westpolitik. It raised the question, as well, of how the West German delegation should behave in Madrid, were CSCE negotiations were still officially open and would be resumed on 9 February 1982 after the Christmas break. Albeit developments in Poland had not caused the interruption of the conference, it was undoubted that they would importantly change its track. At the beginning of January some light was shed over the strategy the NATO-Sixteen would implement once back to Madrid. After few weeks of uncertainties and mutual suspects within the Alliance, the Western partners agreed on a common strategy in which punitive stances were relegated to the background and which Bonn positively assessed as balanced and flexible.\textsuperscript{511}

NATO foreign ministers, gathered on 11 January 1982 in Brussels for a special meeting of the NATO Council on Poland, gave their consent to the EC-Ten’s idea of returning to Madrid to deal with the Polish crisis.\textsuperscript{512} They advanced the idea to dedicate the first weeks of the new conference phase to assess and discuss developments in Poland at the level of foreign ministers at a special plenary session.\textsuperscript{513} Hence, the Western proposal consisted in reopening review debates with an exclusive focus on the ongoing violations of Helsinki provisions perpetrated in Poland. In the Western view, it was a necessity dictated by the circumstances: even though the “RM-39” draft remained a valid basis for a final document, concrete negotiations on human aspects of détente could not be normally pursued as long as

\textsuperscript{512} The idea had been proposed by Genscher to his American colleague on occasion of the visit of the West German foreign minister, together with the Chancellor, to Washington between 4-6 January. See: Besuch des Bundeskanzlers und des Bundesministers in Washington, 04.-06.01.1982. Hier: Polen, 12.01.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
major violations of human rights and basic freedoms were being perpetrated by a participant state.\textsuperscript{514} The Western allies approved three demands directed to the Polish authorities: to end the state of martial law, to release those arrested and to restore a general dialogue with the church and Solidarność.\textsuperscript{515} Advocate of these three demands had been the Bundesrepublik: they had already been issued by the West German Bundestag on 18 December,\textsuperscript{516} and they had been sponsored by Foreign Minister Genscher who at the end of December 1981 had told Polish Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski that, in return for a partial accomplishment of those requests, Bonn would plead for the Polish government with the Western allies, convincing them eventually to withdraw sanctions and creating some room for manoeuvre to continue the cooperation with Warsaw.\textsuperscript{517} The three demands to Poland had been then agreed by the EC-ten on 4 January 1982 and restated on the following day by Schmidt and Reagan, before being agreed as a cornerstone of NATO’s approach to Warsaw. On their fulfilment depended the possibility that Poland could “enjoy fully the benefits of stability in Europe and of constructive political and economic relations with the West”.\textsuperscript{518}

The broad consensus on the three demands to Poland represented an episode of rare unity of the Western Alliance. On occasion of previous major crises within the Eastern bloc – i.e. in the cases of 1953 East Berlin, 1956 Hungary, 1968 Prague and lastly, 1979 Afghanistan – the Western partners had hardly reached common declarations of intents.\textsuperscript{519} Though, substantial strategic and theoretical differences still

\textsuperscript{514} Ibid

\textsuperscript{515} Ibid.


divided the allies’ respective approaches. They regarded, first, the definition of Moscow’s responsibilities and the consequent issue of punitive sanctions; second, the destiny of the CSCE after the special session on Poland; and third, the concrete meaning of the shared consideration that “no business as usual” was possible in Madrid.

The issue of sanctions became one of the central bones of contention between Reagan and the European allies. The U.S. administration advocated a greater Western commitment to the unanimous condemnation of the late developments in Poland. It made of it a matter of principle and morality and put great pressure on Western European governments to adopt hard punitive economic measures against the Soviet Union. In accordance with his policy of strength, Reagan urged the allies to use a “carrot and stick” approach towards the East, which raised little enthusiasm amongst Western Europeans. Similarly to what had occurred in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Western Alliance split again over the issue of sanctions between December 1982 and January 1983: the U.S. administration imposed unilaterally economic sanctions against the Soviet Union; in spite of Washington’s insistence, Western Europeans deferred their decision on the issue by replacing punitive measures with general statements of condemnation and warning. NATO’s foreign ministers – gathered for a special session of the North Atlantic Council dedicated to Poland on 11 February 1982 – limited themselves to recognising the importance of the economic measures announced by President Reagan to persuade Polish and Soviet authorities of the seriousness of Western concerns, without otherwise joining them. The revision of the overall course of their economic relations with the Soviet Union was postponed to an undefined future.

Transatlantic divergences regarded not only the operational consequences of the Polish crisis – i.e. how to deal with it – but its interpretation as well. Considering that the worst scenario of a Soviet military initiative in Europe’s heart had been swept away, Western European leaders tended to abstain from making the Soviets directly responsible for the imposition of the martial law in Poland.\textsuperscript{524} It was undoubted that some Soviet responsibilities were involved in the escalation of the crisis, as West German Chancellor Schmidt had stressed in the Christmas letters sent to Brezhnev and Jaruzelski on 25 December 1981.\textsuperscript{525} However, the FRG avoided, in accordance with its European partners, attributing the origins of Jaruzelski’s initiative to orders coming directly from Moscow.\textsuperscript{526} Whereas Western Europeans had generally tended, since the declaration of the state of emergency in Poland, to focus their criticisms on the repressive measures adopted by Polish authorities in open violations of human rights, free movement and trade union freedoms, Americans had not ceased to direct vehement attacks against the Soviet Union. As West German Ambassador in Moscow Meyer-Landrut had reported to Bonn at the end of December 1981, justified sentiments of indignation over the ongoing repression in Poland had caused misleading assessments in the public opinion: American public statements addressed the Polish crisis as a \textit{de facto} Soviet aggression.\textsuperscript{527}

Interpreting accurately the Polish crisis – i.e. identifying the responsibilities involved, the main problems at stake and the possible solutions in place – was not an issue of secondary importance for Bonn. Since the declaration of the state of emergency developments in Poland had been observed and assessed daily through in-depth analyses

\textsuperscript{526} \textit{Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 76)}, 01.01.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.  
drafted by the Auswärtiges Amt.\textsuperscript{528} Poland was a West German neighbour, connected to the Bundesrepublik through a complex of multiple economic, human and historical ties. It was one of the main addressees of West German Ostpolitik. It was, furthermore, an important participant of the process of multilateral détente. The West German idea of linking the solution to the Polish crisis to the prosecution of East-West dialogue was driven by strategic considerations, national interests and sincere motivations. Hence, in the second part of the Madrid CSCE West German diplomatic efforts were directed to the \textit{sake of Poland} for the \textit{sake of détente}.

\textbf{“No business as usual”: dealing with the consequences of the Polish crisis at the Madrid CSCE}

Continuing the process of multilateral détente represented the unchanged priority of West German foreign policy in the wake of the Polish crisis. With regard to the prosecution of the Madrid CSCE, Genscher held tight to the aim of resuming negotiations on the final act in the direct aftermath of the special opening session dedicated to Poland. Bonn’s Foreign Office instructed its delegation in Madrid to convince the Western partners – especially the U.S. delegation – to remain at the negotiation table and maintain an achievement-oriented attitude with the declared aim of helping Poland’s stabilisation and the general improvement of East-West relations.\textsuperscript{529} The West German interests collided, however, with the goals the U.S. administration pursued in Madrid. U.S. chief delegator Kampelmann had consented to return to the Spanish capital on the scheduled date of 9 February 1982 with a very restricted mandate: after a short plenary session on Poland, he was intentioned to adjourn the conference without further negotiations.\textsuperscript{530} As U.S. Foreign Minister Haig pointed out in his speech

\textsuperscript{528} See the papers collected in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
in the plenary debate at the Madrid CSCE, as long as situation in Poland would not return to normalisation, “business as usual here at Madrid would simply condone the massive violations of the Final Act now occurring in Poland”. 531

Bonn shared partly Washington’s point that it had to be made clear to Moscow and Warsaw that the repressive course in Poland impeded the normal conduction of “business as usual” in Madrid. Notwithstanding a general agreement in principle, the Auswärtiges Amt deduced, however, different operative implications from Haig’s statement. “No business as usual” did not mean, according to the West German viewpoint, interrupting or adjourning the conference: Western delegations should rather use the Polish crisis – especially its economic implications – to urge Moscow and Warsaw to make concessions on Western demands. 532 The gravity of the repressive measures undertaken by Polish authorities, as well as their harmful impact on the prosecution of East-West relations, should not be ignored. Condemnation should be openly expressed by Western delegations during the plenary debate and be then channelled during negotiations into efforts of bearing pressure on the Eastern delegations to the Western advantage. 533 This was, according to Bonn, the meaning of the three demands Western countries had been directing to Poland since December 1982: besides their public dimension, they should be used tactically to force the East to concessions. Not differently from the management of the Afghan crisis, dealing with the Polish question required the alternation of firmness on principles and flexibility in negotiations. The restart of East-West negotiations should not be made dependent on the reestablishment of normalisation in Poland; to the contrary, solutions for the Polish crisis could develop within the framework of the CSCE. This was the core difference between the meaning the U.S. and the West German delegations attributed to the

533 Ibid.
formula of “no business as usual”: whilst for the first it meant exclusion of negotiations in conditions of abnormality, for the second it meant “harder negotiations” in order to restore normality.

The special session on Poland, which opened in Madrid on 9 February 1982, offered to the Auswärtiges Amt the ideal stage to expose the main lines of its strategy of de-escalation and stabilisation. In his address to the plenary assembly, Genscher listed first the violations of the Helsinki commitments perpetrated in Poland to direct then to Warsaw’s military government the main Western demands: “Lift martial law. Release the detainees. Resume the dialogue with the Church and with Solidarność. Let the scientists return to their work”.534 If Polish authorities would return to the path of reforms and renovation, Bonn was ready – together with the Western partners – to concede that generous financial support the country needed to overcome its economic difficulties.535 There was still a margin, Genscher reminded, to “keep the door open for the expansion of political and economic relations”.536

However, expectations to close quickly debates on Poland and move on revealed to be illusionary. The works of the plenary assembly were cramped by procedural obstacles and ideological confrontation. The opening session was interrupted before all delegations could have a word. The Polish chief delegator, who chaired the session, impeded to 12 foreign ministers and diplomats amongst the 21 inscribed on the list of speakers to hold their speeches by raising procedural motivations.537 The “Kafkaesque play”, as it was defined by Spanish Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca,538 aggravated the exacerbation of tensions between delegations. Debates took on confrontational tones whose harshness

534 Rede des BM auf der KZSE-Sitzung in Madrid am 09.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
reminded of the tensest days of confrontation at the Belgrade CSCE. As the Western delegations claimed their legitimate right to denounce open violations of the Helsinki Accords committed by one participant state, the Eastern countries stigmatised any Western remark as an external interference in the country’s domestic affairs and as an attempt to internationalise the Polish crisis. Against Bonn’s hope, the new phase of the CSCE deadlocked hopelessly, again, over the Polish crisis.\footnote{Ibid.}

Confronted with the growing East-West animosity dominating in Madrid, the group of the NNAs got more and more inclined to a renewed adjournment-option.\footnote{KSZE-Folgetreffen Madrid. Hier: Plenum vom 19.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.} The proposal of Swiss Foreign Minister Aubert to defer the conference works to the fall of 1982 was opposed, as a few months before, by the West German delegation. A speaker of the \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} confirmed Bonn’s unchanged intention to conduct negotiations on the basis of the “RM-39” draft with the goal of achieving an acceptable final document. The possibility of adjourning the conference to autumn would be taken into account if and only if strictly useful for that purpose.\footnote{KSZE-Folgetreffen Madrid. Hier: Stand des Madrider Folgetreffens, 18.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.} In this case, the restart of negotiations should be scheduled on a precise date and not tied to the fulfilment of any precondition – especially with regard to the situation in Poland.\footnote{KSZE-Folgetreffen Madrid. Hier: Sondierungen der N+N-Delegationen, 22.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.} In spite of its outspoken position, the West German delegation had soon become aware of the fact that circumstances had made the conduction of substantial negotiations very hard during the first 1982 conference weeks.\footnote{Ibid.} Multilateral debates continued to be strongly beset by the cumbersome Polish issue. Some positive signals seemed to arrive from the Polish side in the course of February, as during a press conference Deputy Foreign Minister Wiejacz announced Warsaw’s intention to lift martial law and other restrictions until the
end of the month and to start consultations on a possible new course of reforms with trade unions and the church. Moreover, it was promised that Solidarność’s leader Lech Walesa would be set free in the near future together with other protesters kept in custody.\textsuperscript{544}

However, as at the beginning of March it became clear that no concrete steps would follow to Warsaw’s promises, most Western delegations expressed themselves in favour of the adjournment-option. For the West German delegation there was no other choice as to join the majority. Kastl pointed out to the allies, however, that the recess of the conference should be presented neither as an exceptional circumstance, nor as a Western victory over the Eastern bloc. Most of all, the decision had not to be motivated by referring to Poland. Any explicit linkage between the suspension of the conference and the Polish crisis would otherwise tie dangerously the possibilities to resume multilateral negotiations with future developments in the Eastern country.\textsuperscript{545} Bonn wanted to avoid this circumstance at all cost. Even though positive signals coming from Warsaw would undoubtedly enhance the possibility of restarting East-West dialogue on the CSCE matters, they had not to be turned into compulsory preconditions for the possibility itself to negotiate. Of another opinion was, as renowned, the U.S. administration. At the end of March, Undersecretary Eagleburger pointed out in front of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe that there would be no room for negotiating with the East in Madrid if no significant initiatives for the restoration of normality – i.e. “the release of political prisoners, the lifting of martial law, the initiation of a process of national reconciliation” – would be realised by the Polish government.\textsuperscript{546} The fact that Eagleburger referred generally to the release of “some” prisoners and to the initiation of a process of reconciliation without demanding its completion were assessed by Bonn as signal of a possible, more flexible attitude of the

\textsuperscript{544} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{545} KSZE-Folgetreffen Madrid. Hier: 1. 16-er Abstimmung am Vormittag des 09.03.82; 2. Redaktionsgruppensitzung am 09.03.82, 09.03.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.

\textsuperscript{546} Sondersitzung des Politischen Komitees am 26.03. in Brüssel. Hier: Zusatzinformation zum Thema KSZE (Amerikanische Haltung), 25.03.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
U.S. administration. Onto those signals grabbed West German hopes to make the process of multilateral détente continue in spite of its evident crisis.

On 12 March 1982, after a month of unfruitful debates on Poland had undermined the possibility of restoring the conditions for running “business as usual”, the plenum at Madrid decided to adjourn the restart of negotiations for the final document on the basis of the “RM-39” draft to 9 November 1982. The West German delegation could achieve at least the fulfilment of its requests: the adjournment was decided with the consensus of all participant states; the resuming of negotiations was scheduled on a precise date without being subjected to any preconditions.

During the months after the conference recess, the destiny of the process of European détente remained very uncertain. Divergences of views on matters of East-West relations continued to split the Western Alliance. Bonn’s main task with regard to the CSCE process focused on convincing the sceptic partners to return to Madrid on the scheduled date. Flexibility and pragmatism continued to represent the trademark of the West German foreign political approach to East-West relations throughout 1982. In a strategic paper of July 1982 the Auswärtiges Amt highlighted that every international conjuncture was marked by specific problems Western countries had to take into account to rethink pragmatically their diplomatic strategies towards the process of détente. The adverse state of international relations required to adapt the CSCE policy to the situation. Translated into the practice of the negotiations for the final document of the Madrid CSCE, it meant to understand what could be achieved and what not under the given

548 Zum Madrider-Folgetreffen, 29.03.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
549 Ibid.
circumstances. Bonn’s Foreign Office suggested interpreting and pursuing the principle of equilibrium amongst the components of the final act with flexibility. It was not always possible to attain improvements in all fields of the Helsinki Act. This approach contrasted with the U.S. and British rigid insistence on including in the final document of Madrid reinforced commitments in the field of human rights. But, as the credibility of such commitments would be compromised by persisting violations in Poland, the request was tantamount to aim at an empty final document, on the model of Belgrade.

Change and continuity: the new West German federal government dealing with the last moves of the Madrid CSCE

During 1982 the West German federal government was faced with serious social, political and economic problems on the domestic front. The recess of the Madrid CSCE seemed to give right to those West Germans who denounced the Reagan administration’s lack of willingness to negotiate with the East. There was a shared feeling that East-West relations had returned to the hard confrontational tones of the first Cold War years. Protests against the return to a course of military and nuclear confrontation with the Eastern bloc intensified as the imminent appointment for the deployment of new U.S. missiles on the West German territory came closer. As negotiations in Madrid had been failing to bring improvements on the front of détente, the question of the implementation of NATO strategy’s “armed track” remained at the centre of the public debate without an adequate counterbalance. Besides public anxieties and social unrests, the federal government was growingly confronted with political problems inside the social-liberal coalition. The unfolding of 1982 was marked by the progressive deterioration of the relations between the SPD and the FDP. Political balances within the Bundestag were shifting. Chancellor Schmidt, in a

552 Ibid.
position of minority inside its own party with regard both to the missiles issue and economic matters, was increasingly in trouble with the allied party. The overall affirmation of the neoliberal turn affected the configuration of the West German political landscape as well. The common social-liberal project came to an end in the course of 1982, as divergences on economic policies become irreconcilable and the entente on foreign policy was no more sufficient to keep the coalition together. Helmut Schmidt, the “good manager of economic affairs”, was defeated foremost on the front of unsolved economic problems. The FDP left the coalition government in September and joined a new alliance with the opposition of the CDU/CSU. The Christian Democratic leader Helmut Kohl was elected Bundeskanzler by the Bundestag on 1 October 1982 after Schmidt had been deposed through a constructive vote of no confidence – used for the first time in the parliamentary history of the FRG.

This major political change marked the return to power of the CDU for the first time after the Bundesrepublik had entered the new era of good relations with the GDR and the East. The new Chancellor led the party which had vehemently opposed the new Ostpolitik in the years of its formation and consolidation. Christian Democrats had reconciled with the policy of dialogue with the East only in the late Seventies, after bilateral Ostpolitik and multilateral Enstspannungspolitik had brought to important realisations and had affirmed themselves as solid foreign political paradigms. This reconciliation paved the way for securing a certain degree of continuity in foreign policy, once the CDU came back to power. Hence, the program of radical spiritual-moral renovation of West German politics announced by Helmut Kohl left nearly

553 On the gradual cooling-off of relations between the SPD and the FDP and on the growing problems within the SPD which paved the way to the political change in the fall of the year, see: H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, pp. 392-402.
554 Ibid.
555 As well explained by Kielmannsegg, the Christian Democrats’ reconciliation with Ostpolitik was comparable, for its development and significance, to the SPD’s reconciliation with the FRG’s Western integration at the end of the Fifties. See: P.G. Kielmannsegg, Das geteilte Land. Deutsche Geschichte, 1945-1990, p. 233.
untouched the cornerstones of the FRG’s foreign political system. Continuity in foreign policy was granted, moreover, by Genscher’s confirmation at the lead of the Auswärtiges Amt. Some corrections were introduced to adjust the balance of Westpolitik-Ostpolitik: diplomatic relations with the GDR and the Eastern countries continued to be pursued, but with less ideal conviction; greater attention was directed to foster the special relationship with Washington and reinvigorate the process of European integration. Even though Bonn’s dialogue with the East continued, the West German propulsive role diminished under the years of government of Helmut Kohl who, unlike Brandt and Schmidt, did not share similar ambitions to play the role of interpreter between the East and the West. With regard to the process of multilateral détente, Bonn’s commitment to the CSCE process remained nearly unchanged. Quite meaningfully, the Helsinki Final Act, which had been strongly opposed by Kohl at the time of its signing, was mentioned in the new Chancellor’s inaugural address in front of the Bundestag as “an element of change, a Charta for the coexistence in Europe”.

Kohl’s seizure of power was not the only significant political turnover of the fall of 1982. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev died in November 1982; KGB chief Yuri Andropov was chosen by the Politburo as the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Brezhnev’s replacement brought no dramatic change to the Soviet international strategy: Andropov had been, together with Foreign Minister Gromyko and Minister of Defence Ustinov, one of the three aged members of the troika which had directed Moscow’s foreign policy in the years of Brezhnev’s physical decline. The stagnation marking the last years of Brezhnev’s leadership continued under the short offices of Andropov and of his successor Konstantin Chernenko.

556 Ibid., p. 234.
557 Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 405.
As the West German political landscape was undergoing a major change, the appointment for the resuming of the CSCE in Madrid was approaching. Reconfirmed as foreign minister of the new Christian-liberal government, Genscher continued to support the idea of restarting multilateral negotiations with the aim of bringing the conference to a quick and acceptable conclusion. Even though all delegations had agreed to return to Madrid without requiring the fulfilment of any preconditions in return, the U.S. delegation aimed de facto – backed by the British and the Dutch – at tying the destiny of the conference to the liberalisation of the repressive course in Poland. During the 1982 summer break the West German Foreign Office observed with preoccupation that the restart of multilateral negotiations in Madrid in the fall of that year seemed to be possible, given the circumstances, only if either Poland would fulfil the three Western demands or the U.S. administration would change its mind.\footnote{Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer und des Botschafters Ruth, 12.07.1982, in AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 206, p. 1088.}

An answer to the dilemma of whether the U.S. delegation would accept to return to Madrid came few weeks before the scheduled date for the beginning of the last conference phase. On occasion of an informal meeting in Lisbon, all Western chief delegators agreed to resume negotiations in Madrid on 9 November. Washington’s assent was merely tactical and aimed at pleasing the European requests. The U.S. delegation remained of the view that the possibility of a successful conclusion of the conference was to exclude.\footnote{Botschafter Kastl, Madrid (KSZE-Delegation), an das Auswärtige Amt, 11.11.1982, in AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 300, p. 1562.}

As Kampelmann pointed out to his NATO partners, the Alliance’s solidity was the U.S. priority: “Negotiations are not the aim of the U.S.; if we negotiate, we do it as a favour to our friends”.\footnote{Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer, 13.10.1982, in AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 270, p. 1407 (footnote).} However, Washington asked for compensation for its return to Madrid. In the margins of Lisbon’s informal meeting Kastl was informed by Kampelmann that his delegation would continue to negotiate at a higher price: i.e. in change of the Western partners’ assent to include additional demands on
human rights, evidently tailored on the Polish situation, in the list of Western proposals for the final document.\textsuperscript{562}

On those additional demands the U.S. delegation made dependent the good outcome of the conference once back to the negotiation table. Addressees of the American ultimatum were both the Eastern delegations and the Western partners, whose deviations would not be tolerated by Washington. Between the last weeks of 1982 and the first weeks of 1983 a renewed stalemate dominated at Madrid. As Selvage has correctly highlighted, all delegations were compelled, for different reasons, to remain in the Spanish capital, but were unable to pursue real negotiations.\textsuperscript{563} It was clear that the CSCE had turned into a forced occasion of gathering in times in which the exacerbation of the superpower relationship reached its zenith.

A way out of the deadlock was offered by a new draft of the final document presented by the NNA delegations on 15 March 1983, whose providential efforts were praised, once more, by the West German delegation.\textsuperscript{564} The so-called “RM-39 revised” took extensively into account the Western aims and incorporated a large number of Western proposals. Most importantly, the mandate of the CDE was defined according to Western criteria. The area of MBFR was extended to the whole European territory, with consideration for the functional limitation for maritime activities. The convening of a meeting of experts on human rights – one of the main U.S. request from the beginning of the conference – was now assured. Even though improvements in the “human dimension” remained insufficient, the new NNA draft proposed some small facilitations of human contacts and incorporated a passage on the freedom of religion and contacts between churches which, though not being a West German demand, responded largely to

\textsuperscript{562} Ibid., p. 1406.
\textsuperscript{564} Namensartikel des Herrn Bundesministers über den N+N-Vorschlag eines Schlussdokuments des Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffens, 30.03.1983, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.879.
Main reason of disappointment for Bonn was the exclusion, amongst several other aspects left out, of the West’s proposals in the field of information, traditionally a West German priority domain. But according to the assessment of the Auswärtiges Amt, the overall progress made in the “human dimension” with respect to the Helsinki Accords represented a not minor achievement. As the West German delegation had unceasingly repeated since the beginning of the conference – and particularly after the exacerbation of the Polish crisis – the actual state of East-West relations required pragmatism and flexibility, which suggested focusing only on those issues where a compromise with the Eastern countries was possible. Bonn remained loyal to its realistic approach: small, attainable improvements in the field of human contacts should not be sacrificed in the name of greater unreachable aims. The “RM-39 revised” had all the characteristics, in Bonn’s view, to be considered as a good document for a satisfactory, substantial conclusion of the conference.

Not of the same idea was the U.S. delegation: backed by the British and the Dutch, it continued to refuse to negotiate any documents which did not include all November 1982’s Western requests in toto. As Kastl reported to Bonn after a round of top-level talks in Washington, the CSCE continued to represent, as before in Belgrade as now in Madrid, a quite secondary stage for the U.S. foreign policy. The Reagan administration considered the CSCE mainly a forum on human rights and a multilateral showcase to carry out its ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. In the meantime, the vehemence of the U.S. anti-
communist rhetoric gained new impulse, as Reagan addressed the Soviet Union as “an evil empire” in a renowned public speech on 8 March 1983. The statement was ensued, a couple of weeks later, by Reagan’s announcement of the launch of a new big project in the field of military security under the label of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Within the overall security strategy of the U.S. administration the CDE played a very little role, as the decision to tie its destiny to the acceptance of unattainable demands in the field of human rights demonstrates.

West German diplomacy tried, first, to convince the U.S. administration of the opportunity to foster the “RM-39 revised”. In a letter to U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, Genscher stressed that “on the whole the draft does greater justice to Western interests than Eastern ones”. He then added that “the draft by the neutral and non-aligned countries affords a framework for keeping the CSCE process alive and for making the Soviet Union answer every three years for its behaviour in honouring the pledges entered into and for wringing further concessions from it in the fields of importance to us.” When it became clear that the attempts of persuasion pursued that far would not affect Washington’s decisions, Bonn tried to correct its strategy. As West German chief delegator Kastl observed, any attempts to convince the U.S. delegation in Madrid and the administration in Washington of the value of the NNA draft or of the reasonable idea of Western “victory” at Madrid were vain. Bonn’s efforts were redirected, hence, to convince the Americans of the detrimental consequences of an eventual failure of the Madrid CSCE.

The new strategy of “reinforced persuasion” attempted by Chancellor Kohl during his visit in Washington in mid-April 1983

570 George Schultz had replaced Haig after his resignation on July 1982.
572 Ibid.
levered the spread anti-American sentiments present in the West German society. Anti-Americanism had grown in the *Bundesrepublik*, indeed, after the adoption of NATO’s 1979 dual-track decision and the inauguration of the first Reagan administration, returning to similar levels of those of the Vietnam War’s years. Reagan’s foreign policy had raised widespread public concerns almost everywhere in Western Europe. According to an opinion poll published in *Newsweek* in 1983, pluralities of around 40 percent of the people interviewed in France, Britain and Germany disapproved American policies. The transatlantic relationship in the first half of the Eighties was marked by problems regarding the *entente* within the Western Alliance and the U.S. image in Western Europe. Both aspects were taken into account by the arguments devised by the West German Foreign Office to convince Washington.

Hence, Kohl and Genscher warned the U.S. administration that in case it would not modify its intransigent stances towards negotiations at the Madrid CSCE, the European allies would have no other choice than to follow, to the detriment of the outcome of the conference. Whilst this would savage the surface of the Alliance’s unity, the West would become the easy target of Soviet propaganda and blamed for the failure of the CSCE. Predictably, a large part of the Western public opinion, too, would single out the U.S. responsibility. Many Western Europeans had doubts about Washington’s commitment to East-West dialogue and were protesting against the deployment of U.S. middle-range rockets in Europe. A renewed *faux pas* on the front of the CSCE process would reinforce such suspicions further, to the detriment both of the U.S. reputation and missiles. The West German federal


575 On the redefinition of Western European representations of the U.S. in the early Eighties, see: J. Hansen, C. Helm and F. Reichherzer, eds., *Making Sense of the Americas: How Protest Related to America in the 1980s and Beyond* (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 2015).
government – as the administration in Washington was admonished – would hardly manage to make the deployment publically acceptable if not able to offer some concrete improvements in the field of détente in return.\textsuperscript{576} The list of West German arguments continued by depicting other consequent negative scenarios: the hardening of Spain’s path towards NATO membership; the strengthening of neutralist movements in Scandinavia; the disappointment of the lefts in power in France; the risk of compromising cooperation with the NNA countries.\textsuperscript{577}

Bonn tabled an ultimatum trade option, by demanding Washington’s commitment to a successful conclusion of the conference in Madrid in return for Bonn’s endorsement of the decision of stationing U.S. Pershing II on its territory. The intertwining between the diplomatic pursuit of the process of détente and its domestic reception had always been an important constituent of Bonn’s CSCE policy. It was not the first time that the West German federal government, when negotiating with its Western allies and the Eastern countries, reminded its counterparts of its domestic need for concrete achievements on the front of détente and made a tactical use of it in order to attain its foreign policy goals. Quite interestingly, this assertive diplomatic initiative towards Washington was taken by a liberal-right coalition government which had declared that strengthening the special relationship with the U.S. was its main foreign policy goal. This episode shows that the landscape of relations between Americans and Western Europeans was more complicated than mere ideological and political vicinity would suggest and was rather dependent on specific circumstances, especially when vital national interests were involved.

The upcoming implementation of the armed track of NATO’s 1979 decision had tactical implications with regard to negotiations with the Soviet delegation at the Madrid CSCE, too. Moscow hoped that a positive decision on the CDE would undermine the psychological

\textsuperscript{577} Ibid.
grounds of the decision to station U.S. LRTNF in Western Europe. Even though Bonn disagreed with such calculation, it was determined to use it strategically to win the Soviet approval of the Western parameters for the CDE.\textsuperscript{578} Time became a decisive factor in the spring of 1983: in order to attain their respective goals, both Bonn and Moscow aimed at reaching as soon as possible an agreement on the Madrid final act – and a positive decision on the CDE – before the first missiles would be stationed on the West German soil in the fall of the year. On 6 May 1983 the Soviet delegation appealed to all participating states to negotiate on the basis of “RM-39 revised”. The initiative meant that the Soviets accepted the last NNA draft in its entirety, including its provisions regarding the CDE. Time for further negotiations had run out: no additional Western proposals or revisions would be taken into account by the Soviet delegation.\textsuperscript{579}

By accepting the NNA draft in all its parts, the Soviet Union had decided to make large concessions to Western requests. Besides the matter of the mandate of the CDE, “RM-39” included indeed a series of proposals which had already been tabled at the Belgrade CSCE and had been rejected by the Eastern countries for years. The new opening revealed the East’s urgency to obtain a final document which ensured the convening of the CDE and the continuation of cooperation with the West. In April 1983 Erich Honecker expressed its favour to a successful conclusion of the conference.\textsuperscript{580} The East German leader was aware that the interruption of the CSCE process would burden the continuation of inner-German relations. As the GDR’s economic dependency on cooperation with the FRG had dramatically grown, the protection of inner-German relations had become increasingly vital for East Berlin. Negotiations on important financial projects and on the facilitation of human contacts had continued in the early Eighties via the existing

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{578} \textit{Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Schauer}, 30.03.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. I, doc. 85, p. 447.
\end{itemize}
confidential channels. However, adverse international conditions – i.e. the renewed bipolar confrontational course, the Polish crisis and its repercussions within the Eastern bloc, the East-West competition over missiles – had drastically limited Honecker’s room of manoeuvre and prevented the East German leader to make significant concessions to the FRG. There was awareness both in Bonn and East Berlin that the achievement of a multilateral agreement at the Madrid CSCE would facilitate the expansion of bilateral relations between the two German states. The multilateral embeddedness of the inner-German dialogue continued to be in place in 1983 and still affected German political decisions.

The Madrid CSCE at its conclusion: matters of détente, matters of security

In the concluding phase of the Madrid CSCE, the game of the agreement on the final document was played mainly within the Western field. Washington did not seem to be particularly impressed by the West German strategy of reinforced persuasion. The aim of securing the planned deployment of U.S. rockets in Western Europe contributed to convince the Reagan administration to remain involved in the affairs of European détente, but did not urge the American delegation in Madrid to revise its strategy and goals. For the West German frustration, additional provisions on human rights continued to be demanded with unchanged insistence. On occasion of the London meeting of the Four Political Directors on 22 April 1983, Kampelmann notified that the corrections to the NNA draft suggested by the Western delegations were insufficient; the “Soviet performance” – i.e. the implementation by Soviet authorities of concrete steps in the field of human rights – was added as fundamental precondition for the conclusion of the conference. As the U.S. chief delegator had pointed out to the British, French and West German colleagues: “For us

The performance is of the same importance as CDE”. The Western allies’ respective positions remained irreconcilable: whilst Washington advocating the possibility of a failure of the conference – for which the Soviet Union could be blamed – Bonn aimed at the favourable conclusion of the meeting and not at the apportioning of blame. Also after the Soviets had opened to the acceptance of “RM-39 revised”, the U.S. delegation did not change its mind. The NNA draft’s provisions remained inadequate: as Secretary of State Schultz explained to his British, French and West German colleagues, at the Madrid CSCE it was about improving both the text of the conference final document and the Soviet behaviour.

The way to the conclusion of the Madrid CSCE was paved by a last intermediation attempted by the Spanish delegation. As guest of the conference, Madrid had promised to take all necessary initiatives to favour a successful outcome of the second follow-up conference. Spain’s new Socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales took the initiative on 17 June 1983 by proposing to incorporate into “RM-39 revised” two provisions convening a meeting of experts on human rights in Ottawa – a major concession to one of the U.S. fundamental demands – and a meeting of experts on human contacts in Bern – an addition pleasing particularly Bonn. Moreover, the calendar of the CDE was set: the works of the preparatory meeting were scheduled for the end of October in Helsinki and the beginning of the main conference for 17 January 1984 in Stockholm. A week later, all Western and NNA delegations declared their willingness to accept the Spanish draft. After few days of uncertainty, on occasion of the meeting of the Soviet

583 Ibid., p. 607.
bloc’s leaders of 28 June in Moscow, Andropov suggested to accept the Spanish offer.\textsuperscript{587} On 1 July Soviet chief delegator Kovalev declared officially to be willing to work within the framework of the Spanish initiative. As unique, small concession to Moscow’s requests, the clause convening the meeting of experts on human contacts was incorporated into the chairman’s statement, instead of being included amongst the matters of Basket III.\textsuperscript{588}

On 15 July 1983 the final document of the Madrid conference was approved by thirty-four delegations – with the only exception of Malta, the “enfant terrible” of the CSCE,\textsuperscript{589} which, as it had already done in Belgrade, tied its approval to three additional requests.\textsuperscript{590} The shooting down of a South Korean passenger plane flying over Soviet territory by the Soviet air force in September 1983 represented the last hindrance and episode of East-West tension marking the concluding moves of the Madrid CSCE.\textsuperscript{591} Works were still protracted until the fall of 1983 – the year initially thought for beginning possibly the third review conference. After “two years and eight months of continual frustration” – as it was commented by the West German delegation\textsuperscript{592} – the second CSCE follow-up meeting came to a conclusion which was far more satisfactory than initial expectations and following developments had let hope. The achievements in the human field were reason of particular satisfaction for the West German diplomacy. Besides the convening of the two meetings of experts on human rights and on

\textsuperscript{588} Ibid., p. 56.
\textsuperscript{590} Malta’s three requests consisted (1) in a declaration of intents to reduce armaments in the Mediterranean region; (2) in the inclusion of the Mediterranean sea in the area of the CBMs; and (3) in the convening of a meeting of experts on security in the Mediterranean basin.
\textsuperscript{592} Deutsch-sowjetische KSZE-Konsultationen am 7./8.08.1980 in Bonn, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
human contacts, the West could attain a series of important improvements which were largely tailored on the situation in Poland. The Eastern countries committed themselves to recognising the freedom of religion and tolerating free contacts between churches; to facilitating the fulfilment of the applications for family reunification and marriage between Eastern and Western citizens, by introducing faster processing times, clearer rules, more information and lower taxes; to guaranteeing free access to the respective embassies and consulates for foreign visitors; to selling Western newspapers and magazines at reasonable prices and to improving working conditions of Western journalists; to liberalising trade unions, by recognising the right of citizens to choose freely their trade union.593

On 8 September 1983, the foreign ministers of all thirty-five participant states gathered in Madrid to approve the final document. The conference ended, as it had begun, under a high political profile. This responded, as the West German Foreign Office pointed out, to the significance of the circumstance: in Madrid was celebrated the first important political agreement between the East and the West after a long time.594

Few weeks after the adoption of the final document of Madrid the preparatory works of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe started in Helsinki. The Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which had originated from two parallel proposals by the Soviets and the French, represented a traditional long-sought goal of the Warsaw Pact and had turned into the priority aim of the Western delegations at the Madrid CSCE. The mandate of the conference had been progressively shaped according to the Western criteria. The Warsaw Pact had ceded, indeed, on the inclusion of the Soviet territory up to the Urals; on the primal negotiation of binding and verifiable CBMs; and on the notification of big manoeuvres. As unique concession to the Eastern requests, the

593 “KSZE: Der Präsident ist sehr zufrieden”, Der Spiegel, Nr. 29/1983.
obligation of notifying air and naval forces operating on the Atlantics in connection with ground forces had been accepted by the West.\footnote{595 “KSZE: Der Präsident ist sehr zufrieden”, Der Spiegel, Nr. 29/1983.}

The West German Foreign Office was confident that the positive outcome of Madrid would nourish renewed East-West cooperation and exert a positive effect on the prosecution of armament negotiations.\footnote{596 Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Steinkuehler, 25.07.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. II, doc. 223, p. 1144.} The fact that the CSCE process could have continued and expanded notwithstanding major adversities reinforced Bonn’s firm belief that European détente was the right way to follow. Within the West German overall complex of détente and security, the upcoming CDE represented an important stage wherein the grounds for the construction of a safer Europe could be negotiated. As the following chapter of this work illustrates, matters of security returned to dominate East-West relations in the wake of Madrid as they done before its start; but important decisions on central security issues took place elsewhere, outside the CSCE framework.

During the very last days of the follow-up meeting in Madrid, INF negotiations\footnote{597 Formal negotiations on INF between the superpowers had opened in Geneva on 30 November 1981} and the deployment of U.S. new cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe were main items of debate between Genscher and his Soviet and East German colleagues, Gromyko and Fischer, in the margins of the conference.\footnote{598 Ministerialdirektor Pfeffer, z.Z. Madrid, an das Auswärtige Amt, 08.09.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. II, doc. 262, pp. 1314-1317; and Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem Außenminister der DDR, Fischer, in Madrid, 09.09.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. II, doc. 263, pp. 1318-1322.} Negotiations in Geneva had reached a stalemate because of the Soviet demand to include the British and French strategic systems in the U.S count and the consequent U.S. refusal to take the request into account.\footnote{599 Ministerialdirektor Pfeffer, z.Z. Madrid, an das Auswärtige Amt, 08.09.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. II, doc. 262, pp. 1314-1317.} As Andropov explained in an interview with the Prawda, the Soviet security strategy aimed at preventing a West’s military hegemony on the European continent by
pursuing two concrete goals: the inclusion of third countries’ nuclear systems in the calculation of the INFs and the exclusion of the stationing of new U.S. LRTNF in Western Europe. In return, Andropov was open to concessions, by reducing the number of Soviet warheads targeted at Western Europe. Around the issue of the nuclear arms in Europe everyone was playing its own diplomatic game. At stake for Bonn were its traditional security needs and reasons of transatlantic alliance: it was not just about diminishing the Soviet threat but remaining on board with the deployment decision as well. As he had already done before on occasion of negotiations on the CDE, Genscher reminded Fischer that all fractions of the Bundestag had agreed in 1979 to start the stationing of Pershing II in the fall of 1983, if negotiations on armaments control would not lead to concrete results capable of appeasing West German security needs.

Eastern hopes that the agreement on a CDE would be sufficient to derail the armament track of NATO’s dual-track decision vanished in the course of few weeks after the conclusion of the CSCE in Madrid. The preparatory works for the CDE concluded successfully on 11 November 1983. The Conference on Disarmament in Europe would start on 17 January 1984 in Stockholm. On 22 November 1983, the majority of the West German Bundestag – namely the MPs of the CDU/CSU and FDP fractions – approved the stationing of the U.S. Pershing II. The day after the Soviets announced to walk out of INF negotiations and on 8 December they decided to break off START negotiations as well. On 10 December, the stationing of the U.S. new cruise and Pershing II missiles began in Germany and Italy.

The deployment of Pershing II in the FRG was followed by Genscher’s reassurances about the West German enduring commitment to détente. The fulfilment of its alliance duties did not mark a shift in Bonn’s foreign policy. As Genscher claimed in front of the Bundestag on 6 December 1983: “missiles neither are an instrument for a ‘new policy of strength’, nor are conceived as an instrument for a new confrontational strategy towards the Soviet Union on the European territory; to the contrary, we hold onto détente and cooperation”.\textsuperscript{605}

Assessing the second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid: security needs, good intentions and foreign political ambitions

The deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe marked the symbolic conclusion of the long diplomatic affairs of the second CSCE follow-up meeting of Madrid. Matters of security in Europe dominated its overall unfolding. They strongly affected the preparation of the conference. Multilateral negotiations in Madrid focused mainly on the issue of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe and were flanked by the fluctuating unfolding of talks on armaments and disarmaments in Geneva. The CSCE participants’ security needs were taken into account to shape the respective diplomatic strategies towards the allies and their counterparts. And, last but not least, the common interest in the security aspects of détente provided the grounds for achieving an agreement on a substantial final document. This does not mean that the Madrid CSCE was just about security. As stressed in the previous paragraph, multilateral cooperation was intensified in other areas of the Helsinki Accords, too. With regard to the “human dimension”, in particular, achievements were possible which had been unattainable at the Belgrade CSCE and had seemed unconceivable during the tensest phases of negotiations in Madrid. The way to those improvements had been largely paved by the CSCE participants’ respective security needs and security fears.

Paradoxically, when major crises unsettled East-West relations, détente managed to achieve more concrete realisations. The importance of such results had not to be diminished: a positive outcome of the conference was not expected. Episodes of tension endangering the continuation of negotiations in Madrid were serious and fears that the developments in Afghanistan and Poland would interrupt the process of détente for good were real.

The Federal Republic of Germany was the country which suffered the most from the uncertainties caused by the deterioration of East-West relations. Therefore, it had good reasons to celebrate the outcome of the Madrid CSCE as a diplomatic success. The CSCE continued to be for the Bundesrepublik the multilateral framework which allowed and completed the bilateral pursuit of its Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik. Bonn’s federal government was aware of their vital interdependence. As East-West confrontation escalated between the late Seventies and the early Eighties, the West German Foreign Office repeatedly observed in its internal strategic papers that, if East-West dialogue would come to an end, it would be impossible for Bonn to continue to expand inner-German relations single-handed. This awareness did not represent an element of novelty: but concrete evidence for it was provided by the renewed escalation of East-West confrontation at the turn of the decade.

The CSCE process asserted itself gradually as a West German established foreign policy priority in the aftermath of Helsinki. Its well-grounded stability within the FRG’s foreign political system was proven by the fact that it continued to be pursued nearly unchanged after the major political turn marked by Kohl’s seizure of power in the fall of 1982. Not only did the CSCE process keep the door open for a future solution to the German question, but it turned into an important channel to keep open East-West dialogue itself. European détente had had since its origins alternative aims in respect to superpower détente. As American-Soviet relations returned to confrontation under the Carter and the first Reagan administrations, European détente prevailed by default as the only available form of East-West dialogue to
remain in place. Taking into account the changing international circumstances and the lessons learnt at the follow-up meeting in Belgrade, the FRG’s CSCE policy was subject to a partial rethinking: it readdressed its goals by diminishing expectations; it gained in flexibility and pragmatism; it acquired a more explicit separation between levels of principles and practice; and it was shaped as a tool of anti-cyclical stabilisation in times of crisis. Moreover, the interaction between détente and security policies – which had traditionally shaped the West German concept of détente – took on new tactical tasks. If matters of security risked endangering détente, security needs were levered strategically in order to safeguard the achievements of détente. Even though elements of real threats for the continuation of the CSCE process were more serious in Madrid than they had been in Belgrade, higher were the risks for the participants of the CSCE to compromise their own respective interests.

The Warsaw Pact’s unveiled interest in the security dimension of the CSCE was used strategically by West German diplomacy in order to obtain concessions in the human field. Bonn’s enduring confidence in the possibility of achieving concrete results in those areas where the Eastern countries had refused cooperation before was motivated by the awareness that, unlike at the Belgrade CSCE, the Soviet Union had now a greater interest in not leaving Madrid empty handed. As analysed in Chapter 2, the Eastern bloc had presented itself to the first review test of European détente without any specific goals. Its efforts had been directed mainly to the attainment of a rash conclusion of the conference which would simply allow cooperation with the West to continue. During the diplomatic preparation of the second CSCE follow-up meeting, Moscow had revealed to Bonn its interest in negotiating the convening of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe, with the unspoken aim of mining the political and psychological premises for the implementation of the armed track of NATO’s 1979 decision, as it has been analysed in Chapter 3.

The shift in the Warsaw Pact’s attitude towards CSCE negotiations had been urged by the changing balance of power between the blocs.
The East’s economic weakness and security worries, as well as the cooling off of the superpower relationship, compelled the Soviet Union to turn to Europe. Notwithstanding the Soviet frustration with the U.S. initiatives, the nature of the superpower relationship under the Carter administration was still based on the recognition of parity. But Reagan’s new policy of strength wiped out any illusion of negotiating with the Soviet Union on an equal footing. Matters of perception were involved in the political shift as well: Reagan’s assertive security policies put an end to the idea of the “weakness of the West” promoted by the Soviet bloc throughout the Seventies. To the contrary, the Warsaw Pact was confronted with a renewed military competition it was not able to afford. As Washington had needed superpower détente to deal with the consequences of the disastrous Vietnam War, Moscow needed now European détente to face its international and intra-bloc difficulties. It had to be remembered that also the 1969 Budapest Appeal – the first Eastern proposal for a pan-European security conference without preconditions – had come in a time when the Soviet Union was dealing with the negative diplomatic repercussions of the crackdown on Czechoslovakia.\footnote{A first proposal had been made by the Soviet Union in 1954 but had turned down by NATO because of the exclusion of the United States and Canada. The Appeal Budapest represented hence the first serious proposal, dictating no preconditions with regard to the participants. On this point, see: J.M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, p. 213.} The Soviet weakness at the beginning of the Eighties was aggravated by the growing international isolation that the invasion of Afghanistan and the protracting of the Polish crisis brought about. Besides drawing Soviet financial resources and rousing fears of contamination in the other Eastern countries, the Polish crisis unveiled to the world the fragility of the realisations of socialism in the Eastern societies. All these elements of East’s urgency and weakness were carefully examined by the Auswärtiges Amt: they nourished the West German confidence in the possibility of obtaining favourable achievements at the Madrid CSCE.

Similar considerations were taken into account by the arguments Bonn used to convince its most sceptical allies of the opportunity to
continue multilateral negotiations in spite of adverse circumstances. The CSCE was subject to criticism within several participating states; they interpreted it as a diplomatic tool in Soviet hands used cleverly by Moscow to compensate for its incapability of coping with international security challenges and intra-bloc political changes. West German diplomats repeated unceasingly that the Soviet bloc negotiated from a position of weakness and the outcome of the conference could be smartly directed, as a consequence, to the West’s advantage.

A second block of arguments the West German diplomacy frequently appealed to, especially in the wake of Poland’s military takeover, rested upon the stabilising effects that the prosecution of multilateral détente negotiations could exert on the Polish crisis. As developments in Poland casted a lengthening shadow over the unfolding of the CSCE, West German efforts were directed to linking a possible solution to the emergency in Poland to the good outcome of the conference – and not vice versa. Whether the CSCE did contribute to the de-escalation of the Polish crisis and prevented a Soviet armed intervention in the country is object of historical debate. Zubok has firmly rejected this hypothesis: as Soviet papers show, the decision to avoid the repetition of “another Prague” was taken by Moscow independently from considerations linked to the CSCE. However, it is undoubted that the Polish crisis showed that Eastern countries needed cooperation with the West more and more. Hence, West German diplomacy turned a perhaps overestimated aspiration – i.e. normalising the Polish crisis through détente negotiations – into a diplomatic tool of persuasion: the potential beneficial effects of the CSCE on Poland were frequently used by West German diplomats to convince the Western allies of the opportunity to remain in Madrid and continue with “business as usual”.

608 V.M. Zubok, A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, pp. 267-268.
Bonn’s wish to remain at Madrid at (almost) any costs risked to cut the West German delegation from the majority of the Western partners in a number of delicate phases of the conference. Isolation was a risk that the FRG could not afford. Preserving the unity of the Western Alliance – or at least its surface – and bringing negotiations to a favourable conclusion appeared to be – throughout most of the duration of the conference – incompatible aims. Notwithstanding the Western Alliance performed very poorly at the Madrid CSCE, the fact that both aims could be attained in the end was reason of satisfaction for Bonn’s federal government. The achievement of the final document of Madrid represented probably the last significant success of West German diplomacy when dealing with the convergence of Westpolitik and Ostpolitik, until the end of the Cold War.
“Die Prozedur und das Ziel für die Entspannungspolitik in Europa sind abgesteckt. Der Schlingerkiel ist in Position. Er hat in den vergangenen Jahren, als die Wogen des Misstrauens zwischen Ost und West hochgingen, das Schiff vorm Kentern bewahrt.”

Christoph Bertram, Die Zeit, July 26, 1985

Chapter 5

The “Return of the Superpowers” and the “Return of the Past”: A Reappraisal of the Process of Multilateral Détente Ten Years after Helsinki (1984-1985)

Introduction

The years of the first Reagan administration represented a troublesome and ambivalent period in the trajectory of the Cold War transatlantic partnership. Whereas moments of profound crises alternated with moments of rapprochement in several policy areas, as Nuti has highlighted, in the field of East-West cooperation transatlantic divergences were profound. One of the most evident elements emerging from the long experience of the second CSCE review meeting in Madrid was that the chasm between American and Western German conceptions of East-West dialogue had never been more profound. As it has been analysed in the previous chapters of this work, the U.S. had been a quite sceptical participant of the CSCE since the origins of the

609 “The mechanism and the aim of détente policy in Europe are outlined. The rolling keel is in position. It protected the ship from capsizes in the last years, as the weaves of distrust between the East and the West reached their peak.” [transl.]
European endeavour. The transatlantic partners had managed, however, to reach in Helsinki a strategic convergence between the respective interests of superpower détente and European détente. This temporary entente could not have been replicated at the CSCE in Belgrade and Madrid. Although single leading actors and specific elements of disputes changed from Belgrade to Madrid, the lacking convergence between West German and American interests represented an element of continuity. Whereas Carter’s human rights battle needed the CSCE as international showcase, Reagan’s overall foreign political vision did not envisage any room for European détente. Quite significantly, before the resuming of negotiations in Madrid in the fall of 1982, American chief delegator Kampelmann explained to the European colleagues that a positive conclusion of the follow-up conference and the convening of the CDE risked alimenting détente illusions and mistaken feelings of improved security in the continent of the public opinion.611

The problematic entente with Washington concerned the other face of détente, too, i.e. cooperation in the field of security. The alternation of fears of American decoupling and fears of excessive American assertiveness marked the West German – and more generally Western European – attitude towards Washington’s initiatives in the field of military security. European worries were alimented by several episodes of lacking information coming from the side of the U.S. administration. The frustration experienced by Bonn’s federal government on occasion of Carter’s fluctuating conduction of the neutron bomb affair continued during the Reagan administration. Both in the case of Reagan’s launch of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in March 1983 and of the renown “walk in the woods” between the U.S. and Soviet chief delegators at the INF-talks in Geneva, respectively Paul Nitze and Juli Ji Kwizinski – on whose occasion they agreed on a reduction of arm systems which pleased Western Europeans – the allies were informed by the U.S. administration only after initiatives had already been

Divergences of views and interests on security were particular problematic for the Bundesrepublik, the country which most depended on the U.S. military protection and most suffered from uncertainties and changes in the field of security. Whereas Bonn’s concerns about the vulnerability of NATO’s deterrence strategy towards the Soviet bloc and fears of a possible American decoupling were reassured by the implementation of NATO’s dual-track decision and the stationing of new American LRTNF, Reagan’s aim of asserting the West’s military superiority over the East endangered, to the contrary, the maintenance of that strategic balance of power between the East and the West which represented, in the West German view, the cornerstone of détente and peace in Europe.

The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm, whose works were inaugurated on 17 January 1984, provided the FRG with an additional framework where it could aspire to play a relatively influential role in shaping the discussion of security issues. The conference was a derivation of the CSCE; as it will be shown in this chapter by analysing the West German approach to the conference during its first year, Bonn borrowed a number of elements from the CSCE and brought along to Stockholm similar strategies, aims and ambitions. Bonn greatest aspiration, namely relaunching East-West dialogue through a successful pursuit of the CDE, remained largely unfulfilled. Indeed, the unfolding of the Stockholm conference coincided in time with the restart of Soviet-American negotiations that marked the renewed assertion of the superpower dialogue in the field of security as the main stage of East-West relations in the second half of the decade. 1985 was not only the year of the epochal change marked by Gorbachev’s seizure of power in the Soviet Union. It was a year of important anniversaries as well. As the second part of the chapter analyses, West German efforts with regard to the upcoming celebrations of the year 1985 were directed to intertwine commemorations of Europe’s past – namely of the fortieth

anniversary of the conclusion of WWII – with celebrations of Europe’s possible changing future – namely of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. This linkage provides an additional explanation for the significance attributed by the West German Foreign Office to the ceremony in Helsinki. Besides material achievements, in the mid-1980s the CSCE continued to serve important purposes of West German international image as well.

**The FRG’s aspirations at the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm**

After having stood two tests in Belgrade and Madrid and having survived major international crisis, the CSCE process had acquired a certain amount of solidity. A sort of semi-institutionalisation had come into being in the course of the decade after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. A genuine institutionalisation of the CSCE process in the sense of its bureaucratisation would be realised only after the end of the Cold War. New CSCE institutions would be established by the 1990 Charter of Paris for a new Europe which would open a new era for the process of European détente. Its transformation into an international organisation able to cope with the new tasks and challenges of the post-Cold War time would bring to the 1994 decision by the Budapest Summit of changing the name from the CSCE to the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Bureaucratising the process of multilateral dialogue in Europe remained, instead, out of the scope of the CSCE as long as the Cold War was in place. All Eastern offers in this direction had been declined by the Western countries since the origins of the CSCE. The West German Foreign Office had repeated many times in its strategic papers the reasons underlying this decline: the nature of the forum for multilateral East-West cooperation

should remained flexible and open, as well as its political relevance high. The requests for bureaucratising the CSCE process advanced by the Eastern countries entailed the risk of lowering its political value, by turning it into an empty framework for the freezing of the status quo in Europe. Hence, as it has been shown in the previous chapters, both elements – flexibility and involvement of political commitment – had contributed to rescue the process of European détente from its ultimate interruption during the tensest phases of bipolar confrontation. However, a combination of practices, dynamics and rules had progressively cemented over the years beyond formal institutionalisation. The CSCE had been taking the shape of a process of steady learning by doing, wherein diplomats and experts of all delegations, as well as the planning offices of all participants’ foreign ministries, had got skilled to know each other’s interests, approaches, and ways of negotiating. This load of experience had contributed to bestow a certain degree of continuity on the CSCE process, notwithstanding changing leaderships and changing international conditions.

As it had been analysed in this work, the West German diplomacy was taught some important lessons in the course of the unfolding of the multilateral détente process, which had been used by Bonn to adjust the orientation of its policies and its concrete strategies. The experience collected over a decade of CSCE was put to work by the West German Foreign Office to prepare and shape the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm – simply known by its acronym CDE. After a rapid preparatory meeting, which took place in Helsinki between 25 October and 11 November 1983, the main works of the CDE opened in the Swedish capital on 17 January 1984.\textsuperscript{615} The CDE was a rib of the CSCE: its convening and its mandate had been included in the final document of Madrid after long

negotiations. Its participants were the same thirty-five member states of the CSCE. The CDE was an integral part of the multilateral complex on which rested European détente. It provided a parallel forum for political cooperation on security which flanked both the CSCE and the other multilateral and bilateral forums of negotiations on disarmament and armament control in place. Hence, its general aim was directed to enhancing security in Europe and favouring the overall improvement of East-West relations. According to the West German viewpoint, the conference in Stockholm served the purpose to show that East-West dialogue in the mid-Eighties was not exclusively dominated by issues of missiles deployment. This was a way to affirm that, notwithstanding the stationing of U.S. Pershing II on the West German territory, cooperation with the East in the field of security could and should continue.

In times in which MBFR negotiations were permanently deadlocked and INF negotiations and superpower arms reduction talks had been broken off for an undefined period of time, Bonn identified in the CDE an adequate occasions to relaunch East-West dialogue on security. The recent success of the Madrid CSCE against the background of adverse international circumstances had reinforced the West German confidence in the means and potential of European détente. As long as relations of superpowers remained strained, the West German Foreign Office could continue to nourish its ambition of playing a propulsive role in East-West affairs. The FRG’s self-representation as a mediator between the East and the West still had in 1984 a two-fold meaning: it coincided with Genscher’s genuine ambition to pursue a more influential foreign policy; and it continued to serve the purpose of affecting public perceptions of Bonn’s foreign political decisions

positively. Particularly in the wake of the unpopular decision made by the federal government of proceeding with the stationing of new American weapons on the West German territory, matters of self-representation were carefully handled by the Auswärtiges Amt in the public sphere. As an example, State Secretary Meyer-Landrut was meticulously instructed to highlight, on occasion of his participation in the popular television show Kontraste on Germany’s first broadcaster ARD, the central role played by the Bundesrepublik in bringing together the two superpowers during the last years of bipolar tension.\textsuperscript{619}

From the West German viewpoint, the general aims and foreign political usefulness of the CDE were consistent with the broader framework of multilateral détente. In order to repeat in Stockholm the successful outcome of the Madrid conference, there were a number of elements that the CDE should borrow from the experience of the CSCE. First, the West German Foreign Office aimed at reproducing at the CDE, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, the structure laid down by the Helsinki Final Act.\textsuperscript{620} The partition of negotiations in thematic Baskets had provided a successful procedural solution at the CSCE: it had consented to pursue parallel negotiations in different areas with a certain autonomy, by keeping constantly an eye on improvements made in other fields. Drawing inspiration from the CSCE scheme, Bonn had in mind to divide the work at the CDE amongst different commissions working in parallel.\textsuperscript{621} This would allow interconnecting strategically separate negotiation tracks, i.e. to use Eastern interests in some areas to force concessions in other areas. This aim would be attained only in December 1984, as all delegations would decide to restructure the CDE in working groups, after one year of sterile negotiations.\textsuperscript{622} Second, the contents of the CSCE Basket I provided the basis for negotiations on disarmament. Indeed, the proposal package tabled by the Western delegations on 24 January 1984 built significantly upon the Helsinki

\textsuperscript{620} Ibid., p. 18.
\textsuperscript{621} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{622} J. Freeman, \textit{Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond}, p. 99.
CBMs, by putting forward provisions for sizeable improvements and expansion of existing measures. Third, according to what West German diplomacy had always advocated at the CSCE, pragmatism should inform the conduction of negotiations: any “take it or leave it” approach should be put aside and Soviet conference interests – in the case of the CDE mainly ideological – should be strategically used to force Eastern delegations to make concessions on Western demands. Moreover, there were other elements that the CDE shared with the CSCE: the high political rank of the conference, marked by the presence of the participants’ foreign ministers at the inaugural session; the grouping of delegations into a number of main groups (namely, the NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the NNA groups) and sub-groups (namely the EC-group – with a limited role – and the Nordic group – a loose gathering of NATO’s and NNA delegations coming from the same area) and the configuration of alliances (with NATO’s and NNA delegations sharing a common view notwithstanding different nuances with regard to single proposals and goals).

On its whole, Bonn’s idea of the CDE in Stockholm was consistent with the West German general conception of realistic détente and with the assessment of the West German possibilities of diplomatic success. This second element explained Bonn’s insistence that an important part of negotiations in Stockholm should be devoted – besides debates on concrete measures – to the discussion of the principle of renouncing the use of force. According to the West German position, debates on the formulation of the principle should start from the beginning of the conference. This idea contrasted with the approach to the conference of other Western partners, especially with the French one. France held a strong interest in the conference on disarmament, which originated from the initial idea formulated by Giscard d’Estaing in 1978 and which French diplomacy had been the first advocate of before and during the

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623 For a more insightful analysis of the Western proposal package, see: ibid., p. 93.
625 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, p. 96.
626 Ibid.
Madrid CSCE. As French Ambassador Andréani explained to West German State Secretary Meyer-Landrut in January 1984, Western delegations had to proceed in Stockholm according to the principle of “first things first”: i.e. negotiations should focus first on concrete measures; issues of principle could be eventually discussed in an ensuing phase, as conclusive crowning of the conference.\(^{627}\) Bonn opposed to the French position motivations which entailed, once again, general tactical considerations, its own foreign political interests, as well as its own vision of détente. The multilateral recognition of the principle of renouncing the use of force was a Soviet request which had consequently to be handled with some caution. It had been proposed by the Warsaw Pact in January 1983 and relaunched by Gromyko before the start of negotiations in Stockholm:\(^ {628}\) the definition of a treaty on the non-use of force was one of the broad “political proposals” demanded by the Soviet foreign minister in order to remediate to the dangerous climate created by the NATO deployment.\(^ {629}\) The recognition of the principle would provide further reassurance to the Eastern enduring security worries. It offered, moreover, an adequate handhold for Soviet ideological aims: after the armed track of NATO’s security strategy had been implemented, the Soviet bloc was compelled to rethink what the long-sought conference could be immediately used for.\(^ {630}\) Bonn aimed at repeating the successful two-fold strategy Western delegations had devised at the Madrid CSCE when negotiating the CDE: first, the Warsaw Pact’s interest in attaining the principle of renouncing the use of force should be used as a lever to obtain Eastern concessions in other fields; second, Western delegations should commit themselves to the formulation of the principle, by shaping it as much as possible according to their own view and interest.\(^ {631}\) Focusing on negotiations on the principle of non-use of force provided West


\(^{628}\) The proposal was contained in the declaration of the Political Council of the Warsaw Pact which gathered in Prague on 4-5 January 1983: see AAPD, 1983, vol. I, p. 40.

\(^{629}\) J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, p. 98.

\(^{630}\) Ibid., p. 91.

German diplomacy, moreover, with other tactical advantages: namely, the West German delegation could aspire to play a more prominent role in discussions on non-use of force than in other negotiations areas wherein, given the more technical matters at stake, the positions of other NATO’s bigger partners would undoubtedly have greater weight. With regard to the contents of the principle of non-use of force, the FRG intended to reach in Stockholm the assertion of a common reinforced formulation entailing some potential for change: namely, the principle should be directed to overcoming the 1968 Brezhnev’s Doctrine and to avoiding the repetition of unilateral international intervention as the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.632 A shared recognition of the principle of non-use of force, together with further improvements of the CBMs and an agreement in the field of conventional forces in Europe – which represented another primal conference interest of the FRG – would contribute, according to the West German viewpoint, to make East-West relations in the field of military security more stable and calculable in the immediate future.633 The duality of stabilisation and change, underpinning the idea that pursuing stabilisation in the present would pave the way to change in the future and marking the theoretical approach of the Bundesrepublik to the CSCE process, was reconfirmed by the West German conception of what the Stockholm conference would and should be.

The West German delegation, guided by Ambassador Klaus-Jürgen Citrus, committed itself to playing a propulsive role within the Western European caucus.634 As at the CSCE negotiations, the West German Foreign Office’s first task consisted in collecting the necessary consensus of the Western allies around its own conference aims. During the first months of 1984 West German diplomacy worked on convincing the sceptical Western partners – particularly the French and the Americans, who considered discussions on principles of secondary

632 Ibid.
importance and likely to be eventually postponed to the last phase of
the conference 635 – of the opportunity to develop a common operative
concept of non-use of force, in conformity with the Western conference
goals and with the West German conception.636 A first signal of opening
came from the U.S. administration in the late spring of 1984. In his
Dublin’s speech on 4 June 1984, Reagan proposed to discuss at the
Stockholm CDE the formulation of the principle of non-use of force in
return for the Soviet commitment to negotiations on technical aspects
of CBMs. The U.S. shift opened the way to the inclusion of the principle
into the list of Western conference aims.637 Bonn’s Foreign Office
welcomed this turn with satisfaction. But the meaning of Reagan’s
move went far beyond the internal dynamics within the Western
caucus, as well as beyond the strict development of the conference on
disarmament in Stockholm. The American foreign political strategy
towards the Soviet Union was preparing a major shift during the
months of Reagan’s second election campaign which would bring to
the President re-election on 6 November 1984. Reagan’s speech in
Dublin contained, indeed, a much more relevant message: it
represented an invitation directed to the other superpower to return to
the main negotiation table and resume bilateral talks on nuclear arms
reduction.638

635 The French and the Americans were the most sceptical. Andréani had repeated to
Meyer Landrut in January 1984, what he had already explained to West German
ministerial director Pfeffer in December 1983: Paris was not against the idea itself of using
negotiations on the principle of non-use of force as a lever to obtain concession from
Moscow; but in the French strategy the formulation of the principle was postponed to an
undefined future, as conclusive crowning of the Stockholm conference. See: AAPD, 1983,
vol. II, doc. 394. With regard to the U.S. position, President Reagan had pointed out in
January 1984 that the issue was not amongst his priorities: “First, we need to find ways to
reduce – and eventually to eliminate – the threat and use of force in solving international
383.

637 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Hartmann, 27.07.1984, in AAPD,
167, 08.06.1984, p. 807.
New ways for cooperation on security: the restart of the superpower dialogue in the mid-Eighties

The first year of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe came to conclusion on 14 December 1984 without any significant result. Negotiations had proceeded in a sterile manner through the largest part of the first conference year, under the influence of the lengthening impact of the NATO deployment of the fall of 1983. Between September and December 1984 debates had taken on a more business-like character – even though they had focused mainly on procedural issues – as a consequence of the beginning of a progressive shift in the Soviet attitude. By assessing what possible future developments would mark the CDE in the following year, West German chief delegator Citron observed that, in respect with the CSCE, the destiny of the conference in Stockholm would more strongly depend on the willingness to negotiate of the superpowers. The unfolding of the Stockholm CDE during 1984 coincided with a moment of transition in East-West relations. The balance of power between the two Cold War blocs was under redefinition after the implementation of the armed track of NATO’s dual-track decision. In its wake, the Soviet bloc started a process of redefinition of its security strategy and international interests. The U.S. administration was preparing to shift its political course towards the Soviet Union. The balance of power between European détente and superpower détente was undergoing a major change as well.

The works of the CDE would continue until September 1986, when an agreement would be reached in Stockholm. It would be the first

639 The fourth negotiation round took place between 6 November and 14 December 1984; the previous three rounds took place, respectively, between 17 January and 16 March 1984, between 8 May and 6 July 1984, and between 11 September and 12 October 1984.
640 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, p. 98.
important agreement in the field of security since the formulation of the 1975 Helsinki’s CBM-provisions and the 1979 signing of SALT II.\textsuperscript{642} It would be also the first agreement signed in the new era of superpower dialogue which slowly began in the mid-Eighties. Being the CDE an emanation of the CSCE process, its concluding document represented an important improvement in the field of the CSCE security chapter.\textsuperscript{643} Hence, its successful conclusion could be interpreted more as an outcome of the restart of American-Soviet negotiations rather than an achievement of European détente. It marked the omen of a changing trend: bilateral superpower talks on arms reduction would provide the decisive forum where important decisions in the field of security would be taken in the second half of the Eighties. Against West German aspirations, multilateral negotiation frameworks – as the CDE in Stockholm, MBFR negotiations in Vienna and the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva – would represent quite secondary stages.

The declared aim of the conference in Stockholm was to relaunch East-West dialogue and mark the beginning of a new phase of cooperation in Europe.\textsuperscript{644} In January 1984, directly before the conference start, West German Ambassador at the NATO headquarters Ruth had predicted that the conference in Stockholm could “give a hint to a profound process of rethinking in Moscow”.\textsuperscript{645} The prediction of a CDE’s influence on political changes in the Soviet Union turned out to be overrated. A major political shift did occur in the Soviet Union in the mid-Eighties. Its preparation and realisation was mainly interwoven with the return of the superpower dialogue on the international stage.

On 7-8 January 1985 the American and Soviet foreign ministers met in Geneva to resume talks on disarmament. Schultz und Gromyko decided to restart negotiations on disarmament with the common goal of taking effective actions to reduce nuclear intercontinental and middle-range weapons, to hinder the space arms race and to reinforce

\begin{footnotes}
\item[643] Ibid., 142.
\item[645] Ibid., p. 58.
\end{footnotes}
strategic stability. This bilateral meeting marked the gradual return of the superpower dialogue which would dominate East-West relations in the second half of the 1980s. The restart of Soviet-American talks on arms control and disarmament was a slow-moving process on which the numerous conflicts and episodes of mistrust of the previous years weighed importantly. Its path was shaped by important domestic developments occurring both in the Soviet Union and in the U.S. between 1984 and 1985.

With regard to the USSR, old Soviet leader Andropov died in February 1984 after a long illness and was replaced by another old apparatchiki, Konstantin Chernenko, who would die as well only a year after, in March 1985. The youngest member of the Politburo was elected as Chernenko’s successor thanks to the decisive vote of Andrei Gromyko: on 11 March 1985 the time of Mikhail Gorbachev as new leader of the USSR was inaugurated, marking an epochal change in the Soviet domestic and foreign political course. With regard to the other superpower, a major foreign political shift occurred in the U.S. within a framework of power continuity. During the unfolding of his second presidential election campaign in 1984, Ronald Regan decided to change the direction of his foreign political program: the assertive anti-Soviet tones which had dominated Reagan’s first mandate were replaced by repeated invitations to Moscow to focus on the shared interests of the superpowers and work together on the reduction of nuclear armaments.

Reagan’s invitations to renewed superpower cooperation did not go unheard. After Soviet initial hesitation, a first step towards the restart of superpower talks on arms reduction took place in the fall of 1984, as Reagan and Schultz met Gromyko on 26 and 28-29 September in New

647 V.M. Zubok. A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, p. 276.

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York in the margins of the UN General Assembly. In their respective addresses in front of the General Assembly, both Reagan and Gromyko reaffirmed the superpowers’ responsibility for the management of the world affairs. Reagan proposed to Gromyko regular talks on regional questions and greater commitment to achieving concrete results at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, at the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm, and in the field of nuclear armaments. These initiatives for renewed bipolar cooperation were observed and assessed with some caution in Bonn. Reagan’s willingness to resume negotiations with Moscow undoubtedly pleased West German needs for a relaxation of East-West relations. However, Bonn’s Foreign Office looked with some preoccupation at the hidden risks of resurgent bilateralism: the fact that Europe had been addressed as a “regional problem” in Reagan’s and Gromyko’s speeches in front of the UN General Assembly roused concerns about a possible limitation of that relative room of manoeuvre that European initiatives had hardly gained in the course of the last decade.

Quite significantly, when assessing the resuming of talks between the superpowers, the West German Foreign Office pointed out that: “our statement ‘we cannot replace the dialogue between the superpowers’ should now be paralleled by an U.S. similar statement affirming its will not to replace the European and CSCE partners’ efforts for dialogue, cooperation and stability in Europe. Both forms of dialogue have to complete each other”. The other face of the desire of protecting multilateral détente from the turbulences of the superpower relationship was the wish to protect the prosecution of multilateral détente from the superpower monopoly over the management of East-
West dialogue. Even though the resuming of American-Soviet negotiations was still in embryo in the second half of 1984, it is interesting to see how rapidly the West German Foreign Office identified the intrinsic perils that this return could involved for its ambitions of playing an influential international role between the East and the West.

Times had changed since the early Seventies, when the parallel projects of European détente and superpower détente had been conceived and first put into practice. The conditions underlying Washington’s decision to move towards a more cooperative course with Moscow were profoundly different in the mid-Eighties: the U.S. administration proposed now to negotiate on arms control from an established position of undisputed force. Similarly, the reasons of the Soviet consent were different: in the course of the Eighties the USSR growingly needed to relieve itself of its most burdensome military encumbrances. As Romero has rightly observed, Washington’s return to dialogue in the mid-Eighties did not represent a return to Kissinger’s project of superpower détente. The framing conditions of European détente had changed as well. As the momentum of convergence with the interests of the superpower dialogue had disappeared, European détente had learnt to survive on its own legs. European détente – namely the CSCE process – had undoubtedly had the great merit of allowing East-West dialogue not to be interrupted during the tensest years of the bipolar relationship. However, its triumph by default over superpower détente had led some of its participants – the FRG on the frontline – to somewhat overestimate its international role within the broader framework of Cold War relations. As it has been analysed in the previous chapters, the FRG, as one of the key player of European détente, had developed a good deal of self-confidence in the potential for change of European détente in the course of the troubled unfolding of the CSCE. West German Foreign Minister Genscher stressed in front of his NATO partners, once again in December 1984, that the CSCE

process provided the adequate political framework for the pursuit of
the superpower dialogue, by completing it thanks to the manifold
nature of its contents.655 Bonn’s insistence on including the re-emergent
superpower dialogue into a single, comprehensive landscape was
largely motivated by the desire to continue to have its say in matters
directly affecting West German vital national and international
interests; and by the aspiration not to renounce to the international
room of manoeuvre Bonn’s diplomacy had conquered with great effort
during the last decade.

**A symbolic year: commemorating the common past, looking to the common future**

1985 was an important year from a symbolic viewpoint. Two
important anniversaries fell within the space of few months: they both
were of particular significance for the FRG. The first was the fortieth
anniversary of the end of WWII and of the Potsdam conference. The
recurrence reminded West Germans of the painful origins of their
democratic rebirth and of the territorial, political and psychological
restrictions which still affected their national and international identity.
The second was the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki
Accords, i.e. of the founding act of the multilateral process of détente
which had provided the FRG with vaster foreign political possibilities
and had contributed to reinforce its international emancipation.

The two anniversaries were tied by a *fil rouge* which intertwined
Germany’s past, present and future. They touched some West German
very sensitive nerves: whilst the first recalled the roots of Germany’s
and Europe’s division, the second addressed the possibilities for its
future overcoming. Hence, it is not surprising that the respective
organisations of both celebrations interacted with each other as well.
The West German Foreign Office tried deliberately to establish a

linkage between the organisation of the celebrations for the anniversary of WWII’s conclusion and the organisation of the ceremony for the first ten years of European détente. Being important matters of West German international image involved in the celebration of both anniversaries, the ceremonies in their memories were carefully prepared within the Auswärtiges Amt and by West German diplomacy already starting from 1984.

West German diplomatic efforts were devoted to shape the political meaning of the upcoming celebrations of the year 1985, as much as possible, according to the FRG’s view. The anniversary of the conclusion of WWII was particular worrisome for Bonn. The federal government’s aim was avoiding that the focus of celebrations would excessively lay on the issue of Germany’s defeat.656 A demonstration of what Bonn feared that the ceremony on 8 May 1985 would turn into was provided by the celebrations of the D-Day on 6 June 1944, i.e. of the landings operation which had marked the beginning of the liberation of German-occupied Western Europe. The dilemma whether a West German delegation would be present at the commemorative ceremony in Pointe du Hoc represented for Bonn a crucial issue of great diplomatic significance. The list of invites was limited to all those who could be counted amongst the winners of the Normandy landings: the heads of state and government of the six countries which had participated in the military operation, namely the U.S. President, the British Queen, the Prime Minister of Canada, the Kings of Norway and Belgium, the Queen of Netherlands; the Grand Duke of Luxembourg, who had participated in the landing at Normandy as an officer of the British army; and the ministers of defence of those countries whose big contingents of soldiers had taken part in the operation, namely Poland, Denmark, Greece and Czechoslovakia.657 The configuration of the ceremony for the D-Day seemed to be marked by a symbolically divisive character which greatly displeased Bonn. The Auswärtiges Amt

had informed its three big Western allies – France, the U.S. and the U.K. – of its preference for shaping celebrations, as far as it was possible, as a forward-looking event whose meaning should not be limited to a mere memory of the past. Celebrations in Normandy should be respectful, according to the words of West German Ambassador in Paris Scholler, of “the present position of the Bundesrepublik as a democratic constitutional state and a loyal member of the Western Alliance and of the European Community”. Bonn was aware of the fact that the German past imposed unavoidable duties and responsibilities, with whom the FRG had to cope with. Bonn’s attempt was directed, however, to transform the commemoration of the past into an occasion of reaffirmed reconciliation. Initially, West German requests did not find positive reception in Paris. Indeed, as Ambassador Schoeller reported to Bonn, French President Mitterrand attached special importance to the commemoration of the landing at Normandy. The stress on reconciliation wished by West Germans would be more suitable as symbolic cornerstones of the celebrations of 8 May the year after. The awkwardness of the West German relations with its European allies with regard to their common but different past prevented Bonn from taking any assertive initiatives to convince Paris. The decision to rule out the presence of a West German delegation at the celebrations in Normandy was, however, reason of disappointment for Bonn. As it was assessed in the Auswärtiges Amt, the fact that the exclusion of the FRG at the commemorative ceremony on 6 June 1984 fell in a month marked by numerous important meetings of the Western Alliance did highlight even more the enduring existence of demarcation lines amongst the Western partners. Ultimately, even though the FRG was not represented in Normandy, it received a moral reward through its mentioning in Mitterrand’s address in Pointe du Hoc. In the passage concerning the past confrontation with Germany, after remembering German war victims and partisans, the French

658 Ibid.
659 Ibid. (footnote 3).
660 Ibid. (footnote 3).
Few months after the celebrations for the Normandy landings, another important anniversary was commemorated in France, this time in the presence of the West German Chancellor. On 22 September 1984 Mitterrand and Kohl were together on the battlefield of Verdun to honour the victims of the longest battle of WWI, quintessence of the bloodbath marking Europe’s history at the beginning of the century. The symbolic value of the ceremony staged in Verdun was welcomed with coolness by a large part of the European press: most reports did not forget to highlight that it had the meaning of a palliative consolation for the exclusion of the West German chancellor at the fortieth anniversary of the D-Day. To the contrary, the celebration in Verdun was praised by Bonn’s federal government as an additional crucial reaffirmation of the solidity of the French-German entente. From a pragmatic viewpoint, the spirit of reconciliation dominating in Verdun gave clear indications, according to Bonn, on the right way to follow for remembering the past in view of the upcoming anniversaries of 1985.

The commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the conclusion of WWII on 8 May 1945 represented, for several reasons, a delicate appointment for the FRG. It was the day of remembrance of Germany’s defeat. It recalled the responsibilities of the Nazis for the rage of the war and for the crimes committed against humanity. It reminded the Germans and the world of the clear-cut division between Europe’s liberators and war winners on the one side and Europe’s occupants and war defeated on the other side. The issue of war’s defeat still remained in the Eighties a sensitive issues for the FRG: for a country which had

661 Not without satisfaction, West German Ambassador in Paris Scholler reported to Bonn that the German passage of Mitterrand’s speech was the one receiving greatest attention on French television. See: Botschafter Scholler, Paris, an das Auswärtige Amt, 07.06.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc. 164, p. 796.


663 Ibid.
built its postwar identity on the pursuit of a full integration into the family of Western democracies, every element or circumstance echoing back to the existence of a German special path was carefully handled by the West German federal government. Quite significantly, in an internal paper drafted by ministerial director Pfeffer on the issue of the commemoration of 8 May, the formulation according to which “the defeat of Germany had paved the way to the rebirth of democracy in the Western part of the country” was replaced by the recognition that “Hitler’s fall had led to the liberation of Western Europe and to the rebirth of democracy in the Western part of the country”.\textsuperscript{664} It was not only opportune to single out Hitler’s responsibilities for Germany’s defeat; it was of the utmost importance, as well, to tie Germany’s destiny to the common European destiny.

Even though the FRG had managed to consolidate over the postwar decades its position as an integral part of the Western Alliance, the burden of the past continued to affect the country’s relations with its Western partners. The fortieth anniversary of the end of WWII reminded Bonn of another bitter truth, i.e. that its national settlement remained dependent on the decisions of its allies.\textsuperscript{665} The former capital of the German Reich was the quintessential symbol of this lasting dependency: decisions about the arrangement for postwar Germany had been taken in Berlin; questions concerning the status of the divided city continued to be item of regular debate between Bonn, its allies and the Soviet Union throughout the whole duration of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{666}

\textsuperscript{664} Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer, 8.11.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. II, doc. 298, p. 1390

\textsuperscript{665} In the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin signed on 3 September 1971, the Four Powers had reaffirmed the validity of their joint rights and responsibilities over Berlin and Germany as a whole.

\textsuperscript{666} The main questions with regard the status of Berlin, discussed after the signing of the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, concerned: first, the extension of the validity of international treaties signed by the FRG to West Berlin (see: AAPD, 1977, vol. I, doc. 382); second, the inclusion of West Berlin into the 1979 direct election of the European Parliament (see: AAPD, 1976, vol. II, doc. 231); third, the establishment of a Federal Environment Agency in West Berlin. One important regular forum of discussion on inner-German and Berlin questions was provided by the routine of the meetings of the
Hence, the U.S. proposal to organise a commemorative ceremony on 8 May 1985 in the city of Berlin did not enjoy the West German favour. As pointed out by the Auswärtiges Amt in an internal paper, the FRG did not want to appear, on occasion of the anniversary of the end of WWII, as an object of international affairs.\textsuperscript{667} As Kohl confirmed to Reagan in the course of his visit to Washington at end of November 1984, the West German federal government intended to take care of the anniversary and to take part in the celebrations together with the Western allies.\textsuperscript{668} Bonn’s idea was to shape the commemoration of the anniversary as a celebration of reconciliation between former enemies, by lessening distinctions between winners and losers: whilst an “East-West Verdun” did not seem to be feasible because of the tense state of international relations, a sort of “Verdun within the Western Alliance” could be instead realised.\textsuperscript{669} Insisting on the aspect of reconciliation implied, according to the West German viewpoint, not restricting celebrations to the mere commemoration of the past, but focusing instead of the ensuing positive developments that had sprung from the conclusion of the war.

It was during his talks with American Secretary of State Schultz at the end of 1984 that Genscher advanced the proposal of tying the commemoration on 8 May 1985 with the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.\textsuperscript{670} This operation would offer the possibility to commemorate Europe’s common past, foreign ministers of the FRG, the U.S., the U.K. and France, which traditionally took place in conjunction with the gatherings of NATO’s Council of Ministers. The coordination between the Bundesrepublik and the three Western partners was two-way: on the one hand, Bonn was offered the possibility to be involved and have voice in the decisions regarding Berlin – for whose status the three powers shared the responsibility with the Soviet Union; on the other hand, Bonn was asked to keep constantly informed the Western partners about the pursuit of its bilateral relations with the GDR.

\textsuperscript{669} \textit{Ibid}.
looking at the same time towards Europe’s common future. Bonn had put a peculiar stress on the future-oriented character of the CSCE since its origins, by advocating the idea that the steady improvement of the process of détente would create the favourable conditions for the overcoming of the continent’s division and for the solution to the German question. In 1985 the future-oriented character of the CSCE process served to another purpose as well: i.e. to cope with the most problematic aspects of the remembrance of the German past and with its enduring legacies still weighing on the FRG’s international image. The linkage with the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the end of WWII helps explain Bonn’s insistence, in the course of 1984, on the necessity of preparing carefully the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the CSCE and deciding in due time at what political level the ceremony in Helsinki would take place. Genscher sponsored the idea of gathering at the level of foreign ministers, as he had done beforehand when preparing the Madrid CSCE. The process of European détente continued to require the highest political commitment of its participants. As commented by West German foreign policy analyst Christoph Bertram: “foreign ministers would go to Helsinki not just for a class reunion of memories; they could instead continue to work on shaping the future.”

Celebrating ten years of European détente: a final reappraisal

As Genscher has recalled in his memoirs, the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the CSCE, which took place in Helsinki between 31 July and 1 August 1985, was mainly a West German initiative. According to the West German wish, the foreign ministers of the thirty-five participant states of the CSCE participate in the ceremony in the

Finnish capital. The significance of the gathering limited itself to its symbolic value: neither the thirty-five foreign ministers agreed on a common declaration – apart from proclaiming their vague willingness to continue the CSCE process and deepen cooperation in the field of economy and environment – nor any tangible impulse was given to the future development of the CSCE.674 The real element of novelty of the ceremony in Helsinki was represented by the international debut of new Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.675 After Soviet foreign policy had been under Gromyko’s steady direction for 27 years, Shevardnadze’s appointment was surrounded by diffuse curiosity and many expectations in Western Europe.

Hence, at the celebrations of European détente everyone’s eyes were focused on the superpowers. As contemporary policy analyst Christoph Bertram commented, relations between the superpowers in Helsinki were very affable.676 If on the one hand Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze recalled in his speech at the plenary session the urgent necessity of peaceful coexistence,677 on the other hand U.S. Secretary of State Georg Schultz spoke in Helsinki of the possibility of opening a “new era” of international politics.678 Similarly to the CDE in Stockholm, the meeting in Helsinki on 31 July-1 August 1985 did represent more a test for the willingness to cooperate of the superpowers rather than a test for the willingness to improve the process of European détente. The significance of the Soviet-American encounter in the Finnish capital was mainly assessed by commentators and foreign policy analysts of the time through the lenses of the upcoming bilateral appointment of November 1985, when Reagan and Gorbachev would meet for the first time. It would be the first time that a U.S. president and a Soviet leader would come face to face with each

674 Ibid.
other since the last meeting between Carter and Brezhnev in 1979.679 Quite significantly, Gorbachev gave evidence of some new flexibility in foreign policy before the CSCE foreign ministers gathered in Helsinki to celebrate European détente. The new Soviet leader advanced the proposal, first, of a unilateral moratorium for all nuclear tests starting from 6 August 1985 – date of the fortieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima – and lasting until the end of the year. Second, the Kremlin smoothed its position on the American SDI project during the arms reduction talks in Geneva. The Soviet delegation opened, just before the conclusion of the second negotiation round, to the possibility of implementing research programmes in the field of anti-ballistic missile defence systems under certain conditions; moreover, it declared its availability to discuss the possible dismantling of about 30 percent of its missile delivering systems and nuclear warheads.680

Whether and to what extent the improvement of European détente would benefit from the return of superpower initiative in the field of East-West dialogue was unclear in the summer of 1985. According to Christoph Bertram, looking back at the developments of the previous decade helped answer to the question what the CSCE process could and could not be in the future.681 In the past ten years of CSCE, setbacks had been paralleled by important achievements. First, the Helsinki framework had provided protection for the slow but steady process of change in the Soviet bloc. After Helsinki, transformations in the field of East-West contacts had been pursued by the West with the forced connivance of the Soviet bloc’s communist regimes. Second, the CSCE process had affirmed itself as an important form of diplomacy by instalment wherein the ball of dialogue remained steadily in game. This had allowed, third, Europeanising and stabilising East-West relations in times of major bipolar tensions. 682 However, the question

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682 Ibid.
the participants of the CSCE were compelled to answer to in the summer of 1985 was whether the framework of the process of European détente would still be valid in the future under changing international conditions. In an interview released in August 1985, Genscher declared that East-West relations were at the beginning of a new era in which the West German Foreign Office would continue its realistic policy of détente with unchanged efforts.

The CSCE process had always represented an important indicator of the state of health of bipolar relations. Once more, the 1985 gathering of the CSCE foreign ministers in Helsinki served the purpose to test the direction of the changing dynamics East-West relations were going through. The return of the superpower dialogue changed the conditions that had underlain the unfolding of multilateral détente. Whereas Genscher declared he was intended to give new impulse to his realistic détente policy towards the East, it was evident that Bonn’s foreign political possibilities would be compelled to cope with the ongoing redefinition of Cold War dynamics. As argued by Bertram, in this new phase of East-West relations the FRG seemed not to play a central role for the first time since the late Seventies. After his appointment, Gorbachev had decided to travel first to Paris and Rome; similarly, his Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met Genscher only at the end of his tour of visits in the Western European capitals. Times had changed since the era of Schmidt’s Eastern diplomacy of state visits. The lower profile of West German diplomatic initiatives towards the East was certainly affected, first, by Kohl’s international vision, which privileged a pronounced preference for the special relationship with the U.S.; and second, by the enduring opposition to proactive Eastern initiatives shared by some large sectors of the CDU. However, Genscher’s aspirations to play a propulsive role in the process of East-

683 Ibid.
684 “Genscher warnt vor Wechselbädern”, in Der Spiegel, 32/1985, 05.08.1985.
West rapprochement were challenged most importantly by the resumption of the superpower monopoly on East-West dialogue.

To sum up, 1985 represented an important year of transition and redefinition for the FRG’s international identity. West German foreign policy was compelled to cope with some major challenges imposed both by the public confrontation with its own past and by the gradual, renewed shift in Cold War balances. Analysing how the West German international role was redefined and redefined itself against the background of the changing international conditions of the last Cold War years will be the important task of future historical research.
Conclusions

Assessing the meaning of the FRG’s CSCE policy in the years 1975-1985

This thesis has shown that the West German Foreign Office undertook major efforts to allow the process of multilateral détente in Europe to continue and improve between 1975 and 1985, on the basis of the founding grounds laid down in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. These efforts aimed primarily at protecting the achievements of East-West dialogue from the renewed exacerbation of bipolar tensions which marked international relations between the late Seventies and early Eighties. This work does not discard traditional interpretations according to which the CSCE represented for the FRG the necessary multilateral framework to embed its dynamic policies towards the GDR (Deutschlandpolitik) and the Soviet bloc (Ostpolitik) and make them acceptable to the Western partners. However, it challenges the idea that the meaning of the FRG’s CSCE policy can be reduced to this single aspect. The multilateral guarantee of Bonn’s bilateral Eastern policies was only one side of a more complex foreign political project which involved manifold motivations and aims.

After the formative years of negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki, the CSCE policy affirmed itself after 1975 as a solid foreign policy paradigm and a major foreign political priority of the FRG. Improving the process of multilateral détente was a genuine West German political interest. As it had been highlighted in this thesis, the Auswärtiges Amt dedicated a great deal of time and attention to the preparation of the CSCE meetings: the diplomatic work of coordination with the Western partners and negotiation with the Eastern and NNA
countries was sided by a careful planning within the Foreign Office. A load of papers addressing strategic considerations and political orientations, assessments of contingent conditions, course corrections, evaluations of reached outcomes and previsions of future developments were drafted by diplomats, officers and policy analysts working for the Auswärtiges Amt. Bonn’s engagement in the CSCE process implied a combination of ideal stances, vital national interests and foreign political ambitions. The analysis of their interweaving explains why the CSCE process represented a main German question in the years 1975-1985: it involved, directly and indirectly, the manifold dimensions of the German question (question of intra-European borders and their change; definition of new shared rules of co-existence; question of trust building and mutual perceptions; duality of Westpolitik-Ostpolitik; issues of Germany’s image); it allowed the FRG to pursue its vital foreign political needs and interests; it provided the FRG with the framework wherein the federal government could merge the peculiarities of the country’s geopolitical position with its ambition of playing a more influential international role.

Ideal inspiration

The 1975 Helsinki Final Act added to the complex of Treaties negotiated and signed with the Eastern countries during the first successful phase of Bonn’s new Ostpolitik. On their whole they form the “constitutional” corpus of West German détente. With Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik Bonn’s CSCE policy shared the ideal horizon, too. The aim of building a new European order of peace, which had been the cornerstone of Bahr’s conception of Ostpolitik and had been mentioned by Willy Brandt in his acceptance speech on occasion of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in 1971, was inherited and pursued by Genscher in the field of the CSCE. As the West German foreign minister unceasingly repeated in speeches and interviews, Bonn efforts should be directed to the reinforcement of the

climate of détente in Europe which would create in the long-term the favourable conditions for German people to decide in self-determination about their unification. The traditional view according to which Bonn’s Eastern policies suffered from a loss of visionary inspiration after the important achievements of the years 1969-1973 does not stand scrutiny: the analysis of speeches and public interventions on issues of East-West dialogue during the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s shows that the idealistic thrust marking West German détente during its formative years remained nearly unchanged. As Konrad Seitz has put it in his introduction to the volume collecting a selection of Genscher’s speeches, for the West German foreign minister multilateral détente was Deutschlandpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik was multilateral détente.688 Contrary to the argument according to which the issue of “unification” disappeared from Bonn’s political agenda since the mid-Seventies, the process of multilateral détente provided the federal government with an adequate framework within which the discourse on the German reunification could be continued.689 Even though strict inner-German issues were always kept out of the multilateral negotiation agenda at the CSCE meetings both for Bonn’s and East Berlin’s own will, the proclaimed West German aim underpinning the process of multilateral détente remained always to keep the door open to the German reunification in the long-run. Bonn’s insistence on the importance of multiplying and expanding human contacts between the blocs – the primal goal pursued by West German diplomats at the CSCE negotiations – was certainly due to the wish of improving the present living-conditions of Germans living

689 Beside the CSCE, the UN was the other main stage were the discourse on German reunification was publicly addressed; references to the division-unification issue were mentioned by Genscher in his annual speech in front of the General Assembly in New York. See, for instance: Rede Genschers vor der 30. UNO-Generalversammlung, 24.09.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 179.024; Rede Genschers vor der 34. UNO-Generalversammlung, 27.09.1979, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 179.034; Interview Genschers anlässlich seiner Rede vor der 37. UNO-Generalversammlung, 07.10.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 179.047.
beyond the Iron Curtain. However, it rested upon the awareness, as well, that improved every-day contacts would pave the way to a growing interdependence between the two German states and the two blocs.  

**Vital national needs**

The prosecution of the CSCE process was of primal importance for Bonn because it contributed to satisfy the country’s vital interests not only in the field of human contacts, but in the field of security as well. The peculiarity of West German security needs has been discussed in the introduction of the thesis. The FRG’s influence on decisions in the field of the military security was limited by the existing structural limitations to the country’s self-reliance in this area. Differently, Bonn’s diplomacy could aim at having a greater weight when discussing about security issues within the CSCE framework. This was mainly due to the existence of multiple interactions amongst the Helsinki Baskets: through crossed negotiations West German delegators could pursue the goal – not always successfully – to achieve results in some areas by making concessions in other areas. Confidence-building measures and the Conference on Disarmament in Europe were Bonn’s primal conference interests. They were an integral part of a broader security complex whose reinforcement was felt as more urgent as greater became the federal government’s perennial worries and uncertainties about the fragile East-West military balances in Europe. Security and détente had been intertwined constitutive dimensions of the common project of European détente since the times of the 1967 Harmel Report. This dissertation discards the view according to which issues of security dominated West German international initiatives and East-

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690 The achievements of the inner-German dialogue in the years of the Schmidt administration must be evaluated through the same lenses. Frequently defined “minor” if compared with the 1972 signing of the Basic Treaty, they laid instead fundamental and concrete grounds for the rapprochement between the two German states: one need only consider the permanent legacy of the project of construction of the highway connecting Hamburg with Berlin, which was successfully negotiated in the years 1978-1980. See: M. Roth, *Zwei Staaten in Deutschland. Die sozialliberale Deutschlandpolitik und ihre Auswirkungen 1969-1978* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981).
West relations between the late Seventies and the early Eighties, by making the prosecution of a policy of détente nearly impossible. It suggests instead to look more carefully at the interaction of security and détente and to interpret it differently. Even though an accurate investigation of debates and negotiations in the field of security is out of the scope of the thesis, it has been attempted to take into considerations their interactions with the developments of the CSCE process. Their study prompts the following conclusion: not only did détente and security continue to belong to the same political project even in the years of renewed Cold War tension, but they were also correlated to each other in a complex way. Far from representing a mere hindrance to the prosecution of East-West dialogue, security issues offered the opportunity to give a new impulse to the CSCE process and rediscover a field of shared East-West convergent interest which would allow negotiations to achieve concrete improvements, as the analysis in chapters 3 and 4 has shown.

*Foreign political ambitions*

West German efforts in the pursuit of multilateral détente were dictated, moreover, by Bonn’s ambitions to develop a more self-reliant and assertive international identity. The country’s overwhelming economic strength and assumption of new international tasks – for instance, the ones deriving from the FRG’s first appointment as rotary member in the UN Security Council – nourished the West German federal government’s awareness of the necessity to have its voice more clearly heard in the realm of world affairs. The CSCE policy was mentioned in Genscher’s memoirs as one of the three pillars – beside the UN policy and the engagement for the project of European Union – which built Bonn’s new foreign policy of growing international responsibility.⁶⁹¹ There was awareness in Bonn that the solution to the German question – at least to its psychological aspects linked to widespread fears of a perennial German threat – passed through the demonstration that Germany could play a different, responsible role in Europe. Hence, the pursuit of multilateralism – and in the specific of

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multilateral détente – by Bonn aimed at the assertion of the FRG as a more influential European power. It wasn’t a coincidence that Bonn’s efforts were directed to the reinforcement not only of the process of détente but of the political and foreign political identity of the EC as well. In this sense, Bonn’s CSCE policy in the years 1975-1985 has to be collocated within a game played mostly within the Western caucus. As it has been analysed in the course of this study, an important part of the West German diplomatic efforts were directed, both during the preparation and the unfolding of the CSCE meetings, to coordinating and negotiating with the Western partners. The Western coordination within both the smaller EC-caucus and the larger NATO-caucus proved to be problematic in many occasions over the decade under study. The numerous changes of leadership in the Western countries contributed to the reconfiguration of the landscape of relations and balances within the Alliance. The evolution of the FRG’s role within the Western Alliance coincided in time and interacted with this broader process of redefinition transatlantic relations underwent in these years.

The reasons of the West German special interest in the CSCE were twofold. First, the multilateral dimension of the process of European détente offered the adequate conditions for Bonn to take more dynamic initiatives. The necessary coordination with the Western partners set the limits of the FRG’s ultimate decisions: as it has been analysed in the course of the work, Bonn could not allow itself to bear the risk of diplomatic isolation. This provided the antidote against the allies’ enduring fears of a FRG’s solo turn to East, of its possible decision to opt for neutrality and of its return to great power politics. However, the large composition of the diplomatic forum allowed West German diplomacy to use multiple negotiation channels and take a wide range of diplomatic initiatives at multiple levels within the Western caucus.

692 Gensch...
with the NNA countries and the Eastern counterparts. It was on this diplomatic work behind the scenes that Bonn focused its attention and efforts in order to pursue its foreign political goals in autonomy. Second, the CSCE process was the most suitable framework wherein Bonn could cultivate its ambitions of playing a political lead role within the Western caucus in the field of East-West dialogue which would parallel the country’s undisputable leadership in the field of economy. Given the geographic structure of the CSCE, the FRG could use the peculiarities of its geopolitical position – collocated in the centre of the continent (Mittellage) and on the outskirts of the Western bloc (Randlage) – to perform the role of natural mediator between the East and the West. The CSCE encouraged Germany’s traditional Central European vocation: not coincidentally, frequent references to the inheritance left by the East-West policies of Weimar Republic’s Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann emerged from Genscher’s explanations of his multilateral détente policy.693 Hence, the trajectory of the CSCE policy in the years 1975-1985 could be read through the lenses of a vaster process of growing West German self-confidence and emancipation in foreign policy. Assessing this process requires to take into due account both its achievements and shortcomings. Achievements were manifold: the dialogue with the East continued in spite of bipolar major tensions; channels of dialogue remained open even when the conditions for material agreements lacked; the U.S. administration remained involved in the process of European détente, even though it did not share either its aims and methods; East-West ties increasingly grew and improvements in the different areas covered by the Helsinki Final Act were realised. Those results were valuable for Bonn for their tangible impact as well as for reasons of diplomatic

prestige: being the country which invested most efforts into the project of multilateral détente, the FRG perceived any advancement attained on the front of the CSCE as its own diplomatic victory. As described in the preceding chapters of this work, in several occasions the FRG overestimated the effectiveness of its diplomatic means. Neither was Bonn able to persuade the U.S. administration to undertake a more pragmatic course in Belgrade and Madrid; nor was it able to bear the risks of diplomatic isolation within the Western Alliance. Suspicions about the ultimate aims of Bonn’s special interest in continuing East-West dialogue in spite of major bipolar tensions re-emerged regularly in the debate within the Western Alliance. It was especially in the years 1981-1982 – the most difficult years in the trajectory of the CSCE process, when many within the Western caucus took into serious account the opportunity of changing foreign political course towards the East – that the FRG returned to be placed under special surveillance. A problem of trust and perceptions continued to be an integral part of the German question. West German attempts to change its international image brought only to partial results. The long-lasting limitations to Bonn’s foreign policy did not only draw the borders within which West German diplomacy could chase to reinforce its general international action; but they did limit the political and psychological West German room of manoeuvre within the framework of the CSCE as well.

Assessing the trajectory of the FRG’s CSCE policy in the years 1975-1985

Another conclusion which emerges from this study is that the FRG’s CSCE policy underwent a major process of qualitative change in the years after 1975. Contrary to the scholars’ general trend to focus on the genesis of the CSCE and on the formative years of Bonn’s involvement in multilateral détente negotiations, the significance of this consecutive evolution deserves greater attention. The trajectory of Bonn’s multilateral policy of détente in the years 1975-1985 represented a step-by-step learning process, where setbacks and crises turned into
occasions of revision and correction. Episodes of crisis played a formative role in the evolving process of Bonn’s multilateral détente strategy. Crisis is an ancient word, which originally indicated the act of separating the wheat from the chaff; as the etymology of the word suggests, crises represent occasions of rethinking, where decisions are to be made about what one had to preserve and what one had to get rid of. This was the case of the process of partial revision the West German détente strategy went through in the late 1970s: the stall of the CSCE process and the climate of growing crisis coming into being in the landscape of East-West relations urged Bonn to make some decisions about what its détente policy had to focus on and renounce to.

The theoretical grounds underpinning the West German participation in the CSCE remained nearly unchanged since Helsinki onwards: a pronounced continuity regarded its general aims and principles. To change were the strategies devised by Bonn in order to deal with the concrete challenges the CSCE process was faced with from time to time. The West German Foreign Office gradually developed a realistic policy of détente, whose realism did not limit itself to good intentions but was growingly translated into practice. As chapters 2 and 3 have shown, even though the concept of “realistic détente policy” was formulated by the Auswärtiges Amt and advocated by Genscher amongst the Western allies in the aftermath of the first CSCE in Helsinki, it was only during the years spanning between the follow-up meetings of Belgrade and Madrid that the concept found new ways of coming into being. As major international challenges – primarily the Afghan and the Polish crises – affected directly the validity and continuation of the CSCE process, realism became synonym of increasing flexibility and adaptability. Flexibility implied to accept the separation between the levels of principles from the level of actions. During the preparation and the unfolding of the review conference of Madrid – under the boost of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, of the general deterioration of East-West relations, and of the imposition of martial law in Poland – Bonn learnt to look with more flexibility at the respect of the principles of geographic and functional integrity of multilateral détente. This meant, in the practice, that CSCE
negotiations could continue in spite of Afghanistan and Poland; and that détente improvements were to pursue at different speeds in different areas.

The analysis of how West German diplomacy dealt with the East-West dispute over missiles and the Polish crisis with regard to the CSCE process has revealed one Bonn’s important intuition: i.e. that serious episodes of crises could be used to the Western advantage, if managed with carefulness and discretion. The West German Foreign Office identified in the missiles and the Polish crises some potential for relaunching the CSCE process. In the case of the first, the Soviet wish to derail the implementation of the armed track of 1979 NATO’s decision was used to force the Soviet bloc to negotiations. In the case of the second, the CSCE’s potential beneficial effect on Poland’s stabilisation and liberalisation was used to convince the sceptical Western partners to continue negotiations in Madrid. Notwithstanding the partial success of the second strategy – especially with regard to the capability of persuading the U.S. administration to pursue a more moderate negotiation course – Bonn’s intuition remains important. It suggests an alternative interpretation of the role of the crises marking the years of the so-called second Cold War which does not limit itself to considering the harmful impact of these episodes of crisis on East-West relations but which takes into account their multi-faceted meaning.

Pursuing a realistic détente policy meant, as well, being able to take into account with pragmatism the reasons and motivations of all parts involved into the CSCE process. As Genscher wrote in 1984: “The Helsinki Final Act could be signed because none of the participants aimed at attaining everything by expecting the others to cede everything. This had to remain valid for the future continuation of the CSCE process as well”.694 The lesson learnt from the Helsinki CSCE could be replicated at the follow-up meeting in Madrid after the misstep of Belgrade and after long, strenuous efforts to convince the U.S. administration to abandon its zero-sum approach to negotiations. As Bonn unceasingly repeated to Washington during the unfolding of

694 H.D. Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 312.
the Madrid CSCE, the Eastern vital interest for a CDE and enhanced economic cooperation with the West could be turned to the West’s advantage and to the CSCE’s sake. Tying the Soviet bloc’s growing needs for cooperation in the security and economic fields to the advancement of the process of multilateral détente was the most important achievement the CSCE process could attain after Helsinki: it paved the way to the ensuing major developments of the last Cold War years.
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