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Speaking with a Single Voice

The Assertion of the EC as a Distinctive International Actor, 1969-79

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Abstract

The object of analysis of this dissertation is the process of the assertion of the European Community as a distinct and distinctive international actor during the 1970s. The main argument is that the EC’s activity on the global stage underwent a major qualitative change in those years, increasing considerably in intensity and scope. The EC asserted itself not only as a major economic player, but also as a distinct political player. Moreover, its international activity was endowed with a distinctive character. The EC claimed that it was a «force for good», particularly attached to dialogue and cooperation, and aimed at promoting a more balanced and a more just international order, as well as an original and innovative approach to international relations.

To be sure, the EC’s international activity remained quite fragmentary, often declaratory, and sometimes ineffective. This was hardly surprising. To a large extent, disappointment with the EC’s achievements was due to the excessively high expectations that had been held of its activity. Contrary to most existing historiography, I argue that the 1973–74 crisis was more a beginning than an ending point for the assertion of the EC as an international actor. In those years its traits and ambitions were defined. The European Council was established and the coherence of the EC’s international activity was improved. The EC became a recognizable player at the UN and it gained recognition by basically all of the world’s countries. The range of action available for the EC’s international activity was defined and quite a clear division of labor with the member states and with the US was established, leading the EC to focus on “civilian” activities and to cultivate a distinctive profile.

This is the first extensive and dedicated historical account of the EC’s international activity as a whole during the 1970s. I consider all the main aspects of it, in order to reconstruct the overall process of assertion of the EC on the international stage and the general traits of the EC as an international actor. I consider how and why such an assertion was promoted, how it was connected to other contemporary developments, and who influenced the definition of the traits of the EC as a global player. I focus on instances where the assertion of the EC on the global stage was debated and its traits were defined. In most cases debates about it were not explicit, and debates on more specific and
actual topics worked as proxies for them. As a consequence, I focus on the aspects of the EC's international activity where the fundamental conceptions underlying it were the most apparent.

Actors involved in the making of the EC as an international actor often held different views and conceptions of it. The compromise and combination of these different conceptions led to the definition and assertion of the EC's specific traits as an international actor. The main actors involved were the governments of the EC member states – a particularly important role being played by France – but the EC Commission also took some significant initiatives. In order to reconstruct the views of the governments and of the Commission, I rely mainly on archival sources drawn from the archives of the EC institutions and from the archives of the foreign ministries of France, Britain and Germany.

The first three chapters of the thesis focus on the process of establishment of the EC as a distinct international actor. Thus, they focus on the definition of the structures, procedures and means for its international activity. I show that the design of the institutional structure for it was quite difficult and it often required to reach fragile and ambiguous compromises. The reason for this was that the institutional design was strongly affected by the member states' views on the final form of European political integration, which were divergent. I look at the means created for the expression of the EC's voice on the international stage, and I argue that the main reason why the EC did not always manage to speak clearly was its member states' reticence about it. The structure for the EC's international activity was heavily affected not only by institutional constraints, but also by some political ones. These constraints led to the exclusion of entire fields of international affairs from it. I argue that this exclusion strongly affected the traits of the EC as an international actor, by inviting it to focus on specific “civilian” sectors of international affairs.

The adoption of a distinctive approach to international affairs was useful for the EC's assertion, since it made it possible to highlight its original character with regard to its own member states and to the US. The EC sought to assert itself as a distinctive international actor by focusing on fields of international affairs such as development cooperation, dialogue with the developing countries, the promotion of human rights in third countries, and so on. It is towards these fields that I turn to in chapters 4 through 6. In each chapter, I analyze the conceptions underlying the EC’s engagement in the field, as well as the image that the EC tried to project on the international stage. I show that the EC consistently tried to convey an image of itself as a «force for
good.» However, there was a fundamental mismatch between the discourse and image of the EC as a force for good and its actual policies and initiatives: deeds often fell well short of words. I consider this mismatch, analyzing the reasons why the EC rhetoric set very ambitious goals and why the EC found it very difficult to meet them. Part of the reason for it was that rhetoric was meant to rationalize some of the limited capabilities available for the EC's international activity, and to make up for them. I argue that the EC established a sort of vicious circle: it resorted to rhetoric in order to make up for its limited capabilities, but this strategy raised very high expectations. The EC was unable to meet these expectations, and as a result the limits of its capabilities were exposed even more.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIEC</td>
<td>Conference on International Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMEA</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariff and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAEF</td>
<td>Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGCI</td>
<td>Sécretariat Général du Comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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Introduction

Object and argument of the dissertation

At the end of the 1960s, the EC's international activity consisted in the external commercial relations of the Community and in its policies for the management of relations with some former colonies of the EC member states. By the end of the 1970s, the Community had joined the UN and the G7 summits, and it had taken part in major international negotiations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. It had established direct relations with almost all of the world's countries and it had concluded commercial and cooperation agreements with many of them. EC member states had started to coordinate their foreign policies, and they had adopted a number of common positions and declarations on the main international political issues.

The argument of this thesis is that the EC's international activity underwent a major qualitative change in the 1970s, leading to the assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive international actor. The EC's activity on the global stage increased considerably in comparison to the previous period, both in terms of intensity and scope. The EC asserted itself not only as a major global economic player, but also as a distinct global political player. Moreover, the EC's international activity was endowed with a distinctive character, claiming a particular attachment to dialogue and cooperation. The EC claimed that it was a «force for good» and that its distinctive activity on the global stage was to promote a more balanced and a more just international order. The process of the assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive international actor during the 1970s is the object of analysis of this dissertation.

By using the term “the EC,” I refer to the complex of the Community system (EEC, ECSC, Euratom), of the European Political Cooperation system, of the European Council and of other initiatives jointly taken by their member states.¹ All these instances were different

¹ The EC member states were France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and starting from 1973 the United
expressions of a general activity of cooperation involving the same group of European countries and aiming at the promotion of a closer integration between them. By “international activity” of the EC I refer to the complex of policies, initiatives and relations carried out on the international stage by the EC in its various forms, such as for instance the Community’s external policies and the EPC initiatives. As for the notion of “international actor,” I adopt Christopher Hill’s definition of it: an international actor is clearly delimited from others and from its environment; it has procedures to make its own decisions; it has structural prerequisites and means for international action.

My dissertation contributes to the burgeoning trend in historiography that challenges the long held view that the 1970s were a period of deep crisis and inability to act for the EC. To be sure, the EC was seriously affected by the economic and energy crisis, by the evolution of the international monetary system, by evident strains and tensions in transatlantic relations, by the problems concerning the British membership, and so on. All of these problems were real, and it is clear that the EC experienced a «crise de confiance, crise de volonté, crise de lucidité» during the 1970s. However, growing evidence indicates that the period was also one of striking dynamism for the EC. The EC experienced its first enlargement, and major institutional innovations were decided, such as the establishment of the EPC, the creation of the European Council and the direct election of the European Parliament. New common policies were launched, such as the regional policy and the social policies. Most importantly, the project of monetary cooperation led to the creation of the European Monetary System.

It was in the external sphere that the EC reached some of its most

Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark.


remarkable achievements during the 1970s, as was recognized at the time. For instance, in late 1977 the President of the EC Commission Roy Jenkins worried about the imbalance between the «apparent, and at present, real external strength» of the EC, and «its internal weakness and difficulties.» These achievements did not lead only to the consolidation of the EC's position as a major international economic actor, but also to the assertion of the EC as a distinct international political actor. Daniel Möckli and Maria Gainar have recently analyzed such a development, but they have focused almost exclusively on the creation of the EPC and on its activities. In this dissertation I show that the EC's assertion as an international actor did not concern only the EPC: I consider also the other aspects of the EC's international activity and I show that they contributed to the EC's assertion to a considerable extent.

The existing historiography tends to argue that the goal of asserting the EC as a political global player was abandoned very quickly after its launch, mainly because of the pressures exerted by the US against it and because of the economic and political crisis begun in 1973–74. The clearest example of this interpretation is offered by Daniel Möckli in European Foreign Policy during the Cold War. My dissertation challenges this interpretation: I argue that 1973–74 was indeed a turning point for the EC's international activity, but it was more a beginning than an ending point for the assertion of the EC as an international actor. In order to appreciate this, it is essential to look beyond the EPC and to consider the more general picture of the EC's international activity. It is also essential to adopt realistic benchmarks for the assessment of such

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5 For the assertion of the EC as a major economic and commercial power, see L. Coppolaro, The Making of a World Trading Power. The European Economic Community (EEC) in the GATT Kennedy Round negotiations (1963–67), (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).

6 M. Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne: Les Neuf et la Coopération politique européenne de 1973 à 1980 (Bruxelles: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012); D. Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War. Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009). The EPC was a system for EC member states’ cooperation in the foreign policy field. It was established in 1970, and it was managed by intergovernmental institutions and procedures which were formally separated from the Community ones.

7 The Community’s international activity mainly concerned commercial issues and development cooperation. Other aspects of the EC’s international activity concerned the European Council.
an activity, properly taking into account the constraints affecting it.

In the early 1970s, the EC's international activity had quite vague traits and imprecise ambitions. It was in its very infant phase, and it is not by chance that most of the debates about it focused on structures, procedures and institutions. It was the 1973–74 crisis which made the EC's project of political integration really engage with reality, favoring a much clearer definition of its traits. Initial ambitions certainly had to be reduced as a result, but the EC's international activity did not end. Quite the contrary, it experienced its real beginning. The European Council was established and the coherence of the EC's international activity was improved. The EC became a recognizable player at the UN and it gained recognition by basically all of the world's countries. The limits of the room of maneuver available for the EC's international activity were defined and quite a clear division of labor with the US was established, leading the EC to focus on “civilian” activities and to cultivate a distinctive profile.

While this dissertation shows that the EC asserted itself as a distinct international political actor, it also advances the argument that the EC sought to assert itself as a distinctive international actor during the 1970s. The EC consistently presented itself as an international actor adopting and promoting an original and innovative approach to international relations. This approach assigned a central role to the notions of international cooperation and dialogue, to the understanding of international relations as a positive sum game, to the pursuit of values rather than only material interests. The adoption of this approach was useful for the EC's assertion as a distinct international actor, since it made it possible to highlight its original character with regard to its own member states and to the US. It also made it possible to compensate the limited capabilities available for the EC to act with rhetoric. While doubts can be held on both the plausibility and sincerity of this distinctive approach to international relations, fewer doubts can be held on the fact that the EC did stress its attachment to it. The EC often tried to substantiate its distinctive approach with the adoption of actual policies and initiatives, even though it rarely managed to do so effectively.

To argue that the EC asserted itself as a distinct and distinctive international actor during the 1970s does not mean to dismiss or overlook the limits, shortcomings and flaws of this process, which are quite evident. The EC's international activity remained quite fragmentary, often declaratory, and sometimes ineffective. This was hardly surprising, given the gravity of the economic and political crisis hitting Europe in those years, and given the inherent difficulty of
promoting political integration between nation states with significantly different interests and political cultures. To a large extent, disappointment with the EC’s achievements could be attributed to the excessively high expectations that had been held of it.\textsuperscript{8} In this respect, the EC created a sort of vicious circle, a capabilities–expectations trap: its limited capabilities of acting effectively on the international stage led it to rely much on rhetoric, but rhetorical commitments raised even higher expectations, which in turn had less and less chance of being met given the available capabilities.

**Relations with the literature and contribution to it**

The EC’s international activity in the 1970s has attracted a significant amount of interest from historians during the last few years. The most comprehensive view on it is provided by the collective volume *Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s*, edited by Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani.\textsuperscript{9} Most of the other studies have focused on specific external policies of the Community or on the activities of the EPC. Studies have dealt with the external trade policies of the Community and with its policies of development cooperation.\textsuperscript{10} Analyses have been devoted to the evolution of the relations between the EC and the US,\textsuperscript{11}


the Soviet bloc, China, and the non-aligned or developing countries. The role played by the EC in its neighborhood has been studied, focusing in particular on the CSCE and on its activity in the Mediterranean and in the Middle-East. The EPC system and activities have been thoroughly analyzed by Möckli and Gainar. Finally, some studies have looked at the creation of the European Council and at the establishment of connections between the EC and the G7 summits.

Detailed and accurate historical reconstructions of the specific aspects and instances of the EC’s international activity are essential.

17 Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européene; Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War.
Building upon them, it is now possible and necessary to draw a broader picture of the EC as a global player. In this dissertation I take a broad perspective on the EC’s international activity, considering its general process of definition and growth during the 1970s. I consider how and why the assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive international actor was promoted, how it was connected to other contemporary developments, and who influenced the definition of the traits of the EC as a global player. In doing so, I analyze the fundamental conceptions underlying the main aspects of the EC’s international activity, such as its institutional structure and the limits of its room of action.

So far there have not been any extensive and dedicated historical account of the EC’s international activity as a whole and of the general conceptions underlying it. Some recent works have taken into consideration limited aspects of it. Some of them have focused on the Declaration on European identity released by the EC member states in 1973, which largely dealt with the EC’s international activity. The Declaration is quite an interesting document, but its elaboration was strictly connected to a contingent attempt at reassessing transatlantic relations and it was mostly meant to influence the negotiations about it. The Declaration was only one specific step in a much longer and more composite process of definition and assertion of the EC’s role on the global stage. After Empires by Giuliano Garavini is possibly the most remarkable attempt to date to analyze the general conceptions underlying the EC’s international activity and it is one of the main points of reference for my dissertation. However, Garavini focuses on a specific aspect of the international activity of the EC, namely its relations with the “Global South” countries.

By extensively and specifically investigating the process of assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive international actor, I aim at enriching the historical understanding of the evolution undergone by the EC’s international activity during the 1970s. On the one side, my

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21 Garavini, After Empires.
analysis can enrich the understanding of specific aspects of it. On the other side, my analysis can provide some insight on the evolution of the more general process of European integration. Conceptions of the EC as an international actor and debates about it concerned different significant aspects of European integration, such as the structure and traits of the EC's institutions, the relationship between the Community and its member states, the definition of the final goal of integration, and so on. The analysis of the process of assertion of the EC as a global player can also provide some insight into the long-term process of the reassessment of the position and role of Europe on the international stage, with the transition from the European empires to a divided Europe in a bipolar world, to a Europe taking part in a globalizing, multipolar international order.

Besides contributing to the literature on the history of European integration, my dissertation can contribute to the political science literature on the European Union as an international actor. Especially in the last decade, the question of the character and identity of the EU as an international actor has attracted much attention from political scientists. They have discussed and looked at the role played by the EU in international affairs, at the principles orienting its activity in them, at the interests and values informing their design. The extent to which the EU can be considered a distinct international actor has been widely debated, as well as the extent to which it can be considered a distinctive international actor with a «civilian» or «normative» character.

international actor have mostly been theoretically oriented so far. The biggest efforts to investigate them empirically have been carried out by Sonia Lucarelli and a handful other scholars. While being aware of the differences existing between the EC and the EU and between historical and political science research, my dissertation can offer empirical evidence and historical insight to the debate on the EU as an international actor. Contrary to what most of the political science literature assumes, I show that the process of assertion of the EC/EU as an international actor started well before the establishment of the EU and of its Common Foreign and Security Policy. Moreover, a comprehensive analysis of the early conceptions, traits and image of the EC as an international actor can help to understand how they were defined, how they were engrained, and how they affected the later developments of the EC/EU’s international activity and identity.

**Approach and focus of the analysis**

In this dissertation I analyze how the assertion of the EC as a distinct international actor came about, and how it was defined the distinctive character assigned to it. In order to do so, I consider both the Community and the EPC dimensions of the EC's international activity, differently from most of the existing studies. The institutional separation between these two dimensions should not be overlooked. However, such a separation should not obliterate the fact that Community and EPC dimensions involved the same countries and to some extent the same people, and that they were both meant to concur to European political integration. To look at the EC's international activity as a whole is essential in order to appreciate the overall process of assertion of the EC on the international stage and the general traits of the EC as an international actor.

In order to analyze the assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive international actor, I focus on instances and debates where its assertion was debated and its traits were defined. Actors involved in the making of the EC as an international actor often held different

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views and conceptions of it. In particular, member states' governments advocated different conceptions of the EC's international activity and promoted different understandings of its traits as an international actor. For instance, the French government insisted on the necessity to establish the EC as an actor clearly distinct from the US. The Dutch government argued that the EC should assert itself as generous partner of the developing countries, the Italian government called for a federal outcome of the European political integration, and so on. The compromise and combination of these different conceptions led to the definition and assertion of the EC's specific traits as an international actor.

In some cases member states explicitly and directly discussed the assertion of the EC as an international actor. The case of the elaboration of the Declaration on the European identity was one instance of this. However, in most cases reflections and debates leading to the definition of the traits of the EC as an international actor were less explicit. Debates on more specific and actual topics worked as proxies for debates on the conception of the EC as an international actor. For instance, when the EC member states discussed the location of the headquarters of the EPC secretariat, they were actually debating about the relationship that should incur between the Community and the EPC, and the desirable degree of involvement of supranational institutions in the EC's international activity. I focus on the aspects of the EC's international activity where the fundamental conceptions underlying it were the most apparent, such as the design of the institutional structure for it, the definition of its relationship with transatlantic cooperation, the pursuit of policies deliberately aimed at projecting a distinctive image of the EC, and so on.

I focus on the EC's external policies which were deliberately intended to affirm the distinctiveness of the EC, such as the policies concerning the developing countries and human rights. These policies were deemed important to show and claim the originality of the EC's approach to international affairs, and to signal the EC's willingness to leave its mark on them. I focus especially on the assertion of the EC as a global player, and on policies meant to bring a distinctive EC contribution to the international system at large. For this reason, I do not pay special attention to policies mostly concerning Europe and its neighborhood, such as the enlargement and Mediterranean policies and the EC's participation in the CSCE. I do not focus on external policies mostly dealing with day-by-day business either or mostly aiming at a quite straightforward protection of European interests, such as many commercial and monetary policies. To be sure, such a selection does not
imply that these policies were not relevant – the only thing that it implies is that they were less relevant than others as far as the assertion of the EC as a distinctive global player was concerned.

In analyzing the process of the definition and assertion of the EC as an international actor, I focus on the main actors involved in the design and management of the EC's international activity. To a great extent, the governments of the EC member states were the main actors involved. States played a crucial role in the design of the general features of the EC's international activity and in the making of its policies and initiatives in international affairs. To focus on governments, it means to look at politicians on the one hand and at officials and diplomats on the other hand. In assessing states' views and actions, I assume that they were mostly driven by a rational pursuit of interests. However, I assume that ideas and role conceptions also matter in the making of foreign policy. Especially in cases such as French Gaullism or Dutch Third-Worldism, ideas clearly affected the way in which national interests were framed, the definition of the goals worth pursuing, and the room available to compromise with alternative conceptions of the EC's international activity.

Beside member states' governments, I take into account the role played by the EC Commission. The Commission took significant initiatives in favor of the assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive international actor, partly because such an assertion was expected to strengthen the Commission's weight. A particularly significant role was played by some members of the Commission, such as Sicco Mansholt, Christopher Soames, Claude Cheysson, and Roy Jenkins. The European Parliament played little role in the assertion of the EC as an international actor, since it had limited competences and weight in this respect. However, its activity favored the elaboration of some cross-national and cross-party views on the EC's international role, and in some cases the Parliament managed to assert these views. For instance, the Parliament contributed to the devotion of increasing attention to human rights by the EC in the second half of the 1970s.

In order to reconstruct the views of the EC's international activity held by the member states' governments and by the EC institutions, I rely mainly on documents produced by them. The kinds of sources

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considered are mainly internal documents preparing policy positions, reports from member states’ embassies and speeches by European leaders. Archival sources are mainly drawn from the archives of the EC institutions and from the archives of the foreign ministries of France, Britain and Germany, which were the most influential member states. The variety of the archival sources considered is a relevant feature of this dissertation. The existing literature on the EC’s international activity relies mainly on French sources; this poses a problem of bias, especially because France was often the odd man out in the various debates on the EC’s international activity.

In terms of time frame, my analysis spans between 1969 and 1979. Major changes occurred between 1969 and 1972, which created qualitative changes in the EC’s international position and activity, triggering the very beginning of the process of assertion of the EC as a distinct international actor. Particularly important changes in this regard were the resignation of Charles De Gaulle, the approval of the British entry into the EC, the beginning of détente, the decoupling of the dollar from gold, and the increasing assertiveness of the developing countries. Major changes occurred between 1979 and 1981 opened a new and different phase for the process of assertion of the EC. Important changes in this regard were the outbreak of the second oil shock, the election of Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterrand, and Ronald Reagan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the affirmation of a neo-liberal paradigm in global North–South relations. While there are good reasons to regard 1969–79 as a relatively coherent unit of analysis, some significant turns did occur during that period as well. The most important turn occurred in 1973–74, with the transatlantic crisis of the «Year of Europe,» the outbreak of the energy and economic crisis and the election of new leaders in Britain, France and Germany.

26 Documents are drawn from the following archives: Historical Archives of the European Union (Florence), Central Archives of the European Commission (Brussels), Central Archives of the Council of the EU (Brussels), Archives of the French foreign ministry (Paris), National Archives (Paris), National Archives (London), Archives of the German foreign ministry (Berlin), Central State Archives (Rome). Some funds were consulted also at the Churchill Archives in Cambridge and at the Archives of the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam.

27 The most striking case in this respect is the monumental history of the EPC written by Maria Gainar, wherein the only national archival sources considered are the French ones (Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne).
Structure of the dissertation

The dissertation is divided into six chapters, preceded by a brief prologue providing some essential background and contextualization. Because of the complex and composite character of the process of assertion of the EC as an international actor, the dissertation is organized by a thematic rather than a chronological structure. The first three chapters focus on the definition and establishment of the structures, procedures and means for the EC’s international activity, enabling it to assert itself as a distinct international actor. The last three chapters focus on the traits and contents of the EC’s activity in three policy fields which were particularly relevant for its assertion as a distinctive international actor. To some extent, the division between the two halves of the thesis does mirror a chronological difference, since the processes analyzed in chapters 1 through 3 mainly occurred before or during the 1973–74 crisis, while the processes analyzed in chapters 4 through 6 mainly occurred during or after it.

In chapter 1 I analyze the definition and establishment of the institutional structure for the EC’s international activity: the creation of the EPC, the definition of its relationship with the Community, the debate on the political role that could be played by the EC Commission, the attempts at improving the coherence of the EC’s international activity. I show that the design of this institutional structure was strongly affected by the different member states' views on the final form of European political integration. To evaluate possible institutional innovations, states always considered whether these innovations moved political integration towards a federal or a confederal model. As a consequence of these deep implications of the traits of the institutional structure for the EC’s international activity, its design was quite difficult and it often required to reach fragile and ambiguous compromises between divergent conceptions.

Chapter 2 is to a large extent complementary to chapter 1, since it focuses on the definition and establishment of the institutions and means meant to enable the EC to speak with a single voice on the international stage. Once common positions were reached between member states, these positions had to be expressed. On the one hand, I look at the means created for the expression of the Community’s voice, on the other hand, I look at the means for the expression of the EPC and of the European Council. I show that most world countries were receptive to the assertion of the EC on the international stage, and it fact they favored further progress in political integration. The main reason why the EC did not always manage to speak clearly on the
international stage was its member states' reticence about it. One common European voice might sometimes be expressed, but it should not substitute the choir of single national voices.

Chapter 3 also focuses on the definition of the structure for the EC's international activity. However, the chapter does not focus on institutional aspects but rather on political ones, namely the political constraints which led to the exclusion of entire fields of international affairs from the EC's international activity. I look at member states' *domaines réservés*, as well as at the substantial exclusion of defense matters from the range of action available to the EC. Other major constraints on it were promoted by the US: the EC should deal only marginally with the Middle East question and with energy matters. I argue that this restriction of the range of action available for the EC's international activity strongly affected its traits, by inviting the EC to focus on specific “civilian” sectors of international affairs. As a result, a division of labor was established between the EC and its member states, as well as between the EC and the US.

Political constraints on the EC's international activity directed its focus towards fields of international affairs such as development cooperation, dialogue with the developing countries, the promotion of human rights in third countries, and so on. Activity in these fields enabled the EC to assert itself as a distinctive international actor – as some put it at the time, as a «civilian power.» It is towards this activity that I turn to in chapters 4 through 6. In chapter 4 I look at the EC's engagement in favor of development cooperation, especially at the reassessment of its cooperation system with the Lomé Convention. In chapter 5 I look at the EC's efforts for a reform of the international economic order offering more weight to the developing countries and favoring an overcoming of the juxtaposition between economic blocs. In chapter 6 I look at the EC's activity for the promotion of human rights in third countries outside Europe.

In each chapter, I analyze the conceptions underlying the EC's engagement in the considered field, as well as the image that the EC tried to project on the international stage. I show that the EC consistently tried to convey an image of itself as a «force for good,» caring about third countries' difficulties and about their people's welfare. However, there was a fundamental mismatch between the discourse and image of the EC as a force for good and its actual policies and initiatives: deeds often fell well short of words. I consider this mismatch, analyzing the reasons why the EC rhetoric set very

28 Duchêne, «Europe's role in world peace.»
ambitious goals and why the EC found it very difficult to meet them. Part of the reason for it was that rhetoric was meant to rationalize some of the limited capabilities available for the EC's international activity, and to make up for them. I argue that the EC established a sort of vicious circle: it resorted to rhetoric in order to make up for its limited capabilities, but this strategy raised very high expectations. The EC was unable to meet these expectations, and as a result the limits of its capabilities were exposed even more.
Prologue

The failure of early attempts at political integration

The Second World War drastically changed Europe's position in international affairs, making it weaker, and sanctioning the emergence of the US and the USSR as the two new world superpowers. The sharp diminution of Europe's global standing was to be further accentuated by the process of decolonization, which was partly a by-product of the war itself. Beside the decrease in global standing, European countries had to address two major strategic problems. With the beginning of the Cold War in the late 1940s, Europe was divided into two parts and it became a major theatre of confrontation between the West and the Soviet bloc. The other major strategic problem was the reconstruction and the division of Germany: Western countries were eager to tie West Germany to them and to ensure that its recovery would not endanger Europe's stability.

In order to address these challenges, some influential European political leaders, intellectuals, and pressure groups advocated the promotion of economic and political integration of Western European countries. Only in this way, it was believed, could they restore some weight and influence in a world dominated by the two superpowers, as well as discourage the expansion of Soviet influence in Western Europe and deal with the German problem. Integration would offer the West Europeans «une revanche contre le destin»\(^1\) and a chance «d'être présentes […] au rendez-vous du XXIème siècle.»\(^2\) The first major governmental initiative for Western European integration led to the establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, which was followed by the European Economic Community and the European Community for Atomic Energy in 1958.

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1 G. Robin (Presidency of the French Republic), Note sur l'Europe, August 23, 1974, in Archives Nationales [AN], AG 5(3), 921.
2 Ibid.
Besides increasing the international weight of Western Europe as a whole, European integration was also meant to strengthen the international weight of each member state.\(^3\) This goal was extremely clear in the case of France: according to the French President Georges Pompidou, European countries «ont l’habitude et, donc, ont contracté le besoin de jouer un rôle mondial.»\(^4\) France could not easily acquiesce to its marginalization in international relations, and European integration was expected to work as a multiplier of French influence in international affairs. France expected to play the role of the pivot in Western Europe, enjoying a particular prominence within it.\(^5\) However, European political integration would work as a multiplier of influence for the other member states as well.

Early initiatives for European integration had a mostly economic content, focusing on the creation of a common market and of joint institutions for the management of economic issues. Not only had these initiatives a clear political import however, but they were also combined with initiatives explicitly aimed at promoting European political integration. The notion of political integration referred to two different yet interconnected processes. On the one hand, it referred to the establishment of a common European political space with common institutions and states’ cooperation in a number of policy fields. On the other hand, it referred to the promotion of consultation, coordination and joint action between European countries in international affairs.

In the early 1950s the establishment of a European Community of Defense was discussed. The EDC envisaged integration in the military sector, with the creation of common armed forces. The EDC was to be included in a European Political Community, which was conceived in federal terms and which was to promote member states’ foreign policy coordination as well. However, the ratification of the EDC Treaty was


\(^5\) Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO], Planning Committee, Paper on the external relations of the EC, November 1972, in the National Archives [NA], FCO 49/391.
rejected by the French National Assembly in August 1954, mainly because of its concern with the German rearmament and because of the Gaullist opposition to the EDC’s federalist conception.\(^6\) In 1960 the French President Charles De Gaulle launched another major attempt at European cooperation in international affairs. What the so-called Fouchet Plans aimed at, was to build a «Union of States» with a common foreign and defense policy. The Union was to be governed by regular meetings of the member states' heads of state and government, who would deliberate by unanimity.\(^7\) Negotiations on the Fouchet Plans failed in 1962, because of sharp divergences between France and its partners on the relationship between the Union and NATO, on the position of Britain, and on the intergovernmental character of the envisaged institutions.

After the failure of the Fouchet Plans, no other major attempt was made for the political integration of the EC member states. A few other initiatives were envisaged, but they were aborted at a very early stage.\(^8\) Favorable conditions for political integration were missing in the 1950s and 1960s. Because of the Cold War, Western Europe enjoyed a limited room of maneuver in international affairs. Even when some room did exist, Western Europeans could not agree on the way to follow, mainly because of the sharp divergence between De Gaulle’s European and foreign policy and the policies of the other EC governments. As a result, the EC's international activity was essentially limited to external trade matters. Community institutions were in charge of the external aspects of the common commercial policy, and of the external aspects of the common agricultural policy. For the matters concerning the common market, it was the Community institutions which were competent in the economic international organizations. The Community also had a role to play in the relations with the African countries associated with it.

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\(^8\) For instance, in 1964 plans were advanced by Paul-Henri Spaak, Giuseppe Saragat, and by the German government, and another plan was proposed by Pierre Harmel in 1968.
The scope of Community competences in international affairs was limited by the EC treaties, and particularly by the narrow interpretations given by the member states to them.\(^9\) Even if the Community did have some competences, its activity was not very effective. Coordination between its different external policies was weak, as they were pursuing partially different goals. Trade, agricultural and association policies were designed by different directorate-generals of the EC Commission and by partially different formations of the Council of ministers. The making of the Community’s external policies was described as «accidental, improvised and disjointed»,\(^10\) by the President of the EC Commission. Even more deficient were the coherence and coordination between the Community’s external policies and the foreign policies bilaterally pursued by the member states, and the coherence between bilateral foreign policies themselves.

One of the reasons why coherence was limited and policies tended to be conceived in narrow sectorial terms in the 1960s was the lack of a clear general political vision underlying the Community’s international activity: «Une formulation de principe des bases de notre politique extérieure communautaire a fait défaut jusqu’ici.»\(^11\) The international activity of the Community was mostly determined by the need to manage the immediate external consequences of specific aspects of internal economic integration. There was no general vision providing overall coherence and direction to them, and the EC commissioner for external relations Ralf Dahrendorf acknowledged that «le processus de formation de la volonté sur le plan de la politique étrangère dans la Communauté ne va pas de pair avec leurs effets sur ce même plan.»\(^12\) Similarly, the President of the EC Commission Franco Maria Malfatti argued that «nous affirmons notre présence dans le monde parfois en

\(^9\) R. Dahrendorf, Personal communication «Quelques principes et points de vue relatifs aux relations extérieures de la CE,» June 13, 1972, in Archives of the International Institute for Social History [IISG], Mansholt 216. The art. 235 of the EEC Treaty made it possible for the Council of ministers to give a broad interpretation of the Community competences.


The re-launch of political integration in the late 1960s

It was in the late 1960s that Western European governments seriously started to discuss political integration again. The shift from limited economic integration to increasingly comprehensive political integration was neither a linear nor a necessary process. To be sure, the available experience of integration constituted a useful basis for a further expansion of the fields of cooperation. With the European Communities having been running for almost twenty years, a whole set of customs, structures, procedures of cooperation had been developed by the Western European governments.

The resumption of projects for Western European political integration in the late 1960s and early 1970s was closely connected to the beginning of détente between the West and the Soviet bloc and to the increasing European reluctance to align with the US in international affairs. Because of these changes, Western European political integration ceased to be considered only as a vague aspiration for a faraway future and started to be seriously discussed. The relaxation of international tensions favored by détente led to a reduction of the pressure exerted by the Cold War on Europe, and to a relaxation of the Western bloc's cohesion. As a consequence, it became possible for the Western European countries to envisage the launch of some initiatives in international affairs autonomous from the US. The beginning of détente encouraged a reassessment of international relations, opening up a window of opportunity for an increase of the international role of the Western European countries.

Détente offered some opportunities for Western Europe to act in international affairs, but it also posed some risks for it. In May 1972 the US and the USSR signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and in June 1973 they signed an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Europeans were not consulted in these negotiations even though they directly concerned European security. These developments raised

doubts about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee in Europe, which had already been partly called into question with the adoption of the strategy of flexible response by NATO. These developments provoked a «sense of urgency, if not panic» among Western Europeans: nuclear parity and the US–USSR dialogue could in fact lead to the establishment of a world condominium between the two superpowers, whereby the relative weight of Western Europe in international affairs would be even further reduced. As a consequence, a strengthening of Western Europe's coordination and presence in international affairs was seen as imperative.

The process of superpowers détente was mirrored in Europe by the relaxation of tensions between West Germany and its Eastern neighboring countries, as envisaged by the so-called Ostpolitik launched by Willy Brandt in the late 1960s. With Ostpolitik, the autonomy and activism of West Germany in international affairs increased considerably. Such an increase constituted a potential danger for the other Western European countries, since Ostpolitik could ultimately lead to outcomes unwelcome to them, such a neutralist drift of West Germany, an expansion of Soviet influence in Europe, or Germany's reunification. In order to counter such possible evolutions and to tie West Germany closely to the West, the promotion of Western European political integration could be a useful strategy. The West German government itself was in favor of it, as a way to reassure its partners about its foreign policy course.

17 T. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 81. According to Andreas Wilkens instead, German positions on Ostpolitik and European integration were kept as separate as possible from one another (Wilkens, «New Ostpolitik and European integration: Concept and policies in the Brandt era,» in European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik–
In the late 1960s increasing strains begun to appear in a number of fields of transatlantic relations, ranging from trade to monetary affairs, from political relations to security affairs. The EC had become a major commercial competitor for the US. While the US had previously accepted the economic costs implied by European integration, it was harder to accept them at a time of relative economic difficulty such as the late 1960s. In the political sphere, Western European countries were increasingly reluctant to ease the burden carried by the US for the defense of the West and to support American initiatives such as their intervention in Vietnam. Especially after Nixon's inauguration, the US displayed an increasing tendency towards unilateralism and envisaged a partial reduction of its engagement in Europe. From both a political and an economic point of view, a fundamental change affecting the transatlantic relationship was Nixon's decision to end dollar convertibility for gold and to impose a surtax on imports on August 15, 1971.

Western Europeans leaders (with the notable exception of De Gaulle) had previously assumed that the pursuit of European integration could be fundamentally coherent with the preservation of good transatlantic relations. Such an assumption probably rested on an insufficient appreciation of «what such a united Europe would really mean.» This assumption came to be put into question in the late 1960s, with the US taking a more critical stance towards European political integration, and with Europe developing positions and preferences different from the American ones. As Piers Ludlow has put it, what occurred was «a significant shift from the mutually beneficial symbiosis between European and Atlantic cooperation […] to a much more uneasy and uncomfortable period of coexistence.»


21 N. P. Ludlow, «The end of symbiosis: The Nixon era and the collapse of comfortable co-existence between European and Atlantic integration,» in Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe–America?, ed. G. Scott-Smith and V. Aubourg
Strains in the transatlantic relations were not a complete novelty. What was new was the European attitude towards them: Western European governments were not as ready to yield to the US as they had tended to be in the previous decades. At a time of détente, alignment with the US was not the only available option. The change in attitude was particularly striking in West Germany and in Britain. In the previous decades, West Germany had been extremely careful to cultivate the transatlantic relationship. Now it was more willing to increase its autonomy, as it showed with Ostpolitik: agreement with the US was desirable, but it should not come at all costs and the development of distinctive Western European positions could be envisaged. Similarly, Britain was traditionally attached to the transatlantic relationship. However, in the 1970s Britain was a new member state of the EC, and therefore had to prove its European credentials. In particular, Britain was wary of appearing to be a sort of Trojan horse of the US.\(^\text{22}\) A crucial role in this change of attitude was played by the personal views of the new German and British leaders Willy Brandt and Edward Heath.

While Germany and Britain became more critical towards the US, France partially softened its age-old confrontational attitude towards it, making it possible to establish a common ground with its European partners. As a British diplomat put it, the French were

> pathologically sensitive about any possible implication that Europe is in any sense subordinate to or dependent upon the United States. It is strangely like a sort of Third World psychosis towards the colonial power.\(^\text{23}\)

The divergence between Gaullist and Atlanticist visions had been one of the main obstacles to the pursuit of Western European political integration in the previous years. The departure of De Gaulle from the French Presidency in 1969 made the French position less uncompromising and less repelling for the other Western European countries, even though Gaullist ideas such as the notion of «Europe européenne» continued to exert a strong influence on the French

\(^{22}\) FCO, Planning Committee, Paper on the external relations of the EC, November 1972, in NA, FCO 49/391; M. D. Butler (FCO, European integration – external), Note on transatlantic relations, October 8, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1748.

\(^{23}\) C. Ewart-Biggs (British embassy in France), Note on US/Europe, August 28, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1739.
The choice of the EC as forum for political integration

The changing strategic environment, increasing transatlantic strains and the changing European attitudes largely explain why Western European political elites came to regard the pursuit of political integration as a viable strategy to pursue in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, it was not obvious that Western European political integration should be pursued in the framework of the European Communities. In fact, the Community might seem an unlikely forum for coordination and cooperation on political issues and in international affairs: until then, it had mostly dealt with the establishment of a common internal market and with agricultural matters. An EC commissioner for external relations did exist, but he almost exclusively dealt with international trade matters.

The Community might also seem an unlikely forum for cooperation in international affairs because it was only one among several international organizations promoting cooperation in Western Europe. For instance, there was the European Free Trade Area, the Western European Union and the NATO Eurogroup, and discussion of international political issues was already occurring within the WEU and the Eurogroup. Moreover, it was possible to establish a new ad hoc forum for political integration. However, it was the Community that was chosen as the main forum for the pursuit of Western European political integration. Despite its mainly technical and economic focus, the promoters of the Community had conceived of it as kernel of a more general process of integration of Western Europe. Accordingly, integration as carried out in the Community had been charged with a significant political and symbolic meaning. Moreover, to use the Community as forum for the pursuit of Western European political

integration made it possible to build upon its experience, its resources and its economic might. At the end of the 1960s the Community was a major world economic power, and with the entry of Britain it became the biggest power in international trade.²⁵

An additional reason why the Community was chosen as the main forum for the pursuit of Western European political integration was its membership. France was a full member and protagonist of the Community, while it was not member of the NATO Eurogroup. Given its weight and position, it would have been extremely hard to pursue Western European political integration without French participation and commitment. While including France, the Community did not include other NATO members and other European countries which could pose serious obstacles to the pursuit of political integration, either because of their neutralism or because of their troublesome domestic political situation like Spain, Portugal and Greece.

The most serious problem with the use of the Community as the main forum for Western European political integration was the fact that Britain was not member of it. To envisage political integration without Britain would have been far from ideal, especially from the point of view of France’s partners in the Community, which were eager to counter the French pressure to reduce the Community’s ties with the US. Atlanticist European governments regarded the participation of Britain as a guarantee against Gaullist drifts, hence they were extremely wary of political integration until the EC’s enlargement to Britain could be decided after the departure of De Gaulle.²⁶ With Britain in, the Community would regroup a large portion of Western Europe, and all the main European powers.

Even if it was decided to pursue Western European political integration in the framework of the Community, in the late 1960s the Community consisted in fact in an aggregation of three separate communities (ECSC, EEC, Euratom), which had been sharing institutions since 1967. The field of activity of each Community was clearly delimited to sectorial tasks by its founding treaty, thus political

integration could only partially be pursued inside the existing framework. New structures and procedures had to be defined for member states' cooperation in political matters, even though Community institutions were to be involved in it. Some new structures were gradually established outside the framework set by the communities' founding treaties, such as the European Political Cooperation system and the European Council.

A few reasons determined the re-launch of Western European political integration in the late 1960s, and a few reasons made it desirable to pursue it in the framework of the EC. For its part, the EC Commission was clearly eager to widen its field of activity, and it was increasingly aware of the fact that the growing economic weight of the Community on the international stage could imply the assumption of an increasing share of responsibilities in international affairs by it. The EC Commission's eagerness and readiness to increase its activity in international affairs would have not been sufficient to make the Community move towards political integration in the absence of the other more decisive strategic factors mentioned earlier. However, they provided additional drive for the pursuit of political integration in the EC framework.

In order to expand its competences, the EC Commission tended to rely on the argument that the actual economic weight of the EC made it necessary to step up its political weight as well. It was especially a matter of not disappointing the expectations held by many third countries towards European integration, which called for it to move beyond mere economic integration. Concern with third countries' expectations was not only stressed by the Commission, but it was noticed by member states as well. For instance, the Foreign Office argued that

the outside world [...] will not understand if the European voice on foreign policy matters does not develop in a manner which is appropriate to the increasing cohesion of the Community in international economic affairs.\(^\text{27}\)

When EC leaders and officials travelled abroad or were called by third countries' leaders and diplomats, they were often «surprised to see the extent to which the European identity is an accepted fact by so

many of the foreigners.» The EC Commission noticed «l’attente d’un nombre croissant de partenaires qui souhaitent déjà pouvoir considérer l’Europe comme un interlocuteur unique.» As the President of the EC Commission Sicco Mansholt put it, «le monde nous regarde, parfois avec espoir, parfois avec scepticisme, parfois avec crainte.» Acknowledgement of third countries’ interest in the EC invited it to be more aware of its weight in international affairs and of the expectations nurtured towards it. As the EC commissioner for external relations Christopher Soames argued,

We cannot be one of the mightiest industrial complexes, the largest trading unit, the richest holder of currency reserves in the world and not live up to the global responsibilities for peace and prosperity that fall on us by virtue of that potential power [...] The time has come for us to play an adult political role in the world.

Many third countries were critical towards the Community’s commercial policy, which was deemed too protectionist. Some of them made it clear that they could consent to the commercial policy only if it was included into a more general process of European political integration, which was expected to bring benefits to third countries too.


30 Verbatim of the first session of the Paris Summit, October 19, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788.


The stress on political benefits in return for some economic costs had underlain the traditional American attitude towards European integration, but it spread well beyond the US. For instance, in 1972 the Indonesian President Suharto called for Western European political integration, arguing that «si ce développement vers l'union politique continue à trainer dans le temps, cette zone préfrentielle des pays riches ne peut que prendre l'aspect d'une discrimination.»

The Hague and Paris Summits

By the end of the 1960s, some major obstacles to the pursuit of Western European political integration had disappeared, such as the tenure of De Gaulle. Two major factors pushing for it had appeared, such as the relaxation of international tensions and the increasing European reluctance to align with the US in international affairs. Some other secondary factors reinforced this drive, such as the eagerness of Community institutions to deal with new fields of activity and the calls for political integration made by third countries. The combination of these factors led to the re-launch of Western European political integration, concerning both its internal and external aspect. The project of political integration was first addressed at The Hague Summit in 1969, but it was forcefully launched in 1972 at the Paris Summit.

In July 1969 the new French President Georges Pompidou had proposed to convene a summit meeting of the heads of state and government of the EC member states. The goal of the summit was to discuss major changes affecting international relations and to re-launch European integration. The summit took place in The Hague on December 1 and 2, 1969, and it produced a series of decisions in different fields, overall meant to promote «completion, deepening, and enlargement» of the EC. As far as the EC’s international activity was concerned, the heads of state and government endorsed a German proposal to explore suitable ways to re-launch cooperation in the foreign policy field. However, divergences remained on the

33 Suharto reported in S. Mansholt, Report on visit to the ASEAN countries, September 27, 1972, in IISG, Mansholt 222.

institutional form that cooperation should take, and on the desirable relationship between European political integration and transatlantic cooperation. The summit’s conclusions about political integration were quite prudent and vague as a result: according to the Belgian political director it was only decided that «il n’est pas complètement exclu que l’on puisse étudier l’éventualité de savoir si, peut-être, avec les précautions d’usage, on pourrait parler de la politique extérieure.»

Despite their prudence, the conclusions of The Hague Summit led to the establishment of the system of European Political Cooperation in 1970, as I will show in chapter 1. The EPC enabled member states’ governments to consult and cooperate in foreign policy matters. However, the creation of the EPC and its early phase were characterized by great prudence. It was the summit held in Paris in October 1972 which gave a strong impetus for the pursuit of political integration. As Pompidou put it, it was by then clear that European countries «peuvent retrouver une place digne de ce que nous sommes, mais cela n’est possible qu’au moyen d’une Europe unie.»

The need for common action in international affairs was perceived as one of the most important reasons for political integration by the European public opinion as well.

The Paris Summit had been mainly convened in order to identify a common European response to the American economic and monetary decisions of August 15, 1971. The summit was also gradually endowed with the task of designing the general lines of development of the EC in the following years. By the time of the summit, the enlargement of the EC to Britain had been decided, making it more pressing to promote a qualitative change in the EC’s international activity. The enlargement was bound to turn the EC into a larger economic actor, a mightier commercial power, and it was closely linked with a deepening and widening of the EC’s activity overall. As the British Prime minister Edward Heath argued at the summit, «la Communauté, maintenant, jouera le rôle d’une grande puissance dans le monde.» For this reason, political cooperation was deemed «la plus nécessaire de nos


37 Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, pp. 295, 298.
entreprises."\(^{39}\) Leaders at the summit decided to strengthen the EPC and they stated their commitment to the liberalization of international trade and to development promotion.

The Final Declaration of the Paris Summit was particularly significant with regard to the assertion of the EC as a distinct international actor:

L’Europe doit être capable de faire entendre sa voix dans les affaires mondiales et de fournir une contribution originale à la mesure de ses ressources humaines, intellectuelles et matérielles et d’affirmer ses propres conceptions dans les rapports internationaux, conformément à sa vocation d’ouverture, de progrès, de paix et de coopération [...]. Conformément à ses finalités politiques, la construction européenne permettra à l’Europe d’affirmer sa personnalité dans la fidélité à ses amitiés traditionnelles et aux alliances de ses États membres et de marquer sa place dans les affaires mondiales en tant qu’entité distincte, résolue à favoriser un meilleur équilibre international, dans le respect des principes de la Charte des Nations unies.\(^{40}\)

The Declaration expressed some of the key ideas underlying the conception and discourse of the EC as an international actor in the following years: the EC was to become a distinct entity speaking with a single voice in international affairs, and promoting a distinctive conception of international relations. It was to prove its outward-looking character and to engage in favor of progress, peace, cooperation, and stability.

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38 Minutes of the Paris Summit, October 19, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788.
39 G. Pompidou, Statement at the opening session of the Paris Summit, October 19, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3786.
40 EC heads of state and government, Declaration of the Paris Summit, 1972.
Chapter 1
Building Institutions for the EC's International Activity

One of the most debated aspects of the process of assertion of the EC as an international actor was the design of the institutional structure for it. Institutional design was important because it affected the character and import of the EC's international activity, as well as the kind of actors and procedures involved in it. Debates on institutions were also crucial in terms of defining the limits and traits of the political space which was to be available for the Community's external activity, and for intergovernmental cooperation on international political matters. The design of the institutional structure for the EC's international activity was particularly complex because it was closely related to other ongoing developments concerning the economic and political integration of Western Europe. In particular, it was complex because EC member states held divergent visions of the definitive form that European integration should take.

In this chapter I analyze first of all the process of the establishment of the European Political Cooperation system in 1969–70, which was the first and main forum for the discussion of international political affairs at the EC level. I then analyze the debates surrounding the exact nature of the relationship between the Community’s external activity and the EPC, and the role that Community institutions like the EC Commission could take in international affairs. As a result of these debates, it was decided that Community and EPC structures for the EC’s international activity should remain distinct and separate. In the last part of the chapter I analyze the attempts which were made over time to nuance and partially bridge such a separation, notably through the establishment of the European Council in 1974 and through the project for the establishment of a European Union by 1980.

What I show in this chapter is that the design of the institutional structure for the EC's international activity was greatly affected by the
member states' concern for the form and forum of further European political integration in the future. Debates and negotiations on the institutions necessary for the EC's international activity were partly seen as proxies of the debate on the future form of European integration itself. They invited attention to fundamental questions such as whether political integration should occur inside or outside the Community framework and whether the EC should pursue a federal or a confederal model of integration. The ambiguities and flaws of the institutional structure which was established for the EC's international activity can largely be explained as the result of compromises concerning these very delicate, fundamental and divisive issues.

**The establishment of the European Political Cooperation**

At The Hague Summit in 1969, the EC heads of state and government agreed that a system for cooperation on foreign policy and other political issues should be established. The design of such a system was assigned to the political directors of the national foreign ministries. The main political problem was to agree on an institutional structure for cooperation which could suit the federalist positions of most of the member states' governments as well as the French intergovernmental conception of European integration. In the following months, some ambitious plans for the pursuit of political integration along federal lines were deployed by Germany in particular, with the support of most of the other member states. Remarks by the French about such plans were telling of their prudence: «Oh oh! Pas question,»1 «Ils galopent!!,»2 «Il va falloir les calmer.»3 Plans for political integration along federal lines risked bringing about «une amputation de la France.»4

In October 1970 the EC foreign ministers adopted the political directors' report (the so-called “Davignon Report”) and agreed to

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1 G. Pompidou, Handwritten remark on telegram from the directorate for political affairs, February 1970, in AN, AG 5(2), 1035.
2 Handwritten remark on telegram from the directorate for political affairs, February 1970, in AN, AG 5(2), 1035.
4 M. Debré, Note pour Pompidou, May 15, 1972, in AN, AG 5(2), 89.
establish the system of European Political Cooperation. In order to promote member states' consultation and cooperation in international affairs, the foreign ministers were to meet at least twice per year, while a political committee formed by the political directors was to meet more frequently. The EPC presidency was to match the presidency of the Council of ministers, so each member state would hold it for six months. A group of European correspondents and a few working groups were also gradually established, wherein member states' experts could discuss specific political topics. Moreover, consultations were foreseen between member states' ambassadors in third countries and representatives to international organizations.

The EPC system was to develop outside the framework of the Community, according to an intergovernmental model: cooperation was to be based on consensus among governments, decisions were not to be legally binding, and Community institutions were not to be substantially involved. The EPC was to be dealt with by the political directorates of the national foreign ministries, while the member states' permanent delegations to the EC would continue to deal only with the Community policies. Despite its formal separation from the Community system, the EPC was to contribute together with it to the overall endeavor of European political integration. The most important link between Community and EPC was given by their coincidence in membership: only the member states of the Community could take part in the EPC, and all of them were to take part in it. Moreover, some


6 In order to stress the distinction between the Community and the EPC, the ambassadors could not discuss Community matters, which were to be dealt with only by the embassies' commercial counsellors (De Courcel (MAEF, Secrétaire général), Note sur les rapports entre la CPE et les CE, February 28, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3798).


8 According to Maria Gainar, it was France which posed membership in the Community as a condition for participation in the EPC, in order to exclude Britain from political cooperation before its entry into the Community (Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, p. 51). However, apart from the short-term case of Britain, the coincidence in membership between the Community and the EPC was consistent with the other member states' aim at combining
scope was left open for further rapprochement between the Community and the EPC systems in the future.

The goal of the EPC was to promote consultation and cooperation between member states in international affairs. No explicit mention was made of the goal of establishing a common foreign policy, and no deadlines were decided for further progress in political cooperation. The EPC was deliberately given a low-key character, and its launch went relatively unnoticed to external observers. Even from a symbolic point of view, no efforts were made to stress the significance of the first EPC ministerial meeting on November 19, 1970. Failures of previous ambitious attempts at political integration account for the low-key character assigned to the EPC endeavor: the adoption of a pragmatic, incremental approach, and a focus on few specific issues were deemed preferable to the launch of grand projects.

Federalist governments and pressure groups criticized the apparent lack of ambition of the EPC, as well as its intergovernmental character. For instance, the Italian government argued that «le résultat atteint est de minime importance et la méthode retenue est radicalement impropre» and federalist actors downplayed the EPC as a mere «zone de libre échange politique.» The fact was that the low-key profile of the EPC and its pragmatic character were necessary conditions for its very establishment, given the extent of the divergence between member states’ views of the final form of European political integration. The EPC’s character made it possible to avoid the outbreak of intractable economic and political aspects of integration.

disputes between intergovernmentalists and federalists: the former could be happy with the EPC as it stood, while the latter were given the hope that political integration could evolve in a supranational direction in the future.  

In principle, the EPC could deal with internal and external aspects of political integration, but in fact it dealt only with cooperation in international affairs. The choice of the issues to be addressed for the member states’ consultation and cooperation was subject to the agreement of all of them. Issues seen as too divisive and delicate, such as defense matters, were avoided, but a clear will was present to address significant political issues nevertheless. Accordingly, in its early years the EPC addressed the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the EC’s relations with the US, the Middle East problems, and so on. Over time, the range of issues addressed came to cover most of the major issues in international affairs, so that almost all the political units within the foreign ministries came to be involved in the EPC.

At the Paris Summit in October 1972 the EC leaders hinted at the possibility of a partial rapprochement between the Community and the EPC systems, but no substantial consequence followed. In fact, the separation between Community and EPC was further stressed by the second report on the EPC, which was approved by the foreign ministers in July 1973. The workings of the EPC were deemed satisfactory overall and only a handful of changes were decided. Mutual consultation had become «almost a reflex» and contacts between the member states’ foreign ministries were occurring almost on daily basis. Despite this progress, it was not always easy to move

15 Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, p. 86. A partial turn in this respect occurred in 1976, when the EPC discussed the creation of a single European judiciary space (MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les initiatives françaises dans le domaine de la CPE, September 27, 1979, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4148).
16 Angela Romano overstates her case when she claims that the promotion of détente in Europe was the main task of the EPC («The main task of the European Political Cooperation: Fostering détente in Europe,» in Perforating the Iron Curtain. European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985, ed. P. Villaume and O. A. Westad (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2010)).
17 E. Blumenfeld (MEP), Projet de rapport sur la CPE, June 16, 1977, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4148.
from the stage of mere consultation to the one of real cooperation.\textsuperscript{19} The main change intervened in 1973 was in fact not institutional in nature, but political: the British entry into the EC modified the power balance within the EPC, provided new resources for the EC’s activity in international affairs, and it helped to direct increased attention to some new issues dear to Britain.

**Different views on the evolution of political integration**

In terms of institutions, a sharp distinction was established between the Community and the EPC. But in terms of membership and long-term goals, a close connection between them was established instead – a connection which has tended to be overlooked by most of the historiography on the subject. The existence of both a distinction and a connection between the Community and the EPC established a political and institutional tension which has lasted for decades.\textsuperscript{20} This tension was due to member states’ different preferences on the relationship that should incur between the Community and the EPC. In turn, such different preferences were due to member states’ divergent views on the future development of political integration itself. They had divergent views on the role that states should play, and on the best way to defend and promote their interests in international affairs. Could delegation to supranational institutions be more effective than intergovernmental cooperation in this respect? Did a common European interest in international affairs exist, complementing the mere sum and concert of national interests?

On the one hand, the French government strongly promoted a model of political integration based on intergovernmental cooperation.

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\textsuperscript{18} MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur cinq années de CPE, June 18, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3785; Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War*, pp. 91–92; Gainar, *Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne*, p. 571.

\textsuperscript{19} MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur la CPE, January 7, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3791; MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur la CPE, March 28, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3784.

\textsuperscript{20} It was the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 which merged the roles of the European commissioner for external relations and of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, and which established a single service of external action.
Accordingly, it deemed it crucial to delimit the fields of activity of Community institutions and to preserve a sharp distinction between them and the purely intergovernmental instances of cooperation such as the EPC. On the other hand, most of the other governments, the EC Commission and the European Parliament promoted a reduction or even the eradication of the separation between the Community and the EPC. Some of these actors promoted a federal model of political integration, while others were mostly concerned with enhancing the overall effectiveness and coherence of the Community and EPC activities.

The French government was attached to the vision of a «Europe des États» which had been articulated by Charles De Gaulle. Member states had to preserve an original and relevant role: federal models of integration were opposed, and the establishment of a European confederation was promoted instead, with a government formed by member states' representatives and which would be independent from the European Parliament. Some supranational form of integration was acceptable in delimited policy areas, but national governments had to retain overall control over the process. Partners' supranationalism was deemed illusory and utopian at best, or else sheer demagogy. As the French representative to the EC Étienne Burin des Roziers argued, «on refuse de suivre les dogmatiques et les rêveurs en quête d'une Union européenne destinée à demeurer le thème d'un exercice de style ou le sujet de vaines et stériles controverses.»

According to France, it was particularly important that national governments retained full control over foreign policy matters. France opposed any rapprochement between the Community and the EPC, seeking in fact to reduce the links between them as much as possible. It claimed that economic and political international issues were clearly

21 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur l’avenir institutionnel de la construction européenne, January 21, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3771; P. Peltier (French delegation to the EC), Note sur l’UE, February 27, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3771.
22 É. Burin des Roziers (French permanent representative to the EC), Note sur les préliminaires aux débats sur l’UE, February 27, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3771.
23 M. Palliser (British permanent representative to the EC), Note on political consultation, April 21, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1197; É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur la CPE et le «renforcement» institutionnel de la CE, May 23, 1972, in AN, AG 5(2), 89.
24 P. Peltier, Note sur l’UE, February 27, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3771.
separate from each other and there existed no «grey zone» between them requiring a concurrence of the Community and the EPC.  

France argued that only an intergovernmental approach could make cooperation on foreign policy matters possible, while the adoption of a supranational approach would only spark endless ideological debates and competence struggles, possibly leading to the abandonment of political cooperation altogether. A supranational approach would make it possible to reach agreement only on secondary issues, while it would hinder the elaboration of a proper distinctive foreign policy for the EC.

Italy and the Benelux countries openly envisaged a federal evolution for European integration instead, mostly because of their political culture and geopolitical situation. A European government with a supranational character should be established, the powers of the European Parliament should be greatly strengthened, and a single framework and similar procedures should be in place for all the instances of cooperation between member states. Accordingly, the separation between the Community and the EPC should be reduced,

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26 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur le secrétariat de la CPE, May 12, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3786.


and the EC Commission should be more involved in foreign policy matters. It is hardly surprising that the Commission and the European Parliament also envisaged a federal evolution for European integration. According to their view, the Commission would become a sort of European government with general competence and the Parliament would increase its role and powers. It is quite telling in this respect that even a French Gaullist like the Commission President François-Xavier Ortoli endorsed the Commission’s demands.

The German government broadly shared the goal of a federal Europe as the final stage of integration. It expressed its support to the goal of strengthening the European Parliament, to a more frequent recourse to majority voting, and even to the drafting of a constitution for Europe. However, Germany often let the other federalist governments make most of the running – especially after Willy Brandt’s departure from the chancellorship in 1974. Germany rather focused its efforts on the promotion of functional progress in integration, focusing in particular on the project of an Economic and Monetary Union. As far as the Community–EPC relations were concerned, Germany constantly demanded to loosen the sharp distinction between them, and to increase their links and coherence instead.

While sympathizing for a confederal evolution of the EC, during the Heath government Britain showed a limited interest in the debate on supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. The main concern it expressed was to strengthen the import and the effectiveness of the EC’s international activity in a pragmatic way. The separation between the Community and the EPC was deemed very dysfunctional, since it


30 F.-X. Ortoli, Letter to Pompidou on the Copenhagen Summit, November 29, 1973, in AN, AG 5(2), 257. The handwritten remark by Pompidou was «Oh! Oh!»

31 For an overview on the German position, see B. von Staden (German political director), «Political cooperation in the European Community,» in Aussenpolitik, 23 (2), 1972. See also MAEF, Europe centrale, Compte-rendu des entretiens Schumann–Scheel, January 22, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3784.

was very hard to define and justify a separation between economic international issues to be treated by the former, and political international issues to be treated by the latter.\textsuperscript{33} Third countries clearly did not understand such a separation either, and they were sometimes addressing the EC Commission for matters falling under the EPC competence instead.\textsuperscript{34} Britain’s desire to reduce the sharp Community–EPC distinction was also influenced by its administrative culture: Britain was the only EC member state alongside Belgium whose foreign ministry did not have separate political and economic divisions.\textsuperscript{35} In the other member states, divisions were eager to preserve their respective competences, thus they contributed to hinder closer coordination between Community and EPC matters.

According to the British government, what mattered was the EC’s international activity taken overall. The British wanted a single institutional framework for it, merging the EPC ministerial meetings with the meetings of the Council of ministers and creating a single secretariat to support their activities.\textsuperscript{36} Below the ministerial level the distinction between Community and EPC could remain, since its working was deemed satisfactory.\textsuperscript{37} A rapprochement between the

\textsuperscript{33} M. Palliser, Note on political consultation, April 21, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1197; P. Cuvillier (French embassy in the UK), Note sur la Communauté et la CPE, February 15, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3784.


\textsuperscript{35} M. D. Butler (FCO, European integration), Note on the EPC machinery, February 19, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/166. In the Foreign Office there was a department responsible for all the external questions of European integration, regardless of their Community or EPC character (W. Wallace, «National inputs into European Political Cooperation,» in European Political Cooperation, ed. D. Allen, R. Rummel, and W. Wessels (London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982), p. 54).

\textsuperscript{36} É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur la demande britannique visant à porter devant les instances communautaires les sujets qui relèvent de la CPE, January 17, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Grande-Bretagne, 356; M. Palliser, Note on a Community foreign policy, March 27, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1654.

\textsuperscript{37} J. O. Wright (FCO, Economic affairs), Note on a Community foreign policy, March 14, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1654. The British also envisaged regular meetings between the member states’ permanent representatives to the EC and
Community and the EPC would not only increase the effectiveness of their activity, but it would also create more occasions for general political debates within the EC itself. Indeed, Britain was eager to move beyond the «juridisme formaliste» which tended to dominate the Community activities. With the change in government from Conservative to Labour in 1974, Britain continued to plead for a pragmatic rapprochement between the Community and the EPC, but it also adopted a much more negative attitude towards a possible federal evolution of the EC.

EC member states held different conceptions of the space that should be established at the EC level for cooperation in international affairs. The debate mostly concerned the size and features of such a space: in which fields should cooperation occur? How should cooperation unfold, and who should be in control of it? What should be the instruments of cooperation? I now focus on two significant instances of this debate, namely the discussions on the creation of an EPC secretariat, and on the role that the EC Commission could play in international affairs. These discussions shed light on the preferences held by the member states on some fundamental aspects of the institutional structure for the EC’s international activity, and in particular on the relationship that should incur between the Community and the EPC systems.

The struggle on the location of the EPC secretariat

At the Paris Summit in 1972 the EC Commission proposed to move the EPC into the Community framework. Such a move would have enabled the Commission to get involved in the making of the EPC, and it would have favored a reduction of the EPC institutional distinctness.

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39 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur la CPE et le «renforcement» institutionnel de la Communauté, May 23, 1972, in AN, AG 5(2), 89.
The Commission's proposal was endorsed by most of the member states, but France opposed it. What the summit participants agreed upon, was to let the EPC institutions consider the external aspects of the Community policies and to let EPC and Community institutions communicate whenever international developments affected Community policies. However, in the following years the member states disagreed on whether a narrow or a broad interpretation should be given to these decisions, and new attempts to move the EPC closer to the Community framework were frequently made.

In the run-up to the 1972 Paris Summit, the establishment of an EPC secretariat was one of the most debated subjects. Its establishment was expected to be one of the main outcomes of the summit, but it turned out to be one of the main obstacles to the success of the summit itself. The proposal to establish an EPC secretariat was launched by the German government in the fall of 1971. The secretariat was to be a small standing body charged with administrative and coordination tasks. Since the presidency of the EPC moved from one member state to another every six months, it was deemed useful to have a standing body able to give technical support to the new presidents and to increase continuity and smoothness in the EPC’s activities. Indeed, the increase of EPC activities imposed quite a considerable administrative burden upon the presidency, which was especially heavy for the smaller member states.

Member states largely agreed that a secretariat of this kind could be useful. Italy proposed to endow the secretariat with political competences as well, but the other member states preferred for it to be only a technical body. However, agreement on the traits and usefulness of the EPC secretariat was not matched by any agreement on its location. Bitter disagreement on its location finally prevented the very establishment of the secretariat. Given the limited role and the low-key profile of the secretariat, the reasons for disagreement on its location were purely political in nature. Concerns relating to prestige

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42 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur le développement de la CPE, January 28, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3002.
43 C. Arnaud (MAEF, Europe), Note sur les conceptions italienne et française sur le secrétariat de la CPE, August 10, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3786.
were involved, since the future evolution of the EPC could gradually turn the seat of its secretariat into «the political capital of Europe.» More importantly, the choice of the headquarters of the secretariat was interpreted as a choice affecting the very lines of development of European political integration itself.

The debate unfolded in such a way that the only considered choices for the headquarters of the EPC secretariat were Paris or Brussels. The case for Paris was strongly made by France, with a remarkably direct engagement of Pompidou himself. To locate the secretariat in Paris would have added prestige to the French capital, and it would have signaled the central role of France in the EC’s international activity. Brussels should not have been chosen as seat of the secretariat in order to preserve a sharp distinction between the Community and the EPC activities. Moreover, the French government deemed it crucial to preserve a sharp distinction between the EPC and the political consultations carried out in NATO, whose headquarters were in Brussels.

Support for Brussels as seat of the EPC secretariat was expressed by Germany, Britain, the Benelux countries and the EC Commission. To a large extent, their goals were precisely the opposite of the French ones. Apart from logistic convenience, placing the secretariat in Brussels would have kept opportunities open for the development of closer relations between Community and EPC in the future. The location of the EPC secretariat in the same city as the NATO headquarters was not seen as a problem but as an opportunity. Moreover, supporters of Brussels were particularly wary of Paris being the only alternative option: Luxembourg or even Rome were occasionally mentioned, but these options were never seriously discussed.

The purely political character of the divergence on the location of the EPC secretariat and its symbolic relevance hindered the outcome of any compromise, which was not impossible in theory. Scope for compromise could be found in the definition of the precise features and functions of the secretariat, of its relations with the Community institutions, of the profile and nationality of its secretary-general, and so on. Some member states were ready to compromise and even

44 A. Rendell. «Site of political secretariat will be an important issue when Mr. Heath and M. Pompidou meet,» in The Times, February 22, 1972.
45 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur les velléités de remise en cause de l’équilibre institutionnel de la Communauté à la faveur du développement de la CPE, March 30, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3784.
Germany, Britain and Italy were among them. However, France on one side and the Benelux countries on the other side were unwilling to yield, and the topic was finally dropped from the summit agenda.

Since the choice of the headquarters of the EPC secretariat raised very delicate and seemingly intractable divergences concerning the very conception of European political integration itself, the project of establishing an EPC secretariat was never revived in the following years. Pompidou’s death in 1974 did not soften the French position: even if his successor Valéry Giscard d’Estaing avoided a strong personal involvement in this issue, he could not consent to Brussels because of his delicate domestic relations with the Gaullists. When proposals were made to provide a dedicated supporting body to the existing EPC institutions, the very term “secretariat” was carefully avoided. Because of the sensitivity of the matter, the main solution envisaged to improve the coherence and efficiency of EPC was to establish a sort of informal secretariat. Each EPC presidency was to be assisted by some officials of the foreign ministries of other member states, and this sort of secretariat was to be based in the capital city of the member state temporarily holding the presidency.

Despite the problems that it posed, the absence of an EPC secretariat came to be seen as having some positive aspects as well. Its absence was praised, for instance, because it forced member states’ foreign ministries to cooperate very closely with each other in order to ensure that EPC activities ran smoothly and consistently. Foreign ministries’ officials had to perform all the tasks that a secretariat would have done on their behalf otherwise. For the French government, the absence of an EPC secretariat was the lesser evil. If it was not possible to establish the secretariat in Paris, then it was better not to have any secretariat at all, even if that implied some more difficulties for the EPC activities. If activities appeared too complex to be carried out in the absence of a

46 See for instance MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur le secrétariat de la CPE, May 25, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3791.
47 FCO, Working group on Europe, Paper on European political unification, October 26, 1971, in NA, FCO 49/356; R. A. Hibbert (British embassy in West Germany), Note on German views on the Summit, August 14, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1205.
49 Von Staden, «Political cooperation in the EC,» p. 132.
secretariat supporting them, it was preferable to reduce the intensity and ambition of the EPC activities rather than to establish a secretariat making them feasible.\textsuperscript{50}

The struggle on the political role of the Commission

Much of the debate on the desirability of a rapprochement between Community and EPC institutions concerned the role that Community institutions should play in the EPC activities. The problem did not much concern the Council of ministers, which was gradually brought closer to the EPC ministerial meetings, and it did not much concern the European Parliament either, which gained the possibility of posing questions on EPC matters and remained rather marginal overall. It was on the issue of the need to reduce the Commission’s marginality in the EPC, or on the need to preserve it, that much of the debate on the institutional structure for the EC’s international activity were focused. Was the Commission to be a technical body acting as member states' agent in the sole economic domains set by the EC treaties, or was it to become a single European government with competences extending to crucial political domains as well?

Member states' preferences on the extent of the Commission's involvement in political issues largely mirrored their preferences on the development of European political integration itself. Federalist governments stated their support for a heightening of the political profile of the Commission, even though none of them were very eager to devolve actual power to it. The main opponent of a federal evolution, namely the French government, was extremely active and careful not to let the Commission’s political role increase: as the French put it, the Commission had a «vocation essentiellement administrative.»\textsuperscript{51} France tried to devalue the Commission’s profile at a symbolic level as well, either through protocol choices or linguistic devices. For instance, the French proposed to call “commissions” all the technical bodies that should support member states' intergovernmental cooperation in different fields: in such a way the EC Commission

\textsuperscript{50} MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur le développement de la CPE, May 10, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3785.

\textsuperscript{51} MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les premières réflexions sur le Rapport Tindemans, January 9, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773.
would become simply one among many technical bodies assisting national governments.52

One strategy available to member states to strengthen the political profile of the Commission was to appoint strong commissioners. As long as the Commission was formed by rather obscure figures, it was hard for it to acquire much political weight. For this reason, in 1973 the British government appointed Christopher Soames as commissioner.53 Soames was the son-in-law of Winston Churchill and a potential leader of the Conservative party. Britain ensured the external relations portfolio for him, showing the importance that it attached to the involvement of the Commission in international affairs. Conversely, the French government deliberately tried to counter the Commission’s politicization by appointing a rather low profile commissioner, Claude Cheysson, who had a merely technical background.54 In order to increase the political profile of the Commission, attempts were also made to turn its representation offices in third countries into what would resemble EC embassies. For instance, in 1973 it was Jens Otto Krag, Prime Minister of Denmark until just a few months earlier, who was appointed head of the Commission’s representation office in Washington.55

Despite the real possibility of recurring to these expedients, the main contribution to the increase of the political role of the Commission would clearly come from an expansion of its competences. The Commission asked to be involved in all the EC activities and not only in the Community ones. To this end, the Commission always insisted participating in the summit meetings where national leaders discussed the general lines of the EC’s development and of the EC’s international activity, such as at The Hague, Paris and Copenhagen summits. According to the Commission, its participation in such meetings was important even when Community policies were not directly discussed, in order to ensure coherence and consistence to the overall EC’s activity. Despite initial French resistance, it became customary for the

52 P. Peltier, Note sur l’UE, February 27, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3771.
54 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur la CPE et le «renforcement» institutionnel de la Communauté, May 23, 1972, in AN, AG 5(2), 89. Ironically, Cheysson turned out to interpret his role in a very political way.
Commission's president to join member states' leaders in their summit meetings and in the European Council.

Within a few years of the creation of the EPC, the Commission managed to be associated with most of its activities. According to a Council decision of December 1976, the Commission was to join the EPC working groups only for the matters directly concerning it. However, when the EPC presidency was held by states other than France the Commission was usually invited to attend the EPC meetings for all the agenda items, since its participation was deemed convenient and useful in order to assert the Commission's role.56 The Commission was also associated with the EPC coordination of member states' positions in international conferences, and it took part in the conferences themselves for the matters falling within its competence. For example, the Commission was directly involved in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. Its presence combined rather than substituted the presence of the EC member states, which were either individually represented or represented by the president of the Council. In most cases, EC delegations to international conferences were jointly presided by the Commission and by the Council.

Some of the strongest debates on the role of the Commission in international affairs concerned its participation in the summits of the main industrialized countries (the so-called “G7 summits”) which were regularly organized from 1974. For both its own ambitions and under the pressure of small EC member states, the Commission asked to be invited to the summits. It argued that it was important that the EC as such could discuss matters of general interest, such as the global economic situation, especially given the Community’s competences in economic matters. The British government was lukewarm towards the Commission's participation, and the French government strongly opposed it.57 According to the French, the summits were mere informal meetings between a handful of countries: the Commission could not expect to be associated with all the member states' external relations.58 The Commission and the small EC member states obtained a


representation of the Commission to the summits for the matters touching Community competences, and the provision of information on the summit activities to all the member states.

The Commission sometimes took initiatives in international affairs that appeared too political in character to the member states. Initiatives were not dramatic in scope: the attention that they sparked was mainly due to their possible implications for the development of the Commission’s role in the long-term. Not surprisingly, it was the French government which was particularly sensitive to these initiatives. For instance, in 1979 the President of the EC Commission Roy Jenkins was criticized for receiving some Arab ambassadors and discussing the Camp David agreements with them, while the EC commissioner for development Claude Cheysson was criticized for his decision to meet the Sahrawi liberation movement Polisario without consulting the EC member states.\(^5^9\) Cheysson sparked particularly strong French protests when he decided by himself to express the Commission’s support to the leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union in 1979, therefore openly taking a side in the extremely complex Rhodesian crisis.\(^6^0\) As a reaction to the protests of the member states, the Commission claimed that it was a «political body» which was entitled to act whenever an event occurring in a third country deserved it.\(^6^1\)

Struggles on the extent of involvement of the Commission in the EC’s international activity were indicative of one fundamental tension underlying the entire institutional evolution of the EC, namely the tension between short-term and long-term perspectives. As far as possible innovations were framed in a short-term perspective, member states could often find an agreement about them quite easily. For instance, little harm could be expected from the participation of the President of the Commission in meeting of the EC heads of state and government. What was often troublesome, was for member states to

59 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Fiche sur les initiatives diplomatiques de la Commission, May 7, 1979, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4146; J.-M. Merillon (French ambassador to Algeria), Note sur le séjour à Alger de Cheysson, October 18, 1979, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4146.
60 MAEF, Affaires africaines et malgaches, Note sur le message de Cheysson à N’komo, May 7, 1979, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4146.
61 Spokesperson of the EC Commission, Statement to the press on the telegram sent by Cheysson to N’komo, April 30, 1979, in Historical Archives of the European Union [HAEU], EN 294.
agree on institutional changes when they were framed in a long-term perspective. In this case even small changes were assigned strong political significance. Not only would they constitute a precedent, but they were also regarded as indicating whether European political integration would move in a federal or confederal direction. Given member states' divergent preferences on the final form of European integration, whenever institutional changes were framed in a long-term perspective member states were often only able to agree upon vague compromises about them. Because of the vagueness of such compromises, tensions between member states would resurface whenever it was necessary to turn general compromises into specific and concrete decisions.

**Bridging the gap: the creation of the European Council**

The establishment of the EPC system of political cooperation widened the range of the EC's international activity well beyond the set of external trade and development policies of the Community, making it much more explicitly political in character. Despite such a strengthening, the EC's international activity continued to be affected by problems of fragmented competences, insufficient coherence, unclear general vision, and vague final goals. Around the mid-1970s, reflections on how to tackle these problems contributed to the establishment of the European Council, to the elaboration of a few projects for the establishment of a European Union encompassing all the dimensions of European integration, and to an evolution in the customs and workings of the existing EC and EPC institutions.

During the 1970s the Community's external policies continued to focus mostly on external trade. A 1970 sentence of the Court of Justice of the EC had ruled that Community institutions were entitled to act on all the external matters connected to the internal matters on which the Community was competent, yet member states gave a restrictive interpretation to this ruling.\(^{62}\) Even if the Community took significant initiatives on international trade matters, it was unable to act in other fields of international affairs which were important for its internal development. It was particularly the establishment of the EPC which

led to a considerable widening of the range of international activity of the EC overall considered during the 1970s. What remained insufficient was the coordination between the different instances of the EC's international activity, and especially the clarity of the general political vision underlying them.

The insufficient strength and clarity of the political vision underlying the EC's international activity were particularly felt at a time of serious economic and political crisis like the one which had begun in the early 1970s. In the midst of the crisis, the Commission was unable to assume a leading propulsive role because of member states' disagreement on the function and character that the Commission should have. Also the Council of ministers found it hard to play a propulsive role because of its structure and its weak leadership.63 Starting from 1969, the member states' heads of state and government had begun to meet more frequently than in the past.64 However, their summits were called as exceptional events on an ad hoc basis. In order to give new impetus to European integration, and provide a clearer political direction to the activity of the EC, in September 1973 Pompidou proposed to convene summit meetings on a regular basis.

It was at the Paris Summit in December 1974 that the member states agreed upon the creation of the European Council.65 Heads of state and government were now to meet three times a year. In order to preserve the light structure and informal character of the European Council, leaders decided against giving the Council a formal legal basis. Leaders would provide a general orientation to the EC's activity and development, enhancing its coherence and dynamism. The European Council was meant to promote an overall re-launch of European integration, in particular in its political dimension.66 As far as the EC's

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64 During the 1958–68 period, the only summits held were the summits in Paris and Bonn in 1961 and the Rome Summit in 1967.
65 On the creation of the European Council, see Mourlon-Druol, «Filling the EEC leadership vacuum?,» Maria Gainar's account overestimates the role played by Jean Monnet (Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, pp. 307–316).
66 E. Mourlon-Druol, «Regional integration and global governance: The example of the European Council (1974–1986),» in Les cahiers Irice, 9 (1), 2012, p. 94. According to the initial French conception, the European Council should only deal with foreign policy and EPC matters and «contribute to the resolution of world issues» (Pompidou quoted in A. É. Gfeller, «A European voice in the Arab world: France, the superpowers and the Middle East, 1970–74,» in Cold War History, 11 (4), 2011, p. 663; see also Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie
international activity was concerned, the European Council was assigned the task of ensuring «progress and overall consistency in the activities of the Communities and in the work on political co-operation.»67 Being the only instance where it was possible to treat Community and EPC matters together, the European Council would provide impulse and direction to the EC's international activity and it would act as EC's spokesperson on the international stage.68

The establishment of the European Council was «la mesure la plus importante qui ait été prise pour l'Europe depuis la signature du traité de Rome.»69 France played a fundamental role in promoting the creation of the European Council. Even if its structure was clearly intergovernmental in nature, member states could reach an agreement on its creation since the Council was to complement the existing Community institutions, rather than challenge them.70 The creation of the Council did not seek to force a turn of the EC in a confederal direction, even if it did favor such a path.71 In fact, federalist governments made some attempts to bring the European Council into the Community framework, conceiving it as a sort of special form of the Council of ministers, but these attempts failed.

The creation of the European Council helped to reduce the gap between the Community and the EPC activities. Following the creation of the Council, a few more innovations intervened, reducing such a gap throughout the second half of the 1970s. Most of them occurred only through a silent evolution of customs rather than through the adoption of formal explicit decisions by the member states. For instance, the participation of the Commission in the European Council went without saying. Not only was the Commission taking part in most EPC activities, but it started also to perform some administrative functions

70 Mourlon-Druol, «Filling the EEC leadership vacuum?,» p. 320.
71 Mourlon-Druol, «Regional integration and global governance,» p. 95.
in them. Even the European Parliament managed to gain some control over the EPC: by 1978, one third of the questions posed by MEPs during the question time concerned EPC matters.

The difference between Community and EPC meetings was less and less stressed at the ministerial level and even at the lower levels, «thus breaking a taboo that was negatively affecting the actorness of the EC.» Member states had already agreed not to replicate the infamous format employed during the Danish presidency in 1973, when the foreign ministers met in Copenhagen in the EPC framework, and then they all moved to Brussels to discuss matters in the Community framework few hours later. At the Paris Summit in 1974 the heads of state and government explicitly agreed that ministers could hold Council and EPC meetings at the same time. Joint Council and EPC meetings became standard practice in the following years. Sometimes ministers discussed Community and EPC matters in sequence, sometimes they discussed Community and EPC aspects of a specific issue at the same time.

Bridging the gap: the project of the European Union

The European Council was the only EC institution which could treat Community and EPC matters together. However, at the Paris Summit in October 1972, the heads of state and government had approved the


75 Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, p. 339.
project of the creation of a European Union by 1980. The European Union should encompass «l’ensemble de leurs relations,» that is to say both the economic and the political dimensions of integration.\textsuperscript{76} The Belgian Prime Minister Léo Tindemans was assigned the task of drafting a report on the features that the EU should have, and he handed in his report in December 1975.\textsuperscript{77} In sketching the traits of the EU, Tindemans adopted a pragmatic approach, deliberately putting forward limited but feasible proposals rather than ambitious but utopian visions; it was «l’Europe du possible plutôt qu’une Europe du souhaitable.»\textsuperscript{78} The Tindemans Report was overall well received by the member states both for its limited ambitions and for the satisfactory balance that it struck between their different preferences on the development of European integration, so that there was «something for everyone.»\textsuperscript{79}

Tindemans let the general traits of the EU be rather undefined: the EU should imply qualitative progress in integration, but it would only constitute one step towards a further final stage of integration, «l’objectif ultime étant estompé dans les brumes.»\textsuperscript{80} Even the calendar for the establishment of the EU was let undefined, with the dropping of the goal of 1980 from the Report. In terms of institutional change, Tindemans proposed an overall strengthening of the existing institutions: the European Council would be formalized, and the role of the President of the Commission would be strengthened. The powers of the European Parliament would be increased and the Parliament would be involved in the process of the appointment of the Commission. Even if they were not exclusively federalist in inclination, Tindemans’s institutional proposals did envisage a move towards a parliamentary model that could leave room open for a stronger federal turn of the EU in the future. For this reason the French government opposed these

\textsuperscript{76} EC heads of state and government, Déclaration du sommet de Paris, 1972.
\textsuperscript{78} MAEF, Note sur le Rapport Tindemans, March 5, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773.
institutional proposals, receiving implicit support from the British government as well.\footnote{MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les premières réflexions sur le Rapport Tindemans, January 9, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773; MAEF, Note sur le Rapport Tindemans, March 5, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773; MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur la Grande-Bretagne et le Rapport Tindemans, June 14, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Grande-Bretagne, 363.}

As far as the EC’s international activity was concerned, Tindemans proposed to formalize the possibility for foreign ministers to hold Council and EPC meetings at the same time, so to mirror at the ministerial level what occurred at the level of heads of state and government with the European Council.\footnote{Tindemans, Report on European Union, 1975.} More generally, Tindemans proposed to allow Community institutions to discuss «all problems if they are relevant to European interests.»\footnote{Ibid.} Tindemans’s proposals in this respect were positively received by most of the governments, especially the British and German ones, which had since long pressed to reduce the artificial Community–EPC divide.\footnote{H. L. Davies (British embassy in West Germany), Note on German views on the Tindemans Report, March 12, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/167.} The French government was open to the establishment of greater connections between the two dimensions, but it opposed their formalization.\footnote{MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les premières réflexions sur le Rapport Tindemans, January 9, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773; MAEF, Europe occidentale, Dossier sur le Rapport Tindemans, February 11, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773.} The introduction of some flexibility in this respect was possible, but it was important to keep the Community–EPC distinction alive, since «plus on abolit les cloisons, plus la Commission est amenée ou a la faculté de prendre des positions politiques.»\footnote{MAEF, Europe occidentale, Dossier sur le Rapport Tindemans, February 11, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773.}

The main proposal put forward by Tindemans on the EC’s international activity was to overcome the consensus procedure in the making of the common external policies and possibly even of the EPC.\footnote{Tindemans, Report on European Union, 1975.} Member states should legally commit themselves to consulting each other on any foreign policy issue, and they should politically commit themselves to reaching a common position. If no consensus was present, the minority should rally to the views of the majority —
provided that some escape clause could be invoked when fundamental national interests were at stake. The rationale for the proposal was not to obliterate sensitive national interests, but to discourage member states from seeking «marginal national advantage over each other.»

Accordingly, Tindemans's proposal was merely presented as «a matter of political common-sense.»

The main implicit target of Tindemans's proposal for the overcoming of the consensus procedure in foreign policy matters was the French government, whose tendency to behave as «cavalier seul» on a number of issues was regarded as «a major thorn in the flesh of political cooperation.». Indeed, the strongest opposition to the Tindemans's proposal was expressed by France. The proposal was deemed to be unrealistic, since it would in fact increase the risk of turning mere disagreements into deep ruptures, and it would lead to «a Europe with a minimal [foreign] policy and member states with none.» France often held minority positions on a number of international issues, therefore it risked losing its veto power if the Tindemans's proposal was accepted. The French foreign minister Jean Sauvagnargues even stated that «the French government did not accept the aim of a common foreign policy» altogether.

Even if member states gave an overall positive reception to the Tindemans’s Report, the Report itself was quite rapidly shelved. The goal of establishing a European Union by 1980 was not achieved, and most of Tindemans’s proposals were not implemented. In particular, as far as the making of the external policies of the EC was concerned, no significant change was introduced in the second half of the 1970s. Few formal institutional innovations were agreed: it was only with the

89 Ibid.
90 R. Cooper (FCO, European integration – external), Note on the French behavior within the Community, January 30, 1980, in NA, FCO 98/884. See also R. Hibbert (British embassy in France), Note on the French attitude towards the EPC, March 17, 1980, in NA, FCO 98/884.
91 J. Sauvagnargues reported in FCO, Record of a discussion between foreign ministers of the Nine on the Tindemans' Report, May 31, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/168. See also MAEF, Note sur le Rapport Tindemans, March 5, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773.
92 Jobert, «Quelques réflexions sur le Rapport Tindemans.»
Single European Act in 1986 that some innovation was introduced, and especially with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that the external activity of the EC/EU was strengthened and some connections were established between the political and the economic dimensions.

The institutional structure for the EC's international activity

Until the late 1960s, the international activity of the EC was very limited, fragmented, and lacking in ambition. What happened during the first half of the 1970s, was a remarkable expansion of the number of fields of international affairs in which EC member states cooperated; a creation of institutional instances where coherence between the different activities of the EC in international affairs could be promoted; a considerable increase in the ambition and vision of the EC's international activity. From an institutional point of view, the most significant developments occurred in this period were the creation of the European Political Cooperation in 1970 and the creation of the European Council in 1974. As a result of these developments, the EC was now able to act in most fields of international affairs.

Even if the EC was established as a distinct international actor, its member states did not cease to have a foreign policy of their own. The establishment of the EC as an international actor merely added a new dimension to the member states' activity in international affairs: they retained their ability to act autonomously in international affairs, but they were now able to take advantage of the EC dimension as well. The EC dimension did put some constraints on the member states by forcing them to agree on common policies in some cases, and by inviting them to coordinate their positions in other cases. However, the EC dimension offered also increased opportunities to the member states. For instance, states could use the EC to strengthen and multiply the impact of their own policies. On the contrary, they could use the EC dimension of international activity to conceal their positions on delicate matters.

94 One of the clearest instances of this strategy was France’s attempt at making the EC endorse and adopt its Arab policy (Gfeller, «A European voice in the Arab world»).

Since the EPC and the European Council had an intergovernmental character, member states retained a particularly strong role in the making of the EC's international activity. As a result, most of the EC's international activity was decided through intergovernmental cooperation. The intergovernmental turn of European integration in the 1970s was clearly very significant, but it should nonetheless not be overestimated. The distinction between the Community and EPC aspects of the EC's international activity was important, but it was not extremely neat. In fact, the Community and EPC were linked by strong political ties and by some institutional ones too. Despite the major role played by the member states, the EC's international activity was not a mere sum of national wills. Once positions and policies were elaborated, they were presented as positions and policies of the EC as a whole. They became embedded in an EC discourse, were linked to other EC policies, and were regarded as EC policies by third countries: to a certain extent they acquired a logic of their own, escaping close member states' control.

In this chapter I have shown that the design of the institutional structure for the EC's international activity was very much connected to and influenced by the debate on the form that further political integration should take in the future. To a large extent, debates on the headquarters of the EPC secretariat, on the political initiatives of the EC Commission, and on the relations between Community and EPC, were proxies for more fundamental debates. Since member states held divergent preferences on the final form of European political integration, the institutional structure for the EC's international activity was largely the result of compromises. The ambiguity and flaws of some of its aspects were clearly due to the impossibility to reach a definitive agreement on the form that future political integration should take. Such limits and flaws of the institutional structure posed some obstacles for the development of the EC's international activity, but at the same time they were probably unavoidable for its very launch.

The design of the traits of the EC institutions was largely regarded as indicative of the final form that European integration would take. For this reason, member states' positions on the former were often influenced by their positions on the latter. Member states' positions on the final form of European integration were often meant to appeal to domestic political elites and public opinion. For this reason, they were sometimes strongly rhetoric in nature. For instance, the French government could not depart excessively from the Gaullist vision of integration, while the governments of Italy and the Benelux countries
could not depart from the federalist orthodoxy. While governments were ready to make compromises on punctual aspects of the institutional design, they were also required to uphold the dominant national conception of European integration. For this reason, compromises were harder to reach whenever symbols were at stake, or whenever the issue was subject to public scrutiny, such as during the discussion on the headquarters of the EPC secretariat, or on the admission of the EC Commission to the G7 meetings.
Chapter 2
Enabling the EC to Speak with a Single Voice

During the 1970s, the EC member states established institutions and mechanisms designed to elaborate coordinated positions on many international issues. A logical complement to this process was the establishment of a set of institutions and mechanisms which were to be used for the expression of the common positions that were elaborated. To this end, during the 1970s the Community as such established direct diplomatic relations with more than a hundred countries, and it entered dozens of international organizations. Common EC views started to be expressed to third countries and at the UN, and the EC member states started to release common statements on many international issues. These developments were meant to show that the EC was becoming a distinct global player, and that the EC member states were building a common foreign policy. It is upon these developments that I focus in this chapter.

Since the international activity of the Community was separated from that of the EC member states acting through the EPC and the European Council, I analyze them separately. As far as the Community is concerned, I look at the means available for it to speak and act on the international stage, such as its participation in international organizations, the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with third countries, and its admission to the UN General Assembly. As far as member states are concerned, I look at the means available to the EPC and to the European Council in order to speak and act on the international stage, such as the release of common statements, the performance of common démarches, and the pursuit of voting cohesion at the UN. Finally, I consider an attempt which was made to bridge the gap between the expression of a single voice by the Community and by the member states, namely the establishment of common European embassies in third countries.
I show that during the 1970s the EC was endowed with quite a striking set of means for the expression of a single voice in international affairs. Such a development was clearly perceived by third countries, which came to regard the EC as an international actor in itself. In fact, the available means would have made it possible for the EC to speak with a single voice more often than it actually happened. Most third countries would have favored such a development, but the main obstacle to the full usage of the means available to the EC was the wariness of its own member states. The source of such a wariness was the member states' willingness to retain autonomy for their national foreign policies, and their different preferences for the evolution of European political integration. As far as the long-term goal of political integration was concerned, member states tended to confirm their support of it, but their actual behavior indicated that some of their pledges were only rhetorical in nature.

The Community speaking with a single voice

Even though the EPC was established in 1970, it produced little visible output until 1973. Works mainly focused on the design of the structures and procedures of the EPC itself, while works on substance matters were quite slow until the Paris Summit and the entry of Britain into the EC. The EPC was initiated with prudence, and member states initially focused on mutual consultation and information rather than on the elaboration of common positions to project outside. As a consequence, until 1973 the expression of EC's positions in international affairs was mainly carried out by the Community. The means available to the Community to this end were its participation to international organizations and conferences, and the establishment of direct diplomatic contacts with third countries. Community views were expressed either by the EC Commission or by the president of the Council of ministers.

During the 1950s and 1960s the Community had been associated with an increasing number of international organizations. In particular, it had been associated with specialized bodies and agencies of the UN, such as GATT, the UN Economic and Social Council and its regional commissions, the UN Conference for Trade and Development, FAO,
ILO, UNIDO, and so on.¹ In most cases the Community was initially invited to attend meetings as a guest, and over time it was formally admitted as an observer on a permanent basis.² The Community was also associated with the UN activities for the second development decade, and with the international conferences on primary goods organized by the UN. Its association with international organizations often occurred along with the association of other regional organizations, and it was directly linked to the competences detainted by the Community in fields such as external trade and development cooperation. To a great extent it was the EC Commission which was responsible for these matters: because of this, in December 1970 the Commission spoke for the first time on behalf of the EC in a UN body.

The increasing participation of the Community in the activities of international organizations favored the establishment of direct relations between the Community and other main actors involved in them. Until the early 1970s, the Community had no representation offices in third countries (except for the office in London, which was active before the British entry). The only representation offices of the Community were the ones at international organizations, such as those in Paris at the OECD and UNESCO, in Geneva at the international organizations based there, and in Santiago del Chile for relations with Latin America as a whole.³ During the 1970s, offices at international organizations were created also in New York, Vienna and Bangkok.⁴ The first

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¹ FCO, Note on the status of the EEC in UN bodies, February 2, 1973, in NA, FCO 61/1136.
² For the different patterns of the EC’s admission to international organizations, see E. Grillo Pasquarelli, «La participation de la Communauté Économique Européenne aux accords multilatéraux,» in La Communauté Européenne dans les relations internationales (Nancy: Centre européen universitaire, 1972), pp. 181–182; J.-P. Jacqué, «La participation de la Communauté économique européenne aux organisations internationales universelles,» in Annuaire français de droit international, 21, 1975, pp. 927–928.
³ In 1978 the headquarters of the EC delegation to Latin America were transferred from Santiago to Caracas.
representation office of the Community in a third country was the representation of the EC Commission to the US, which was established in 1971. Other offices at a third country’s government were established in Tokyo in 1974 and in Ottawa in 1976.

It was not by chance that the first Community’s office in a third country was the one in Washington. The US had been among the first countries to establish direct contacts with the Community, and it had played an important role in the very early phases of European integration. Relations with the EC member states were very deep, and relations with the Community were very close and frequent, especially on trade matters. Community officials regularly visited Washington and they regularly consulted with American officials on a wide range of issues. In terms of formal recognition of the Community, the Community’s mission in Washington was given diplomatic status in 1972. In 1971 US–Community relations were established at the parliamentary level too, with the organization of regular meetings between members of the Congress and of the European Parliament.\(^5\)

Besides the representation offices of the Commission in third countries and the Community’s missions at international organizations, during the 1970s the EC Commission ensured direct contacts with third countries by establishing press and information offices in Ankara, Madrid and Lisbon. Moreover, the Commission was represented by some residing delegates in all the developing countries associated with the Community, that is to say most Mediterranean countries, almost all the African ones, and a few countries in the Caribbean and in the Pacific. By the end of the 1970s the Commission had delegates in 47 developing countries.\(^6\) Commission’s delegates in associated countries were meant to perform technical tasks concerning development projects, but de facto they represented the Community in their host country and they enjoyed quasi-diplomatic status.\(^7\)


\(^7\) On the profile and functions of the Commission’s delegates in developing countries, see V. Dimier and M. McGeever, «Diplomats without a flag: The
Commissions’ representations in third countries performed more tasks and gained increasing profile over time. However, they represented only the EC Commission, not the Community as a whole. The representation of the Council of ministers was assigned to the embassy of the member state holding its presidency, which was also representing the EPC once it was established. Since the Commission’s representations in third countries could not claim to represent the Community as a whole, member states were even wary of allowing them to use symbols of the Community, such as the flag. Despite the limits established by the member states, the Commission’s representations in third countries usually enjoyed diplomatic status and they were listed among state embassies rather than among the representations of international organizations, even though some formal differences set them apart from national embassies.

In terms of assertion of the EC as a distinct international actor with a clear political profile, it may seem not so significant that the Community took part in specialized international organizations dealing with economic matters. Also, the establishment of direct contacts between the EC Commission and other actors was largely aimed at dealing with technical economic matters. However, it is important to notice that economic matters were gaining increasing political salience during those years: even if negotiations often focused on specific technical issues, they did offer the Community the chance to define and promote its own vision on clearly political matters such as the evolution of the international trade system, and the changing relations between industrialized and developing countries. On its own part, the EC Commission was willing to fully exploit these opportunities in order to prove that it was not only a technical body, but a fully-fledged political actor.

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8 Dimier and McGeever, «Diplomats without a flag,» p. 497.
Establishing diplomatic relations with third countries

To a great extent, the assertion of the Community as an actor speaking with a single voice in international affairs was driven by the Commission's eagerness of self-assertion. However, the assertion of the Community was also in tune with the eagerness of most third countries to recognize it as an interlocutor. Indeed, third countries' eagerness to enter in relations with the Community helped to compensate the limited means available for the expression of the Community's voice in international affairs. For instance, in the mid-1970s the only diplomatic missions of the Community in third countries were those in the US, Japan and Canada, while there were a hundred countries enjoying diplomatic relations with the Community, and most of them had a diplomatic mission in Brussels.10 Interest in the EC was spread well beyond Western countries: as Soames argued, «countries and groups of countries all over the world want to define their relations with us.»11

In many cases third countries' eagerness to recognize the Community as an interlocutor depended on economic and commercial considerations. The EC was one of the most important economic powers in the world and it enjoyed a great share of world trade. Especially after the entry into force of the Common Commercial Policy in 1970, any third country interested in trading with Western European countries had to address the Community. Establishing relations with the Community was particularly important at times of deep change of the international economy such as the 1970s, with the increasing opening of many national economies, the increasing fluctuations of the prices of goods and the opening of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.

Some countries sought to enter into a dialogue with the Community because they had been particularly affected by the deepening of European economic integration and by the enlargement of the EC. Most Mediterranean countries sought agreements with the Community and

demanded the establishment of consultation mechanisms with it. The British entry into the EC disrupted some established trade patterns, so that Australia and New Zealand asked to deepen relations with the Community, and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka obtained the conclusion of commercial agreements with it.\textsuperscript{12} India had already signaled its attention to the Community by being the first developing country to establish direct diplomatic relations with it in 1962.\textsuperscript{13}

Other countries were eager to develop their trade with the Community in order to diversify their commercial relations and to exploit the European market for their exports. This was the case of many Latin American countries for instance. Since 1969, regular meetings were held between Latin American ambassadors and Community officials.\textsuperscript{14} In 1970, Latin Americans obtained the establishment of a consultation mechanism with the Community, which unfolded at the level of experts and at the parliamentary level.\textsuperscript{15} Beside Latin American countries, Middle Eastern and Asian countries also sought to establish a relationship with the Community.\textsuperscript{16} Third countries' economic and commercial interest in the Community was such that by 1979 over 80 of them had signed agreements with it.\textsuperscript{17}

In some cases third countries were more willing to deepen their relations with the EC than the EC itself was. For instance, the countries of the Association of South-Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) established a committee in Brussels, paid high-level visits to the Community, and demanded to institutionalize mutual dialogue and to establish an EEC–ASEAN association.\textsuperscript{18} Interest was such that the visit of the President of the EC Commission François-Xavier Ortoli to Indonesia in 1974 was a

\textsuperscript{12} Speaking notes for Soames’s press conference at the end of a visit in the Far East, October 4, 1974, in Churchill Archives, Soames, 42.

\textsuperscript{13} C. Soames, Speech at the first meeting of the EEC/India Joint Commission, May 27, 1974, in ACCE, Speeches collection; W. Haferkamp, Speech at the opening of the India Trade Centre in Brussels, February 29, 1980, in ACCE, Speeches collection.


\textsuperscript{16} See for instance Record of meeting between Soames and the Iranian minister of economic affairs, May 14, 1975, in Churchill Archives, Soames, 42.

\textsuperscript{17} W. Haferkamp, Speech «The external relations of the EC,» Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, June 8, 1979, in ACCE, Speeches collection.
cover story in all the country's newspapers. However, because of French and British wariness the Community responded with very limited enthusiasm to the ASEAN's eagerness to deepen relations. A joint study group was established and a joint summit meeting was held in 1978.

There were two reasons for the Community's wariness towards the deepening of relations with some third countries demanding it. The first reason was that the Community was often attacked for its conclusion of preferential trade agreements with third countries, which were seen by the US and others as breaching GATT rules and philosophy. Many third countries were asking preferential treatment, but the Community had pledged to conclude as few preferential agreements as possible. The second reason was that the Community had agreed to preserve a special position in its external relations for the developing countries associated to it. The deepening of relations with a multiplicity of other developing countries would have hit the associates' position: while some member states were actually in favor of such a development, France was always extremely keen to prevent this from happening.

Even if economic considerations often determined third countries' eagerness to recognize the Community as an interlocutor and to enter into a relationship with it, many countries in fact assigned a political value to the strengthening of their economic relations with the Community. In some cases, the relationship between the Community and third countries focused on economic issues, but they were approached in a political way. For instance, dialogue between Japan and the Community established in the mid-1970s was based on developing joint economic and political perspectives. This dialogue was characterized by a strong emphasis on economic cooperation, but it also included discussions on political issues such as human rights and democracy. The dialogue helped to foster understanding and trust between the two sides, paving the way for future cooperation.

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19 P. Gorce (French ambassador to Indonesia), Report on Ortoli’s visit to Indonesia, March 5, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3839.

and the Community largely focused on economic issues that had strong political flavor, such as the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the relations between industrialized and developing countries. The opening of a delegation of the EC Commission in Tokyo in 1974 had a clear political meaning, since it was the first case of Japan endowing diplomatic recognition to an international organization in which Japan itself was not part. Moreover, Japan explicitly demanded that the representation was given a high-profile head, able to provide political flavor to it.

Developing countries were interested in the EC not only as an economic but also as a political actor. This was the case for the ASEAN countries and for the Latin American ones, but it was especially the case of the developing countries associated with the Community. Since its establishment in 1963, the Euro-African association was aimed at dealing with more than merely economic matters. The association was endowed with a full range of institutions, so that periodic meetings were held at the governmental and at the parliamentary level, addressing a multiplicity of different issues. The political component of the association was preserved also in the partnership between the Community and the so-called ACP developing countries which was established in 1975. In the late 1970s the Organization for African Unity also sought to establish a dialogue with the EC.

Some third countries openly encouraged and welcomed progress in Western European political integration, asking to move their relationship with the EC from an economic to an explicitly political domain. For instance, Canada wanted to elaborate a joint declaration of principles with the EC and to establish a system of permanent bilateral consultation with it. In was especially in the case of the US that the EC's international activity was valued for its political import and not

21 EC Commission, Group for summit preparation, Document sur les relations extérieures et les responsabilités de la Communauté dans le monde, March 16, 1972, in IISG, Mansholt 209; Presidency of the Council of the EC, Note de synthèse sur les relations extérieures de la Communauté et ses responsabilités dans le monde, June 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3003.
22 F. de Laboulaye (French ambassador to Japan), Report on Ortoli’s visit to Japan, February 26, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3839.
23 É. Burin des Roziers (French permanent representative to the EC), Note sur la nomination de Krag, September 28, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Danemark, 3211.
only for its economic one. The US expressed readiness to deal with the EC as a political interlocutor, even if it did show some ambiguities in this respect. Transatlantic strains – on which I focus in the next chapter – did not concern the project of European political integration in itself, but rather its future relations with the transatlantic relationship. Because of these strains, the first official visit of an American President to the EC institutions could only take place with Carter in 1976, even if it had already been envisaged in the previous years.

The case of China was possibly the case where the political interest underlying economic relations with the Community was the clearest. Trade flow between China and the Community was very weak, while there was a strong mutual interest for deepening political relations. China had opposed European integration until the late 1960s, but after the Sino-Soviet split it had started to strongly support it in a clear anti-Soviet function.26 Because of its mainly strategic concerns, China was especially calling for progress in the political and military aspects of European integration.27 On the European side, closer relations with China were seen as useful to put some pressure on the USSR.28 Following an opening by the Chinese government, the first contact at the political level between the Community and China occurred in May 1975. On that occasion the Chinese government announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Community.29


29 Record of meeting between Soames and the Chinese foreign minister, May 5, 1975, in Churchill Archives, Soames, 42; C. Soames, Notes used for a press
decision was remarkable, since it long preceded the establishment of
diplomatic relations between China and the US, and since China was
the first communist country to establish diplomatic relations with the
Community, except for Yugoslavia.  

Establishing unofficial relations with the Soviet countries

By the mid-1970s, the only countries which did not officially
recognize the Community were the countries of the Soviet bloc and a
handful of Asian countries. The attitude of the USSR was consistent
with its age-old sharp opposition to Western European integration. On
ideological grounds, the USSR accused the EC of being a capitalist,
imperialist and neo-colonial endeavor. On a strategic level, Western
European integration ran counter to the ideal scenario pursued by the
USSR, that is to say a weak and divided Western Europe and a Western
Germany only loosely tied to the West. Deeper Western European
integration could reduce the Soviet room of maneuver in Europe and
exert undesired appeal on the neutral countries and the Central-Eastern
European countries as well. Central-Eastern European countries were
readier than the USSR to enter in contact with the Community, but they
could not afford to adopt strong autonomous initiatives in this regard.

Despite the harsh Soviet criticism, in 1962 the Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev had acknowledged the Community as a reality to deal
with. No action was taken to follow up this opening, but in the
following years technical contacts could be established between the
Community and Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The
Community actively encouraged the establishment of these relations

30 Chenard, «Seeking détente and driving integration,» p. 25.
31 Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, and Mongolia.
32 V. Zubok, «The Soviet Union and European integration from Stalin to
Gorbachev,» in Journal of European Integration History, 2 (1), 1996.
33 EPC Political Committee, Rapport sur la CSCE, 1971, in AMAEF, Affaires
politiques, CE, 3791; FCO, Planning staff, Paper on the EC relations with the
34 W. Mueller, «Recognition in return for détente? Brezhnev, the EEC, and the
Moscow Treaty with West Germany, 1970–1973,» in Journal of Cold War Studies,
13 (4), 2011, pp. 81–82.
and it explicitly offered substantial commercial advantages to the Eastern European countries in return for full political recognition.\textsuperscript{36} Among world countries, the Soviet bloc ones were basically the only ones which were so wary of entering into relations with the Community, to the extent that the Community had to actively promote its recognition by them.

In December 1972 the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev expressed a change in the Soviet attitude, hinting at the possibility of establishing «some sort of businesslike relations» between the Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).\textsuperscript{37} The main reason for this change was the pressure exerted by some satellite countries, which were ready to take autonomous initiatives with regard to the Community.\textsuperscript{38} By then it was clear that the Community would not fall apart in the near future as the Soviets had foreseen – on the contrary, integration was becoming stronger. The Common Commercial Policy had endowed the Community with exclusive competence in the trade field, so it would soon be necessary for Central-Eastern European countries to deal directly with the Community, because of the importance of their commercial relations with it. The opening made by Brezhnev in 1972 was designed to give some leeway to the satellite countries whilst retaining Soviet control upon them by proposing the CMEA as interlocutor of the Community.\textsuperscript{39}

The question of the Soviet recognition of the Community was particularly relevant in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. EC member states decided not to send a delegation of the Community as such to the CSCE, but to include representatives of the EC Commission in the national delegation of the


\textsuperscript{37} Brezhnev quoted in Mueller, «Recognition in return for détente?,» p. 95.


\textsuperscript{39} Kansikas, «Acknowledging economic realities,» p. 324; Mueller, «Recognition in return for détente?,» p. 95.
member state holding the presidency of the Council of ministers. The recognition of the Community by the Soviet countries would be one of the goals pursued by the EC member states at the conference, but it would not be an item subject to negotiation. In fact no formal recognition occurred at the conference, but the EC member states acted in a coordinated way in the CSCE and «Moscow tended to treat the Community countries as a group.» By May 1973 Brezhnev had started to use the expression “European Community” instead of the previously employed expression “common market.” The EC countries made the very signature of the CSCE Final Act conditional upon the possibility to sign it on behalf of the EC as well. Confronted with the firmness of their stance, Soviet countries did not object when in 1975 the President of the Council of ministers Aldo Moro declared that he would sign the CSCE Final Act on behalf of the EC as such.

As long as it was necessary to establish some relations with the Community, the Soviets aimed at asserting the CMEA as its interlocutor. In such a way, the negotiation position of the Soviet bloc countries would be stronger and the control of the USSR upon its satellites would be ensured. Moreover, the establishment of a parallel between the Community and the CMEA would help to downsize the political ambitions of the former and to upgrade the international profile of the latter. In keeping with this strategy, in August 1973 the secretary of the CMEA paid a private visit to the president of the Council of the EC, and the following year the president of the EC Commission François-Xavier Ortoli was invited to Moscow. Following these exchanges, in February 1975 the first EEC–CMEA meeting was held. However, the Community had no interest at establishing relations with the CMEA as such, therefore strengthening

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the Soviet grip upon the satellite countries.\textsuperscript{46} Rather, the goal of the Community was to establish bilateral relations with each of the Soviet bloc countries. Because of the opposite goals of the Community and of the USSR, EEC–CMEA talks made hardly any progress in the following years.

As a consequence of the application of the Common Commercial Policy to Eastern Europe in 1975, and of the lack of progress in the EEC–CMEA talks, Central-Eastern European countries sought to conclude bilateral trade agreements with the Community. Between 1976 and 1980 the Community concluded agreements with all the Central-Eastern European countries except for the GDR and the USSR.\textsuperscript{47} In fact, even the USSR itself entered in informal negotiations with the Community over fisheries matters in February 1977.\textsuperscript{48} The conclusion of trade agreements and the existence of frequent even if informal contacts between the Soviet bloc countries and the Community pointed at a substantial recognition of the latter by the former. As Angela Romano argues, Soviet bloc countries’ «persistent denial of official recognition had become a mere façade.»\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{The entry of the Community into the UN General Assembly}

The Soviet refusal to recognize the EC as an international actor was a crucial factor affecting the process of the admission of the Community to the most widely recognized forum for international affairs, namely the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Soviet bloc countries did not have enough votes in order to block the admission of the Community to the UN, but they did have the power to turn it into a politically costly process. Political disincentives provided by the Soviet bloc were sufficient to convince the EC not to seek admission until 1974. The admission of the Community to the UN General Assembly

\textsuperscript{46} MAEF, Europe orientale, Note sur le rapport du Comité politique sur la CSCE, October 30, 1971, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3791; MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur les contacts CEE–Comecon, September 11, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792; Romano, «Untying Cold War knots,» p. 159; Mueller, «Recognition in return for détente?», p. 95.


\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 169.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 171.
was precisely one of the by-products of East–West détente: it became possible only when détente and the admission of the two German states to the UN substantially lowered the political costs involved in it. The Community’s admission was further facilitated by the Soviet acknowledgement of the Community as a reality and by the parallel admission of the CMEA to the UN.

The strengthening of the Community’s presence at the UN was mainly meant to assert it as something more than a mere specialized regional international organization. The Community initially only aimed at being admitted to the Second Commission of the UN General Assembly. The Second Commission was the body of the General Assembly where economic affairs, international trade and development questions were dealt with. At that time the General Assembly was devoting more and more attention to these issues, on which the Community had some exclusive competences.\(^{50}\) The EC Commission wanted to be able to intervene directly in these UN debates: following the Commission’s pressure, in 1970 the Council of ministers decided to demand the admission of the Community as such to the Second Commission of the UN General Assembly.\(^{51}\) However, EC member states’ representatives to the UN decided not to forward the demand «pour des raisons d’opportunité politique.»\(^{52}\)

The main obstacle to the admission of the Community was the Soviet reticence about it: the Soviet bloc countries could consent to the Community’s admission only if the CMEA was admitted as well, which was an unwelcome perspective for some EC member states. An additional problem was that the two German states were not full members of the UN yet.\(^{53}\) In 1971 the Community launched a new bid for its admission to the Second Commission of the UN General Assembly. Obstacles linked to the Soviet position were decreasing, but

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51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

the UN legal service argued that a dedicated debate in the General Assembly was required.\(^{54}\) Faced with the risk of a politicization of the issue in the debate, EC member states' representatives decided to drop the demand of admission.

According to the EC Commission and to the European Parliament, the failure of the admission bid was partly due to a «défaut de volonté politique des États membres.»\(^{55}\) EC member states' representatives to the UN were not enthusiastic about losing some power to the advantage of the Community as such.\(^{56}\) To be sure, the Commission's eagerness for admission to the UN was affected by its desire to heighten its profile and increase its influence on the international stage. The member states' lack of enthusiasm was also partly due to the implicit link between the question of the Community's admission to the UN and the question of its admission to the incoming CSCE, which was not settled yet: if the Community as such was admitted to the UN General Assembly, it would have been harder to keep it out of the CSCE.\(^{57}\)

The Community did not promote other bids for its admission to the UN General Assembly in the following years. Coordination between member states ensured some representation of the Community at the


UN, so that for instance a single spokesperson was usually expressing the common position on matters falling under the Community competence.\textsuperscript{58} In the course of the discussion on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations on December 7, 1972 the President of the Council of ministers made the first intervention on behalf of the Community in the UN General Assembly.\textsuperscript{59}

It was only in November 1973 that the possibility of a new bid for the Community’s admission to the UN General Assembly was considered, as demanded by the EC Commission.\textsuperscript{60} The Commission argued that the recent enlargement and deepening of the EC made admission necessary. Moreover, the General Assembly was increasingly dealing with economic matters falling under the Community competence.\textsuperscript{61} Most importantly, there were less obstacles to the admission, since the USSR had softened its attitude towards the Community and the two German states had entered the UN in September 1973.\textsuperscript{62} In June 1974 the Commission argued that the Community could ask for admission not only to the Second Commission but to the UN General Assembly as a whole, which was seen as «the ideal theatre for the Nine to assert themselves externally.»\textsuperscript{63} None of the EC member states were enthusiastic about the

\textsuperscript{58} T. Hijzen (EC Commission, DG I), Note sur la coordination des positions des États membres au cours de la 28ème session de l’Assemblée Générale, December 5, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 115.


\textsuperscript{60} Maas (EC Commission), Note on the relations between the EEC and the UN, November 1973, in NA, FCO 61/1136; K. Meyer, Note on the status of the Community at the UN General Assembly, December 6, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 265.


Commission's proposal, but none of them vetoed it either.\textsuperscript{64}

With the resolution 3208 on October 11, 1974 the UN General Assembly admitted the Community as an observer on a permanent basis, along with the CMEA. The Community became the first international organization endowed with the right of speech in the Assembly committees.\textsuperscript{65} The Community delegation to the General Assembly was to be jointly headed by a representative of the EC Commission and a representative of the presidency of the Council of ministers, with either one or the other acting as spokesperson according to the matter discussed.\textsuperscript{66} In 1976 the Community mission to the UN was accorded official diplomatic status. By then, the Community was taking part in about fifty international organizations: it was full member of GATT and of a few commodity organizations, and it was observer member in 37 other organizations.\textsuperscript{67} When the Community was given full membership in international organizations and agreements, a clause was usually employed assimilating the Community to a state.\textsuperscript{68}

\textbf{The EC member states speaking with a single voice}

By 1974 the possibility of the Community to express its views on international affairs had been considerably increased over the previous


\textsuperscript{65} The secretary-generals of the Organization of American States, of the Arab League, and of the Organization of African Unity had been admitted as observers to the General Assembly respectively in 1948, 1950, and 1965. They could only assist to the Assembly’s works, but not take the floor.

\textsuperscript{66} Coreper, Conclusions sur le statut de la Communauté auprès des Nations Unies, September 12, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4144.


\textsuperscript{68} D. Dormoy, «Le statut de l’Union européenne dans les organisations internationales,» in L’Union européenne et les organisations internationales, ed. D. Dormoy (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1997), pp. 42–43.

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years. The Community had entered a number of international organizations and the UN General Assembly, and a remarkable set of direct diplomatic relations had been established between the Community and a large number of third countries around the world. All these structures and tools allowed and invited the Community to express its views on international affairs. However, the Community was able to express its views only as far as its competences permitted it, that is to say mainly on international trade and development issues. As far as political issues were at stake, the ability of the EC as a whole to intervene did not depend on a strengthening of the Community but rather on progress in the EPC.

It was in late 1973 that the EC started to express its views on international issues falling outside the Community sphere. By then the EPC had become sufficiently structured and the EC member states had become willing to express a distinct single voice in international affairs. The first joint declaration by the EC member states on an international issue was the EPC communiqué on the Arab-Israeli war on October 13, 1973.\(^{69}\) The release of such a declaration signaled the very high ambitions initially endowed to the EPC: the EC member states were taking a common position on one of the most complex and delicate international issues of the time, on a pressing crisis and on a subject which the US and the EC disagreed on, and which traditionally divided member states themselves. The communiqué was followed by common démarches at third countries' governments.

The release of common statements on international political issues and the performance of common démarches became one of the main activities carried out by the EPC in the following years.\(^{70}\) The release of common statements increased in number and weight especially after the creation of the European Council in 1974. Indeed, one of the main functions assigned to the Council was «donner un caractère plus solennel ou un retentissement particulier à leur prise de position sur un sujet d'actualité. Il s'agit pour le Conseil européen de faire entendre la voix de l'Europe.»\(^{71}\) To this goal, it was decided that «le présidence


\(^{71}\) V. Giscard d'Estaing, Letter to the other heads of state and government of the EC member states on the European Council, January 21, 1977, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4085. See also E. Mourlon-Druol, «Regional integration
exerce la fonction de porte-parole des Neuf et se fait leur interprète sur le plan diplomatique.»

It became customary for the EC heads of state and government to release declarations on international issues. The direct involvement of leaders gave more strength and visibility to these declarations. As Maria Gainar argues, the Council became «une sorte de vitrine des Neuf sur la scène internationale.»

The release of joint statements on international issues became one of the most employed means for expressing the EC member states' cohesion at the UN too. Starting from 1975, the president of EPC made a common statement at the opening of each session of the UN General Assembly, expressing EC member states' views on all the main international issues. Because of its solemn aspect and its comprehensive character, such a common statement was seen as «an ideal opportunity to show the profile of the [Nine]» in international affairs. At the General Assembly EC member states were also making common statements to explain their voting decisions, provided that they had a common position. While they made only two joint declarations in the General Assembly in 1973, they made sixty-one joint declarations in 1977. As the member states’ delegations to the UN remarked,

Les déclarations communes affirment, peut-être même de façon


75 Bot, «Cooperation between the diplomatic missions of the Ten,» p. 163.

By the mid-1970s the EC was expressing its own views on all the major international issues. Views were expressed through the Community if the issues fell into its competence and through member states' joint statements in all the other cases. Despite the large number of joint statements released by the Community, the EPC, and the European Council, they had only a limited impact. The problem was that statements were often very generic because they had to hide substantial divergences between the member states' positions. Even when common statements could be agreed, divergences made it hard to follow them up in any substantial way. The release of generic statements which could not be substantially followed up could in fact be counterproductive, leading to a loss of the EC's credibility and influence abroad.78

Together with the release of common statements, one of the most important means for the EC member states to express a single view on international issues was their voting cohesion at the UN. Cohesion in voting was regarded as «la manifestation par excellence de l'identité européenne.»79 The EPC devoted many energies to coordinate and harmonize member states' positions on the different issues at stake in order to increase the coherence of their voting behavior. Member states' delegations could hold as many as a few hundred meetings during a single session of the UN General Assembly.80 EC member states' voted together on 61 percent of the roll-call votes in the General Assembly in 1974, up from 43 percent in the previous year, and voting coherence remained around 60 percent in the following years.81

Despite the EPC harmonization efforts, significant divergence

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77 Representations of the EC member states at the UN, Rapport sur la coopération entre les Neuf lors de la 29ème session de l'Assemblée Générale, March 1975, in NA, FCO 58/894.
78 Maes, «The EC and the UN General Assembly,» pp. 82–83; Bot, «Cooperation between the diplomatic missions of the Ten,» p. 164.
80 In 1984 Bernard Bot was reporting around 250–300 meetings per session («Cooperation between the diplomatic missions of the Ten,» p. 159).
remained in the member states' voting behavior at the UN. Divergence was particularly hard to overcome on some sensitive issues: as a third country’s diplomat remarked, EC member states «vote together on unimportant questions and apart on important ones.»82 France was «the bête noire of voting cohesion,»83 since it was the member state the most inclined to vote alone, but also Denmark and Ireland often voted differently from the majority of the other member states. By contrast, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg never voted alone.84 EPC coordination efforts helped to avoid outright opposite voting behaviors, however: while in 1973 EC member states ended up with a Yes/No split five times, from 1975 to 1977 they split in such a sharp way only once per session, and only one time did the split concern a substantial issue such as the arms embargo against South Africa.85

The EPC achieved moderate success in the harmonization of the foreign policies of the EC member states, and it favored the expression of common positions on most international issues. Despite the limits of declarations and of voting cohesion, EC member states increasingly managed to express common positions in international affairs. This achievement was sanctioned by a growing recognition of the EC as a distinct international actor by third countries – not only with regard to economic issues but also to political ones. EC member states' delegations to the UN reported that the EC had become «a recognizable group and a reality in the calculations of the other UN groups.»86 Also, as a French diplomat remarked, «other people no longer ask you what

82 Foot, «The EC's voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly,» p. 351.
84 Foot, «The EC's voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly,» p. 358.
85 Ibid., pp. 353, 355, 360.
86 J. C. Thomas (British delegation to the UN), Note on cooperation between the Nine at the UN, March 4, 1975, in NA, FCO 58/894. See also Representations of the EC member states at the UN, Rapport sur la coopération entre les Neuf lors de la 29ème session de l’Assemblée Générale, March 1975, in NA, FCO 58/894; EPC Political Committee, Report on the political cooperation of the Nine at the UN, April 26, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3794.

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France is going to do. They ask you what the Nine are going to do.»

Member states’ delegations to the UN were often feeling a stronger need to act in unison than their home governments did, since they were «confronted day by day with the expectations or even the pressure of Third World countries and other regional groupings.» Sometimes it was third countries that urged the EC to take the lead on some international issues, and to speak with one voice about them.

Third countries started to look for dialogue on international political issues with the EC member states collectively taken. The earliest case of third countries’ interest in the EC as a political interlocutor occurred in December 1973. While the EC leaders were convened for the Copenhagen Summit, the foreign ministers of four Arab countries went to Copenhagen uninvited and asked to discuss with the EC member states. They called for their stronger involvement in the Middle East issues and for closer cooperation between the EC and the Arab countries.

Other notable instances of third countries’ interest in the EC as a political interlocutor occurred in 1975, when the EC member states met with Egyptian and Israeli diplomats and with all the parties of the Cyprus conflict. Even the Soviet ambassador at the UN sought a dialogue with the EC member states on disarmament. It was particularly at the UN that third countries sought contacts with the EPC president. Outside the UN, it was sometimes more complex for third countries to identify their interlocutor, since they did not always understand the separation between Community and EPC. Moreover, the EPC president changed every six months and no secretariat existed, so that it was remarked that «communication with third parties is entirely disorganized.»

87 Diplomat quoted in P. Strafford, «The growing presence of the Nine at the UN,» in The Times, December 30, 1975. Similar observations were reported in Representations of the EC member states at the UN, Rapport sur la coopération entre les Neuf lors de la 29ème session de l’Assemblée Générale, March 1975, in NA, FCO 58/894.


89 Ibid., p. 160.

90 President of the EPC, Rapport aux chefs d’état ou de gouvernement sur la réunion des ministres des affaires étrangères des Neuf avec des ministres des affaires étrangères arabes, December 17, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3789.

91 Strafford, «The growing presence of the Nine at the UN.»

92 Ibid.

93 F. Judd (FCO, Minister of state), Paper on the future development of the EPC, January 1978, in NA, FCO 98/401.
No single voice for the EC at the UN Security Council

By the mid-1970s the EC member states were expressing common positions on many international issues, and the EC was increasingly regarded as a distinct international actor. The assertion of distinct and common positions by the EC member states had a great limit, however: no coordination occurred between them on the activities of the UN Security Council. While the UN General Assembly did deal with significant issues, it was in the Security Council that the most delicate international issues tended to be discussed. France and Britain were permanent members of the Security Council and enjoyed veto power in it, while either West Germany or Italy were often elected as temporary members of the Council. However, in the Security Council EC member states were exclusively serving in their individual capacity both in principle and in practice.

As the EPC activities were progressing and the EC was increasingly expressing common positions at the UN General Assembly during the 1970s, the EC member states which were not part of the Security Council exerted growing pressure on their partners in order to discuss the activities of the Council in the EPC framework. The EC member states had agreed to cooperate in the activity of all the UN bodies in which some member states were not taking part, and the Security Council was the only exception to this practice. As the British conceded, third countries tended to associate the EC as a whole with the positions expressed by the EC members of the Security Council: EC countries which were not members of the Council ended up with being associated with positions that they did not even have the chance to discuss.\footnote{P. M. Maxey (FCO, United Nations), Note on cooperation among the Nine on Security Council matters, May 20, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/208; FCO, Record of Anglo-French consultations on UN affairs, September 1976, in NA, FCO 98/210.} An additional reason in favor of some cooperation in Security Council matters was that such matters often came up in other UN forums, so coordination in the former could help coordination in the latter, and the other way round.\footnote{P. M. Maxey, Note on cooperation among the Nine on Security Council matters, May 20, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/208.}

It was especially Belgium and the Netherlands which pressed their partners to discuss the activities of the Security Council in the EPC framework. Their repeated pressures led the EC foreign ministers to
agree on the so-called “Dublin formula” in June 1975. According to this formula, the EC members of the Security Council «should, to the greatest possible extent, inform their partners» about the Council’s activities.\textsuperscript{96} Rather than establishing a practice of throughout consultation and coordination \textit{à neuf} on the Security Council’s activities, the Dublin formula merely led to occasional communications from members to non-members. Mutual information did increase, but it was usually given on a bilateral basis and Security Council issues continued not to be collectively discussed by the EC member states on a regular basis.\textsuperscript{97}

Belgium and the Netherlands repeatedly called for an improvement of the procedures agreed upon in Dublin, but the French government rejected and vetoed any improvement.\textsuperscript{98} Britain adopted a more nuanced position about it, deeming French firmness on this issue «provocative»\textsuperscript{99} and «extreme […] It is not realistic, nor it is conducive to the development of political cooperation.»\textsuperscript{100} Some more consultation with the EC partners on Security Council matters could be conceded, even though clear limits should remain on the extent of cooperation.\textsuperscript{101} France and Britain agreed on the fact that consultation of the partners on Security Council matters would not be mandatory, nor would they act as spokespersons of the EC in the Council. They would also retain complete freedom to decide how to cast their votes in it.\textsuperscript{102}

According to the Tindemans Report on the European Union, by the time of the creation of the EU, member states would be required to consult with one another on all international problems and they would

\begin{flushleft}
96 \textit{Ibid}.
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97 \textit{Ibid}.
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98 British delegation to the UN, Note on the Security Council, April 15, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/971; FCO, Note on the coordination of the Nine at the UN, September 1976, in NA, FCO 98/209.
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99 FCO, Note on the coordination of the Nine at the UN, September 1976, in NA, FCO 98/209.
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100 P. M. Maxey, Note on cooperation among the Nine on Security Council matters, May 20, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/208.
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be required to reach a common position, if necessary recurring to majority voting.\textsuperscript{103} If a common foreign policy was enforced in such a way, «le statut de membre permanent dont disposent la France et la Grande-Bretagne aux Nations-Unies n'a plus de raison d'être.»\textsuperscript{104} France and Britain would turn into mere spokespersons of the EC in the UN Security Council, and third countries could argue that «since the Nine are speaking with one voice, they need only single representation.»\textsuperscript{105} For this reason, France and Britain opposed Tindemans’s proposals. The EC members of the Security Council were not very eager to present a common position in it, even if prior coordination between them usually took place. Occasionally the EC members did present a common position in the Security Council, but this was not turned into a custom.\textsuperscript{106} The desire not to present a common European position in the Security Council contributed to the French and British wariness of discussing security questions in the EPC.\textsuperscript{107}

It is paradoxical that the EC member states made efforts to reach common positions on many international issues, but they deliberately sought not to present common European positions in the most important forum for the discussion of international affairs, namely the Security Council. If the pursuit of deep political integration was really the ultimate goal pursued by the EC member states, it was logical to envisage for the long-term a participation of the European Union as such to the UN Security Council. The Tindemans Report did not make such a suggestion explicitly, but the participation of the EU to the Security Council was the natural outcome of the creation of a common foreign policy decided with majority voting. In fact, EC member states were extremely wary of presenting common European positions in the Security Council: despite their pledges of commitment to the promotion of a common foreign policy, none of them was really eager to move towards it.


\textsuperscript{104} MAEF, Directeur adjoint des affaires politiques, Note sur le Rapport Tindemans, January 12, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3773; see also British delegation to the EC, Commentary on the Report on European Union, January 13, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/165.

\textsuperscript{105} J. C. Thomas, Note on cooperation between the Nine at the UN, March 4, 1975, in NA, FCO 58/894. See also British delegation to the UN, Note on the Security Council, April 15, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/971.

\textsuperscript{106} Lindemann, «EPC at the UN,» p. 117.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p. 117.
The project of common European embassies

In order to increase the effectiveness and coherence of the whole set of EC’s activities in international affairs, it was necessary to reduce the gap between the Community and the EPC spheres. This gap affected the process of decision-making on international issues, as it was shown in chapter 1, but it also affected the process of expression of the EC’s positions in international affairs. Both the Community and the EPC had their own means and structures for the expression of their views and for the cultivation of their relations with third countries. Little institutional arrangements existed to ensure coherence between the positions expressed by the Community and by the EPC, which could not be taken for granted as a result. The creation of the European Council was meant to address such a problem, but other proposals were also discussed to increase the coherence between the positions expressed by the Community and by the EPC.

One of these proposals was advanced by the EC Commission in 1975: in the perspective of the establishment of a European Union, the Commission proposed to establish diplomatic representations of the EC as a whole in third countries, encompassing both the Community and its member states. Until then, a double channel was in place for the representation of the EC in third countries: the EC Commission had its own diplomatic missions, while the Council of ministers, the EPC, and the European Council were represented by the embassy of the member state holding their presidency. In some cases, the EC member states’ ambassadors periodically met together with officials and leaders of their host country. The Commission’s proposal aimed at presenting third countries with a single common European embassy, whose very existence was expected to increase the coherence of the EC’s views on international issues, and to favor the perception of the EC as a distinct and cohesive international actor by external observers.

A proposal for the establishment of a common European embassy had in fact already been advanced by the German government in December 1974. The German project aimed at establishing a common embassy in Guinea-Bissau. The EC member states had recognized

Guinean independence in August 1974, but none of them planned to open an embassy in the country. According to the German proposal, the common European embassy would represent the Community, the EPC, the European Council and the member states individually taken. The member state holding the Council’s presidency would manage the relations with the embassy and each member state would contribute to its staffing and costs. The common ambassador would represent common positions where available and the positions of the different member states in the other cases. The only existing case of common embassy at the time was the one of Niger, Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey in Israel.

Reducing and sharing administrative costs was certainly one of the reasons underlying the German proposal. However, its main goal was to foster progress in European political integration, which had entered a period of relative crisis during 1974. The very existence of a common ambassador would incite member states to reduce their differences, so that they could present a common position to their counterpart. The Guinean experiment would create a precedent that could later be replicated elsewhere and that would constitute a useful experience for the envisaged evolution of the EC into a European Union. Guinea-Bissau was identified as a good case for such an experiment because no established pattern of member states' relations with it existed. None of them had strong economic and political interests there, and very few EC citizens lived in the country. Moreover, it was a very small and marginal country: in case of failure, the experiment of the common embassy would not have seriously

111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
affected the pursuit of greater political integration.\textsuperscript{119}

The strongest opposition to the German proposal was expressed by the French government. France had strong interests in the countries surrounding Guinea-Bissau and it was afraid that the establishment of a common embassy could enable its European partners to exert some indirect influence in the region.\textsuperscript{120} France was especially opposed to the German project because it was meant to combine the Community and the EPC dimensions of the EC's international activity. The project was also meant to bring about a common European foreign policy, which was not a notion conceded by the French:

Nous nous sommes toujours gardés jusqu'à présent d'employer l'expression 'politique étrangère commune', même comme objectif à atteindre. Dans ces conditions, il ne serait guère logique d'admettre le principe d'une représentation commune.\textsuperscript{121}

No common European embassy could finally be established in Guinea-Bissau. Similarly, the proposal advanced by the EC Commission in 1975 was rejected.

\textbf{Europe may speak with a single voice, but not with only one voice}

During the 1970s the EC was endowed with a number of means for the expression of a single voice in international affairs. On one hand, the Community was admitted to several international organizations and conferences, the foremost example being the UN General Assembly. Moreover, it established representation offices abroad, as well as direct diplomatic relations with almost all of the world's countries. Such a development was mostly driven by the endowment to the Community of exclusive competence on trade and by the EC Commission's willingness to defend its turf and to increase its own

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} EPC presidency, Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en Guinée-Bissau, January 29, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519.
\item \textsuperscript{119} \textit{Ibid.}; EPC Presidency, Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en Guinée-Bissau, May 13, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519.
\item \textsuperscript{120} MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en Guinée-Bissau, February 11, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3798.
\item \textsuperscript{121} MAEF, Affaires juridiques, Note sur la représentation commune des Neuf en Guinée-Bissau, February 5, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3798.
\end{itemize}
profile and influence on the international stage. On the other hand, the EPC led member states to release an increasing number of joint statements on international issues and to make common démarches, as well as to increase their voting cohesion at the UN. Joint statements were frequently released by the European Council too. Such an increase of member states’ coordination in international affairs was mostly driven by their own political willingness to move towards it and by the need to meet the expectations raised by the developments of European integration.

Developments in European political integration were overall well received by third countries. They clearly paid attention to the EC’s activity in international affairs, and they came to regard it as a global player of its own – not only economic, but also political in nature. Third countries also continued to pay attention to the EC as an international actor in the late 1970s, when the EC was experiencing increasing difficulties. Even then the EC foreign ministers could claim that the EC was «increasingly regarded by the external world as a coherent entity in world affairs,» 122 and Soames could claim that the EC was «a pole of attraction to the outside world» to such an extent that «countries vie with each other to link themselves to it.» 123 According to the President of the EC Commission Roy Jenkins, third countries perceived the EC’s strengths more than most EC actors did, so that «the Community looks stronger, sometimes more imposing, to those outside it than to those within.» 124

Most third countries were welcoming the assumption by the EC of a stronger role in international affairs. The assertion of the EC as a distinct international actor and its expression with a single voice were in fact hindered more by the wariness of the EC member states themselves than by the attitude of third countries. It was the EC member states which postponed the Community’s admission to the UN, which kept in place the inefficient separation between the

Community and the EPC divisions, which failed to follow up common statements with substantial initiatives, which rejected EPC coordination on Security Council matters, and so on. As demonstrated in this chapter, there were differences between individual member states' attitudes towards these issues, and France was most often the state holding back. However, no member state exerted a strong pressure to move from an EC sometimes speaking with a single voice to an EC speaking with only one voice in international affairs.

Any member state was keen to retain and cultivate «soit son image de marque […] soit ses liens avec un autre groupe que celui des Neuf […] soit encore les droits particuliers qu’il tient.» This naturally applied to the biggest European powers, namely France and Britain. However, Germany was also especially keen to retain foreign policy autonomy for East–West relations, Denmark had to combine membership in the EC with membership in the group of Scandinavian countries, Ireland was particularly sensitive to neutrality and colonial issues, the Netherlands wanted to stress their concern about development issues, and so on. Apart from the desire to retain some foreign policy autonomy, member states’ wariness of letting the EC speak with only one voice in international affairs was affected by their divergent positions on the internal and institutional aspects of political integration. In particular, little agreement existed on the political role that the EC Commission could play, and on the relationship between the Community and the EPC spheres, as shown in chapter 1.

The question of the expression of a single voice by the EC in international affairs clearly illustrates the ambiguities and the limits of the process of assertion of the EC as a distinct international actor. EC member states often stated that their long-term goal was to have Europe speaking with one voice on the international stage. In fact, they did not aim to have a Europe speaking with only one voice: one common European voice might sometimes be expressed, but it should not substitute the choir of single national voices. As was the case for the internal institutional aspects of European political integration, for the external aspects there was also a mismatch between the rhetorical statements and pledges made by the member states and the actual decisions and actions taken by them. To be sure, pledges referred to developments envisaged for the long-term. However, some actual decisions taken in the short-term often tended to hinder rather than to favor the realization of such pledges.

125 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur cinq années de coopération politique, June 18, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3785.
Chapter 3
Limited Room for the EC's International Activity

During the 1970s the EC was endowed with a multiplicity of means and structures for the deployment of its international activity, which offered it considerable opportunities. However, the EC exploited only some of these opportunities. One obvious reason for this was the member states' difficulty in reaching compromises on certain issues, which made the EC unable to move much beyond mere statements and vague commitments. A more important reason was that entire sectors of international affairs were excluded from the range of action of the EC, one example being defense. In the case of these sectors, member states avoided EC coordination, preferring either to retain national freedom of maneuver or to pursue Atlantic coordination. The exclusion of these sectors was partly due to the member states' view of the character of the EC's international activity, and partly due to their view of the relationship between it and transatlantic cooperation.

In this chapter I focus on the process of defining the range of action available for the EC's international activity, which led to the exclusion of entire sectors of international affairs from it. First of all, I consider the member states' domaines réservés, wherein they deliberately envisaged no coordination with the EC partners. Then I look at the reasons why the member states ruled out the pursuit of EC cooperation in the defense field, which was clearly one of the most important domains in international affairs. Despite its dependence on the US in terms of defense, in the early 1970s the EC tried to assert quite a large range for its international activity, developing its own positions on delicate issues – even at the risk of antagonizing the US itself. However, such an attempt was short-lived and the EC was forced to abandon it in 1974. Consequently, the EC had to refrain from taking its own tough, autonomous stances on issues that could spark controversies with the US, such as in regards to energy or the Middle East question.
The definition of the range of action available for the EC's international activity was certainly affected by the pressures exerted on it by the US. However, I argue that its definition was even more heavily affected by the EC member states' own attitudes towards the transatlantic relationship. On the one hand, Germany, Britain and the Netherlands tended to block any political integration initiative that risked harming transatlantic relations, such as the Euro-Arab dialogue or the pursuit of EC coordination on energy. On the other hand, France tended to block any political integration initiative that risked strengthening transatlantic relations, such as the promotion of European defense coordination in close connection with NATO. Aside from concerns about transatlantic relations, member states clearly envisaged a system totally without common activity in particular sectors where they wanted to retain national freedom of action, or where they preferred to coordinate at the level of the West. As a result, European political integration was to deal with only some aspects of international affairs.

**Member states' *domaines réservés***

It is not by chance that the French expression *domaines réservés* was often employed to identify the fields and issues of international affairs where the EC member states did not envisage EC coordination, in order to preserve their ability to deploy fully autonomous national actions. Among the member states, France was the country the most attached to the notion of *domaines réservés*, and it forcefully argued for their exclusion from the range of action of the EC's international activity. France «sometimes seemed to regard the single voice of the Nine as a drag on their own policies.»¹ However, the other member states were also eager to retain national freedom of action in some fields which were deemed particularly sensitive and important for their own national interests. As a result, there were some areas of international affairs which could not be dealt with at the EC level.

One of the most important *domaines réservés* for France was francophone sub-Saharan Africa. To be sure, the Community was asked to contribute to the development of this region through preferential

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¹ FCO, Record of meeting between the British and German political directors, July 16, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/975.
commercial agreements and a transferal of aid funds. However, its involvement in the region would be strictly limited to development promotion: as far as political relations were involved, neither the Community nor the EPC wanted to interfere. At the EPC level France refused to discuss most of the grave crises affecting its former African colonies during the 1970s. The French government made clear that the possible development of a common African policy of the EC would be given “un coup d’arrêt très ferme.” French opposition to EC coordination in sub-Saharan Africa was mainly due to the fact that France’s relations with its former African colonies were still strongly neocolonial in nature. European partners were not to interfere in the close relations between France and politically embarrassing regimes such as that of Bokassa in the Central African Republic.

France was the EC member state which was by far the most attached to the exclusion of some domains of international affairs from the EC’s international activity. However, the other member states were also wary of coordinating with the partners at the EC level in some fields. For instance, given the peculiarity of its situation during the Cold War, and the sensitiveness of its relations with the Eastern neighboring countries, West Germany was wary of excessively involving its EC partners in this area. EC cooperation was desirable or acceptable on some aspects of the relations with the Eastern European countries, such as the CSCE, for instance. However, the German government preferred to avoid EC cooperation in other domains, even though it frequently consulted with some partners on a bilateral basis about them.

Britain tended to be very supportive of the goal of European political integration, and it highlighted its willingness to discuss even the more sensitive issues with its EC partners. The British willingness to discuss the Rhodesian crisis in the EPC was particularly stressed, since it stood in stark contrast to France’s wariness of involving its EC partners in the crises affecting its own former colonies. However, the British government also argued that the specificity of its interests in some fields of international affairs required the full preservation of its national freedom of action. For instance, the Wilson government fought


3 C. Martin (Cabinet of de Guiringaud), Brief for meeting of the EC foreign ministers, October 3, 1977, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4149.

hardly against close EC coordination in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. Britain argued that North Sea oil made its position too peculiar to coordinate with the other EC member states on energy matters.\textsuperscript{5} Being nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council, France and Britain were also clearly opposed to close EC cooperation on these issues. All they could consent to was some bilateral cooperation and some information of the partners.\textsuperscript{6}

Member states' willingness to exclude some fields and issues of international affairs from consultation and cooperation with EC partners clearly depended not only on the sensitivity of their interests, but also on the difference between their own position and the positions held by the partners in these respects. If a state held a minority position, it clearly had no incentive to coordinate with its partners. In case of EC coordination, it would either be forced to move closer to the majority position and thus away from its own national interests, or it would be placed in the position of “demandeur,” and hence be required to offer substantial counterparts for the observation of its interests. Benefits of collective action could be lower than the costs implied by it: as Jeffry Friden put it in political science jargon, «there is a clear trade-off between the advantages of scale and the disadvantages of overriding heterogenous preferences,» thus «the closer a member state's preference is to the EU's expected collective preference, the better off it will be with pooling.»\textsuperscript{7}

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\textsuperscript{5} E. Wellenstein (EC Commission, DG I), Note sur rencontre du groupe pour le dialogue entre pays producteurs and consommateurs de pétrole, March 21, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1117; EC Commission, Report on meeting of the group on energy, April 7, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1117; J. de Beaumarchais (French ambassador to the UK), Note sur les déclarations de Callaghan sur le dialogue Nord–Sud, October 8, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Grande-Bretagne, 350.

\textsuperscript{6} British delegation to the UN, Note on the Security Council, April 15, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/971; P. M. Maxey (FCO, United Nations), Note on cooperation among the Nine on Security Council matters, May 20, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/208; FCO, Note on the coordination of the Nine at the UN, September 1976, in NA, FCO 98/209.

\textsuperscript{7} J. A. Frieden, «One Europe, one vote? The political economy of European Union representation in international organizations,» in European Union Politics, 5 (2), 2004, pp. 262, 265.
\end{flushleft}
The renunciation to the pursuit of a European defense

Arguably, cooperation on defense matters should be one of the main elements in a process of political integration. Indeed, the first ambitious project for European political integration focused on defense, aiming at establishing a European Defense Community. Also, the Fouchet plans discussed in 1961–62 envisaged a system of European cooperation on political and defense matters. After the failure of the EDC and of the Fouchet plans, the EC member states did not pursue other attempts at cooperation on defense matters. Most of them cooperated in the framework of NATO, since, except for Ireland, they all took part in the Alliance. However, France withdrew from the NATO integrated military command in 1966, due to concerns of national independence from the US. Besides NATO, EC member states cooperated in the framework of the Western European Union, which had precisely been established for cooperation on defense and security matters. However, by the early 1970s the WEU had been substantially marginalized, much to the benefit of NATO.8

When the goal of European political integration was re-launched at The Hague and Paris summits, some projects for cooperation on defense were considered. Cooperation on defense matters would imply a clear progression in European political integration, and it could favor the assertion of the EC as an international actor, strengthening its position and providing real grip to its international activity. Unless it included defense, the EC’s international activity would keep «le caractère un peu irréel d’exercices d’État Major où de manoeuvres dans lesquels on ne tire qu’à blanc.»9 In the long run, it was argued that «l’identité européenne ne peut-elle être réelle sans défense propre et autonome.»10 Moreover, the establishment of a European defense would strengthen Europe's position with regard to the US, and it would

help to meet the American calls for a more balanced sharing of the defense burden.

Aside from the benefits that the launch of European defense cooperation could have brought to the development of European political integration, its launch could also have been useful for addressing some of the grave strategic worries concerning Western Europe in the early 1970s. Western Europeans were increasingly worried about the trustworthiness of the American commitment to the defense of Europe in case of a crisis with the USSR. The adoption of the flexible response strategy by NATO could have led the US to decide not to use its nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe. Moreover, the possible reduction of the American conventional forces in Europe might encourage an aggressive Soviet attitude and increase risks for Western Europe in case of crisis. Effective European cooperation on defense matters could have been helpful for addressing these worries, even if at the same time it might have encouraged an American retrenchment.

Some projects for European cooperation on defense matters were discussed in the early 1970s. Most of them did not aim at the establishment of a European defense system outside the NATO framework, or at the establishment of a proper European army. They rather aimed at reassessing the European component of NATO and at improving coordination on arms production, planning, procurement, and so on. In 1968 the European full members of NATO had established the Eurogroup, which was precisely aimed at improving their coordination on defense matters. However, the Eurogroup mainly addressed technical issues, and it was quite weak in political terms. Defense cooperation projects which were discussed in the early 1970s largely focused on a strengthening of the Eurogroup and on the establishment of some connection between it and the EPC system of political integration. These projects were mostly advanced by Britain and Germany.


12 French embassy in Bonn, Note sur la République Fédérale et les relations Europe–Amérique, February 18, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 2985.

With Britain and France being nuclear powers, in principle it was even possible to envisage European cooperation on nuclear defense. To this end, West Germany insisted on including a clause in the US–USSR non-proliferation treaty granting the possibility for Europe to build upon the French and British nuclear capability in the future.\footnote{Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War. Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), pp. 86–88; G.-H. Soutou, «L’anneau et les deux triangles: les rapports franco-allemands dans la politique européenne et mondiale de 1974 à 1981,» in Les années Giscard. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et l’Europe 1974–1981, ed. S. Berstein and J.-F. Sirinelli (Paris: Armand Colin, 2006), p. 50.} However, several political problems hindered the development of a Western European nuclear deterrent. One major problem was the disagreement on the extent of desirable involvement of Germany in such a project.\footnote{Ibid.; R. de Saint-Legier (MAEF, Amérique), Note sur la politique américaine à l’égard de l’Europe, December 15, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3004; D. Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War, p. 89.} Another major problem was France’s willingness to retain complete national control over its deterrent, and its wariness of cooperation projects as a result.\footnote{British embassy in Washington, Memorandum «The US and the enlarged EC: commercial and economic issues,» January 25, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1294; R. de Saint-Legier, Note sur la politique américaine à l’égard de l’Europe, December 15, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3004; Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War, p. 89; G.-H. Soutou, «Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les États-Unis et l’Europe,» in Journal of European Integration History, 6 (2), 2000, p. 124.} French weapons could be used for the defense of Western Europe as a whole, but only on a case-by-case basis and at the discretion of the French President.\footnote{Andréani, «L’Europe, l’OTAN et la France,» p. 350.} Because of these problems, projects for European defense almost exclusively focused on conventional defense.

One more obstacle to European cooperation on defense matters was the growing diffusion of pacifist and neutralist preferences among Western European public opinion.\footnote{R. de Saint-Legier, Note sur la politique américaine à l’égard de l’Europe, December 15, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3004.} In such a political context, and considering the economic crisis of the 1970s, it was hard to envisage the substantial increase of military spending that the development of a European defense would have required. However, the main obstacle
hindering progress in European cooperation on defense issues was the mismatch between the set of Western European countries which were pursuing political integration (i.e. the EC member states) and the set of countries which were pursuing military coordination within NATO. Ireland constituted a problem in this respect, but the main problem was the position of France.

To a large extent, Britain and Germany envisaged European defense cooperation as a way to bring France back into the Atlantic system. France did envisage some cooperation with the US on defense, but only on a strictly bilateral basis.19 France was extremely skeptical towards the British and German initiatives for defense cooperation, since it wanted to preserve a neat separation between European political integration and NATO.20 As a consequence, France did not want to enter the Eurogroup or other possible similar arrangements, which Pompidou described as «un sac, dont la corde qui le ferme est américaine.»21 Another reason for France’s opposition was its worry that the establishment of a system of European defense might encourage a German drift to the East.22 Moreover, European defense cooperation could create problems in the relations with the USSR and with the US, and its delicacy might hinder rather than favor progress towards European political integration.23

In principle, France did not oppose European defense cooperation. As long as it took place outside NATO, the establishment of a European system of defense cooperation could actually offer great opportunities

19 Soutou, «Pompidou et les relations entre les États-Unis et l’Europe,» pp. 6, 27.
23 Soutou, «L’anneau et les deux triangles,» p. 50.
for the exertion of French political influence. De Gaulle had envisaged such a development, and the French government sometimes suggested it during the 1970s as well. For instance, at the heyday of the transatlantic tensions in late 1973, the French foreign minister Michel Jobert argued that Europe was «more and more abandoned to herself» and proposed to carry out closer European cooperation on defense.\footnote{24} Cooperation should take place outside of NATO, in the WEU. For this reason, the proposal was coldly received by the EC partners, which were eager to promote cooperation in the NATO Eurogroup instead.\footnote{25}

In 1975 and 1976 some more projects were considered for the development of European defense cooperation. In the perspective of the establishment of the European Union, the EC Commission proposed to endow the EU with a «potential competence» on defense matters, which would be activated only when conditions would make it possible.\footnote{26} The Tindemans Report on the EU dealt with defense matters to some extent, arguing that «European Union will not be complete until it has drawn up a common defence policy.» EC member states were invited «regularly to hold exchanges of views on […] defence matters» and «to cooperate in the manufacture of armaments.»\footnote{27} The EU was supposed to be established by 1980: the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt argued that a common European defense policy should be established by that time.\footnote{28} As with most of the other proposals of the Report, the ones on defense were rapidly

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shelved.

Fundamental divergences between the EC member states’ views on the relationship between European defense and NATO made it impossible not only to establish a European defense structure, but also to discuss defense matters in the EPC framework. Giscard argued that the problem of European defense was «un problème qui ne peut pas être utilement abordé.» For opposite reasons, the German and Dutch governments agreed with him: they would discuss defense matters in the EPC framework only if a clear link with NATO was ensured. During Giscard’s presidency, France partly softened its attitude towards NATO, deciding to join the European Planning Group in NATO, for instance. However, such a policy shift was not sufficient to permit the launch of a strong and substantial cooperation of defense matters at the European level. As a result, defense cooperation continued to occur mostly in the NATO framework and partly through bilateral contacts, while defense was excluded from the range of action of the EC’s international activity.

The adoption of a confrontational stance towards the US

The absence of any agreement for the development of European cooperation on defense matters constrained the development of the EC’s international activity, since the EC was to remain strongly dependent upon the defense provided by NATO and by the US. While most EC actors were happy with the American provision of defense, the dependence upon the US constrained the room for the launch of autonomous European initiatives in international affairs. Indeed, if these initiatives were not welcome by the US, the US could «in the last resort, insist on having its way by threatening to leave the Europeans to

their own devices unless they come to heel.» The relevance and effectiveness of this constraint was to appear clearly in early 1974, when the American administration explicitly threatened a reduction of its commitment to the defense of Europe as a way to force the EC member states not to pursue an excessively autonomous course in international affairs.

In the early 1970s the EC member states adopted quite a confrontational stance vis-à-vis the US, signaling their will to depart from the American foreign policy line on some issues. The adoption of such a stance was favored by the beginning of détente and it was spurred by the increasingly divergent views between the EC and the US on a number of issues. Divergent views were held on trade and monetary issues, on international political affairs, on Western military cooperation, and so on. This divergence made clear that American and European interests «are not necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical.» Moreover, the Nixon administration was showing an increasing ambivalence about the very goal of European political integration and little concern with the European complaints for the American unilaterialism.

While divergent positions between the EC member states and the US were not an absolute novelty, the Europeans' reluctance to meet American concerns was quite striking. What was particularly striking was the German and British reluctance in this regard, since the French wariness towards close transatlantic relations was age-old. Especially starting from 1972, France advocated the adoption of quite a

32 J. T. Masefield (FCO, Planning staff), Note on Euro–American consultations, June 26, 1975, in NA, FCO 49/567.


confrontational attitude towards the US by the EC. Its call was not strongly resisted by the German and British governments, which were traditionally much more eager to cultivate close transatlantic relations. On personal grounds, both Edward Heath and Willy Brandt were less attached to the transatlantic relationship than their predecessors and they did not go well with Nixon. Moreover, the German and British governments had to prove their commitment to the goal of European political integration which was set in the Hague and Paris summits.

The evidence of increasing West European reluctance to meet American concerns on a number of international issues led the US National Security adviser Henry Kissinger to launch the infamous «Year of Europe» initiative on April 23, 1973:

The Atlantic nations must find a solution for the management of their diversity to serve the common objectives which underlie their unity. We can no longer afford to pursue national or regional self-interest without a unifying framework. We cannot hold together if each country or region asserts its autonomy whenever it is to its benefit and invokes unity to curtail the independence of others. We must strike a new balance between self-interest and the common interest.

Kissinger's initiative was aimed at re-launching transatlantic cooperation. The US and the EC would discuss most of the issues dividing them and they would work out a «New Atlantic Charter.» In reality, the Year of Europe initiative turned out as an occasion for a further increase in the existing strains. European reactions to Kissinger's proposal were very wary. The EC governments did not subscribe to the vision of the transatlantic relationship proposed by the US, and they instead sought a reassessment of the relationship based on Europe's own terms. They sought to exploit the Year of Europe in order to prove that the EC had become a cohesive political entity to be reckoned with.

Kissinger's attempt at drawing the Europeans into a global

37 H. Kissinger, Address to the AP's annual dinner, New York, April 23, 1973. Kissinger's speech was the most important call for a reappraisal of the transatlantic relationship, but it was not the first one: see for instance French embassy in Washington, Note sur la visite à Washington de Dahrendorf, October 9, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787; French embassy in Bonn, Note sur les relations entre la CEE et les États-Unis, January 16, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3004.
reassessment of the transatlantic relationship was perceived as «clearly the most important single element» in his proposal by the Europeans.38 A global approach would make it possible for the US to extract concessions from the EC in the economic and political fields in return for the preservation of the American security umbrella. Otherwise, Kissinger warned that an exacerbation of economic and political strains could lead to a reduction of the American commitment to the defense of Western Europe.39 However, the EC governments insisted on isolating the discussion of security issues from the other ones, and they opposed the drafting of a single new Atlantic Charter.40 Two separate documents should be elaborated, one addressing security issues to be signed only by NATO members and another one addressing the relationship between the US and the EC as such. The latter declaration would grant American recognition to the EC as a cohesive political entity.

Moreover, the EC member states refused to acknowledge the special character of their relationship with the US. While most of the EC governments were ready and willing to acknowledge that such a special character was a matter of fact, France exerted strong opposition against it.41 France argued that its acknowledgement could offer the US a way «pour invoquer vis-à-vis d'eux une allégeance […] de l'Europe des Neuf.»42 Transatlantic relations should be considered «a question like any other,»43 «“normal” and on the same basis as with other states.»44 Kissinger was particularly infuriated by the European refusal to acknowledge the special character of their relationship, deeming the

draft of the EC–US Declaration so anodyne that «it would need a very few changes in the wording for the US to sign a similar paper with the USSR.» Because of these problems, negotiations for the EC–US Declaration were abandoned in November 1973.

Beside the lack of progress in the Year of Europe negotiations, transatlantic strains further increased after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973. The EC member states and the US held different views with regard to it and they were critical of each other’s positions. The Europeans held the US partly responsible for the war, and hence for the oil embargo imposed by the Arab countries against some Western ones, which was hitting them hard. The US complained about the line adopted by the Europeans during the war, which was deemed too lenient towards the Arabs. The EC’s denial of support to the American airlift to Israel caused severe irritation in the US, while the launch of a nuclear alert by the US caused outrage in Europe, since it was decided without even consulting or informing the Europeans.

The exacerbation of transatlantic tensions in late 1973 led the EC member states to publish a «Declaration on the European identity,» which was one the most explicit attempts at asserting the EC’s distinctness on the international stage during the 1970s. The Declaration was elaborated by the EC member states during the Year of Europe and it was precisely meant at identifying the features distinguishing the EC from the US. While the document had initially been conceived of only for internal use, the EC member states later opted in favor of its publication in order to declare and highlight the EC’s distinctness. The release of the Declaration by the EC leaders at the Copenhagen Summit in December 1973 represented the heyday of

44 C. Ewart-Biggs (British embassy in France), Note on US/Europe, August 28, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1739.
45 R. Cromer, Note on the relations between the US and the EEC, November 2, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1742.
47 The elaboration of the Declaration was explicitly proposed by the British government, but it was an idea which was already circulating (M. C. Beers, «European unity and the transatlantic gulf in 1973,» in Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe–America?, ed. G. Scott-Smith and V. Aubourg (Paris: Soleb, 2011), p. 492).
Europe’s attempt at asserting its international personality by juxtaposing itself with the US.

The contents of the Declaration were not particularly original: they constituted a sort of catalogue of principles to which the EC claimed to be attached. More than its content, the Declaration is interesting for its stress on the notion of a “European identity,” which was not widely employed before then. Most of all, the Declaration is interesting for the very fact that the drafting and release of such a document was deemed necessary. The decision of drafting it as well as the stress put on the elements distinguishing the European identity from any other were clearly closely connected to the ongoing process of assertion of the EC on the international stage, and on the attempt at expanding its room of maneuver with regard to the US. As Sophie Huber put it, «the expression “European identity” seemed to echo a willingness to act and exist.»

**The US as the tenth member state of the EC?**

The existence of transatlantic structures of cooperation had provided an essential framework for the development of European integration since its very beginning. As Piers Ludlow argues, transatlantic cooperation had made it possible to relieve European institutions of political and security tasks with which they would have clearly not been able to deal on their own. Even if the transatlantic

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49 Huber quoted in Kreis, «L’émergence de la notion d’“identité” dans la politique de la CE,» p. 72.
50 N. P. Ludlow, «The end of symbiosis: The Nixon era and the collapse of comfortable co-existence between European and Atlantic integration,» in Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe–America?, ed. G. Scott-Smith and V. Aubourg (Paris: Soleb, 2011), pp. 63–69. See also J. Sauvagnargues (French ambassador to West Germany), Note sur les relations entre la CEE et les États-Unis, January 16, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3004; N. Henderson (British ambassador to West Germany), Report on Brimelow’s visit to Bonn, August 17,
relationship continued to work as a useful framework in this respect, in
the early 1970s it was also increasingly regarded by EC actors as
hindering further progress towards European political integration.
Some confrontation with the US could in fact favor a stronger and
clearer assertion of the EC as a distinct international actor. Indeed, the
juxtaposition to an “Other” – often a relatively close one – is one of the
most common strategies employed in identity-building processes.

In the early 1970s the EC tried to pursue such a strategy of
juxtaposition, stressing the differences which set it apart from the US.
Such a strategy was particularly promoted by France, which
deliberately sought occasions to highlight the EC’s distinctness from the
US. Juxtaposing the EC with the US could be used «as a sort of
common external tariff behind which to foster the infant growth of
integration.»

Accordingly, Kissinger contended that the Europeans had «come to believe that their identity should be measured by [their] distance from the United States.»

On his part, Pompidou argued that «l'Europe ne sera l'Europe que si elle se distingue – je ne dis pas: se coupe – je dis se distingue de l'Amérique.» France saw juxtaposition to the US not only as favoring the assertion of the EC’s distinctness, but also as favoring an evolution of the transatlantic relationship towards a binary and symmetrical structure. Indeed, France envisaged the evolution of the West into «un monde bipède,» wherein the US and the EC would have «la même puissance, la même force, la même capacité.»

It was precisely the future form of the relationship between the EC and the US which was at stake during the Year of Europe. To what an extent was the EC to become distinct from the US and autonomous from it? To what an extent was the asymmetry between them to be reduced? Some of the most important elements in this respect were the features of the future structures and procedures for transatlantic


54 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les relations Europe/États-Unis, June 7, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792.

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dialogue. One of the goals which had lead the US to launch the Year of Europe was to establish new procedures for dialogue with the Europeans, since the existing chances for dialogue in the OECD and NATO were deemed inadequate. In fact, the Year of Europe negotiations themselves constituted an occasion to experiment with new and stronger forms of transatlantic dialogue.

The French government was afraid that new forms of transatlantic dialogue could enable the US to exert an influence on the making of the EC policies. The US could turn into a sort of tenth member state of the EC, hindering the adoption of distinct positions by it and perpetuating the asymmetry in the transatlantic relationship. In order to avoid such developments, the French government strove to frame the Year of Europe negotiations as a dialogue between two separate and cohesive entities. The EC as such would be the only counterpart of the US in the process and it would discuss with it on a basis of equality. The French opposed «toute procédure qui prendrait la forme d'une discussion collective:» the US should not be involved before the definition of the common European positions and no discussion à dix should occur, since «ce n'était pas la voie permettant de faire apparaître l'identité européenne.» For this reason, France argued that if Nixon was to visit


Europe at the conclusion of the Year of Europe negotiations, he should not meet with all the EC heads of state and government together («it would be like Charlemagne convening his barons and laying down the law»), but only with the presidents of the Council of ministers and of the EC Commission.

The American vision of the future form of the transatlantic relationship was opposite to the French one. The relationship was clearly to remain asymmetrical in kind. In his Year of Europe speech, Kissinger famously argued that «the United States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests.» American positions in the following months gave the impression to the Europeans that the US aimed at a perpetuation of such an asymmetry. According to the representation proposed by Michel Jobert, Kissinger envisaged «l’Europe confinée à sa vocation purement régionale et le monde s’ordonnant autour de la puissance américaine comme autrefois l’empire du Milieu s’entourait de sept lunes gravitant autour de lui.»

Even if Jobert’s representation was clearly excessively negative and very partisan, the US envisaged the development of the EC into a political actor, but the EC would have to coordinate its initiatives and positions with those of the US.

During the Year of Europe the US sought to establish a system of permanent transatlantic consultations, so that the EC would consult

Europe/États-Unis, February 26, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792.


63 Jobert, Mémoires d’avenir, p. 231.
with the US before adopting its positions on international issues. As the French put it, «le problème de la consultation préalable était au coeur de la question des relations entre l’Europe et les États-Unis.» For the Year of Europe negotiations too, the US envisaged a dialogue wherein the EC did not present the US with definitive common positions. However, in keeping with the quite confrontational attitude that it had adopted, the EC presented definitive common positions to the US during the negotiations. American calls for the establishment of joint working groups formed by the US and by each of the EC member states were turned down. However, the elaboration of common European positions was a slow process and it often required difficult compromises between the member states: once compromises were concluded, it was particularly hard for the US to induce changes in them.

Kissinger repeatedly complained about the cumbersome procedure for decision-making in the EPC. He especially complained that the EC was presenting the US with *faits accomplis* and he continued to press for preliminary consultations. Most EC member states were sensitive to the American complaints and ready to consent to closer consultations. They did not share the French concerns about the possible exertion of American interference in the definition of the EC positions, and they were, in fact, quite eager to anchor the development of European political integration to the West. Unlike what France was claiming,


most EC member states did not aim at turning the EC into a political entity comparable to the US. What they sought instead was to achieve a stronger activity and profile for the EC on the international stage, so as to reduce the imbalance in the transatlantic relationship.

**Consenting to limits to the EC's autonomous activity**

The EC’s attempt to assert itself as a distinct international actor by adopting a confrontational attitude towards the US was short-lived. The confrontational attitude had to be abandoned as soon as the US stepped up its pressure, and when the EC was hit by the outbreak of the oil crisis at the end of 1973. During the early months of 1974 the US successfully ensured that the EC would not develop a common energy policy detached from the American one, or an autonomous role in the Middle East. The US also obtained an acknowledgement of the special character of the transatlantic relationship, as well as the possibility of getting involved in the making of the ÉPC. Permanent dialogue with the US would be carried out and European political integration would not go as far as to endanger transatlantic cohesion.

France was the only member state which tended to give precedence to the goal of European political integration over the preservation of transatlantic cooperation, arguing that «l’évolution des rapports euro-américains [...] ne doit pas compromettre le sens et la portée de l’acheminement des Neufs vers l’Union européenne.» 68 Despite the American threats, the French government did not expect that prioritizing European integration would necessarily jeopardize the security of Western Europe, since «les forces américaines sont en Europe dans l’intérêt des États-Unis.» 69 In any case, France could enjoy a free-rider position: certain as it was that its EC partners would have ensured that the US did not disengage from the defense of Europe, the French government could safely express its wariness about close transatlantic relations. The expression of such a wariness responded to domestic political imperatives, and it could also be used to prove the strength of the French commitment to the building of Europe as a

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68 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les rapports euro-américains, July 1, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3007.

politically cohesive actor.

The Washington Conference on energy in February 1974 was possibly the clearest instance of the EC member states' tendency to opt for the preservation of Atlantic unity over the pursuit of European political integration, in the case of a necessary choice between the two. The Conference was an American initiative, and it was meant to elaborate a common Western response to the energy crisis. In fact, even if energy concerns were real, the initiative clearly had general political goals, namely to stop Europe drifting away from the US. Tactically, energy was a good topic to reaffirm Atlantic unity: the EC member states had diverging positions and interests on energy, and they were also very weak because of their structural dependence on oil imports. The American proposal for a conference of the industrialized countries was launched a couple of days before the Copenhagen Summit in 1973, which was expected to agree on a common energy policy but failed to do so.\textsuperscript{70}

At the Washington Conference, Nixon and Kissinger explicitly made a linkage between transatlantic cooperation in energy matters and in security matters.\textsuperscript{71} They claimed that the Europeans could not enjoy the latter while eschewing the former by developing autonomous initiatives towards the Arab countries. According to the American project, the conference was to lead to the establishment of a permanent organization regrouping Western consumer countries.\textsuperscript{72} France was opposed to the creation of such an organization, and few weeks before the conference Jobert launched an alternative proposal, calling for a global energy conference in the UN framework.\textsuperscript{73} Because of the French opposition, the mandate for the Washington conference approved by the Council of ministers excluded the establishment of the permanent organization envisaged by the US.

At the conference the EC member states were forced to choose between the establishment of a permanent organization and therefore Atlantic unity on one side, or the pursuit of a distinct European energy policy on the other side. All member states except for France yielded

\textsuperscript{70} Hilfrich, «West Germany’s long Year of Europe,» p. 253.
\textsuperscript{72} Möckli, «The EC-Nine and transatlantic conflict,» p. 84; Venn, «International co-operation versus national self-interest,» p. 76.
\textsuperscript{73} Hilfrich, «West Germany’s long Year of Europe,» p. 253.
and opted for the former. As a result, in November 1974 they joined the newly established International Energy Agency. The split between the EC member states was certainly encouraged by the US, but it had also much to do with European and personal politics. A crucial role in consenting to the American initiative was played by the Germans, and in particular by the finance minister Helmut Schmidt, who clashed directly with Jobert. Jobert argued that Schmidt wanted a Europe receiving from the US «conseils, appuis et parfois directives,» while on the contrary he sought a «Europe européenne.» The split between EC member states and the creation of a Western framework for energy cooperation led to a substantial exclusion of energy matters from the EC’s international activity.

Part of the reason why the American administration was particularly eager to bring the Europeans back into line was their adoption of original positions on the Middle East. During the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 the EC member states had taken a position which was critical of Israel and of the US, and on November 6 they had released a declaration calling for Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories, and for the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people. The adoption of this line was clearly linked to the European eagerness to preserve decent relations with the oil producing Arab countries. On November 21, Jobert proposed to establish a permanent structure for dialogue and cooperation between the EC and the Arab countries. As Möckli puts it, France «was particularly indignant over Europe’s marginalisation during the October War and was now keen on enhancing the political identity of the Nine.»

The adoption of an original stance on the Middle East and the project of cooperation with oil producing countries were resting on an approach that had been shaped in the EPC in the previous years. EPC cooperation on the Middle East had started in early 1971 thanks to a

74 Goldsborough, «France, the European crisis and the Alliance,» p. 539.
75 Jobert, Mémoires d’avenir, p. 289.
76 Hilfrich, «West Germany’s long Year of Europe,» p. 246. The possibility of establishing a dialogue between the EC and the Arab countries had already been suggested by Algeria (G. Garavini, After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957–1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 177).
French initiative, and the Commission had proposed to establish a dialogue with oil producing countries in October 1972.\textsuperscript{78} EPC cooperation on the Middle East contributed to shift member states' positions closer to the pro-Arab position adopted by France. The project of Euro-Arab dialogue put forward by France was aimed at a further strengthening of the EC's relations with the Arab countries, complementing their initiatives on the Middle East and their Mediterranean policies.\textsuperscript{79} In the French intentions, the project was also clearly aimed at countering the American attempt at building a Western front of consumer countries which would confront the producing ones. France's partners were not eager to establish the Euro-Arab dialogue, but they acquiesced to it, partly because they feared negative Arab reactions in case of rejection of the project.\textsuperscript{80} They substantially endorsed the pursuit of closer cooperation with the Arab countries at the Copenhagen Summit in December 1973.

The US strongly opposed the project of a Euro-Arab dialogue, arguing that it undermined its attempts at addressing the Arab-Israeli question and the energy problems.\textsuperscript{81} Nixon even threatened a troop withdrawal from Europe as a reaction to it. Partly because of the American opposition and partly for their own reasons, France's EC partners attached some conditions to the establishment of a dialogue with the Arab countries. Germany made it conditional upon France's participation in the Washington conference on energy, while Britain made it conditional upon agreement on regular consultations with the


\textsuperscript{79} Gfeller, «A European voice in the Arab world,» pp. 665–666.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p. 666. Italy was quite favorable to the project however (Garavini, \textit{After Empires}, p. 177).

The launch of the dialogue became possible only in June 1974, after the conclusion of the Gymnich compromise on consultations with the US. By then, it had been made clear that the dialogue would not address political issues such as the Arab-Israeli problem, and that it would largely eschew oil issues as well.\textsuperscript{83} As Cheysson remarked, «entrée dans le dialogue qui est un exercice politique pour des raisons politiques les Européens refusent pourtant d’y parler politique.»\textsuperscript{84}

The French occasionally sought to stress the political significance of the dialogue and to give a more political character to it, so that it could compensate for the EC's absence from the Geneva peace conference on the Arab-Israeli question.\textsuperscript{85} However, the dialogue preserved its very low-key profile and its largely economic focus. The biggest political issue addressed in the context of the Euro-Arab dialogue was the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in it, which was demanded by the Arab parties in order to obtain a Western recognition of the organization. In order to avoid the need to take a position on this issue, the EC member states resorted to an expedient: the dialogue would not occur between national delegations but rather between one European and one Arab delegation, and each side would be free to choose the composition of its own delegation.\textsuperscript{86}

The EC did not completely align with the US on the Arab-Israeli question, and it managed to launch the Euro-Arab dialogue. However, its activism in the Middle East was substantially constrained and reduced, to the extent that the second EPC declaration about it was released only in 1977. The Euro-Arab dialogue was indeed launched, but it did not address political issues and it was extremely thin on energy matters too. It was only with the Venice Declaration in 1980 that the EC once again took a strong political initiative on the Middle East question. While the declaration confirmed the originality of the EC's position with regard to the American one, it sparked limited criticism by the US. By then the transatlantic relationship was more stable than in the early 1970s, transatlantic communication was good and the EC

\textsuperscript{83} Möckli, «The EC-Nine and transatlantic conflict,» pp. 88–89; Hilfrich, «West Germany’s long Year of Europe,» pp. 249–250.
\textsuperscript{84} Cheysson quoted in de la Serre, «Conflit du Proche-Orient et dialogue euro-arabe,» p. 88.
\textsuperscript{85} Hilfrich, «West Germany’s long Year of Europe,» p. 248.
\textsuperscript{86} Allen, «Political Cooperation and the Euro-Arab dialogue,» p. 75.
had proven itself to be ready to meet most American concerns.\textsuperscript{87}

The establishment of permanent consultations with the US

In connection with the re-launch of the Euro-Arab dialogue in March 1974, the German government proposed to establish a system of preliminary consultations between the EC and the US. According to the German proposal, the US would be consulted on EPC matters after political directors had discussed them but before foreign ministers finalized decisions.\textsuperscript{88} Preliminary consultations would ensure that European political integration would not affect transatlantic cooperation. France opposed the German proposal, arguing that it risked leading to American interference in the EC’s decision-making and therefore to hinder the evolution of the EC into a distinct political entity. A compromise could be agreed upon in April 1974 with the so-called “Gymnich compromise,” which was finally adopted in June. In the previous weeks, an important change in leadership had occurred in Britain, Germany and France. The new British and German leaders Harold Wilson and Helmut Schmidt were more Atlanticist than their predecessors and less committed to the goal of European political integration. The new French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was also more positive towards the US compared to Pompidou, and he consented to the establishment of transatlantic consultation.\textsuperscript{89}

The Gymnich compromise acknowledged the desirability of coordination between the EC and the US on matters of common interests, but France obtained that consultations would not be mandatory and neither would they be institutionalized. The EC would agree about consulting the US “d’une façon pragmatique et cas par cas. Si l’un des partenaires soulève la question de l’information et de la


\textsuperscript{88} Hilfrich, «West Germany’s long Year of Europe,» pp. 248–249.

\textsuperscript{89} On the impact of the 1974 leadership change in Europe on the transatlantic relations, see N. P. Ludlow, «The real Years of Europe? US–West European relations during the Ford administration,» in \textit{Journal of Cold War Studies}, 15 (3), 2013, pp. 141–146.
consultation d'un état allié ou ami, les Neuf en discuteront.» The US consented to this formula, which was mirrored in the Declaration on the Atlantic relations signed by the NATO members on June 26, 1974. Even if in principle consultation was to happen in both directions, in fact it was the EC which was expected to consult with the US. As a British official put it,

> We seek to avoid a US veto by discovering in advance if our views are acceptable: the Americans merely inform us, as a courtesy, so that we are facing in the right direction when the time comes to march behind them.

The Gymnich formula worked quite smoothly and effectively. It allowed to avoid outright American interference in the EC policies on one side, and the presentation of faits accomplis to the Americans on the other side. Strains did appear between the EC and the US during the Carter administration, but they mostly concerned personal politics, they did not really concern the EC’s international activity. The Gymnich formula worked well mostly because the troublesome experience of the Year of Europe had already traced the limits of the room available for the EC’s activity and it had highlighted the points of transatlantic tension which should not be revived. In the following years some proposals for a further strengthening of the procedures of

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90 Informal text of the Gymnich gentlemen’s agreement, June 10, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3792.

91 «The Allies are convinced that the fulfillment of their common aims requires the maintenance of close consultation, cooperation and mutual trust […] In the spirit of the friendship, equality and solidarity which characterise their relationships, they are firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world. They wish also to ensure that their essential security relationship is supported by harmonious political and economic relations» (Declaration on Atlantic relations, June 26, 1974, available at <http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/SID-4F186CF0-B04537D2/natolive/official_texts_26901.htm?blnSublanguage=true&selectedLocale=en&submit.x=9&submit.y=4>).


transatlantic dialogue were put forward, aiming in particular at its institutionalization.\textsuperscript{94} However, most of the actors involved preferred to focus on small pragmatic improvements in order not to revive battles of principles.\textsuperscript{95} For instance, to pay a visit to the US became a habit – but not a duty – for the president of the Council of ministers and for the president of the European Council.\textsuperscript{96}

The establishment of regular transatlantic consultations brought about a further restraint on the EC’s international activity. As the British noted,

The problems associated with getting an internal agreement to conduct a genuine consultation with the Americans at the right moment sometimes appear so great that the Nine lower their sights to a less ambitious goal, which can be accomplished without contact with the Americans.\textsuperscript{97}

By trying to avoid initiatives which could lead to serious strains with the US, the EC member states limited the room for their activity in international affairs. Indeed, «Europeans have a certain impression of independent action, but they cannot in reality carry forward policies which run counter to those of the United States.»\textsuperscript{98} Ambitions of establishing the EC as a strong international actor that was clearly independent from the US were effectively abandoned by the mid-1970s.

Ties between the EC member states and the US were narrowed around the mid-1970s not only by the establishment of a custom of transatlantic consultations, but also by the introduction of the summit

\textsuperscript{94} Tindemans, Report on European Union, 1975. The establishment of a sort of «economic NATO» was also suggested (J. E. Cable, Note, July 30, 1975, in NA, FCO 49/567).

\textsuperscript{95} J. E. Cable, Note, July 30, 1975, in NA, FCO 49/567; P. Ramsbotham (British ambassador to the US), Note on the Tindemans Report, January 29, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/166; J. O. Wright (British ambassador to West Germany), Note on the Tindemans Report, February 4, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/166.


\textsuperscript{97} J. T. Masefield, Note on European/American relations, August 18, 1975, in NA, FCO 49/567.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
meetings of the main industrialized countries, the so-called G5, G6 and G7 summits. Their introduction was proposed by Giscard, who built upon ideas already suggested by Schmidt.99 The first summit in Rambouillet in December 1975 gathered the leaders of the US, of Japan, and of the three biggest European countries, namely France, West Germany and Britain. It is remarkable that the initiative came from the French: in the previous years France had strenuously fought against the establishment of multilateral contacts between the US and the EC member states. Given the impossibility of pursuing strong European political integration on France’s terms, France now looked at the establishment of a sort of directorate of great powers in order to exert European and global influence. Giscard’s proposal was also clearly due to the acknowledgement of the fact that Europe alone could not successfully address the major economic problems facing it, and coordination was needed at the level of Western countries.100

The EC as such was not initially meant to take part in the summits. Pressure exerted by the small member states and by the EC Commission ensured the participation of the President of the EC Commission and of the President of the European Council starting from 1977. Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz argue that the creation of the G7 was «an important step in enhancing the European Community’s role in the structures of international governance.»101 It is true that European countries were «almost grotesquely overrepresented» in the summits, and they had a real chance to exert an influence on the international agenda.102 However, the participation of EC member states and of EC institutions in the summits did not really bring about an enhancement of the international role of the EC as such. Each EC actor took part in the summits in its own capacity: it was single Western European countries that gained international weight, and summits were not an occasion for the assertion of the EC as a

102 Ludlow, «The real years of Europe?,» p. 160.
distinct international actor.

The European Council and the Western summits were created around the same time, between the end of 1974 and the end of 1975. However, their establishment did not always lead to a two-steps process wherein EC member states defined a common position in the framework of the Council, and where they then discussed it with the Western partners at the summits. The establishment of the Council and of the G7 rather led to a two-pillar structure. On some international matters, the EC member states defined a common position in the Council and then they upheld it in the G7 summits. On other international matters, the EC member states preferred to avoid defining a common EC position, and instead sought to retain national freedom of action at the G7 summits. Therefore, they could hardly claim to represent the views of the EC as such in the summits.

**The range of action available to the EC's international activity**

The assertion of the EC as an international actor required not only providing it with means and structures for action, but also defining the range of action available to it. During the 1970s, the range of action available to the EC's international activity was gradually defined. The limits of this range mainly depended on the existence or absence of incentives for member states to coordinate action at the EC level. In some cases, member states had no incentive to coordinate with their EC partners because they held minority positions: for this reason, states defended their *domaines réservés* and France did not consent to EC cooperation on defense. In other cases, member states had incentives to coordinate at a level higher than the EC: coordination at the G7 level was preferable for some major economic problems for instance. The limits of the range of action available to the EC also depended on the pressure exerted by the US for the exclusion of some sectors of international affairs from it. American pressures led to constraints on the EC's international activity mainly because, given their strategic dependence in terms of both defense and energy needs, the EC member states were in no position to resist them.

As a result of this process of defining the range of action available to the EC's international activity, such activity was considerably constrained. However, the EC had been endowed with a large set of
institutions, procedures and tools to carry out a distinct activity in international affairs. Moreover, the EC member states continued to pledge their commitment to the goal of turning the EC into a distinct global player with its own distinct profile. Such pledges could not be easily subverted and the existing institutions could not be easily dismantled. Given the limits constraining the range of action available, the most effective strategy for the EC to carry out a distinct activity on the global stage was to focus on fields where cooperation was possible and where the means available to it could fully be exploited. Therefore, the EC member states would take only limited common initiatives with regard to the Middle East and to defense. The EC would rather focus its activity on fields such as international trade, development cooperation, human rights promotion, and so on.

In terms of assertion of the EC as a distinct global player, the EC's activity in the fields of development cooperation, dialogue with the developing countries and human rights promotion was particularly significant. Activity in these fields allowed the EC to exploit the means available for the assertion of its international role, while simultaneously respecting the range of action available for its activity. As a result, a sort of division of labor was established between the EC and the US. The division was largely based on the military/civilian cleavage: military and security issues were largely to be dealt with by the US and NATO, while “civilian” issues were available for the deployment of distinct and original action by the EC. While clearly deriving from the limited range of action available to the EC’s international activity, its civilian focus was consistent with the EC’s age-old discourse presenting European integration as an endeavor for international cooperation and progress. Since the division of labor was not based on a regional/global cleavage, the EC was able to deploy an original action with a global reach, even though it was no real global power. In this way, the EC would also contribute to discharge the US of some of its global responsibilities.

In the following chapters I look closely at the EC's international activity in the fields of development cooperation (chapter 4), promotion of dialogue with the developing countries on the international order (chapter 5), and promotion of human rights (chapter 6). I analyze the ways in which the EC tried to develop and pursue initiatives in these

103 Romero, «Refashioning the West to dispel its fears,» pp. 120–121.
fields which would contribute to its own assertion as a global player and to highlight its original profile as such.
Chapter 4
The EC as Partner of the Developing Countries

Cooperation with developing countries was one of the oldest fields of activity of the EC in international affairs. The EEC Treaty in 1957 had associated the colonies of the member states to the Community: they were to be included in the common market and they were to receive development aid from the EC Commission. After the accession of these countries to independence from around 1960, the form of their association to the Community was adjusted but the association itself was not eradicated. In the early 1970s, deep changes occurring inside and outside Europe and the British entry into the EC made it especially necessary to reassess the development cooperation policy of the Community. The reassessment led to the establishment of a two-tier system of cooperation, with the Lomé Convention addressing the old associated countries and other former colonies, and with some cooperation policies addressing other developing countries.

In this chapter I analyze the process of reassessment of the Community’s development cooperation in the 1970s. First of all, I look at the debates on development cooperation that occurred at the 1972 Paris Summit, which led to the definition of the two-tier structure of the Community’s system of cooperation. Then I look at the negotiations for the renewal of the association that took place between 1972 and 1975, which led to the Lomé Convention. Several new developing countries were included in the Lomé system, and some innovative instruments of cooperation were introduced. Finally, I look at the negotiations for the establishment of the worldwide tier of the Community’s development cooperation. All these processes were closely connected with an underlying debate on the conception of the role of the EC with regard to the developing countries, and with regard to international affairs more generally. Thus, in analyzing these processes I focus on the different conceptions of the role of the EC which were promoted by the different EC actors involved.
I argue that in the first half of the 1970s the Community's engagement in favor of development cooperation ceased to be seen as an activity merely aimed at dealing with some post-colonial issues. The Community's engagement in favor of development cooperation rather started to be conceived and presented as a sign of the EC's distinctive character as an international actor: the EC claimed to be an outward-looking actor, genuinely concerned with developing countries' problems, eager to move beyond the colonial legacy. The conclusion of the Lomé Convention in 1975 was hailed by the EC as important proof of the distinctive character of its international activity. Even if Lomé could be presented in this way, I show that the reassessment of the Community's development cooperation was in fact less determined by an enlightened design than by a compromise between member states' economic and political interests.

The 1972 Paris Summit and the EC's concern with development

The 1972 Paris Summit was the first occasion for old and new EC member states to discuss the Community’s development cooperation. The relevance of the summit made it seem like a good occasion to stress the EC’s concern for development issues and to show it to external observers. In those years, development issues were acquiring increasing salience, partly because of the increasing activism of developing countries on the international stage, and partly because of the interest in development issues expressed by parties, social movements and public opinion in Western Europe. While the summit was due to focus on other issues, it was seen as important to signal that the enlarged Community was not to become an inward-looking fortress. It was important to signal that the enlarged EC was aware of its increased international responsibilities, and that it aimed at being more outward-looking and attentive to the developing countries' problems. A stronger engagement with cooperation would have

1 British delegation to the EC, Paper on the external relations and responsibilities of the Community, March 16, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3786; European Parliament, Résolution à l'intention de la prochaine conférence au sommet, July 5, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 79/1982 223; Mémorandum néerlandais sur la conférence des chefs d’État et de gouvernement, July 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1203; MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur la conférence au sommet, September 29, 1972, in
signaled the generous character of the EC and its ambition at «faire le bien dans le monde.»

The need to improve the EC's image as an international actor was made more pressing by the outcome of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, which convened in April 1972, and was deemed disappointing by the developing countries. Signaling the Community's concern for development issues was also seen as a good way in which to counter the European youth's increasing disenchantment towards European integration itself. The 1968 events had highlighted a cleavage between youth and political elites in the EC. Because of young peoples' increasing concern for the developing world, the EC political elites found it useful to stress the Community's commitment to development cooperation in order to re-legitimize integration: the youth «ne doit pas croire que nous nous réunissons pour etre plus riches. L'aide aux pays sous-développés est un idéal qui doit la séduire.»

In order to signal the Community's concern for development issues, the participants in the summit discussed the adoption of a few initiatives. In particular, they discussed the adoption of a quantitative target for the share of member states' GDP to be devoted to development cooperation. At the UNCTAD Conference in 1972 a 0.7 percent target had been approved for public aid. The EC Commission proposed to rise the target to the 1 percent of GDP at the summit, but the proposal received no support apart from Belgium. The debate rather focused on the opportunity to restate the 0.7 percent target – not

AMAÆF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787.

2 E. Heath's intervention, Minutes of the Paris Summit, October 19, 1972, in AMAÆF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788. See also MAÆF, Minutes of Schumann–Heath meeting, August 24, 1972, in AMAÆF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787; G. de Juniac (French ambassador to Belgium), Note on the Paris Summit, October 17, 1972, in AMAÆF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787.


4 The King of the Belgians quoted in Juniac, Note sur la conférence au sommet, October 17, 1972, in AMAÆF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787.

really a major advance in fact. Not even this target could be restated in Paris, however. This was mainly because Britain opposed it, since its share of public aid was considerably lower than its partners. Beside the target for aid, the Commission proposed to set a target for the increase of the EC’s imports from developing countries in the following years. The target stated that a 15 percent annual increase should be pursued by strengthening the commercial preferences offered by the EC. France opposed the proposal, arguing that it was not realistic in scope, uncertain in outcome, and that the priority should have gone to increasing aid instead. The main French concern in this regard was to avoid reducing the relative commercial advantages enjoyed by the developing countries associated with the EC.

The British government proposed three initiatives at the summit. It proposed to untie bilateral development aid, removing the requirement for recipient countries to grant benefits and procurements to the donor country, which was rejected by France. The British also proposed to improve the terms of future European loans to developing countries – a proposal which was met with neither strong opposition nor

6 Minutes of the Paris Summit, October 20, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788.
7 A. Douglas-Home, Note on aid and the Summit, September 21, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/121; J. de Beaumarchais (French ambassador to the UK), Note sur la conférence au sommet, October 17, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787. The structure of British aid differed from that of the other member states because the private sector played a much bigger role in the British case.
8 EC Commission, Communication en vue de la préparation de la conférence au sommet, July 7, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 79/1982 225. According to the Commission's estimates, a 15 percent increase of imports from developing countries would have brought about a 6 percent increase of their GPD (EC Commission, Memo on the objective for imports of manufactured products into the enlarged Community, September 28, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1213).
9 MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur la préparation du sommet européen, September 15, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787; C. Soames (British ambassador to France), Note on UK proposals on aid, October 15, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1215; MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur des points qui pourraient être évoqués au Sommet, October 18, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787; A. Douglas-Home, Note on aid and the Summit, October 10, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1214; Minutes of the Paris Summit, October 20, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788.
enthusiasm. The most important British proposal was the approval of a debt waiver, which suggested that the terms of EC member states' past loans to the poorest developing countries be improved. The waiver was presented as an immediate, significant and clearly identifiable measure. Germany had reservations about it for financial reasons however, and France strongly opposed the waiver because of the relevance of French loans involved, and because the British proposal had been tailored to benefit the Indian subcontinent, which was no political priority for France.

Diverging positions on the actual initiatives on development proposed for immediate adoption at the summit made it impossible to approve any of them. The summit's final declaration announced only vague engagements in the field and merely added that «ce questions feront l'objet d'études.» Disappointment for such a result was expressed by developing countries' observers and by the European Parliament. If the summit was to be used as an occasion to give a signal and improve the EC's image as partner of the developing countries, it failed. Why could agreement in principle on the adoption of initiatives on development not be translated into an agreement on actual initiatives? One reason was the absence of viable promoters of compromise. British and French positions were «poles apart,» and the positions of Belgium, the Netherlands and the EC Commission were...

12 Ibid.; D. Williams (FCO, ODA), Draft telegram on aid at the EEC Summit, September 18, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1210.
13 J. A. Robinson (FCO, European integration), Paper on the strengthening of the institutions of the Community and progress in the political field, May 3, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1197; J. J. B. Hunt (Cabinet, Second permanent secretary), Minute on the European summit meeting, May 10, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1198; N. Henderson (British ambassador to West Germany), Note on aid and the Summit, September 22, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1211; A. Douglas-Home, Note on aid and the Summit, October 10, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1214; British embassy in Bonn, Note on aid and the Summit, October 12, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1214; C. Soames, Note on UK proposals on aid, October 15, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1215.
15 J.-M. Soutou (French ambassador to Algeria), Note on the comments on the Paris Summit in the Algerian press, October 23, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788; European Parliament, Resolution on the results of the Paris Summit, November 15, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 79/1982 224.
16 C. Soames, Note on the UK proposals on aid for the Summit, October 15, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1215.
considered radical or even «extravagant.» 17 Germany and Italy were wary of wasting energy in the development cooperation field, which was no priority for either of them. 18 Another factor hindering compromise was the fact that many other issues were on the summit table, and most of them had a higher priority for member states.

The structure of the EC's development cooperation

The idea of using the Paris Summit as an occasion to improve the EC's image as partner of the developing countries failed. The summit was more fruitful as far as the discussion on the general structure of the EC development cooperation was concerned. The main questions to define were whether and to what an extent the Euro-African focus of the EC's cooperation was to stay. What was decided at the summit was that the EC «attache une importance essentielle à la politique d'association,» 19 but at the same time the EC was also invited «à mettre en oeuvre progressivement une politique globale de coopération au développement à l'échelle mondiale.» 20 A two-tier system of cooperation was designed, with the Yaoundé association on one side and new worldwide policies on the other side. This compromise put at least a temporary end to the struggle between the so-called regionalist and mondialist views of the Community's development cooperation that had been ongoing since its very establishment, opposing in particular France to the Netherlands and Germany.

Despite the German and Dutch opposition to it, the preservation of the Yaoundé system of association with former European colonies

17 D. Williams, Note on aid at the EEC Summit, September 18, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1210. See for instance S. Mansholt, Declaration to the plenary session of UNCTAD III, April 17, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 2/1975 54; S. Mansholt, Intervention at the exceptional meeting with the socialist group at the European Parliament on Mansholt's observations for a new economic policy, May 29, 1972, in HAEU, GSPE 54.
18 J. Sauvagnargues (French ambassador to West Germany), Note sur la conférence au sommet, October 18, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787; C. Lucet (French ambassador to Italy), Note sur la conférence au sommet, October 18, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3787.
20 Ibid.
could not be called into question. According to the interpretation given by the Council of ministers, the EEC Treaty required the Community to offer the former colonies the possibility of association. The preservation of the association and of its centrality was a strong political priority for France.\textsuperscript{21} The association was a means for France to continue to exert «une influence régulatrice et stabilisatrice»\textsuperscript{22} in Africa and to enjoy economic and political benefits out of it while hiding behind the Community façade. As an Italian diplomat put it, the Yaoundé system «was little more than a way of preserving a French sphere of influence at Community expense:»\textsuperscript{23} France contributed only 33 percent to the European Development Fund, but its former colonies benefited of the 80 percent of it.\textsuperscript{24} The centrality of Euro-African relations was an important element of the Gaullist orthodoxy which could not be easily dismissed.\textsuperscript{25} According to France the association was

\begin{quote}
un élément essentiel de l’acquis communautaire et un pilier indispensable et exemplaire des relations extérieures des Neuf. Elle manifeste principalement l’action spécifique et permanente de la Communauté sur des régions [...] qui sont [...] le prolongement naturel, géographique et historique de l’Europe.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

Beside the French government, the EC Commission was also strongly attached to the preservation of the Yaoundé association, since it had

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\begin{enumerate}
\item Minutes of the Paris Summit, October 19, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788.
\item A. Grandi reported in S. J. G. Cambridge (British embassy in Italy), Note on the EEC association and reverse preferences, February 20, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1690.
\item «A Gaullist government still think that decisive influence in outlandish places like Chad and Djibouti is worthwhile in itself» (J. Ling (FCO, West Africa), Report on visit to Paris to discuss West Africa, November 13, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1271).
\item MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur les négociations d’association et la politique d’aide de la CEE, July 3, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3007.
\end{enumerate}

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established an entire directorate-general devoted to it (the DG VIII).\(^{27}\)

Also, the associated countries had vested interests in the preservation of the association, since they depended substantially upon trade with and aid from the Community.

The Netherlands and Germany did not support the cultivation of neocolonial relations, favoring a liberal approach to international trade and development. Moreover, their interests were mostly directed at developing countries which were not associated with the Community. For this reason, the Netherlands and Germany had to reluctantly accept the establishment of the association in 1957, but they had always tried to overcome or at least weaken it. As the French remarked, «nous considérons [...] que l'association est une fin en soi, alors que les allemands la considèrent comme une étape transitoire vers un régime très largement ouvert sur l'extérieur.»\(^{28}\)

In principle, the British view on the association was closer to the German and Dutch one. However, the overcoming of the association was no priority for Britain in the short term. Edward Heath had granted Pompidou the British agreement to the preservation of the association, and the agreement was formally stated in the Treaty of accession of Britain to the Community.\(^{29}\)

However, Britain still aimed at overcoming the association in the long run:

> We would not wish to see these special arrangements as a permanent feature of the international scene [...] we hope by and large that this would be both the first and the last time we would have to extend discriminatory treatment of this character; that we would try to keep it to a respectable minimum; and that we would try to reduce it over time.\(^{30}\)

As a result of the strong attachment of France to the association, and of the British unwillingness to challenge its existence, the association was preserved. However, German, Dutch and British pressures managed to secure the establishment of a world tier of development

\(^{27}\) British officials were «impressed by the attachment of DG VIII officials to the dogma of the existing Yaoundé system» (W. J. Adams (FCO, European integration), Note on the association under Protocol 22, September 29, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1266).

\(^{28}\) P. Achard (SGCI), Note sur le renouvellement et élargissement de la Convention de Yaoundé, June 5, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3005.

\(^{29}\) Minutes of Pompidou–Heath meeting, May 20, 1971, in AN, AG 5(2), 1014.

\(^{30}\) D. Williams, Note on association problems, December 29, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1269.
cooperation to complement it. Even if the establishment of a two-tier structure for the Community’s development cooperation resulted from a compromise between these divergent preferences, such a structure tended to be presented by the Community as the outcome of a pragmatic and sensible approach to development.\footnote{C. Cheysson, Intervention devant la Commission paritaire de l'association, June 28, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 40/1985 57.} The Community could not address the problems of all the developing countries, since its resources were limited. A focus on Africa would ensure rational and effective cooperation, and it would offer the chance of experimenting with innovative forms of cooperation, which could later be transferred to a global level. At the same time, the worldwide tier of cooperation showed that the Community did not disregard the most pressing problems of non-associated developing countries.

Even if the Paris Summit was successful in reaching a compromise on the structure of the EC development cooperation, the compromise itself was rather vague. What was the relative weight of the two tiers? To what an extent was the association to remain central in the system? Much depended on the relationship that would be established between the association and the former British colonies, which would be affected by the British entry into the EC. If they joined it, the association would clearly remain the central element of the Community’s development cooperation, while in the opposite case it risked being gradually emptied and marginalized. The British Treaty of adhesion offered three options to the Commonwealth developing countries located in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific: each of them could decide to join the association with the Community, to negotiate a looser system of association with it, or to opt for a mere trade agreement with it.

France’s position on the desirable relationship between the association and the former British colonies was informed by its concern with the preservation of a Yaoundé-like association as the central element of the Community’s development cooperation. Attachment to it was due to several economic, political and strategic considerations. According to the British, the French attachment to the association even had pre-political components, with «a strong emotional element»\footnote{E. E. Tomkins (British ambassador to France), Note on the French African policy, June 8, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1796.} and «a substantial element of amour-propre»\footnote{Ibid.} involved. The French came...
to the conclusion that the entry of as many Commonwealth states as possible into the association would minimize the risk of emergence of substantial challenges to it:

La véritable sauvegarde de la politique d'association dite 'de Yaoundé' est étroitement liée à son application non discriminatoire au plus grand nombre possible d'États du Commonwealth associables, quelque importantes que soient les conséquences financières de cette perspective.\(^{34}\)

The enlargement of the association would bring the British on board, and it would remove the differentiated treatment of francophone and anglophone African countries, which was politically hard to justify.\(^{35}\) The only French hesitation about the enlargement to the Commonwealth associables regarded the case of Nigeria. Because of its size, Nigerian entry would heavily imbalance the association and it would challenge French influence in Western Africa, hence a mere commercial agreement with it was preferable.\(^{36}\)

The British position on the enlargement of the association rested on the acknowledgement of the fact that «we are stuck with something like the Yaoundé arrangements until the end of this decade.»\(^{37}\) If the Commonwealth countries did not join the association, Britain could hardly obtain significant changes to it.\(^{38}\) Britain would have to transfer

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34 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d'association, December 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759. See also SGCI, Note sur le renouvellement et élargissement de la politique d'association, April 11, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759; C. Soames, Note on the problems of association, November 7, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1268; MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur le renouvellement de la Convention de Yaoundé, January 17, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.

35 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d'association, December 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759; SGCI, Note sur le renouvellement et élargissement de la politique d'association, April 11, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.

36 M. G. Fort (British high commission in Nigeria), Note on the French attitudes towards Nigerian association with the EEC, September 23, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1266; C. M. Le Quesne (FCO, Africa), Note on France, Nigeria, the EEC etc., June 1, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1694; P. Achard, Message pour le représentant permanent auprès de la CE sur le renouvellement et élargissement de la Convention de Yaoundé, July 5, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.

37 D. Williams, Note on association problems, December 29, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1269.

substantial funds to the francophone associates, while at the same time bearing alone the burden for development aid to its own former colonies. As a consequence, the accession of Commonwealth countries to the association was desirable. The Foreign Office declared itself «anxious to take every step open to us to ensure that as many of the Commonwealth countries concerned as possible choose the Yaoundé option.» The entry of the Commonwealth associable countries was substantially favored also by the other EC member states, which were eager to reduce the French influence on the association.

The departure from the Yaoundé model of association

For various different reasons, all the EC member states favored the accession of the Commonwealth developing countries to the association. The problem was that these countries were extremely skeptical about it. They had criticized the association since its very establishment, and they widely regarded it as a French-driven neo-colonial arrangement – quite an accurate assessment indeed. The negative attitude of the associable states was further incited by the Commonwealth secretariat, which lobbied hard in order for them not to join the association, with a particularly heavy involvement of general-secretary Arnold Smith. In order to overcome the associables'
wariness, the British government and the EC Commission lobbied them as well.44 Influential initiatives to convince the associables to join were taken in particular by the new deputy director-general of DG VIII, Maurice Foley.45 However, lobbying was not sufficient to overcome resistance. The most effective means available to the Community to convince the associables to join was to amend the features of the association that they disliked the most.

EC member states had quite a large amount of room of maneuver with regard to the design of the features of the new association. At the Paris Summit the EC member states had agreed on the principle of the preservation of the acquis of the Yaoundé association, but the content of the acquis was not clearly defined. In fact, «aucune garantie de substance n’a été donné quant au contenu futur du régime d’association.»46 According to minimalist interpretations, to preserve the acquis merely meant to preserve the existence of a special association agreement between the Community and a limited set of developing countries.47 According to maximalist interpretations, to preserve the acquis meant to preserve all the main instruments and features of the Yaoundé association, if only slightly adapting them to


45 A. Hewitt and K. Whiteman, «The Commission and development policy: bureaucratic politics in EU aid – from the Lomé leap forwards to the difficulties of adapting to the twenty-first century,» in EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 140–141. Foley was a former British Labour politician who had been minister for development. As a Christian trade unionist, since his youth he had been cultivating a remarkable network of acquaintances in sub-Saharan Africa, both in the Christian and in the trade union circles.

46 MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur les relations de la CEE avec les pays associés et associables, May 10, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.

the new situation. As Britain pointed out, «the core of that disagreement is whether the new convention of association will be broadly on the same terms of the present Yaoundé Convention.»\footnote{48 FCO, Note on Protocol 22, July 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1696.}

Since the associable states would reject a Yaoundé-type of association, substantial change of its features should be devised. However, the priority for France was to keep the association as close as possible to the Yaoundé model. France saw the enlargement of the association as useful to secure the preservation of its centrality, but the enlargement should not come at the price of significant changes to the association.\footnote{49 FCO, Record of Anglo-French talks on association questions, May 14, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1693; É. Burin des Roziers (French permanent representative to the EC), Note sur les negociations avec les EAMA et les pays du Commonwealth associables, May 17, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759; E. E. Tomkins, Note on the French African policy, June 8, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1796.} As the former Commission official Dieter Frisch put it, France was trying to «“sauver les meubles” de l’association “francophone” initiale.»\footnote{50 D. Frisch, «Le role de la France et des français dans la politique européenne de coopération au développement,» in La France, l’Europe et l’aide au développement. Des traités de Rome à nos jours, ed. G. Bossuat (Paris: IGPDE, 2013), p. 119.} The Yaoundé system of cooperation had largely been conceived by the French to the advantage of the former French colonies, and also its management was largely influenced by France and by French officials. France feared that its partners aimed at «une dénaturation profonde de la politique d’association.»\footnote{51 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d’association, December 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.} Open-ended negotiations for the renovation of the association should absolutely be avoided, and only the Commonwealth associables opting for the Yaoundé model could come to the negotiation table.\footnote{52 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur le renouvellement de la Convention de Yaoundé et sur l’association des pays du Commonwealth, April 11, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.}

While for the French the preservation of the Yaoundé model of association was more important than its enlargement, for the British it was the other way round. The British priority was to get as many associables as possible to join the association: «who participates is more important than the nature of the association itself.»\footnote{53 D. J. E. Ratford, Note for Anglo-French talks on association questions, May 3, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1692.} Thus it was
desirable to get rid of the features of the Yaoundé model that discouraged the associables to join.\textsuperscript{54} Accordingly, they argued, the features of the new association should be defined as limitedly and vaguely as possible before the opening of the negotiations. This position was supported by Germany and the Netherlands, which aimed at weakening the association to the advantage of the worldwide tier of cooperation. As the French remarked, «il semble donc que nous soyons en désaccord avec les Allemands sur tous les points fondamentaux concernant le renouvellement et l’élargissement de l’association.»\textsuperscript{55} At the very least, Germany and the Netherlands aimed at overcoming the elements of the Yaoundé model that they regarded as neocolonial, such as the commercial preferences offered to the EC by the associated countries.

On April 4, 1973 the Commission issued its memorandum on the incoming negotiations.\textsuperscript{56} The Commonwealth associable countries were invited to join relatively open-ended negotiations for a new association agreement. The negotiations were not to be explicitly based on the Yaoundé model, and the associables were not required to indicate a preliminary choice between the three options envisaged in the British Treaty of adhesion. The French insisted on tying the negotiations to the Yaoundé model, but their position was increasingly isolated during the process of definition of the Community’s negotiation mandate. Indeed the mandate did not satisfy France, which found it «général, incomplet, souvent ambigu.»\textsuperscript{57} However, even the new French commissioner for development Claude Cheysson agreed that the negotiation should be open and that no step should be taken that could discourage the associables to adhere.\textsuperscript{58}

This approach was successful in overcoming the associables’

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\textsuperscript{54} J. A. Robinson, Note on Smith and association with the Community, January 4, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1266. See also É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur les negociations avec les EAMA et les pays du Commonwealth associables, May 17, 1973, in HAEU, SGICEE 8759; FCO, Note on the memorandum from the Commission on the negotiations under Protocol 22, May 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1693.

\textsuperscript{55} SGCI, Note sur le renouvellement et élargissement de la Convention de Yaoundé, June 5, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3005.


\textsuperscript{57} SGCI, Note sur le renouvellement et élargissement de la Convention de Yaoundé et la coopération au développement, November 16, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 3006.
wariness, since all of them participated in the first conference with the Community on July 25 1973. At the conference, the President of the Council of ministers made it clear that the features of the new association would not necessarily have to be the same as the Yaoundé ones.\textsuperscript{59} The British claimed that «all this constitutes inevitably a considerable defeat for the French,»\textsuperscript{60} while «we have secured all our objectives.»\textsuperscript{61} From a political and symbolic point of view, the July 1973 conference marked a shift in the external relations of the EC. As the British remarked, «this must have been the first meeting ever held by the Community at which no single word of French was uttered from start to finish.»\textsuperscript{62} The age-old dominance of the French conception of the Community's relations with the developing countries was challenged as never before.

The abolition of the reverse preferences

The reverse preferences were the most controversial element of the Yaoundé association. They consisted in the concession of preferential commercial treatment by the associated countries to the Community's exports to them. Associated countries were not obliged to offer such a preferential treatment, but its concession was regarded as important in political terms. Critics of reverse preferences argued that they were a neocolonial arrangement, since it was unfair that developing countries with big economic and financial problems should offer a preferential

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{59} President of the Council of the EC, Declaration, Conférence d'ouverture entre la CEE, les EAMA, d'autres États africains et certains pays indépendants du Commonwealth, July 25, 1973, in ACCE, BAC 40/1985 65.
\end{flushleft}
treatment to the exports of the EC countries. The actual economic impact of reverse preferences was quite negligible, but the issue became highly politicized and therefore hotly debated. The struggle was mostly symbolic in nature, and concerned divergent conceptions of the relations between the Community and the developing countries.

For France reverse preferences were «the essential political element in an association agreement» and they had to be considered part of the acquis of the Yaoundé association. They supposedly made the cooperation system less one-sided: reverse preferences made the association a sort of free trade area, wherein countries accorded mutual preferences to each other. For this reason, reverse preferences contributed to make the association special and to differentiate it from other cooperation agreements. Moreover, reverse preferences made the association secure, since they were seen as an essential element in order to base it on a free trade area and therefore make it consistent with the GATT rules. These arguments made by France were supported by most of the francophone associated countries themselves.

On the contrary, for Britain reverse preferences were not «part of the distinctive character of the association.» Their actual import was so little that there was no reason to attach too strong an importance to them, either in defending or criticizing them. However, reverse

63 R. S. Faber (British embassy in the Netherlands), Note on EEC association and reverse preferences, February 20, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1690.
65 MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur le renouvellement de la Convention de Yaoundé, January 17, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.
68 European Parliament, Committee for development and cooperation, Relazione sui risultati della nona riunione annuale della Conferenza parlamentare dell’associazione, June 6, 1973, in HAEU, PE0 1594.
70 M. D. Butler (FCO, European integration), Note on the EEC association for developing Commonwealth countries, December 11, 1972, in NA, FCO
preferences had become one of the main targets of the associable states’
criticism, thus the associables could hardly be expected to join the
association as long as reverse preferences were in place.71 According to
France, Britain advocated the abolition of reverse preferences also for a
tactical concern. In the incoming negotiations for the new association,
the francophone developing countries would enjoy a stronger
bargaining position with regard to the anglophone ones, since the
former would be able to demand counterparts in return for their
concession of reverse preferences. On the other hand, if reverse
preferences were abolished at the outset of the negotiations, the
anglophone countries would be better placed to promote their own
vision of the association.72

Even though the British opposition to reverse preferences was
mainly based on pragmatic and tactical considerations, it was also
consistent with a liberal conception of the Community’s role in the
international trade system. Reverse preferences were criticized not only
by Britain, but also by the other EC member states strongly linked with
a liberal view of international trade, especially the Netherlands.
According to them, reverse preferences were not even necessary to
ensure the association’s consistence with GATT rules, and in fact they
were contrary to the spirit of GATT.73 Reverse preferences were strongly
criticized also by the US, which was wary of the Community’s
preferential agreements with groups of third countries.74 Liberal

70/1268; J. de Beaumarchais, Note sur l’élargissement de l’association, June 11,
1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.
71 M. D. Butler, Note on reciprocity in the trading provisions of the renewed
Yaoundé Convention, July 7, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1264; FCO, ODA, Report on
meeting with Ferrandi, December 14, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1269.
72 É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur le problème des préférences inverses,
February 14, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759; G. D. Cumming, «Les relations
entre le Royaume-Uni et la Communauté européenne dans le domaine de l’aide
au développement entre 1975 et 2000: influence mutuelle ou dialogue de
sourds?» in La France, l’Europe et l’aide au développement. Des traités de Rome à
73 N. Statham (British embassy to West Germany), Note on the association with
the EEC for developing Commonwealth countries, January 10, 1973, in NA,
FCO 30/1688; J.-M. Palayret, «Da Lomé I a Cotonou: morte e trasfigurazione
della Convenzione CEE/ACP,» in Il primato sfuggente: l’Europa e l’intervento per
74 D. Williams, Note on association problems, December 29, 1972, in NA, FCO
30/1269; É. Burin des Roziers, Note sur les États-Unis et les accords de libre
criticism of reverse preferences further fostered French support for them, since defending reverse preferences was seen as a way to signal the French distance from the American vision of the international economic order.\textsuperscript{75}

During preparations for the negotiations of the new association, the Commonwealth associable countries did not backtrack on their rejection of reverse preferences, and they actually managed to undermine support for them among the francophone associates too. In the common statement delivered by the African countries at the conference with the Community in July 1973, the concession of reverse preferences was excluded. With support for reverse preferences already being weak within the EC, France and the Commission finally had to consent to their abolition.\textsuperscript{76} The abolition of the reverse preferences was one of the most significant departures of the Community’s development cooperation system from the Yaoundé model, signaling a move away from a neocolonial conception of the Community’s relations with the developing countries. As Kaye Whiteman put it, the abandonment of reciprocity was the «jewel in the crown» of the new system.\textsuperscript{77}

The innovative aspects of the Lomé system of cooperation

The reassessment of the system of cooperation between the Community and former colonies of its member states led to the conclusion of a new Convention, which was signed in Lomé on February 28, 1975.\textsuperscript{78} The Convention established a system of

\begin{footnotesize}
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    \item \textsuperscript{75} SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d’association de la CEE avec les pays africains, December 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.
    \item \textsuperscript{76} J. A. Robinson, Note on Protocol 22, September 12, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1698.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
cooperation between the EC and 46 developing countries located in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Despite the inclusion of a few Caribbean and Pacific countries, the system continued to be mostly centered on the Euro-African region. The institutional and financial aspects of the system of cooperation did not undergo significant changes with regard to the Yaoundé association, while some considerable innovations were introduced with regard to the commercial aspects.

In terms of institutions, the most relevant change with regard to the Yaoundé association was their renaming. The anglophone countries wanted to overcome the term “association” in favor of less one-sided denomination, therefore the system of cooperation was called “partnership” instead of “association” and the developing countries participating in it were called “ACP countries” instead of “associated countries.” Similarly, the reference to the association was removed from the institutions of the system, which were renamed “EEC–ACP Council of ministers” and “EEC–ACP Consultative assembly.”79 Apart from renaming, the most significant institutional innovation of Lomé was the organization of some meetings between members of the Community’s Economic and Social Committee and economic and social actors of the ACP countries, starting from June 1977.80

As for the financial aid, the European Development Fund was increased, but the funds per capita decreased.81 The most interesting evolution regarding aid concerned the Community’s own ways of managing it.82 Until the early 1970s, decisions on the allocation of the funds were largely subject to discretionary choices and influenced by personal acquaintances. Fund allocation was mainly managed by former French colonial administrators who had become Commission officials, and in particular by the director of the EDF Jacques Ferrandi. His approach to aid allocation came under increasing criticism as the British joined the EC and Cheysson became commissioner for

development. Younger officials with different backgrounds and operational styles acquired more weight, and aid started to be allocated on the basis of objective criteria. Recipients’ needs and capacities were evaluated, as well as the likely effectiveness of aid. The adoption of more objective criteria was requested by Britain. Objective criteria benefited the anglophone developing countries, which were larger than the francophone ones, and which were relatively good in designing sound developmental projects. For this reason, Dimier interprets the adoption of objective criteria of aid allocation as a strategy aimed at reducing French dominance. However, British sources show that their adoption was sought by Britain not only because of their expected benefits: internal pressures and the institutional culture made Britain eager to overcome the neocolonial methods of Ferrandi.

The single most innovative element of the Lomé cooperation system was its mechanism for the stabilization of the developing countries’ export revenues, the so-called Stabex. Since the establishment of the association, commercial cooperation was seen as a crucial element of it beside financial aid, characterizing it as a system of global cooperation. However, the commercial element of the association had undergone a gradual erosion over the years. According to the French, its weakening could bring about a loss of the «raison d’être» of the association itself. In order to counter the gradual erosion of the commercial component of the association, little could be done on the commercial preferences side. New, different measures had to be

86 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d’association de la CEE avec les pays africains, December 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.
88 SGCI, Note sur les perspectives de la politique d’association de la CEE avec les pays africains, December 1972, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.
identified and introduced. «Conservation de l'acquis ne signifie pas immobilisme et absence d'innovation:»89 as the French recognized, «l'association [...] ne peut se survivre qu'au prix d'une transformation profonde.»90

Reflections on new measures to strengthen the commercial component of the association largely focused on the elaboration of instruments for the stabilization of the revenues of the associated countries’ exports.91 Revenues had experienced increasing oscillations over the previous years, and they had decreased overall, worsening the situation of many associated countries. Ideas to tackle the problem had been emerging in different circles.92 Most of the projects were based on an insurance model, with funds going to support producers' revenues in case the market made them fall below a certain threshold. The introduction of instruments for the stabilization of export revenues met the French concern with a strengthening of the commercial element of the association. As for the British position, Britain had already established a system of stabilization of sugar exports in the Commonwealth framework, and it was eager to translate it into the Community.93 Moreover, stabilization measures met the British concern for endowing the association with some innovative, original elements which would be able to make it attractive for the associable countries.94 For this reason and for its concerns about the erosion of commercial

90 SGCI, Note sur le renouvellement et élargissement de la politique d’association, April 11, 1973, in HAEU, SGCICEE 8759.
92 R. J. Spencer (British delegation to the EC), Note on the association for developing Commonwealth countries, July 6, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1264; FCO, Record of meeting with officials from DG VIII, July 13, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1265; W. J. Adams, Note on association under Protocol 22, September 29, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1266.
cooperation, also the EC Commission supported stabilization measures.

Opposition to the establishment of a system of export stabilization was expressed by the Dutch and partly by the German governments.95 Their opposition was not in principle, since the Netherlands and Germany were actually open to the establishment of a worldwide system of export stabilization.96 However, they were wary of the introduction of stabilization measures at the regional level of the association, since it would further strengthen the specificity of the relationship between the Community and the associated countries. The establishment of stabilization measures was not strongly opposed, however, and the Dutch and German resistance instead focused on their details and on the size of their financial import.97

As a result of the negotiations between the EC member states, the establishment of a system for the stabilization of the revenues of the associated countries’ exports was approved, known as the Stabex. The Stabex was to compensate countries for revenue instability, with a transferral of funds to them with zero interest charged.98 Compensation payments were allocated almost automatically and according to objective criteria, since they were due whenever revenues fell below a determined threshold: aid directionality was further reduced compared to the Yaoundé system. For its objective and for its features the Stabex was presented by the EC as a major sign of its commitment to

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94 K. A. East (British high commission in Nigeria), Report on visit of Foley, September 1, 1972, in NA, FCO 30/1266; R. Goldsmith (British delegation to the EC), Report on meeting with Foley and Mann, March 15, 1973, in NA, FCO 30/1690.


98 Grilli, The EC and the Developing Countries, pp. 27, 30.
addressing developing countries’ problems.

**Lomé as a new model of international relations?**

The Lomé Convention featured a few significant departures from the Yaoundé model of association, especially in terms of commercial provisions. The most notable ones were the abolition of the reverse preferences and the establishment of the Stabex mechanism. The innovations introduced in the Lomé Convention allowed the Community to present it as a contribution to the establishment of a new model of relations between industrialized and developing countries. Lomé was deemed an exemplary model of international cooperation, a particularly advanced system for development promotion, and «une vision d’un monde nouveau dans un ordre différent.»

The preamble of the Convention proclaimed that it established «a new model for relations between developed and developing states, compatible with the aspirations of the international community towards a more just and more balanced economic order.»

The main reason why Lomé could be presented in this way was that it was the first major instance of reception and implementation of some of the demands that the developing countries had been making for years. A few weeks before the signature of the Lomé Convention, the 1974 session of the UN General Assembly had ended. As I will show in chapter 5, the developing countries had managed to make the Assembly approve the goal of the establishment of a new international economic order. However, the prospects for its implementation were low, and little agreement could be reached with the industrialized countries on actual measures to improve the situation of the developing countries. Lomé could be presented as a system of cooperation which included some of the measures demanded by the developing countries, and which was introduced in agreement with some industrialized countries. From such a perspective, Lomé could certainly be regarded as a model to translate to a global level.

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The claim of the innovative and pioneering character of the Lomé system has been challenged by some scholars, who have stressed the clear aspects of continuity between Lomé and the Yaoundé association. For instance, Marjorie Lister has argued that «instead of creating a new economic order, Lomé was an elaboration of the old order,» and that it «was really about traditional politics; it was about creating a sphere of influence for the European Community.»101 Similarly, Lotte Drieghe and Jan Orbie argue that Lomé was not a novel project, but rather «a continuation of the largest member state’s policies on a European scale.»102 To be sure, a number of elements did clearly link the Lomé model of cooperation with its predecessor: its regional focus, the clear imbalance of power between the Community and the developing countries, most of the instruments of cooperation, and so on. The preservation and pursuit of the EC member states’ interests did play an important role in the design of the Lomé system. However, this is not really surprising. Lomé was not an enlightened and disinterested project designed by some visionaries, but it was instead largely the result of intergovernmental bargaining and horse trading between the EC member states’ political and economic interests.

Despite the clear role played by member states’ horse trading, Lomé was sufficiently innovative and original in its approach that it could credibly be presented as a novel model for international relations. Most importantly, Lomé was regarded as such by many external observers. For the Community, this was an extremely important result. Drieghe and Orbie are right in pointing out that the presentation of Lomé as a novel model of international relations was closely linked to the EC’s need to strengthen its legitimacy and role on the international stage.103 In early 1975 the EC was experiencing a serious crisis: the success of Lomé allowed it to counter it at least at a symbolic level. With Lomé, the EC showed that it was able to establish the most ambitious system of development cooperation to date, and that it was willing to promote a new model of international relations based on interdependence and cooperation. In the previous years the EC had been calling for it in several forums: Lomé proved that its commitment was sincere, and that the Community was ready to meet developing countries’ concerns which could not be met in other international arenas.

103 Ibid., p. 179.
The weakness of the worldwide tier of cooperation

According to the compromise reached by the EC member states at the Paris Summit in 1972, the preservation of the regional tier of the Community's system of development cooperation should have been combined with the establishment of a set of cooperation policies addressing the developing countries which were not included in it. The establishment of cooperation policies towards these countries had always been advocated by Germany and the Netherlands, and the British entry into the EC strengthened their calls. Britain was very interested in the establishment of the Community's policies which addressed its former colonies but which could not be included in the association system because of their size – countries such as India and Pakistan. The establishment of a global tier of development cooperation was favored also by the EC Commission, which would expand its influence as a result.

A first step towards the establishment of a global tier of development cooperation was the establishment of the Community's system endowing preferential commercial treatment to the manufactured goods exported by the developing countries in 1971. The only other global-level Community cooperation policy was the food aid policy, which addressed food crises in different developing countries. France made the establishment of more ambitious and comprehensive worldwide policies of cooperation conditional upon the successful renewal of the regional association. In turn, the British government made the pursuit of the negotiations for the renewal of the association conditional upon the approval of the principle of the concession of Community aid to non-associate countries. In July 1974 the Council confirmed such a principle, and it also approved the establishment of a small program of technical assistance to non-associated countries.

104 British ministry of overseas development, Brief on EEC aid to the non-associate developing countries, June 7, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/4.
107 Ibid.
The strength of the link between the renewal of the association and the beginning of cooperation with non-associates was made patent by the timing of the Commission communication on aid to non-associates in 1975: the Lomé Convention was signed on Friday, February 28, and the Commission adopted the communication when it next met, which was on Wednesday, March 5. The Commission proposed to allocate 766 million dollars to non-associates over the 1976–80 period, with a special focus on the least developed countries and on Asia in particular.\(^\text{108}\) However, the Council could not adopt the proposal because of German and Italian resistance on financial grounds.\(^\text{109}\) After the departure of Willy Brandt and Erhard Eppler and after the outbreak of the crisis, the German government had lost some enthusiasm for development cooperation. The adoption of the Commission’s proposal was particularly hindered by the weakening of the British government. The Commission launched its proposal at the height of the struggle of renegotiating the British membership of the EC: the British minister for cooperation Judith Hart was campaigning for an outright exit, and thus she was in an awkward position to give support to the Commission’s proposal for aid to non-associates.\(^\text{110}\)

It was the pressure exerted by the European Parliament that favored the overcoming of the deadlock in the Council on the strengthening of the Community’s cooperation policies towards non-associated countries. The Parliament obtained the insertion in the Community budget for 1976 of 20 million dollars to be destined to aid to non-associates.\(^\text{111}\) Financially, the engagement was almost negligible. Politically, however, it was an important step. Continued opposition from some member states hindered agreement on the allocation of the funds for several months: only the risk of an institutional clash with the Parliament over budgetary powers led the Council to decide to make the 20 million dollars available, and to approve their allocation in November 1976.\(^\text{112}\) About 73 percent of funds were destined for the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \(^\text{108}\) Ibid.
  \item \(^\text{109}\) British ministry of overseas development, Brief on the EEC aid to the non-asssociate developing countries, June 7, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/4.
  \item \(^\text{110}\) EC Commission, DG VIII, Note sur l’aide financière et technique communautaire en faveur de PVD non-associés, April 9, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 25/1980 1896.
  \item \(^\text{111}\) FCO, European integration, Note on aid to non-associates, June 14, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/4.
  \item \(^\text{112}\) British delegation to the EC, Report on Coreper meeting on aid for non-associates, October 7, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/4.
\end{itemize}
poorest Asian countries (mainly India, Pakistan and Bangladesh), 20 percent to Latin America and 7 percent to non-associated Austral African countries.\textsuperscript{113}

However tentative, the launch of the Community’s initiative for development cooperation with non-associated countries was significant because it signaled that the Community did not aim at focusing solely on the Euro-African region nor on the former colonies of the member states. A specific debate took place on the opportunity of signaling such an engagement. France preferred the assumption of a low-key profile by the Community in this respect and it proposed that the Community should merely contribute to initiatives taken by other international organizations in favor of the non-associated countries.\textsuperscript{114} On the contrary, the EC Commission and the other EC member states argued that the Community’s engagement in favor of the non-associates should be clearly visible.\textsuperscript{115} Moreover, the Community’s cooperation initiative with non-associates was significant because the allocation of funds tended not to be based on merely political criteria, but rather on objective criteria such as the evaluation of countries’ poverty and basic needs.

Community funds for aid to non-associated countries constantly increased in the late 1970s, reaching 138.5 million dollars for 1980.\textsuperscript{116} However, their inclusion in the Community budget was subject to yearly negotiations and debate and the funds were allocated on an ad hoc basis. The lack of a certain basis for it made it impossible to design and implement long-term development projects. When the Council finally agreed on grounding the program on a stable basis, the approval of the ensuing regulations was blocked for several months by a veto

\textsuperscript{113} The repartition of funds between the three regions remained almost unchanged during the following years (G. Chedeville, «Evolution of the EEC policy towards development cooperation,» in The EEC in the Global System, ed. K. B. Lall, W. Ernst, and H. S. Chopra (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984), pp. 70–71).

\textsuperscript{114} Presidency of the Council of the EC, Note sur l'aide financière et technique à des PVD non associés en 1976, August 11, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/4; D. Maitland (British permanent representative to the EC), Report on Council meeting on the Community financial and technical aid to non-associated developing countries, November 9, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/5.

\textsuperscript{115} W. J. Adams (British delegation to the EC), Note on aid to non-associates, August 27, 1975, in NA, FCO 58/895.

cast by the Netherlands for constitutional reasons.\textsuperscript{117} As a result, by 1980 the worldwide tier of the Community’s development cooperation was still extremely limited and fragile.

**Development cooperation and the assertion of the EC as a distinctive actor**

During the 1970s the system and policies of development cooperation of the Community were thoroughly reassessed. Some new elements were introduced, while some existing elements underwent significant changes, such as the system of cooperation with the former colonies of the EC member states. In almost all the instances of the reassessment of the Community’s development cooperation, a juxtaposition was evident between the position held by France on one side and the position held by the Netherlands and Germany on the other side. France advocated a system of development cooperation largely centered upon the association with the former colonies in Africa, possibly very close to the model of cooperation designed in the previous decades. On the contrary, the Netherlands and Germany sought to reduce the strength of the Euro-African focus of the Community’s system of cooperation and they sought to move it away from a neocolonial model.

For its intermediate position between the French views and the Dutch and German ones, Britain played a particularly influential role in the reassessment of the Community’s development cooperation. Its role was particularly influential because such a reassessment was made necessary by the British entry into the EC and by the consequent need for defining the relationship between the Community and the Commonwealth developing countries. The result of the struggle and compromise between the different views held by the member states was the establishment of a two-tier system of development cooperation. At least a partial departure was possible from the neocolonial model of the relationship between the Community and the developing countries, thanks to the abolition of the reverse preferences and the adoption of objective criteria for aid allocation.

Some of the features of the Lomé system of cooperation made it

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{117} FCO, ODA, Note on aid to non-associates, August 1979, in NA, FCO 98/411.
\end{footnote}
particularly innovative, such as its multi-dimensional character and especially its mechanism for the stabilization of export revenues. The Lomé system was presented as proof of the generous character of the Community and of its genuine concern with developing countries' problems: Lomé proved that the EC was an original, progressive and distinctive international actor. It was neither selfish nor inward-looking, and it was ready to move beyond the colonial legacy. Lomé was also presented as a major contribution to the establishment of a new model of international relations, promoting international cooperation and interdependence and promoting a reduction of the gap between industrialized and developing countries.

The Lomé system allowed the EC to present itself as a distinctive international actor, even if in fact the system was not as innovative and as disinterested as the Community pretended it was. Many of its features were in continuity with the Yaoundé system of cooperation, and many of its innovative features resulted from sheer bargaining between member states' interests. To be sure, there were a few actors which were sincerely concerned with the developing countries' problems, especially within the EC Commission and the European Parliament – but in reality they exerted limited influence. Even if Lomé was not as innovative as the Community pretended it to be, it was still possible for the Community to present it as such. The attention paid by Community to stress and signal the importance of Lomé indicated that development cooperation had acquired a central place in the Community's international activity, especially as far as the assertion of a distinctive character of the EC was concerned.

Even if the establishment of the Lomé cooperation system could be presented as a success, other aspects of the reassessment of the Community's development cooperation were less successful. Attempts to use the Paris Summit to signal the Community's concern with development failed, and also the attempt at establishing a global tier of cooperation was overall unsuccessful. These failures were particularly striking because member states did agree on the opportunity of acting, but they were unable to do so because they disagreed on the particular measures to take. As a result of this inability, the Community often had to resort to making mere pledges and rhetorical commitments. However, the inability of following up all these pledges with actual measures affected the credibility of the Community's claims, as well as its image as a committed partner of the developing countries.
Chapter 5
The EC as Promoter of a New International Order

The 1970s were a period of wrenching change for the international economy. The international monetary system was shaken by Nixon’s decision in August 1971 to decouple the dollar from gold. A round of GATT negotiations for the liberalization of trade took place. National economies became increasingly interconnected, patterns of industrial production were changing, and markets were experiencing increasing instability. Some developing countries and Japan asserted themselves as new influential actors, while the US and the EC were struggling to reassess their role. Even if most of the changes concerned economic issues, they were fundamentally political in character. The international order and the balance of power between states were changing. In particular, the developing countries were challenging the position enjoyed by the industrialized ones, demanding radical changes to the international order. The import and complexity of all these problems led governments to discuss and negotiate solutions and changes throughout the whole decade.

This chapter focuses on the participation of the EC in the debates concerning the reassessment of the international economic order. In particular, it focuses on the debates concerning the reassessment of the developing countries’ role in the international system. Debates about it occurred mainly at the UN Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN General Assembly, and at the Conference for International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), starting from 1975. To be sure, there were other important aspects of the international economy which were discussed during the 1970s, such as monetary issues and trade between industrialized countries. The reason why I do not focus specifically on these debates is that they were less relevant in terms of assertion of the EC as an international actor promoting a distinctive vision of the international order. Debates on the developing countries’
role offered more opportunities for the EC to articulate a distinctive vision of it.

In the debates on the international economic order and on the developing countries' role in it, the Community constantly advocated a reduction of the gap between industrialized and developing countries, and the establishment of permanent mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation between them. It argued that it was essential to avoid confrontation between juxtaposed economic blocs, and the EC rather tried to promote regional integration and interregional dialogue. International economic relations were conceived as a positive sum game, wherein the welfare of any actor depended on the welfare of the others. The EC heavily emphasized the value of interdependence and dialogue, and it tried to assert itself as the most progressive industrialized actor. The adoption of such a position was clearly linked to the impossibility for the EC to afford a confrontation with producing countries, but it was also consistent with the narrative of European integration itself, and it was useful to assert and highlight the EC's distinctiveness as an international actor. Despite the EC's efforts to assert itself as a progressive actor, deeds fell short of words in this respect.

Offering trade preferences to the developing countries

The first occasion for the EC to promote its vision of a more balanced international order was the establishment of the system of generalized preferences for the developing countries' exports. As early as 1963 the Community proposed that industrialized countries endowed a preferential tariff treatment to some of the exports of the developing countries.¹ The measure was aimed at favoring the inclusion of these countries in the international trade and at promoting their economic development, so that the gap between them and the industrialized countries could be reduced. The principle of the introduction of generalized preferences for developing countries' exports was unanimously approved by the member states of UNCTAD in 1968.² Its approval was one of the first instances of negotiated and shared adoption of a measure improving the position of developing

¹ EC delegation, Statement on the access to markets, CIEC, February 19, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1120.
countries in the international system.

The Community system of generalized preferences entered into force on July 1, 1971. It endowed preferential tariff treatment to all manufactured goods coming from the developing countries, with a few limits and safeguard clauses. The most important limit was clearly the exclusion of most agricultural goods from the system. Despite this limit, the Community presented the establishment of its system of generalized preferences as a sign of its commitment to a more balanced and more just international economic order. No chance was missed to underline the fact that the Community had been the first – and for a few years the only – major industrialized actor to turn the commitment made in UNCTAD into actual measures. The President of the EC Commission Franco Maria Malfatti claimed that the concession of preferences was «a political act, which proves the attitude of the Community and its member states towards the Third World better than any other act.»

The commercial preferences offered to the manufactured goods of all the developing countries were not the only preferences offered by the Community to third countries. The Community offered special commercial preferences to the countries associated with it, such as those taking part in the Yaoundé cooperation system. In the early 1970s the Community concluded new preferential commercial agreements with some developing countries, such as the Mediterranean ones. These agreements were presented by the Community as a contribution to the development of these countries and to their greater inclusion in international trade. However, these agreements were heavily criticized not only by those developing countries which happened to be not benefiting from them, but first and foremost by the American government.

2 UNCTAD was one of the main arenas for discussion between industrialized and developing countries; general UNCTAD conferences were convened every four years starting from 1964.


5 E. Martino and J.-F. Deniau, Projet de communication sur la politique d’association et de régimes préférentielles de la Communauté, April 9, 1970, in HAEU, EM 156; N. Samuels (US deputy under-secretary of state), Speech «The
The actual impact of the Community’s preferential agreements upon world trade and American exports was very limited, to the extent that Europeans complained that American criticism had «more emotion than logic.» Indeed, the reason for the American criticism was political rather than economic. The US argued that the Community’s preferential agreements favored the division of the world into separate and competing trading blocs, thus undermining the promotion of free trade. They were not only at odds with the GATT principle of the most favored nation, but also with the very philosophy underlying the GATT. Moreover, the US resented the possible expansion of the EC preferential agreements to Latin America. Since the EC was the largest trading power in the world, the EC’s preferential agreements could become a real challenge to the international trade system. However, the Community continued to state its support to the pursuit of a greater liberalization of world trade and it turned down the political significance of its preferential agreements, arguing that «preferences are not a devilish invention designed to undermine the world trading system.»

6 FCO, Planning staff, Paper on the external relations of the EC: relations with the developing world, May 1, 1973, in NA, FCO 49/460.
9 E. Wellenstein (EC Commission, DG I), Report on Soames’s visit to the US, February 18, 1973, in Churchill Archives, SOAM 42. See also P. Malvé (EC Commission’s delegation to the US), Speech on the evolution of economic and commercial relations between the US and the EC, St. Louis Conference on world trade, September 23, 1971, in ACCE, Speeches collection.
The Community argued that preferential agreements were to be limited in number and scope, and that they were helpful for tying some developing countries to the West. Special agreements were necessary to promote their growth, since most of these countries were strongly underdeveloped and the near absence of manufactured goods among their exports made it impossible for them to benefit of the system of generalized preferences. While the Community stressed the economic rationale underlying the agreements, France was explicit about their political rationale. The preservation of preferential agreements was important because they signaled «l'originalité et dans une large mesure la personnalité de la Communauté Economique Européenne.» Moreover, France favored the establishment of a regional trading bloc encompassing Western Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa, in keeping with the age-old notion of Eurafrica.

In order to preserve and stress the distinctness of the Community within the international economic order, France was also attached to the Community's common external tariff. The US repeatedly complained about the trade barriers defending the Community, and they were extremely critical of its strictly protectionist policy on agricultural trade. In the perspective of the incoming Multilateral Trade Negotiations, some EC member states envisaged not only a reduction of the Community's agricultural protectionism, but also a gradual dismantling of the common external tariff altogether. However, the French government opposed such a development, arguing that the Community's common external tariff had an essential political meaning and should be preserved in the long-term too. The common external tariff signaled the EC's distinctness and it was necessary in order to avoid the dilution of the EC into a broad Western free trade area.

The Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the so-called Tokyo Round) that took place during the 1970s led to a reduction of trade barriers between countries. However, the Community preserved its protectionist agricultural policy and its common external tariff, which

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was deemed useful to protect European producers at such a time of crisis, and of the deep changes to the international economy. Despite third countries' criticism, the Community also preserved its special preferential arrangements with the developing countries associated with it. The only result that could be obtained by the external pressures was a gradual overcoming of the reverse preferences granted to the Community by the developing countries associated with it.

The EC as the most progressive industrialized actor

The 1972 conference of UNCTAD in Santiago del Chile was an extremely important occasion for a general discussion of the remarkable changes which were affecting the international economic system and for the definition of suitable measures to address them. While at the previous general conference of UNCTAD in 1968 the developing countries had mostly aimed at gaining some specific improvements in the trade field, by 1972 they had adopted more radical demands, envisaging a fundamental overhaul of the whole international economic order. Developing countries' agenda had undergone a politicization, and a connection had begun to be established between the economic demands made by the G77 and the political demands made by the Non-Aligned Movement. As a result, the Santiago Conference was the first instance of thorough discussion at a world level about the very structure of the international order.

The Santiago Conference was also an important occasion for the EC, since it was the first instance where it could articulate its general vision of the international economic order and present it to all of the world's countries. In those months the EC was making substantial progress for its assertion on the international stage, since the EPC had been launched a few months earlier and the member states were preparing for the Paris Summit and for the entry of Britain. By inviting the EC member states to define common positions on some of the main international issues of the time, the Santiago Conference was the first major occasion to present the EC as a distinct international actor and to express its distinctive views. In particular, in Santiago the EC had the

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chance to stress its attachment to the notion of multilateral dialogue and to show its willingness to meet some of the developing countries’ concerns. Its attitude sharply contrasted with the American one, which was much more reluctant in this respect.

In Santiago the EC stressed its belief in the intrinsic value of multilateral dialogue.\textsuperscript{15} The EC took an active role at the conference, trying to mediate between the radical demands of the developing countries and the conservative positions of the US and Japan. The adoption of this role was particularly promoted by the President of the EC Commission Sicco Mansholt, who personally engaged in promoting dialogue and in asserting the EC as the main interlocutor for the developing countries.\textsuperscript{16} In keeping with this approach, the EC endorsed the developing countries’ call for their extensive involvement in the management of the international economic system. It was the EC which promoted the approval of resolutions calling for the participation of the developing countries in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and in the reform of the international monetary system. These two resolutions were deemed «les plus importants succès obtenus par les pays en voie de développement et [ils] n’auraient pas été possible sans la Communauté.»\textsuperscript{17}

The EC’s acknowledgement of the need to reform the international economic system and its adoption of an active role in this respect were promoted by Mansholt and other members of the European delegations in Santiago. Their position built upon reflections that had been developed by several European actors in the previous years, especially by leftist politicians and movements, but also by Catholic actors. One of the clearest examples of such reflections was the speech of the Italian foreign minister Aldo Moro at the 1969 session of the UN General Assembly.\textsuperscript{18} Moro advocated the notion of «integral peace,» calling for a

\textsuperscript{15} EC Commission, Communication on UNCTAD III, March 3, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 2/1975 52.


\textsuperscript{17} EC Commission, Rapport sur les résultats de la 3ème session de la CNUCED, June 13, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 2/1975 54.

substantial reduction of the international economic and political unbalances. Countries should join efforts to remove causes of instability and promote global development, and they should all adopt an open, cooperative attitude in their mutual dealings.

Besides praising the intrinsic value of dialogue, in Santiago the EC argued in favor of some substantial reforms of the international economic system. In particular, it advocated a more rational international division of labor.\(^{19}\) The developing countries should industrialize and overcome their reliance solely upon the export of primary commodities, which accounted for 75–80 percent of their foreign exchange earnings.\(^{20}\) In order to adapt the European economy to these changes, the EC Commission envisaged an ambitious strategy for the restructuring of the European industrial sector.\(^{21}\) It is worth noticing that the prospect of changes to the international division of labor was supported by the European trade unions as well.\(^{22}\)

In Santiago the EC also argued in favor of an «aménagement concerté de l’économie,» that is to say a stronger involvement of public actors in the management of the international economy.\(^{23}\) Even if member states held partly different views on this subject, there was a widespread feeling that stronger public intervention was needed in order to ensure the stability and efficiency of the international economy and to bring about «un ordre international plus juste.»\(^{24}\) Interventions were needed especially in the trade field, for instance through the


\(^{22}\) Garavini, After Empires, p. 129.


\(^{24}\) Ibid.
conclusion of international agreements on primary commodities.\textsuperscript{25}

Only a handful of substantial measures could in fact be agreed upon at the 1972 UNCTAD conference, mainly because of the great gap between many of the developing countries' demands and the industrialized countries' willingness to meet them. The EC blamed the very strict position adopted by the US and Japan, which hindered agreement with the developing countries. The EC member states were in fact opposed to some measures demanded by the developing countries: the strict position adopted by the US and Japan offered them the chance to enjoy a free rider position in this respect. While the US and Japan ensured that industrialized countries would make no substantial concessions, the EC could claim that it was ready to make those concessions and blame the other industrialized countries for the failure of the conference. From the point of view of the EC the conference was quite successful, since it allowed the EC to play an active and constructive role, to highlight its distinctness and to improve its image among third countries.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{How new should the new international economic order be?}

Developing countries were disappointed by the poor results of the Santiago Conference. As a consequence, they adopted a more radical stance towards the existing international economic order, and a more confrontational approach towards the industrialized countries. At the conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers in September 1973 it was decided they would exert pressure on the industrialized countries by limiting the production and raising the price of oil.\textsuperscript{27} Industrialized countries which depended on oil imports would be forced to make concessions, which would benefit all the developing countries. Banners in Algiers proclaimed that the «OPEC is the shield of the Third World,» and an Indian diplomat openly stated «we intend to exploit the oil crisis to force you into a general revision of the terms of

\textsuperscript{25} EC Commission, Communication on UNCTAD III, March 3, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 2/1975 52.
\textsuperscript{26} EC Commission, Rapport sur les résultats de la 3ème session de la CNUCED, June 13, 1972, in ACCE, BAC 2/1975 54.
\textsuperscript{27} Garavini, After Empires, pp. 175–177.
exchange that will do us more justice.»\(^{28}\) Oil prices quadrupled in late 1973, strongly hitting the EC, which depended on oil imports for 95 percent of its oil consumption and for 50–60 percent of its energy needs.\(^{29}\)

The employment of oil as a political weapon was effective in increasing the developing countries' pressure upon the industrialized ones. They obtained the convocation of a special session of the UN General Assembly in spring 1974, which was precisely aimed at promoting a reform of the international economic order. The works carried out in the special and in the ordinary session of the UN General Assembly in 1974 led to the approval of a resolution calling for a new international economic order and of a program of action aimed at bringing it about. The former called for

the Establishment of a New International Economic Order based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States, [...] which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations.\(^{30}\)

Moreover, the UN General Assembly approved the Charter of economic rights and duties of the states. Reforms envisaged by the UN General Assembly concerned most of the domains of the international economic relations, spanning from the monetary field to the trade of primary commodities, from international finance to development aid. However, most of the reforms were bound to remain on paper. Western countries acquiesced in the approval of these UN documents by consensus, but they did not feel committed to the reforms called by them.\(^{31}\) The EC continued to concede that some reforms of the

\(^{28}\) Ibid., p. 180.


international economic order were needed, since some of its aspects were obsolete and it was necessary to recognize the increasing weight acquired by the developing countries. However, most industrialized countries wanted the fundamental features and institutions of the existing international order to stay in place, while the developing countries wanted quite a radical change to them.

The approach adopted by the developing countries in 1973–74 was described as «polémique, agressif et peu réaliste» by the EC. Its confrontational character discouraged the reception of developing countries' demands by the industrialized countries. Most of the demands were deemed too radical: as far as rhetorical commitments and endorsement of general principles were required, the EC could adopt quite forward positions, but its position was much more hesitant when developing countries' demands implied massive financial transfers and a strong impact on the domestic economy. Compared to the early 1970s, the EC’s stance was more reluctant also because of the magnitude of the economic crisis hitting it in those years. Moreover, EC member states did not want to depart excessively from the American position, since transatlantic relations were undergoing a delicate phase. As for the EC Commission, the departure of Mansholt at the end of 1973 reduced its eagerness to meet developing countries' demands.

While the EC was not willing to meet most of the demands made by the developing countries, it could not really afford to adopt a confrontational attitude towards them either. Especially after the developing countries’s decision to employ oil as a political weapon, the EC was very vulnerable and exposed to pressure. In order to deal with this awkward position, the EC remained extremely wary of making substantial concessions to the developing countries, but at the same time it adopted a relatively open and positive attitude towards them. In particular, it continued to state its readiness to engage in dialogue.

32 President of the Council of the EC, Speech at the CIEC, December 16, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1118; President of the Council of the EC, Speech at UNCTAD IV, May 6, 1976, in ACCE, Speeches collection.


33 President of the Council of the EC, Declaration to the UN General Assembly, April 10, 1974, in ACCE, BAC 129/1983 306.


36 Ministero degli esteri, Elementi per un intervento sulla CCEI al Consiglio europeo, November 1975, in Archivio Centrale dello Stato [ACS], Moro, 121.
with the developing countries and its staunch belief in the intrinsic value of multilateral dialogue. As the EC Commission proudly stated, «the Community will never be the first to stop trying to negotiate.»37

The EC tried to perform as «the developing world's most understanding partner.»38 Consultation and coordination did occur with the other industrialized countries, but the Community was eager to preserve and stress its specificity.39 Its adoption of an open and positive attitude was clearly due to the need to avoid a head-on conflict with the developing countries, but it was also connected to some fundamental traits of the EC’s self-conception as an international actor. The EC was eager to assert itself as mediator and promoter of dialogue between the industrialized and the developing countries, even when their positions were very far apart. In this respect, there was an analogy with the EC’s aspiration to promote dialogue and moderation between the Eastern and the Western blocs. The Italian ministry for foreign affairs argued that the EC should act as «factor of political equilibrium between East and Est and of economic equilibrium between North and South,» promoting an overcoming of the sharp division between blocs.40

In the UN debates on the international economic order, the EC conceded that some of the developing countries' demands should be met, especially with regard to the assertion of national sovereignty on natural resources. However, the EC insisted on a recognition of the fact that industrialized countries did have some legitimate rights, and not only duties as the developing countries tended to suggest.41 In particular, the EC insisted on a recognition of all countries’ right to a

stable access to commodities: «la souveraineté sur les ressources naturelles doit ainsi trouver son corollaire dans des devoirs [...] envers tous ceux dont le bien-être et le développement dépendent de l'accès libre à ces ressources.» Access to commodities could not be restricted as a means of exerting political pressure: as the EC Commission argued, «this is the one positive thing the Community has sought in the Charter [of economic rights and duties]. Without equity on this subject, the Charter would not justify subscription by member states.» The recognition of mutual interests was presented as a necessary condition for the reform of the international economic order and for the EC's contribution to it. In order to underline this concept, the EC insisted on printing on the fly leaf of the Charter of economic rights and duties Benito Juarez’s sentence «Respect for the rights of others is peace.»

The EC argued that developing countries and industrialized ones were both responsible for the functioning of the international economy:

La communauté mondiale est confrontée actuellement à des problèmes de dimension telle que des solutions ne peuvent être recherchées que sur le plan mondial. Toute action visant à faire face à ces problèmes doit être entreprise dans un esprit de solidarité entre États.

The EC constantly stressed the notion of interdependence: the EC could preserve its prosperity only if prosperity spread to the developing countries as well, but at the same time developing countries had no chance of experiencing economic progress if they let the industrialized countries fall into crisis. International economic relations were seen as a positive sum game, thus «interdépendance, coresponsabilité et concertation» were stated as the key elements characterizing the EC's

vision of a desirable international order.\footnote{48 President of the Council of the EC, Speech at the CIEC, December 16, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1118.}

The Conference on International Economic Cooperation

Instances of dialogue and negotiations between industrialized and developing countries at the UN produced little results. Little agreement could be reached on reforms and adjustments of the international economic system, and in fact industrialized and developing countries often confronted one another in an aggressive way. In order to create a multilateral forum more conducive to dialogue, in 1975 the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) was established. Following its establishment, debates on the reform of the international economic system tended to shift from the UN to the CIEC.

It was the French government which proposed to convene a conference on international economic issues outside the UN framework. The proposal was launched as early as February 1974, and it was initially meant to focus only on energy issues.\footnote{49 F. Petrini, «L’arma del petrolio: lo “shock” petrolifero e il confronto Nord–Sud. Parte I,» in Dollari, petrolio e aiuti allo sviluppo: il confronto Nord–Sud negli anni ’60–’70, ed. D. Caviglia and A. Varsori (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2008), p. 103.} Its launch was clearly closely connected with the Washington conference on energy promoted by the US. While the US was stressing the need to strengthen solidarity between the consumer countries, France rather stressed the need to strengthen the dialogue between consumers and producers, arguing that «il faut éviter de créer l’impression de la constitution d’un cartel des riches.»\footnote{50 F. Puaux (French political director) quoted in E. Wellenstein, Note sur la coopération dans le domaine énergétique, January 11, 1974, in HAEU, EN 455.} The French proposal was clearly dictated by political concerns to do with securing national autonomy from the US and with breaking France’s isolation on energy issues. However, the proposal also built on ideas that the EC had been advocating in the previous years. EC actors had repeatedly advocated dialogue with the producing countries, arguing that «we must not create a “Holy Alliance” of the rich consumer countries in opposition to the producer
Agreement on the conference proposed by the French was difficult to reach. Governments held different views on the relationship that should be between the conference and contemporary initiatives for strengthening consumers' solidarity, on the combination of energy topics with other topics as demanded by the developing countries, and on the structure of the conference itself. Once the conference was finally convened, it was no longer a conference on energy held at the height of confrontation between producers and consumers, but it was a much broader “Conference on International Economic Cooperation” held in the aftermath of the period of deepest confrontation. By the time of the opening of CIEC, industrialized and developing countries «talked with, not to each other» anymore.

As the British representative to the UN noticed,

The mood has changed. Partly because Western countries have obviously taken the demands more seriously and partly because the developing countries have begun to realise the futility of false consensus, counsels of moderation have begun to be heard. Developing countries had realized that the confrontational approach adopted in 1973–74 would be unlikely to bring about actual reforms of the international economic system. As far as the industrialized countries were concerned, the US had softened its attitude towards the developing countries’ demands. The EC member states acknowledged that «the only hopeful strategy which remains is to seek a consensus on

53 J. Pronk quoted in I. Richard (British permanent representative to the UN), Report on the 7th special session of the General Assembly, October 1, 1975, in NA, FCO 98/207.
54 Ibid.
a generally acceptable reform of the international system.» Some actual concessions had to be made, even though it was necessary to ensure that they would be reasonable and that they would be balanced by other measures benefitting the Western countries. As the Foreign Office observed,

The increasing transfer of resources from the richer to the poorer countries is, and should be, inevitable. It must be our objective to see that this process takes place in an ordered and controlled manner [...] The process of detailed discussion creates the opportunity to turn something wild, extravagant and expensive into something rational, practical and reasonably priced.

The EC continued to state its support for the pursuit of multilateral dialogue and its attachment to the notion of interdependence between industrialized and developing countries. Interdependence was seen not only as a matter of fact in the existing international economic system, but also as an ideal to be actively pursued. As an observer put it at the time, the EC should promote «optional interdependence, that is a strategy in which a deliberate choice is made for mutually dependent relations, cooperation and partnership.» EC leaders hoped that the developing countries' economic growth would directly favor the EC's own economic re-launch. In order to cultivate the dialogue, the EC was required to make some concessions to the developing countries: however, the cost of these concessions was expected to be lower for the EC than the cost which would have been implied by a confrontation with the developing countries. In case of any failure of the dialogue,


58 FCO, Planning staff, Paper for a more coherent UK policy in the dialogue between developed and developing countries, July 15, 1976, in NA, FCO 49/639.


European economic problems would increase and the Soviet appeal on developing countries would grow. A failure of dialogue would be «néfaste pour la consolidation de la position de la Communauté dans le monde.»

To a large extent, the CIEC had been conceived as a forum for dialogue on international economic matters alternative to the UN forums. The EC was critical of the latter because their own features encouraged confrontation between economic blocs, favored grand general discussions with limited actual outcomes, and gave excessive weight to the developing countries. These problems were clearly exposed not only by the sessions of the General Assembly in 1974, but also by the bitter confrontation experienced at the UNCTAD conference which was held in Nairobi at the same time as the CIEC. As Frank Judd argued, «if anybody set out to design a structure to guarantee the maximum chance of confrontation he could not do better than the present shape of UNCTAD.» Nineteen developing countries and eight industrialized ones were participating in the CIEC, with the Community representing all the EC member states. The small number of participants was expected to be conducive to dialogue, as well as to make the conference works more efficient thanks to time saving and to the relatively high quality of the delegations.

The industrialized countries made concerted efforts not to reproduce in the CIEC the confrontations between economic blocs experienced at the UN. There was some coordination between their positions, but consultations were kept confidential and industrialized countries deliberately refrained from having a single spokesperson.


63 F. Judd (Minister for overseas development), Note on UNCTAD IV, June 8, 1976, in NA, FCO 49/637.

64 Beside the Community, the countries participating in the CIEC were Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia.


66 EC Commission, Remarques sur les travaux de la commission “développement” de la CCEI, March 3, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1120; EC
The Community paid particular attention to highlight the specificity of its positions. This strategy was promoted not only by France, which was traditionally wary of too close a coordination with the US, but it was shared by all the member states. As Cheysson put it, «il faut cesser de nous enfermer de part et d’autre dans des casemates soigneusement fortifiées, soigneusement fermées avant même que nous nous rencontions.» Despite this concern, the positions of the Community and of the US had undergone a considerable rapprochement in comparison to the early 1970s. A particularly important step for their coordination was the creation of the G7: as Giuliano Garavini argues, «the creation of the G7 was a direct response to the battle waged by the Global South to promote a new international economic order.»

While the European and American positions had undergone a rapprochement, the developing countries held increasingly divergent positions. Even if they managed to present a common front at the CIEC, their economic situations and prospects were increasingly different. The Community duly encouraged the surfacing of these divisions, in order to weaken the negotiating position of the counterparts and to overcome the dynamic of sharp juxtaposition between cohesive economic blocs. As Schmidt argued, the industrialized countries should try «to break up the unholy alliance between the LDCs and OPEC.» Among the developing countries, the Community addressed the moderates and the hardliners in different ways, by token of whether they were producers or consumers, and whether they were the emerging countries and the least developed ones. However, despite this attempt at moving beyond a juxtaposition of economic blocs, a fundamental division did remain between industrialized and developing countries at the CIEC.

According to the EC, if the CIEC format of dialogue proved successful, it could lead to the constitution of a sort of economic Security Council. Only a few representative countries would take part in it, and regional organizations would possibly be involved as well.

68 Garavini, After Empires, p. 206. See also Caviglia, «La conferenza di Rambouillet...» p. 191.
69 Schmidt quoted in Garavini, After Empires, p. 209.
70 EC Commission, DG I, Note sur les problèmes Nord–Sud, November 25, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1128; A. Stakhovitch (EC Commission, DG I),
Dialogue would be less confrontational and more focused on the research of actual solutions. Besides envisaging an economic complement to the UN Security Council, the EC also envisaged the establishment of a system of «collective comice secouriste» which would complement the UN collective security system. The CIEC format of dialogue did not prove as successful as the EC had hoped. The main problem was that the moves of the nineteen developing countries taking part in it were closely scrutinized by the other G77 members. Developing countries taking part in the CIEC could not negotiate away the positions adopted by the G77 as a whole, and they had to prove their loyalty by strongly upholding them. As a result, chances for compromise between industrialized and developing countries in the CIEC were not much higher than in the UN.

The EC and the outcomes of the CIEC

The Community pursued two main substantial goals at the CIEC. Commodity producing countries should consent to ensure an «approvisionnement suffisant et continu des pays consommateurs dans des conditions de stabilité.» In particular, oil producing countries should ensure stable and secure provisions to the EC. The other main goal was the establishment of a «concertation systématique» on energy matters between producing and consuming countries. The establishment of a dedicated forum on energy would ensure the exchange of mutual information and retain the possibility of discussing fuel prices taking into account all of the actors' interests. It was maintained that prices should be rewarding for the producers but also

71 J. Callaghan, Speech to the CIEC, December 16, 1975, in ACCE, Speeches collection.
equitable for the consumers, and they should favor the economic growth of both groups of countries.\textsuperscript{75}

The Community was particularly eager to establish a permanent forum for dialogue on energy, but this proposal was part of a more general aspiration to institutionalize dialogue with the developing countries in a number of fields. For instance, the Community favored the establishment of systems of permanent consultation on industrial cooperation and on primary commodities.\textsuperscript{76} Support for such systems of consultations clearly mirrored the EC's belief in the potential of multilateral dialogue and in the usefulness of a joint management of the international economic system. Moreover, it mirrored the EC's preference for a management of crucial aspects of the international economy by political actors, even though EC member states held slightly different preferences in this regard.\textsuperscript{77} The establishment of a permanent forum for dialogue on energy matters turned out to be impossible, however, since the developing countries deemed the counterparts offered by the industrialized countries insufficient.\textsuperscript{78}

The developing countries saw the CIEC as a chance to gain some of the concessions that they had not managed to attain in the UN forums. CIEC measures would probably be less grandiose than those envisaged at the UN, but they would be agreed with the industrialized countries and they would therefore have a much higher chance of being implemented. Developing countries pursued several goals at the CIEC: they advanced demands concerning their public finance situation and development aid, the problem of the instability of commodities markets and the worsening of the terms of exchange of their exports, the need for industrial cooperation and for transfers of technology, and so on. The whole set of developing countries' demands aimed at strengthening the means of management of the international economy

\textsuperscript{75} E. Wellenstein, Note sur la relance du dialogue avec les pays producteurs de pétrole, May 28, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1117.

\textsuperscript{76} EC delegation, Déclaration sur la formation des prix et les mécanismes de marché, CIEC, March 20, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1121; EC delegation, Déclaration sur la coopération industrielle, CIEC, April 24, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 79/1982 5.


\textsuperscript{78} FCO, Brief on the North–South dialogue, September 1, 1977, in NA, FCO 58/1047.
by public actors and at increasing the developing countries' role in this respect.\textsuperscript{79}

In order to address the developing countries' demands, the Community adopted an approach «progressive et réaliste,»\textsuperscript{80} aimed at avoiding «the over-facile generalizations of principle which lead some to maximalism and others, through reaction, to minimalism.»\textsuperscript{81} The Community claimed to share most of the developing countries' concerns in principle, but it argued that many of the measures that they demanded were unfeasible, ineffective or even detrimental for them. The Community tried to shift the debate away from the grand measures aiming at a deep restructuring of the international order, arguing that

à des solutions certes intellectuellement idéales mais qui ne pourraient être mises en œuvre qu’à moyen ou long-terme, nous avons toujours préféré des solutions concrètes mais plus immédiates, même si nous reconnaissons volontiers qu’elles sont encore partielles.\textsuperscript{82}

The CIEC works focused mainly on the issue of the stability of the commodity markets and on the issue of the indebtedness of many developing countries. The instability of commodity prices and the decreasing terms of exchange of the export of raw materials were a central concern for the developing countries. The problem of instability had especially worsened with the increasing volatility of exchange rates and the declining value of the dollar.\textsuperscript{83} Previous debates about these issues with the industrialized countries had not led to agreement on significant measures to address them. The only measure that had been introduced was the Stabex mechanism, but it only concerned the developing countries that took part in the Lomé cooperation system. In the CIEC the parties discussed once again measures to stabilize markets, such as the indexation of commodity prices, the creation of buffer stocks financed by a UN Common Fund, a strengthening of the IMF Compensatory Financial Fund, and the conclusion of some


\textsuperscript{80} President of the Council of the EC, Speech at the CIEC, December 16, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1118.

\textsuperscript{81} EC delegation, Statement on the access to markets, CIEC, February 19, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1120.

\textsuperscript{82} President of the Council of the EC, Speech at UNCTAD IV, May 6, 1976, in ACCE, Speeches collection.

\textsuperscript{83} Garavini, After Empires, p. 133.
commodity agreements on a product-by-product basis.

Agreement on the establishment of a UN Common Fund to create buffer stocks of commodities was regarded by the developing countries as «the acid test of serious intent by industrialised countries.» The Community supported the goal of the stabilization of the commodity markets, which would also ensure stable and secure commodity provisions for it. However, the EC member states could not agree on the measures to adopt to that end. They heavily opposed indexation and they were divided on the other envisaged measures. Germany was particularly resistant, opposing the Community’s participation in the UN Common Fund and the conclusion of a general agreement on commodities. As a result of the divisions within the Community and of the wariness of the other industrialized countries, the actual outcomes of the negotiations on commodities in the CIEC were very limited.

The financial situation of many developing countries was seriously deteriorating, and the indebtedness of non-oil producing developing countries rose from 9.2 billion dollars in 1973 to 39 billion dollars in 1975. As early as 1964 the industrialized countries had subscribed to the target of devoting 0.7 percent of GDP to public development aid, but they were nowhere near to it in the late 1970s. The EC member states merely stated that they «s’efforceront d’atteindre dans les meilleurs délais» the target. Given the industrialized countries' reticence on aid, the developing countries rather focused their efforts on the debt issue. What they sought was not only an improvement of future borrowing conditions, but also at least a partial cancellation of their debts towards industrialized countries. They came to regard the debt issue as a key test of the industrialized countries' willingness to

84 F. Judd, Note on UNCTAD IV, June 8, 1976, in NA, FCO 49/637. See also G. Corea quoted in Garavini, After Empires, p. 223.
86 W. M. Knighton (British Trade department), Report on UNCTAD IV, June 9, 1976, in NA, FCO 49/637.
88 Garavini, «La CE e il NOEL» p. 122.
cooperate in the CIEC.\textsuperscript{91} The Community failed this test: despite a Dutch proposal for a collective debt moratorium, the Community offered only some help on a strictly case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{92} It argued that «les instruments existants en ce domaine ont fait leurs preuves»\textsuperscript{93} so there was no need to bring any substantial change to them.

CIEC parties could eventually agree on only a few actual measures for the improvement of the international economic system.\textsuperscript{94} It was decided that specific agreements concerning price and the trade of some commodities would be negotiated. The establishment of a Common Fund for commodities was also agreed in principle, but it was a lengthy process which produced poor results in the end.\textsuperscript{95} As a goodwill gesture, the industrialized countries participating in the CIEC agreed to launch a special action in favor of the developing countries worth 1 billion dollars.\textsuperscript{96} However, the initiative fell well short of the «Marshall Plan for the Third World» which had been called on by European leaders such as the British Prime Minister Howard Wilson and the President of the EC Commission Roy Jenkins.\textsuperscript{97}

By the end of the 1970s, dialogue between industrialized and developing countries had been carried out in several forums, but results were remarkably disappointing. The reason for this failure did not lie in the format of the dialogue. Part of its reason was that developing countries found it increasingly difficult to elaborate a coherent and cohesive strategy for the pursuit of their goals. Their

\textsuperscript{90} MAEF, Coopération économique, Note sur le dialogue avec les pays en voie de développement, July 23, 1975, in AMAEF, RFA, 3009.

\textsuperscript{91} EC Commission, DG I, Note sur les résultats des travaux de la commission “développement” de la CCEI, July 20, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1124.

\textsuperscript{92} Council of the EC, Note sur le problème de l’endettement des pays en voie de développement, April 2, 1976, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1121.

\textsuperscript{93} President of the Council of the EC, Speech at UNCTAD IV, May 6, 1976, in ACCE, Speeches collection.

\textsuperscript{94} Co-chairmen of the CIEC commissions, Report on the CIEC, June 2, 1977, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1130.

\textsuperscript{95} Tosi, «Europe, the UN and dialogue with the Third World,» pp. 182–184.

\textsuperscript{96} Council of the EC, Directives pour la CCEI, April 5, 1977, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1130.

economic situations were becoming more and more divergent, and political divisions were present between them. Moreover, the possibility of using oil as a political weapon and the majority enjoyed at the UN were clearly not sufficient for the developing countries to impose their vision of the international order and to bring about its restructuring. The deterioration of the economic situation in some developing countries in the late 1970s encouraged them to abandon altogether demands for a radical change of the international order.\footnotemark[98]

The poor results of the dialogue between industrialized countries and developing ones were also due to the resistance exerted by the former against any substantial change to the international economic order. Despite their rhetorical pledges and commitments, industrialized countries had no intention of giving up their influence on the international economic system. The Community itself continued to state its commitment to the pursuit of a more equitable and balanced international economic order, but in fact it did not take many actual initiatives to bring it about.\footnotemark[99] The economic crisis hitting the Community clearly made it very difficult for its member states to consent to costly measures in favor of the developing countries. The crisis rather invited the adoption of a defensive attitude, which was also favored by the weakening of the European social actors which had been pressing for the adoption of a progressive attitude towards the developing countries, such as the social movements and some left-wing parties and trade unions.\footnotemark[100]

Overcoming blocs: the promotion of interregional dialogue

One of the reasons why the CIEC had been launched was to experiment with a format of international dialogue which was expected to be less conducive to confrontation compared to the UN forums. The EC was particularly eager to overcome the confrontation between the industrialized and developing countries and to promote a less


\footnotetext[99]{Garavini, «La CE e il NOEI,» p. 140.}

\footnotetext[100]{Ibid., p. 143; Garavini, «The colonies strike back,» p. 319.}
dichotomous structure of the international economic order. However, the CIEC was not very successful in this respect. To a large extent, also in the CIEC dialogue that took place between a set of industrialized countries on one side and a set of developing countries on the other side. In terms of overcoming the logic of confrontation between economic blocs, the EC attempted some other experiments at the same time as the CIEC, and they were slightly more successful in this respect.

The EC promoted the establishment of permanent forums for dialogue with the Latin American countries, the Arab countries, the ACP countries, and the ASEAN countries. To be sure, the establishment of these forums was not only due to the search for a form of dialogue with the developing countries which was an alternative to the bloc confrontation. There were specific motives behind the launch of each of these dialogues, such as the desire to ensure secure oil supplies to Europe, the will of preserving a special relationship with many former European colonies, the need to respond to third countries’ desire to deepen commercial relations with the Community, and so on. Except for the ACP case, the EC played a small role in the establishment of regional organizations in other continents, even though the EC occasionally claimed to constitute a model for them.

The EC warmly welcomed the emergence of other regional organizations during the 1970s and it encouraged their consolidation. It expressed its eagerness to establish structures and habits of permanent dialogue with them. In part, the EC envisaged the establishment of dialogue with regional groups of developing countries for tactical goals: for instance, the EC hoped that its establishment of close relations with the ACP countries would help to soften G77 positions. However, the EC envisaged the establishment of dialogue with regional groups for strategic goals too, namely to favor the emergence of an international order structured around a few large groupings of countries rather than two economic blocs. In turn, such an order would favor the promotion of the EC’s distinctness, which risked waning if industrialized countries formed a common cohesive front of their own. As Cheysson put it,

[Europe’s] development and its integration favor the emergence of a multipolar world, less dangerous than a world dominated by the superpowers […] On this point the specific interests of Europe coincide with those of the LDCs, who want greater balance in international affairs.101

The EC consistently supported the development of regionalism and

101 Garavini, After Empires, p. 217.
of interregional contacts during the 1970s. The establishment of permanent and sometimes institutionalized structures and habits of dialogue with other regional organizations was the most evident element of this process, but not the only one. Another element was the very strong and ultimately effective defense of the Community policies granting preferential commercial treatment to the regions associated with the EC, despite the heavy criticism waged against them by some third countries. Similarly, the Community made strong efforts to defend and preserve the regional orientation of its development cooperation policy. These instances of the promotion of regionalism show that the process was not necessarily innovative, and it was partly linked with the desire to preserve old areas of European influence, especially in Africa. For this reason, the French government was particularly eager to cultivate the EC’s links with Africa and with the Arab countries. In 1979 Giscard even launched the project of establishment of a “trilogy” between the EC, the African countries and the countries of the Arab League, but the other EC member states did not endorse it.\footnote{French Presidency of the Republic, Note sur le projet de trilogue euro-arabo-africain, April 18, 1980, in NA, FCO 98/949; H. Jean-Baptiste (Presidency of the French Republic), Note sur le trilogue, November 26, 1980, in AN, AG 5(3), 918. In the previous years, Giscard had envisaged the establishment of a Euro-African dialogue that would complement the existing Euro-Arab dialogue (G. Robin (Presidency of the French Republic), Note sur le Conseil européen, July 4, 1977, in AN, AG 5(3), 913; V. Giscard d’Estaing, Allocution à la conférence franco-africaine, May 22, 1978, in AN, AG 5(3) 326).}

Despite the French attachment to the cultivation of its traditional regional areas of influence, the EC’s attempt at promoting regionalism and interregional contacts was not only due to this concern of cultivating old links. The frequency and consistency of the EC’s attempt at promoting them indicate the existence of a sort of reflex: regardless of the countries or of the matter at stake, the EC always found it beneficial to advocate progress in regional integration and the establishment of dialogue and cooperation with other regions. The EC addressed Latin American organizations, the Arab League countries, the ACP countries and the countries of the Organization for African Unity, the ASEAN: dialogue was sought with all the existing regional organizations, the only major exception to this pattern being the EC’s wariness towards the establishment of contacts with the CMEA. In terms of the promotion of interregional contacts, the establishment of links between the Community and ASEAN in 1978 is regarded as «a seminal moment for inter regionalism» and as «the model for
interregional cooperation.»

The international order and the assertion of the EC as a distinctive actor

The economic crisis which hit Western Europe starting from late 1973 was a crucial factor for the definition of the EC’s attitude towards the existing international economic order. Before the outbreak of the crisis, the EC repeatedly stated its sympathy towards the developing countries’ demands for a more balanced and fair economic order. It promoted some initiatives to meet their concerns, and it repeatedly signaled its readiness to agree to the adoption of stronger measures in their favor. However, American opposition hindered agreement on such measures in the international instances of dialogue with the developing countries. The radicalization of developing countries’ demands made it harder and harder to agree on actual measures. The outbreak of the economic crisis in late 1973 made it increasingly difficult for the EC to consent to radical reforms of the international economic order. Europe’s economic troubles made it politically very hard for governments to consent to costly measures favoring developing countries, even when developing countries softened their attitude around the mid-1970s.

Despite the clear difference between the period preceding the outbreak of the economic crisis and the period following it, there was a remarkable continuity in EC’s attitude during the 1970s. While rejecting the developing countries’ most radical demands for reforming the international economic order, the EC constantly adopted an open and positive attitude towards their concerns. It stressed its sympathy towards the developing countries, its staunch belief in the value of dialogue, and its desire to play the role of the most progressive actor among the industrialized countries. It constantly advocated the promotion of a more balanced international order, of a stronger interdependence between countries, and of a more rational and better-managed international economic system. It repeatedly sought to overcome the juxtaposition of economic blocs, exploring the possibility of promoting interregional dialogue.

The adoption of this attitude was clearly connected with tactical concerns: on the one hand it was useful to reduce the risk of confrontation with the developing countries, which the EC could not really afford, and on the other hand it was useful in order to stress the EC's distance from the conservative American positions. The adoption of an open and positive attitude was not only due to tactical concerns, however. It was also connected with a sincere belief in the virtues of multilateral dialogue and international cooperation held by influential EC actors. «The very idea that cooperation was the preemptive and sole response to the dangers of crisis operated as the foundational myth of European integration;»

104 dialogue and cooperation being core elements of the EC's narrative of European integration itself, the EC was willing to link its international profile to their promotion.

As I have shown, the clear limit of this attempt was the EC's difficulty in matching this open and positive attitude with the approval of actual measures meeting the developing countries' demands and bringing about real improvement of the international economic order. The EC did make some contributions to the reduction of imbalances between industrialized and developing countries through the introduction of trade preferences, and to a more consensual management of the international economic system through the involvement of developing countries in it. However, the EC was overall unable to match the progressive image that it was projecting with adequately substantial measures in keeping with it. This problem resonated the difficulty experienced by the EC in matching words with deeds which was shown in chapter 4 with regard to development promotion. The same problem of matching words with deeds affected the EC's attempt at presenting itself as a promoter of human rights in third countries, as I will show in the following chapter.


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Chapter 6
The EC as Promoter of Human Rights in Third Countries

During the 1970s, human rights were established as an important issue on the international political agenda, attracting an unprecedented amount of attention from the UN and from individual states alike, as well as attention from NGOs and influential sectors of public opinion. Increasing criticism was directed at the ongoing instances of colonial rule, at the policies of racial discrimination like apartheid, at the violent repression of domestic political opposers, and so on. As an acknowledgement of the relevance acquired by human rights, in 1977 the Nobel Prize for peace was awarded to Amnesty International. According to Samuel Moyn, the main reasons for the increasing attention paid to human rights during the 1970s were «the failure of more maximal visions of political transformation»¹ and the nonpartisan, ecumenical character of the notion of human rights.² Some civil society actors and political actors in many Western countries came to regard the promotion of human rights as a viable goal on which to focus.

The increasing salience of human rights affected the EC as well as many other international actors. The EC discussed human rights with regard to Western Europe, so that cooperation with the Council of Europe and the possibility for the EC as such to join the European Convention on human rights were considered.³ The EC discussed human rights with regard to its neighborhood, as recent historiography has shown: during the 1970s the EC engaged in favor of

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2 Ibid., pp. 132, 144.
3 On April 5, 1977 the Council of ministers, the EC Commission and the European Parliament released a joint declaration on the respect of fundamental rights within the Community. In 1979 the EC Commission proposed the accession of the EC to the European Convention on human rights.
democratization in Spain, Portugal and Greece, and it notably discussed human rights with the Soviet countries in the CSCE, both before and after the conclusion of its Final Act. Historiography has so far neglected another field of the EC's engagement in favor of human rights in the 1970s, namely their promotion in third countries outside of Europe. In this chapter, I focus on the EC's promotion of human rights in the Portuguese colonies, in Chile, in South Africa and in the African countries taking part in the Lomé Convention.

I analyze the reasons why the EC engaged in the support and promotion of human rights outside Europe during the 1970s. I analyze the ways and means in which such an engagement unfolded, and the reasons why it encountered only a limited success. While a general agreement existed on the desirability of asserting the EC as an international actor promoting human rights, EC member states tended to split on the translation of such a general goal into specific actual policies. This was due to the member states' divergences on foreign policy goals, understandings of human rights, and visions of the EC's international role. In most cases, deeds fell well short of words. Despite the limited results, I argue that the EC's decision to engage in favor of human rights outside of Europe was part of the EC's attempt at highlighting its distinctiveness as an international actor: the EC sought to present itself as an actor that cared about people and that was driven by values, not only by interests. It is worth noticing that the EC's engagement in human rights promotion began before they were placed high on the international agenda by Jimmy Carter in 1977.

External pressures putting the EC on the defensive

The beginning of the EC's engagement in human rights issues outside of Europe was largely spurred by third countries' attacks to the EC's relations with Portugal, Chile, South Africa and Israel during the

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1960s and early 1970s. Especially at the UN, these countries were heavily criticized for their policies violating individual or people’s rights (the expression “human rights” became popular only in the late 1970s). Even if other countries did violate rights, the UN focused upon these few cases mainly because of their Western character. Developing countries enjoyed a majority position in most of the UN bodies and they could count on Soviet support on these issues: in order to attack the Western countries, the Soviet bloc ones were ready to wrap «a blanket of non-aligned solidarity and virtue around their own heads.»

In parallel with attacks by third countries, the EC’s relations with Western countries violating human rights were increasingly coming under fire in Western Europe as well. Public opinion paid increasing attention to human rights issues, and the mobilization of NGOs and pressure groups increased considerably. The role played by grassroots mobilization promoted by Amnesty International was especially striking, but a number of other groups were active. The increase in citizens’ concern for human rights was particularly strong in the Netherlands, where it reinforced a «sense of moral obligation in world politics» that traditionally affected Dutch foreign policy. Citizens’ concern also exerted significant pressure on the left-wing parties in Britain and Germany.

Developing and Soviet countries attacked the EC member states for their bilateral relations with the Western countries violating human rights, and for the NATO support to some of them. Some motives made it desirable for the EC member states to address these attacks together.

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5 Moyn, The Last Utopia, pp. 149, 155.
6 British delegation to the UN in Geneva, Report on the 32nd session of the UN Commission on human rights, March 5, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/972.
If they could agree on a common approach to human rights, the EC member states’ position would be strengthened, since the adoption of a common approach would have substantially increased the costs for third countries to exert pressure upon them.\textsuperscript{10} Countries attacking them would find it harder to exploit divergences in policy lines and the particular exposure of individual member states on some issues. By the same token, if a common approach was adopted rogue countries would also find it harder to threaten retaliatory measures in case of the adoption of a tougher stance on human rights by the EC member states. Some EC member states also regarded cooperation in human rights issues desirable because it would further widen and strengthen the range of activity of the EPC.\textsuperscript{11} Human rights could potentially constitute an occasion to make the EC’s international activity more effective, by favoring a combination of EPC and Community means: EPC diplomatic initiatives could complement Community’s measures concerning trade and development cooperation. Cooperation on human rights at the EC level would benefit member states also because it would reduce the human rights advocates’ pressure against their bilateral policies, and therefore enable them to preserve quite a business-as-usual approach in the bilateral sphere.\textsuperscript{12}

Even if cooperation in human rights at the EC level tended to be regarded as desirable, some obstacles hindered it. The main obstacle was the member states’ divergences in regards to the issue of what role human rights should play as a foreign policy goal, and as an object of European cooperation. EC actors had different views on the subject, and they also had different interests at stake in the countries concerned. Should human rights promotion aim to bring about actual change in third countries, or rather should it be about asserting a distinctive image of the EC as an international actor? How was the goal of human rights promotion to relate to other foreign policy goals, such as the preservation of European economic and strategic interests in third countries? Reaching a compromise on these questions was not easy, and outcomes were often partial and ambiguous.

\textsuperscript{10} FCO, United Nations, Brief on human rights at the UN, March 9, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/970; M. Palliser (FCO, Permanent under-secretary), Note on human rights and foreign policy, April 29, 1977, in NA, FCO 58/1143.
\textsuperscript{11} R. A. Hibbert (British political director), Note on coordination with the Nine on human rights questions, December 1977, in NA, FCO 58/1146.
\textsuperscript{12} MAEF, Affaires africaines et malgaches, Note sur la consultation politique à neuf sur l’Afrique au sud du Sahara, March 11, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3803.
Distancing itself from Portuguese colonialism

The only European empire which had not undergone decolonization by the early 1970s was the Portuguese one. Portugal was ruled by an authoritarian government and it was not a member of the EC, but it was a member of NATO and therefore a close ally of most EC member states. Its colonies in Central and Austral Africa exerted increasing resistance to the Portuguese rule, but Portugal made strong military and political efforts to retain control over them. Portugal called for solidarity from NATO partners in this endeavor and it exerted successful pressures on the US. The European partners of Portugal struggled to hold a balanced position, combining the continuation of military cooperation, arms trade and commercial relations with Portugal alongside criticism of colonialism and the cultivation of discreet contacts with African liberation movements.

EC member states believed that the demise of the Portuguese empire was inevitable: only its particular path and timing was still to be decided. The most desirable pathway was a peaceful and negotiated process of decolonization, which would allow Portugal to withdraw with honor from its empire. Negotiated decolonization was seen as the best way to ensure stability and the preservation of Western influence in the African regions concerned. Since the Portuguese government seemed unable to accept the inevitability of decolonization, EC member states were ready to give help and support to it. Not only economic help was foreseen, but also help on a political and even cultural level: a proper «education politicize» of the Portuguese was deemed necessary to make them change their attitude.


16 French embassy in Lisbon, Note sur les difficulté du Portugal avec les pays d’Europe du Nord, April 7, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3520. See also MAEF, Europe méridionale, Note sur la France et l’avenir du Portugal
The EC member states held different views in regards to the opportunity of exerting pressures on the Portuguese government. The Portuguese government was reportedly characterized by "une extreme susceptibilité"\(^{17}\) about external pressures on its colonial policy. According to France, Germany and Britain, public pressure could alienate Portugal, hindering the pursuit of a negotiated decolonization process. For this reason, confidential dialogues on a bilateral basis were preferable. According to Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland on the other hand, clear public initiatives in favor of decolonization were needed. They envisaged initiatives spanning from the exertion of public pressures upon Portugal to the adoption of a more confrontational voting behavior at the UN, as well as the possibility of supporting African liberation movements and the expulsion of Portugal from NATO.\(^{18}\) The main rationale behind these public initiatives was less to do with exerting effective pressure for change than it was to do with indicating to the European public and to third countries that the EC opposed the Portuguese colonial policy. For as long as the goal was to assert the EC as a clear resister of colonialism, the mere reliance on confidential dialogue was clearly insufficient.

Concerns about the image of the EC with regard to Portuguese colonialism was closely linked to the increasing politicization of the Portuguese colonial issue at the UN. The focus on the Portuguese issue at the UN became more and more visible, and in the early 1970s the Western allies of Portugal were increasingly attacked for their alleged support for its colonial policy.\(^{19}\) While the US opted to support Portugal, the Europeans complained about the "embarras croissant" en Afrique, March 10, 1971, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519.

\(^{17}\) MAEF, Affaires africaines et malgaches, Note sur la démarche européenne à Lisbonne, March 4, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519. See also French embassy in Lisbon, Note sur les difficultés du Portugal avec les pays d'Europe du Nord, April 7, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3520; Auswärtige Amt, Note on the problems of Portuguese territories in Africa, April 3, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3803.

\(^{18}\) EPC presidency, Report on EPC meeting on Portuguese territories in Africa, April 4, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, Groupes d'experts Afrique CPE.

which «l'obstination de Lisbonne» caused them. Their preservation of links with Portugal would harm European relations with the African countries and decrease the credit enjoyed by the EC among developing countries. Additionally, Western European public opinion was increasingly attuned to Portuguese colonialism. Dutch public opinion was particularly critical of it: the Dutch media devoted considerable attention to it, some demonstrations were organized, and some products from the Portuguese colonies were boycotted, such as Angolan coffee. The mobilization of public opinion was mirrored by the positions adopted by the left-wing parties of the government majority, which called for the adoption of a more critical stance towards Portuguese policies.

The tension between the need not to alienate the Portuguese government and the need to assert the EC as a clear critic of Portuguese colonialism made it hard for the EC to agree on a common position. In the EPC context, agreement was reached for the exertion of discreet bilateral pressures upon the Portuguese government, along with the adoption of some mild public position intended as a «manifestation de “bonne volonté” exploitable devant les opinions publiques nationales et auprès des gouvernements africains.» However, the Dutch and Danish governments deemed the common European initiatives too mild. They complemented them with stronger bilateral initiatives in terms of support to the African liberation movements and of a convergence with the developing countries at the UN debates on the Portuguese colonial rule.


22 MAEF, Affaires africaines et malgaches, Note sur les territoires portugais d’Afrique, April 10, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, Groupes d’experts Afrique CPE.

23 French delegation to the UN, Note sur les territoires portugais d’Afrique, December 3, 1971, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3516; French embassy in Lisbon, Note sur les difficultés du Portugal avec les pays d’Europe du Nord, April 7, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3520; French embassy in The Hague, Note sur les Pays-Bas et la Guinée-Bissau, February 14,
sought to differentiate their position from the position of their European partners, in order to increase their political credit among the developing countries. For instance, in August 1974 the Netherlands broke the agreement for a joint recognition of Guinea-Bissau by the EC countries in order to recognize it slightly in advance of its partners.

The Portuguese revolution of April 1974 made it easier for the EC countries to agree a common European approach to Portuguese decolonization: the new Portuguese democratic government itself was in favor of decolonization, and the decolonization law of July 1974 opened the way for a quick accession of colonies to independence. The EC supported the new Portuguese policy, not only in political terms but also in economic ones. EPC and Community means were effectively combined, so that EPC endorsements of the new Portuguese policy were complemented by the provision of Community aid to the former Portuguese colonies and of financial and commercial support to Portugal itself. To a large extent, the Portuguese issue was the first instance of a pattern which characterized the EC’s attitude to most other cases of human rights violations in third countries: the EC was increasingly attentive to and critical of them, but it found it hard to agree on common measures because it was divided between advocates of a prudent approach and advocates of a vocal approach.

Distancing itself from human rights violations in Chile

The policies of the military dictatorship established in Chile in September 1973 became the first instance where international concerns with human rights violations spread around much of the world. For this reason, it was the first case which directly confronted the EC with

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1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3519.
24 MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur les territoires portugais d’Afrique, April 22, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3803.
26 J. A. de Sedouy (cabinet of Cheysson), Report on Cheysson’s visit to Lisbon, October 15, 1974, in HAEU, EN 1067.
major human rights violations committed by a non-European government. The definition of the Western European reaction to the policies of the new Chilean government became an important item on the political agenda since the very occurrence of the coup. The EC relations with Chile underwent close scrutiny by third countries, but also by European public opinion: European parties, trade unions and the press all called for the EC to act in order to oppose human rights violations in Chile. Calls were advanced especially by the socialist and communist parties, which pressed their national governments. For instance, in Britain a movement of solidarity with Chile developed in close ties with the Labour party.\textsuperscript{27} In the European Parliament, socialists promoted questions, resolutions and the envoy of a mission to Chile.\textsuperscript{28} The former President of the EC Commission Sicco Mansholt was personally concerned with Chile, which he visited as leader of the Socialist International, an event which «deeply shocked» him.\textsuperscript{29} Trade unions organizations also appealed to the EC in order for it to take initiatives.\textsuperscript{30}

In order to respond to third countries’ pressure and the calls of public opinion, and to the personal concern expressed by some European political actors, the EC member states released several public declarations on the Chilean issue, and the European Parliament approved a few resolutions on the subject.\textsuperscript{31} Public declarations were not expected to be very effective in bringing about an actual


\textsuperscript{29} S. Mansholt, Statement at the end of visit to Chile, March 21, 1975, in IISG, Socialist International 264.


improvement of the human rights situation in Chile, but they were more useful for domestic European purposes. For the improvement of the situation in Chile, hopes were put in the exertion of discreet pressure on the Chilean government through confidential diplomatic contacts. For instance, the EC repeatedly addressed Pinochet «ain we Le government chilies use de Clemenceau et suspense execution de sec condamnations à mort et adventuresses condemnations futures.»

Deeming confidential initiatives insufficient, some sectors of European public opinion and the Dutch government called the EC to enforce economic sanctions against Chile. In particular, calls aimed at cutting European provisions of aid to the country. The Community’s aid to Chile at this time mostly consisted of food aid: since it benefited the poorest sectors of the population, the Council of ministers decided not to cut it. However, it decided to channel aid through non-governmental organizations like the churches rather than through the Chilean government itself. The outcome of the discussion on cutting aid to Chile set a blueprint for later Community debates on the use of aid cuts as a sanction against human rights violations in a third country: aid transfers directly benefiting the poorest sections of the population would not be cut, but measures would be taken to ensure that the recipient government did not divert it. A typical method to prevent this from happening was to channel aid through NGOs.

Besides economic sanctions, the EC discussed the opportunity of making symbolic political gestures to signal its concern with the human rights situation in Chile. In particular, the possibility of moving the headquarters of the EC Commission’s representation office in Latin America from Santiago del Chile to another country was discussed. The office was meant to deal with relations with Latin America as a whole and not with Chile as such. The reason why it had been based in Santiago was that a number of Latin American organizations and intergovernmental conferences were hosted there. Given the technical rationale for the Santiago seat, pressures for moving the office for political reasons were initially resisted by Commission officials. Later in the decade, the main headquarters of the EC’s activity in Latin

32 President of the Council of the EC, Message to Pinochet, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3803. See also L. Boselli, Report on visit by the Chilean ambassador, November 6, 1975, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 1056.
America were set in Caracas. The EC Commission made a few other symbolic gestures to signal its concern. For instance, several high-level meetings were held between commissioners and leaders of the Chilean opposition, often at the encouragement of the EC Commission’s itself.36

The EC took a few common measures to signal its concern with the human rights situation in Chile. However, adopted measures were clearly disproportionately small with regard to the alleged concern of the EC member states. The Chilean situation was not thoroughly discussed in the EPC framework, thus adopted measures mainly concerned the Community. In this regard, their modesty was less apparent and in fact they were quite remarkable. Never before had the Community discussed the use of aid sanctions for human rights reasons, nor had it modified its aid policies to address human rights issues. The Commission took quite explicit political positions with regard to Chile, which could hardly be justified with the mere pursuit of its technical and economic tasks. It is remarkable that member states like France did not protest against the Commission making explicitly political gestures, such as meeting the leaders of the opposition.

Distancing itself from white minority rule in Austral Africa

During the 1970s, the situation in a number of Austral African countries sparked international concern. There were the Portuguese colonies fighting for independence first and then struggling to overcome deep internal divisions and heavy foreign interferences. There was South Africa with its domestic apartheid regime and with its aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbors. There was the ongoing crisis in Rhodesia, where a white minority government defied internal opposition and widespread external criticism. Some of these issues

were not altogether new, but they acquired new salience in the 1970s. In respect to them, the EC tried to assert an image of itself as a supporter of the independence of the African peoples and as an opponent of racial discrimination.

There were three main reasons why the EC actors deemed it important to project an image of the EC as an actor having progressive positions on Austral African issues. Firstly, these issues attracted increasing international attention. African and developing countries were seriously concerned with them, and they looked at the EC’s attitude towards these issues as a crucial test for the EC’s international profile and for its credibility. Secondly, the Soviet Union was asserting itself as a supporter of the struggles of the Austral African liberation movements, seeking «d’assumer la direction de l’Afrique progressiste.» As long as Western countries' positions on the Austral African issues remained timid, the Soviet influence in the area could further increase, directly challenging the West: «Il fallait veiller à ce que l’URSS et Cuba n’apparaissent pas comme les défenseurs de l’Afrique contre le colonialisme. Les Neuf devraient se ranger délibérément du coté de l’indépendance des Africains.» Finally, if the EC was too timid or conservative on Austral African issues, it risked wasting the capital of credibility that it had gained among African countries thanks to its engagement in development cooperation. For this reason, officials of the EC Commission deliberately tried to link support to African regionalism, promotion of development and support to the struggle of the liberation movements in Austral Africa. For instance, the adjoint director-general of DG VIII Maurice Foley promoted the establishment of the South African Development Coordination Conference.

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40 On Foley, see p. 136n.

In order to assert itself as a supporter and as a trustworthy partner of the African peoples, the EC deployed a number of initiatives during the 1970s. A series of joint declarations on Austral African issues were released by the EPC and by the European Council, spanning from Angolan independence and war to the settlement of the Rhodesian problem, and from the apartheid policies to the status of Namibia. The EPC made strong efforts to follow up joint declarations with consistent voting behavior at the UN. The release of declarations was often followed by the promotion of confidential diplomatic contacts, especially with the South African government. Besides purely verbal initiatives, the EC provided some aid to the victims of apartheid, to South Africa's neighboring countries and to some liberation movements active in the region. This aid was seen as the price for the EC to pay «pour assurer sa présence en Afrique australe et en même temps sauvegarder ses intérêts politiques et économiques.»

Most of the efforts focused on exerting pressure on the South African government, which was involved in almost all of the issues affecting Austral Africa. In order to exert pressure on it, the EC observed the arms embargo approved by the UN and introduced some additional sanctions, such as restraints on South Africa's sporting and cultural contacts with Europe. The most salient EC initiative against apartheid was the establishment of a code of conduct for the European companies which were active in South Africa. The code was largely inspired to the code of conduct approved by the British government in 1974, and it was aimed at de facto overcoming some apartheid

42 See for instance Council of the EC, Message to the UN Secretary General on the occasion of Namibia Day, August 26, 1975, in NA, FCO 58/897; EC foreign ministers, Declaration on Angola, February 23, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, Portugal, 3522; EPC presidency, Common statement at the UN conference against apartheid, July 27, 1977, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4149; EPC presidency, Common statement at the UN conference to combat racism and racial discrimination, August 15, 1978, in ACCE, BAC 48/1984 129.


practices. The adoption of an EC code was proposed by Britain in July 1977 and the code was approved by the EPC in September 1977. The main reason for the speed with which the code was adopted was the risk of the EC appearing as too mild a critic of apartheid, at a time when Soweto riots were taking place, the UN was holding a conference against apartheid, and the US were strengthening their measures against apartheid. The implementation of the code was only assigned to the individual member states and it was far from perfect.

The set of verbal, economic and legal initiatives adopted by the EC tried to convey an image of the EC as an opponent of South African policies, of white minority rule in Austral Africa, and of external interferences in Angola and Namibia. Apartheid was deemed as «parfaitement étrangère à l’esprit de notre temps» and as an «insulte à la dignité de l’homme.» According to the EC commissioner Claude Cheysson, the struggle in Austral Africa was «le même que celui que nous avons mené il y a trente ans»: it was a fight for human dignity and for the basic values praised by Europe.

Despite the EC’s efforts to assert itself as a supporter of the independence of African peoples and as an opponent of racial discrimination, EC initiatives were falling short of the demands made by the African countries and by some European pressure groups. The EC member states continued to recognize the South African government as legitimate, opposing its expulsion from the UN and denying support to the African National Congress. The EC did not break economic relations with South Africa: with the Community

48 Ibid., p. 32.
49 French delegation to the UN, Projet d’intervention sur l’Afrique du Sud, October 30, 1974, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, EPC, Problèmes africains.
50 EPC presidency, Common statement at the UN conference against apartheid, July 27, 1977, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4149.
51 Cheysson, Message aux journées d’études sur l’apartheid, April 6, 1978, in PAAA, B 200, 121849.
52 EPC presidency, Report on meeting of working groups on Africa and the UN, June 28, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, EPC, Groupes d’experts Afrique.
accounting for half of South-African foreign trade volume and for more than a half of the foreign investments in South Africa, trade sanctions by the EC would have exerted a very strong pressure on its government but they would have been costly for Europe as well.\textsuperscript{53} Limits on the EC's willingness to meet demands for forceful initiatives in favor of African peoples were largely due to the strong material interests held by some member states in the region. Moreover, the EC could not strain excessively its relations with South Africa because its regional influence made dialogue with South Africa necessary in order to bring ongoing negotiations on Angolan, Namibian and Rhodesian issues to a satisfactory end.\textsuperscript{54} In order not to alienate the South African government, most of the EC initiatives in fact paid only a limited attention to the domestic apartheid policies and rather focused on the more general Austral African issues.

The constraints on the EC's initiatives on Austral Africa

The set of initiatives taken by the EC in order to promote independence and fight racism in Austral Africa were less the result of a shared European approach to the issues concerned than the result of a compromise between divergent approaches by the different EC actors involved. The EC member states were pursuing different lines on the Austral African issues, and divisions between them made it difficult to agree on common initiatives and to project a coherent image of the overall EC's stance on Austral African problems. To be sure, problems affecting Austral Africa during the 1970s were extremely complex and even single states struggled to define coherent and effective policies towards them. The attempt at coordinating EC member states' policies towards them was possibly over-ambitious, and in any case its main outcome was a mere set of statements, declarations, and démarches.

Some member states were calling for the adoption by the EC of very


stringent measures against South African policies. Such member states were Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and often Italy as well: these countries did not have significant material interests in Austral Africa, while they had some influential domestic pressure groups calling for the adoption of strong measures. These countries were calling for comprehensive trade sanctions against South Africa, for a sharp reduction of European contacts with it, and for the adoption of much more public initiatives by the EC. They were giving substantial support to African liberation movements and they regularly voted differently from their EC partners in the UN votes on Austral African issues.

Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands were deemed «dogmatic to the forward, moralistic position on apartheid.» In fact, their EC partners accused them of being more interested in improving their own image on the international stage than in effectively bringing about real change in Austral Africa. As a French diplomat noticed,

Pour les Irlandais et les Danois, soutenus pas les Italiens et les Hollandais, il faut que les Neuf prennent à l'égard de l'Afrique du Sud des initiatives dans le seul but d'afficher leur hostilité à l'apartheid, et cela indépendamment des événements qui peuvent survenir [...] Il s'agit de leur part d'une attitude de principe qui, du reste, se justifie plus par le désir de manifester leur intérêt pour la défense des droits de l'homme et d'afficher des positions “anticolonialistes” que par le souci de provoquer des changements réels.

Britain, France and Germany had a much more prudent position with regard to Austral Africa, and to South Africa in particular. They had significant economic interests there: South Africa was an important


57 Kvale Svenbalrud, «Apartheid and NATO,» p. 756.

market for some European industries and it was an important supplier of commodities, providing, for instance, 35 percent of the EC's uranium imports. Britain, France and Germany would have borne by far most of the costs of any economic sanctions: according to British estimates, a universal trade embargo against South Africa could cost Britain 1 percent of GDP. Besides economic interests, these countries had geopolitical concerns as well, especially regarding shipping routes and the Soviet influence in the region.

There is reason to believe in the sincerity of the British, French and German commitment to a change of South African policies. Moral considerations aside, the costs of preserving white minority rule were expected to grow increasingly over time and to eventually become untenable. The weight and relevance of black Africa was expected to grow as well, so that

if it came to an either/or choice, the balance of economic advantage for the United Kingdom would seem to lie in black rather than white Africa and the passage of time seems likely to tip the balance further in this direction.

The adoption of European initiatives for a change of South African policies would also be useful since they would help «to remove the causes of further communist opportunism.» Britain, France and Germany sought gradual and negotiated change in Austral Africa, in order to ensure the preservation of political and economic stability. For this reason, they opposed the adoption of a confrontational stance as demanded by their EC partners. They


opposed the break of diplomatic relations with South Africa and they gave only limited support to liberation movements. They opposed the adoption of public EC initiatives, which may well win some support among the African countries but which were likely to cause a hardening of the South African line. They opposed the adoption of trade sanctions, which were deemed counterproductive since they would make the South-African government close their ranks and they would foster instability. However sensible such a prudent stance might have been, the problem with its adoption was that it «donnait l'impression de défendre les minorités blanches.»

Some difference set France apart from Britain in terms of its approach to Austral African issues. Britain overall favored defining a common EC position and it actively promoted its elaboration. For instance, Britain sought cooperation with the EC partners on Rhodesia and it proposed common initiatives such as the deployment of a European mission to Namibia. This attitude stemmed both from a general British favor towards the EPC and from the awareness of the particular exposure of Britain in Austral Africa. On the contrary, France was wary of cooperating with the partners. It opposed the release of some joint declarations, the deployment of common missions, the joint recognition of Angola, and so on. The main French fear was that the definition of a common European policy on Austral Africa could lead to the definition of a common European policy on Africa as a

64 French embassy in Bonn, Note on Ogbu’s visit to Bonn, August 30, 1973, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, RFA, 2985.
whole, which was not regarded as a desirable development.\footnote{C. Martin (cabinet of de Guiringaud), Brief for meeting of the EC foreign ministers, October 3, 1977, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4149.}

Seventy resolutions on apartheid were voted on at the UN between 1973 and 1980: the EC member states voted in unison only 17 times.\footnote{Holland, \textit{The EC and South Africa}, p. 69.} Because of the deep divisions between EC member states on the Austral African issues, most of the efforts were directed at «achieving the minimum of divergence of views among the Nine, rather than a joint policy.»\footnote{N. J. Thorpe (FCO, Central and Southern Africa), Note on coordination of the policies of the Nine at the 33rd UN General Assembly, April 1978, in NA, FCO 58/1286.} As a result, much energy was spent on reaching outcomes which were not very incisive. Even when common initiatives could be agreed upon, they were often «insufficiently robust in substance and insipid in tone,»\footnote{R. J. Dalton, Note on the Community coordination on Namibia, December 21, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/977.} and they lacked the large political support that was vital to nurture them. Because of their compromised character, no member state was ready to strongly defend such initiatives from the criticisms that they received from the African countries on one side and from South Africa on the other side.

Even when it was possible to reach common positions in the EPC, the EC member states often broke with them, either by adopting stronger bilateral initiatives or by withdrawing from the common initiatives themselves.\footnote{MAEF, Europe occidentale, Report on EPC meeting on Austral Africa, May 5, 1976, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3794.} In order to cover the differences between member states, quite strong rhetorical positions were taken, complementing the weak character of common initiatives. However, this strategy was not very effective, since it further exposed the EC to criticisms of incoherence between its words and deeds. As a result, the EC failed to convey a clear idea of its position on Austral African issues. While a general orientation in favor of multiracialism and independence could be discerned, there were too many nuances, making it hard to discern the European position on more specific aspects of the issues at stake.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Martin1977} C. Martin (cabinet of de Guiringaud), Brief for meeting of the EC foreign ministers, October 3, 1977, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4149.
\bibitem{Holland1979} Holland, \textit{The EC and South Africa}, p. 69.
\bibitem{Thorpe1978} N. J. Thorpe (FCO, Central and Southern Africa), Note on coordination of the policies of the Nine at the 33rd UN General Assembly, April 1978, in NA, FCO 58/1286.
\end{thebibliography}
The EC taking the offensive on human rights

In the cases of Portugal, Chile and South Africa, the EC was mostly confined to a defensive position on human rights. Since these countries belonged to the West, the EC had some links with them, and third countries and sectors of the European public opinion continued to attack such links. Even if criticism focused mostly on rogue Western countries, violations of human rights occurred in a number of developing countries as well. Open criticism of them by the EC was hindered by some obstacles, however. Developing countries would have attacked European criticism as an attempt to interfere with their internal affairs. They would have argued that observance of some human rights was a luxury that countries affected by basic social and economic problems could not yet afford. Moreover, European criticism concerning political rights would have spurred demands for a stronger European engagement for the promotion of economic rights, but the EC member states were not much willing to grant it.  

Despite these obstacles, in the late 1970s the EC adopted an offensive stance on human rights. The EC kept quite a prudent attitude towards human rights violations occurring in Soviet bloc countries, and it rather focused on violations occurring in developing countries. The adoption of a more offensive stance on human rights was largely a reaction to the shift in the US human rights policy promoted by the Carter administration. Human rights promotion had not been a primary goal for the previous administrations, and Henry Kissinger was extremely skeptical about it. Despite the prudent and tentative character of the EC engagement in favor of human rights, in early 1976 it was possible for EC diplomats to claim that «Western delegations as a whole now look to the Nine for a lead on the entire range of human rights questions.» Since January 1977, Carter turned human rights into a focal item on the US foreign policy agenda – in words if not in deeds. A human rights bureau and a human rights committee were created, and the US decided to cut aid and military cooperation to some gross human rights violators; now it was the EC that had to catch up with

76 D. Williams (Ministry for overseas development), Note on human rights and aid, July 12, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/1010.
77 British delegation to the UN, Note on human rights at the UN, May 3, 1976, in NA, FCO 58/1009.
78 The human rights bureau had been created during the Ford administration because of Congressional pressure. As Barbara Keys shows, the bureau was initially meant to be a mere “cosmetic gesture” however (Keys, «Congress,
the American activism on human rights.

Together with the shift in the American foreign policy, the adoption of an offensive stance on human rights by the EC in the late 1970s was also linked with the constantly increasing concern with human rights among European public opinion. The pressure exerted on the Community by NGOs and individual citizens grew to such an extent that in 1978 the EC Commission had to establish a standing ad hoc group to answer their appeals and enquiries on humanitarian questions. The European Parliament also focused a great deal on human rights issues, to the extent that between 1973 and 1979 it approved as many as 530 resolutions concerning them. MEPs frequently posed questions concerning human rights issues with regard to an extremely large range of world countries. Human rights were seen by the Parliament as a useful issue to focus upon in order to strengthen its own authority and legitimacy. The Parliament sought to assert itself as «the forum which best stood for European values» and as «the conscience and the critical voice of Europe.» While the Parliament was only partly successful in asserting itself in such a way, its pressure on human rights issues was quite successful and it managed to place and keep human rights on the EC’s agenda.

The adoption of a proactive stance on human rights by the EC was promoted also by the British government. It was the British foreign minister David Owen in particular who stressed the importance of human rights, to the extent that he published a book about the issue in 1978, in which he argued that «a concern for human rights should permeate our whole foreign policy.» However, human rights were to


79 EC Commission, General secretariat, Compte rendu de la première réunion du Groupe inter-services chargé d’examiner les réponses à donner aux lettres émanant d’organisation à but humanitaire, December 6, 1978, in HAEU, EN 298.


83 Owen, Human Rights, p. 2.
become only one among many factors determining foreign policy – in fact, they were likely to remain «a very minor factor.» 84 Other EC member states such as the Netherlands and Denmark were strongly concerned with human rights as well, but they were not much interested in dealing with them at the EC level, since they were aware that cooperation would probably constrain and dilute their relatively radical stances on the subject. Finally, the adoption of a proactive stance on human rights was promoted by the engagement of some prominent Community figures such as the President of the EC Commission Roy Jenkins and the EC commissioner for external relations Wilhelm Haferkamp. Haferkamp described himself as a convinced supporter of Amnesty International, and close relations existed between Amnesty and his cabinet and the Commission’s directorate-general for external relations. 85

To a large extent, the adoption of a proactive stance on human rights by the EC was connected with the perceived need to define its traits as an international actor. Commitment to human rights would help to give purpose to the EC's international activity and it would reinforce the image of a «force for good» that the EC had been trying to assert in the previous years, especially with its initiatives towards the developing countries. Asserting itself as an actor supporting freedom, democracy and the underdog, the EC sought to win the hearts of domestic and international public opinion. 86 However desirable the EC's initiatives on human rights might have been, there were few cases where human rights violations could be raised without putting the interests of some EC member states at stake. 87 The asymmetry in member states' interests and links with third countries made it difficult to agree on cases to target for proactive initiatives. In particular, the French government was wary of discussing the human rights situation of developing countries with its EC partners, since the situation in a few former French colonies was extremely negative. France dismissed the usefulness of the «démarches platoniques» of EPC and argued that it was up to the UN, not to the EC, to judge on internal political

In order to isolate the pursuit of human rights violations from political considerations, in 1976 the German government proposed to its EC partners to promote the establishment of an International Court of Human Rights, on the model of the European Court.\textsuperscript{89} An independent international court could help governments to avoid difficult choices of priority between divergent foreign policy goals. Moreover, an independent international court could focus on human rights violations occurring in the Soviet countries and in the developing ones attracting limited criticism, and as consequence these countries would exert less pressures on the West. Even if the German proposal was admittedly a proposal for the long-term, it was received with «the greatest skepticism» by the other EC member states and it was rapidly shelved.\textsuperscript{90}

EC initiatives for proactive human rights promotion in third countries followed a double strategy. On the one hand, a focus would be put on a few rogue states and direct pressures would be exerted upon them. Single country cases would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and close attention would be paid to the worst human rights offenders. On the other hand, EC efforts would mainly focus on improving the general international atmosphere, spreading awareness for human rights and trying to gradually turn their respect into a widespread international norm. In 1977 the EC member states agreed on drafting a general annual EPC report on human rights.\textsuperscript{91} EC ambassadors in third countries were required to provide a regular assessment of the human rights situation in their host countries.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{88} MAEF, Amérique, Note sur les droits de l'homme en Amérique Latine, April 4, 1978, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 4087.

\textsuperscript{89} Auswärtige Amt, Note sur la création d'une Cour internationale des droits de l'homme, August 20, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/209.

\textsuperscript{90} FCO, United Nations, Report on meeting of the UN experts group, August 27, 1976, in NA, FCO 98/210.


The inclusion of human rights in the Lomé Convention

It was mainly in the field of the Community’s development cooperation policies that the EC adopted a proactive stance on human rights in the late 1970s. The provision of the Community’s development aid to countries grossly violating human rights came increasingly under fire in the EC. Concern was expressed in the media, in the parliaments and by pressure groups such as the European Movement and Amnesty International.93 British public opinion was particularly wary of the possibility that European public money could be diverted by third governments violating human rights, or that the concession of aid could by hailed by such governments as a sign of political approval of their actions by the EC.94 Calls were made to tie the provision of aid to a country to its human rights performance. However, developmental experts argued that aid cuts would cause project disruptions and financial waste, would probably be ineffective, would certainly harm the poor, and they could lead to attach other strings to aid.95 Developmental experts rather suggested positive conditionality, but these proposals were met with little success.96

It was with reference to Uganda that the issue of the provision of aid to a country where human rights were violated was first discussed at the Community level. The Ugandan government led by Idi Amin Dada was effectively committing patent gross violations of fundamental human rights. As a signatory of the Lomé Convention, Uganda was a recipient of Community aid. Since the Lomé Convention did not allow the suspension of aid for political reasons, the British government

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reacted to domestic pressures concerning Uganda by asking the EC Commission to reduce and delay aid to Uganda as much as possible.\footnote{The only legal option available was outright denunciation of the Convention, which was not deemed desirable.} Aid was indeed heavily delayed, so that by March 1977 only 0.2 percent of the available funds had been spent.\footnote{A. Young-Anawaty, «Human rights and the ACP–EEC Lomé II Convention: Business as usual at the EEC,» in New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 13 (63), 1980, p. 65n.} On June 21, 1977 the Council of ministers approved the so-called Uganda guidelines. According to this decision, the Council would take steps «to ensure that any assistance given by the Community to Uganda does not in any way have as its effect a reinforcement or prolongation of the denial of basic human rights to its people.»\footnote{Council of the EC, Uganda guidelines, June 21, 1977, in NA, FCO 98/604.}

The decision to reduce and delay aid to Uganda because of its poor human rights performance was the very first instance of use of aid cuts as a political sanction by the Community. Similar de facto suspension of aid for human rights reasons was decided with regard to Equatorial Guinea in 1978, the Central African Republic in 1979 and Liberia in 1980.\footnote{Arts, Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation, p. 324; K. Arts, «European Community development cooperation, human rights, democracy and good governance: At odds or at ease with each other?,» in Sustainable Development and Good Governance, ed. K. Ginther, E. Denters, and P. De Waart (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 267–268.} Delays in aid provision did express the EC’s concern with human rights violations, but they were contingent solutions resting on weak legal grounds.\footnote{FCO, Note on human rights and difficulties caused by current practice, June 1978, in NA, FCO 98/331.} In order to codify the possibility of cutting aid in case of gross human rights violations, the British government called for the inclusion of human rights provisions in the new Lomé Convention, which was due to be renewed in 1979. According to the British proposal, the new Convention should include a reference to human rights in the preamble and an operational clause allowing the reduction or suspension of aid to a country in case of gross and persistent violations of human rights.\footnote{M. Jenkins (FCO, European integration – external), Note on the Lomé renegotiation, February 22, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/330; FCO, Note on human rights and the Lomé Convention, March 3, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/330.} The inclusion of human rights in the new Lomé Convention was described by the British government as «one of
our main aims»103 in the negotiations.

When the EEC–ACP Joint Committee met in Maseru in June 1977, it reached a general agreement for the inclusion of some reference to human rights in the new Convention.104 However, despite the open attitude of some ACP countries, in the following months the ACP group came to oppose the inclusion of human rights in the new Convention.105 Their opposition to any operational clause was strict, while their attitude remained slightly more open to the inclusion of a general reference in the preamble.106 They claimed that the Convention should have a merely economic character and that the Community should not interfere with the internal affairs of the ACP countries. Even if some ACP states did criticize human rights violations committed by their partners, «when others outside Africa took this question up, the automatic African reaction was to close ranks.»107

Besides the ACP opposition, the inclusion of a human rights provision in the new Convention was hindered by the opposition of France and Germany to it. France claimed that the provision would be regarded as interference by the ACP countries, and France itself had no desire to let its EC partners interfere with its African policy.108 While the French government opposed both the inclusion of an operational clause and of a reference to human rights in the preamble, Germany could envisage the latter.109 Germany worried that a worsening of the EC’s relations with the ACP countries could lead to an expansion of the

103 F. Judd (FCO, Minister of state), Note on the renegotiation of Lomé, March 8, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/330.
Soviet influence on it. Most of all, the German wariness was due to the counterparts that the ACP countries could demand in exchange for the inclusion of a human rights provision: they could increase their pressure on Austral African issues and advance demands for the promotion of economic rights and on the treatment of their nationals migrated to the EC.\textsuperscript{110} Also, most of the other EC member states opposed the inclusion of an operational clause on human rights in the new Convention. Only the Netherlands supported the British proposal, but domestic political reasons made the Dutch support not very strong and effective.\textsuperscript{111}

Britain insisted that «only an operative provision in the Convention would give the Community a totally watertight position.»\textsuperscript{112} However, in the memorandum for the negotiation of the new Convention the EC Commission proposed to include a reference to human rights in the preamble and to release a unilateral declaration on them, but it did not envisage the inclusion of an operational clause.\textsuperscript{113} The Commission did not expect such a clause to be acceptable to the ACP states, and it was keen to preserve the security and stability of the Lomé trade and aid provisions. Moreover, according to the Commission in case of human

\begin{itemize}
\item C. R. Budd (FCO, European integration – external), Note on the Lomé renegotiation, November 14, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/333; J. A. Shepherd (British embassy in the Netherlands), Note on Lomé II, March 9, 1979, in NA, FCO 98/614.
\end{itemize
rights violations aid should not be suspended, but it should rather be provided according to special criteria and by special means, as it had been decided for Chile. The Commission proposed to tie aid not to human rights, but to the observance of some norms on working conditions identified by the International Labour Organization. The proposal was opposed by Britain since it undermined its bid for human rights, but it was also received with little enthusiasm by the other member states.\textsuperscript{114}

Even if the Commission did not endorse the British proposal for the establishment of a formal link between aid provision and respect of human rights, it was active in establishing an informal link between them: it was largely due to an autonomous Commission's initiative that Community aid to some central African countries was suspended in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{115} Despite its attachment to the human rights issues, the European Parliament failed to exert any strong pressure on human rights during the renegotiation of the Lomé Convention. The main reason for this was that the Parliament was divided on the establishment of a link between aid and human rights.\textsuperscript{116} Especially because of the socialists' pressure, the Parliament expressed serious doubts on the use of aid cuts as an instrument for the promotion of political goals.\textsuperscript{117}

In June 1978 the EC foreign ministers agreed that a general reference to human rights should be included in the preamble of the new Lomé Convention. Britain did not manage to overcome its isolation on the inclusion of an operational clause in the Convention: what the ministers could agree in June 1979 was to take an internal Community decision to use aid for objectives consistent with human rights.\textsuperscript{118} According to the internal decision adopted by the Council on November 20, 1979, in case

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} G. E. FitzHerbert (FCO, European integration – external), Note on the Commission proposal on working conditions, February 7, 1979, in NA, FCO 98/614.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Arts, Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation, p. 324.
\item \textsuperscript{116} European Liberals and Democrats, Resolution on the Lomé Convention, December 2, 1978, in NA, FCO 98/334; European Parliament, Committee for social affairs, Parere sulla comunicazione della Commissione sulla cooperazione allo sviluppo e il rispetto di talune norme internazionali in materia di condizioni di lavoro, April 4, 1979, in HAEU, PE0 2955.
\item \textsuperscript{117} European Parliament, Committee for development and cooperation, Relazione sulla comunicazione della Commissione sulla cooperazione allo sviluppo e il rispetto di talune norme internazionali in materia di condizioni di lavoro (rapp. K. Nyborg), May 2, 1979, in HAEU, PE0 2955.
\end{itemize}
of consistent denial of the dignity of man the Community would «consider the necessary action.»\textsuperscript{119} Despite British efforts, not even in an internal decision could an explicit link be established between aid provision and the respect of human rights.

\textbf{Human rights and the assertion of the EC as a distinctive actor}

EC engagement in favor of human rights begun as a reaction to the pressures exerted by third countries and European civil society with regard to the human rights violations committed by Western countries like Portugal, South Africa and Chile. In the second half of the 1970s the EC turned to a more offensive and proactive policy of human rights promotion, addressing human rights violations occurring in developing countries and approving sanctions against them. It is highly significant that this shift started before the accession of Carter to the US presidency. The strengthening of the EC policy on human rights was not merely a reaction to the strengthening of the American one, even though the latter contributed to reinforce the EC's drive towards a more assertive policy in the late 1970s.

An important role in the promotion of the EC's engagement in favor of human rights was played by European public opinion and by civil society actors. Direct contacts were established between the Community institutions and civil society actors such as Amnesty International. It was the first case where NGOs, movements and citizens managed to exert a strong influence on some EC's external policies. It was also the first case where the European Parliament managed to exert such an influence. However, governments continued to play a crucial role in the making of the EC's external policies: pressures from below could exert an influence especially when a government decided to back them. The context of domestic political situation and individual agency played an important role in this respect, as the examples of the Netherlands and Britain showed.

While a clear shift in favor of human rights concerns could be

\textsuperscript{118} British delegation to the EC, Report on the ACP/EEC negotiating conference, June 27, 1979, in NA, FCO 98/615.

\textsuperscript{119} Council of the EC, Decision on the Lomé Convention, November 20, 1979, in NA, FCO 98/615.
detected in the EC’s discourse, at the level of actual policies the shift was much more blurred. A clear cleavage existed between rhetoric and deeds. Actual results were particularly poor in the cases of Portugal and of Austral Africa. Despite their poverty, policies implemented in the case of Chile were relevant because they were the first case where aid was diverted out of human rights concerns. Building upon this experience, aid cuts were used as a sanction in Uganda and other African countries: even though negative conditionality could not enter the Second Lomé Convention, it was established as a strategy that was possible to use. The EC member states could reach agreement only on a limited number of initiatives, mainly because they had divergent interests in the targeted countries. Since agreement on initiatives was often the result of difficult compromises between these divergent interests, initiatives were often timid and uncertain, and no member state was ready to defend them strongly.

To some extent, improvement of the human rights situation in third countries was a marginal goal of the EC’s human rights policies themselves. These policies should not be seen as the expression of a shared moral code or even of a European identity, but rather as part of an attempt to build and assert an EC’s international identity. The instrumental character of the EC’s engagement with human rights is made quite clear by the mismatch between rhetoric statements and actual policies. The EC actors did not promote human rights in third countries as a way «to realize their principled beliefs,» but rather to respond to domestic and external pressure and to contribute to the assertion of the EC as a distinctive international actor.

As Jack Donnelly argues, one of the main reasons why states pursue human rights in foreign policy is that «human rights are important to national identity.» According to David Chandler, «an interventionist ethical foreign policy can be a powerful mechanism for generating a sense of political purpose and mission.» Ethical foreign policy provides «a sense of self-identity, purpose and self-belief,» which was precisely what the EC was seeking in the 1970s. It is not by chance that the EC started to express concern with human rights at the same time

120 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, p. 42.
123 Ibid., p. 300.
as it sought to assert itself as an international actor: to identify with original, “trendy” causes could be a strategy for the EC to heighten and differentiate its profile as such.
Conclusions

The establishment of the EC as an international actor

The argument of this thesis has been that the EC's international activity underwent a major qualitative change in the 1970s, leading to the assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive international actor. The goal of this dissertation was not to prove that the EC developed a single common foreign policy, that it turned into a unitary cohesive political actor, or that it became a full-fledged global power. None of these things happened. The goal of this dissertation was instead to prove that some significant steps were taken during the 1970s towards the strengthening of the EC's international activity. The EC was established as a political international actor, that is to say it became something more than a loose set of countries sharing some economic arrangements and interests as it was until the late 1960s. This outcome was the result of a thorough process of reassessment of Western Europe's role in a changing, globalizing world.

Achievements and shortcomings of the EC as an international actor must be assessed in a reasonable way. It is not reasonable to assess them by comparing the international activity of the EC to that of the US or of one of the European powers. The EC was not a state and it was not bound to become one, despite the federalists' rhetoric and efforts. It is not realistic to assess the achievements of the EC's international activity by adopting as a benchmark the excessively high expectations held by many towards it. Its establishment and development was an extremely complex and difficult process: it was difficult to agree on common action in international affairs by many different states with partly divergent interests and with different political cultures. It was all the more difficult to do so in a context like the one of the 1970s, which was troubled by a deep multi-dimensional crisis. In retrospect, it is striking that the EC managed not to fall apart during that period, and it is remarkable that it actually managed to proceed towards a form of political integration.
To notice the progress made towards political integration should not lead us to overlook the serious limits and flaws that affected the EC’s international activity. The range of action available to it was quite seriously constrained by the member states' unwillingness to coordinate policies in some domains and by their willingness to coordinate some policies at the level of the West rather than at the EC level. Member states preserved quite a considerable room for their own independent activity in international affairs, somehow competing with the EC and with its attempt to speak with a single voice. Even in the fields where the EC was able to act, its activity was not always effective. These flaws were partly due to the weaknesses of the institutional structure managing the EC’s international activity, with the inefficient separation between Community and EPC branches. Flaws were partly due to the vague principles and ambiguous vision guiding the EC’s international activity, which resulted from fragile compromises between divergent conceptions or interests held by the member states.

Despite these limits, I do argue that the EC was established as a distinct international actor during the 1970s. The Community greatly increased its ability to act on the international stage, not only at the regional level but also at the global one. Its competences were broadened, its institutional structure was strengthened, means were endowed to it for the expression of a single voice, and its political profile was heightened. Some relevant policies and initiatives could be agreed upon, and a discourse could be shaped on the EC’s international role and profile. The member states started to coordinate on international affairs outside the Community framework, and the EPC system made it possible for them to reach common positions on quite a large number of international issues. The international profile of the EC was further heightened by the European Council’s activity, which contributed to assert its presence on the international stage.

The need to consider both the Community and the EPC

Scholars and observers often dismiss the import of the EC’s international activity. Their judgements are sometimes drawn from a prevalent focus on “high politics” matters. The Community had little possibility to act in these fields; the EPC could act, but it tended to find it difficult to do so effectively. The EPC had a promising start in the early 1970s but then it was not always successful in living up to the
high expectations held towards it. As it was noticed already at the time, «histologist [...] de la cooperation politicize, accumulate lech occasions per dues, lech démarches vanes, et un certain herbalism.»¹ It is possible to make a more balanced and accurate assessment of the achievements and shortcomings of the EC’s international activity by also taking into consideration “low politics” matters, by way of looking at the whole picture of the EC’s international activity. In contrast to the somehow disappointing trajectory of the EPC, most of the external policies of the Community grew considerably both in effectiveness and scope during the 1970s.

Some of the literature on European integration suggests that the EC tried to assert itself as an international actor in the early 1970s, but the EC drastically retrenched its ambitions as early as in 1974, as a consequence of American pressure and of the energy and economic crisis. Daniel Slick’s study on the EPC is the clearest expression of this interpretation.² This interpretation rests on the adoption of a narrow perspective, since it rests on an analysis of the EPC alone and on a focus on the short-term which magnifies the ambitions held by the EC during the Year of Europe and the disenchantment experienced by it in 1974. Looking at the whole picture of the EC’s international activity and adopting a more long-term perspective, a different interpretation emerges.

The 1973–74 period was clearly a turning point for the EC’s international activity. However, unlike how Möckli perceives it, I see it as a beginning point for it rather than its ending point. The 1969–73 period was not the period when the EC was able to act on the international stage. In fact, it was a formative period for the EC’s international activity, when a rough image of the EC as an international actor was being sketched. The EC’s international activity was very much an endeavor in the making, with relatively vague traits and general ambitions. Most of the debates in those early years were somehow inward-looking: they focused mostly on structures, procedures and institutions internal to the EC. The EC itself was undergoing significant changes, with the decisions taken in The Hague and Paris summits and with the entry of Britain into it.

The 1973–74 crisis tested the EC’s project of political integration. As a result, traits and ambitions of the EC’s international activity were

¹ MAEF, Europe occidentale, Note sur cinq années de CPE, June 18, 1975, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3785.
defined much more clearly. This definition did certainly imply a diminution of the initial ambitions of the EPC, but it did not bring about the end of the EC's international activity. On the contrary, it brought about its proper beginning. Key elements of the EC as an international actor could be defined: the European Council was established, the EC became a recognizable player at the UN, and it obtained recognition from the Soviet bloc and from China. The transatlantic crisis greatly contributed to defining the limits of the room available to the EC and of its range of action: these limits were narrower than anticipated by the EC leaders in the early 1970s, but their clarification invited the EC not to embark on unrealistic and divisive projects. Moreover, the division of labor with the US contributed to the definition and projection of a distinctive “civilian” profile for the EC as an international actor, which could be articulated quite successfully at the CSCE, in Lomé, and at the CIEC.

To look at both the Community and the EPC dimensions of the EC's international activity is important not only to give a balanced assessment of its achievements and shortcomings, but also to appreciate the real divide affecting the EC's international activity. To be sure, the divide between the Community and the EPC was important in institutional and procedural terms, and it had an impact on the effectiveness and form of political integration. However, its importance has been overestimated in the literature. The external policies of the Community and the EPC were quite closely complementing and connected with each other, and the gap between them was relatively bridged after the relaxation of the French attitude and the creation of the European Council in 1974–75. Conversely, the existing literature on this topic has tended to underestimate the real divide deeply affecting the EC's international activity, namely the divide between the domains which could be addressed at the EC level and the domains which could not.

As I have shown in chapter 3, the EC's international activity was deliberately limited to some domains of international affairs. Member states were not to coordinate and cooperate at the EC level on all the international issues: there were sectors of international affairs which were reserved for national action or strictly bilateral cooperation, there were sectors reserved for cooperation at a European level different than the EC (such as the NATO Eurogroup for instance), and there were sectors reserved for cooperation at a higher level, either with the US or with the West more generally. The acknowledgement of the existence and relevance of this divide leads to a more balanced assessment of the achievements of the EC's international activity. It is clearly legitimate to
criticize the EC's inability to deploy convincing actions in the sectors where it was allowed to act – this inability was certainly present – but it is less sensible to criticize the EC's inability to act in sectors where it was not supposed to act at all.

The paramount role played by the member states

Some recent works on European integration history have stressed the role played by actors other than states in the making of the EC policies, such as the EC Commission, the European Parliament, transnational networks, and so on. The EC Commission played some role in the making of the EC's international activity, especially when its presidents or members were authoritative and eager to assert the Commission's role on the international stage. The Commission was successful in launching some initiatives, in exerting pressure for common action in some fields of international affairs, and in promoting some original ideas for the EC's international activity. The Commission also played a role in seeking compromise between different member states' positions, even though sometimes the Commission's own positions required compromise with the member states. For instance, on development issues the Commission – especially during Manhole's and Acheson's tenures – tended to take very progressive positions that states were unwilling to endorse.

The role of the European Parliament in the EC's international activity was very marginal. The Parliament had the chance to intervene on some issues and exert some influence upon them, mainly as far as trade and development cooperation were concerned. In terms of political impact, the Parliament contributed to the establishment of the

world tier of development cooperation and especially to the adoption of EC initiatives against human rights violations in third countries. While the direct impact of the Parliament was limited in terms of actual policies and initiatives, it played a more important role in the promotion of common European views on international affairs. Debates and works in the Parliament and cooperation between European parties contributed to identify themes, principles, and ideas upon which the EC's international activity could build.

Even if the EC Commission and to a minor extent the European Parliament exerted some influence on the EC's international activity, states, and in particular their governments, clearly played a paramount role. They played a crucial role in the definition and assertion of the EC's international activity, as well as in the making of the EC's policies and initiatives in international affairs. In particular, a central role was played by the national ministries of foreign affairs, both at the level of the minister himself and of the senior officials and diplomats. Senior officials were particularly important to ensure some continuity in the national foreign policy lines. A central role was also played by the heads of state and government of the EC member states, not only because of their influence on the lines adopted by their own governments, but also because crucial decisions for the definition and assertion of the EC's international activity were taken at summit meetings.

Among the member states, France played a particularly significant role. On most of the issues and debates considered in this dissertation, France's position differed from the one of its partners – on the institutional structure for the EC's international activity, on the political role of the Commission, on the relationship between political integration and transatlantic cooperation, and so on. France was at the same time the most vocal advocate of a strong assumption of an international role by the EC and the member state which objected to the strengthening of the EC's international activity the most. France often objected to it precisely because its conception of the EC as an international actor differed strongly from the conception held by most of its partners. For the French government, Community institutions should play a very limited role in the EC's international activity, and such an activity should develop autonomously from the US, while for the other member states it was often the other way round.

Member states played a paramount role in the definition of the EC's international activity, in the assertion of the EC as an international actor, and in the making of the international initiatives and policies of
the EC. The role to be played by the member states was also a central aspect of the definition of the EC's international activity itself. It was a central question for the definition of the range of action available for the EC's international activity and for the definition of the institutional structure for it. States preserved a considerable influence in international affairs because the EC's international activity was largely based on an intergovernmental model, and because they excluded some sectors of international affairs from it. The very establishment of the EC's international activity had been conceived of to enable member states to preserve an international influence, making them more adapted to the undergoing evolution of the international order. The EC's international activity provided member states with a new layer to play with, either to multiply their weight on the international stage or to conceal their positions behind the EC's façade.

**Different conceptions of the EC as an international actor**

In this dissertation I have paid particular attention to the conceptions of the EC as an international actor which underlay its activities. Some of these conceptions were shared by the member states or agreed by them through compromise. For instance, they agreed that the EC was to be not only an economic international actor, but also a political one, and its international activity was to contribute to the deepening of Western European political integration. However, the EC was to act only in some sectors of international affairs: it was desirable that the EC spoke with a single voice sometimes, but it was not desirable that its voice came to be the only voice of Europe on the international stage.

Member states also agreed that the EC was to focus on “civilian” activities on the international stage. The EC's international activity was to be endowed with a distinctive character, or at least it was to be presented as having a distinctive character. It was to stress the virtues of international dialogue and cooperation, and to advocate an overcoming of power politics and bloc confrontation. The EC's international activity was to be aimed at making a distinctive contribution to international relations. It was to promote their domestication, with the establishment and strengthening of multilateral institutions and norms, and with the application of domestic categories to the international relations, such as the notion of the respect for
individual rights, and the drawing of parallels between the working class and the developing countries.

Member states had different and sometimes divergent conceptions with regard to other aspects of the EC's international activity. One major divergence between them regarded the desirable degree of involvement of the Community institutions in the EC's international activity. Some member states advocated a federal evolution for European political integration, while others (especially France) envisaged a confederal evolution. As I showed in chapter 1, divergent member states' conceptions of the long-term evolution of political integration greatly affected the design of the institutional structure for the EC's international activity. Its structure was mainly built along intergovernmental lines due to the French insistence, but also because supporters of the federal model were not always consistent with their rhetoric: no government was in fact too eager to devolve actual powers to the Community institutions.

Another major divergence between member states' conceptions of the EC's international activity regarded its relationship with transatlantic cooperation. Most governments envisaged a pursuit of the EC's international activity in connection with the US and NATO, as a complement and contribution to transatlantic cooperation rather than as an alternative to it. In contrast to this position, France tended to envisage the pursuit of the EC's international activity in juxtaposition to the transatlantic cooperation, or at least in autonomy from it. Its EC partners partially endorsed such a vision during the brief period of European challenge to the US during the Year of Europe, but they moved away from it in early 1974. Even if France continued to oppose the establishment of a too-close relationship between European political integration and transatlantic cooperation, it did not manage to impose its vision and it had to consent to measures such as the Gymnich compromise on preliminary consultation with the US.

France and its EC partners tended to be at odds also with regard to their conception of the focus of the EC's international activity: for France, the EC should mainly focus on the Euro-African region and on the Mediterranean, while the other member states tended to envisage an overcoming of the age-old Euro-African focus, which was closely connected with the colonial legacy. The difference between these two conceptions was particularly evident in the case of the development cooperation policies. As a result of these divergent drives, the EC's international activity was to address all of the world's countries, but it was to retain quite a significant focus on the Mediterranean and on
Africa, through the Mediterranean policy, the Euro-Arab dialogue, the Lomé Convention, and so on.

Finally, member states had different conceptions of the relative weight that values and interests were to have in the EC's international activity. For some member states, especially the small ones, the EC should be a sort of a moral international actor, observing and promoting specific values rather than sheer interests. In particular, countries like the Netherlands argued that the EC should show particular concern with the problems of the developing countries and with human rights. They claimed that value promotion could go as far as to hit some material interests of the EC. For other member states, especially the ones having significant interests in third countries, value promotion should not go so far. This divergence in conception was substantially resolved by the adoption by the EC of a strongly value-oriented rhetoric, which was complemented with much more prosaic and interest-oriented decisions and actions. This strategy was particularly evident in the cases considered in chapters 5 and 6, wherein the EC spoke at length on the need to reform the international order and promote human rights, but it failed to take many actions in reality.

**Reasons for stressing the distinctive character of the EC**

The EC made frequent and consistent efforts to stress its original character as an international actor. It claimed that its approach to international relations was innovative and possibly even pioneering. It continuously stated its ambition to move beyond power politics, towards a system of international relations based on cooperation, dialogue and interdependence. A more balanced and more just international system should be promoted, and the EC was to «faire le bien dans le monde.» As Sophie Huber has put it, «les responsables européens entreprirent de construire une identité politique que l’on pourrait qualifier de volontariste, créative, originale, altruiste et universaliste.» This insistence upon the original, distinctive character

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4 E. Heath’s intervention, Minutes of the Paris Summit, October 19, 1972, in AMAEF, Affaires politiques, CE, 3788.
of the EC's international activity was closely linked to the EC's own narrative of European integration: European integration was supposed to promote a new model of international relations not only between the EC member states, but also between the EC and third countries. This way of framing the EC's activity was largely rhetorical, even though some EC actors were sincerely persuaded by it.

The efforts made by the EC to stress its distinctive and original character as an international actor were not only linked to the EC's narrative of European integration. I argue that the process of assertion of the EC as a distinctive international actor was closely connected with the process of its assertion as a distinct international actor. To stress the original character of its international activity was useful for the EC in order to assert itself as a recognizable actor. The stress put by the EC on values and on its original approach to international affairs was useful to cultivate the division of labor between the EC and its member states in international affairs, and between the EC and the US. It was also useful to make up for some flaws of the EC's ability to act on the international stage.

The stress put on the original character of the EC's international activity was closely connected to the establishment of a division of labor between the EC and the member states. As I have argued, the fundamental division characterizing the EC's international activity was not the one between the Community and the EPC, but the one between the fields inside the range of action of the EC and the ones outside it. This division provided an opportunity for member states to play with the national and EC layers. They could respond to domestic and external pressures for value-oriented initiatives by delegating them to the EC layer. In this way they could claim to be receptive of moral concerns, while at the same time defusing some of the pressure exerted on the national foreign policy and retaining its freedom of action for a more traditional pursuit of material interests.

An example of this strategy was the EC's initiatives for human rights promotion in Austral Africa. At the EC level, a large number of high-profile declarations were released and value-oriented initiatives were launched to respond to the pressure of anti-apartheid movements and of most African countries. Some of their pressure could be defused in such a way, making it easier for member states to continue to cultivate interest-oriented low-profile bilateral relations with South Africa. The possibility of establishing this sort of division of labor and of playing with the EC layer offered an incentive for member states to
promote the assertion of the EC as a distinct and distinctive international actor. At the same time, the importance of the existence of such a division of labor invited states to put some limits on the EC's assertion, in order to preserve room for independent national activity on the international stage.

**The capabilities--expectations trap**

One of the main reasons why the EC repeatedly stressed its distinctive character as an international actor was to rationalize some of its limits and to make up for them. The EC's international activity was clearly hindered by limited capabilities to deploy effective, coherent, and incisive initiatives. To claim a distinctive, original character as an international actor made it possible for the EC to rationalize some limits of its capabilities. For instance, it made it possible to suggest that the EC did not have capabilities to act in the defense field because the EC was simply not interested in power politics. Similarly, it made it possible to suggest that the EC was eager to establish a dialogue with commodity producing countries because it believed in the intrinsic value of dialogue and interdependence, and not only because its strategic dependence made it impossible for the EC to afford confrontation with those countries.

To claim a distinctive and original character made it not only possible for the EC to rationalize its limited capabilities, but also to try to make up for them: where the EC was not able to go with deeds, it tried to go with words. Thus, it resorted to rhetoric, statements and declarations in order to mark its presence on the international stage. In order to mark a presence, it was clearly useful to adopt innovative, original, imaginative positions. For instance, disagreement between member states and limited financial possibilities made the EC largely incapable of meeting many of the requests advanced by the developing countries for the reform of the international economic order. Both in the UN and in the CIEC, the EC tried to make up for its incapacity to meet developing countries' requests by expressing and stressing progressive visions of the international order and by making rhetorical concessions to the developing countries.

The problem with resorting to rhetoric in order to make up for limited capabilities was that this strategy created and widened the gap
between the EC’s capabilities to act and the expectations held towards it by internal and external observers. Christopher Hill has identified such a capabilities–expectations gap with regard to the EC in the early 1990s:

The Community had been talked up [...] to a point where it is not capable of fulfilling the new expectations already (and often irrationally) held of it. This is true both of the number and the degree of expectations.⁶

This happened «because a coherent system and full actorness are still far from realization,» and because «not just in terms of substantive resources [...] but in terms of the ability to take decisions and hold to them – the EC is still far from being able to fulfil the hopes of those who want to see it in great power terms.»⁷ The existence of a gap between expectations and capabilities clearly created a problem of credibility for the EC’s international activity and it led to disappointment with it. The existence of this problem was already apparent to some EC actors in the 1970s, who complained about the difficulty for the EC as an international actor «not to gain a hearing but rather to meet the expectations placed in us.»⁸

Possibly the most significant instance of this gap between expectations and capabilities in the 1970s concerned the very goal of the establishment of the EC as an international actor. Member states stated their commitment to the goal of asserting the EC as an international actor, of endowing it with a common foreign policy, of enabling it to speak with a single voice. Some went as far as to envisage a common army, a constitution, and so on. However, the EC’s assertion on the international stage fell short of the expectations which were raised towards it – not surprisingly, given their ambitiousness. These expectations were fueled by the member states, but it was the member states themselves which made it impossible for the EC to meet them. Member states’ governments did not really aim to turn the EC as such

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⁷ Ibid., p. 318, italics in original text.
into a full-fledged global power with a single cohesive foreign policy and only one voice on the international stage. They rather aimed at a more modest coordination of foreign policies and cooperation in some fields of international affairs, but they rarely stated it openly. Part of the reason why the EC’s international activity is usually regarded as weak and disappointing is that the EC itself fueled unrealistic expectations about it.

The analysis of the EC’s international activity during the 1970s does not only show the existence of a capabilities–expectations gap, but also the existence of a sort of capabilities–expectations trap. The EC and its member states often resorted to high-profile rhetorical proclamations and ambitious statements on many international issues, and this created expectations among the observers. The EC’s insistence upon the innovative and generous character of its international activity created the expectation that such an activity would be substantially different than traditional foreign policy. The EC found itself trapped in a sort of vicious circle, wherein it had to resort to high-profile rhetoric to make up for its limited capabilities to act, but this rhetoric further raised expectations, setting extremely ambitious standards and goals which could hardly be met. As a result, the limited capability of the EC to act effectively and coherently in international affairs was exposed even more.
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1950s and 1960s

1951
Establishment of the European Coal and Steal Community

1954
The French National Assembly rejects the Treaty establishing a European Defence Community; the Western European Union is established

1958
Establishment of the European Economic Community

1962
Failure of the Fouchet Plans for political integration

1966
France withdraws from the military integrated command of NATO

1967
Merging of the institutions of the European Communities

1968
Establishment of the NATO Eurogroup
Completion of the EC customs union

1969

Establishment of a Community delegation in Santiago del Chile

April 28
Charles De Gaulle resigns from the French Presidency

June 20
Georges Pompidou becomes President of France

September 28
Willy Brandt becomes West German Chancellor

December 1-2
The Hague Summit of the EC

1970

January 1
The common commercial policy enters into force

July 1
The Malfatti EC Commission takes office

October 27
Approval of the first report on the European Political Cooperation and establishment of the EPC

November 19
First EPC ministerial meeting

December
The Commission speaks for the first time on behalf of the EC in a UN body
1971

March 31  Sentence of the Court of Justice on the external competences of the Community (AETR case)
July 1    Entry into force of the EC's system of generalized preferences
August 15 Decoupling of dollar from gold and imposition of a surtax on US imports
October  Establishment of the EC Commission's permanent representation office in Washington

1972

January 22 The British treaty of adhesion to the EC is signed, Britain joins the EPC
March 21   Malfatti resigns from the EC Commission's presidency, he is succeeded by Sicco Mansholt
April 13 – May 21 UNCTAD Conference in Santiago del Chile
April 23   French referendum on the EC's enlargement
May 22    US–USSR SALT I Treaty
October 19–21 Paris Summit of the EC
November 16 The EC member states appear collectively at the NATO Council for the first time
December 7 First intervention on behalf of the Community at the UN General Assembly
December 21 Leonid Brezhnev opens to the establishment of relations between the CMEA and the EC

1973

January 1 Britain, Ireland and Denmark enter the EC
January 6 The Ortoli Commission takes office
April 23  Henry Kissinger's speech on the “Year of Europe”
June 22   US–USSR agreement on the prevention of nuclear war
July 3    Opening of the CSCE
July 23   Approval of the second EPC report
September 5-9 The Non-Aligned Movement decides to use oil prices as a political weapon
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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>September 9</td>
<td>Opening of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (GATT Tokyo Round)</td>
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<td>September 18</td>
<td>The two German states are admitted to the UN as full members</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 25</td>
<td>The President of the EC Council meets with Kissinger: it is the first time that the EC speaks with a single voice in international affairs, CSCE aside</td>
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<td>September 27</td>
<td>Pompidou proposes to convene EC summits on regular basis</td>
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<td>September 28</td>
<td>Jens Otto Krag is appointed head of the Commission's representation office in Washington</td>
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<td>October 13</td>
<td>EPC communiqué on the Arab-Israeli war, it is the first joint declaration by the EC member states on an international issue</td>
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<td>November 6</td>
<td>EPC declaration calling for the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people</td>
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<td>November 14</td>
<td>The drafting of the EC–US declaration of principles is halted</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 21</td>
<td>Michel Jobert proposes to establish a permanent dialogue between the EC and the Arab countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 12</td>
<td>“Pilgrims’ speech” by Kissinger</td>
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<td>December 14-15</td>
<td>Copenhagen Summit of the EC; the EC ministers meet with Arab ministers</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 15</td>
<td>Release of the Declaration on European identity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**1974**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Establishment of the EC Commission’s representation office in Tokyo</td>
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<td>February 11-13</td>
<td>Washington Conference on energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 4</td>
<td>Harold Wilson becomes British Prime Minister Relaunch of the project of Euro-Arab dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 21</td>
<td>“Gymnich compromise” on EC–US consultations</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1</td>
<td>The UN General Assembly approves the program for a new international economic order</td>
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<td>May 16</td>
<td>Helmut Schmidt becomes West German Chancellor</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 19</td>
<td>Valéry Giscard d’Estaing is elected French President</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 26</td>
<td>Ottawa Declaration on the Atlantic relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 9</td>
<td>Richard Nixon resigns from the US Presidency</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 16</td>
<td>The President of the EC Commission is invited to Moscow</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 11</td>
<td>The Community is admitted to the UN General Assembly as an observer on permanent basis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
November 18    Establishment of the International Energy Agency
December 4    Germany proposes to establish common European embassies
December 9-10  Paris Summit of the EC, the establishment of the European Council is approved
December 12    The UN General Assembly approves the Charter of economic rights and duties of the states

1975

May 8    Establishment of EC–China diplomatic relations
June    Approval of the “Dublin formula” on EC member states' consultation on UN Security Council matters
June 5    Referendum on British membership to the EC
August 1    The CSCE Final Act is signed on behalf of the EC as such
September    The EPC President inaugurates the custom of making a common statement at the opening of each session of the UN General Assembly
November 15-17  G5 Summit in Rambouillet
December 16    First ministerial meeting of the CIEC
December 31    Submission of the Tindemans Report on European Union

1976

The EC mission to the UN is given diplomatic status

October 18    Funds for cooperation with non-ACP developing countries are included in the Community budget

1977

January 6    The Jenkins Commission takes office
Jimmy Carter is the first US President to visit the EC institutions
May 7    The EC joins the G7 summits
June 3    Conclusion of the CIEC
June 21    Approval of the “Uganda guidelines” on aid and human rights
September 20    Approval of the EC Code of conduct for European companies in South Africa

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October 11-12 Agreement for the drafting of annual EPC reports on human rights

1978

April 3 EC–China trade agreement
November Establishment of a Commission's standing group to answer appeals and enquires on humanitarian questions
November 20-21 First EC–ASEAN ministerial meeting

1979

March 3 Margaret Thatcher becomes British Prime Minister
June 7-10 First direct election of the European Parliament
November 20 The EC will «consider the necessary action» in case of consistent denial of the dignity of man in aid recipient countries
December 24 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

1980-81

1980 Ronald Reagan is elected US President
1980 Venice Declaration on the Middle East
1981 North-South summit in Cancun
Directory of people

Here are reported the positions and affiliations of all the people who are mentioned in the dissertation, or who authored sources which were quoted in it. Reported positions refer to the period for which the people were mentioned.

Achard, Pierre – SGCI (France)
Adams, W. James – FCO, European integration, 1971-72; British delegation to the EC, 1973-77
Amin Dada, Idi – President of Uganda
Angles – French embassy in the UK
Arnaud, Claude – MAEF, Europe
Baudouin – King of the Belgians
Beaumarchais, Jacques de – French ambassador to the UK
Beinhardt, Gerd – (Germany) EC Commission, DG I
Bernard, Jean-René – Secretary-general of SGCI (France)
Bersani, Giovanni – (Italy) Member of European Parliament
Blumenfeld, Erik B. – (Germany) Member of European Parliament
Bokassa, Jean-Bédel – President of the Central African Republic, 1966-76; Emperor of Central Africa, 1976-79
Boselli, Luigi – (Italy) EC Commission, DG I
Brandt, Willy – West German foreign minister, 1966-69; West German chancellor, 1969-74; President of the Socialist International, 1976-92
Brezhnev, Leonid – General secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR
Budd, Colin R. – FCO, European integration (external)
Buist, J.L.F. (Ian) – FCO, Under-secretary at the ODA
Burin des Roziers, Étienne – French permanent representative to the EC
Butler, Michael D. – FCO, European integration (external), 1972-74; FCO, Assistant under-secretary for European integration, 1974-76
Cable, James E. – FCO, Planning staff
Callaghan, James – British foreign minister
Cambridge, Sydney J. G. – British embassy in Italy
Carter, Jimmy – President of the US
Cheysson, Claude – (France) EC commissioner for development
Christaki de Germain, Carl – (France) EC Commission, DG I
Coles, A. John – British delegation to the EC
Cooper, Robert F. – FCO, European integration (external)
Cromer, Rowley – British ambassador to the US
Cuvillier, Philippe – French embassy in the UK
Da Fonseca-Wollheim, Hermann – (Germany) cabinet of F.-X. Ortoli
Dahrendorf, Ralf – (West Germany) EC commissioner for external relations
Dalton, Richard J. – British delegation to the UN
Davies, Hugh L. – British embassy in West Germany
Davignon, Étienne – Belgian political director
De Courcel, Geoffroy C. – MAEF, Secretary-general
De Gaulle, Charles – President of the French Republic
De Guiringaud, Louis – French foreign minister
De Juniac, Gontran – French ambassador to Belgium
De Laboulaye, François – French ambassador to Japan
De Saint-Legier, René – MAEF, Amérique
Deniau, Jean-François – (France) EC commissioner for development
Duff, A. Antony – FCO, Deputy under-secretary for Middle East and Africa, 1975-77
East, Kenneth A. – British high commission in Nigeria
Eppler, Erhard – West German minister for economic cooperation
Ewart-Biggs, Christopher – British embassy in France
Faber, Richard S. – British embassy in The Netherlands
Fellermaier, Ludwig – (West Germany) Member of European Parliament, head of the socialist group
Ferrandi, Jacques – (France) EC Commission, DG VIII
FitzHerbert, Giles E. – FCO, European integration (external)
Foley, Maurice – (Britain) EC Commission, DG VIII
Fort, Maeva G. – British high commission in Nigeria
Frisch, Dieter – (Germany) EC Commission, DG VIII
Furness, Alan E. – British embassy in Senegal
Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry – French minister of economy and finance, 1969-74; President of the French Republic, 1974-81
Goldsmith, Robert (Bob) – British delegation to the EC
Gorce, Pierre – French ambassador to Indonesia
Haferkamp, Wilhelm – (West Germany) EC commissioner for external relations
Hart, Judith – British minister for cooperation
Heath, Edward – British Prime minister
Henderson, J. Nicholas – British ambassador to West Germany
Hibbert, Reginald A. – British embassy in West Germany, 1972-75; British political director, 1976-79; British embassy in France, 1979-82
Hijzen, Theodorus – (Netherlands) EC Commission, DG I
Hunt, John J. B. – British cabinet, Second permanent secretary
Jean-Baptiste, Henry – Presidency of the French Republic
Jenkins, Michael R.H. – FCO, European integration (external)
Jenkins, Roy – (Britain) President of the EC Commission
Jobert, Michel – French foreign minister
Judd, Frank – Minister for overseas development, 1976-77; FCO,
minister of state, 1977-79

Khrushchev, Nikita – First secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR


Knighton, William M. – British trade department, under-secretary

Krag, Jens Otto – Danish Prime minister, 1971-72; Head of the EC Commission’s representation office in the US, 1974-76

Laidler, M. D. – FCO, European integration

Le Quesne, C. Martin – FCO, Deputy under-secretary for Africa

Ling, Jeffrey – FCO, West Africa

Luard, Evan – FCO, Parliamentary under-secretary

Lucet, Charles – French ambassador to Italy

Maas – EC Commission, DG I

Maitland, Donald J.D. – British permanent representative to the EC

Malfatti, Franco Maria – (Italy) President of the EC Commission

Malvé, Pierre – (France) EC Commission’s delegation to the US

Mansholt, Sicco – (Netherlands) EC commissioner for agriculture, 1958-72; President of the EC Commission, 1972-73; vice-president of the Socialist International

Marshall, Peter H.R. – British delegation to the UN

Martin, Claude – Cabinet of L. De Guiringaud

Masefield, J. Thorold – FCO, Planning staff

Maxey, Peter M. – FCO, United Nations

Merillon, Jean-Marie – French ambassador to Algeria

Meyer, Klaus – (West Germany) EC Commission, General secretariat

Moro, Aldo – Italian foreign minister, 1969-72, 1973-74; Italian head of government, 1974-76

Muller, Jean-Claude – (France) EC Commission, DG VIII

Murray, Donald F. – FCO, Assistant under-secretary for Asia

Nixon, Richard – President of the US

Ortoli, François-Xavier – (France) President of the EC Commission

Overton, Hugh T.A. – FCO, North America

Owen, David – British foreign minister

Palliser, A. Michael – British permanent representative to the EC, 1973-75; FCO, Permanent under-secretary, 1975-82

Peltier, P. – French delegation to the EC

Phan van Phi, Raymond – (France) EC Commission, DG I

Pinochet, Augusto – President of Chile

Pompidou, Georges – President of the French Republic

Puaux, François – French political director

Ramsbotham, Peter – British ambassador to the US

Ratford, David J.E. – FCO, European integration

Renner, Wolfgang – (West Germany) Head of the EC Commission’s representation office in Latin America

Reuter, Étienne – (Luxemburg)
Cabinet of R. Jenkins
Richard, Ivor – British permanent representative to the UN
Robin, Gabriel – Presidency of the French Republic
Robinson, John A. – FCO, Assistant under-secretary for European integration
Samuels, Nathaniel – US deputy under-secretary of State
Sauvagnargues, Jean – French ambassador to West Germany, 1970-74; French foreign minister, 1974-76
Schaetzel, J. Robert – US representative to the EC
Schmidt, Helmut – West German minister of finance, 1972-74; West German chancellor, 1974-82
Sedouy, Jacques A. de – (France) Cabinet of C. Cheysson
Shepherd, John A. – British embassy in the Netherlands
Simpson-Orlebar, Michael K.O. – FCO, United Nations
Sinclair, Carolyn – FCO, European integration (external)
Smith, Arnold – (Canada) Secretary-general of the Commonwealth
Soames, Christopher – British ambassador to France, 1968-72; EC commissioner for external relations, 1973-77

Soutou, Jean-Marie – French ambassador to Algeria
Spencer, Rosemary J. – British delegation to the EC
Stakhovitch, André – (France) EC Commission, DG I
Statham, Norman – British embassy in West Germany
Stefani, Umberto – (Italy) EC Commission, General secretariat
Suharto – President of Indonesia
Thomas, Jeremy C. – British delegation to the UN
Thorpe, Nigel J. – FCO, Central and Southern Africa
Tindemans, Léo – Belgian Prime Minister
Tomkins, Edward E. – British ambassador to France
Wellenstein, Edmund – (Netherlands) EC Commission, DG I, 1967-76; Chairman of the CIEC committee on development, 1975-77
Williams, Douglas – FCO, ODA, 1968-74; Ministry for overseas development, 1974-77
Wilson, Harold – British Prime Minister
Wright, J. Oliver – FCO, deputy under-secretary for economic affairs, 1972-74; British ambassador to West Germany, 1975-81